Following is a letter allegedly from February 1914 and from the then Russian Imperial Minister of

Interior Pyotr Nikolayevih !urnovo to "mperor Niholas II in whih !urnovo puts the blame for the
imminent #armed onflit between two groups of powers$ on #"ngland$ %as he refers to her& and at
the same time stresses the need for Russia to improve relations with 'ermany as the two empires(
aording to him( have no onfliting interests) *n the other hand( most of !urnovo+s preditions
ontained in the letter( if it is not a fake( as to soial upheaval that would strike both Russia and
'ermany in the aftermath of the impending war proved aurate)
"ven if not from 1914( whih an ertainly be heked( the te,t onstitutes a very good read in the
eve of the forthoming markings of the 1--
th
anniversary of ..I and the manifest intent of both
'ermany and /ritain to e,onerate themselves of all blame for the war by putting it on 'avrilo
Prinip+s shoulders and the 0erbs)
b)
A Future Anglo-German War Will Become an Armed Conflict between Two Groups
of Powers
1he entral fator of the period of world history through whih we are now passing is the
rivalry between "ngland and 'ermany) 1his rivalry must inevitably lead to an armed
struggle between them( the issue of whih will( in all probability( prove fatal to the
van2uished side) 1he interests of these two powers are far too inompatible( and their
simultaneous e,istene as world powers will sooner or later prove impossible) *n the one
hand( there is an insular 0tate( whose world importane rests upon its domination of the
sea( its world trade( and its innumerable olonies) *n the other( there is a powerful
ontinental empire( whose limited territory is insuffiient for an inreased population) It has
therefore openly and andidly delared that its future is on the seas) It has( with fabulous
speed( developed an enormous world ommere( built for its protetion a formidable navy(
and( with its famous trademark( 3Made in 'ermany(3 reated a mortal danger to the
industrial and eonomi prosperity of its rival) Naturally( "ngland annot yield without a
fight( and between her and 'ermany a struggle for life or death is inevitable)
1he armed onflit impending as a result of this rivalry annot be onfined to a duel
between "ngland and 'ermany alone) 1heir resoures are far too une2ual( and( at the
same time( they are not suffiiently vulnerable to eah other) 'ermany ould provoke
rebellion in India( in 0outh 4fria( and( espeially( a dangerous rebellion in Ireland( and
paraly5e "nglish sea trade by means of pirateering and( perhaps( submarine warfare(
thereby reating for 'reat /ritain diffiulties in her food supply6 but( in spite of all the daring
of the 'erman military leaders( they would sarely risk landing in "ngland( unless a
fortunate aident helped them to destroy or appreiably to weaken the "nglish navy) 4s
for "ngland( she will find 'ermany absolutely invulnerable) 4ll that she may ahieve is to
sei5e the 'erman olonies( stop 'erman sea trade( and( in the most favourable event(
annihilate the 'erman navy( but nothing more) 1his( however( would not fore the enemy
to sue for peae) 1here is no doubt( therefore( that "ngland will attempt the means she
has more than one used with suess( and will risk armed ation only after seuring
partiipation in the war( on her own side( of powers stronger in a strategi sense) /ut sine
'ermany( for her own part( will not be found isolated( the future 4nglo7'erman war will
1
undoubtedly be transformed into an armed onflit between two groups of powers( one
with a 'erman( the other with an "nglish orientation)

It Is Hard to Discoer An! "eal Adantages to "ussia in "approc#ement wit#
$ngland
8ntil the Russo79apanese .ar( Russian poliy has neither orientation) From the time of
the reign of "mperor 4le,ander 111( Russia had a defensive alliane with Frane( so firm
as to assure ommon ation by both powers in the event of attak upon either( but( at the
same time( not so lose as to obligate either to support unfailingly( with armed fore( all
politial ations and laims of the ally) 4t the same time( the Russian :ourt maintained the
traditional friendly relations( based upon ties of blood( with the :ourt of /erlin) *wing
preisely to this on;unture( peae among the great powers was not disturbed in the
ourse of a great many years( in spite of the presene of abundant ombustible material in
"urope) Frane( by her alliane with Russia( was guaranteed against attak by 'ermany6
the latter was safe( thanks to the tried paifism and friendship of Russia( from revanhist
ambitions on the part of Frane6 and Russia was seured( thanks to 'ermany<s need of
maintaining amiable relations with her( against e,essive intrigues by 4ustria7=ungary in
the /alkan Peninsula) >astly( "ngland( isolated and held in hek by her rivalry with
Russia in Persia( by her diplomats< traditional fear of our advane on India( and by strained
relations with Frane( espeially notable at the time of the well7known Fashoda inident(
viewed with alarm the inrease of 'ermany<s naval power( without( however( risking an
ative step)
1he Russo79apanese .ar radially hanged the relations among the great powers and
brought "ngland out of her isolation) 4s we know( all through the Russo79apanese .ar(
"ngland and 4meria observed benevolent neutrality toward 9apan( while we en;oyed a
similar benevolent neutrality from Frane and 'ermany) =ere( it would seem( should have
been the ineption of the most natural politial ombination for us) /ut after the war( our
diplomay faed abruptly about and definitely entered upon the road toward
rapprohement with "ngland) Frane was drawn into the orbit of /ritish poliy6 there was
formed a group of powers of the 1riple "ntente( with "ngland playing the dominant part6
and a lash( sooner or later( with the powers grouping themselves around 'ermany
beame inevitable)
Now( what advantages did the renuniation of our traditional poliy of distrust of "ngland
and the rupture of neighbourly( if not friendly( relations with 'ermany promise us then and
at present?
