Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1800 January 27, 1948
CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority Parties,
petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.
Ramon Diokno for petitioner.
City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondent.
FERIA, J .:
This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaig
manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of
Manila, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza
Miranda on Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the
government for redress to grievances on the groun that the respondent refused to grant such
permit. Due to urgency of the case, this Court, after mature deliberation, issued a writ of
mandamus, as prayed for in the petition of November 15, 1947, without prejudice to writing later
an extended and reasoned decision.
The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed
by the Constitutions of democratic countries. But it a casettled principle growing out of the
nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be
so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, not
injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such
and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power" which is the power to
prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government
through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional
and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities,
and cities authorizing their legislative bodies, called municipal and city councils to enact
ordinances for the purpose.
The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal Board
of the City of Manila, which according to section 2439 of the Administrative Code is the
legislative body of the City. Section 2444 of the same Code grants the Municipal Board, among
others, the following legislative power, to wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression
of riots, affrays, disturbances, and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the use of streets,
avenues ... parks, cemeteries and other public places" and "for the abatement of nuances in the
same," and "(ee) to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants."
Under the above delegated power, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted sections
844 and 1119. Section of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense against public
peace, and section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in
any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect
with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." And section 1119 provides the following:
"SEC. 1119 Free for use of public The streets and public places of the city shall be
kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the
pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided
by ordinance or regulation: Provided, that the holding of athletic games, sports, or
exercise during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or public places of the
city and on the patron saint day of any district in question, may be permitted by means of
a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places or portions
thereof, where such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And provided,
further, That the holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public places is
prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor who shall, on every
such ocassion, determine or specify the streets or public places for the formation, route,
and dismissal of such parade or procession: And provided, finally, That all applications to
hold a parade or procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than twenty-four
hours prior to the holding of such parade or procession."
As there is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City regulating the
holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places, the provisions of saif
section 1119 regarding the holding of any parade or procession in any street or public paces may
be applied by analogy to meeting and assembly in any street or public places.
Said provision is susceptible to two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is
vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful
assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of
Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the
Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or
public places to be used for the purpose, with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to
secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.
After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second
construction, that is construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer
upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the
permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may
pass or the meeting may be held.
Our conclusions find support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. State of New
Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. Chap. 145, section 2,
providing that "no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted
unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the select men of the town or from
licensing committee," was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring
upon the licensing board unfetted discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the
Supreme Court of the United States in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes
firming the judgement of the State Supreme Court, held that " a statute requiring pewrsons using
the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local
authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or a freedom of
speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities
are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration, the time, place, and manner of
the parade and procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an
opportunity to provide proper policing and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or
refuse license, ... ."
We can not adopt the alternative construction or constru the ordinance under consideration as
conferring upon the Mayor power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be
tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for
holding of meetings, parades or processions, because such a construction would make the
ordinance invalid and void or violative of the constitutional limitations. As the Municipal Boards
is empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks, and the other public places, and the word
"regulate," as used in section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means and includes the
power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but can not be construed a synonimous with
construed "suppressed" or "prohibit" (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil., 103), the
Municipal Board can not grant the Mayor a power that it does not have. Besides, the powers and
duties of the Mayor as the Chief Executive of the City are executive and one of them is "to
comply with and enforce and give the necessary orders for the faithful performance and
execution of laws and ordinances" (section 2434 [b] of the Revised Administrative Code), the
ligislative police power of the Municipal Board to enact ordinances regulating reasonably the
excercise of the fundamental personal rights of the citizens in the streets and other public places,
can not be delgated to the Mayor or any other officer by conferring upon him unregulated
discretion or without laying down rules to guide and control his action by which its impartial
execution can be secured or partiality and oppression prevented.
In City of Chicago vs. Trotter, 136 Ill., 430, it was held by the Supreme Court of Illinois that,
under Rev. ST. Ill. c. 24, article 5 section 1, which empowers city councils to regulate the use of
public streets, the council has no power to ordain that no processions shall be allowed upon the
streets until a permit shall be obtained from the superintendent of police, leaving the issuance of
such permits to his discretion, since the powers conferred on the council cannot be delegated by
them.
The Supreme COurt of Wisconsin in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N.W.,
1104, held the following:
"The objections urged in the case of City of Baltimore vs. Radecke, 49 Md., 217, were
also, in substance, the same, for the ordinance in that case upon its face committed to the
unrestrained will of a single public officer the power to determine the rights of parties
under it, when there was nothing in the ordinance to guide or cintrol his action, and it was
held void because "it lays down no rules by which its impartial execution can be secured,
or partiality and oppression prevented." and that "when we remember that action or
nonaction may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from
favoritism and other improper influences and motives easy of concealment and difficult
to be detected and exposed, it becomes unnecessary to suggest or to comment upon the
injustice capable of being wrought under cover of such a power, for that becomes
apparent to every one who gives to the subject a moment's consideration. In fact, an
ordinance which clothes a single individual with such power hardly falls within the
domain of law, and we are constrained to pronounce it inoperative and void." ... In the
exercise of police power, the council may, in its discretion, regulate the exercise of such
rights in a reasonable manner, but can not suppress them, directly or indirectly, by
attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The
discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion, to be exercised within the
limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer
and arbitrary authority, making him in its exercise a petty tyrant."
In re Frazee, 63 Michigan 399, 30 N.W., 72, a city or ordinance providing that "no person or
persons, or associations or organizations shall march, parade, ride or drive, in ou upon or through
the public streets of the City of Grand Rapids with musical instrument, banners, flags, ... without
first having obtained the consent of the mayor or common council of said city;" was held by the
Supreme Court of Michigan to be unreasonable and void. Said Supreme Court in the course of
the decision held:
". . . We must therefore construe this charter, and the powers it assumes to grant, so far as
it is not plainly unconstitutional, as only conferring such power over the subjects referred
to as will enable the city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in accordance with the
limitations and conditions required by the rights of the people themselves, as secured by
the principles of law, which cannot be less careful of private rights under the constitution
than under the common law."
"It is quite possible that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger and
disorder in cities than in smaller towns or in rural places. This may justify reasonable
precautionary measures, but nothing further; and no inference can extend beyond the fair
scope of powers granted for such a purpose, and no grant of absolute discretion to
suppress lawful action altogther can be granted at all. . . . ."
"It has been customary, from time immemorial, in all free countries, and in most civilized
countries, for people who are assembled for common purposes to parade together, by day
or reasonable hours at night, with banners and other paraphernalia, and with music of
various kinds. These processions for political, religious, and social demonstrations are
resorted to for the express purpose of keeping unity of feeling and enthusiasm, and
frequently to produce some effect on the public mind by the spectacle of union and
numbers. They are a natural product and exponent of common aims, and valuable factors
in furthering them. ... When people assemble in riotous mobs, and move for purposes
opposed to private or public security, they become unlawful, and their members and
abettors become punishable. . . ."
"It is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations create public
disturbances, or operate as a nuisance, or create or manifestly threaten some tangible
public or private mischief, that the law interferes."
"This by-law is unreasonable, because it suppresses what is in general perfectly lawful,
and because it leaves the power of permitting or restraining processions, and thier
courses, to an unregulated official discretion, when the whole matter, if regualted at all,
must be permanent, legal provisions, operating generally and impartially."
In Rich vs. Napervill, 42 Ill., App. 222, the question was raised as to the validity of the city
ordinance which made it unlawful for any person, society or club, or association of any kind, to
parade any of the streets, with flags, banners, or transparencies, drums, horns, or other musical
instruments, without the permission of the city council first had and obtained. The appellants
were members of the Salvation Army, and were prosecuted for a violation of the ordinance, and
the court in holding the ordinance invalid said, "Ordinances to be valid must be reasonable; they
must not be oppressive; they must be fair and impartial; they must not be so framed as to allow
their enforcement to rest on official discretion ... Ever since the landing of the Pilgrims from the
Mayflower the right to assemble and worship accordingto the dictates of one's conscience, and
the right to parade in a peaceable manner and for a lawful purpose, have been fostered and
regarded as among the fundamental rights of a free people. The spirit of our free institutions
allows great latitude in public parades and emonstrations whether religious or political ... If this
ordinance is held valid, then may the city council shut off the parades of those whose nations do
not suit their views and tastes in politics or religion, and permit like parades of those whose
nations do. When men in authority are permitted in their discretion to exercise power so
arbitrary, liberty is subverted, and the spirit of of our free institutions violated. ... Where the
granting of the permit is left to the unregulated discretion of a small body of city eldermen, the
ordinance cannot be other than partial and discriminating in its practical operation. The law
abhors partiality and discrimination. ... (19 L.R.A., p. 861)
In the case of Trujillo vs. City of Walsenburg, 108 Col., 427; 118 P. [2d], 1081, the Supreme
Court of Colorado, in construing the provision of section 1 of Ordinance No. 273 of the City of
Walsenburg, which provides: "That it shall be unlawful for any person or persons or association
to use the street of the City of Walsenburg, Colorado for any parade, procession or assemblage
without first obtaining a permit from the Chief of Police of the City of Walsenburg so to do,"
held the following:
"[1] The power of municipalities, under our state law, to regulate the use of public streets
is conceded. "35 C.S.A., chapter 163, section 10, subparagraph 7. "The privilege of a
citizen of the United States to use the streets ... may be regulated in the interest of all; it is
not absolute, but relative, and must be excercised in subordination to the general, be
abridged or denied." Hague, Mayor vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S.,
496, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954, 964; 83 Law, ed., 1423.
