The first deliberate adoption of it as the basis of a political organization of human society is found in the

Declaration of Rights which was made and published by the representatives of the people of Virginia, assembled in
convention on the twelfth day of June, I776. This docu-ment was followed, on the fourth day of July, in the same year, by
the Declaration of Independence by the United States of America, in which the assertions of the Virginian Declaration that
all men possess certain inherent rights, and that government is or ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection
and security of the people, nation or com-munity in respect of which it is established, are substantially repeated;
Edmund Burke:
Whatever each man can separately do, without trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for himself;
and he has a right to a fair portion of all which society with all its combinations of skill and force can do in his favour.

http://www.libertarianism.org/publications/essays/excursions/jeremy-benthams-attack-natural-rights George H.
Smith
Natural-rights theory was the revolutionary doctrine of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, being used to justify
resistance to unjust laws and revolution against tyrannical governments. This was the main reason why Edmund Burke
attacked natural rightsor abstract rights, as he called themso vehemently in his famous polemic against the French
Revolution, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). Burke later condemned the French Constitution of 1791,
which exhibited a strong American influence, as a digest of anarchy.
Similarly, Jeremy Bentham, in his criticism of the French Declaration of Rights (1789), called natural rights anarchical
fallacies, because (like Burke) he believed that no government can possibly meet the standards demanded by the doctrine
of natural rights. Earlier, a liberal critic of the American Revolution, the English clergyman Josiah Tucker, had argued
that the Lockean system of natural rights is an universal demolisher of all governments, but not the builder of any.
The fear that defenders of natural rights would foment a revolution in Britain, just as they had in America and France,
alarmed British rulers, causing them to institute repressive measures. It is therefore hardly surprising that natural-rights
theory went underground, so to speak, during the long war with France. Even after peace returned in 1815 a cloud of
suspicion hung over this way of thinking. Natural rights were commonly associated with the French Jacobins
Robespierre and others who had instigated the Reign of Terror so a defender of natural rights ran the risk of being
condemned as a French sympathizer, a Jacobin, or (worst of all) an anarchist.
Thus did British liberalism don a new face after 1815, as an atmosphere of peace resuscitated the movement for political
and economic reforms, and as many middle-class liberals embraced a non-revolutionary foundation for economic and
civil liberties. The premier theory in this regard, which would become known as utilitarianism, was developed by
Jeremy Bentham and popularized by his Scottish protg James Mill (the father of John Stuart Mill) and by many other
disciples.
Bentham did not originate the utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number; we find similar
expressions in a number of eighteenth-century philosophers, such as Hutcheson, Helvetius and Beccaria. For our purpose,
the most significant feature of Benthams utilitarianism was its unequivocal rejection of natural rights.
Natural rights, according to Bentham, are simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,
nonsense upon stilts So-called moral and natural rights are mischievous fictions and anarchical fallacies that encourage
civil unrest, disobedience and resistance to laws, and revolution against established governments. Only political rights,
those positive rights established and enforced by government, have any determinate and intelligible meaning. Rights are
the fruits of the law, and of the law alone. There are no rights without lawno rights contrary to the lawno rights
anterior to the law.
The significance of Bentham does not lie in his advocacy of social utility, or the general welfare, or the common good
for this idea, by whatever name it was called, was regarded by many earlier classical liberals as the purpose of legislation,
in contradistinction to its standard.
The fundamental problem was this: Given that social utility should be the purpose of legislation, how can this rather
vague goal be attained? How can the legislator possibly know which measures will promote the greatest happiness for the
greatest number? To this question classical liberals in the Lockean tradition had answered, in effect: By respecting the
natural rights of individuals. Thus if social utility is the general goal of legislation, natural rights are thestandard, or rule,
which must be followed if this goal is to be achieved.
Bentham broke with this venerable tradition, in which utility and rights were seen as different aspects of the same process,
by rejecting the entire scheme of natural rights and by proposing that social utility serve as both the goal and standard of
political activity.
According to Bentham, the happiness of individuals, of whom a community is composedis the sole end which the
legislator ought to have in view [and] the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends
on the legislator, to be made to fashion his behavior. Natural rights are not only a groundless fiction, one that is
incompatible with an empiricist methodology, but they are a highly dangerous fiction to boot, because they have
traditionally been used to undermine the authority of governments. In short, natural rights are terrorist language.
Thus did Bentham reject the roundabout method of natural rights, according to which the legislator should respect rights
as a means to the end of social utility. Rather, the legislator should calculate social utility directly by assessing the impact
of a given law on the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
As I said, this was a significant departure from earlier liberal thinking, in which natural rights and social utility were seen
as complementary. Bentham severed this friendly relationship by totally rejecting natural rights. If a particular law
promotes the greatest happiness for the greatest number, then it is legitimate and proper, regardless of how it might be
evaluated from a natural-rights perspective.
Bentham believed that the greatest happiness for the greatest number can be ascertained by some calculus or process of
moral arithmetic by means of which we may arrive at uniform results. But how? Benthams solution came in the form
of his hedonic calculus, a discussion of which occupies a good deal of his most famous book, An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789).
How can the legislator calculate the greatest happiness for the greatest number, measured in terms of maximal pleasure
and minimal pain? Benthams procedure, despite a veneer of exactitude, is incredibly vague on this point. After listing
seven circumstances (intensity, duration, certainty, fecundity, etc.) that are relevant to this calculation, Bentham says
that an exact account of a proposed legislative act can be arrived at by first determining for a given individual the sum
of all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on the other; and by then taking an
account of the number of persons who interests appear to be concerned and repeating the same calculation with respect
to each.
Bentham repeatedly refers to the quantity and measurement of pleasures and pains, but nowhere does he address the
serious problems of dealing with pleasure and pain quantitatively (as if they can be added together in a single sum); nor
does he explain how it is possible to quantify and compare the subjective feelings of different individuals. (This latter
problem is now called the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons.)
