Secure Shell

SECURE SHELL MCA2011
1. INTRODUCTION
SECURE SHELL
As Internet access becomes increasingly inexpensive an available! it
"as become a viable replacement #or traitional co$riers! telep"one!
an #ax! as %ell as remote ial&$p access to a company's internal
comp$ter reso$rces()ne o# t"e biggest c"allenges in $sing t"e Internet
to replace more traitional comm$nications is sec$rity( In t"e past!
companies "ave maintaine t"eir o%n moem ban* ial&$p access to
company reso$rces so t"at critical ata %asn't being transmitte over
t"e p$blic net%or*( Moem ban*s are expensive to maintain an
on't scale %ell( In a large company! long istance c"arges #or roa
%arriors alone can ma*e t"is an expensive sol$tion(
1.1Security Requirements
+"ere are t"ree core sec$rity re,$irements #or a remote aministrative access
tec"nology(
Confidentiality +"e transmitte ata m$st not be reaable by $na$t"ori-e
parties on t"e net%or*( Con#ientiality is ac"ieve t"ro$g" encryption(
Inte!rity Una$t"ori-e parties m$st not be able to moi#y t"e ata %it"o$t
etection( Integrity is ac"ieve by $sing c"ec*s$m val$es! %"ic" allo% etection
o# tampering attempts at t"e receiving en(
"ut#entication .ot" parties o# t"e comm$nication m$st be able to ienti#y eac"
ot"er reliably! so t"at no one can mas,$erae as t"e ot"er party( A$t"entication
can be implemente by $sing c"allenge pass%ors! #or example( Ho%ever! t"e
strongest a$t"entication is ac"ieve t"ro$g" p$blic&*ey cryptograp"y an igital
signat$res(
MAC/0CERC 1 CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
Sec$re S"ell is a protocol t"at provies a$t"entication! encryption an ata
integrity to sec$re net%or* comm$nications( Implementations o# Sec$re S"ell
o##er t"e #ollo%ing capabilities3 a sec$re comman&s"ell! sec$re #ile trans#er! an
remote access to a variety o# +C45I4 applications via a sec$re t$nnel( Sec$re S"ell
client an server applications are %iely available #or most pop$lar operating
systems(
$.HISTRO%
Sec$re S"ell "as seen steay improvement an increase aoption since 1667(
+"e #irst version o# Sec$re S"ell 8SSH19 %as esigne to replace t"e non&sec$re
U0I: ;rcommans< 8rlogin! rs"! an rcp9( Sec$re S"ell version 2 8SSH29!
s$bmitte as an Internet Engineering +as* =orce 8IE+=9 ra#t in 166>! aresses
some o# t"e more serio$s v$lnerabilities in SSH1 an also provies an improve
#ile trans#er sol$tion(
+"is increasing pop$larity "as been #$ele by t"e broaer availability o#
commercially evelope an s$pporte client an server applications #or
?ino%s! U0I: an ot"er plat#orms! an by t"e e##orts o# t"e )penSSH pro@ect
to evelop an open so$rce implementation
MAC/0CERC A CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
&.'UNCTION"LIT% O' SECURE SHELL
Sec$re S"ell provies t"ree main capabilities! %"ic" open t"e oor #or many
creative sec$re sol$tions(
& Sec$re comman&s"ell
& Sec$re #ile trans#er
& 4ort #or%aring
&.1Secure Command S#ell
Comman s"ells s$c" as t"ose available in Lin$x! Unix! ?ino%s! or t"e #amiliar
B)S prompt provie t"e ability to exec$te programs an ot"er commans!
$s$ally %it" c"aracter o$tp$t( A sec$re comman&s"ell or remote logon allo%s
yo$ to eit #iles! vie% t"e contents o# irectories an access c$stom atabase
applications( Systems an net%or* aministrators can remotely start batc" @obs!
start! vie% or stop services an processes! create $ser acco$nts! c"ange
permissions to #iles an irectories an more( Anyt"ing t"at can be accomplis"e
at a mac"ine's comman prompt can no% be one sec$rely #rom t"e roa or
"ome(
&.$ (ort for)ardin!
4ort #or%aring is a po%er#$l tool t"at can provie sec$rity to +C45I4
applications incl$ing e&mail! sales an c$stomer contact atabases! an in&"o$se
applications( 4ort #or%aring! sometimes re#erre to as t$nneling! allo%s ata
#rom normally $nsec$re +C45I4 applications to be sec$re( A#ter port
#or%aring "as been set $p! Sec$re S"ell rero$tes tra##ic #rom a program 8$s$ally
a client9 an sens it across t"e encrypte t$nnel! t"en elivers it to a program on
t"e ot"er sie 8$s$ally a server9( M$ltiple applications can transmit ata over a
MAC/0CERC C CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
single m$ltiplexe c"annel! eliminating t"e nee to open aitional v$lnerable
ports on a #ire%all or ro$ter(
=or some applications! a sec$re remote comman s"ell isn't s$##icient an
grap"ical remote control is necessary( Sec$re S"ell's port #or%aring capabilities
can be $se to create an encrypte t$nnel over %"ic" an application can be r$n(
1irt$al 0et%or* Client! a cross plat#orm DUI remote control application is a goo
example( 0o% %e are going to tell abo$t t$nneling or port #or%aring in etail(
+"e #ollo%ing sections incl$e t$nneling over t"e Internet! Intranet an to t"e
s"are reso$rces an %e explain "o% Sec$re S"ell t$nneling %or*s3
=ig$re 1( +$nneling over t"e Internet
Con#erence attenees at p$blic 4Cs( +ravelers $sing a "otel or airport %ireless
LA0( Bay exteners logging bac* into %or* at nig"t( +ele%or*ers con$cting
b$siness #rom "ome( All o# t"ese %or*ers can increase b$siness e##iciency by
leveraging t"e p$blic Internet to stay connecte( .$t %"at are t"e ris*sE
Consier a tele%or*er $sing t"e Internet to access e&mail 8see #ig$re9( ?"en t"e
%or*er's client sens mail! messages are relaye to an SM+4 server( ?"en t"e
client reas mail! message "eaers an boies are o%nloae #rom a 4)4 or
IMA4 server( Anyone any%"ere in t"is pat" t"ro$g" t"e Internet can $se a sni##er
to capt$re not only cleartext message boies! b$t also e&mail aresses! $ser
names! an pass%ors(
=ig$re 2( +ypical Remote Access Sec$rity Ris*s
