Sei sulla pagina 1di 26

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S.
GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J .:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent,
Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy."
1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in
the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs
awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.
2
The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot
ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka
kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing
ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka,
kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako
ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to
10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano
ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung
hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on
your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang
nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala
mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung
paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at
tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka
puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa
akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo.
Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.
3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes."
An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated
October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of
Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the
above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S.
Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder
secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing
the contents of the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court
granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the
violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by
a personother than a participant to the communication.
4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed
Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and
holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section
1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that
the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution
6
dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"
7
that the
applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends
that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.
8
In
relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.
9
Finally, petitioner agues that
R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act.
10

We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a
statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is
applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted
to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible
11
or absurb
or would lead to an injustice.
12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator"
13
under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by
third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of
secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the
recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not
criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for
example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the
intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous
even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their
intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor,
that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of
offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record
the observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It
is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the
intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the
observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the
board of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to
this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and
observations are being made should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say:
"Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you."
That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning,
he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot
complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the
observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being
taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be
used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the
bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be
penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is
done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It
is the communication between one person and another person not between
a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with
the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore
plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision
seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the
law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a
third person should be professed."
14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The
word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to
share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the
act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting, as in a conversation,
15
or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)"
16
These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any
doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator
Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual
nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all,
civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose.
Freeconversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity,
agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not
intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication,
among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to
state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature
of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of
the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and
free exchange of communication between individuals free from every
unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.
17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
18
a case which dealt with the
issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension
for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization
did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither
among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein,
19
following
the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused."
20
The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable
facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as
among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 88-403, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 64.
2 Rollo, p. 48.
3 Rollo, pp. 47-48.
4 Rollo, p. 9.
5 Rollo, p. 37.
6 Rollo, p. 99, Annex "H".
7 Rollo, p. 13.
8 Id.
9 Rollo, p. 14.
10 Rollo, p. 14-15.
11 Pacific Oxygen and Acytelene Co. vs. Central Bank 37 SCRA 685 (1971).
12 Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 (1970).
13 Rollo, p. 33.
14 Rollo, p. 67.
15 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 460 (1976).
16 Id.
17 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. III, No. 31, at 573 (March 10, 1964).
18 145 SCRA 112 (1986). See also, Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA 235 SCRA 111 (1994).
19 Id., at 120.
20 Id., at 121.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J .:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision
1
of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on
certiorari
2
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.
3
On
January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City.
4
Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that
his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on
December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8,
2006.
5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the
Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered
the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite
the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn
still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead
a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself
but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,
7
the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
8
in order for him
or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
9
Article 26 of the Family
Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind
the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as
determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;
10
the provision was
enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse."
11

THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,
12
Gerbert filed the present petition.
13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a
determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to
the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched
the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the
Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a
proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there
is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina
fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would
be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General
and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,
14
both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of
this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages
void
15
and voidable
16
marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at
the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.
17
Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.
18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,
19
enacted Executive Order
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording,
as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.
20
and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.
21
In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign
courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus,
recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."
23
The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to
the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.
24
Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding,
would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;
25
Article 17 of the
Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If
the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national
law.
26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in
limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse.
In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition
of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of
right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or
final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action
before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien
abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid
according to his or her national law.
27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
of another country."
28
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself
or herself.
29
The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically
for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as
an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of
the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,
30
but failed
to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.
31
Under this situation, we
can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce
law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns)
obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow
other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our
laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized,
shall have the effect of res judicata
32
between the parties, as provided in
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata
effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.
34
We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to
draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register."
The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce
legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e.,
those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent
in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate
or illegitimate, or his being married or not."
35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a
persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753
or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of
divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil
status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
x x x x
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in
their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and
naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,
the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto
authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be
given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as
yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it
annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of
a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,
36
and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982
37
both of which
required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law,
the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC
may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of
Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed
with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;
38
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings;
39
and that the time and place for
hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
40
As these
basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding
41
by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and
REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag
City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the
REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance
with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil
Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice


Footnotes
* Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17,
2010.
1 Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.
2 Id. at 3-20.
3 Id. at 27.
4 Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.
5 Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.
6 Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:
It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the Register of Annulment of Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order of
execution of such foreign judgment is issued by competent Philippine court.
7 Supra note 1.
8 Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.
9 Rollo, p. 31.
10 G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.
11 Id. at 121.
12 Gerberts motion for reconsideration of the RTCs October 30, 2008 decision was denied in an order dated February 17, 2009; rollo, p. 32.
13 Supra note 2.
14 Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.
15 The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code.
16 The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family Code.
17 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.
18 Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume One, with the Family Code of the Philippines (2004
ed.), p. 262.
19 Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.
20 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
21 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
22 Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.
23 Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.
24 The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so.
25 See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
x x x x
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
26 Parenthetically, we add that an aliens legal capacity to contract is evidenced by a certificate issued by his or her respective diplomatic and consular
officials, which he or she must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family Code). The Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however, must still
resort to a judicial action for a declaration of authority to remarry.
27 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20.
28 Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.
29 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448; see also Bayot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November
7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.
30 Rollo, pp. 38-41.
31 The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn was dissolved by the Canadian court. The full text of the courts
judgment was not included.
32 Literally means "a thing adjudged," Blacks Law Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes a rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits, on points and matters determined in the former. Supra note 28
at 462.
33 See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110, where the Court said:
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for
enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly
determine its efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claimof a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
34 On the face of the marriage certificate, the word "DIVORCED" was written in big, bold letters; rollo, p. 37.
35 Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390, citing Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).
36 Rollo, pp. 47-50.
37 Id. at 51.
38 Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
39 Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
40 Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
41 When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil status of a person), a Rule 108 proceeding is deemed adversarial in nature. See Co v. Civil
Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420, 430.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by
MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all
surnamed ABISTO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J .:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land
registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to
cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the
application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set
aside the Decision
1
promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent
Resolution
2
promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of
Appeals
3
in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged
Decision reads:
4