[2, 3] An excellent statement of the power of a municipality to impose regulations in the
use of public streets is found in the recent case of Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.,
569; 61 S. Ct., 762, 765; 85 Law, ed. 1049; 133 A.L.R., 1936, in which the following
appears; "The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the
safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been
regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding
the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of
cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a
restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public
convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted excercise of
some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. One would
not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he thought it his religious
duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public attention
to an announcement of his opinions. As regulation of the use of the streets for parades
and processions is a traditional excercise of control by local government, the question in
a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly
abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and
the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to public places.
Lovell vs. Criffin, 303 U.S., 444, 451;58 S. Ct., 666, 668, 82 Law. ed., 949 [953]; Hague
vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 496, 515, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954, 963,
964; 83 Law. ed., 1423 [1436, 1437]; Scheneider vs. State of New Jersey [Town of
Irvington]; 308 U.S., 147, 160; 60 S. Ct., 146, 150; 84 Law. ed., 155 [164]; Cantwell vs.
Connecticut, 310 U. S., 296, 306, 307; 60 S. Ct., 900, 904; 84 Law. ed., 1213 [1219,
1220]; 128 A.L.R. 1352."
[4] Our concern here is the validity or nonvalidity of an ordinance which leaves to the
uncontrolled official discretion of the chief of police of the municipal corporation to say
who shall, who shall not, be accorded the privilege of parading on its public streets. No
standard of regulation is even remotely suggested. Moreover, under the ordinance as
drawn, the chief of police may for any reason which he may entertain arbitrarily deny this
privelege to any group. in Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569, 85 Law. ed., 1049,
1054, said:
"In the instant case the uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege of using the
public streets in a lawful manner clearly is apparent from the face of the ordinance before
us, and we therefore hold it null and void."
The Supreme Court of the United States in Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307
U. S., 496, 515, 516; 83 Law. ed., 1423, declared that a municipal ordinance requiring the
obtaining of a permit for a public assembly in or upon the public streets, highways, public parks,
or public buildings of the city and authorizing the director of public safety, for the purpose of
preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage, to refuse to issue a permit when after
investigation of all the facts and circumstances pertinent to the application he believes it to be
proper to refuse to issue a permit, is not a valid exercise of the police power. Said Court in the
course of its opinion in support of the conclusion said:
". . . Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the
United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national
questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must
be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance
with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or
denied.
"We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance quoted in Note 1 void upon
its face. It does not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or parks the
standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere
opinion that such refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.' It can
thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free
expression of views on national affairs for the prohibition of all speaking will
undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression of the
privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with
the exercise of the right."
Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which
provides that the Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of
all classes, cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the petitioner,
for the simple reason that said general power is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the
Municipal Board requiring licenses or permits to be issued by the Mayor, such as those found in
Chapters 40 to 87 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. It is not a specific or
substantive power independent from the corresponding municipal ordinances which the Mayor,
as Chief Executive of the City, is required to enforce under the same section 2434. Moreover
"one of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the Legislature
to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority," except
certain powers of local government, specially of police regulation which are conferred upon the
legislative body of a municipal corporation. Taking this into consideration, and that the police
power to regulate the use of streets and other public places has been delegated or rather conferred
by the Legislature upon the Municipal Board of the City (section 2444 [u] of the Administrative
Code) it is to be presumed that the Legislature has not, in the same breath, conferred upon the
Mayor in section 2434 (m) the same power, specially if we take into account that its exercise
may be in conflict with the exercise of the same power by the Municipal Board.
Besides, assuming arguendo that the Legislature has the power to confer, and in fact has
conferred, upon the Mayor the power to grant or refuse licenses and permits of all classes,
independent from ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board on the matter, and the provisions
of section 2444 (u) of the same Code and of section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances to the
contrary notwithstanding, such grant of unregulated and unlimited power to grant or refuse a
permit for the use of streets and other public places for processions, parades, or meetings, would
be null and void, for the same reasons stated in the decisions in the cases above quoted, specially
in Willis Cox vs. New Hampshire, supra, wherein the question involved was also the validity of
a similar statute of New Hamsphire. Because the same constitutional limitations applicable to
ordinances apply to statutes, and the same objections to a municipal ordinance which grants
unrestrained discretion upon a city officer are applicable to a law or statute that confers unlimited
power to any officer either of the municipal or state governments. Under our democratic system
of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government,
except perhaps in cases of national emergency. As stated in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering,
supra, "The discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion to be exercised within
the limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer an
arbitrary authority making in its exercise a petty tyrant."
It is true that Mr. Justice Ostrand cited said provision of article 2434 (m) of the Administrative
Code apparently in support of the decision in the case of Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil., 255-
261, but evidently the quotation of said provision was made by the writer of the decision under a
mistaken conception of its purview and is an obiter dictum, for it was not necessary for the
decision rendered. The popular meeting or assemblage intended to be held therein by the
Communist Party of the Philippines was clearly an unlawful one, and therefore the Mayor of the
City of Manila had no power to grant the permit applied for. On the contrary, had the meeting
been held, it was his duty to have the promoters thereof prosecuted for violation of section 844,
which is punishable as misdemeanor by section 1262 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of
Manila. For, according to the decision, "the doctrine and principles advocated and urged in the
Constitution and by-laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speeches
uttered, delivered, and made by its members in the public meetings or gatherings, as above
stated, are highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite rebelious conspiracies and disturb and
obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty."
The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions,
specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be
delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in
the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of
public order." As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting,"
and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason
given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any consideration. As stated in the portion of
the decision in Hague vs. Committee on Industrial Organization, supra, "It does not make
comfort and convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables
the Director of Safety to refuse the permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent
riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the
instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs, for the
prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities." To this we may add the
following, which we make our own, said by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in
Whitney vs. California, 71 U. S. (Law. ed.), 1105-1107:
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men
feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the
bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . . .
"Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear
political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. . . .
"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions
essential effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious.
Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be
inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to a society. . . . The fact
that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough
to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.
Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crimes are education
and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and
assembly." Whitney vs. California, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep., 71 Law., ed., pp. 1106-1107.)
In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted and, there appearing no
reasonable objection to the use of the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, for the meeting applied for, the
respondent is ordered to issue the corresponding permit, as requested. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon and Briones, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J ., concurring:
The subject-matter of the petition is not new in this jurisdiction. Under Act No. 2774, section 4,
amending section 2434, paragraph (m) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Mayor has
discretion to grant or deny the petition to hold the meeting. (See Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57
Phil., 255.) And, in the case of U. S. vs. Apurado, 7 Phil., 422, 426, this Court said:
"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the
people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such
occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the
disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the
prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by
individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious
and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for
redress of grievances would become a delusion and snare and the attempt to exercise it on
the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those
who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes
which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If
instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be
sought out and punished therefor."
The petitioner is a distinguished member of the bar and Floor Leader of the Nacionalista Party in
the House of Representatives; he was the chief campaigner of the said party in the last elections.
As the petition comes from a responsible party, in contrast to Evangelista's Communist Party
which was considered subversive, I believe that the fear which caused the Mayor to deny it was
not well founded and his action was accordingly far from being a sound exercise of his
discretion.

BRIONES, M., conforme:
En nombre del Partido Nacionalista y de los grupos oposicionistas aliados, Cipriano P. Primicias,
director general de campaa de las minorias coaligadas en las ultimas elecciones y "Floor
Leader" de dichas minorias en la Camara de Representantes, solicito del Alcalde de Manila en
comunicacion de fecha 14 de Noviembre, 1947, permiso "para celebrar un mitin publico en la
Plaza Miranda el Domingo, 16 de Noviembre, 1947, desde las 5:00 p.m. hasta la 1:00 a.m., a fin
de pedir al gobierno el remedio de ciertos agravios." Tambien se pedia en la comunicacion
licencia para usar la plataforma ya levantada en dicha Plaza.
El Vice-Alcalde Cesar Miraflor actuo sobre la solicitud en aquel mismo dia dando permiso tanto
para la celebracion del mitin como para el uso de la plataforma, "en la inteligencia de que no se
pronunciaran discursos subversivos, y ademas, de que usted (el solicitante) sera responsable del
mantenimiento de la paz y orden durante la celebracion del mitin."
Sin embargo, al dia siguiente, 15 de Noviembre, el Alcalde Valeriano E. Fugoso revoco el
permiso concedido, expresandose los motivos de la revocacion en su carta de tal fecha dirigida al
Rep. Primicias.
"Sirvase dar por informado dice el Alcalde Fugoso en su carta que despues de
haber leido los periodicos metropolitanos da esta maana en que aparece que vuestro
mitin va a ser un 'rally' de indignacion en donde se denunciaran ante el pueblo los
supuestos fraudes electorales perpetrados en varias partes de Filipinas para anular la
voluntad popular, por la presente se revoca dicho permiso.
"Se cree aade el Alcalde que la paz y el orden en Manila sufriran dao en dicho
'rally' considerando que las pasiones todavia no se han calmado y la tension sigue alta
como resultado de la ultima contienda politica.
"Segun los mismos periodicos, delegados venidos de provincias y estudiantes de las
universidades locales participaran en el 'rally,' lo cual, a mi juicio, no haria mas que
causar disturbios, pues no se puede asegurar que concurriran alli solamente elementos de
la oposicion. Desde el momento en que se mezclen entre la multitud gentes de diferentes
matices politicos, que es lo que probablemente va a ocurrir, el orden queda en peligro una
vez que al publico se le excite, como creo que sera excitado, teniendo en cuenta los fines
del mitin tal como han sido anunciados en los periodicos mencionados.
"Se dice que los resultados de las ultimas elecciones seran protestados. No hay base para
este proceder toda vez que los resultados todavia no han sido oficialmente anunciados.
"Por tanto termina el Alcalde su orden revocatoria la accion de esta oficina se toma
en interes del orden publico y para prevenir la perturbacion de la paz en Manila."