Arme %it" t"is stolen ata! a passive attac*er can replay original or moi#ie
messages! even sen t"em to ot"er estinations( .y actively mas,$eraing as a
legitimate e&mail client or server! a ;man in t"e mile< 8Mit M9 attac*er can
intercept an rop messages! or insert ne% #orge messages(
Mail&speci#ic sec$rity meas$res li*e 4D4 an S5MIME encrypt an igitally sign
message boies! b$t leave cleartext message "eaers( =$rt"ermore! t"ey o
not"ing to protect t"e mail server #rom attac*( Mail servers listening to %ell&
*no%n SM+4! 4)4! an IMA4 ports are easily iscovere by port scans( Hac*ers
can $se an open server to relay spam or tie $p t"e server %it" enial&o#&service
8BoS9 attac*s( .y ;#ingerprinting< t"e server! t"ey can exploit *no%n
v$lnerabilities in t"e server's operating system or email so#t%are( Leaving t"is
mission&critical reso$rce %ie open to Internet access is clearly $n%ise(
+$nneling %it" Sec$re S"ell can "elp by eliminating open ports! bloc*ing
MAC/0CERC F CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
$na$t"ori-e $sers! an ens$ring t"e privacy an integrity o# all SM+4! 4)4! an
IMA4 tra##ic exc"ange bet%een mail clients an servers(
A(A +$nneling +o S"are Reso$rces
+oay! many companies s"are net%or*e reso$rces( =ile s"ares on U0I: servers
are mo$nte on remote systems $sing t"e 0et%or* =ile System 80=S9 an
SAM.A protocols( Batabases li*e Microso#t Access an SGL Server inter#ace
%it" )B.C rivers to ans%er ,$eries iss$e by )B.C clients( Users remotely
access Conc$rrent 1ersioning System 8C1S9 so$rce coe repositories $sing
terminal em$lators an DUI #ront&ens li*e ?inC1S( Eac" s"are reso$rce is a
b$siness asset t"at m$st be protecte #rom BoS attac*s! loss! malicio$s
moi#ication! an $na$t"ori-e access( )S sec$rity meas$res H ?ino%s an
U0I: #ile system rea5%rite privileges! $ser names! an pass%ors H control
access( Ho%ever! t"ey o not"ing to preserve ata privacy an integrity %"en
s"ares are accesse remotely(
A common example is t"e corporate tele%or*er %it" cable moem Internet
access( A tele%or*er t"at $ses t"e b$ilt&in Client #or Microso#t 0et%or*s to s"are
#iles bet%een "ome an o##ice 4Cs $n%ittingly exposes t"ese s"ares to every
neig"bor on t"e same cable passing( .eca$se cable is an ;al%ays on< tec"nology!
%o$l&be attac*ers "ave plenty o# time to per#orm a ictionary attac*! iscovering
s"are $ser names an pass%ors( +"$s arme! t"e attac*er can brea* into s"ares
an servers on t"e corporate net%or*s t"at are accessible %it" t"e same
creentials(
Anot"er reso$rce s"are or accesse remotely is t"e "ome or o##ice es*top(
Screen s"aring can be accomplis"e %it" remote control so#t%are li*e Symantec
pc Any%"ere! A+I+ Labs 10C! Microso#t 0etMeeting! ?ino%s :4 Remote
Bes*top Assistance! an ?ino%s 0+52000 Remote Bes*top 4rotocol 8RB49
MAC/0CERC > CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
client! an +erminal Services( Una$t"ori-e remote control "as long been a
sec$rity concern #or enterprise aministrators( .eca$se t"ese sol$tions are
#ree5inexpensive an easy to eploy! %or*ers install t"em #or convenience %it"o$t
#irst aressing t"e in"erent ris* to t"eir comp$ters an t"e net%or*( Sec$re S"ell
t$nneling can provie strong $ni#orm a$t"entication! access control! an privacy
#or s"are #iles an es*tops( Instea o# leaving RB4 or 10C ports open #or
exploit! t$nneling m$ltiplexes t"ese non&sec$re streams onto a single Sec$re S"ell
session(
&.* Ho) Secure S#ell Tunnelin! +or,s
Application streams are t$nnele over Sec$re S"ell by #or%aring inivi$al +C4
ports( In t"is section! %e #oc$s on local port&#or%aring3 t$nnels initiate by t"e
Sec$re S"ell client( +"is irection is #ar more common t"an remote port&
#or%aring3 t$nnels initiate by t"e Sec$re S"ell server( ?"en a local port is
#or%are! Sec$reCR+ 8t"e Sec$re S"ell client9 listens to a speci#ie +C4 port on
t"e local "ost( 1S"ell 8t"e Sec$re S"ell server9 opens a +C4 connection to t"e
remote "ost %"ere t"e server application is act$ally r$nning( .y convention3
J +"e local"ost re#ers to t"e application clientKs "ostL remote"ost re#ers to t"e
application serverKs "ost( +ypically! i# local"ost is not speci#ie! it e#a$lts to t"e
Sec$reCR+ "ost( I# remote"ost is not speci#ie! it e#a$lts to t"e 1S"ell "ost(
J +"e localport re#ers to t"e port t"at t"e application client sens to an
Sec$reCR+ listens to( +"e remoteport re#ers to t"e port t"at 1S"ell sens to an
t"e application server listens to( In most cases! t"e localport can be any arbitrary!
$n$se port on t"e local"ost( +"e remoteport m$st be t"e IA0Aassigne M%ell&
*no%nM listening port #or t"e application being t$nnele(
+o $se t"e port&#or%ar! t"e client application m$st be recon#ig$re to connect to
local"ost3localport instea o# remote"ost3remoteport( 4ac*ets sent by t"e client
to local"ost3localport are intercepte by Sec$reCR+ or anot"er SSH client!
local"ost3localport are intercepte by Sec$reCR+ or anot"er SSH client!
encrypte! an t$nnele t"ro$g" t"e Sec$re S"ell connection to 1s"ell or anot"er
MAC/0CERC N CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
=ig$re A( Local 4ort =or%aring
SSH server( )n receipt! 1S"ell ecrypts t"ese pac*ets! relaying t"em as cleartext
t"ro$g" t"e +C4 connection to t"e server at remote"ost3remoteport( Local port&
#or%aring #or e&mail is ill$strate in =ig$re(
+ra##ic in transit bet%een Sec$reCR+ an 1S"ell is cryptograp"ically protecte(
Ho%ever! tra##ic bet%een 1S"ell an t"e remote "ost is not( +ypically! 1S"ell is
locate insie t"e net%or* perimeter! be"in a #ire%all( +"e #ire%all is con#ig$re
to permit Sec$re S"ell! b$t not t"e t$nnele application protocols 8in t"is example!