:onsidering with any degree of are the events whih have taken plae sine the 1reaty of
Portsmouth( we find it diffiult to pereive any pratial advantages gained by us in
rapprohement with "ngland) 1he only benefit7improved relations with 9apan7is sarely a
result of the Russo7"nglish rapprohement) 1here is no reason why Russia and 9apan
should not live in peae6 there seems to be nothing over whih they need 2uarrel) 4ll
Russia<s ob;etives in the Far "ast( if orretly understood( are entirely ompatible with
9apan<s interests) 1hese ob;etives( in their essentials( are very modest) 1he too broad
@
sweep of the imagination of over5ealous e,eutive offiials( without basis in genuine
national interests( on the one hand( and the e,essive nervousness and impressionability
of 9apan( on the other( whih erroneously regarded these dreams as a onsistently
e,euted poliy7these were the things that provoked a lash whih a more apable
diplomay would have managed to avoid)
Russia needs neither Aorea nor even Port 4rthur) 4n outlet to the open sea is undoubtedly
useful( but the sea in itself is( after all( not a market( but merely a road to a more
advantageous delivery of goods at the onsuming markets) 4s a matter of fat( we do not
possess( and shall not for a long time possess any goods in the Far "ast that promise any
onsiderable profits in e,portation abroad) Nor are there any markets for the e,port of our
produts) .e annot e,pet a great supply of our e,port ommodities to go to industrially
and agriulturally developed 4meria( to poor( but likewise industrial( 9apan( or even to the
maritime setions of :hina and remoter markets( where our e,ports would inevitably meet
the ompetition of goods from the industrially stronger rival powers) 1here remains the
interior of :hina( with whih our trade is arried on( hiefly overland) :onse2uently( an
open port would aid the import of foreign merhandise more than the e,port of our own
produts)
9apan( on her part( no matter what is said( has no desire for our Far "astern possessions)
1he 9apanese are by nature a southern people( and the harsh environment of our Far
"astern borderland annot attrat them) .e know that even within 9apan itself northern
Be5o is sparsely populated( while apparently 9apanese oloni5ation is making little
headway even in the southern part of 0akhalin Island( eded to 9apan under the 1reaty of
Portsmouth) 4fter taking possession of Aorea and Formosa( 9apan will hardly go farther
north( and her ambitions( it may be assumed( will turn rather in the diretion of the
Philippine Islands( Indo7:hina( 9ava( 0umatra( and /orneo) 1he most she might desire
would be the a2uisition( for purely ommerial reasons( of a few more setions of the
Manhurian railway)
In a word( peaeable oe,istene( nay( more( a lose rapprohement( between Russia
and 9apan in the Far "ast is perfetly natural( regardless of any mediation by "ngland)
1he grounds for agreement are self7evident) 9apan is not a rih ountry( and the
simultaneous upkeep of a strong army and a powerful navy is hard for her) =er insular
situation drives her to strengthen her naval power( and alliane with Russia would allow
her to devote all her attention to her navy( espeially vital in view of her imminent rivalry
with 4meria( leaving the protetion of her interests on the ontinent to Russia) *n our
part( we( having the 9apanese navy to protet our Paifi oast( ould give up one and for
all the dream( impossible to us( of reating a navy in the Far "ast)
1hus( so far as our relations with 9apan are onerned( the rapprohement with "ngland
has yielded us no real advantage) 4nd it has gained us nothing in the sense of
strengthening our position in Manhuria( Mongolia( or even the 8lianghai territory( where
the unertainty of our position bears witness that the agreement with "ngland has ertainly
not freed the hands of our diplomats) *n the ontrary( our attempt to establish relations
with 1ibet met with sharp opposition from "ngland)
C
In Persia( also( our position has been no better sine the onlusion of this agreement)
"very one realls our predominant influene in that ountry under the 0hah Nasr7"ddin(
that is( e,atly at a time when our relations with "ngland were most strained) From the
moment of our aord with the latter( we have found ourselves drawn into a number of
strange attempts to impose upon the Persian people an entirely needless onstitution( with
the result that we ourselves ontributed to the overthrow( for the benefit of our inveterate
enemies( of a monarh who was devoted to Russia) 1hat is( not only have we gained
nothing( but we have suffered a loss all along the line( ruining our prestige and wasting
many millions of roubles( even the preious blood of Russian soldiers( who were
treaherously slain and( to please "ngland( not even avenged)
1he worst results( however( of the aord with "ngland77and of the onse2uent disord
with 'ermany77have been felt in the Near "ast) 4s we know( it was /ismark who oined
that winged phrase about the /alkan problem not being worth to 'ermany the bones of a
single Pomeranian grenadier) >ater the /alkan ompliations began to attrat muh more
attention from 'erman diplomay( whih had taken the 30ik Man3 under its protetion( but
even then 'ermany( for a long time( failed to show any inlination to endanger relations
with Russia in the interests of /alkan affairs) 1he proofs are patent) !uring the period of
the Russo79apanese .ar and the ensuing turmoil in our ountry( it would have been very
easy for 4ustria to reali5e her herished ambitions in the /alkan Peninsula) /ut at that
time Russia had not yet linked her destinies with "ngland( and 4ustria7=ungary was fored
to lose an opportunity most auspiious for her purposes)
No sooner had we taken the road to loser aord with "ngland( however( than there
immediately followed the anne,ation of /osnia and =er5egovina( a step that might have
been taken so easily and painlessly in 19-D or 19-E) Ne,t ame the 4lbanian 2uestion and
the ombination with the Prine of .ied) Russian diplomay attempted to answer 4ustrian
intrigue by forming a /alkan league( but this ombination( as might have been e,peted(
proved to be 2uite unworkable) Intended to be direted against 4ustria( it immediately
turned on 1urkey and fell apart in the proess of dividing the spoils taken from the latter)
1he final result was merely the definite attahment of 1urkey to 'ermany( in whom( not
without good reason( she sees her sole protetor) In short( the Russo7/ritish
rapprohement evidently seems to 1urkey as tantamount to "ngland<s renouning her
traditional poliy of losing the !ardanelles to us( while the reation of the /alkan league(
under the auspies of Russia( appeared as a diret threat to the ontinued e,istene of
1urkey as a "uropean power)
1o sum up( the 4nglo7Russian aord has brought us nothing of pratial value up to this
time( while for the future( it threatens us with an inevitable armed lash with 'ermany)

Fundamental Alignments in t#e Coming War
8nder what onditions will this lash our and what will be its probable onse2uenes?