De ahi el presente recurso de mandamus para que se ordene al Alcalde recurrido a que expida
inmediatamente el permiso solicitado. Se pide tambien que ordenemos al Procurador General
para que investigue la fase criminal del caso y formule la accion que justifiquen las
circunstancias.
Dada la premura del asunto, se llamo inmediatamente a vista arguyendo extensamente los
abogados de ambas partes ante esta Corte en sus informes orales.
1

El recurso se funda, respecto de su aspecto civil, en el articulo III, seccion 1, inciso 8 de la
Constitucion de Filipinas, el cual preceptua "que no se aprobara ninguna ley que coarte la
libertad de la palabra, o de la prensa, o el derecho del pueblo de reunirse pacificamente y dirigir
petiticiones al gobierno para remedio de sus agravios." Con respecto al posible aspecto criminal
del caso se invoca el articulo 131 del Codigo Penal Revisado, el cual dispone que "la pena de
prision correccional en su periodo minimo, se impondra al funcionario publico o empleado que,
sin fundamento legal, prohibiere o interrumpiere una reunion pacifica, o disolviere la misma."
La defensa del recurrido invoca a su favor los llamados poderes de policia que le asisten como
guardian legal de las plazas, calles y demas lugares publicos. Se alega que como Alcalde de la
Ciudad de Manila tiene plena discrecion para conceder o denegar el uso de la Plaza Miranda, que
es una plaza publica, para la celebracion de un mitin o reunion, de conformidad con las
exigencias del interes general tal como el las interpreta. Especificamente se citan dos
disposiciones, a saber: el articulo 2434 (b), inciso (m) del Codigo Administrativo Revisado, y el
articulo 1119, capitulo 118 de la Compilacion de las Ordenanzas Revisadas de la Ciudad de
Manila, edicion de 1927. El articulo aludido del Codigo Administrativo Revisado se lee como
sigue:
xxx xxx xxx
"(m) To grant and refuse municipal license or permits of all classes and to revoke the
same for violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited
by law or municipal ordinance are being committed under the protection of such licenses
or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is carried
on, or for any other good reason of general interest." La ordenanza municipal indicada
reza lo siguiente:
La ordenanza municipal indicada reza lo siguiente:
"SEC. 1119. Free for use of public. The streets and public places of the city shall be
kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the
pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided
by the ordinance or regulation: Provided, That the holding of athletic games, sports, or
exercises during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or public places of the
city and on the patron saint day of any district in question, may be permitted by means of
a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places, or
portions thereof, where such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And
provided, further, That the holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public
places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor, who shall,
on every occasion, determine or specify the streets or public places for the formation,
route, and dismissal of such parade or procession: And provided, finally, That all
applications to hold a parade or procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than
twenty-four hours prior to the holding of such parade or procession."
Parece conveniente poner en claro ciertos hechos. El mitin o "rally" de indignacion de que habla
el Alcalde recurrido en su carta revocando el permiso ya concedido no consta en la peticion del
recurrente ni en ningun documenmento o manifestacion verbal atribuida al mismo, sino
solamente en las columnas informativas de la prensa metropolitana. El recurrente admite, sin
embargo, que el objeto del mitin era comunicar al pueblo la infinidad de telegramas y
comunicaciones que como jefe de campaa de las oposiciones habia recibido de varias partes del
archipielago denunciando tremendas anomalias, escandalosos fraudes, actos vandalicos de
terrorismo politico, etc., etc., ocurridos en las elecciones de 11 de Noviembre; llamar la atencion
del Gobierno hacia tales anomalias y abusos; y pedir su pronta, eficaz y honrada intervencion
para evitar lo que todavia se podia evitar, y con relacion a los hechos consumados urgir la pronta
persecucion y castigo inmediato de los culpables y malhechores. De esto resulta evidente que el
objeto del mitin era completamente pacifico, absolutamente legal. No hay ni la menor
insinuacion de que el recurrente y los partidos oposicionistas coaligados que representa tuvieran
el proposito de utilizar el mitin para derribar violentamente al presente gobierno, o provocar una
rebelion o siquiera un motin. En realidad, teniendo en cuenta las serias responsabilidades del
recurrente como jefe de campaa electoral de las minorias aliadas y como "Floor Leader" en el
Congreso de dichas minorias, parecia que esta consideracion debia pesar decisivamente en favor
de la presuncion de que el mitin seria una asamblea pacifica, de ciudadanos conscientes,
responsables y amantes de la ley y del orden.
2

Se ha llamado nuestra atencion a que en el articulo arriba citado y transcrito de las Ordenanzas
Revisadas de Manila no figura el mitin entre las materias reglamentadas, sino solo la procesion o
parada por las calles. Esto demuestra, se sostiene, que cuando se trata de un mitin en una plaza o
lugar publico, la concesion del permiso es ineludible y el Alcalde no tiene ninguna facultad
discrecional. Pareceme, sin embargo, que no es necesario llegar a este extremo. Creo no debe
haber inconveniente en admitir que el mitin esta incluido en la reglamentacion, por razones de
conveniencia publica. Verbigracia, es perfectamente licito denegar el permiso para celebrar un
mitin en una plaza publica en un dia y una hora determinados cuando ya previamente se ha
concedido de buena fe el uso del mismo lugar a otro a la misma hora. La prevencion de esta clase
de conflictos es precisamente uno de los ingredientes que entran en la motivacion de la facultad
reguladora del Estado o del municipio con relacion al uso de calles, plazas y demas lugares
publicos. Por ejemplo, es tambien perfectamente licito condicionar el permiso atendiendo a su
relacion con el movimiento general del trafico tanto de peatones como de vehiculos. Estas
consideraciones de comfort y conveniencia publica son por lo regular la base, el leit-motif de
toda ley u ordenanza encaminada a reglamentar el uso de parques, plazas y calles. Desde luego
que la regla no excluye la consideracion a veces de la paz y del buen orden, pero mas adelante
veremos que este ultimo, para que sea atendible, requiere que exista una situacion de peligro
verdadero, positivo, real, claro, inminente y substancial. La simple conjetura, la mera aprension,
el temor mas o menos exagerado de que el mitin, asamblea o reunion pueda ser motivo de
desorden o perturbacion de la paz no es motivo bastante para denegar el permiso, pues el derecho
constitucional de reunirse pacificamente, ya para que los ciudadanos discutan los asuntos
publicos o se comuniquen entre si su pensamiento sobre ellos, ya para ejecer el derecho de
peticion recabando del gobierno el remedio a ciertos agravios, es infinitamente superior a toda
facultad reguladora en relacion con el uso de los parques, plazas y calles.
La cuestion, por tanto, que tenemos que resolver en el presente recurso es bien sencilla. Tenia
razon el Alcalde recurrido para denegar el permiso solicitado por el recurrente, ora bajo los
terminos de la ordenanza pertinente, ora bajo la carta organica de Manila, y sobre todo, bajo el
precepto categorico, terminante, expresado en el inciso 8, seccion 1, del Articulo III de la
Constitucion? No constituye la denegacion del permiso una seria conculcacion de ciertos
privilegios fundamentales garantizados por la Constitucion al ciudadano y al pueblo?
Resulta evidente, de autos, que el recurrido denego el permiso bajo lo que el mismo llama "all-
pervading power of the state to regulate," temiendo que el mitin solicitado iba a poner en peligro
la paz y el orden publico en Manila. No se fundo la denegacion en razones de "comfort" o
conveniencia publica, vgr., para no estorbar el trafico, o para prevenir un conflicto con otro mitin
ya previamente solicitado y concedido, sino en una simple conjetura, en un mero temor o
aprension la aprension de que, dado el tremendo hervor de los animos resultante de una lucha
electoral harto reida y apasionada, un discurso violento, una arenga incendiaria podria amotinar
a la gente y provocar serios desordenes. La cuestion en orden es la siguiente: se puede anular o
siquiera poner en suspenso el derecho fundamentalisimo de reunion o asamblea pacifica,
garantizado por la Constitucion, por razon de esta clase de conjetura, temor o aprension? Es
obvio que la contestacion tiene que ser decididamente negativa. Elevar tales motivos a la
categoria de razon legal equivaldria practicamente a sancionar o legitimar cualquier pretexto, a
colocar los privilegios y garantias constitucionales a merced del capricho y de la arbitrariedad. Si
la vigencia de tales privilegios y garantias hubiera de depender de las suspicacias, temores,
aprensiones, o hasta humor del gobernante, uno podria facilmente imaginar los resultados
desastrosos de semejante proposicion; un partido mayoritario dirigido por caudillos y liders sin
escrupulos y sin conciencia podria facilmente anular todas las libertades, atropellar todos los
derechos incluso los mas sagrados, ahogar todo movimiento legitimo de protesta o peticion,
estrangular, en una palabra, a las minorias, las cuales como sabe todo estudiante de ciencia
politica en el juego y equilibrio de fuerzas que integran el sistema democratico son tan
indispensables como las mayorias. Que es lo que todavia podria detener a un partido o a un
hombre que estuviera en el poder y que no quisiera oir nada desagradable de sus adversarios si se
le dejara abiertas las puertas para que, invocando probables peligros o amagos de peligro,
pudiera de una sola plumada o de un solo gesto de repulsa anular o poner en suspenso los
privilegios y garantias constitucionales? No seria esto retornar a los dias de aquel famoso Rey
que dijo: "El Estado soy yo," o de aquel notorio cabecilla politico de uno de los Estados del Sur
de America que asombro al resto de su pais con este nefasto pronunciamiento: "I am the only
Constitution around here"? Es inconcebible que la facultad de reglamentar o el llamado poder de
policia deba interpretarse en el sentido de justificar y autorizar la anulacion de un derecho,
privilegio o garantia constitucional. Sin embargo, tal seria el resultado si en nombre de un
concepto tan vago y tan elastico como es el "interes general" se permitiera in terdecir la libertad
de la palabra, de la cual los derechos de reunion y de peticion son nada mas que complemento
logico y necesario. Una mujer famosa de Francia 3 en la epoca del terror, momentos antes de
subir al cadalso y colocar su hermoso cuello bajo la cuchilla de la guillotina, hizo historica esta
exclamacion: "Libertad, cuantos crimenes se cometen en tu nombre!" Si se denegara el presente
recurso legitimando la accion del recurrido y consiguientemente autorizando la supresion de los
mitines so pretexto de que la paz y el orden publico corren peligro con ellos, un desengaado de
la democracia en nuestro pais acaso exprese entonces su suprema desilusion parafraseando la
historica exclamacion de la siguiente manera: "Interes general, paz, orden publico, cuantos
atentados se cometen en vuestro nombre contra la libertad!"