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal
appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the
registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident
of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now
deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and
Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa
Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D
located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private
oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding
taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for
original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529.
5
The application was docketed as Land Registration Case
(LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
6
However, during the pendency of his petition,
applicant died. Hence, his heirs Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary
Ann, all surnamed Abistado represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who
was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the
petition "for want of jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants through
their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:
7

. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to
publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in
the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is
of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction
over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory
provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation.
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982,
which in its pertinent portion provides:
8

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of
PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the
provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the
Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is
mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to
publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of
general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is
dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is
indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be
powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case.
As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a
newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a
requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the
court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which,
as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA
Resolution dared November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this
recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition
on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he
is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his
petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.
9

The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of
discretion"
10
in holding
. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case
No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and
in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial
hearing shall be "published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of
general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is
"necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper
of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process."
11

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the
requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere
"procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient
to confer jurisdiction.
12

In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:
13

. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is couched in
mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with
equal force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the
opportunity "to explain matters fully and present their side." Thus, it justified its
disposition in this wise:
14

. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required
procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other
requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by
mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were
complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded
to make any objection of the application for registration.
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall,
within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the
date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-
five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for
land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3)
posting.
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing,
the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial
hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however,
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining
owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice
shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain
date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not
be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that
publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land
registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any
publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can
validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of
statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication
requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the
Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order
setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus
indicates the mandatory character of a statute.
15
While concededly such literal
mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately
depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case
the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic
vs. Marasigan,
16
the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that
Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1)
publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If
the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in
detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition
who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and
occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of
reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise
imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.
17
Being in
rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as
against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. Anin rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who
may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred
from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been
ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration
court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership
thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who
institutes an action for recovery of realty.
18
He must prove his title against the
whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved
when all persons concerned nay, "the whole world" who have rights to or
interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to
court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary
norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from
concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be
given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be
deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the
Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been
complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that
the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may
not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may
not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real
estate. In sum, the all-encompassingin rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective
of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement
of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it
would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly,
this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The
law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application.
19
There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration
filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication
in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private
respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 29-36.
2 Ibid., p. 37.
3 Seventh Division composed of Justice Celso L. Magsino, ponente; and
Justices Serafin E. Camilon, Chairman; and Artemon D. Luna, concurring.
4 Ibid., p. 35.
5 Known as the Property Registration Decree.
6 Presided by Judge Niovady M. Martin.
7 Rollo, p. 41.
8 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
9 The Solicitor General asked for and was granted an extension of 30 days
within which to file a "petition for review on certiorari." It is thus strange why
the OSG described its petition as one "forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court." In any event, the Court, in its Resolution dated March 9, 1992
admitted the OSG's "petition for review on certiorari," clearly ruling that the
petition was one for review, and not one for certiorari.
10 Ibid., p. 21. This should really read "reversible error" since as already
explained, the petition should be treated as one for review under Rule 45.
11 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
12 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
13 Ibid., p. 34; Decision, p. 6.
14 Ibid.
15 Bersabal vs. Salvador, 84 SCRA 176, 179-180, July 21, 1978, citing Dizon
vs. Encarnacion, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717, December 24, 1963.
16 198 SCRA 219, 227-228, June 6, 1991.
17 Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, September 16, 1910.
18 Archbishop of Manila vs. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593, March 31, 1915.
19 Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, 24 SCRA
708, 712, August 22, 1968 citing Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil.
504, 1913; People vs. Mapa, L-22301, August 30, 1967; Pacific Oxygen and
Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968; Dequito vs. Lopez,
L-27757, March 28, 1968.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE
C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C.
PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE
OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES
PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-
NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL,
GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING
JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro
Manila, respondents.

PARAS, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside:
(a) the decision of the Court of Appeals
1
dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C.
Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista,
Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the
petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the
resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged
natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother
of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was
survived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the
deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:
Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood
of the deceased, to wit:
Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased
and represented by the following:
Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres
Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal,
Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the
intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental
Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated
that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres
Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit,
to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full
blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement
made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the
deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein
petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of
such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of
the above-entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the
court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia
Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres
Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,
manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres
Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary
Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to
reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge
Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby
resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and
Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo,
pp. 515-526). and such motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No.
14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the
decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July
14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized
natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article
992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645
[1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not
due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under
conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article
992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are
within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid
down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC,
supra, where this Court ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and
the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law
for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers
the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in
holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in
the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres
Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of
Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to
represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further
elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely
answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate
children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death.
The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of
the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are
themselvesillegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this
matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be
argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate
child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which
provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate
succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or
mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992.
Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to
state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants
shall inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of
illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by
Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.
(Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12).
Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more
humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the
words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must
be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]).
The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart
from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear,
it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may
be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v.
FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the
same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend
only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved
in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a
general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor
add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to
whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in
the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED
LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 120721 February 23, 2005
MANUEL G. ABELLO, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, TEODORO D.
REGALA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
27134, entitled "Comissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manuel G. Abello, Jose C.
Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Avelino V. Cruz and Court of Tax Appeals,"
which reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) to withdraw
his letters dated April 21, 1988 and August 4, 1988 assessing donors taxes and
to desist from collecting donors taxes from petitioners.
During the 1987 national elections, petitioners, who are partners in the Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) law firm,
contributed P882,661.31 each to the campaign funds of Senator Edgardo
Angara, then running for the Senate. In letters dated April 21, 1988, the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed each of the petitioners P263,032.66 for
their contributions. On August 2, 1988, petitioners questioned the assessment
through a letter to the BIR. They claimed that political or electoral
contributions are not considered gifts under the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC), and that, therefore, they are not liable for donors tax. The claim
for exemption was denied by the Commissioner.
1
1vvphi1.nt
On September 12, 1988, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CTA,
which was decided on October 7, 1991 in favor of the petitioners. As
aforestated, the CTA ordered the Commissioner to desist from collecting
donors taxes from the petitioners.
2