1he fundamental groupings in a future war are self7evidentF Russia( Frane( and "ngland(
on the one side( with 'ermany( 4ustria( and 1urkey( on the other) It is more than likely that
other powers( too( will partiipate in that war( depending upon irumstanes as they may
4
e,ist at the war<s outbreak) /ut( whether the immediate ause for the war is furnished by
another lash of onfliting interests in the /alkans( or by a olonial inident( suh as that
of 4lgeiras( the fundamental alignment will remain unhanged)
Italy( if she has any oneption of her real interests( will not ;oin the 'erman side) For
politial as well as eonomi reasons( she undoubtedly hopes to e,pand her present
territory) 0uh an e,pansion may be ahieved only at the e,pense of 4ustria( on one hand(
and 1urkey( on the other) It is( therefore( natural for Italy not to ;oin that party whih would
safeguard the territorial integrity of the ountries at whose e,pense she hopes to reali5e
her aspirations) Furthermore( it is not out of the 2uestion that Italy would ;oin the anti7
'erman oalition( if the sales of war should inline in its favour( in order to seure for
herself the most favourable onditions in sharing the subse2uent division of spoils)
In this respet( the position of Italy is similar to the probable position of Rumania( whih( it
may be assumed( will remain neutral until the sales of fortune favour one or another side)
1hen( animated by normal politial self7interest( she will attah herself to the vitors( to be
rewarded at the e,pense of either Russia or 4ustria) *f the other /alkan 0tates( 0erbia
and Montenegro will un2uestionably ;oin the side opposing 4ustria( while /ulgaria and
4lbania %if by that time they have not yet formed at least the embryo of a 0tate& will take
their stand against the 0erbian side) 'reee will in all probability remain neutral or make
ommon ause with the side opposing 1urkey( but that only after the issue has been more
or less determined) 1he partiipation of other powers will be inidental( and 0weden ought
to be feared( of ourse( in the ranks of our foes)
8nder suh irumstanes( a struggle with 'ermany presents to us enormous diffiulties(
and will re2uire ountless sarifies) .ar will not find the enemy unprepared( and the
degree of his preparedness will probably e,eed our most e,aggerated alulations) It
should not be thought that this readiness is due to 'ermany<s own desire for war) 0he
needs no war( so long as she an attain her ob;et7the end of e,lusive domination of the
seas) /ut( one this vital ob;et is opposed by the oalition( 'ermany will not shrink from
war( and( of ourse( will even try to provoke it( hoosing the most auspiious moment)
T#e %ain Burden of t#e War Will Fall on "ussia
1he main burden of the war will undoubtedly fall on us( sine "ngland is hardly apable of
taking a onsiderable part in a ontinental war( while Frane( poor in man power( will
probably adhere to stritly defensive tatis( in view of the enormous losses by whih war
will be attended under present onditions of military tehni2ue) 1he part of a battering ram(
making a breah in the very thik of the 'erman defene( will be ours( with many fators
against us to whih we shall have to devote great effort and attention)
From the sum of these unfavourable fators we should dedut the Far "ast) /oth 4meria
and 9apan77the former fundamentally( and the latter by virtue of her present politial
orientation77are hostile to 'ermany( and there is no reason to e,pet them to at on the
'erman side) Furthermore( the war( regardless of its issue( will weaken Russia and divert
her attention to the .est( a fat that( of ourse( serves both 9apanese and 4merian
interests) 1hus( our rear will be suffiiently seure in the Far "ast( and the most that an
D
happen there will be the e,tortion from us of some onessions of an eonomi nature in
return for benevolent neutrality) Indeed( it is possible that 4meria or 9apan may ;oin the
anti7'erman side( but( of ourse( merely as usurpers of one or the other of the unproteted
'erman olonies)
1here an be no doubt( however( as to an outburst of hatred for us in Persia( and a
probable unrest among the Moslems of the :auasus and 1urkestan6 it is possible that
4fghanistan( as a result of that unrest( may at against us6 and( finally( we must foresee
very unpleasant ompliations in Poland and Finland) In the latter( a rebellion will
undoubtedly break out if 0weden is found in the ranks of our enemies) 4s for Poland( it is
not to be e,peted that we an hold her against our enemy during the war) 4nd after she is
in his power( he will undoubtedly endeavour to provoke an insurretion whih( while not in
reality very dangerous( must be onsidered( nevertheless( as one of the fators
unfavourable to us( espeially sine the influene of our allies may indue us to take suh
measures in our relations with Poland as will prove more dangerous to us than any open
revolt)
4re we prepared for so stubborn a war as the future war of the "uropean nations will
undoubtedly beome? 1his 2uestion we must answer( without evasion( in the negative)
1hat muh has been done for our defene sine the 9apanese war( I am the last person to
deny( but even so( it is 2uite inade2uate onsidering the unpreedented sale on whih a
future war will inevitably be fought) 1he fault lies( in a onsiderable measure( in our young
legislative institutions( whih have taken a dilettante interest in our defenes( but are far