El consenso general de las autoridades en los paises constitucionalmente regidos como Filipinas,
particularmente en Estados Unidos, es que el privilegio del ciudadano de usar los parques, plazas
y calles para el intercambio de impresiones y puntos de vista sobre cuestiones nacionales si bien
es absoluto es tambien relativo en el sentido de que se puede regular, pero jamas se puede
denegar o coartar so pretexto o a guisa de regulacion (Hague vs. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U. S., 515-517). Este asunto, planteado y decidido en 1938, ha venido a ser
clasico en la jurisprudencia americana sobre casos del mismo tipo que el que nos ocupa. La
formidable asociacion obrera Committee for Industrial Organization conocida mas popularmente
por la famosa abreviatura CIO, planteo una queja ante los tribunales de New Jersey contra las
autoridades de Jersey City, (a) atacando, por fundamentos constitucionales, la validez de una
ordenanza municipal que regulaba y restringia el derecho de reunion; y (b) tachando de
inconstitucionales los metodos y medios en virtud de los cuales ponian en vigor la ordenanza las
referidas autoridades.
Los hechos del caso, brevemente expuestos, son, a saber: La CIO trataba de celebrar mitines y
asambleas publicas en Jersey City a fin de comunicar a los ciudadanos sus puntos de vista sobre
la "National Labor Relations Act." Las autoridades de la ciudad, comenzando por el Alcalde
Hague el famoso cabecilla de la muy notoria maquina politica de New Jersey, rehusaron
consistentemente conceder licencia para dichos mitines bajo la especiosa alegacion de que los
miembros de la organizacion obrera solicitante eran comunistas y del orden publico corria
peligro de grave perturbacion; es decir, casi, casi la misma alegacion que en el presente caso. La
denegacion de la licencia se fundaba en una ordenanza municipal que trataba de reglamentar el
derecho constitucional de reunion y asamblea pacifica.
Los tribunales de New Jersey, declarando inconstitucionales la ordenanza en cuestion y los
metodos por los cuales se trataba de poner en vigor, sentenciaron a favor de la CIO
permitiendole celebrar los mitines solicitados. Elevado el asunto en casacion e la Corte Suprema
Federal, esta confirmo la sentencia con solo una ligera modificacion. Entre otros
pronunciamientos se dijo que: (a) donde quiera este alojado el titulo sobre las calles, parques y
plazas, desde tiempo inmemorial los mismos siempre se han considerado como un fideicomiso
para uso del publico, y desde tiempos remotos que la memoria no alcanza se han usado siempre
para fines de reunion y de intercambio de impresiones y puntos de vista entre los ciudadanos, asi
como para la libre discusion de los asuntos publicos; (b) que el uso de las calles y plazas publicas
para tales fines ha sido siempre, desde la antiguedad, una parte importante y esencial de los
privilegios, inmunidades, derechos y libertades de los ciudadanos; (c) que el privilegio del
ciudadano de los Estados Unidos de usar las calles, plazas y parques para la comunicacion de
impresiones y puntos de vista sobre cuestiones nacionales puede ser regulado en interes de todos;
es en tal sentido absoluto pero relativo, y debe ser ejercitado con sujecion al "comfort" y
conveniencia generales y en consonancia con la paz y el buen orden; pero no puede ser coartado
o denegado so pretexto y forma de regulacion; (d) que el tribunal inferior estuvo acertado al
declarar invalida la ordenanza en su faz, pues no hace del "comfort" o conveniencia en el uso de
calles y plazas la norma y patron de la accion official; por el contrario, faculta al Director de
Seguridad a rehusar el permiso en virtud de su simple opinion de que la denegacion es para
prevenir motines, trastornos o reuniones turbulentas y desordenadas; (e) que, de esta manera, y
conforme lo demuestra el record, la denegacion puede ser utilizada como instrumento para la
supresion arbitraria de la libre expression de opiniones sobre asuntos nacionales, pues la
prohibicion de hablar producira indudablemente tal efecto: (f) y, por ultimo, que no puede
echarse mano de la supresion official del privilegio para ahorrarse el trabajo y el deber de
mantener el orden en relacion con el ejercicio del derecho. En otras palabras, traduciendo
literalmente la fraseologia de la sentencia, aun a riesgo de incurrir en un anglicismo, "no puede
hacerse de la supresion official incontrolada del privilegio un sustituto del deber de mantener el
orden en relacion con el ejercicio del derecho." He aqui ad verbatim la doctrina:
"5. Regulation of parks and streets. "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest,
they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The
privilege of the citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is
not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not in the
guise of regulation be abridged or denied. We think the court below was right in holding
the ordinance . . . void upon its face. It does not make comfort or convenience in the use
of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to
refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent riots, disturbances, or
disorderly assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of
arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs for the prohibition of
all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities. But uncontrolled official
suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in
connection with the exercise of the right." (Hague vs. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515-516.)
Durante la audiencia del presente asunto se hizo mencion del caso de Evangelista contra
Earnshaw, 57 Jur. Fil., 255, como un precedente en apoyo de la accion del Alcalde recurrido.
Pero la similitud es solo en el hecho de que el entonces Alcalde D. Tomas Earnshaw tambien
revoco el permiso previamente concedido al partido comunista que representaba Crisanto
Evangelista para celebrar mitines en Manila, pero las circunstancias en ambos casos son
enteramente diferentes. El Alcalde Earnshaw revoco el permiso despues de una minuciosa
investigacion en que se habian encontrado pruebas indubitables no solo de que en los estatutos y
documentos del partido comunista se preconizaba como uno de sus primordiales objetivos el
derribar al gobierno americano en Filipinas gobierno que ellos calificaban de imperialista y
capitalistico sino que de hecho en mitines celebrados con anterioridad los comunistas habian
pronunciado discursos clara y positivamente sediciosos predicando una abierta rebelion e
incitando un alzamiento para liberar, segun ellos, al proletariado filipino de las garras del
imperialismo capitalista. La accion, por tanto, del Alcalde Earnshaw se fundo no en una simple
conjetura, en un mero temor o aprension, sino en la existencia de un peligro inminente, claro,
real, sustantivo ingrediente unico y excepcionalisimo que permite una salvedad suspensiva
singularisima en el ejercicio de los privilegios constitucionales de que se trata.
Existe ese ingrediente en el caso que nos ocupa? Indudablemente que no. Ni siquiera se ha
hecho la mas pequea insinuacion de que las minorias coaligadas en cuyo nombre se ha pedido
la celebracion del mitin en cuestion tuvieran el proposito de derribar al gobierno por metodos y
procedimientos violentos. El mismo Fiscal Villamor, en su informe oral, admitio francamente la
legalidad de la coalicion y de sus fines. Podemos tomar conocimiento judicial de que esas
minorias coaligadas lucharon en todas las provincias y municipios de Filipinas presentando
candidatos para todos los cargos nacionales, provinciales y locales, y de que su candidatura
senatorial triunfo en 21 provincias de las 50 que componen el mapa electoral, y en 5 ciudades
con carta especial de las 8 que existen, incluyendose entre dichas 5 la de Manila, capital del
archipielago.
Que la coalicion minoritaria no es una organizacion subversiva como la que fue proscripta en el
caso de Evangelista contra Earnshaw, sino que por el contrario propugna la balota, no la bala,
como el instrumento normal y democratico para cambiar los gobiernos y las administraciones, lo
demuestra, ademas del hecho ya apuntado de que lucho en las ultimas elecciones prevaliendose
de las armas proveidas por la legalidad y sacando partido de los medios de que disponia frente a
la natural superioridad del partido gobernante, lo demuestra, repito, la circunstancia de que
despues de hechas las votaciones y mientras se estaban contando los votos y cuando vio que,
segun ella, se habia escamoteado o se estaba escamoteando la voluntad popular en varias partes
mediante engaos, abusos y anomalias de diferentes clases, no busco la violencia ni recurrio a la
accion directa para hallar remedio a sus agravios o vengarlos, sino que trato de cobijarse bajo la
Constitucion reuniendo al pueblo en asamblea magna al aire libre para comunicar y discutir sus
quejas y recabar del gobierno el correspondiente remedio. Y esto lo hizo la coalicion
oficialmente, con todas las rubricas del protocolo, formulando la peticion del mitin el hombre
que mejor podia representarla y ofrecer garantias de legalidad y orden ante los poderes
constituidos el recurrente en este caso, cuya solvencia moral y politica esta doblemente
garantida por su condicion de lider de las minorias en el Congreso y jefe de campaa de las
mismas en las pasadas elecciones. Que mejor prueba de legalidad y de propositos pacificos y
ordenados?
Por tanto, las circunstancias han venido a situar al gobierno en una encrucijada: por un lado, el
camino angosto de la represion, de una politica de fuerza y de cordon ferreo policiaco; por otro
lado, la amplia avenida de la libertad, una politica que consista en abrir espitas y valvulas por
donde pueda extravasarse no ya la protesta sino inclusive la indignacion del pueblo, previniendo
de esta manera que los vapores mal reprimidos hagan estallar la caldera, o que la desesperacion
lo arrastre a conspirar en la sombra o a confiar su suerte a los azares de una cruenta discordia
civil. Creo que entre ambas politicas la eleccion no es dudosa.