SM+4! 4)4! an IMA49( In essence! t"is con#ig$ration relies on t"e #ire%all to
protect cleartext tra##ic an insie servers on t"e tr$ste LA0( ?"en t"e LA0
cannot be tr$ste or Intranet servers are at a premi$m! 1S"ell can r$n on t"e same
mac"ine as t"e server application( In t"is case! t"ere is no nee to speci#y a
remote "ost in t"e port#or%ar H Sec$reCR+ an 1S"ell interact %it"
client5server applications on eac" local "ost( Application pac*ets are protecte
en&to&enL cleartext is never sent over t"e net%or*(
=ig$re C( Local 4ort&#or%aring to Application on 1S"ell Server
Local port&#or%aring is appropriate %"en Sec$reCR+ is r$nning on t"e same 4C
as t"e client application! initiating o$tbo$n +C4 connections to t"e server
application( )ccasionally! $sers nee to accept +C4 connections initiate in t"e
reverse irection by an application on t"e Sec$re S"ell server&sie( +"is can be
accomplis"e %it" remote port&#or%aring(
Remote port&#or%aring may be $se i# t"ere is a nee #or applications to connect!
t"ro$g" t"e Sec$re S"ell server! to an application t"at resies on t"e Sec$re S"ell
client&sie( ?"en a remote port is #or%are! Sec$reCR+ 8t"e Sec$re S"ell client9
re,$ests t"at 1S"ell 8t"e Sec$re S"ell server9 listen to an arbitrary! $n$se +C4
port on t"e Sec$re S"ell server( ?"en a connection is re,$este to t"is port on t"e
Sec$re S"ell server! t"e Sec$re S"ell server opens anot"er port to t"e Sec$re S"ell
client to relay t"e #or%are tra##ic( 4ac*ets receive at remote "ost3remote port
are intercepte by t"e Sec$re S"ell server an re&irecte to t"e Sec$re S"ell
client at local"ost3localport(
=ig$re 7( Remote 4ort #or%aring
In t"is case! #or%are tra##ic can be seen as ;#lo%ing< bet%een some
inepenent client 8t"e application t"at accesses t"e reverse&#or%are port9! t"e
Sec$re S"ell server 8remote"ost9! t"e Sec$re S"ell client 8local"ost9! an a
estination server 8t"e application t"at cons$mes t"e reverse&#or%are ata9(
=ig$re ill$strates remote port&#or%aring to a +elnet server on t"e local"ost( ?it"
remote port&#or%aring! t"e server application is typically co&locate %it"
Sec$reCR+( +"e server can also r$n on a tr$ste "ost near Sec$reCR+ H #or
example! a S)H) LA0 gate%ay t"at is remotely aministere t"ro$g" +elnet(
?"en con#ig$ring remote port&#or%ars! $ni,$e listening ports m$st be assigne
to eac" Sec$reCR+( In =ig$re! 1S"ell can #or%ar +elnet sessions to several
i##erent Sec$reCR+s H provie t"at eac" $ses a i##erent remote port(
+"ese examples ill$strate t"e broa po%er an #lexibility o# Sec$re S"ell
t$nneling( .$t it is also important to bear in min3
J Sec$re S"ell #or%ars inivi$al +C4 connections! b$t not port ranges( M$lti&
connection applications li*e =+4 t"at $se ep"emeral ports o not len t"emselves
%ell to port&#or%aring( +o trans#er #iles sec$rely over Sec$re S"ell! it is better to
$se S=+4 or SC4 protocols! s$pporte by 1S"ell server! Sec$re=: #ile trans#er
client! an t"e Sec$reCR+ 1C4 $tility(
J Alt"o$g" concept$ally possible! stanar Sec$re S"ell oes not #or%ar UB4
atagram services( Ho%ever! R4C&base UB4 protocols li*e 0=S can be t$nnele
over Sec$re S"ell $sing #reely available extensions li*e S0=S(
&.- Secure 'ile Transfer
Sec$re =ile +rans#er 4rotocol 8S=+49 is a s$bsystem o# t"e Sec$re S"ell protocol(
In essence! it is a separate protocol layere over t"e Sec$re S"ell protocol to
"anle #ile trans#ers( S=+4 "as several avantages over non&sec$re =+4( =irst!
S=+4 encrypts bot" t"e $sername5pass%or an t"e ata being trans#erre(
Secon! it $ses t"e same port as t"e Sec$re S"ell server! eliminating t"e nee to
open anot"er port on t"e #ire%all or ro$ter( Using S=+4 also avois t"e net%or*
aress translation 80A+9 iss$es t"at can o#ten be a problem %it" reg$lar =+4(
)ne val$able $se o# S=+4 is to create a sec$re extranet or #orti#y a server or
servers o$tsie t"e #ire%all accessible by remote personnel an5or partners
8sometimes re#erre to as a BMO or sec$re extranet9(
Using S=+4 to create a sec$re extranet #or s"aring #iles an oc$ments %it"
c$stomers an partners balances t"e nee #or access %it" sec$rity re,$irements(
+ypical $ses o# a sec$re extranet incl$e $ploaing o# #iles an reports! ma*ing an
arc"ive o# ata #iles available #or o%nloa an proviing a sec$re mec"anism #or
remote aministration #ile oriente tas*s( Extranets %it" b$siness partners "ave
proven to be m$c" more e##ective #or companies t"an more traitional met"os o#
comm$nication li*e p"one or #ax( In #act! S=+4 can a$tomate many o# t"ese
transactions so t"ey ta*e place %it"o$t "$man intervention(
A sec$re extranet is one o# t"e sa#est %ays to ma*e speci#ic ata available to
c$stomers! partners an remote employees %it"o$t exposing ot"er critical
company in#ormation to t"e p$blic net%or*( Using S=+4 on yo$r extranet
mac"ines e##ectively restricts access to a$t"ori-e $sers an encrypts $sernames!
pass%ors an #iles sent to or #rom
=ig$re F( Sec$re =ile +rans#er
*. (ROTOCOL ."SICS O' SECURE SHELL
+"e Sec$re S"ell protocol provies #o$r basic sec$rity bene#its3
User "ut#entication
Host "ut#entication
Data Encry/tion
Data Inte!rity
*.1 User "ut#entication
A$t"entication! also re#erre to as $ser ientity! is t"e means by %"ic" a system
veri#ies t"at access is only given to intene $sers an enie to anyone else(
Many a$t"entication met"os are c$rrently $se! ranging #rom #amiliar type
pass%ors to more rob$st sec$rity mec"anisms( Most Sec$re S"ell
implementations incl$e pass%or an p$blic *ey a$t"entication met"os b$t
ot"ers 8e(g( *erberos! 0+LM! an *eyboar interactive9 are also available( +"e
Sec$re S"ell protocol's #lexibility allo%s ne% a$t"entication met"os to be
incorporate into t"e system! as t"ey become available(
MAC/0CERC 1A CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
=ig$re >( Sec$re s"ell A$t"entication
4ass%or A$t"entication
4ass%ors! in combination %it" a $sername! are a pop$lar %ay to tell anot"er
comp$ter t"at yo$ are %"o yo$ claim to be( I# t"e $sername an pass%or given
at a$t"entication matc" t"e $sername an pass%or store on a remote system!