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the CTA decision on
April 20, 1994.
3
The appellate Court ordered the petitioners to pay donors tax
amounting to P263,032.66 each, reasoning as follows:
The National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:
Sec. 91. Imposition of Tax. (a) There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and
paid upon the transfer by any person, resident, or non-resident, of the property
by gift, a tax, computed as provided in Section 92. (b) The tax shall apply
whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or
indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible.
Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of law, the transfer of property by gift,
whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or
indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible, is
subject to donors or gift tax.
A gift is generally defined as a voluntary transfer of property by one to another
without any consideration or compensation therefor (28 C.J. 620; Santos vs.
Robledo, 28 Phil. 250).
In the instant case, the contributions are voluntary transfers of property in the
form of money from private respondents to Sen. Angara, without
considerations therefor. Hence, they squarely fall under the definition of
donation or gift.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General:
The fact that the contributions were given to be used as campaign funds of Sen.
Angara does not affect the character of the fund transfers as donation or gift.
There was thereby no retention of control over the disposition of the
contributions. There was simply an indication of the purpose for which they
were to be used. For as long as the contributions were used for the purpose for
which they were intended, Sen. Angara had complete and absolute power to
dispose of the contributions. He was fully entitled to the economic benefits of
the contributions.
Section 91 of the Tax Code is very clear. A donors or gift tax is imposed on
the transfer of property by gift.1awphi1.nt
The Bureau of Internal Revenue issued Ruling No. 344 on July 20, 1988, which
reads:
Political Contributions. For internal revenue purposes, political contributions
in the Philippines are considered taxable gift rather than taxable income. This is
so, because a political contribution is indubitably not intended by the giver or
contributor as a return of value or made because of any intent to repay another
what is his due, but bestowed only because of motives of philanthropy or
charity. His purpose is to give and to bolster the morals, the winning chance of
the candidate and/or his party, and not to employ or buy. On the other hand, the
recipient-donee does not regard himself as exchanging his services or his
product for the money contributed. But more importantly he receives financial
advantages gratuitously.
When the U.S. gift tax law was adopted in the Philippines (before May 7,
1974), the taxability of political contributions was, admittedly, an unsettled
issue; hence, it cannot be presumed that the Philippine Congress then had
intended to consider or treat political contributions as non-taxable gifts when it
adopted the said gift tax law. Moreover, well-settled is the rule that the
Philippines need not necessarily adopt the present rule or construction in the
United States on the matter. Generally, statutes of different states relating to the
same class of persons or things or having the same purposes are not considered
to be in pari materia because it cannot be justifiably presumed that the
legislature had them in mind when enacting the provision being construed.
(5206, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 546.) Accordingly, in the absence
of an express exempting provision of law, political contributions in the
Philippines are subject to the donors gift tax. (cited in National Internal
Revenue Code Annotated by Hector S. de Leon, 1991 ed., p. 290).
In the light of the above BIR Ruling, it is clear that the political contributions
of the private respondents to Sen. Edgardo Angara are taxable gifts. The
vagueness of the law as to what comprise the gift subject to tax was made
concrete by the above-quoted BIR ruling. Hence, there is no doubt that political
contributions are taxable gifts.
4

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals
denied in its resolution of June 16, 1995.
5

Petitioners thereupon filed the instant petition on July 26, 1995. Raised are the
following issues:
1. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR WHEN IT FAILED
TO CONSIDER IN ITS DECISION THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE
ENACTMENT OF OUR GIFT TAX LAW?
2. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE INTENTION OF THE GIVERS IN DETERMINING
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
WERE GIFTS SUBJECT TO DONORS TAX?
3. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR WHEN IT FAILED
TO CONSIDER THE DEFINITION OF AN "ELECTORAL
CONTRIBUTION" UNDER THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE IN
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
ARE TAXABLE?
4. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE OF CLOSE TO
HALF A CENTURY OF NOT SUBJECTING POLITICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS TO DONORS TAX?
5. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE RELIED UPON BY
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND BY THE PETITIONERS TO THE
EFFECT THAT POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS ARE NOT TAXABLE
GIFTS?
6. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT
APPLYING AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE ON THE GROUND THAT
THIS WAS NOT KNOWN AT THE TIME THE PHILIPPINES GIFT TAX
LAW WAS ADOPTED IN 1939?
7. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN RESOLVING
THE CASE MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF A RULING ISSUED BY THE
RESPONDENT ONLY AFTER THE ASSESSMENTS HAD ALREADY
BEEN MADE?
8. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR WHEN IT DID
NOT CONSTRUE THE GIFT TAX LAW LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE
TAXPAYER AND STRICLTY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION?
6