Se alega que antes del 11 de Noviembre, dia de las elecciones, el Alcalde recurrido habia
concedido a las minorias coaligadas permisos para celebrar varios mitines politicos en diferentes
sitios de Manila; que en dichos mitines se habian pronunciado discursos altamente inflamatorios
y calumniosos llamandose ladrones y chanchulleros a varios funcionarios del gobierno nacional
y de la Ciudad de Manila, entre ellos el Presidente de Filipinas, el Presidente del Senado y el
mismo recurrido, suscitandose contra ellos la animadversion y el desprecio del pueblo mediante
la acusacion de que han estado malversando propiedades y fondos publicos con grave detrimento
del bienestar e interes generales; que, dado este antecedente, habia motivo razonable para creer
que semejantes discursos se pronunciarian de nuevo, minandose de tal manera la fe y la
confianza del pueblo en su gobierno y exponiendose consiguientemente la paz y el orden a serias
perturbaciones, teniendo en cuenta la temperatura elevadisima de las pasiones, sobre todo de
parte de los grupos perdidosos y derrotados.
Estas alegaciones son evidentemente insostenibles. Darles valor equivaldria a instituir aqui un
regimen de previa censura, el cual no solo es extrao sino que es enteramente repulsivo e
incompatible con nuestro sistema de gobierno. Nuestro sistema, mas que de prevencion, es de
represion y castigo sobre la base de los hechos consumados. En otras palabras, es un sistema que
permite el amplio juego de la libertad, exigiendo, sin embargo, estricta cuenta al que abusase de
ella. Este es el espiritu que informa nuestras leyes que castigan criminalmente la calumnia, la
difamacion oral y escrita, y otros delitos semejantes. Y parafraseando lo dicho en el citado
asunto de Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, la supresion incontrolada del
privilegio constitucional no puede utilizarse como sustituto de la operacion de dichas leyes.
Se temia dice el recurrido en su contestacion que la probable virulencia de los discursos y
la fuerte tension de los animos pudiesen alterar seriamente la paz y el orden publico. Pero
cabe preguntar de cuando aca la libertad, la democracia no ha sido un peligro, y un peligro
perpetuo? En realidad, de todas las formas de gobierno la democracia no solo es la mas dificil y
compleja, sino que es la mas peligrosa. Rizal tiene en uno de sus libros inmortales una hermosa
imagen que es perfectamente aplicable a la democracia. Puede decirse que esta es como la mar:
serena, inmovil, sin siquiera ningun rizo que arrugue su superficie, cuando no lo agita ningun
viento. Pero cuando sopla el huracan lease, Vientos de la Libertad sus aguas se alborotan,
sus olas se encrespan, y entonces resulta horrible, espantosa, con la espantabilidad de las fuerzas
elementales que se desencadenan liberrimamente.
Ha dejado, sin embargo, el hombre de cruzar los mares tan solo porque pueden encresparse y
enfurecerse a veces? Pues bien; lo mismo puede decirse de la democracia: hay que tomarla con
todos sus inconvenientes, con todos sus peligros. Los que temen la libertad no merecen vivirla.
La democracia no es para pusilanimes. Menos cuando de la pusilanimidad se hace pretexto para
imponer un regimen de fuerza fundado en el miedo. Porque entonces el absolutismo se disfraza
bajo la careta odiosa de la hipocresia. Ejemplo: los Zares de Rusia. Y ya se sabe como
terminaron.
El Magistrado Sr. Carson describio con mano maestra los peligros de la libertad y democracia y
previno el temor a ellos con las luminosas observaciones que se transcriben a continuacion,
expuestas en la causa de Estados Unidos contra Apurado, 7 Fur. Fil., 440 (1907), a saber:
"Es de esperar que haya mas o menos desorden en una reunion publica del pueblo para
protestar contra agravios ya sean reales o imaginarios porque en esos casos los animos
siempre estan excesivamente exaltados, y mientras mayor sea el agravio y mas intenso el
resentimiento, tanto menos perfecto sera por regla general el control disciplinario de los
directores sobre sus secuaces irresponsables. Pero si se permitiese al ministerio fiscal
agarrarse de cada acto aislado de desorden cometido por individuos o miembros de una
multitud como pretexto para caracterizar la reunion como un levantamiento sedicioso y
tumultuoso contra las autoridades, entonces el derecho de asociacion, y de pedir
reparacion de agravios seria completamente ilusorio, y el ejercicio de ese derecho en la
ocasion mas propia y en la forma mas pacifica expondria a todos los que tomaron parte
en ella, al mas severo e inmerecido castigo si los fines que perseguian no fueron del
agrado de los representantes del ministerio fiscal. Si en tales asociaciones ocurren casos
de desorden debe averiguarse quienes son los culpables y castigarseles por este motivo,
pero debe procederse con la mayor discrecion al trazar la linea divisoria entre el desorden
y la sedicion, y entre la reunion esencialmente pacifica y un levantamiento tumultuoso."
En el curso de los informes se pregunto al Fiscal, defensor del recurrido, si con motivo de los
discursos que se dicen calumniosos y difamatorios pronunciados en los mitines de la oposicion
antes de las elecciones ocurrio algun serio desorden: la contestacion fue negativa. Como se dice
mas arriba, en el mitin monstruo que despues se celebro en virtud de nuestra decision en el
presente asunto tampoco ocurrio nada. Que demuestra esto? Que los temores eran exagerados,
por no llamarlos fantasticos; que el pueblo de Manila, con su cordura, tolerancia y amplitud de
criterio, probo ser superior a las aprensiones, temores y suspicacias de sus gobernantes.
La democracia filipina no puede ni debe sufrir un retroceso en la celosa observancia de las
garantias constitucionales sobre la libertad de la palabra y los derechos concomitantes el de
reunion y peticion. Se trata de derechos demasiado sagrados, harto metidos en el corazon y alma
de nuestro pueblo para ser tratados negligentemente, con un simple encogimiento de hombros.
Fueron esas libertades las que inspiraron a nuestros antepasados en sus luchas contra la opresion
y el despotismo. Fueron esas libertades la base del programa politico de los laborantes
precursores del '96. Fueron esas libertades las que cristalizaron en la carta organizacional de
Bonifacio, generando luego el famoso Grito de Balintawak. Fueron esas libertades las que
despues informaron los documentos politicos de Mabini y la celebre Constitucion de Malolos. Y
luego, durante cerca de medio siglo de colaboracion filipino americana, fueron esas mismas
libertades la esencia de nuestras instituciones, la espina dorsal del regimen constitucional y
practicamente republicano aqui establecido. Nada mejor, creo yo, para historiar el proceso de
esas libertades que los atinados y elocuentes pronunciamientos del Magistrado Sr. Malcolm en la
causa de Estados Unidos contra Bustos, 37 Jur. Fil., 764 (1918). Es dificil mejorarlos; asi que
opto por transcribirlos ad verbatim a continuacion:
"Hojeando las paginas de la historia, no decimos nada nuevo al afirmar que la libertad de
la palabra, tal y como la han defendido siempre todos los paises democraticos, era
desconocida en las Islas Filipinas antes de 1900. Por tanto, existia latente la principal
causa de la revolucion. Jose Rizal en su obra 'Filipinas Dentro de Cien Aos' (paginas 62
y siguientes) describiendo 'las reformas sine quibus non,' en que insistian los filipinos,
dijo:
"El ministro, . . . que quiera que sus reformas sean reformas, debe principiar por declarar
la prensa libre en Filipinas, y por crear diputados filipinos.
"Los patriotas filipinos que estaban en Espaa, por medio de las columnas de La
Solidaridad y por otros medios, al exponer los deseos del Pueblo Filipino, pidieron
invariablemente la 'libertad de prensa, de cultos y de asociacion.' (Vease Mabini, 'La
Revolucion Filipina.') La Constitucion de Malolos, obra del Congreso Revolucionario, en
su Bill de Derechos, garantizaba celosamente la libertad de la palabra y de la prensa y los
derechos de reunion y de peticion.
"Tan solo se mencionan los datos que anteceden para deducir la afirmacion de que una
reforma tan sagrada para el pueblo de estas Islas y a tan alto precio conseguida, debe
ampararse ahora y llevarse adelante en la misma forma en que se protegeria y defenderia
el derecho a la libertad.
"Despues sigue el periodo de la mutua colaboracion americano-filipina. La Constitucion
de los Estados Unidos y las de los diversos Estados de la Union garantizan el derecho de
la libertad y de la palabra y de la prensa y los derechos de reunion y de peticion. Por lo
tanto, no nos sorprende encontrar consignadas en la Carta Magna de la Libertad Filipina
del Presidente McKinley, sus Instrucciones a la Segunda Comision de Filipinas, de 7 de
abril de 1900, que sientan el siguiente inviolable principio:
"Que no se aprobara ninguna ley que coarte la libertad de la palabra o de la prensa o de
los derechos del pueblo para reunirse pacificamente y dirigir peticiones al Gobierno
para remedio de sus agravios."
"El Bill de Filipinas, o sea la Ley del Congreso de 1. de Julio de 1902, y la Ley Jones, o
sea la Ley del Congreso de 29 de Agosto de 1916, que por su naturaleza son leyes
organicas de las Islas Filipinas, siguen otorgando esta garantia. Las palabras entre
comillas no son extraas para los estudiantes de derecho constitucional, porque estan
calcadas de la Primera Enmienda a la Constitucion de los Estados Unidos que el pueblo
americano pidio antes de otorgar su aprobacion a la Constitucion.