That Bentham sometimes had doubts about his own hedonic calculus is clear from one of his unpublished manuscripts,
where he had this to say about the possibility of adding up quantities of happiness among different individuals:
Tis in vain to talk of adding quantities which after the addition will continue distinct as they were before, one mans
happiness will never be another mans happiness: a gain to one man is no gain to another: you might as well pretend to
add twenty apples to twenty pears, which after you had done that could not be forty of any one thing but twenty of each
just as there was before.
Bentham concedes that his hedonic calculus, like the theory of natural rights, is based on a fiction, or unreal abstraction.
But he also claims that his fiction is successful because it can function as a practical guide for legislators.
This addibility of the happiness of different subjects, however, when considered rigorously, it may appear fictitious, is a
postulatum without the allowance of which all political reasoning is at a stand.
When Bentham applies his principle of utility to political measures, he often appeals not to his fictional hedonic calculus
but to the general principle that each individual is normally the best judge of his own interests and should therefore be left
free to pursue his own happiness in his own way. The legal recognition of this principle, as manifested in a respect for
individual freedom, is the best way to promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
That each person is normally the best judge of his own interests seemed to Bentham so obvious as not to require much
justification. But there was a serious danger lurking in this premise, as his natural-rights critics were quick to point out.
They agreed that a person is usually the best judge of his own interests, but they maintained that even when this is not the
case, a person has a right to act according to his own judgment, so long as he respects the equal rights of others.
So the crucial point was this: Who is to decide whether a given person assesses his interests correctly or notthe
individual or the government? After all, Bentham conceded that people can make mistakes about what will promote their
happiness, but who should determine when these mistakes are made and when they are not? Benthams theory suggests
such decisions should ultimately be made by a legislative authority, not by individuals, for it is the job of legislators to
calculate the greatest happiness for the greatest number, and they are empowered to enforce their decisions.
This was what so infuriated Benthams liberal critics, such as Thomas Hodgskin and Herbert Spencer, and this is the key
to understanding the rift in nineteenth-century British liberalism that was precipitated by the immense influence of Jeremy
Bentham.
The utilitarians, according to their critics, had undercut the moral foundation of a free society by their rejection of natural
rights. True, many utilitarians had strong pro-freedom beliefs. Bentham, for example, was a fairly consistent advocate of
free market economics, and he did not hesitate to take up unpopular causes in the area of civil liberties (as we see in his
opposition to capital punishment and in his call to abolish laws against homosexuality). Given these and other liberal
causes, the principle of utility could indeed function as a powerful weapon in defense of individual libertyprovided, of
course, that those in power agreed with Benthams assessments of social utility. But that was precisely the problem.
Benthams ideal legislator reminded his critics too much of Platos philosopher-kingthat wise and benevolent social
planner who has the best interests of his subjects at heart. Bentham prided himself on his hard-headed political realism,
but this lapse into idealism was severely ridiculed by the defenders of natural rights.
Again and again Benthams liberal critics, most notably Thomas Hodgskin and Herbert Spencer, attacked the utilitarians
for their historical blindness and political naivet. How often in human history, they asked, have political rulers actually
governed with the best interests of their subjects at heart? Never, or almost never, they answered. And, given human
nature, may we realistically expect that rulers will magically lose their self-seeking inclinations immediately upon gaining
power, forgoing their own interests for the sake of the common good? Or may we expect rulers to behave like other
mortals, and continue to pursue their own interests through the coercive instrumentality of government?
Bentham was aware of this problem, and he found an answer in his theory of democracy. If the franchise were extended,
if the people at large were able to elect their rulers, then there would emerge an identity of interests between the rulers and
the ruled, for people would surely never vote against their own interests.
Benthams natural-rights critics generally favored democratic reform, but they were not nearly so sanguine about its
prospects. Democracy is desirable, but it is not a cure-all. Like many of their American counterparts, they believed that a
majority could tyrannize over a minority as surely as any tyrant. Indeed, they regarded democratic despotism as more
dangerous than monarchical despotism, since a despot can be resisted more easily than a majority. Only a theory of
natural rights, which defines the proper limits of government, can morally empower minorities to demand that their rights
be respected, whatever the form of a government may be.
And so went the great debate between the two schools of classical liberalism: the Benthamite utilitarians versus the
defenders of natural rights. This debate, one of the most fascinating in the history of political thought, sets the stage for
our discussion of Thomas Hodgskins The Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted (1832) a devastating
frontal assault on Benthamite utilitarianism.

http://philosophynow.org/issues/21/What_is_natural_about_Natural_Rights
Michael Birshan
What is natural about Natural Rights?
Do Natural Rights exist? Michael Birshan investigates one of the more persistent political assertions of the modern world
in this prize-winning essay.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness
Thomas Jefferson, US Declaration of Independence, 1776
It is clear that Jefferson along with the other Founding Fathers believed that in addition to all man-made rights there is
a body of rights which were not the progeny of civilisation and which have always existed and will always exist. These
are the Natural Rights. They, as Tom Paine says, appertain to man in right of his Existence.
1
Simply by being a human,
one possesses these inalienable and immutable rights regardless of the government, religion, or ethical system under
which one lives.
There is, of course, another view: that there is nothing natural about Natural Rights. Supporters of this stance include
Bentham, Burke, Mill, Nietzsche, and (sometimes) Rousseau. Bentham is the most passionate of these opponents of
Natural Rights, expressing a view that is as unequivocal as it is absolute:
Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptable rights, rhetorical nonsense nonsense upon stilts.
Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies
Before one can support either of these diametrically antagonistic views or, indeed, propose a synthetic position, one must
understand the essence of rights. Rights are founded on ethical value judgements, which may be empirical or rational. A
right is that which confers legitimacy upon an action or a belief. For example, if one has a right to free speech, the act of
speaking freely is given legitimacy. This legitimacy derives from whichever authority conferred the right in question. For
example, when the British government signed the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they conferred
upon British citizens the right to life, liberty and security of person
2
(among much else). A right is different from a law
of nature because a right is a protected option not a diktat. A right to life does not mean that one will live, it means that
ones life is protected. However, a law of nature is only a law of nature because it is a diktat and is always true.