from grasping the seriousness of the politial situation arising from the new orientation
whih( with the sympathy of the publi( has been followed in reent years by our Ministry of
Foreign 4ffairs)
1he enormous number of still unonsidered legislative bills of the war and navy
departments may serve as proof of thisF for e,ample( the plan of the organi5ation of our
national defene proposed to the !uma as early as the days of 0eretary of 0tate
0tolypin) It annot be denied that( in the matter of military instrution( aording to the
reports of speialists( we have ahieved substantial improvements( as ompared with the
time before the 9apanese .ar) 4ording to the same speialists( our field artillery leaves
nothing to be desired6 the gun is entirely satisfatory( and the e2uipment onvenient and
pratial) Bet( it must be admitted that there are substantial shortomings in the
organi5ation of our defenes)
In this regard we must note( first of all( the insuffiieny of our war supplies( whih(
ertainly( annot be blamed upon the war department( sine the supply shedules are still
far from being e,euted( owing to the low produtivity of our fatories) 1his insuffiieny of
munitions is the more signifiant sine( in the embryoni ondition of our industries( we
shall( during the war( have no opportunity to make up the revealed shortage by our own
efforts( and the losing of the /alti as well as the /lak 0ea will prevent the importation
from abroad of the defene materials whih we lak)
4nother irumstane unfavourable to our defene is its far too great dependene(
generally speaking( upon foreign industry( a fat whih( in onnetion with the above noted
E
interruption of more or less onvenient ommuniations with abroad( will reate a series of
obstales diffiult to overome) 1he 2uantity of our heavy artillery( the importane of whih
was demonstrated in the 9apanese .ar( is far too inade2uate( and there are few mahine
guns) 1he organi5ation of our fortress defenes has sarely been started( and even the
fortress of Reval( whih is to defend the road to the apital( is not yet finished)
1he network of strategi railways is inade2uate) 1he railways possess a rolling stok
suffiient( perhaps( for normal traffi( but not ommensurate with the olossal demands
whih will be made upon them in the event of a "uropean war) >astly( it should not be
forgotten that the impending war will be fought among the most ivili5ed and tehnially
most advaned nations) "very previous war has invariably been followed by something
new in the realm of military tehni2ue( but the tehnial bakwardness of our industries
does not reate favourable onditions for our adoption of the new inventions)
T#e &ital Interests of German! and "ussia do not Conflict
4ll these fators are hardly given proper thought by our diplomats( whose behaviour
toward 'ermany is( in some respets( even aggressive( and may unduly hasten the
moment of armed onflit( a moment whih( of ourse( is really inevitable in view of our
/ritish orientation)
1he 2uestion is whether this orientation is orret( and whether even a favourable issue of
the war promises us suh advantages as would ompensate us for all the hardships and
sarifies whih must attend a war unparalleled in its probable strain)
1he vital interests of Russia and 'ermany do not onflit) 1here are fundamental grounds
for a peaeable e,istene of these two 0tates) 'ermany<s future lies on the sea( that is( in
a realm where Russia( essentially the most ontinental of the great powers( has no
interests whatever) .e have no overseas olonies( and shall probably never have them(
and ommuniation between the various parts of our empire is easier overland than by
water) No surplus population demanding territorial e,pansion is visible( but( even from the
viewpoint of new on2uests( what an we gain from a vitory over 'ermany? Posen( or
"ast Prussia? /ut why do we need these regions( densely populated as they are by Poles(
when we find it diffiult enough to manage our own Russian Poles? .hy enourage
entripetal tendenies that have not eased even to this day in the Gistula territory by
inorporating in the Russian 0tate the restless Posnanian and "ast Prussian Poles whose
national demands even the 'erman 'overnment( whih is more firm than the Russian(
annot stifle?
",atly the same thing applies to 'aliia) It is obviously disadvantageous to us to anne,(
in the interests of national sentimentalism( a territory that has lost every vital onnetion
with our fatherland) For( together with a negligible handful of 'aliians( Russian in spirit(
how many Poles( 9ews( and 8krainian 8niates we would reeiveH 1he so7alled 8krainian(
or Ma5eppist( movement is not a menae to us at present( but we should not enable it to
e,pand by inreasing the number of turbulent 8krainian elements( for in this movement
there undoubtedly lies the seed of an e,tremely dangerous >ittle Russian separatism
whih( under favourable onditions( may assume 2uite une,peted proportions)
I
1he obvious aim of our diplomay in the rapprohement with "ngland has been to open
the 0traits) /ut a war with 'ermany seems hardly neessary for the attainment of this
ob;et( for it was "ngland( and not 'ermany at all( that losed our outlet from the /lak
0ea) .as it not beause we made sure of the ooperation of the later power( that we freed
ourselves in 1JI1 from the humiliating restritions imposed upon us by "ngland under the
1reaty of Paris?