"Mencionamos los hechos expuestos tan solo para deducir la afirmacion, que no debe
olvidarse por un solo instante, de que las mencionadas garantias constituyen parte
integrante de la Ley Organica La Constitucion de las Islas Filipinas.
"Estos parrafos que figuran insertos en el Bill de Derechos de Filipinas no son una huera
palabreria. Las palabras que alli se emplean llevan consigo toda la jurisprudencia que es
de aplicacion a los grandes casos constitucionales de Inglaterra y America. (Kepner vs.
U. S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1917], 214 U. S., 470.) Y cuales son
estos principios? Volumen tras volumen no bastaria a dar una contestacion adecuada.
Pero entre aquellos estan los siguientes:
"Los intereses de la sociedad y la conservacion de un buen gobierno requieren una
discusion plena de los asuntos publicos. Completa libertad de comentar los actos de los
funcionarios publicos viene a ser un escalpelo cuando se trata de la libertad de la palabra.
La penetrante incision de la tinta libra a la burocracia del absceso. Los hombres que se
dedican a la vida publica podran ser victimas de una acusacion injusta y hostil; pero
podra calmarse la herida con el balsamo que proporciona una conciencia tranquila. El
funcionario publico no debe ser demasiado quisquilloso con respecto a los comentarios
de sus actos oficiales. Tan solo en esta forma puede exaltarse la mente y la dignidad de
los individuos. Desde luego que la critica no debe autorizar la difamacion. Con todo,
como el individuo es menos que el Estado, debe esperarse que sobrelleve la critica en
beneficio de la comunidad. Elevandose a mayor altura que todos los funcionarios o clases
de funcionarios, que el Jefe Ejecutivo, que la Legislatura, que el Poder Judicial que
cualesquiera o sobre todas las dependencias del Gobierno la opinion publica debe ser
el constante manantial de la libertad y de la democracia. (Veanse los casos perfectamente
estudiados de Wason vs. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B., 73, Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3 F. & F.,
372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Carden, 5 Q. B. D., 1.)
Ahora que ya somos independientes es obvio que la republica no solo no ha de ser menos celosa
que la antigua colonia en la tenencia y conservacion de esas libertades, sino que, por el contrario,
tiene que ser muchisimo mas activa y militante. Obrar de otra manera seria como borrar de una
plumada nuestras mas preciosas conquistas en las jornadas mas brillantes de nuestra historia.
Seria como renegar de lo mejor de nuestro pasado: Rizal; Marcelo H. del Pilar, Bonifacio,
Mabini, Quezon, y otros padres inmortales de la patria. Seria, en una palabra, como si de un
golpe catastrofico se echara abajo la recia fabrica de la democracia filipina que tanta sangre y
tantos sacrificios ha costado a nuestro pueblo, y en su lugar se erigiera el tinglado de una
dictadura de opera bufa, al amparo de caciquillos y despotillas que pondrian en ridiculo el pais
ante el mundo . . . Es evidente que no hemos llegado a estas alturas, en la trabajosa ascension
hacia la cumbre de nuestros destinos, para permitir que ocurra esa tragedia.
No nos compete determinar el grado de certeza de los fraudes e irregularidades electorales que la
coalicion minoritaria trataba de airear en el mitin en cuestion con vistas a recabar del gobierno y
del pueblo el propio y correspondiente remedio. Pudieran ser reales o pudieran ser imaginarios,
en todo o en parte. Pero de una cosa estamos absolutamente seguros y es que la democracia no
puede sobrevivir a menos que este fundada sobre la base de un sufragio efectivo, sincero, libre,
limpio y ordenado. El colegio electoral es el castillo, mejor todavia, el baluarte de la democracia.
Suprimid eso, y la democracia resulta una farsa.
Asi que todo lo que tienda a establecer un sufragio efectivo
4
no solo no debe ser reprimido, sino
que debe ser alentado. Y para esto, en general para la salud de la republica, no hay mejor
profilaxis, no hay mejor higiene que la critica libre, la censura desembarazada. Solamente se
pueden corregir los abusos permitiendo que se denuncien publicamente sin trabas sin miedo.
5

Esta es la mejor manera de asegurar el imperio de la ley por encima de la violencia.

HILADO, J ., dissenting:
Because the constitutional right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances has been here
invoked on behalf of petitioner, it has been considered doubly necessary to expound at length the
grounds of my dissent. We are all ardent advocates of this right, whenever and wherever
properly exercisable. But, in considering the legal problem here presented serenely and
dispassionately, as I had to, I arrived at a different conclusion from that of the majority.
(a) Right not absolute but subject to regulation. It should be recognized that this right is not
absolute and is subject to reasonable regulations. (Philippine Constitutional Law by Malcolm and
Laurel, 3d ed., p. 407; Commonwealth vs. Abrahams, 156 Mass., 57, 30 N.E. 79.)
Messers. Malcolm and Laurel say: "The right of peaceful assemblage is not an absolute one.
Assemblies are subject to reasonable regulations."
In the above cited case of Commonwealth vs. Abrahams, which is cited in support of the text on
page 407 of the above cited work on Philippine Constitutional Law by Malcolm and Laurel, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered and decided a case involving a regulation
by the Board of Park Commissioners forbidding all persons "to make orations, harangues, or
loud outcries" in a certain park, under penalty of $20, except upon prior consent of the board.
The defendant requested permission to deliver an oration in the park, which was refused by the
board, and thereafter entered the park, and delivered an "oration or harangue" about ten or fifteen
minutes in length. In a criminal trial of said defendant for violating the rules promulgated by the
Board of Park Commissioners, said rules were held valid and reasonable, and not inconsistent
with article 19 of the Bill of Rights (of the Massachusetts Constitution), providing that "the
people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the
common good, give instructions to their representatives, and to request of the legislative body,
by the way of addresses, petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the
grievances they suffer." In that case the defendant admitted that the people would not have the
right to assemble for the purposes specified in the public streets, and might not have such right in
the public gardens or on the common, because such an assembly would or might be inconsistent
with the public use for which these places are held. And the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
said:
". . . . The same reasons apply to any particular park. The parks of Boston are designed
for the use of the public generally; and whether the use of any park or a part of any park
can be temporarily set aside for the use of any portion of the public, is for the park
commissioners to decide, in the exercise of a wise discretion."
In the above-quoted case it appears from the statement of facts preceding the opinion that within
the limits of Franklin Park, there involved, were large areas not devoted to any special purpose
and not having any shrubbery that would be injured by the gathering thereon of a large concourse
of people; that defendant's speech contained nothing inflammatory or seditious, and was
delivered in an ordinary oratorical tone; that at the close of the oration the audience quietly
dispersed; and that no injury of any kind was done to the park. Still, it was held that the
regulation under which the Board of Park Commissioners denied the permission to deliver said
oration requested by the defendant was valid and was not inconsistent with that provision of the
Massachusetts Bill of Rights guaranteeing to the people the "right, in an orderly and peaceable
manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good, give instructions to their representatives,
and to request of the legislative body, by the way of addresses, petitions, or remonstrances,
redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer."
In the case at bar, the Mayor of Manila had the duty and the power, inter alia, "to grant and
refuse municipal . . . permits of all classes . . . for any (other) good reason of general interest"
(Rev. Ad. Code, section 2434 [b]-[m]; italics ours); and "to comply with and enforce and give
the necessary orders for the faithful enforcement and execution of the laws and ordinances in
effect within the jurisdiction of the city." [Ibid., section 2434 (b)-(a)]; and among the general
powers and duties of the Municipal Board, whose ordinances the said Mayor was at once bound
and empowered to comply with and enforce, were such as "regulate the use of streets, . . . parks, .
. . and other public places." [Ibid., section 2444 (u); italics ours.]
Another legal doctrine which should not be lost sight of is that, without abridging the right of
assembly and petition, the government may regulate the use of places public places wholly
within its control, and that the state or municipality may require a permit for public gatherings in
public parks and that, while people have the right to assemble peaceably on the highways and to
parade on streets, nevertheless the state may regulate the use of the streets by requiring a permit
(16 C. J. S., p. 642). In our government the state, through the Charter of Manila, has conferred
certain powers pertinent to the subject under consideration upon the City Mayor, and upon the
Municipal Board. Among these is the duty and power of said Mayor "to grant and refuse
municipal . . . permits of all classes . . . for any good reason of general interest" (italics ours), and
the power and duty of the Municipal Board "to regulate the use . . . of street, . . . parks, . . . and
other public places . . ." (italics ours), already above discussed.
Plaza Miranda in a way is a public square or plaza, and in another sense, in view of its more
frequent public use, is a public place devoted to traffic between several streets which empty into
it within the district of Quiapo. It is a fact of common knowledge and within the judicial notice
of this Court that said plaza is one of the public places constantly used by an usually great
number of people during all hours of the day and up to late hours of the night, both for vehicular
and for pedestrian traffic. It is one of the centers of the city where a heavy volume of traffic
during those hours converges and from which it again proceeds in all directions; and the holding
during those hours of a meeting, assembly or rally of the size and nature of that contemplated by
petitioner and those belonging to the Coalesced Minority Parties when the permit in question was
requested from the City Mayor, must have been expected to greatly inconvenience and interfere
with the right of the public in general to devote said plaza to the public uses for which it has been
destined since time immemorial.
The rule may perhaps be more aptly stated by saying that the right of peaceful assembly and
petition is not absolute but subject to regulation as regards the time, place, and manner of its
exercise. As to time, it seems evident, for example, that the State, directly or through the local
government of the city or municipality, by way of regulation of the right of free speech, may
validly prohibit the delivery of speeches on public streets near private residences between
midnight and dawn. As to place, we have the example of the instant case involving Plaza
Miranda or any other public place. And as to manner, it is a familiar rule that the freedom of
speech does not authorize the speaker to commit slander or defamation, and that laws and
ordinances aimed at preventing such abuses are valid regulations of the right. Among other cases
which may be cited on the same point, we have that of Hague vs. Committee on Industrial
Organization, 307 U. S., 496, 83 Law. ed., 1423, cited in the majority opinion and from which
the following passage is copied from the quotation therefrom in the said opinion:
". . . The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is
not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the
guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." (Italics ours.)