Hence, E cannot have a right to equal mc
2
since it always does.
Furthermore, since rights are based on moral value-judgements they cannot be the same as factual scientific laws.
Molecules have no morality.
From these basic foundations, one can derive three main principles that govern a system of rights. Firstly, a later right
cannot contradict an earlier one (assuming both are granted by the same authority) unless that earlier right has been
explicitly repudiated. For example, if a state confers upon its citizens a right to freedom from torture, then it cannot confer
a right to torture upon its Secret Service the earlier right stops the later one having legitimacy.
Secondly, a right can only be conferred on a body by another body of greater authority or by that body itself. For example,
a Supreme Being can confer rights on mankind but mankind can also confer rights upon itself. A lower authority cannot
confer a right which contradicts a right conferred by a higher authority. For example, a trade union cannot confer a right to
strike on its members if the government has conferred a right to freedom from strikes on its citizens. Whilst, as mentioned
earlier, rights can be conferred by a body on itself, they cannot be conferred by one body on another of equal authority.
For example, Malaysia can confer a right to life on its own citizens but it cannot confer one on those of Myanmar since
both Malaysia and Myanmar are nation-states and hence equal in authority. Furthermore, Malaysia and the Philippines
cannot together confer rights on Myanmar because, although one group contains two nation-states and the other only one,
nevertheless both groups remain equal in authority having no more or less authority than that possessed by nation-states.
A collection of hundreds of bodies can be overruled by one body with greater authority. For example, a Supreme Being
could overrule the whole human population, even though He is one and they are billions.
Thirdly, authority can be ceded. For example, the governments of all members of the European Union have ceded their
ultimate authority over all social legislation that affects their citizens. Hence, through the Social Chapter, rights may now
be legitimately conferred on their citizens by the European Union since, in the area of social legislation, it is now a higher
authority than the national governments.
These three principles are fine in theory, but in practice they throw up a multitude of problems. Whilst it is difficult to
dispute that a higher authority can confer rights on a lower authority, it is quite easy to dispute that the European Union is
a higher authority than the nation-states of which it is comprised. Furthermore, it is debatable whether the ceding of
authority in some cases is permanent does Britain have the right to withdraw from the European Union as some arch
Euro-sceptics wish or has the British Parliament lost some of its sovereignty forever? If so, did it have the right to cede
that authority without direct consultation of citizens in a referendum? More fundamentally, is it correct to take such an
anthropocentric views of rights? Do animals, plants, or the earth itself have rights? Do these rights have to be conferred by
human authorities? If not, what other authorities could confer them?
All these practical questions and problems severely hamper a system of rights, but perhaps if one could demonstrate that
there were certain seminal Natural Rights, then some structure or hierarchy of rights could be built around them.
Jefferson mentions one possible group of Natural Rights when he says that men are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable Rights
3
. As mentioned earlier, rights can be conferred by a higher authority on a lower one and so it
follows that a Supreme Being may confer rights on humanity or indeed the world and these will be Natural Rights.
Consequently, one must attempt to prove the existence of a Supreme Being because unless He exists or at least has
existed, then there is not the slightest possibility of His conferring rights. In the history of philosophy, there have been
numerous attempts to prove His existence, usually based on one of three arguments. The first is the argument from design
which was stated, and then comprehensively rebutted by Hume in his Dialogues on Natural Religion. The second is the
cosmological or causal argument propounded by Aristotle, Maimonides, and Aquinas in Summa Theologica, which asserts
the idea of God as the First Cause. Strong criticisms of this argument were levelled by Hume in the Dialogues on Natural
Religion and Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. The third famous argument was the ontological argument offered by
Anselm, by Spinoza in Ethics, and by Descartes in Meditations with refutation coming from Gaunilo, Kant, and,
ironically, Aquinas. To examine the individual merits of these arguments is beyond the scope of this essay. However, the
fact remains that very strong, and many would say conclusive, rebuttals have been made of these arguments. Perhaps this
is because a Supreme Being does not exist or perhaps it is because comprehension of His nature is beyond the capabilities
of human minds. Either way, it seems likely that one cannot prove the existence of a Supreme Being and hence one cannot
prove the foundation of divinely ordained Natural Rights.
There are further objections why one cannot accept that Natural Rights have been conferred by a Supreme Being. The
most important is the fact that, even supposing one can know for certain of the existence of a Supreme Being, that does
not imply that He will have instituted a system of rights. It is the Judaeo-Christian tradition that asserts that God has set
down irrefutable commandments and conferred irrefutable rights. The essence, however, of Judaism and Christianity is
that one is given free will so that one can choose to obey or disobey Gods laws, based on the strength of ones faith. If
God conclusively revealed his existence, then everyone would obey His laws because they knew God existed rather
than believed He did. Hence, it is likely that if a Supreme Being exists approximating to the Judaeo-Christian model, then
he will have ensured that His existence cannot be proven by rational arguments so as to preserve the necessity of people
making leaps of faith. Therefore, one reaches the conclusion that the Supreme Being conventionally associated with
conferring Natural Rights that is, the Judaeo-Christian God is, if He exists, likely to have arranged it so that one can
never be sure He, his authority, or His Natural Rights actually exist.
None of this categorically disproves the existence of a Supreme Being but it makes it unlikely that one can prove the
existence of Natural Rights from a theological perspective. It remains very difficult to prove a Supreme Being exists and it
remains even more difficult to prove He endowed the universe with Natural Rights.
Other than from a Supreme Being, Natural Rights can only be conferred by two other sources. The first is another higher
authority and the second is humanity itself. Whilst it can be disputed whether man is higher than the animals or merely
equal with them, it cannot be disputed that the whole natural world is superior to humanity, which is only one part of it.