4lso( there is reason to believe that the 'ermans would agree sooner than the "nglish to
let us have the 0traits( in whih they have only a slight interest( and at the prie of whih
they would gladly purhase our alliane)
Moreover( we should not herish any e,aggerated hopes from our oupation of the
0traits) 1heir a2uisition would be advantageous to us only as they served to lose the
/lak 0ea to others( making it an inland sea for us( safe from enemy attak)
1he 0traits would not give us an outlet to the open sea( however( sine on the other side
of them there lies a sea onsisting almost wholly of territorial waters( a sea dotted with
numerous islands where the /ritish navy( for instane( would have no trouble whatever in
losing to us every inlet and outlet( irrespetive of the 0traits) 1herefore( Russia might
safely welome an arrangement whih( while not turning the 0traits over to our diret
ontrol( would safeguard us against a penetration of the /lak 0ea by an enemy fleet)
0uh an arrangement( attainable under favourable irumstanes without any war( has the
additional advantage that it would not violate the interests of the /alkan 0tates( whih
would not regard our sei5ure of the 0traits without alarm and 2uite natural ;ealousy)
In 1rans7:auasia we ould( as a result of war( e,pand territorially only at the e,pense of
regions inhabited by 4rmenians( a move whih is hardly desirable in view of the
revolutionary harater of present 4rmenian sentiment( and of its dream of a greater
4rmenia6 and in this region( 'ermany( were we allied to her( would ertainly plae even
fewer obstales in our way than "ngland) 1hose territorial and eonomi a2uisitions
whih might really prove useful to us are available only in plaes where our ambitions may
meet opposition from "ngland( but by no means from 'ermany) Persia( the Pamir( Auld;a(
Aashgar( !5ungaria( Mongolia( the 8lianghai territory7all these are regions where the
interests of Russia and 'ermany do not onflit( whereas the interests of Russia and
"ngland have lashed there repeatedly)
4nd 'ermany is in e,atly the same situation with respet to Russia) 0he ould sei5e from
us( in ase of a suessful war( only suh territories as would be of slight value to her( and
beause of their population( would prove of little use for oloni5ation6 the Gistula territory(
with a Polish7>ithuanian population( and the /alti provines( with a >ettish7"stonian
population( are all e2ually turbulent and anti7'erman)
"ussia's $conomic Adantages and (eeds do not Conflict wit# German!'s
It may be argued( however( that( under modern onditions in the various nations( territorial
a2uisitions are of seondary importane( while eonomi interests take first rank) /ut in
this field( again( Russia<s advantages and needs do not onflit with 'ermany<s as muh
as is believed) It is( of ourse( undeniable that the e,isting Russo7'erman trade
J
agreements are disadvantageous to our agriulture and advantageous to 'ermany<s( but it
would be hardly fair to asribe this irumstane to the treahery and unfriendliness of
'ermany)
It should not be forgotten that these agreements are in many of their setions
advantageous to us) 1he Russian delegates who onluded these agreements were
onfirmed protagonists of a development of Russian industry at any ost( and they
undoubtedly made a deliberate sarifie( at least to some e,tent( of the interests of
Russian agriulture to the interests of Russian industry) Furthermore( we ought not to
forget that 'ermany is far from being the diret onsumer of the greater share of our
agriultural e,ports abroad) For the greater share of our agriultural produe( 'ermany
ats merely as intermediary( and so it is for us and the onsuming markets to establish
diret relations and thus avoid the e,pensive 'erman mediation) >astly( we should keep in
mind that the ommerial relations of 0tates depend on their politial understandings( for
no ountry finds advantage in the eonomi weakening of an ally but( onversely( profits
by the ruin of a politial foe) In short( even though it be obvious that the e,isting Russo7
'erman ommerial treaties are not to our advantage( and that 'ermany( in onluding
them( availed herself of a situation that happened to be in her favour7in other words( fored
us to the wall7this ation should have been e,peted from 'ermany and thought of) It
should not( however( be looked upon as a mark of hostility toward us( but rather as an
e,pression of healthy national self7interest( worthy of our emulation) 4side from that( we
observe( in the ase of 4ustria7=ungary( an agriultural ountry that is in a far greater
eonomi dependene upon 'ermany than ours is( but nevertheless is not prevented from
attaining agriultural development suh as we may only dream of)
In view of what has been said( it would seem that the onlusion of a ommerial treaty
with 'ermany( entirely aeptable to Russia( by no means re2uires that 'ermany first be
rushed) It will be 2uite suffiient to maintain neighbourly relations with her( to make a
areful estimate of our real interests in the various branhes of national eonomy( and to
engage in long( insistent bargaining with 'erman delegates( who may be e,peted to
protet the interests of their own fatherland and not ours)
/ut I would go still further and say that the ruin of 'ermany( from the viewpoint of our trade
with her( would be disadvantageous to us) =er defeat would un2uestionably end in a
peae ditated from the viewpoint of "ngland<s eonomi interests) 1he latter will e,ploit to
the farthest limit any suess that falls to her lot( and we will only lose( in a ruined
'ermany without sea routes( a market whih( after all( is valuable to us for our otherwise
unmarketable produts)
In respet to 'ermany<s eonomi future( the interests of Russia and "ngland are
diametrially opposed) For "ngland( it is profitable to kill 'ermany<s maritime trade and
industry( turning her into a poor and( if possible( agriultural ountry) For us( it is of
advantage for 'ermany to develop her sea7going ommere and the industry whih
serves it( so as to supply the remotest world markets( and at the same time open her
domesti market to our agriultural produts( to supply her large working population)
9
/ut6 aside from the ommerial treaties( it has been ustomary to point out the oppressive
harater of 'erman domination in Russian eonomi life( and the systemati penetration
of 'erman oloni5ation into our ountry( as representing a manifest peril to the Russian
0tate) .e believe( however( that fears on these grounds are onsiderably e,aggerated)
1he famous 3!rang nah *sten3 was in its own time natural and understandable( sine
'ermany<s land ould not aommodate her inreased population( and the surplus was
driven in the diretion of the least resistane( i)e)( into a less densely populated
neighbouring ountry) 1he 'erman 'overnment was ompelled to reogni5e the
inevitability of this movement( but ould hardly look upon it as to its own interests) For(
after all( it was 'ermans who were being lost to the influene of the 'erman 0tate( thus
