Military Coups in Pakistan and the Corporate Interests Hypothesis

Chaitram Singh

Department of Government and International Studies
Berry College

























1




The corporate interests hypothesis emerged as a rebuttal to the argument by Samuel P.
Huntington in his seminal work, The Soldier and the State, that professionalizing the officer corps
would render military officers politically neutral and keep them from intervening in the political
sphere. Huntington advanced this hypothesis after arguing that military officers were
professionals, not unlike physicians and attorneys, in the sense of having the same defining
elements of professionalism; namely, expertise (in the management of violence), social
responsibility, and a sense of corporate autonomy that sets them apart from lay people. So
involved would officers with a professional orientation be in the technical tasks of equipping,
training, and preparing for possible combat, argued Huntington, they would have little time to
involve themselves in policy questions.
1
The initial rebuttal of Huntington=s hypothesis came from Samuel Finer, in his classic
work, The Man on Horseback. Finer argued that it was precisely the officers= sense of their
professionalism which might propel them to intervene in the political sphere. Professional
officers might see themselves as servants of the state, not of the government in power and, as
experts in their field, they might feel they alone are competent to decide on such issues as size,
organization, equipment, recruitment and training of the military, and this might put them on a
collision course with the civilian government. Further, as Finer noted, officers deeply committed
to the preservation of their autonomy might be inclined to intervene against a civilian government
which has infringed on that autonomy. In short, defense of their professionalism might be the
motive behind military officers= intervention against a civilian government.
2



2
Further refinement to this rebuttal to Huntington=s thesis was provided by Eric Nordlinger.
In his book, Soldiers in Politics, Nordlinger argued that the military will intervene to protect or
enhance its corporate interests, defined as its share of the national budget, its corporate autonomy,
and its exclusive right to bear arms in defense of the country. According to Nordlinger, budgetary
allocations are important because they affect the general well-being of officers as well as their
ability to equip and train a modern professional army. Consequently, officers would resist any
attempt to reduce their budget. Nordlinger also agreed with Finer that officers deeply resent any
infringement on their autonomy to determine such matters as recruitment and training,
assignments, formulation of military strategies, and promotions below the most senior levels.
Finally, he noted that officers, as managers of violence in the defense of the nation, regard the
defense of the nation as the exclusive responsibility of the military. Thus, they are likely to regard
the creation of functional rivals, such as a militia or any other paramilitary force, as casting doubt
on the military=s capability and adequacy as the guarantors of the nation=s security and as
portentous of a reduction of the military or its total disbandment and replacement by another
force.
3
These considerations led Nordlinger to posit the following hypothesis: AThe defense or
enhancement of the military=s corporate interests is easily the most important interventionist
motive.@
4

This paper examines the applicability of the corporate interests hypothesis to military
coups in Pakistan. It could be argued that the Pakistani military removed the civilian government
in two of the three military coups the country experienced, pursuant to its Acorporate interests.@
However, the Pakistani military=s definition of its corporate interests has been more expansive
than what has been proffered by Nordlinger and, thus, salvaging the Nordlinger hypothesis in the


3
case of Pakistan would mean interpreting corporate interests as a more elastic concept than
Nordlinger intended.
Let me at the outset point out some of the shortcomings of the corporate interests approach
to explaining military coups. Nordlinger does provide a rank ordering of the three components of
the military=s corporate interests, the weakest causal factor being the budget, and the strongest
being the establishment of any militia or paramilitary force, which in the eyes of the military, poses
a risk to its own survival. However, as Terrence Lee has pointed out, the approach does not
explain why infringement of the military=s corporate interests does not universally bring on
military intervention; why does it occur in some settings and not in others?
5