First, Fifth and Sixth Issues
Section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) reads:
(A) There shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid upon the transfer by any
person, resident or nonresident, of the property by gift, a tax, computed as
provided in Section 92
(B) The tax shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the
gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or
intangible.
The NIRC does not define transfer of property by gift. However, Article 18 of
the Civil Code, states:
In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws,
their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code.
Thus, reference may be made to the definition of a donation in the Civil Code.
Article 725 of said Code defines donation as:
. . . an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or
right in favor of another, who accepts it.
Donation has the following elements: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the
donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do
an act of liberality or animus donandi.
7

The present case falls squarely within the definition of a donation. Petitioners,
the late Manuel G. Abello
8
, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala and
Avelino V. Cruz, each gave P882,661.31 to the campaign funds of Senator
Edgardo Angara, without any material consideration. All three elements of a
donation are present. The patrimony of the four petitioners were reduced
by P882,661.31 each. Senator Edgardo Angaras patrimony correspondingly
increased by P3,530,645.24
9
. There was intent to do an act of liberality
or animus donandi was present since each of the petitioners gave their
contributions without any consideration.
Taken together with the Civil Code definition of donation, Section 91 of the
NIRC is clear and unambiguous, thereby leaving no room for construction.
In Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate
Court
10
the Court enunciated:
It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the
law. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no
room for construction or interpretation. As has been our consistent ruling,
where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no occasion for
interpretation; there is only room for application (Cebu Portland Cement Co. v.
Municipality of Naga, 24 SCRA 708 [1968])
Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what
it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed
(Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 [1985]; Luzon
Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 [1969]; Quijano v. Development
Bank of the Philippines,35 SCRA 270 [1970]).
Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court
interpret or construe its true intent.l^vvphi1.netAmbiguity is a condition of
admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or
of referring to two or more things at the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it
is admissible of two or more possible meanings, in which case, the Court is
called upon to exercise one of its judicial functions, which is to interpret the
law according to its true intent.
Second Issue
Since animus donandi or the intention to do an act of liberality is an essential
element of a donation, petitioners argue that it is important to look into the
intention of the giver to determine if a political contribution is a gift.
Petitioners argument is not tenable. First of all, donative intent is a creature of
the mind. It cannot be perceived except by the material and tangible acts which
manifest its presence. This being the case, donative intent is presumed present
when one gives a part of ones patrimony to another without consideration.
Second, donative intent is not negated when the person donating has other
intentions, motives or purposes which do not contradict donative intent. This
Court is not convinced that since the purpose of the contribution was to help
elect a candidate, there was no donative intent. Petitioners contribution of
money without any material consideration evinces animus donandi. The fact
that their purpose for donating was to aid in the election of the donee does not
negate the presence of donative intent.
Third Issue
Petitioners maintain that the definition of an "electoral contribution" under the
Omnibus Election Code is essential to appreciate how a political contribution
differs from a taxable gift.
11
Section 94(a) of the said Code defines electoral
contribution as follows:
The term "contribution" includes a gift, donation, subscription, loan, advance
or deposit of money or anything of value, or a contract, promise or agreement
to contribute, whether or not legally enforceable, made for the purpose of
influencing the results of the elections but shall not include services rendered
without compensation by individuals volunteering a portion or all of their time
in behalf of a candidate or political party. It shall also include the use of
facilities voluntarily donated by other persons, the money value of which can
be assessed based on the rates prevailing in the area.
Since the purpose of an electoral contribution is to influence the results of the
election, petitioners again claim that donative intent is not present. Petitioners
attempt to place the barrier of mutual exclusivity between donative intent and
the purpose of political contributions. This Court reiterates that donative intent
is not negated by the presence of other intentions, motives or purposes which
do not contradict donative intent.
Petitioners would distinguish a gift from a political donation by saying that the
consideration for a gift is the liberality of the donor, while the consideration for
a political contribution is the desire of the giver to influence the result of an
election by supporting candidates who, in the perception of the giver, would
influence the shaping of government policies that would promote the general
welfare and economic well-being of the electorate, including the giver himself.
Petitioners attempt is strained. The fact that petitioners will somehow in the
future benefit from the election of the candidate to whom they contribute, in no
way amounts to a valuable material consideration so as to remove political
contributions from the purview of a donation. Senator Angara was under no
obligation to benefit the petitioners. The proper performance of his duties as a
legislator is his obligation as an elected public servant of the Filipino people
and not a consideration for the political contributions he received. In fact, as a
public servant, he may even be called to enact laws that are contrary to the
interests of his benefactors, for the benefit of the greater good.
In fine, the purpose for which the sums of money were given, which was to
fund the campaign of Senator Angara in his bid for a senatorial seat, cannot be
considered as a material consideration so as to negate a donation.
Fourth Issue
Petitioners raise the fact that since 1939 when the first Tax Code was enacted,
up to 1988 the BIR never attempted to subject political contributions to donors
tax. They argue that:
. . . It is a familiar principle of law that prolonged practice by the government
agency charged with the execution of a statute, acquiesced in and relied upon
by all concerned over an appreciable period of time, is an authoritative
interpretation thereof, entitled to great weight and the highest respect. . . .
12

This Court holds that the BIR is not precluded from making a new
interpretation of the law, especially when the old interpretation was flawed. It
is a well-entrenched rule that
. . . erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not
block subsequent correct application of the statute (PLDT v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 676), and that the Government is never estopped by
mistake or error on the part of its agents (Pineda v. Court of First Instance of
Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. v. Pineda, 98
Phil. 711, 724).
13