reduing the manpower of their own ountry) Indeed( the 'erman 'overnment made suh
strenuous efforts to preserve the onnetion between its emigrants and their old fatherland
that it adopted even the unusual method of tolerating dual iti5enship) It is ertain(
however( that a onsiderable proportion of 'erman emigrants definitely and irrevoably
settled in their new homes( and slowly broke their ties with the old ountry) 1his fat(
obviously inompatible with 'ermany<s 0tate interests( seems to have been one of the
inentives whih started her upon a olonial poliy and maritime ommere( previously so
alien to her) 4nd at present( as the 'erman olonies inrease and there is an attendant
growth of 'erman industry and naval ommere( the 'erman oloni5ation movement
dereases( in a measure( and the day is not remote when the 3!rang nah *sten3 will
beome nothing more than a sub;et for history)
In any ase( the 'erman oloni5ation( whih undoubtedly onflits with our 0tate interests(
must be stopped( and here( again( friendly relations with 'ermany annot harm us) 1o
e,press a preferene for a 'erman orientation does not imply the advoay of Russian
vassalage to 'ermany( and( while maintaining friendly and neighbourly interourse with
her( we must not sarifie our 0tate interests to this ob;et) /ut 'ermany herself will not
ob;et to measures against the ontinued flow of 'erman olonists into Russia) 1o her( it
is of greater benefit to turn the wave of emigration toward her own olonies) Moreover(
even before 'ermany had olonies( when her industry was not yet suffiiently developed
to employ the entire population( the 'erman 'overnment did not feel ;ustified in protesting
against the restritive measures that were adopted against foreign oloni5ation during the
reign of 4le,ander III)
4s regards the 'erman domination in the field of our eonomi life( this phenomenon
hardly ;ustifies the omplaints usually voied against it) Russia is far too poor( both in
apital and in industrial enterprise( to get along without a large import of foreign apital) 4
ertain amount of dependene upon some kind of foreign apital is( therefore(
unavoidable( until suh time as the industrial enterprise and material resoures of our
population develop to a point where we may entirely forego the servies of foreign
investors and their money) /ut as long as we do re2uire them( 'erman apital is more
advantageous to us than any other)
First and foremost( this apital is heaper than any other( being satisfied with the lowest
margin of profit) 1his( to a large e,tent( e,plains the relative heapness of 'erman
produts( and their gradual displaement of /ritish produts in the markets of the world)
1-
1he lower demands of 'erman apital( as regards returns( have for their onse2uene
'ermany<s readiness to invest in enterprises whih( beause of their relatively small
returns( are shunned by other foreign investors6 also( as a result of that relative heapness
of 'erman apital( its influ, into Russia is attended by a smaller outflow of investors<
profits from Russia( as ompared with Frenh and "nglish investments( and so a larger
amount of roubles remain in Russia) Moreover( a onsiderable proportion of the profits
made on 'erman investments in Russian industry do not leave our ountry at all( but are
spent in Russia)
8nlike the "nglish or Frenh( the 'erman apitalists( in most ases( ome to stay in
Russia( themselves( with their money) It is this very 'erman harateristi whih e,plains
in a onsiderable degree the ama5ing number of 'erman industrialists( manufaturers(
and mill owners in our midst( as ompared with the /ritish and Frenh)
1he latter live in their own ountries( removing from Russia the profits produed by their
enterprises( down to the last kopek) 1he 'erman investors( on the ontrary( live in Russia
for long periods( and not infre2uently settle down permanently) .hatever may be said to
the ontrary( the fat is that the 'ermans( unlike other foreigners( soon feel at home in
Russia and rapidly beome Russiani5ed) .ho has not seen Frenhmen and "nglishmen(
for e,ample( who have spent almost their whole lives in Russia and yet do not speak a
word of Russian? *n the other hand( are there many 'ermans here who annot make
themselves understood in Russian( even though it be with a strong aent and in broken
speeh? Nay( moreover K who has not seen genuine Russians( orthodo,( loyal with all
their hearts dediated to the priniples of the Russian 0tate( and yet only one or two
generations removed from their 'erman emigrant anestry? >astly( we must not forget
that 'ermany herself is( to a ertain e,tent( interested in our eonomi well7being) In this
regard( 'ermany differs( to our advantage( from other ountries( whih are interested
e,lusively in obtaining the largest possible returns from apital invested in Russia( even
at the ost of the eonomi ruin of this ountry) 'ermany( however( in her apaity of
permanent K although( of ourse( not unselfish K intermediary for our foreign trade( has an
interest in preserving the produtive resoures of our ountry( as a soure of profitable
intermediary operations for her)
$en &ictor! oer German! Promises "ussia an $)ceedingl! *nfaourable
Prospect
In any ase( even if we were to admit the neessity for eradiating 'erman domination in
the field of our eonomi life( even at the prie of a total banishment of 'erman apital
from Russian industry( appropriate measures ould be taken( it would seem( without war
against 'ermany) 0uh a war will demand suh enormous e,penditures that they will
many times e,eed the more than doubtful advantages to us in the abolition of the
'erman LeonomiM domination) More than that( the result of suh a war will be an
eonomi situation ompared with whih the yoke of 'erman apital will seem easy)
For there an be no doubt that the war will neessitate e,penditures whih are beyond
Russia<s limited finanial means) .e shall have to obtain redit from allied and neutral
11
ountries( but this will not be granted gratuitously) 4s to what will happen if the war should
end disastrously for us( I do not wish to disuss now) 1he finanial and eonomi
onse2uenes of defeat an be neither alulated nor foreseen( and will undoubtedly spell
the total ruin of our entire national eonomy)
/ut even vitory promises us e,tremely unfavourable finanial prospets6 a totally ruined
'ermany will not be in a position to ompensate us for the ost involved) !itated in the
interest of "ngland( the peae treaty will not afford 'ermany opportunity for suffiient
eonomi reuperation to over our war e,penditures( even at a distant time) 1he little
whih we may perhaps sueed in e,torting from her will have to be shared with our allies(
and to our share there will fall but negligible rumbs( ompared with the war ost)
Meantime( we shall have to pay our war loans( not without pressure by the allies) For( after
the destrution of 'erman power( we shall no longer be neessary to them) Nay( more(
our politial might( enhaned by our vitory( will indue them to weaken us( at least
eonomially) 4nd so it is inevitable that( even after a vitorious onlusion of the war( we
