IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

URBANA DIVISION
NAYA GRACE TAYLOR,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-2072
v.
AJA LYSTILA, M.D., CARLE HEALTH
CARE INCORPORATED, an Illinois
corporation, d/b/a CARLE PHYSICIAN
GROUP, CARLE FOUNDATION
PHYSICIAN SERVICES, LLC, and THE
CARLE FOUNDATION, an Illinois
corporation,
Defendants.
DEFENDANT DR. AJA LYSTILAS MEMORANDUMIN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT
Dr. Aja Lystila, by and through her attorneys, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, respectfully submits
the following Memorandum Of Law in support of her Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against in violation of section 1557(a) of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. 18116(a)) (Affordable Care
Act). Plaintiffs inclusion of Dr. Aja Lystila in this lawsuit is improper. Although the
Affordable Care Act is relatively new, and likely presents an issue of first impression for this
Court, the framework and mechanisms of this type of discrimination lawsuit are well-settled.
Plaintiffs claim is based on the Affordable Care Acts incorporation of protections provided by
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.). Under Title
IX, a private cause of action cannot stand against an individual. Plaintiff , therefore, cannot state
E-FILED
Monday, 16 June, 2014 01:38:18 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
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an individual claim against Dr. Lystila under Section 1557(7) and her complaint should be
dismissed.
PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, Naya Taylor, received health care services from a Carle Foundation clinic
located in Mattoon, Illinois. (Compl. 20). Plaintiff was seeing Dr. Lystila as her primary care
provider. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her sex,
in violation of Section 1557(a) of the Affordable Care Act when Defendants allegedly refused to
provide her with service because she is a transgender woman. (Compl. 1). Defendants deny
that they in any way discriminated against Plaintiff.
Defendant Dr. Lystila brings this Rule 12(b)(6) motion because even if one accepts the
truth of Plaintiffs allegations, Plaintiff cannot state a claim against Dr. Lystila because there is
no individual liability under Section 1557(a) of the Affordable Care Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court may dismiss claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure if the Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court
must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiffs favor. See McCullah v. Gadert, 344 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003). When, as here, the
facts alleged by Plaintiff show that Plaintiff has no cause of action, Plaintiff's complaint is
subject to dismissal. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 473 F. Supp. 2d 858, 867-68 (N.D.
Ill. 2007).
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ARGUMENT
I. SECTION 1557(A) OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT EXPRESSLY
INCORPORATES TITLE IX AND IS THEREFORE GOVERNED BY THE
SAME RESTRICTIONS
Section 1557(a) of the Affordable Care Act prohibits discrimination in health care
programs on the basis of race, color, national original, sex, sex stereotypes, gender identity, age
or disability. Section 1557 states, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided for in this title (or an amendment made by this
title), an individual shall not, on the grounds prohibited under title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of
1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(29 U.S.C. 794), be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of
which is receiving Federal financial assistance, including credits, subsidies, or
contracts of insurance, or under any program or activity that is administered by an
Executive Agency or any entity established under this title (or amendments). The
enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under such title VI, title IX,
section 504, or such Age Discrimination Act shall apply for purposes of violations
of this subsection.
42 U.S.C. 18116(a). According to this section, the prohibited bases for discrimination and
enforcement mechanisms are those provide under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; the Age Discrimination Act of 1975; and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Plaintiff bases her Affordable Care Act claim on grounds that are prohibited by Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972, which, inter alia, prohibits discrimination on the basis of
gender identity. Therefore, Title IX case law controls the analysis of Plaintiffs claim.
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II. BECAUSE THERE IS NO INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY UNDER TITLE IX, THERE
CAN BE NO INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY AGAINST DEFENDANT DR. LYSTILA
There is no private cause of action against individual employees under Title IX. See
Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F. 3d 1014, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a
Title IX claim can only be brought against a grant recipient and not an individual because Title
IX protects against discrimination only from an education program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance). As the Seventh Circuit explained in Smith, there is no individual liability
under Title IX because the language of Title IX applies only to grant recipients who receive
federal financial assistance. See id. at 1018-1019 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Hendrichsen v. Ball
State Univ., 107 F. Appx 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that only a grant recipient, not an
individual, may be sued under Title IX).