Seventh Issue
Petitioners question the fact that the Court of Appeals decision is based on a
BIR ruling, namely BIR Ruling No. 88-344, which was issued after the
petitioners were assessed for donors tax. This Court does not need to delve
into this issue. It is immaterial whether or not the Court of Appeals based its
decision on the BIR ruling because it is not pivotal in deciding this case. As
discussed above, Section 91 (now Section 98) of the NIRC as supplemented by
the definition of a donation found in Article 725 of the Civil Code, is clear and
unambiguous, and needs no further elucidation.
Eighth Issue
Petitioners next contend that tax laws are construed liberally in favor of the
taxpayer and strictly against the government. This rule of construction,
however, does not benefit petitioners because, as stated, there is here no room
for construction since the law is clear and unambiguous.
Finally, this Court takes note of the fact that subsequent to the donations
involved in this case, Congress approved Republic Act No. 7166 on November
25, 1991, providing in Section 13 thereof that political/electoral contributions,
duly reported to the Commission on Elections, are not subject to the payment
of any gift tax. This all the more shows that the political contributions herein
made are subject to the payment of gift taxes, since the same were made prior
to the exempting legislation, and Republic Act No. 7166 provides no
retroactive effect on this point.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.


Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 38.
2
Ibid.
3
Penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, now Associate Justice of this Court, and concurred
in by Associate Justices Oscar M. Herrera and Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, of the Eleventh Division
of the Court of Appeals.
4
Rollo, pp. 39-41 (Emphasis in the original).
5
Rollo, p. 44.
6
Rollo, pp. 167-168.
7
Republic of the Philippines v. Guzman, 326 SCRA 90 (2000); Tayoto v. Heirs of Cabalo Kusop,
184 SCRA 355 (1990).
8
See Manifestation, dated 25 November 2003, by counsel for petitioners informing the Court of the
death of petitioner Abello; Rollo, p. 192-A.
9
P882,661.31 x 4 = P3,530,645.24.
10
320 SCRA 279, 289 (1999).
11
Rollo, p. 174.
12
Rollo, p. 178.
13
Republic v. Phil. Long Distance Co., 26 SCRA 620, 631 (1969).