Hence, Natural Rights may be conferred by Nature herself an idea implied by the term Natural Rights. Before
proceeding, it is important to understand exactly what is meant by Nature. It is simply the whole universe, excluding any
Supreme Beings that might exist. Nature is this self-perpetuating construct that can never be destroyed, except by a supra-
Natural Supreme Being. Hence, in order to discover whether Natural Rights have been conferred by Nature, one must ask
if there is anything that can be deduced from the workings of Nature that indicates a morality? Aristotle argues in Book 1
of Politics that Nature does nothing in vain
4
and few would doubt that there is order in Nature. This does not, however,
imply that there is a morality or ethical structure within the natural world. Nature certainly works in accordance with the
laws of natural science but, as was demonstrated earlier, scientific laws cannot be equated with rights. Nature must have
morality to be able to confer rights.
Darwin in The Descent of Man and On the Origin of Species proposes and produces empirical evidence to support the
claim that the natural world is based on survival of the fittest through Natural Selection. This suggests that the natural
world is entirely amoral and that the only inherent and fundamental that is, Natural principle is that of survival.
Obviously, Darwins work is only theory based on fact and not fact itself. This implies that, just as with a Supreme Being,
it is exceedingly difficult to prove that Nature is essentially amoral. However, if one accepts what is currently the most
likely explanation of the facts, then it implies that the natural world cannot have conferred any Natural Rights except,
arguably, a right to survive. This is arguable because whilst it is true that the natural world enshrines the desire to survive
in its structure, it is difficult to claim that the natural world did so based on a moral or ethical valuejudgement. Nature is a
only quasiliving organism which, although containing sentient life within it, is not truly sentient itself.
The third authority that could confer Natural Rights is humanity itself. However, if these are to be Natural Rights, then
they must be directly derived from some quality of mankind appertain to man in right of his Existence
5
rather than
derive from conscious and consensual discussion. Consequently, one must determine whether there is any quality inherent
in humanity that can be a foundation for a Natural Right. It can be argued that all people share a common humanity and, if
this premise were accepted, one could claim that, therefore, equality of opportunity, equality before the law, even equality
of income are Natural Rights. This, however, proves problematic because the premise is highly dubious. What is this
common humanity? Man shares some common characteristics with plants, but more with animals, more still with
humans, yet more with his race, and yet more still with his family. Why, therefore, should Natural Rights be based upon
similarities between men? Why should they not be based upon the similarities between all living organisms, or between
all members of a family? The great problem is who decides where to draw the line. If man draws the line, then the rights
are no longer Natural as they are not based on inherent qualities of mankind, rather on a conscious decision of mankind.
This provides strong support for the position that there is no reason why mankind should be afforded a special system of
rights based on common humanity. A strong refutation to this position exists: rights, as mentioned earlier, are based on
moral judgements and only humans have the sentience to make moral judgements. But this rebuttal could itself be
criticised: some scientists claim that creatures such as apes and dolphins are possessed of enough sentience to make
simple moral judgements. (Indeed, a rather unconventional group of scientists does actually call for the UN Universal
Declaration to be extended to apes, chimpanzees, and orangutans.) Furthermore, what of children or the mentally deficient
who are not able to make moral judgements? By this rationale, they are excluded from the sphere of Natural Rights.
Whilst it could be argued that children should be included because they will develop morality, the mentally deficient must
remain outside. This position could easily lead to the extermination of the mentally disabled as happened in Nazi
Germany or the forced sterilisation and eugenics programmes practised in post-war Sweden. Moreover, if one is arguing
that man can have Natural Rights because of his sentience, then one can question whether only those of sufficient
intelligence and education to reason thoroughly fall within the sphere of Natural Rights. As with common characteristics,
so with sentience it is very difficult to know where to draw the line, and if man has actively to decide, then the rights
cannot be Natural.
Hence, there are major problems with a system of Natural Rights conferred by humanity upon itself because one cannot
define the boundaries of sentient and moral humanity and, if it requires well-developed cognitive faculties, then major
chunks of what is conventionally considered humanity would be excluded. Moreover, the natural world is a superior
authority to humanity, which is only part of the natural world, and one could therefore argue that the amoral constitution
of Nature precludes any Natural Rights other than those that could be conferred by the Supreme Being.
Hence, one must conclude that there is no proof that there is anything natural that is, immutable, fundamental or innate
about Natural Rights. It is plausible that there is a system of Natural Rights instituted by a Supreme Being but it is
much less plausible that man could ever discover them through rational reasoning. It is likely, although not certain, that no
Natural Rights other than perhaps the right to survive can be derived from Nature. It is plausible, although not likely, that
rights to equality can be derived from a common humanity but their purvey would certainly exclude much of conventional
humanity. Hence, the large majority of the evidence suggests that there is nothing natural about Natural Rights but
does not prove it.
This conclusion may, ironically, lead to several Natural Rights. Bertrand Russell, in The Problems of Philosophy, says
it must be admitted that we can never prove the existence of things other than ourselves and our experiences. No
logical absurdity results from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and my thoughts and feelings and
sensations, and that everything else is mere fancy.
6
If one cannot either prove or disprove the existence of Natural Rights,
a conclusion both Russell and this essay reach, then arguably one must respect someones opinion even if one thinks it is
profoundly wrong. This would make the right to free speech, the right to free thought, and the right to have ones opinions
respected into Natural Rights. However, certain opinions are more likely to be true than others. One cannotknow whether
the sun will rise tomorrow but the opinion that it will is more likely to be true than the opinion that it will not.
Consequently, it is unreasonable to claim that there is a Natural Right to have opinions respected. After all, madness could
be claimed simply to be a minority opinion and few would suggest the rantings of madmen should become respected
beliefs.
The Natural Rights to free speech and free thought are more difficult to refute. However, some opinions are more likely to
be true than others and an opinion is often considered very dangerous if one looks at it from the perspective of another
opinion which one has accepted as fact. For example, the opinion that private profit is good is seen as very dangerous if
one believes in communism. Hence, from a communist standpoint, having a Natural Right to free speech and thought is
dangerous to the whole system. A Natural Right to free speech or thought cannot exist because some thoughts preclude
the legitimacy of other thoughts. It would be impossibly circular to have a Natural Right of free thought, which allowed
for totalitarian thoughts, which did not allow for free thoughts.