Secondly, even in those political systems where military interventions have occurred as a
result of civilian infringement on their corporate interests, the Nordlinger hypothesis provides no
guidance as to when such an intervention will likely take place. In other words, what is the
threshold above which civilian interference in military affairs becomes intolerable? Nordlinger
used the 1964 military coup in Brazil as exemplifying the corporate interests hypothesis. The
government of Joao Goulart was overthrown five days after it had pardoned over one thousand
sailors who had mutinied against their officers on March 24, 1964. However, as Nordlinger
himself acknowledged, the Goulart government had between 1961 and 1964, interposed itself into
the military=s affairs by politicizing the promotion of General officers and by openly seeking the
support of the sergeants in the military. It even excused the action of the sergeants when in 1963,
they protested a Supreme Court ruling by holding as hostages, one judge, the president of the
Congress, and some military officers.
6
Yet, military intervention did not occur against the
government for its infringement of the military=s autonomy by its politicization of promotions and


4
for excusing a serious breach of discipline by the sergeants. In short, the Nordlinger hypothesis
gives no clear guidance regarding the threshold of civilian interference which will provoke
military intervention.
Finally, there is the question of what constitutes the military=s corporate interests. It is
clear from the case of Pakistan that military organizations around the world do not define their
corporate interests in the same way as Nordlinger. To be sure, the components identified by
Nordlinger are a part of those corporate interests but, as the Pakistani case study shows, historical
factors and prior control over the government as a result of earlier coups have also shaped the
military=s corporate interests.
Contextual Reshaping of the Military=s Corporate Interests
One of the problems of the Nordlinger approach is that it relies entirely on professional and
technical considerations to determine the corporate interests of the military. In doing so, it
ignores historical and contextual factors which might have played a role in shaping the military=s
own definition of its corporate interests and which might explain why the military in one national
setting might see these interests differently from the military in another national setting.
The single event which perhaps had the greatest impact on the psyche of the Pakistani
military top brass was the 1947-1948 war with India over the accession of Kashmir. The loss of
territory to India inspired the view within the Pakistani military, as well as within the civilian elite,
that India was an implacable foe against which Pakistan needed to arm itself. Hatred of India
undergirded all major policy positions embraced by the Pakistani military. As Husain Haqqani
put it, AInflexibility in relations with India, and the belief that India represented an existential
threat to Pakistan, led to maintaining a large military, which in turn led the military to assert its


5
dominance in the life of the country.@
7
The Pakistani high command decided to take a
pro-Western posture in the Cold War as a way of securing armaments for the modernization of the
military, and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, General Ayub Khan, interposed
himself in the foreign policy arena when he visited the United States in October 1953 to lobby for
military aid to Pakistan.
8
Thereafter foreign affairs became a key area of interest of the Pakistani
military. Finally the Pakistani military=s claim to a sizable budget was validated by Prime
Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in an address to the nation in October 1948 in which he said, AThe
defense of the state is our foremost consideration . . . We will not grudge any amount on the
defense of our country.@
9
The sanctity of the military=s budget, the anti-India stance, and foreign
affairs all came under direct military control following the October 1958 coup which brought
General Ayub Khan into the presidency.
The military coup of 1958 was not caused by an infringement on the corporate interests of
the military; rather, the military intervened to prevent a descent into chaos. The four western
provinces of Pakistan were chafing against their impressment into the One-Unit scheme, by which
they became fused together into West Pakistan. There was intermittent violence in Sindh;
secessionist tendencies reemerged in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province; and
instability in East Pakistan was dramatized by the outbreak of violence in the provincial assembly
on September 21, 1958.
10
When the military took control, it did so in the belief developed earlier
in the chaotic circumstances at Pakistan=s creation that it alone could save the Pakistani state, a
position reinforced by the Supreme Court=s legitimation of the coup under the doctrine of
necessity to prevent the state from descending to chaos. In fact, the notion of the military as the
savior of the Pakistani state was put into practice during Ayub Khan=s reign in the sense that the