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHLPPNES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARO MAPA ! MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R.
Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNAN"O, J.:
The sole question in this appeal fro a !ud"ent of conviction b# the lo$er court is
$hether or not the appointent to and holdin" of the position of a secret a"ent to the
provincial "overnor $ould constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the
crie of ille"al possession of firear and aunition. %e hold that it does not.
The accused in this case $as indicted for the above offense in an inforation dated
Au"ust &', &()* readin" as follo$s+ ,The undersi-ed accuses MAR./ MAPA 0
MAP12/N3 of a violation of 4ection 565 in connection $ith 4ection *)(* of the
Revised Adinistrative Code, as aended b# Coon$ealth Act No. 7) and as
further aended b# Republic Act No. ', coitted as follo$s+ That on or about the
&8th da# of Au"ust, &()*, in the Cit# of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there $ilfull# and unla$full# have in his possession and under his custod#
and control one hoe-ade revolver 9Palti:;, Cal. **, $ithout serial nuber, $ith
si< 9); rounds of aunition, $ithout first havin" secured the necessar# license or
perit therefor fro the correspondin" authorities. Contrar# to la$.,
%hen the case $as called for hearin" on 4epteber 8, &()8, the lo$er court at the
outset as:ed the counsel for the accused+ ,Ma# counsel stipulate that the accused
$as found in possession of the "un involved in this case, that he has neither a perit
or license to possess the sae and that $e can subit the sae on a question of la$
$hether or not an a"ent of the "overnor can hold a firear $ithout a perit issued
b# the Philippine Constabular#., After counsel sou"ht fro the fiscal an assurance
that he $ould not question the authenticit# of his e<hibits, the understandin" bein"
that onl# a question of la$ $ould be subitted for decision, he e<plicitl# specified
such question to be ,$hether or not a secret a"ent is not required to "et a license for
his firear.,
1pon the lo$er court statin" that the fiscal should e<aine the docuent so that he
could pass on their authenticit#, the fiscal as:ed the follo$in" question+ ,=oes the
accused adit that this pistol cal. ** revolver $ith si< rounds of aunition
entioned in the inforation $as found in his possession on Au"ust &8, &()*, in the
Cit# of Manila $ithout first havin" secured the necessar# license or perit thereof
fro the correspondin" authorit#>, The accused, no$ the appellant, ans$ered
cate"oricall#+ ,0es, 0our ?onor., 1pon $hich, the lo$er court ade a stateent+
,The accused adits, 0es, and his counsel Att#. Cabi"ao also affirs that the
accused adits.,
@orth$ith, the fiscal announced that he $as ,$illin" to subit the sae for
decision., Counsel for the accused on his part presented four 9'; e<hibits
consistin" of his appointent ,as secret a"ent of the ?on. @eliciano 2eviste,,
then 3overnor of Batan"as, dated Aune *, &()*B& another docuent li:e$ise
issued b# 3ov. 2eviste also addressed to the accused directin" hi to proceed to
Manila, Pasa# and Cue-on Cit# on a confidential issionB*the oath of office of
the accused as such secret a"ent,8 a certificate dated March &&, &()8, to the
effect that the accused ,is a secret a"ent, of 3ov. 2eviste.' Counsel for the
accused then stated that $ith the presentation of the above e<hibits he $as
,$illin" to subit the case on the question of $hether or not a secret a"ent dul#
appointed and qualified as such of the provincial "overnor is e<ept fro the
requireent of havin" a license of firear., The e<hibits $ere aditted and the
parties $ere "iven tie to file their respective eoranda.&D$phE&.FGt
Thereafter on Noveber *6, &()8, the lo$er court rendered a decision
convictin" the accused ,of the crie of ille"al possession of firears and
sentenced to an indeterinate penalt# of fro one #ear and one da# to t$o #ears
and to pa# the costs. The firear and aunition confiscated fro hi are
forfeited in favor of the 3overnent.,
The onl# question bein" one of la$, the appeal $as ta:en to this Court. The
decision ust be affired.
The la$ is e<plicit that e<cept as thereafter specificall# allo$ed, ,it shall be
unla$ful for an# person to . . . possess an# firear, detached parts of firears or
aunition therefor, or an# instruent or ipleent used or intended to be
used in the anufacture of firears, parts of firears, or aunition.,7 The
ne<t section provides that ,firears and aunition re"ularl# and la$full#
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or arines Hof the Ared @orces of the
PhilippinesI, the Philippine Constabular#, "uards in the eplo#ent of the
Bureau of Prisons, unicipal police, provincial "overnors, lieutenant "overnors,
provincial treasurers, unicipal treasurers, unicipal a#ors, and "uards of
provincial prisoners and !ails,, are not covered ,$hen such firears are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the perforance of
their official duties.,)
The la$ cannot be an# clearer. No provision is ade for a secret a"ent. As such
he is not e<ept. /ur tas: is equall# clear. The first and fundaental dut# of
courts is to appl# the la$. ,Construction and interpretation coe onl# after it has
been deonstrated that application is ipossible or inadequate $ithout
the.,6 The conviction of the accused ust stand. .t cannot be set aside.
Accused ho$ever $ould rel# on People . !acarandang,5 $here a secret a"ent
$as acquitted on appeal on the assuption that the appointent ,of the accused
as a secret a"ent to assist in the aintenance of peace and order capai"ns and
detection of cries, sufficientl# put hi $ithin the cate"or# of a ,peace officer,
equivalent even to a eber of the unicipal police e<pressl# covered b# section
56(., 4uch reliance is isplaced. .t is not $ithin the po$er of this Court to set aside
the clear and e<plicit andate of a statutor# provision. To the e<tent therefore that
this decision conflicts $ith $hat $as held in People . !acarandang, it no lon"er
spea:s $ith authorit#.
%herefore, the !ud"ent appealed fro is affired.
Concepcion, C."., Re#es, ".$.%., &izon, !a'alintal, $engzon, ".P., (aldiar,
Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, ""., concur.
Foot#ot$s
&E<hibit &.
*E<hibit *.
8E<hibit 8.
'E<hibit '.
74ec. 565 as aended b# Republic Act No. ', Revised Adinistrative Code.
)4ec. 56(, Revised Adinistrative Code.
62i-arra"a ?eranos v. 0ap Tico, 9&(&8; *' Phil. 7J', 7&8.
52-&*J55, =eceber *8, &(7(.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 116719 January 18, 1996
PEOPLE O THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
P!TRICIO !MIGO alias "#E#OT", accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
MELO, J.$
Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an Information
reading as follows:
he undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of
!R"#RA$% M"R%$R, under Art. &'(, in relation to Art. ) of the
Revised Penal *ode, committed as follows:
hat on or about %ecember &+, ,+(+, in the *ity of %avao, Philippines, and
within the -urisdiction of this .onorable *ourt, the above-mentioned
accused, armed with a /nife, with treachery and evident premeditation and
with intent to /ill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attac/ed, assaulted
and stab with said weapon one 0enito 1g #uy, thereby inflicting in-uries
upon the latter, the following in-uries, to wit:
M"2IP2$ #A0 34"1%#-2$! ARM, 2$! *.$#,
A0%4M$1 A1% 2$! .I5. 3I. P$1$RAI41 4
2$! P2$"RA2 *A6I7, %IAP.RA5M #4MA*.,
%"4%$1"M, PA1*R$A# A1% MI%RA16$R#$ *4241.
thus performing all the acts of e8ecution which should have produced the
crime of murder as a conse9uence but nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will, that is, because of the timely and
able medical assistance immediately rendered to the said 0enito 1g #uy.
:p. ,, Rollo.;
to which he pleaded not guilty.