yo$ are a$t"enticate an allo%e access( Some protocols li*e =+4 an +elnet
sen $sernames an pass%ors as easily visible ASCII text ;in t"e clear<!
allo%ing anyone %it" a sni##er program to easily capt$re t"em an t"en gain
access to t"e system(
Sec$re S"ell sa#eg$ars against t"is attac* by encrypting all ata! incl$ing
$sernames an pass%ors! be#ore transmission(
Alt"o$g" pass%ors are convenient! re,$iring no aitional con#ig$ration or
set$p #or yo$r $sers! t"ey are in"erently v$lnerable in t"at t"ey can be g$esse!
an anyone %"o can g$ess yo$r pass%or can get into yo$r system( B$e to t"ese
v$lnerabilities! it is recommene t"at yo$ combine or replace pass%or
a$t"entication %it" anot"er met"o li*e p$blic *ey(
MAC/0CERC 1C CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
4$blic Pey A$t"entication
4$blic *ey a$t"entication is one o# t"e most sec$re met"os to a$t"enticate $sing
Sec$re S"ell( 4$blic *ey a$t"entication $ses a pair o# comp$ter generate *eys H
one p$blic an one private( Eac" *ey is $s$ally bet%een 102C an 20CN bits in
lengt"( Even t"o$g" yo$ can see it! it is $seless $nless yo$ "ave t"e corresponing
private *ey(
4$blic&private *eys are typically generate $sing a *ey generation $tility( .ot"
*eys in t"e pair are generate at t"e same time an! %"ile t"e t%o are relate! a
private *ey cannot be comp$te #rom a corresponing p$blic *ey( In aition to
a$t"entication! *eys can also be $se to sign ata( +o access an acco$nt on a
Sec$re S"ell server! a copy o# t"e client's p$blic *ey m$st be $ploae to t"e
server( ?"en t"e client connects to t"e server it proves t"at it "as t"e secret! or
private co$nterpart to t"e p$blic *ey on t"at server! an access is grante(
+"e private *ey never leaves t"e client mac"ine! an t"ere#ore cannot be stolen or
g$esse li*e a pass%or can( Us$ally t"e private *ey "as a ;passp"rase<
associate %it" it! so even i# t"e private *ey is stolen! t"e attac*er m$st still g$ess
t"e passp"rase in orer to gain access( 4$blic *ey a$t"entication oes not tr$st any
in#ormation #rom a client or allo% any access $ntil t"e client can prove it "as t"e
;secret< private *ey(
Agent =or%aring
Sec$re S"ell Agent is a %ay to a$t"enticate to m$ltiple Sec$re S"ell servers t"at
=ig$re N( Agent =or%aring #or A$t"entication
recogni-e yo$r p$blic *ey %it"o$t "aving to re&type yo$r passp"rase eac" time(
Aitionally! by t$rning on agent #or%aring! yo$ can connect to a net%or* o#
Sec$re S"ell servers! eliminating t"e nee to compromise t"e integrity o# yo$r
private *ey(
0otice t"at t"e private *ey only "as to exist on t"e original SSHclient mac"ine
an t"e passp"rase only nees to be type %"en SSHClient connects to
SSHServerA( ?it"o$t agent #or%aring enable! eac" Sec$re S"ell mac"ine in
t"e c"ain 8except t"e last9 %o$l "ave to store a copy o# t"e private *ey(
SSHServerA! %"en a$t"enticating SSHClient to SSHServer. becomes! in
essence! a client an %o$l re,$ire a private *ey to complete t"e a$t"entication
process( Agent s$pport eliminates t"e nee #or t"e passp"rase to be type #or eac"
connection in t"e se,$ence(
*.$ Host "ut#entication
A "ost *ey is $se by a server to prove its ientity to a client an by a client to
veri#y a ;*no%n< "ost( Host *eys are escribe as persistent 8t"ey are c"ange
in#re,$ently9 an are asymmetricQm$c" li*e t"e p$blic5private *ey pairs
isc$sse above in t"e 4$blic *ey section( I# a mac"ine is r$nning only one SSH
server! a single "ost *ey serves to ienti#y bot" t"e mac"ine an t"e server( I# a
mac"ine is r$nning m$ltiple SSH servers! it may eit"er "ave m$ltiple "ost *eys or
$se a single *ey #or m$ltiple servers( Host a$t"entication g$ars against t"e Man-
in-the-Middle attack( Host *eys are o#ten con#$se %it" session *eys! %"ic" are
$se in t"e ata encryption process isc$sse belo%(
*.& Data Encry/tion
Encryption! sometimes re#erre to as privacy! means t"at yo$r ata is protecte
#rom isclos$re to a %o$l&be attac*er ;sni##ing< or eavesdropping on t"e %ire(
Cip"ers are t"e mec"anism by %"ic" Sec$re S"ell encrypts an ecrypts ata
MAC/0CERC 1F CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
being sent over t"e %ire( A bloc* cip"er is t"e most common #orm o# symmetric
*ey algorit"ms 8e(g( BES! ABES! .lo%#is"! AES! an +%o#is"9(
+"ese operate on a #ixe si-e bloc* o# ata! $se a single! secret! s"are *ey! an
generally involve m$ltiple ro$ns o# simple! non&linear #$nctions( +"e ata at t"is
point is ;encrypte< an cannot be reverse %it"o$t t"e s"are *ey(
?"en a client establis"es a connection %it" a Sec$re S"ell server! t"ey m$st agree
%"ic" cip"er t"ey %ill $se to encrypt an ecrypt ata( +"e server generally
presents a list o# t"e cip"ers it s$pports! an t"e client t"en selects t"e #irst cip"er
in its list t"at matc"es one in t"e server's list(
Session *eys are t"e ;s"are *eys< escribe above an are ranomly generate
by bot" t"e client an t"e server $ring establis"ment o# a connection( .ot" t"e
client an "ost $se t"e same session *ey to encrypt an ecrypt ata alt"o$g" a
i##erent *ey is $se #or t"e sen an receive c"annels( Session *eys are generate
a#ter "ost a$t"entication is s$ccess#$lly per#orme b$t be#ore $ser a$t"entication
so t"at $sernames an pass%ors can be sent encrypte( +"ese *eys may be
replace at reg$lar intervals 8e(g(! every one to t%o "o$rs9 $ring t"e session an
are estroye at its concl$sion(
*.* Data Inte!rity
Bata integrity g$arantees t"at ata sent #rom one en o# a transaction arrives
$naltere at t"e ot"er en( Even %it" Sec$re S"ell encryption! t"e ata being sent
over t"e net%or* co$l still be v$lnerable to someone inserting $n%ante ata
into t"e ata stream Sec$re S"ell version 2 8SSH29 $ses Message A$t"entication
Coe 8MAC9 algorit"ms to greatly improve $pon t"e original Sec$re S"ell's
8SSH19 simple A2&bit CRC ata integrity c"ec*ing met"o(
*.- Ot#er .enefits
Compression! anot"er #eat$re o# t"e Sec$re S"ell protocol! is per#orme prior to
encryption an can signi#icantly re$ce t"e comp$tational cost o# encrypting ata(
Compression can also noticeably improve t"e e##iciency o# a connection an is
MAC/0CERC 1> CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
especially bene#icial in #ile trans#ers! :11 #or%aring an r$nning c$rses&style
programs(
Sec$re S"ell provies "elp#$l o$tp$t or log messages( +"ese messages can be
t$rne on or o## or con#ig$re to give varying levels o# etail( Log messages can
prove very "elp#$l %"en tro$bles"ooting a problem( =or example! i# a client %ere
$nable to connect to a given server! t"is log o$tp$t %o$l be t"e #irst place to loo*
to etermine t"e so$rce o# t"e problem(
-. SECURE SHELL SOLUTIONS
-.1 0S#ell ser1er
+"e 1S"ell Sec$re S"ell server #or ?ino%s an U0I:! creates a sec$re portal to
t"e serverKs reso$rces an t"e net%or*( 1S"ell provies a sec$re alternative to
+elnet an =+4( ?"et"er yo$ nee to remotely access atabases an applications!