6
military was elevated to the status of Pakistan=s paramount institution. From 1958 until the
promulgation of the 1962 constitution, the country was under martial law with military officers
administering different zones of the country and, even after martial law was lifted, the military
continued to play the most important role in the Ayub Khan administration. Political parties were
not allowed to function during the martial law period, and when they reemerged they were only
allowed to operate within narrowly circumscribed parameters.
Through General Ayub Khan, the military directly controlled foreign affairs and, of course,
the military=s budgetary interests were secure. However, Ayub Khan=s rule impacted the
military=s corporate interests in three other ways. First, Ayub Khan introduced a managed form
of democracy called, ABasic Democracy,@ in which the people would participate in an indirect
vote for the president.
11
This idea of a managed democracy under military tutelage would later,
under General Zia-ul-Haq, be enshrined in the constitution. Second, Ayub Khan convinced the
nation that to counteract the centrifugal forces in Pakistan, the country needed Aa strong centre.@
In fact, when he resigned the presidency in 1969, he violated the terms of the constitution he had
fathered and appointed General Yahya Khan as his successor. Third, under Ayub Khan, the Fauji
Foundation, established in 1954 to promote the general welfare of retired military personnel,
expanded its size and reach into the Pakistani economy, giving the military an additional interest in
the general functioning of the economy, beyond its budgetary allocation.
Consolidating the Military=s Corporate Interests: the Zia Regime
Unlike the military coup of 1958, the 1977 coup which brought General Zia-ul-Haq to
power was triggered by concerns about the military=s corporate interests, narrowly defined; in
other words, the Nordlinger hypothesis finds validation in the 1977 coup. The elected


7
government of Zulficar Ali Bhutto interfered with the corporate interests of the military to such an
extent that, when it was provided an opportunity to intervene against the civilian government, it
did, and with relish. Zia described Bhutto as the Aworst cheat and cold-blooded murderer@ who
Ahad been running a Gestapo style police state,@
12
and he placed Bhutto on trial for murder, a
charge which led to Bhutto=s execution.
The accession to the presidency by Zulficar Ali Bhutto following the secession of East
Pakistan began an era of tense civil-military relations. To his credit, Bhutto attempted to
institutionalize civilian rule in Pakistan but the measures he took, while consistent with practices in
functioning democracies, appeared to the Pakistani military as a frontal assault on their privileged
status. Disgraced by their defeat in the 1971 war with India and blamed for the loss of East
Pakistan, the military top brass could do little but endure the diminution of their power and
privileges. Bhutto=s Pakistan People=s Party also kept the military on the defensive by exposing
the heavy drinking and womanizing of the military top brass, especially General Yahya Khan,
under whose leadership the Pakistani military was defeated by India and the country dismembered
by the secession of East Pakistan. The showing on Pakistani television of the surrender
ceremony following the military=s defeat at the hands of the Indian Army added to the humiliation
of the military.
13
Bhutto=s disdain for the military was further demonstrated when on his return
from an overseas trip, he inspected a guard of honor, not from the armed forces as was the practice,
but from the People=s Guards, a paramilitary force run by his own party.
14

Bhutto took several steps to subordinate the military to civilian rule. He began by
downgrading the titles of the respective services from Commander-in-Chief to Chief of Staff,
limitations on their length of service and prospect of renewal, and a prohibition against serving


8
officers participation in political activities of any kind. As Chief of Army Staff, he appointed
General Tikka Khan who, as the so-called AButcher of Bengal,@ appeared willing to accept
civilian supremacy over the armed forces. At the end of Tikka Khan=s term in 1976, Bhutto
bypassed seven generals to appoint General Zia-ul-Haq as the Chief of Army Staff, an act which
provoked the resignation of two of the generals bypassed. The appointment raised the concern in
the military top brass that Bhutto=s selection was based on considerations of political malleability
rather than on seniority and professional competence.
15

Military subordination to civilian authority was enshrined in the 1973 constitution,
promulgated during Bhutto=s presidency. It defined as high treason any attempt to subvert the
constitution, and the parliament passed a law in September 1973 ptoviding the death penalty or life
imprisonment for such a crime. The constitution also required serving officers to take an oath
forswearing participation in political activities of any kind.
16