Hence, one must conclude that it is likely there is nothing natural about Natural Rights but there may be, and if there
are any Natural Rights then the most natural of these is the right to survive.
Right is the child of law: from real laws come real rights; but from imaginary laws, from laws of nature, fancied and
invented by poets, rhetoricians, and dealers in moral and intellectual poisons, come imaginary rights, a bastard brood of
monsters.
Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies

http://darashpress.com/articles/natural-law-summary-and-critique
NATURAL LAW: A SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE
Written By
WILLIAM O. EINWECHTER
Natural law is one of the more difficult subjects that a person can encounter. Whitehead states: The concept of natural
law is one of the most confused ideas in the history of Western thought.[1] This is due to the fact that there are various
conceptions of natural law, and because even those who are in basic agreement on natural law theory often cannot see eye
to eye on the particulars.
In spite of this confusion, there has been enough agreement among natural law thinkers in the West to make it possible to
give a general summary of the natural law position and to identify its major claims.
NATURAL LAW CLAIMS
Natural law proponents consistently make four claims in regard to natural law: 1) there are unchanging principles of law
that exist in nature (are part of the natural realm) that define for man what is right, just, and good, and which ought to
govern his actions; 2) these principles of law are accessible to all men and are discovered by the right use of reason; 3)
these principles of law apply to all men at all times and in all circumstances; 4) man-made laws (e.g., those promulgated
by the state) are just and authoritative only insofar as they are derivable from the principles of law in nature.[2]
The natural law theory is based on the belief that certain principles of law are inherent in the very nature of things and that
men can discern these by means of reason. There is a natural moral order in the universe; a metaphysical realm reached
through reason, not the senses.[3] Hence, natural law standards are beyond empirical proof:
Unprovable though these principles are, however, they can be known by man because they are self-evident. They are, so
to speak, laws that nature has inscribed upon the heart of man. . . . We hold these truths to be self-evident, said the
authors of the American Declaration of Independence; the advocates of the natural-law theory take this to be the status of
all the fundamental principles of right and justice.[4]
Self-evident truth propositions must serve as their own evidence if they are true they must be self-evident because no
evidence can be gathered from the senses or experience to establish them.[5] Hence, natural law is not perceived through
sensory experience, but is intuitively grasped as being true and right by the mind (right reason) and conscience.
Since natural law is part of the nature of things the knowledge of it is accessible to all men through reason apart from any
supernatural revelation. God may be the source of natural law, but he has inscribed his moral law in nature and in man
(who is a part of nature); hence, there is no need for any further revelation outside of nature itself for the knowledge of the
moral law. The natural law theory holds to the sufficiency of nature and mans intellect (reason) to establish a just
ethical system for man and society apart from special divine revelation.
DEFINITIONS OF NATURAL LAW
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.), the Roman Stoic philosopher, said this concerning the natural law:
There is in fact a true law namely, right reason which is in accordance with nature, applies to all men and is
unchangeable and eternal. By its commands this law summons men to the performance of their duties; by its prohibitions
it restrains them from doing wrong. Its commands and prohibitions always influence good men, but are without effect
upon the bad. To invalidate this law by human legislation is never morally right, nor is it permissible ever to restrict its
operation, and to annul it wholly is impossible. Neither the senate nor the people can absolve us from our obligation to
obey this law, and it requires no Sextus Aelius[6] to expound and interpret it. It will not lay down one rule at Rome and
another at Athens, nor will it be one rule today and another tomorrow. But there will be one law, eternal and
unchangeable, binding at all times upon all peoples; and there will be, as it were, one common master and ruler of men,
namely God, who is the author of this law, its interpreter and its sponsor. The man who will not obey it will abandon his
better self, and, in denying the true nature of man, will thereby suffer the severest of penalties, though he has escaped all
the other consequences which men call punishment.[7]
Ciceros description of natural law is based on the speculations of the Greek philosophers, and is a classic statement of the
position. It summarizes, in its essentials, the views of many non-Christian and Christian natural law theorists.
Significantly, this Stoic concept of natural law was reflected in the Emperor Justinians codification of Roman law, and
has ever since been fundamental to an understanding of Western jurisprudence.[8]
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), the medieval Catholic scholar, sought to reconcile the Greek concept of natural law with
Christian theology. Aquinas began by positing an eternal law the Divine Reason by which God governs the universe
and then proceeded to state that man as a creature has the eternal law imprinted on him and by it derives the natural
inclination to proper acts and ends.[9] Aquinas states:
. . . the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law,
is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the
rational creatures participation of the eternal law.[10]
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the Dutch jurist, in his influential work on international law, The Law of War and Peace,
defined natural law as follows: Natural law is the dictate of right reason, indicating that any act, from its agreement or
disagreement with the rational nature, has in it moral necessity or moral turpitude; and consequently that such act is
commanded or forbidden by God, the author of nature.[11] Grotius held that natural law was universal, unchangeable,
and supreme. He wrote: The law of nature is so immutable that it cannot be changed even by God himself. For though
the power of God be immense, there are some things to which it does not extend. . . . So God himself allows himself to be
judged by this rule.[12]
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), the English philosopher, stated in his treatise on politics,Leviathan, that A law of
nature, lex naturalis, is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is
destructive of his life. . . .[13] The law of nature is thus a dictate of reason.[14]
John Locke (1632-1704), the influential English political philosopher, asserts that: The state of Nature has a law of
Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it. . .
.[15] He states that those who transgress the law of nature declare that they live by another rule than that of reason and
common equity and have renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind.[16] Locke
contends that the law originally given to Adam to govern his actions and those of his descendents was the law of
reason.[17]
Charles Rice, a contemporary Roman Catholic scholar, defines natural law by saying:
Morality is governed by a law built into the nature of man and knowable by reason. Man can know, through the use of his
reason, what is in accord with his nature and therefore good. Every law, however, has to have a lawgiver. Let us say up
front that the natural law makes no ultimate sense without God as its author. As a matter of fact, said Hans Kelsen,
probably the foremost legal positivist of the twentieth century, there is no natural-law doctrine of any importance which
has not an essentially religious character. The natural law is a set of manufacturers directions written into our nature so
that we can discover through reason how we ought to act. The Ten Commandments, and other prescriptions of the divine
law specify some applications of that natural law.[18]
In summary, natural law is the light of reason inherent in us by nature, through which we perceive what we ought to do
and avoid. . . .[19] Hence, natural law, according to its proponents, is the light of reason, the dictates of reason, or
simply, right reason. This Reason is the law.