remotely aminister a server or per#orm %eb evelopment tas*s #rom t"e roa!
1S"ell comman s"ell! #ile trans#er! an ata t$nneling services provie sec$re
a$t"entication! encrypte ata trans#er an ata integrity $sing t"e open&stanar
Sec$re S"ell protocol(
-.$ SecureCRT
Sec$reCR+ provies an encrypte Sec$re S"ell session to bot" SSH1 an SSH2
servers( Sec$reCR+ goes #ar beyon proviing basic! sec$re logon( =or local
applications $sing +C45I4 ports! Sec$reCR+'s port #or%aring can rero$te ata
t"ro$g" a single encrypte ata c"annel( Incl$e %it" Sec$reCR+ is 1C4 H an
scp&li*e comman&line $tility! %"ic" provies sec$re #ile trans#er( Sec$reCR+
MAC/0CERC 1N CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
also s$pports non&sec$re telnet #or LA0&base connections be"in a #ire%all an
serial connections to ;tal*< irectly to evices li*e ro$ters(
-.& Secure'2
Sec$re=: lets yo$ c"oose stanar =+4 or sec$re ata trans#er %it" S=+4! as %ell
as =+4 over an encrypte Sec$re S"ell connection( I# yo$r company net%or*! IS4
or ?eb "ost s$pports Sec$re S"ell! yo$ can create a #$lly encrypte #ile trans#er
session $sing Sec$re=:(
-.* Entunnel
Ent$nnel enables yo$r organi-ation to sec$re e&mail! sc"e$les! an ot"er non&
sec$re ata %it" an application t"at is simple to set $p an $se proviing t"e
strong sec$rity o# t"e Sec$re S"ell( Ent$nnel provies ata t$nneling services
%"en connecte to a Sec$re S"ell server li*e 1S"ell an o##ers access to sessions!
connections! an con#ig$rations irectly #rom t"e system tray(
-.- T#reats "ddressed 3y Secure S#ell
.elo% is a isc$ssion o# t"e t"reats t"at Sec$re S"ell is %ell s$ite to protect yo$r
system against(
Ea1esdro//in! or (ass)ord Sniffin!
An eavesropper is a net%or* evice! also *no%n as a ;sni##er<! %"ic" %ill
intercept in#ormation being transmitte over t"e %ire( +"is sni##ing ta*es place
%it"o$t t"e *no%lege o# eit"er t"e client or server an is calle passive
monitoring( User ata incl$ing pass%ors can be stolen t"is %ay i# yo$ $se
insec$re protocols li*e telnet an =+4( .eca$se t"e ata in a Sec$re S"ell session
is encrypte! it is not v$lnerable to t"is *in o# attac* an cannot be ecrypte by
t"e eavesropper(
4an5in5t#e54iddle "ttac, 64IT47
I# t"e #irst connection an "ost *ey exc"ange bet%een a client an a partic$lar
"ost is compromise! t"e MI+M attac* #ools bot" t"e client an server into
t"in*ing t"at t"ey are comm$nicating irectly %it" one anot"er %"en! in #act! an
attac*er is act$ally intercepting all tra##ic bet%een t"e t%o as ill$strate belo%3
+"e client 8.ob9 initiates a connection %it" t"e server 8Alice9( Un*no%n to bot"
.ob an Alice! an attac*er 8Eve9 is %aiting to intercept t"eir connection
negotiation( Eve receives .ob's re,$est #or a connection an a$t"enticates "ersel#
as Alice( Eve t"en initiates a connection %it" Alice posing as .ob an
a$t"enticates "ersel#( +%o sec$re SSH sessions are no% in place %it" Eve reaing
all o# t"e ata being passe bet%een .ob an Alice in clear text(
Sec$re S"ell protects against MI+M attac*s t"ro$g" server "ost a$t"entication(
Unless t"e "ost itsel# "as been compromise! Eve oes not "ave access to t"e
server's private *ey an cannot impersonate Alice(
=ig$re 6( Man&in&t"e&Mile Attac* 8MI+M9
-.8 Insertion and Re/lay "ttac,s
Sec$re S"ell's implementation o# Message A$t"entication Coe algorit"ms
prevents t"e t"reat o# a ;replay< or ;insertion< attac*( In t"is type o# attac*! t"e
attac*er is not only monitoring yo$r Sec$re S"ell session b$t is also observing
yo$r *eystro*es 8eit"er p"ysically! as in loo*ing over yo$r s"o$ler or by
monitoring yo$r terminal's *eyboar %it" so#t%are9( .y comparing %"at yo$ type
%it" t"e tra##ic in t"e SSH stream! an attac*er can e$ce t"e pac*et containing a
partic$lar comman 8elete all #iles! #or example9 an ;replay< t"at comman at a
partic$larly inappropriate time $ring yo$r session(
-.9 Need for (olicy )it# Secure S#ell
0o single piece o# so#t%are can be a complete sec$rity sol$tion( +"ere are #actors
beyon sec$ring comm$nications t"ro$g" strong a$t"entication an encryption
t"at m$st be consiere( +"e p"ysical environment an t"e ;"$man #actor< are
o#ten overloo*e as signi#icant contrib$ting #actors to sec$rity breac"es( +"e
#ollo%ing list provies a s$ggeste starting point #or iss$es an areas o# concern
t"at a t"oro$g" sec$rity policy s"o$l aress3
J (ass)ord and:or /ass/#rase policies are neee so t"at $sers on't select
s"ort! %ea* or g$essable pass%ors( In aition! yo$ s"o$l "ave a policy t"at
states "o% o#ten a pass%or s"o$l be c"ange! an %"et"er or not pass%ors can
be re$se(
J Site security is a critical area t"at many organi-ations #ail to aress ae,$ately(
4ortable comp$ter $sers s"o$l be provie %it" sec$rity evices s$c" as loc*ing
cables an enco$rage not to leave t"ese evices $nattene! even #or a ;min$te