#ubse9uently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information was filed
charging now the crime of murder, to wit:
hat on or about %ecember &+, ,+(+, in the *ity of %avao, Philippines, and
within the -urisdiction of this .onorable *ourt, the above-mentioned
accused, armed with a /nife, with treachery and evident premeditation and
with intent to /ill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attac/ed, assaulted
and stabbed with said weapon one 0enito 1g #uy, thereby inflicting upon
the latter multiple wounds which caused his death and the conse9uent loss
and damage to the heirs of the victim.
:p. <, Rollo.;
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:
3.$R$!4R$, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of M"R%$R punishable under Art. &'(
of the Revised Penal *ode, with no modifying circumstance present, the
accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which
is the medium period of the penalty ofreclusion temporal in its
ma8imum to death and to pay the cost= to indemnify the offended party
the amount of P+<,&,'.>? as actual damages and P)?,???.?? as
compensatory damages and P)?,???.?? as moral damages.
:p. <&, Rollo.;
Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error was
committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion
perpetua against him despite the fact that #ec. ,+ :,;, Article III of the ,+(>
*onstitution was already in effect when the offense was committed.
he facts of the case, as briefly summari@ed in the brief submitted by the 4ffice
of the #olicitor 5eneral and as borne out by the evidence, are as follows:
4n %ecember &+, ,+(+, at around ,:?? P.M., after having spent half-day
at their store, located at 1o. ,AA-A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, %avao
*ity, 0enito 1g #uy was driving their gray !ord !iera bac/ home,
situated at the bac/ of *ar Asia, 0a-ada, %avao *ity. 3ith him during
that time were his daughters, Bocelyn 1g #uy and a younger one
together with his two year old son, who were all seated at the front seat
beside him while a five year old boy was also seated at the bac/ of the
said vehicle. :#1, April &+, ,++,, pp. <-)= #1, March <,, ,++&;
4n their way home and while traversing the 1ational .ighway of
0a-ada, %avao *ity, an orange oyota amaraw driven by one 6irgilio
Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional .ospital,
0a-ada, %avao *ity, without noticing the !ord !iera coming from the
opposite direction. his amaraw was heading for #terlyn Citchenette,
which was situated at the comer of the said hospital. :#1, April &+,
,++,, p. '= #1, March <,, ,++&, pp. < and ,<;
3ith 6irgilio was Patricio Amigo alias 0ebot, a vulcani@er at 2inglingDs
vulcani@ing shop owned and operated by a certain 5aladua. .e was also
seated at the right front seat beside 6irgilio.
%ue to the une8pected veer made by 6irgilio, an accidental head on
collision occurred between the !iera and the amaraw, causing a slight
damaged to the right bumper of the latter. :#1, March <,, ,++&, p. ';
Right after the collision, 0enito immediately alighted from the driverDs
seat and confronted 6irgilio Abogada who also went down from his
vehicle. :#1, April &+, ,++,, p. );
0enito, who was a big man with a loud voice told 6irgilio, E7ou were
not loo/ing,E to which 6irgilio retorted, I did not see youE. :#1, April
&+, ,++,, p. ,A;
3hile the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio
who was merely a passenger of 6irgilio also alighted from the front seat
of the amaraw and instantaneously approached 0enito and advised the
latter to leave since it was merely a small and minor accident. :#1, April
&+, ,++,, pp. ,A-,(;
A bit irritated with the actuation e8hibit by Patricio, 0enito rebu/ed the
former and told him not to interfere, since he had nothing to do with the
accident. :ibid. p. >;
Ir/ed by the comment made by 0enito, Patricio sarcastically as/ed= E7ou
are *hinese, is it youFE 3ith a ready answer 0enito said= E7es, I am a
*hinese and whyFE Patricio in turn replied= #o, you are a *hinese, wait for
a while,E then left. :ibid. pp. > and ,+;
Immediately thereafter, 0enito ordered Bocelyn to call a policeman, but
after a lapsed of about one minute, Patricio returned and arrogantly
approached 0enito, as/ing the latter once again, E7ou are a *hinese, is it
notFE o this 0enito calmly responded in the affirmative. :ibid. pp. >, ,+-
&?;
"pon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled EAh, so you are a *hinese,E
and suddenly too/ a five inch /nife from his waist and simultaneously
stabbed 0enito hitting him twice on the chest. :Ibid. p. &?;
After being hit, 0enito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril, tried
to evade his assailant by pushing Patricio away and run around the
amaraw but Patricio wielding the same /nife and not content with the
in-uries he had already inflicted, still chased 0enito and upon overta/ing
the latter embraced him and thrusted his /nife on the victim several times,
the last of which hit 0enito on the left side of his body. :ibid. pp. (, ,?, &&;
It was at this -uncture that Bocelyn who was still inside the !ord !iera,
pleading for mercy to spare her father tried to get out of the vehicle but it
was very unfortunate that she could not open its door. :Ibid. p. ,?;
Cnowing that Patricio was really determined to /ill her father by refusing
to heed her pleas, Boselyn shouted for help, since there were already several
people around witnessing that fatal incident, but to her consternation
nobody lifted a single finger to help them. :ibid. pp. A, ,?, ,(, &,-&&; 4nly
after her father lay seated on the floor of their !ord !iera after being hit on
the left side of his body that she was able to open the door of the said
vehicle. :Ibid. p ,&;
After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father
bathing with his own blood, embraced him, causing Patricio to cease from
his ferocious assault and noticing the presence of several people, he fled.
:Ibid. p. &&;
hereafter, an enraged Bocelyn chased him, but since the assailant ran faster
than her, she was not able to overta/e him, thus, she instead decided to go
bac/ to where her father was and carried him inside the amaraw who
bumped them and conse9uently brought him to #an Pedro .ospital where
he was attended to at the $mergency Room. :ibid. p ,<;
3hile at the $mergency Room, 0enito who was on a very critical
condition, due to multiple :,<; stabbed wounds, was operated by %r.
Rolando *hiu. After the operation, he was subse9uently brought to the
I*" and stayed there for three :<; wee/s. :Buly ,&, ,++,, pp. < and ';
In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only ,? to &? percent
survival, 0enito was airlifted to Manila and was directly confined at the
*hinese 5eneral .ospital. After three :<; wee/s of confinement, 0enito
e8pired. *A"#$ 4! %$A. G #$P#I# :an overwhelming infection;.
his means that the infection has already circulated in the blood all over
the body. :ibid. pp. A->;
:pp. )+-A), Rollo.;
Accused-appellant contends that under the ,+(> *onstitution and prior to the
promulgation of Republic Act 1o. >A)+, the death penalty had been abolished
and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder
committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of any modifying
circumstances, should bereclusion temporal in its medium period or ,> years, '
months and , day, to &? years of reclusion temporal.
Reasons out accused-appellant:
. . . #ince the death penalty :or capital punishment; is not imposable
when the stabbing and /illing happened, the computation of the penalty
should be regarded from reclusion perpetua down and not from death
penalty. Indeed, the appropriate penalty is deducible from reclusion
perpetua down to reclusion temporal in its medium period. .ence,
there being no modifying circumstances present :p. ) %ecision, ibid.;,
the correct penalty should be in the medium period :Art. A', par. ,,