shall fall into the same sort of finanial and eonomi dependene upon our reditors(
ompared with whih our present dependene upon 'erman apital will seem ideal)
=owever( no matter how sad may be the eonomi prospets whih fae us as a result of
union with "ngland( and( by that token( of war with 'ermany( they are still of seondary
importane when we think of the politial onse2uenes of this fundamentally unnatural
alliane)
A +truggle between "ussia and German! Is Profoundl! *ndesirable to Bot# +ides,
as it Amounts to a Wea-ening of t#e %onarc#ist Principle
It should not be forgotten that Russia and 'ermany are the representatives of the
onservative priniple in the ivili5ed world( as opposed to the demorati priniple(
inarnated in "ngland and( to an infinitely lesser degree( in Frane) 0trange as it may
seem( "ngland( monarhist and onservative to the marrow at home( has in her foreign
relations always ated as the protetor of the most demagogial tendenies( invariably
enouraging all popular movements aiming at the weakening of the monarhial priniple)
From this point of view( a struggle between 'ermany and Russia( regardless of its issue(
is profoundly undesirable to both sides( as undoubtedly involving the weakening of the
onservative priniple in the world of whih the above7named two great powers are the
only reliable bulwarks) More than that( one must reali5e that under the e,eptional
onditions whih e,ist( a general "uropean war is mortally dangerous both for Russia and
'ermany( no matter who wins) It is our firm onvition( based upon a long and areful
study of all ontemporary subversive tendenies( that there must inevitably break out in
the defeated ountry a soial revolution whih( by the very nature of things( will spread to
the ountry of the vitor)
!uring the many years of peaeable neighbourly e,istene( the two ountries have
beome united by many ties( and a soial upheaval in one is bound to affet the other)
1hat these troubles will be of a soial( while not of politial( nature annot be doubted( and
this will hold true( not only as regards Russia( but for 'ermany as well) 4n espeially
1@
favourable soil for soial upheavals is found in Russia( where the masses undoubtedly
profess( unonsiously( the priniples of 0oialism) In spite of the spirit of antagonism to
the 'overnment in Russian soiety( as unonsious as the 0oialism of the broad masses
of the people( a politial revolution is not possible in Russia( and any revolutionary
movement inevitably must degenerate into a 0oialist movement) 1he opponents of the
government have no popular support) 1he people see no differene between a
government offiial and an intelletual) 1he Russian masses( whether workmen or
peasants( are not looking for politial rights( whih they neither want nor omprehend)
1he peasant dreams of obtaining a gratuitous share of somebody else<s land6 the
workman( of getting hold of the entire apital and profits of the manufaturer) /eyond this(
they have no aspirations) If these slogans are sattered far and wide among the populae(
and the 'overnment permits agitation along these lines( Russia will be flung into anarhy(
suh as she suffered in the ever7memorable period of troubles in 19-D719-E) .ar with
'ermany would reate e,eptionally favourable onditions for suh agitation) 4s already
stated( this war is pregnant with enormous diffiulties for us( and annot turn out to be a
mere triumphal marh to /erlin) /oth military disaster(7partial ones( let us hope7and all
kinds of shortomings in our supply are inevitable) In the e,essive nervousness and spirit
of opposition of our soiety( these events will be given an e,aggerated importane( and all
the blame will be laid on the 'overnment)
It will be well if the 'overnment does not yield( but delares diretly that in time of war no
ritiism of the governmental authority is to be tolerated( and resolutely suppresses all
opposition) In the absene of any really strong hold on the people by the opposition( this
would settle the affair) 1he people did not heed the writers of the .iborg Manifesto( in its
time( and they will not follow them now)
/ut a worse thing may happenF the government authority may make onessions( may try
to ome to an agreement with the opposition( and thereby weaken itself ;ust when the
0oialist elements are ready for ation) "ven though it may sound like a parado,( the fat
is that agreement with the opposition in Russia positively weakens the 'overnment) 1he
trouble is that our opposition refuses to rekon with the fat that it represents no real fore)
1he Russian opposition is intelletual throughout( and this is its weakness( beause
between the intelligentsia and the people there is a profound gulf of mutual
misunderstanding and distrust) .e need an artifiial eletion law6 indeed( we re2uire the
diret influene of the governmental authority( to assure the eletion to the 0tate !uma of
even the most 5ealous hampions of popular rights) >et the 'overnment refuse to support
the eletions( leaving them to their natural ourse( and the legislative institutions would not
see within their walls a single intelletual( outside of a few demagogi agitators) =owever
insistent the members of our legislative institutions may be that the people onfide in them(
the peasant would rather believe the landless government offiial than the *tobrist
landlord in the !uma( while the workingman treats the wage7earning fatory inspetor with
more onfidene than the legislating manufaturer( even though the latter professes every
priniple of the :adet party)
It is more than strange( under these irumstanes( that the governmental authority should
be asked to rekon seriously with the opposition( that it should for this purpose renoune
1C
the role of impartial regulator of soial relationships( and ome out before the broad
masses of the people as the obedient organ of the lass aspirations of the intelletual and
propertied minority of the population) 1he opposition demands that the 'overnment should
be responsible to it( representative of a lass( and should obey the parliament whih it
artifiially reated) %>et us reall that famous e,pression of G) NabokovF 3>et the e,eutive
power submit to the legislative powerH3 In other words( the opposition demands that the
'overnment should adopt the psyhology of a savage( and worship the idol whih he
himself made)
"ussia will be Flung into Hopeless Anarc#!, t#e .utcome of W#ic# will be Hard to
Foresee
If the war ends in vitory( the putting down of the 0oialist movement will not offer any
insurmountable obstales) 1here will be agrarian troubles( as a result of agitation for
ompensating the soldiers with additional land allotments6 there will be labour troubles
during the transition from the probably inreased wages of war time to normal shedules6
and this( it is to be hoped( will be all( so long as the wave of the 'erman soial revolution
has not reahed us) /ut in the event of defeat( the possibility of whih in a struggle with a
foe like 'ermany annot be overlooked( soial revolution in its most e,treme form is
inevitable)