However, it was Bhutto=s threat to the survival of the military by the creation of a
paramilitary force called the Federal Security Force, which was the underlying cause of the coup in
1977. As Saeed Shafqat put it, Athe FSF emerged as a crucial factor influencing the pattern of
civil-military relations under the Bhutto regime.@
17
In order to reduce his government=s
dependence on the military for law and order, Bhutto created the Federal Security Force (FSF), a
paramilitary force. Compared to the Pakistani army the FSF was a small force. However, Bhutto,
who was an admirer of China, had stated his preference for a APeople=s Army@ instead of a
conventional army, and this aspiration undoubtedly suggested to the military that the FSF was the
People=s Army in embryo. In fact, in the National Assembly debate, the opposition used such
terms as Aprivate army@ and Arival army@ to describe the FSF, which was not to be under the


9
control of the Pakistani army.
18

Nevertheless, the imperatives of external defense and the necessity for domestic law and
order forced Bhutto to work closely with the military. In July 1973, the new government of
Afghanistan revived the issue of an independent Pashtunistan, which opened a challenge to
Pakistan=s control of the North West Frontier Province. The following year, India detonated a
nuclear device in the Rajasthan desert, a development which heightened the concerns of Pakistani
leaders about India=s military preponderance in South Asia.
19
The result was that the Bhutto
regime spent generously on the military.
Within Pakistan, the military had been deployed for disaster relief operations, to stop
cross-border smuggling, and to maintain domestic law and order. In 1972, the military was
deployed twice to maintain law and order in Sindh because of language riots in July and because of
labor riots later in the year.
20
From 1973 to 1977, the military was deployed to quell an
insurgency in Baluchistan. The Federal Security Service, which had initially been used, proved
inadequate to the task. However, the use of the military against the insurgency demonstrated the
Bhutto government=s dependence on the military for domestic order but also raised concerns
within the military about the politicization of the organization. Bhutto was using the military in a
quarrel that had developed between him and regional leaders in the North West Frontier Province
and in Baluchistan, and which cost the lives of an estimated 3,300 Pakistani soldiers.
21

Within months of the January 1977 election, Bhutto again deployed the military to
maintain domestic order. The election had returned Bhutto to power with an overwhelming
majority, but evidence of fraud in the conduct of the election propelled the opposition into protest.
Demonstrations and strikes were organized by the Pakistan National Alliance, a coalition of


10
opposition parties, and Bhutto reacted by placing restrictions on public assembly and by arresting
several opposition leaders. However, when strikes in several major cities brought the economy to
a standstill and, when the Federal Security Service was unable to maintain law and order, Bhutto
declared martial law and called out the army. A predominately Punjabi army now confronted
civilians in Punjab. Three Brigadiers refused to use their troops against civilians and resigned in
protest. Several of Bhutto=s overseas ambassadors, including two with the rank of General,
resigned, and retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan, a member of the opposition PNA, wrote to the
three service chiefs calling on them not to support an illegal regime and not allow the Pakistani
armed forces to become Aa degenerate police force fit only for killing unarmed civilians.@
22
On
July 5, 1977, the army removed Bhutto from power. As Nordlinger had predicted, the army had
moved against a government whose legitimacy had been deflated by a corrupted election.
Two actions by General Zia-ul-Haq during his protracted stay in power relate to the
military=s corporate interests. First, under Zia, perquisites for senior military officers, which had
been curtailed under Bhutto, were expanded, as were the military=s welfare organizations. To
complement the Army Welfare Trust, which had been set up in 1971 for ex-army personnel, the
Shaheen Foundation and the Bahria Foundation were set up for retired air force and navy
personnel respectively. According to Ayesha Siddiqa, the businesses operated by these
foundations are very diverse, Aranging from smaller-scale ventures such as bakeries, farms,
schools and private security firms to corporate enterprises such as commercial banks, insurance
companies, radio and television channels, fertilizer, cement and cereal manufacturing plants.@
23

The expanded reach of the economic enterprises under the control of the military welfare
organization provided lucrative careers for retired military personnel, enhanced the cohesiveness


11
of the military and gave the organization a major stake in the economic development of Pakistan.
Of note as well is the fact that the Chief of Army Staff is the head of the Fauji Foundation and the
Army Welfare Trust. He appoints the officers who run them, and the army is one of their
customers.
24