NATURAL LAW AND THE CHURCH
Because of the prevalence of Stoic influences at the time of the early church many of the church fathers sought to
reconcile grace and revelation with nature and reason, and utilized Stoic concepts of natural law in their social ethics.[20]
During the Middle Ages, natural law was a central part of the churchs social ethics.[21] Henry summarizes the churchs
discussion over natural law during this period:
There was little debate over the ontological existence of the natural law, but there was significant debate as to the
epistemological basis for perceiving the natural law. Augustine maintained that mans fall into sin so thoroughly corrupted
theimago dei within him that revelation and grace were necessary foundations for the right use of reason. Thomas
Aquinas, on the other hand, emphasized the structures of the imago dei which remained intact despite the fall into sin,
suggesting that grace and revelation serve as corrective supplements to the right use of reason. While Augustine did not
deny that even pagans have some concept of natural justice, he obviously placed more emphasis on the supernatural in
social ethics than Aquinas. Generally speaking, Protestant thinkers have generally been Augustinian and Catholic
thinkers have been Thomistic in dealing with the natural law question.[22]
With the coming of the Reformation and a return to the Bible and Augustinianism, the place of natural law in the social
ethic of the church diminished (although it retained its prominence among the Roman Catholics, as it does to this day).
Even though John Calvin taught that natural law (which he identified as equity) was normative in civil law and social
ethics,[23]the whole system of his theology led to an undermining of the natural law view on social ethics. Therefore,
those who adhered to the Calvinistic system began to move away increasingly from natural law to a more biblical
formulation of civil law, culminating in the explicit biblical law perspective of the Scottish Covenanters and English and
New England Puritans.
However, the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on the power of mans reason to discover truth apart from supernatural
revelation, led to a revival of natural law thinking in the Protestant church. Deism, operating from an Enlightenment
perspective, championed both natural theology and natural law as normative for reasonable men. Even those in the
church who resisted the heterodox teaching of Deism and retained their belief in miracles and the inspiration of the
Scriptures, were often deeply influenced by the rationalism of Deism. This had an impact on their development of social
and civil ethics. In principle, they affirmed both the authority of Scripture and the normative power of right reason
(natural law). But in constructing their philosophy of law, civil government, and social ethics, the weight of authority was
given almost entirely to reason.
John Locke is a good example of those who affirmed orthodoxy but in practice followed the rationalism of the
Enlightenment; therefore, for Locke reason is preeminent in civil law and civil government. The influence of Locke and
Deism in giving the weight of authority to reason and natural law was pervasive among Americas founding fathers at the
time of Declaration of Independence. So even though the founders (most of whom were members of orthodox churches)
often spoke of the Bible and the Christian religion as essential to good government and liberty, their epistemology was
deeply tainted with rationalism.
The predominately natural law basis of the Declaration and the Constitution of 1787 took root (along with its relative,
democratic pluralism) as part of the civil religion of the United States, a religion supported by nearly all the churches.
Later, with rise of the social gospel and modernism, coupled with the popularity of dispensational pietism, evangelicals
and fundamentalists largely withdrew from active participation in political and social matters.
The moral decline of America and the increasing intrusion of the state into all aspects of life has led to a recent resurgence
of political and social activity by the evangelical church. But on what basis shall the church engage the world in the civil
sphere in seeking to promote justice? A principal evangelical answer is natural law.[24] Charles Colson says: Belief in
natural law whether one believes that law is God-given or exists on a more intuitive level is the only real basis we
have to support moral positions.[25] David Jones urges Christians to avoid warfare in the public arena by promoting
justice through an appeal to objective moral law, i.e., natural law, of which there is a universal awareness. Jones
believes that natural law provides common ground for believers and unbelievers to discuss public policy. He contends
that the use of the Bible should be avoided, and Christians should appeal to the broader base of human experience in
promoting the public good . . . persuading people reasonably, appealing to a sense of justice held in common by all who
bear Gods image.[26]
Norman Geisler denounces the theonomic perspective on civil law, and argues that the Christian position on social ethics
must be grounded in natural law.[27] He contends that, Government is not based on special revelation, such as the Bible.
It is based on Gods general revelation to all men. . .; thus, civil law is determined by the natural moral law and not the
written text of the Bible.[28] Alan Johnson calls evangelicals to natural moral law (NML) as an important aspect of their
ethic:
Therefore an evangelical ethic, which is a fully Christian ethic, though it will necessarily be a serious Biblical ethic will
never be merely a Biblical ethic. Not all moral obligation is rooted in Scripture. Neither is all moral obligation rooted in
NML. It is important to recognize that there are two chief sources of ethical knowledge that must be incorporated
dialogically into any serious evangelical Christian ethic . . . especially in the area of social ethics.[29]
Thus, with the revival of evangelical interest in political and social ethics, there has been a corresponding revival of a
natural law perspective in the church. The current natural law doctrine of the evangelical church is a mixture of revelation
and reason; it recognizes the importance of the Bible for informing our understanding, but allows reason is the principal
authority for devising a just social order.
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL REVELATION
The Christian acceptance of natural law finds its entrance through the biblical doctrine of natural revelation. It is on the
basis of what the Bible says about natural revelation that Christian thinkers have sought common ground with the Greek
and Stoic concepts of natural law, and have attempted to incorporate the philosophy of natural law into Christian theology
and ethics.
According to Scripture, God reveals Himself to man through natural revelation. Natural revelation includes the knowledge
of Gods existence, power, glory, and attributes through His works (creation and providence) in the natural realm (Ps.