or t%o<( 4"ysical access to servers! ro$ters! net%or* connections an bac*$p
meia s"o$l be sec$re an limite only to t"ose personnel %"o re,$ire it(
J Security audits of ser1ice /ro1iders are an excellent next step a#ter yo$r
p"ysical plant is sec$re an policies an proce$re #or yo$r organi-ation "ave
been establis"e an implemente( Internet Service 4roviers 8IS49! Application
Service 4roviers 8AS49 an ata storage venors generally "ave rob$st p"ysical
an logical sec$rity in place( An a$it may reveal e#iciencies in t"eir policies
an p"ysical plant b$t %ill more li*ely provie yo$r organi-ation %it" aitional
ieas to improve yo$r o%n sec$rity plan(
J .ac,u/ proce$res are generally aopte #or servers b$t o#ten overloo*e or
ignore #or client %or*stations( Implementing net%or* bac*$p proce$res can
protect an ins$re retrieval o# val$able ata i# a client mac"ine is lost! stolen or
amage( Using Sec$re S"ell %it" t"e above policies in place %ill enable yo$ to
economically! privately! e##ectively an sa#ely $se p$blic net%or*s li*e t"e
Internet to o yo$r ay&toay b$siness comm$nications %it" remote $sers or
b$siness partners(
;. "L<ORITH4S IN THE SSH (ROTOCOLS
SSH51.- SSH5$.=
(u3lic5,ey RSA DS"! DH
Has# 4D-! CRC5&$ SH"51! MB7
Symmetric
&DES! IDEA! ARCFOUR!
BES
&DES! Blowfish! wofish! CAS+&12N! IBEA!
ARC=)UR
Com/ression Olib Olib
;.1 (u3lic5>ey "l!orit#ms
Ri1est5S#amir5"dleman 6RS"7
+"e Rivest&S"amir&Aleman p$blic&*ey algorit"m 8RSA9 is t"e most %iely $se
asymmetric cip"er( It erives its sec$rity #rom t"e i##ic$lty o# #actoring large
integers t"at are t"e pro$ct o# t%o large primes o# ro$g"ly e,$al si-e( =actoring
is %iely believe to be intractable 8i(e(! in#easible! amitting no e##icient!
polynomial&time sol$tion9! alt"o$g" t"is isnKt proven( RSA can be $se #or bot"
encryption an signat$res(
Until September 2000! RSA %as claime to be patente in t"e Unite States by
4$blic Pey 4artners! Inc(! a company in %"ic" RSA Sec$rity! Inc( is a partner(
8+"e algorit"m is no% in t"e p$blic omain(9 ?"ile t"e patent %as in #orce! 4P4
claime t"at it controlle t"e $se o# t"e RSA algorit"m in t"e USA! an t"at t"e
$se o# $na$t"ori-e implementations %as illegal( Until t"e mi&1660s! RSA
Sec$rity provie a #reely available re#erence implementation! RSAre#! %it" a
license allo%ing e$cational an broa commercial $se 8as long as t"e so#t%are
itsel# %as not sol #or pro#it9( +"ey no longer s$pport or istrib$te t"is tool*it!
t"o$g" it is commonly available( Since RSA is no% in t"e p$blic omain! t"ereKs
no longer any reason to $se RSAre#( It is no longer s$pporte! some versions
contain sec$rity #la%s! an t"ere are better implementations o$t t"ereL %e
isco$rage its $se(
Di!ital Si!nature "l!orit#m 6DS"7
+"e Bigital Signat$re Algorit"m 8BSA9 %as evelope by t"e U(S( 0ational
Sec$rity Agency 80SA9! an prom$lgate by t"e U(S( 0ational Instit$te o#
Stanars an +ec"nology 80IS+9 as part o# t"e Bigital Signat$re Stanar
8 BSS9( +"e BSS %as iss$e as a =eeral In#ormation 4rocessing Stanar! =I4S&
1NF! in May 166C( It is a p$blic&*ey algorit"m! base on t"e Sc"norr an ElDamal
met"os! an relies on t"e i##ic$lty o# comp$ting iscrete logarit"ms in a #inite
#iel( It is esigne as a signat$re&only sc"eme t"at canKt be $se #or encryption!
alt"o$g" a #$lly general implementation may easily per#orm bot" RSA an
ElDamal encryption(
Diffie5Hellman ,ey a!reement
+"e Bi##ie&Hellman *ey agreement algorit"m %as t"e original p$blic&*ey system!
invente by ?"it#iel Bi##ie! Martin Hellman! an Ralp" Mer*le in 16>F( It %as
patente by t"em in 16>> 8iss$e in 16N0! patent RC!200!>>09L t"at patent "as no%
expire! an t"e algorit"m is in t"e p$blic omain( Li*e BSA! it is base on t"e
iscrete logarit"m problem! an it allo%s t%o parties to erive a s"are secret *ey
MAC/0CERC 2A CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
sec$rely over an open c"annel( +"at is! t"e parties engage in an exc"ange o#
messages! at t"e en o# %"ic" t"ey s"are a secret *ey( It isnKt #easible #or an
eavesropper to etermine t"e s"are secret merely #rom observing t"e exc"ange
messages(
SSH&2 $ses t"e Bi##ie&Hellman algorit"m as its re,$ire 8an c$rrently! its only
e#ine9 *ey&exc"ange met"o(
;.$ Secret5>ey "l!orit#ms
International Data Encry/tion "l!orit#m 6IDE"7
+"e International Bata Encryption Algorit"m 8IBEA9 %as esigne in 1660 by
:$e@ia Lai an Sames Massey! an %ent t"ro$g" several revisions! improvements!
an renamings be#ore reac"ing its c$rrent #orm( Alt"o$g" relatively ne%! it is
consiere sec$reL t"e %ell&*no%n cryptograp"er .r$ce Sc"neier in 166F
prono$nce it Mt"e best an most sec$re bloc* algorit"m available to t"e p$blic at
t"is time(M
:( Lai an S( Massey! MA 4roposal #or a 0e% .loc* Encryption Stanar!M
Avances in Cryptology && EUR)CR24+ T62 4roceeings! Springer&1erlag!