I construe this declaration of principles by the United States Supreme Court to imply that where
the regulatory action is predicated upon the "general comfort and convenience," and is "in
consonance with peace and good order," as in the instant case, such action is regulation and not
"guise of regulation," and therefore does not abridge or deny the right.
(b) No constitutional right to use public places under government control, for exercise of
right of assembly and petition, etc.
Indeed, carefully analyzed, the action taken by the City Mayor was not even a regulation of the
constitutional right of assembly and petition, or free speech, claimed by petitioner, but rather of
the use of a public place under the exclusive control of the city government for the exercise of
that right. This, I submit, is a distinction which must be clearly maintained throughout this
discussion. No political party or section of our people has any constitutional right to freely and
without government control make use of such a public place as Plaza Miranda, particularly if
such use is a deviation from those for which said public places have been by their nature and
purpose immemorially dedicated. In other words, the City Mayor did not attempt to have
anything to do with the holding of the "indignation rally" or the delivery of speeches thereat on
the date desired at any place over which said mayor had no control his action was exclusively
confined to the regulation of the use of Plaza Miranda for such a purpose and at such a time.
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for a unanimous court in Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U. S.,
569, 85 Law. ed., 1049, 1054, said:
If a municipality has authority to control the uses of its public streets for parades or
processions, as it undoubtedly has, it can not be denied authority to give consideration,
without unfair discrimination, to time, place, and manner in relation to the other proper
uses of the streets. We find it impossible to say that the limited authority conferred by the
licensing provisions of the statute in question as thus construed by the state court
contravened any constituional right. (emphasis ours).
That case was concerened with a prosecution of sixty-eigth "Jehovah's Witnesses" in a municipal
court in the State of New Hampshire for violation of a state statute prohibiting a "parade or
procession" upon a public street without a special license. The appellants invoked the
constitutional right of free speech and press, as well as that of the assembly. The judgment of the
municipal court was affirmed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire and that of the latter was
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. Among other things, the United States Supreme
Court said that the appellants were not prosecuted for distributing leaflets, or for conveying
information by placards or otherwise, or for issuing invitations to a public meeting, or for
holding a public meeting, of for maintaining or expressing religious beliefs. Their right to do any
of these things apart from engaging in a "parade or procession," upon a public street was not
involved in the case. The question of the validity of a statute addressed to any other sort of
conduct than that complained of was declared not to be before the court (85 Law. ed., 1052). By
analogy, I may that in the instant case the constitutional rights of free speech, assmebly, and
petition are not before the court but merely the privilege of petitioner and the Coalesced
Minorities to exercise any or all of said rights by using Plaza Miranda, a public place under the
complete control of the city government. In the same case of Cox vs. New Hampshire, supra,
Chief Justice Hughes, in his opinion, used the following eloquent language:.
"Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized
society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses
of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to
assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never
been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of
safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on
the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need.
Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the
public convenience in the interest of all, it can not be disregarded by the attempted
exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protectio.
One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red lightbecause he thought it his
religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public
attention to an announcement of his opinion...." (85 Law. ed., 1052-1053.).
In other words, when the use of public streets or places is involved, public convenience, public
safety and public order take precedence over even particular civil rights. For if the citizen
asserting the civil right were to override the right of the general public to the use of such streets
or places, just because it is guaranteed by the constitution, it would be hard to conceive how
upon the same principle that citizen be prevented from using the private property of his neighbor
for the exercise of the asserted right. The constitution, in guaranteeing the right of peaceful
assembly and petition, the right of free speech, etc., does not guarantee their exercise upon public
places, any more than upon private premises, without government regulation in both cases, of the
owners' consent in the second..
In Davis vs. Commonwealth, 167 U. S. 43, 42 Law. ed., 71, 72, the United States Supreme
Court, in affirming the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts written by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then of the latter tribunal, quoted from said decision as follows:.
"...As representatives of the public it (legislature) may and does excercise control over
the use which the public may make of such places (public parks and streets), and it may
and does delegate more or less of such control to the city or town immediately concerned.
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or
public park is no more an infringement of the rights of the member of the public than for
the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. When no proprietary right interferes
the legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon the public place by putting an
end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take the lesser step of limiting the public
use to certain purposes. See Dill. Mun. Corp. secs. 393, 407, 651, 656, 666; Brooklyn
Park Comrs. vs. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234, 243, 244 (6 Am. Rep. 70)....".
(c) Authorities cited.--.
I have examined the citations of authorities in the majority opinion. Most of the cases therin cited
are, I think, inapplicable to the oune under consideration, and those which may have some
application, I believe reinforce this dissent. None of them was for mandamus to compel the
granting of a permit for holding a meeting, assembly or the like, upon a public place within the
control of the general or local government..
The fact that a law or municipal ordinance under which a person had been prosecuted for
delivering a speech without the required permit, for example, was declared unconstitutional or
otherwise void for delegating an unfettered or arbitrary discretion upon the lisencing authority,
thus completely failing to confer the discretion, does not mean that such person has the right by
mandamus to force said authority to grant him the permit. If, in such case, the law or ordinance,
conferring the discretion, is unconstitutional or void, the mandamus suit becomes entirely idle.
Such a suit would involve self-contradictory proposition, for the very idea of a permit is
something which may be granted or witheld. He who has the power to grant permission for the
doing of an act necessarily has the correlative power to deny the permission. A "permit" which
under no conditions or circumstances and at no time can be refused needs a different name..
Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569, was concerned with a statute of the State
of New Hampshire which was construed by the Supreme Court of the same State as not
conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse the license, and was held valid
both by said Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States..
In our case, section 2434 (b)-(m) of the Revised Administrative Code does not confer upon the
Mayor of Manila an unfettered discretion to grant or refuse the permit--his power to grant or to
refuse the permit is controlled and limited by the all important requirement of the same section
that whatever his determination, it should be "for any good reason of general interest.".
In City of Chicago vs. Trotter, 136 Ill., 430, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois held that
the power of City councils under the state law to regulate the use of the public streets could not
be delegated by them, and therefore could not be delegated to the superintendent of police. But in
our case, the power of the City Mayor under the Revised Administrative Code has not been
delegated by the Municipal Board of Manila but has been directly conferred by the State through
its legislature. .
In State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585, what was involved was a city ordinance
committing to the unrestrained will of public officer the power to determine the rights of parties
under the ordinance without anything (to guide or control his action.) In our case, as already
stated, the city mayor received his power from the State through the Legislature which enacted
the Revised Administrative Code, and moreover, his action therein provided to be guided and
controlled by the already mentioned requirement that whether he grants or refuses a municipal
premit of any class it shall be for some "good reason of general interest," and not as his
unfettered will may dictate..
The case of In re Fradzee, 63 Mich., 399, involved a city ordinance declared unreasonable and
void by the Supreme Court of Michigan, the ordinance prohibiting certain uses of the public
streets of the City of Grand Rapids "without having first obtained the consent of the Mayor or
Common Council of said City." The ordinance did not prescribe any guide, control or limitation
for, of, and to, the exercise of the power thus conferred upon the mayor or common council. The
following passage from the quotation from the decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan made
in the majority opinion would seem to reinforce the stand taken in this dissent..
"...We must therefore construe this Charter and the powers it assumes to grant, so far as it
is not plainly unconstitutional, as only conferring such power over the subjects referred to
as will enable the city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in accordance with the
limitations and conditions required by the rights of the people themselves, as secured by
the principles of law, which cannot be less careful of private rights under a constitution
than under the common law..
"It is quite possible that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger and
disorder in the cities than in smaller towns or in rural places. This may justify reasonable
precautionary measures, but nothing further; and no inference can extend beyond the fair
scope of powers granted for such a purpose and no grant of absolute discretion to
suppress lawful action altogether can be granted at all...." (emphasis ours.)
The instant case is concerned with an "indignation rally" to be held at one of the busiest and most
frequented public places in this big cosmopolitan city, with a present population estimated to be
150 per cent larger than its prewar population, and the public officer who was being called upon
to act on the petition for permit was the chief executive of the city who was by reason of his
office the officer most directly responsible for the keeping and maintenance of peace and public
order for the common good. And as stated elsewhere in this dissent, his power in the premises
was not without control, limitation or guide and, lastly, the action taken by him was not an
absolute suppression of the right claimed but was merely a postponement of the use of a public
place for the excercise of that right when popular passions should have calmed down and public
excitement cooled off sufficiently to better insure the avoidance of public peace and order being
undermined..
Rich vs. Mapervill, 42 Ill. Ap., 222, had to do with another city ordinance. The court there held
that when men in authority are permitted in their discretion to excercise "power so arbitrary ,
liberty is subverted, and the spirit of our free institution violated." (Emphasis ours.) This is not
our case, as the power of the Manila Mayor now under consideration is not at all arbitrary. It was
further held in that case that where the granting of the permit is left to the unregulated discretion
of a small body of city alderman, th ordinance can not be other than partial and discriminating in
its practical operation. The case at bar is radically different for, as already shown, the discretion
of the City Mayor here is not unregulated, for the phrase "any good reason of general interest" is
certainly an effective regulatory condition precedent to the exercise of the power one way or the
other. And just as certainly the reasons alleged by the respondent Mayor for his action stated in
his letters dated November 15 and 17, 1947, addressed to petitioner and in his affidavit Annex 1,
seem entirely well founded and well taken, consideration being had of his grave responsibilities
as the immediate keeper of peace and public order in the city. Elsewhere in this dissent we quote
from said documents textually..