19:1-6; Acts 14:17; 17:23-31; Rom. 1:19-21), and the knowledge of Gods moral law through mans mind and conscience
(Rom. 1:26-32; 2:14-15). This disclosure is called natural revelation because it is truth made known to man through the
created realm and is perceived apart from any special revelation from God. This natural revelation is sounding forth its
message at all times and in all places (Ps. 19:2-4), speaking of the presence and glory of God and of mans responsibility
to worship God and live according to His moral law. It leaves men without excuse and justly condemns them if they fail to
worship God (Rom. 1:18, 20, 25) or carry out the work of the law written in their hearts (Rom. 2:15).
The moral law revealed through natural revelation in the mind and conscience of man is usually referred to as natural
law. Man was created in the image of God in righteousness and true holiness. He was not neutral in his ethical
perspective, nor a blank slate upon which experience would write the moral law. Man had the impress of Gods moral law
stamped upon his mind and conscience as one made in Gods image. Turretin says that the natural law is rightly
described by common practical notions, or the light and dictation of conscience (which God has engraven by nature upon
every individual, to distinguish between virtue and vice, and to know the things to be avoided and the things to be
done).[30] Gill describes the natural moral law given to Adam as follows:
The natural law, or law of nature, given to Adam, was concreated with him, written on his heart, and engraved and
imprinted in his nature from the beginning of his existence; by which he was acquainted with the will of his Maker, and
directed to observe it; which appears from the remains of it in the hearts of all men, and even of the Gentiles; and from
that natural conscience in every man, which if not by some means lulled asleep, that it does not perform its office, excuses
men from blame when they do well, and accuses them, and charges them with guilt when they do ill, Rom. ii. 14, 15.[31]
There is, therefore, biblical warrant for a concept of natural law, if (and only if) one interprets that concept within the
parameters of the biblical doctrine of natural revelation. Natural law, in that context, is the knowledge of Gods law and of
His righteous judgment as imparted to man through the activity of the mind and conscience. The natural law imprinted
upon mans nature is part of the image of God in man and enables him to function as a responsible moral agent.
However, it must be recognized that this concept of natural law is radically different in its presuppositions than the Greek
and Stoic notions of natural law. The natural law of the philosophers is a theory of ethics devised by autonomous man to
facilitate his rebellion against God and His law-word (Rom. 1:18-25, Ps. 2:1-3). Thus, the attempt to reconcile the Greek
concept of natural law with the biblical concept of natural revelation is an attempt to reconcile human autonomy (i.e., the
sovereignty of reason) with Gods sovereignty. But the claimed autonomy of Athens cannot be reconciled with the
covenantal submission of Jerusalem. All attempts to build a Christian natural law theory on the basis of Greek and Stoic
concepts of natural law lead to the introduction of human autonomy into Christian ethics.
Therefore, Christians must not be fooled by the apparent agreement between pagan theories of natural law and the biblical
concept of natural revelation and be drawn into a natural law perspective on social and political ethics, even if it purports
to be Christian. The Word of God, in fact, calls us to build our knowledge of the moral law, not on natural revelation, but
on the foundation of special revelation, Gods written Word.
NATURAL LAW FOUND WANTING
Scripture teaches that natural law, whether one understands it in the Greek or Stoic sense, as part of natural revelation, or
as a mixture of reason and revelation (e.g., Thomism), cannot serve as the standard for knowing the moral law or for
Christian ethics. Consider the following:
1. The fall of man and the resultant curse upon nature make natural law an imperfect and unreliable standard for the moral
law.
Because of sin, mans reason and conscience have been corrupted; therefore, these cannot be reliable sources for the
knowledge of right and wrong, justice and injustice. The Bible says that fallen man seeks to suppress the truth of God, in
his unrighteousness (Rom. 1:18); that his heart is darkened and full of foolish imaginations (Rom. 1:21); that ways that
seem right to him are often the ways of death (Prov. 16:25); that his heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately
wicked (Jer. 17:9; Gen. 6:5); that his conscience can be seared (1 Tim. 4:2); that his mind and conscience is defiled
(Titus 1:15); and that his carnal mind is not subject to the law of God but at enmity with it (Rom. 8:7).
This darkened, carnal, foolish mind, this defiled conscience is the means of knowing and establishing the moral law? Yes,
says the theory of natural law. We say, God forbid! The objective standard of Gods own infallible Word alone can suffice
to reveal His moral law.
Furthermore, nature itself is under the curse (Gen. 3:17-19; Rom. 8:19-22). Nature cannot be normative, even in an
unfallen worldto make it such is a form of idolatry, worshipping the creature rather than the Creator[32] how much
more in a world cursed by sin. As Rushdoony notes: For the Christian, however, nature is not the standard, because the
world of nature is a fallen world, a world in rebellion against God and infected by sin and death. For a standard, we must
look beyond nature to God.[33]
2. As a creature man stands in need of the Word of his Creator to properly interpret the world and understand Gods will.
Even before the fall man needed positive law (i.e., the explicit commandments of God) in addition to reason and
conscience to know Gods will for him (Gen. 1:28-30; 2:16-17). If unfallen man needed the Word of God to understand
the moral law, it is certain that fallen man stands in greater need of that Word.
But Gods Word in the form of positive law is not simply a remedy for the fall, it is a necessary part of the relationship
between God and man; to advocate the sufficiency of natural law is to introduce the alien concept of human autonomy
into that relationship. The serpent said that men could set aside the Word of God and be gods, determining good and evil
for themselves. Natural law theory follows that lie.
3. The Bible contains no commands or admonitions for men to seek a knowledge of the moral law in natural law.
There is no positive law from God to commend natural law to men as the source of knowing Gods will for men or
nations. Rather, the Bible is filled with commands for men to seek a knowledge of God and His law through His Word
(e.g., Prov. 2:1-9). Given the perspective of the necessity of the Word of God for man and the reality of the fall, it is
obvious why God does not call men to use right reason and seek out His will in natural law. When the preacher
concludes that the whole duty of man is to fear God, and keep his commandments (Ecc. 12:13), he is calling all men in
all nations and in all relations to obey biblical law; natural law is not based in the fear of God and has no
commandments.