Revised Penal *ode; which is ,> years, ' months and , day to &? years
of reclusion temporal.
:p. ,?, AppellantDs 0rief, ff. p. )?, Rollo.;
he 9uestion raised by accused-appellant was settled by this *ourt in People
vs. Muoz :,>? #*RA ,?> H,+(+I; thusly:
In People vs. Gavarra, Bustice Pedro 2. 7ap declared for the *ourt that
Ein view of the abolition of the death penalty under #ection ,+, Article
III of the ,+(> *onstitution, the penalty that may be imposed for
murder isreclusion temporal in its ma8imum period to reclusion
perpetua,E thereby eliminating death as the original ma8imum period.
2ater, without categorically saying so, the *ourt, through Bustice
Ameurfina A. Melencio-.errera in People vs. Masangkay and through
Bustice Andres R. 1arvasa in People vs. Atencio, divided the modified
penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were specified by
Bustice $dgardo 2. Paras inPeople vs. Intino, as follows: the lower half
of reclusion temporal ma8imum as the minimum= the upper half
ofreclusion temporal ma8imum as the medium= and reclusion
perpetua as the ma8imum.
he *ourt has reconsidered the above cases and, after e8tended discussion,
come to the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect
the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III, #ection ,+:,; of the
*onstitution. his conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is
much to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by many of
those now voting for its reversal. he ma-ority of the *ourt, however, is of
the belief that the original interpretation should be restored as the more
acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in 9uestion.
he advocates of the Masang/ay ruling argue that the *onstitution
abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to
the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. hese should
now be divided into three new periods in /eeping with the three-grade
scheme intended by the legislature. hose who disagree feel that Article III,
#ection ,+:,; merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has
not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the
remaining penalties. hese should be maintained intact.
A reading of #ection ,+:,; of Article III will readily show that here is really
nothing therein which e8pressly declares the abolition of the death penalty.
he provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed
unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the *ongress
hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua. he language, while rather aw/ward, is still plain
enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language
under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort
to e8trinsic aids, li/e the records of the constitutional convention, for its
interpretation.
888 888 888
he 9uestion as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the
death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition. 3hatever the intention
was, what we should determine is whether or not they also meant to re9uire
a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the
prohibition against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a re9uirement, if there really was one, is not at all
e8pressed in Article III, #ection ,+:,; of the *onstitution or indicated
therein by at least clear and unmista/able implication. It would have been
so easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly,
leaving no doubts as to its meaning.
4ne searches in vain for such a statement, e8press or even implied. he
writer of this opinion ma/es the personal observation that this might be still
another instance where the framers meant one thing and said another or G
strangely, considering their lo9uacity elsewhere G did not say enough.
he original ruling as applied in the 5avarra, Masang/ay, Atencio and
Intino cases represented the unanimous thin/ing of the *ourt as it was then
constituted. All but two members at that time still sit on the *ourt today.
If we have seen fit to ta/e a second loo/ at the doctrine on which we
were all agreed before, it is not because of a change in the composition
of this body. It is virtually the same *ourt that is changing its mind after
reflecting on the 9uestion again in the light of new perspectives. And
well it might, and can, for the tenets it lays down are not immutable.
he decisions of this *ourt are not petrified rules grown rigid once
pronounced but vital, growing things sub-ect to change as all life is.
3hile we are told that the trodden path is best, this should not prevent
us from opening a fresh trial or e8ploring the other side or testing a new
idea in a spirit of continuing in9uiry.
Accordingly, with the hope that Eas -udges, :we; will be e9ual to :our;
tas/s,E whatever that means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine
providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced
by the *onstitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and
hold that Article III, #ection ,+:,; does not change the periods of the
penalty prescribed by Article &'( of the Revised Penal *ode e8cept
only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and
reduces it to reclusion perpetua. he range of the medium and
minimum penalties remains unchanged.
he *ourt reali@es that this interpretation may lead to certain ine9uities
that would not have arisen under Article &'( of the Revised Penal *ode
before its modification. hus, a person originally sub-ect to the death
penalty and another who committed the murder without the attendance
of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the
same medium period although the former is concededly more guilty
than the latter. rue enough. 0ut that is the will not of this *ourt but of
the *onstitution. hat is a 9uestion of wisdom, not construction. 4f
some relevance perhaps is the parable in the 0ible of the wor/man who
was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had
wor/ed longer than others hired later in the day also paid the same
amount. 3hen he complained because he felt un-ustly treated by the
hoe -urisdiction of the court over the person. An appearance may be
madt agree with me for a pennyF
he problem in any event is addressed not to this *ourt but to the
*ongress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and
e8clusively legislative. As -udges, we can only interpret and apply them
and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as
determined e8clusively by the legislature. 3e should not encroach on
this prerogative of the lawma/ing body.
*oming bac/ to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic
aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the
offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty
prescribed by Article &'( of the Revised Penal *ode which, conformably to
the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua.
his is the penalty we imposed on all the accused-appellants for each of the
three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. he
award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but
the amount thereof is hereby increased to P<?,???.?? in line with the
present policy.
:at pp. ,&?-,&).;
he above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parominog :&?< #*RA A>< H,++,I;
and in People vs. De la ruz:&,A #*RA '>A H,++&I;.
!inally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel
and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy. *ourts are not the forum to plead for
sympathy. he duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of
sympathy or pity for an accused. D!RA "#$ %#D "#$. he remedy is elsewhere G
clemency from the e8ecutive or an amendment of the law by the legislative, but
surely, at this point, this *ourt can but apply the law.
3.$R$!4R$, the appealed decision is hereby A!!IRM$%.
#4 4R%$R$%.
&arvasa, '(', Davide, (r', )rancisco and Panganiban, ((', concur.

Potrebbero piacerti anche