1662! pp AN6&C0C(
IBEA is patente in E$rope an t"e Unite States by t"e S%iss company Ascom&
+ec" AD(+"e name MIBEAM is a traemar* o# Ascom&+ec"( +"e attit$e o#
Ascom&+ec" to%ars t"is patent an t"e $se o# IBEA in t"e Unite States "as
c"ange over time! especially %it" regar to its incl$sion in 4D4( It is #ree #or
noncommercial $se( Dovernment or commercial $se may re,$ire a royalty! %"ere
Mcommercial $seM incl$es $se o# t"e algorit"m internal to a commercial
organi-ation! not @$st irectly selling an implementation or o##ering its $se #or
pro#it(
Data Encry/tion Standard 6DES7
+"e Bata Encryption Stanar 8BES9 is t"e aging %or*"orse o# symmetric
encryption algorit"ms( Besigne by researc"ers at I.M in t"e early 16>0s $ner
t"e name L$ci#er! t"e U(S( government aopte BES as a stanar on 0ovember
2A! 16>F 8=I4S&CF9( It %as patente by I.M! b$t I.M grante #ree %orl%ie
MAC/0CERC 2C CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
rig"ts to its $se( It "as been $se extensively in t"e p$blic an private sectors ever
since( BES "as stoo $p %ell to cryptanalysis over t"e years an is becoming
vie%e as o$tate only beca$se its 7F&bit *ey si-e is too small relative to moern
comp$ting po%er( A n$mber o# %ell&p$blici-e esigns #or special&p$rpose
MBES&crac*ingM mac"ines "ave been p$t #or%ar! an t"eir p$tative prices are
#alling more an more into t"e realm o# pla$sibility #or governments an large
companies( It seems s$re t"at at least t"e 0SA "as s$c" evices( .eca$se o# t"ese
%ea*nesses! 0IS+ is c$rrently in t"e process o# selecting a s$ccessor to BES!
calle t"e Avance Encryption Stanar 8AES9(
Tri/le5DES
+riple&BES! or ABES! is a variant o# BES intene to increase its sec$rity by
increasing t"e *ey lengt"( It "as been proven t"at t"e BES #$nction oesnKt #orm a
gro$p over its *eys! %"ic" means t"at encrypting m$ltiple times %it" inepenent
*eys can increase sec$rity( ABES encrypts t"e plaintext %it" t"ree iterations o# t"e
BES algorit"m! $sing t"ree separate *eys( +"e e##ective *ey lengt" o# ABES is
112 bits! a vast improvement over t"e 7F&bit *ey o# plain BES(
"RC'OUR 6RC*7
Ron Rivest esigne t"e RCC cip"er in 16N> #or RSA Bata Sec$rity! Inc(
8RSABSI9L t"e name is vario$sly claime to stan #or MRivest Cip"erM or MRonKs
Coe(M It %as an $npatente trae secret o# RSABSI! $se in ,$ite a n$mber o#
commercial pro$cts by RSABSI licensees( In 166C! t"o$g"! so$rce coe
claiming to implement RCC appeare anonymo$sly on t"e Internet(
Experimentation ,$ic*ly con#irme t"at t"e poste coe %as inee compatible
%it" RCC! an t"e cat %as o$t o# t"e bag( Since it "a never been patente! RCC
e##ectively entere t"e p$blic omain( +"is oesnKt mean t"at RSABSI %onKt s$e
someone %"o tries to $se it in a commercial pro$ct! so it is less expensive to
settle an license t"an to #ig"t( ?e arenKt a%are o# any test cases o# t"is iss$e(
Since t"e name MRCCM is traemar*e by RSABSI! t"e name MARC=)URM "as
been coine to re#er to t"e p$blicly reveale version o# t"e algorit"m(
ARC=)UR is very #ast b$t less st$ie t"an many ot"er algorit"ms( It $ses a
variable&si-e *eyL SSH&1 employs inepenent 12N&bits *eys #or eac" irection
o# t"e SSH session( +"e $se o# inepenent *eys #or eac" irection is an
exception in SSH&1! an cr$cial3 ARC=)UR is essentially a pa $sing t"e o$tp$t
o# a pse$o&ranom n$mber generator( As s$c"! it is important never to re$se a
*ey beca$se to o so ma*es cryptanalysis trivially easy( I# t"is caveat is observe!
ARC=)UR is consiere sec$re by many! espite t"e eart" o# p$blic
cryptanalytic res$lts(
.lo)fis#
.lo%#is" %as esigne by .r$ce Sc"neier in 166A! as a step to%ar replacing t"e
aging BES( It is m$c" #aster t"an BES an IBEA! t"o$g" not as #ast as
ARC=)UR! an is $npatente an #ree #or all $ses( It is intene speci#ically #or
implementation on large! moern! general&p$rpose microprocessors an #or
sit$ations %it" relatively #e% *ey c"anges( It isnKt partic$larly s$ite to lo%&en
environments s$c" as smart cars( It employs a variable&si-e *ey o# A2 to CCN
bitsL SSH&2 $ses 12N&bit *eys( .lo%#is" "as receive a #air amo$nt o#
cryptanalytic scr$tiny an "as prove impervio$s to attac* so #ar( In#ormation is
available #rom Co$nterpane! Sc"neierKs sec$rity cons$lting company(
T)ofis#
+%o#is" is anot"er esign by .r$ce Sc"neier! toget"er %it" S( Pelsey! B( ?"iting!
B( ?agner! C( Hall! an 0( =erg$son( It %as s$bmitte in 166N to t"e 0IS+ as a
caniate #or t"e Avance Encryption Stanar! to replace BES as t"e U(S(
governmentKs symmetric ata encryption stanar( +%o years later! it is one o# t"e
#ive #inalists in t"e AES selection process! o$t o# 17 initial s$bmissions( Li*e
.lo%#is"! it is $npatente an #ree #or all $ses! an Co$nterpane "as provie
$ncopyrig"te re#erence implementations! also #reely $sable(
+%o#is" amits *eys o# lengt"s 12N! 162! or 27F bitsL SSH&2 speci#ies 27F&bit
*eys( +%o#is" is esigne to be more #lexible t"an .lo%#is"! allo%ing goo
MAC/0CERC 2F CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
implementation in a larger variety o# comp$ting environments 8e(g(! slo%er
processors! small memory! in&"ar%are9( It is very #ast! its esign is conservative!