1
This is because [b]y its terms, Title IX prohibits
discrimination only by a program or activity receiving federal funding. Id. at 1018. The
Seventh Circuit has further recognized that many Title IX cases that have reached the appellate
level originally sought recovery against individuals, but the individual claims were dismissed
and the dismissal was not challenged on appeal. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F. 3d at n.1.
Therefore, since Dr. Lystila is sued individually, she cannot be held individually liable
for a violation of Section 1557(a), which expressly incorporates Title IX.
2
1
The federal Courts of Appeal are in agreement with the Seventh Circuits analysis that individuals may not be
liable under Title IX. See, e.g., Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999); Floyd v.
Waiters, 133 F.3d 786 (11th Cir. 1998) (a Title IX claim can only be brought against a grant recipientthat is, a
local school districtand not an individual); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988) (In
implying a cause of action under Title IX, the Supreme Court has considered only actions against educational
institutions. . . . Accordingly, the separate liability of the supervisory officials must be established, if at all, under
section 1983, rather than under Title IX.).
2
Individual liability is not allowed under any of the civil rights statutes incorporated in to Section 1557(a). See U.S.
E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F. 3d 1276 (2d. Cir. 1995) (holding that individual could not be held
liable under the ADA); Shotz v. City of Plantation Florida, 344 F.3d 1161, 1169 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that there
is no individual liability under Title VI); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (holding that there is not
individual liability under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
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III. PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIMAGAINST
DR. LYSTILA
Although the individual employees of a grant recipient can never be held individually
liable, in limited circumstances, the Seventh Circuit recognizes claims against employees sued in
their official capacities. The Seventh Circuit recognizes official capacity claims, if, and only if,
the official capacity position itself qualifies as a grant recipient. See Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry
Twp., 128 F.3d at 1020-21. But, even if a particular official capacity position qualifies as a grant
recipient, by definition, an official capacity claim is simply a claim against the underlying entity
and does not give rise to individual liability. Id. When claims are brought against both the
underlying entity and its officials in their official capacities, the official capacity claim is
redundant. Id.
Pursuant to Title IX, to successfully allege that an official qualifies as a grant recipient,
Plaintiff must allege that the official possesses control over the program or activity in question.
See id. In the instant case, Plaintiffs Complaint does not even attempt to allege that Dr. Lystila
possesses sufficient control over The Carle Foundation to qualify as a grant recipient. Since
Plaintiff does not and cannot allege the necessary degree of control, Plaintiff cannot state an
official capacity claim against Dr. Lystila. Even if Plaintiff could allege sufficient control, the
fact remains that any such claim would be redundant because The Carle Foundation, and other
Carle entities, are already a party to this case.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff cannot state a Section 1557(a), under the Affordable Care Act, against
Dr. Lystila in her individual capacity because there is no individual liability under Section
1557(a). In addition, Plaintiff cannot state a Section 1557(a) claim against Dr. Lystila in her
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official capacity because Plaintiff does not and cannot allege that she possessed sufficient control
as to qualify as a grant recipient.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Dr. Lystila respectfully request the Court to dismiss
Plaintiffs Complaint.
DATED: June 16, 2014 Respectfully submitted,
SEYFARTH SHAW
By: /s/ Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.
Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.
Gerald L. Maatman
gmaatman@seyfarth.com
Alexis P. Robertson*
arobertson@seyfarth.com
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
131 South Dearborn Street
Suite 2400
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Telephone: (312) 460-5000
Facsimile: (312) 460-7000
Attorney for Defendants
*Application for Admission Pending
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Defendant Dr. Aja Lystilas Memorandum In Support Of Her Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs
Complaint will be served upon Plaintiffs counsel of record through the Courts ECF system on
this 16th day of June, 2014:
Kenneth D. Upton, Jr.
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
3500 Oak Lawn Ave
Suite 500
Dallas, TX 75219
kupton@lambdalegal.org
Christopher R. Clark
Kyle A. Palazzolo
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
105 West Adams
Suite 2600
Chicago, IL 60603
cclark@lambdalegal.org
kapalazzolo@lambdalegal.org
M. Dru Levasseur
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
National Headquarters
120 Wall Street
19th Floor
New York, NY 10005
dlevasseur@lambdalegal.org
/s/ Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.____
Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.
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