4. The Great Commission charges the church with the task of discipling the nations in the Word of God.
Jesus said we are to teach the nations to be obedient to all that He has commanded. The proclamation of the lordship of
Christ demands that men abandon their autonomy (and, thus, their natural law theories!), and submit to Christs Word as
the final authority in all spheres of life. It is not the mission of the church to call the nations to observe all things
whatsoever the dictates of reason teacheth! There is no warrant anywhere in Scripture for the church to disciple the
nations in natural law theory.
5. The prophetic Scriptures picture a day when all nations will seek a knowledge of Gods ways (e.g., His moral law) in
His Word and through the teaching ministry of the church.
According to Scripture, a day is coming when out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from
Jerusalem (Isa. 2:2-3). The triumph of Gods kingdom in the world is depicted here, not in terms of men using right
reason to discover natural law, but in terms of men repenting of their autonomy and earnestly seeking a knowledge of the
law of God as revealed in His Word.
Natural law has never been a part of the churchs preaching mandate, nor will a discovery of natural law principles among
the nations be the sign of her triumph. So why do Christians advocate natural law as the standard for socio-political
ethics?
6. The duty of Christians is to overthrow human autonomy and bring all areas of life under the authority of Christ's Word.
We are called to use the weapons of our warfare in casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself
against the knowledge of God, bringing every thought to the obedience of Christ (2 Cor. 10:4, 5). Natural law theory is
an imagination that exalts mans reason over Gods revealed law-word. Therefore, instead of promoting natural law
ethics, the church is called to demolish natural law speculation and bring all spheres of life (including the socio-political)
under the authority of the Word of Christ. The church and the world has been spoiled through the philosophy and vain
deceit of natural law thinking (Col. 2:8) for long enough. In Christ (the true Logos), are hidden all the treasures of
wisdom and knowledge (Col. 2:3) for ethics; these things are certainly not hid in nature, to be discovered by mans
reason.
7. Men do not know nor can they agree on the content of natural law.
Natural law, based as it is in each mans ability to discern it through reason and conscience, is unwritten law, subjective,
and imprecise. In spite of all the untold hours men have spent in the discussion and development of natural law theories,
there exists no agreed upon detailed codification of the so-called laws of nature. All that exists are formulations of
commonly agreed upon ethical standards that are so general and vague as to be almost useless: Good is to be pursued and
evil is to be avoided. But what is the good? That is the question! It is amazing how few are the self-evident truths of
natural law that men can recognize and agree on!
This weakness of natural law is explained by Brame: Men who claim the ability to identify natural law apart from the
written Word understate the importance of an unchanging written standard and grossly overestimate our ability to agree
on fundamental issues. These assumptions suggest that mans mind and will are not radically affected by the Fall, but the
historical record suggests otherwise. . . .[34] Furthermore, law that is not rooted in explicit commands of Scripture
would be at best abstract, vague, and esoteric. It could neither guide legislation and adjudication nor check abuses by
government, and could be rapidly captured and perverted by an elite, and can offer no objective basis for determining the
appropriate sanction for violations of the law.[35]
Natural law ultimately leads to relativism,[36] because the standard of law is the subjective dictates of reason; so the
positive law of the state becomes relative to what those in power think is just and right. An unwritten natural law cannot
effectively restrain or guide those who govern, and thus it leaves us with what Archie Jones calls pragmatic, seat-of-the-
pants lawmaking.[37]
In contrast to the abstract, unwritten, and imprecise natural law which has to be unveiled by mans fallible reason stands
the Word of God. The Bible gives the revelation of Gods moral law with the precision of written law. Biblical law is
perfect, objective, comprehensive, detailed, and infallible (Ps. 19:7-12), giving man all the knowledge he needs to answer
all the moral question for every sphere of life (2 Tim. 3:16-17); it is the only sound basis for ethics and for building a just
and lasting civil order.
8. Natural law theories (even Christian versions) surrender the absolute authority of Gods Word to interpret the moral
dimension of life.
Natural laws insistence on the ability of human reason to discover moral law apart from divine supernatural revelation
exalts mans mind and conscience over Gods Word. The fatal danger of natural law epistemology is that it makes God
and His Word unneccesary for the knowledge of moral norms. Since the object of knowledge is inherent in the natural
realm and the means of discerning this knowledge is mans own unaided reason, what need have men of God (except as a
distant, impersonal first cause) and the Bible?
Since natural law makes the active presence of God through His Word unnecessary for ethics, it also tends to makes God
and the Bible irrelevant. This fact helps elucidate an earlier observation that the theory of natural law was devised by
autonomous man to facilitate his rebellion against God and His law-word; natural law theory is part of mans suppression
of the truth (Rom. 1:18). The sad thing is that when Christians advocate natural law instead of biblical law, they
unwittingly aid that rebellion.
CONCLUSION
Rushdoony states: From the beginning, man, in trying to understand what law must be, has been seduced by the concept
of natural law as against the biblical insistence on supernatural law.[38] May God be pleased to end that seduction
among His people so that they may be equipped with the infallible Word of God, the sword of the Spirit, as they go
forth to expand the kingdom of God and establish justice in the earth.
Natural law may seem to suffice for those who have no higher vision than the restoration of family values or
traditional values to our culture. But for those who understand the rebellious autonomy inherent in natural law theory;
for those who desire to bring every sphere of life under the authority of God and His Word; for those who long to see the
crown rights of Jesus Christ acknowledged by all including presidents, governors, senators, representatives, judges,
and we the people natural law theory must be firmly rejected. In its place, there must be an explicit biblical standard
for law and ethics; the standard declared by Isaiah: To the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this
word, it is because there is no light in them (Isa. 8:20).

John Stuart Mill
Man is free the only limitation of that freedom is the freedom of others.


Law is not separate from morality because law is a mean of social control, so the state can protect its people.