Second, under Zia, as under Ayub Khan, military overlordship of the country was
unquestioned. Political parties were repressed. The paramountcy of the military and Ayub
Khan=s idea of a supervised democracy were enshrined in the constitution through the adoption of
the Eight Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, empowering the President to dismiss the elected
Prime Minister. This became the mechanism by which the military, acting through the President,
secured the removal of the elected Prime Minister three times between 1989 and 1997.
25
In other
words, between Zia=s death in 1988 and the 1999 coup which brought General Pervez Musharraf
to power, there were three constitutional coups in Pakistan, validating the proposition that Pakistan
had been functioning as a managed democracy under military tutelage.
The 1999 Coup
Like the 1977 coup, the Musharraf coup of 1999 against the government of Nawaz Sharif
was provoked by infringement of the military=s corporate interests. However, unlike the 1977
coup, the corporate interests involved in 1999 were not simply the professional and narrow
organizational interests identified by Nordlinger. Instead, what were involved were the expanded
corporate interests shaped by Pakistan=s early nation-building experience and the accumulated
experiences of the military as governors of the state.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who had been removed from office in 1993 by the President
in accordance with the Eighth Amendment, used the overwhelming National Assembly majority


12
he had secured in the February 1997 election to negate this constitutional provision with the
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. The elimination of this Presidential prerogative
strengthened the power of the Prime Minister and eliminated the veto power the military exercised
working through the President. It is noteworthy that, in 2002, General Musharraf restored this
authority to the presidency stating that, AIf you want to keep the army out, you bring them in.@
26

The second area where the military had differences with the Sharif government was over
foreign policy. In particular, the military was opposed to Sharif=s efforts at rapprochement with
India. Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf refused to attend a welcome ceremony arranged by
Sharif for the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpai, near the Pakistan-India border. Shortly
afterward, Musharraf launched what became known as the Kargil War, by inserting military and
paramilitary forces into Indian-controlled Kashmir.
27
The war lasted form May 1999 to July
1999 and ended with Pakistan=s defeat. Prime Minister Sharif claimed that he had been unaware
of the war preparation, and under pressure from President Clinton, Sharif ordered the withdrawal
of Pakistani solders from Indian territory.
28
The military was upset by Sharif=s decision to
withdraw the troops and by his decision to institute an inquiry into the Kargil War. Relations
between the Prime Minister and Army Chief Musharraf became greatly strained, and some saw the
1999 coup against Prime Minister Sharif as a preemptive action to forestall the war investigation.
29

The immediate circumstances surrounding the overthrow of the Sharif government were
quite dramatic and centered on Sharif=s interference in army affairs. On October 12, 1999, Prime
Minister Sharif announced on national television the dismissal of General Musharraf as Chief of
Army Staff and the appointment of Lieutenant General Ziauddin as his replacement. Musharraf
was at that time in flight to Pakistan from Sri Lanka, and Sharif forbade the passenger Airbus from


13
landing in Pakistan. However, troops loyal to Musharraf, under the command of the Tenth Corps
Commander, arrested Sharif at his residence. On his return, Musharraf took on the title of Chief
Executive and placed Sharif on trial for air piracy and kidnapping.
30

The October 12, 1999 overthrow of the Sharif government was the culmination point of
three institutional affronts to the Pakistani army. Prime Minister Sharif had pressured
Musharraf=s predecessor, General Jehangir Karamat to resign from his post as Chief of Army
Staff. This was the first affront to the military. Next, instead of appointing the army=s most
senior General, Ali Quli Khan Khattack as the Chief of Army Staff, Sharif chose General
Musharraf believing that the latter would be a less risky army chief on account of the fact that he
was a Mohajir (refugee) and would therefore be unable to muster the support for a future coup.
31

Quite apart from upsetting the army chain of command in regard to the expectation of
senior generals for an orderly progression in career appointments, Sharif underestimated the
cohesiveness of the military and the institutional loyalties of the high command. Finally,
Sharif=s most recent attempt to replace the sitting Chief of Army Staff was especially contentious
because Lieutenant General Ziauddin was the junior of several other serving generals and because
his service in a non-combat arm of the military made the appointment a violation of the Pakistani
military tradition in regard to this position.
32