4s has already been said( the trouble will start with the blaming of the 'overnment for all
disasters) In the legislative institutions a bitter ampaign against the 'overnment will
begin( followed by revolutionary agitations throughout the ountry( with 0oialist slogans(
apable of arousing and rallying the masses( beginning with the division of the land and
sueeded by a division of all valuables and property) 1he defeated army( having lost its
most dependable men( and arried away by the tide of primitive peasant desire for land(
will find itself too demorali5ed to serve as a bulwark of law and order) 1he legislative
institutions and the intelletual opposition parties( laking real authority in the eyes of the
people( will be powerless to stem the popular tide( aroused by themselves( and Russia will
be flung into hopeless anarhy( the issue of whih annot be foreseen)
German!, in Case of Defeat, is Destined to +uffer +ocial *p#eaals no /ess t#an
t#ose of "ussia
No matter how strange it may appear at first sight( onsidering the e,traordinary poise of
the 'erman harater( 'ermany( likewise( is destined to suffer( in ase o defeat( no lesser
soial upheavals) 1he effet of a disastrous war upon the population will be too severe not
to bring to the surfae destrutive tendenies( now deeply hidden) 1he peuliar soial
order of modern 'ermany rests upon the atually predominant influene of the agrarians(
Prussian 9unkerdom and propertied peasants)
1hese elements are the bulwark of the profoundly onservative 'erman regime headed by
Prussia) 1he vital interests of these lasses demand a protetive eonomi poliy towards
agriulture( import duties on grain( and onse2uently( high prie for all farm produts) /ut
'ermany( with her limited territory and inreasing population( has long ago turned from an
14
agriultural into an industrial 0tate( so that protetion of agriulture is( in effet( a matter of
ta,ing the larger part of the population for the benefit of the smaller) 1o this ma;ority( there
is ompensation in the e,tensive development of the e,port of 'erman industrial produts
to the most distant markets( so that the advantages derived thereby enable the
industrialists and working people to pay the higher pries for the farm produts onsumed
at home)
!efeated( 'ermany will lose her world markets and maritime ommere( for the aim of the
war7on the part of its real instigator( "ngland7will be the destrution of 'erman
ompetition) 4fter this has been ahieved( the labouring masses( deprived not only of
higher but of any and all wages( having suffered greatly during the war( and being(
naturally( embittered( will offer fertile soil for anti7agrarian and later anti7soial propaganda
by the 0oialist parties)
1hese parties( in turn( making use of the outraged patrioti sentiment among the people(
owing to the loss of the war( their e,asperation at the militarists and the feudal burgher
regime that betrayed them( will abandon the road of peaeable evolution whih they have
thus far been following so steadily( and take a purely revolutionary path) 0ome part will
also be played( espeially in the event of agrarian troubles in neighbouring Russia( by the
lass of landless farmhands( whih is 2uite numerous in 'ermany) 4part from this( there
will be a revival of the hitherto onealed separatist tendenies in southern 'ermany( and
the hidden antagonism of /avaria to domination by Prussia will emerge in all its intensity)
In short( a situation will be reated whih %in gravity& will be little better than that in Russia)
Peace among t#e Ciili0ed (ations Is Imperilled C#iefl! b! t#e Desire of $ngland to
"etain Her &anis#ing Domination of t#e +eas
4 summary of all that has been stated above must lead to the onlusion that a
rapprohement with "ngland does not promise us any benefits( and that the "nglish
orientation of our diplomay is essentially wrong) .e do not travel the same road as
"ngland6 she should be left to go her own way( and we must not 2uarrel on her aount
with 'ermany)
1he 1riple "ntente is an artifiial ombination( without a basis of real interest) It has
nothing to look forward to) 1he future belongs to a lose and inomparably more vital
rapprohement of Russia( 'ermany( Frane %reoniled with 'ermany&( and 9apan %allied
to Russia by a stritly defensive union&) 4 politial ombination like this( laking all
aggressiveness toward other 0tates( would safeguard for many years the peae of the
ivili5ed nations( threatened( not by the militant intentions of 'ermany( as "nglish
diplomay is trying to show( but solely by the perfetly natural striving of "ngland to retain
at all osts her vanishing domination of the seas) In this diretion( and not in the fruitless
searh of a basis for an aord with "ngland( whih is in its very nature ontrary to our
national plans and aims( should all the efforts of our diplomay be onentrated)
It goes without saying that 'ermany( on her part( must meet our desire to restore our well7
tested relations and friendly alliane with her( and to elaborate( in losest agreement with
us( suh terms of our neighbourly e,istene as to afford no basis for anti7'erman agitation
1D
on the part of our onstitutional7liberal parties( whih( by their very nature( are fored to
adhere( not to a :onservative 'erman( but to a liberal "nglish orientation)
February( 1914
P) N) !urnovo
%Minister of Interior of the Russian "mpire&
P!otr Durnoo
From .ikipedia( the free enylopedia
P!otr (i-ola!eic# Durnoo %RussianF NOPQ RSTUVWXYSZ [\Q]UY^& %1J4D in Mosow
'overnorate K 0eptember @4 L*)0) 0eptember 11M 191D in Petrograd& was an Imperial
Russian lawyer and politiian)
Biograp#!1edit2
!urnovo was born in Mosow 'overnorate in 1J4D) =e was a graduate of the Imperial Naval
0hool and Military/Naval Law Academy) =e served in the Ministry of 9ustie reahing the position
of 4ssistant Prourator of the Aiev :ourt of 4ppeals before being transferred to the Ministry of
Interior in 1JJ1) =e was appointed !iretor of Polie in 1JJ4 and remained in that position until
1J9C when he was fored to resign due to a disagreement between himself and
the 0panish 4mbassador to Russia that involved misuse of Polie powers) In 19--( he was
appointed 4ssistant Minister of Interior in harge of Posts and 1elegraph servies) =e remained in
this position until 19-D when he was appointed Minister of Interior on .itte<s reommendation) =e
departed from the position of Minister shortly after .itte<s resignation from the :hairmanship of the
:ounil of Ministers despite his differenes with .itte)
!urnovo is noted for his outspoken opposition to lose relations with the 8nited Aingdom in favor
of lose relations with 'ermany) =e believed that 'erman and Russian interests were
omplementary while .ar between the two ould only result in destrution of the e,isting politial
orders of both) =e e,plained his views( most of whih were reali5ed in the aftermath of .orld .ar
I in a letter
L1M
to Niholas II in 1914)
=e was the last Russian Imperial Minister of Interior who died of natural auses) =is si, suessors
were assassinated or murdered during the so alled Red 1error)
1E