an it is li*ely to be ,$ite strong
C"ST
CAS+ %as esigne in t"e early 1660s by Carlisle Aams an Sta##or +avares(
+avares is on t"e #ac$lty o# G$eenKs University at Pingston in Canaa! %"ile
Aams is an employee o# Entr$st +ec"nologies o# +exas( CAS+ is patente! an
t"e rig"ts are "el by Entr$st! %"ic" "as mae t%o versions o# t"e algorit"m
available on a %orl%ie royalty&#ree basis #or all $ses( +"ese versions are
CAS+&12N an CAS+&27F! escribe in R=C&21CC an R=C&2F12! respectively(
SSH&2 $ses CAS+&12N! %"ic" is name #or its 12N&bit *ey lengt"(
(
;.& Has# 'unctions
CRC5&$
+"e A2&bit Cyclic Re$nancy C"ec* 8CRC&A29! e#ine in IS) AA06! is a
noncryptograp"ic "as" #$nction #or etecting acciental c"anges to ata( +"e
SSH&1 protocol $ses CRC&A2 8%it" t"e polynomial 0xEB.NNA209 #or integrity
c"ec*ing! an t"is %ea*ness amits t"e Minsertion attac*M isc$sse later( SSH&2
protocol employs cryptograp"ically strong "as" #$nctions #or integrity c"ec*ing!
obviating t"is attac*(
4D-
MB7 8MMessage Bigest algorit"m n$mber 7M9 is a cryptograp"ically strong! 12N&
bit "as" algorit"m esigne by Ron Rivest in 1661! one o# a series "e esigne #or
RSABSI 8MB2 t"ro$g" MB79( MB7 is $npatente! place in t"e p$blic omain
by RSABSI! an oc$mente in R=C&1A21( It "as been a stanar "as" algorit"m
#or several years! $se in many cryptograp"ic pro$cts an stanars( A
s$ccess#$l collision attac* against t"e MB7 compression #$nction by en .oer
MAC/0CERC 2> CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
an .osselaers in 166A ca$se some concern! an t"o$g" t"e attac* "asnKt
res$lte in any practical %ea*nesses! t"ere is an expectation t"at it %ill! an
people are beginning to avoi MB7 in #avor o# ne%er algorit"ms( RSABSI
t"emselves recommen moving a%ay #rom MB7 in #avor o# SHA&1 or RI4EMB&
1F0 #or #$t$re applications emaning collision&resistance(
(
SH"51
SHA&1 8Sec$re Has" Algorit"m9 %as esigne by t"e 0SA an 0IS+ #or $se %it"
t"e U(S( government Bigital Signat$re Stanar( Li*e MB7! it %as esigne as an
improvement on MBC! b$t ta*es a i##erent approac"( It pro$ces 1F0&bit "as"es(
+"ere are no *no%n attac*s against SHA&1! an! i# sec$re! it is stronger t"an MB7
simply #or its longer "as" val$e( It is starting to replace MB7 in some
applicationsL #or example! SSH&2 $ses SHA&1 as its re,$ire MAC "as" #$nction!
as oppose to MB7 in SSH&1(
RI(E4D51;=
2et anot"er 1F0&bit MBC variant! RI4EMB&1F0! %as evelope by Hans
Bobbertin! Antoon .osselaers! an .art 4reneel as part o# t"e E$ropean
Comm$nity RI4E pro@ect( RI4E stans #or RACE Integrity 4rimitives Eval$ation
RACE! in t$rn! %as t"e program #or Researc" an Bevelopment in Avance
Comm$nications +ec"nologies in E$rope! an EC&sponsore program %"ic" ran
#rom S$ne 16N> to Becember 1667 !RI4E %as part o# t"e RACE e##ort! evote
to st$ying an eveloping ata integrity tec"ni,$es( Hence! RI4EMB&1F0
s"o$l be rea as Mt"e RI4E Message Bigest 81F0 bits9(
;.* Com/ression "l!orit#ms ?li3
-lib is c$rrently t"e only compression algorit"m e#ine #or SSH( In t"e SSH
protocol oc$ments! t"e term M-libM re#ers to t"e Me#lateM lossless compression
algorit"m as #irst implemente in t"e pop$lar g-ip compression $tility! an later
oc$mente in R=C&1671( It is available as a so#t%are library calle OLI.(
MAC/0CERC 2N CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
@.CONCLUSION
+"e Sec$re S"ell tec"nology provies yo$ %it" net%or* sec$rity tools t"at "elp
compliment yo$r system an ata sec$rity( ?it" Sec$re S"ell! remote connections
are encrypte an t"e aministrators can ecie %"ic" means o# a$t"entication
t"ey re,$ire( Aitionally! Sec$re S"ell enables yo$ to create sec$re remote
bac*$ps an t$nnel ot"er +C4&base tra##ic( Using Sec$re S"ell ens$res t"at yo$r
mission&critical ata is sa#e #rom eavesropping %"ile traversing t"e Internet an
t"e $sers o# t"e ata are strongly a$t"enticate( +"e SSH2 protocol provies
rob$st sec$rity services over +C4 transport layer( +"ese incl$e strong! sec$re
a$t"entication met"os! ata con#ientiality! an integrity( Sec$re S"ell pro$cts
$tili-e t"is sec$rity layer to provie tools li*e interactive an scripte comman&
line access an #ile trans#er capabilities( +"ere is a #amily o# en&$ser binary
pro$cts! %"ic" are %iely $se by system an net%or* aministrators toay(
8. RE'ERENCES
.oo,s:"rticles
S( Simmons! M+"e S$bliminal C"annels in t"e U(S( Bigital Signat$re
Algorit"m 8BSA9(M 4roceeings o# t"e +"ir Symposi$m on3 State an
4rogress o# Researc" in Cryptograp"y! Rome3 =ona-ione Ugo .oroni!
166A(
P( ?( Campbell an M( S( ?iener! MBES Is 0ot a Dro$p!M Avances in
Cryptology CR24+) T62 4roceeings! Springer&1erlag(
Sames .am#orKs boo*! +"e 4$--le 4alace 84eng$in9! #or an investigative
"istory o# t"e 0SA(
S(M( .ellovin! ;Sec$rity problems in t"e +C45I4 protocol s$ite<! S(M(
.ellovin! A+I+ .ell Laboratories! M$rray Hill! 0e% Sersey 0>6>C
MAC/0CERC A0 CALICU+ U01ERSI+2

+e3 Lin,s

U"ttp355%%%(co$nterpane(com5blo%#is"("tmlV
!http"##$ork%net#&phil#Cracking#Internet%ht'l(
U"ttp355%%%(co$nterpane(com5blo%#is"("tmlV
MAC/0CERC AA CALICU+ U01ERSI+2
MAC/0CERC AC CALICU+ U01ERSI+2

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