Clearly, Sharif=s interference in the army=s affairs was an important factor in the
overthrow of the Sharif government, but not the only one. To focus on this factor, which would
be consistent with Nordlinger=s definition of the army=s corporate interests would lead to a
mis-diagnosis of the causes of the 1999 coup. Yet, it is the argument of this paper that the Sharif
government was overthrown because it interfered with the Acorporate interests@ of the Pakistani


14
military, defined much more broadly than the professional and organizational interests asserted by
Nordlinger, interests which included the military=s anti-India stance. The confrontation with
India is the Pakistani military=s foremost foreign policy concern; it provides justification for the
military=s size and budget, which in turn help the military to assert it dominance over the
country.
33

Conclusion
This paper has argued that of the three military coups Pakistan has experienced, only one,
the 1977 coup, comports with the Nordlinger hypothesis. In that coup, the creation of a
paramilitary rival to the military and Prime Minister Bhutto=s stated preference for a APeople=s
Army@ threatened the army=s survival. That and Bhutto=s politicization of the appointment of
the Army Chief were the fundamental causes of the coup. The timing of the coup was based on
considerations of the erosion of legitimacy of the government on account of a rigged election and
heavy reliance on the army for the provision of domestic law and order.
Pakistan=s first coup cannot be justified in terms of any serious infringement of the
military=s corporate interests, and, indeed, no serious analyst has attempted to make that case.
However, in the chaotic circumstances in which Pakistan found itself, the coup and the installation
of a military government of decade-long duration solidified the military=s perception of itself as
the savior of the Pakistani state and their contempt for politicians. Ayub Khan famously said after
the 1958 takeover, AThe most powerful weapon of a politician is his tongue, which we=ve
controlled. I think things are going to be quiet for a while.@
34
Under this praetorian state, the
military established itself as Pakistan=s paramount institution and embraced the idea that what
Pakistan needed was a managed democracy, one supervised by the military.


15
The government of Zulficar Ali Bhutto, 1971-1977, attempted to negate the military=s
expanded corporate interests as a necessary step in his effort to entrench democracy in Pakistan
and civilian supremacy over the armed forces. However, legitimacy deflation, and domestic
disturbances which made Pakistan ungovernable without the imposition of law and order by the
military, exposed his government to a takeover by an army, incensed by the threat his government
posed against its professional interests and its very survival.
Once in power, the military proceeded to de-institutionalize political parties and to reassert
its paramountcy over all domestic institutions. Their idea of a managed democracy was
re-instituted by a constitutional amendment providing for the possible dismissal of an elected
Prime Minister. General Zia expanded the economic reach of the military=s welfare
organizations, giving the military a greater role in the economy and providing it with the material
means to foster greater organizational cohesiveness and institutional loyalty. In the aftermath of
Zia=s dictatorship, Pakistan functioned as a managed democracy and, when the Prime Minister
appeared to violate the rules of the game spelled out by the military, the Eighth Amendment was
activated to vacate the office, pending new elections.
The 1999 coup removed the strongest elected government in over two decades. A Prime
Minister with an overwhelming electoral mandate attempted to fundamentally alter the rules of the
game in an attempt to entrench democracy and to subordinate the military to civilian authority.
The negation of the Eighth Amendment and peace overtures toward India by the civilian
government proved to be more than the military could stomach. Their efforts to be a spoiler in the
rapprochement with India provoked the Prime Minister to seek a more pliable Chief of Army Staff.
This effort, especially the clumsiness of it, precipitated the coup, though some analysts argue the


16
coup planning had already been underway.
35

The 1999 coup was caused by civilian infringement of the Acorporate interests@ of the
military. However, these interests were not coterminous with Nordlinger=s definition of
corporate interests - they were considerably wider. Not only did they include budgetary concerns,
the military=s autonomy, and the military=s exclusive right to bear arms but also a distinct
preference for a managed democracy, the recognition of the military=s paramount status in
Pakistan, foreign affairs as a military preserve, an anti-India stance, and the legitimacy of the
military=s role in the economic affairs of the county through the myriad of companies overseen by
its welfare organizations.
In short, the Pakistani military defines its Acorporate interests@ differently from Finer or
Nordlinger. Those interests have been shaped by historical and contextual factors. However, to
recognize the way the Pakistani military defines its interests is not to say that their claims beyond
narrow professional and organizational matters are uncontested. Every elected Prime Minister of
Pakistan since Zia has attempted to chip away at those claims, and they remain at the heart of the
struggle to establish a real democracy in Pakistan, a goal civilian elites appear to embrace.
However, given Pakistan=s praetorian past, the reassertion of civilian supremacy over the military
seems a daunting task indeed.
A final word needs to be appended regarding corporate interests and military intervention.
What the Pakistani case shows is that to the extent that the term, corporate interests, has
applicability to the myriad of interests the military has arrogated to itself, its definition is far more
expansive than the one Nordlinger provides. In fact, Terrence Lee suggests Aendless definitions@
in the interventionist literature,
36
and the existence of multiple definitions of corporate interests


17
degrades the explanatory value of this concept. Lee=s argument, based on an examination of the
political role of the Indonesian military, that Athe military=s ethos or self-conception of its role
within the nation state@ should be considered instead,
37
finds resonance in the case of Pakistan.
The military=s view of itself as the savior of the Pakistani state, and its early politicization, are
potent explanations of why the military has endeavored to extend its overlordship over the entire
system, including by the exercise of direct military rule.


























Notes


1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State ( Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1985), pp. 8-18; 84.


18

2. Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 2003),
pp.24-27; 47.
3. Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), pp. 68-78.
4. Ibid., p. 65.
5. Terrence Lee, AThe Military=s Corporate Interests: The Main Reason for Intervention in
Indonesia and the Philippines?@ Armed Forces & Society (April 2008), 493.
6. Nordlinger, pp. 72-73.
7. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 15.
8. Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army and the Wars Within (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), pp.103-106.
9. Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), p. 118.
10. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-86 (New Delhi: Konark
Publishers Put Ltd., 1988), pp. 69-72; Talbot, p. 145.
11. Richard Wheeler, APakistan: New Constitution, Old Issues,@ Asian Survey (February
1963), pp. 107-109; Talbot, pp.154-158; Rizvi, 1988, pp. 87-88, 102-104.
12. Rizvi, pp. 230-231.
13. Haqqani, p. 96.
14. Rizvi, p.197.
15. Saeed Shafqat, Civil Military Relations in Pakistan ( Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp.
166-169.
16. Rizvi, p. 201.
17. Shafqat, p. 168.
18. Ibid.
19. Rizvi, pp. 203-204; Haqqani, pp. 94-95; Talbot, p. 223.
20 Talbot, p. 232; Rizvi, p. 208.


19

21. Selig S. Harrison, ANightmare in Baluchistan,@ Foreign Policy (Autumn 1978), pp.
138-139.
22. Nawaz, pp.348-349. See also Talbot, pp. 239-247; Rizvi, pp. 220-224.
23. Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan=s Military Economy (London: Pluto Press,
2007), p. 18.
24. Ibid., pp. 120-122; Nawaz, p. 445.
25. Talbot, pp. 309-310; pp. 327-330; pp. 333-348.
26. Ibid., p. 401.
27. Siddiqa, pp. 96-97.
28. Husain Haqqani, pp. 248-253.
29. Siddiqa, p. 97.
30. Talbot, pp. 375-378.
31. Haqqani, p. 248; Siddiqa, p. 96; Talbot, p. 377.
32. Siddiqa, p. 96-97; Talbot, p. 377.
33. Haqqani, p. 15.
34. Elie Abel, APakistan Still Faces Deep-Seated Problems,@ The New York Times (Oct. 19,
1958), p. E5.
35. Siddiqa, p. 97; Haqqani, p. 255.
36. Lee, p. 494.
37. Ibid., p. 500.