On page 13 of the majority opinion there is aquotation of anothe passage from the case of Cox
vs. New Hampshire, supra, which says:.
"As regualtion of the use of the streets for parades or processions is a traditional exercise
of control by local government, the question in a particular case is whether that control is
exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the
opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions
immemorially associated with resort to public places.".
The above rule means that if the control exerted does not deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right
of assembly, such control is legally valid. This is precisely our case, since the respondent Mayor
neither denied not unwarrantedly abridged the right asserted by petitioner and his companions. If
the postponement of the granting of the permit should be taken as a denial of the right, then we
would practically be denying the discretion of the proper official for it would be tantamount to
compelling him to grant the permit outright, which could necessarily mean that he can never
refuse the permit, for one who cannot even postpone the granting of such permit much less can
altogether refuse it. .
Hague vs, Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 83 Law. ed., 1423, apart from
being clearly distinguishable from the instant case as later demonstrated, contains the passage
quoted on page 7 of this dissent, which decidedly supports it. The distinction between that case
and this is that there "the ordinance deals only with the exercise of the right of assembly for the
purpose of communicating views entertained by speakers, and is not a general measure to
promote the public convenience in the use of the streets or parks" (83 Law. ed., 1436); while in
the instant case section 2434 (b)-(m) of the Revised Administrative Code is not solely aimed at
prhibition of any particular act for it likewise provides permission, and in both cases is expressly
aimed at promoting the "general interest." .
Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569, 95 Law, ed., 1049, is equally in solid support
of this dissent as appears from No. 2 of the syllabus therein:.
"A statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure
a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement
of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is
construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance
of licenses, to a consideration of time, place, and manner, of the parade or procession,
with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to
provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse
licenses, but are required to exercise their discretion free from the improper or
inappropriate consideration and from unfair discrimination." (Emphasis ours.).
In empowering and directing the City Mayor to grant or refuse permits "for any...good reason of
general interest," the Revised Administrative Code plainly has in view only the common good
and excludes all "improper or inappropriate considerations" and "unfair discrimination" in the
exercise of the granted discretion.
Lastly, as between Hague vs, Committee fro Industrial Organization, supra, and Cox vs. State of
New Hampshire supra, the choice is obvious with regard to their authoritative force, when it is
considered that in the former out of the nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court two did
not take part and of the seven who dis only two, Justices Roberts and Black, subscribed the
opinion from which the majority here quote, while in the latter (Cox vs. State of New
Hampshire) the decision was unanimous..
(d) Mandamus unavailable.--- .
Mc Quillin on Municipal Cororations, 2nd ed., Revised, Volume 6, p. 848, section 2714,
expresses the rule obtaining in the United States that the immunity from judicial control
appertaining to the Office of the Governor of the State, or to the Presidency of the United States,
does not attach to the mayoralty of a city. But on page 878, section 2728, ha has the following to
say on the unavailability of mandamus to compel the granting of licenses and permits by
municipal officers:.
"SEC. 2728. To compel the granting of licenses and permits.--If the issuance of the
license or permit is discretionary with the officer or municipal board, it is clear that it
cannot be compelled by mandamus. The cases rarely, if ever, depart from this well
established rule, and in consequence in doubtful cases the judicial decisions uniformly
disclose a denial of the remedy. As already stated, the fundamental condition is that the
petition must show a clear legal right to the writ and a plain neglect of duty on the part of
the public officer to perform the act sought to be enforced. For example, one who seeks
to compel a city to issue to him a permit for the erection of a buiding must show
compliance with all valid requirements of the building ordinances and regulations..
"The granting of licenses or permits by municipal or other public authorities, as
mentioned, is usually regarded as a discretionary duty, and hence, ordinarily mandamus
will not lie to compel them to grant a license or issue a permit to one claiming to be
entitled thereto, especially where it is not alleged and shown that the exercise of such
discretion was arbitrary. All the court can do is to see that the licensing authorities have
proceeded according to law. Their decision will not be reviewed on its merits. Where,
however, refusal to grant a license or to issue a permit, as said above, is arbitrary or
capricious mandamus will lie to compel the appropriate official action...." .
To my mind, the following reasons, alleged by the respondent mayor, negative all element of
arbitrariness in his official action:.
"...please be advised that upon reading the metropolitan newspapers this morning wherein
it appears that your meeting will be an indignation rally at which all the supposed
election frauds allegedly perpetrated in many parts of the Philippines for the purpose of
overriding the popular will, will be bared before the people, this office hereby revokes the
said permit..
"It is believed that public peace and order in Manila will be undermined at the proposed
rally considering the passions have not as yet subsided and tension remains high as an
aftermath of the last political contest..
"According to the same newspapers, delegates from the provinces and students from local
universities will particpate in the said rally which, in my opinion, would only precipitate
trouble since no guarantee can be given that only the opposition elements will be there.
The moment the crowd becomes mixed with people of different political colors which is
most likely to happen, public order is exposed to danger once the people are incited, as
they will be incited, considering the purposes for which the meeting will be held as
reported in the newspapers above mentioned..
"...." (Mayor's letter dated November 15, 1947.).
"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 7, 1947, requesting
for a permit to hold a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, on Saturday, November
22, 1947, for the purpose of denouncing the alleged fraudulent manner in which the last
elections have been conducted and the alleged nationwide flagrant violation of the
Election Law, and of seeking redress therefor. It is regretted that for the same reasons
stated in my letter of November 15, 1947, your request can not be granted for the present.
This Office has adopted the policy of not permitting meetings of this nature which are
likely to incite the people and disrupt the peace until the results of the elections shall have
been officially announced. After this announcement, requests similar to yours will be
granted..
"...." (Mayor's letter dated November 17, 1947.).
"That according to Congressman Primicias, the meeting will be an indignation rally for
the purpose of denouncing the alleged fraudulent manner the said elections were
conducted and the nationwide falgrant violations of the Election Law;.
"2. That it is a fact that the returns of the last elections are still being recounted in the
City of Manila in the Commission on Elections, and pending the final announcement of
the results thereof, passions, especially on the part of the losing groups, remain bitter and
high;.
"3. That allusions have been made in the metropolitan newspapers that in the case of
defeat, there will be minority resignations in Congress, rebellion and even revolution in
the country;.
"4. That I am sure that the crowd that will attend said meeting will be a multitude of
people of different and varied political sentiments;.
"5. ....... .
"6. That judging from the tenor of the request for permit and taking into consideration the
circumstances under which said meeting will be held, it is safe to state that once the
people are gathered thereat are incited, there will surely be trouble between the opposing
elements, commotion will follow, and then peace and order in Manila will be disrupted;
and.
"7. That the denial of said request for permit has been made for no other reasons except
to perform my duty as Mayor of Manila to maintain and preserve peace and order in this
City..
8. That I have assured Congressman Primicias that immediately after the election returns
shall have been officially announced, the Nacionalista Party or any party will be granted
permit to hold meetings of indignation and to denounce alleged faruds." (Annex 1,
Answer.).
For these and other reasons which could be advanced in corroboration, I am of the considered
opinion that the respondent Mayor had under the law the requisite discretion to grant or refuse
the permit requested, and therefore to revoke that which had previously been granted, and that
the reasons for such revocation alleged in his letters dated November 15 and 17, 1947, to
petitioner and in his affidavit Annex 1 were amply sufficient to justify his last action. And be it
distinctly observed that this last action was not an absolute denial of the permit, but a mere
postponement of the time for holding the "rally" for good reasons "of general interest" in the
words of section 2434 (b)-(m) of the Revised Admninistrative Code..

TUASON, J ., dissenting:.
I join in Mr. Hilado's dissent and wish to add a few remarks..
As Mr. Justice Hilado says, freedom of speech, of the press, and of peaceble assemblage, is only
an incidental issue in this case. No one will contest the proposition that the mayor or the
Congress itself may stop the petitioner and his men from meeting peacebly and venting their
grievances in a private place. The main issue rather is the extent of the right of any group of
people to use a public street or a public plaza for a purpose other than that for which it is
dedicated..
The constitutional guaranty of free speech does not prevent the government from regulating the
use of places within its control. A law or ordinance may forbid the delivery of addresses on the
public parks, or on the streets as a valid exrcise of police power. (12 C. J., 954) Rights of
assembly and of petition are not absolute rights and are to be construed with regard to the general
law. (16 C.J.S., 640) Indeed, "the privileges of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and
parks for the communication of views on national questions...must be exercised in subordination
to the general comfort and convenience." (Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307
U. S., 496, 83 Law. ed., 1433) And so long as the municpal authorities act within the legitimate
scope of their police power their discretion is not subject to outside interference or judicial
revsion or reversal (14 C. J., 931.).
The mayor did not act capriciously or arbitrarily in withholding or postponing the permit applied
for by the petitioner. His reasons were real, based on contemporary events of public knowledge,
and his temporary refusal was reasonably calculated to avoid possible disturbances as well as to
adavance and protect the public in the proper use of the most congested streets and public plaza
in an overcrowded city. There was reason to fear disturbances, not from the petitioner and his
men but from elements who had no connection with the holding of the meeting but who, having
gripes, might be easily excited to violence by inflammatory harangues when nerves were on
edge. The fact that no untoward incident occurred does not prove the judiciousness of this
Court's resolution. The court is not dealing with an isolated case; it is laying down a rule of
transcendental importance and far-reaching consequences, in the administration of cities and
towns. If nothing happened, it is well to remember that, according to newspapers, 500 policemen
were detailed to prevent possible disorder at the gathering. It should also be borne in mind that
vehicular traffic in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda had to be suspended and vehicles had to be
rerouted, during and after the meeting. All of which entailed enormous expense by the city and
discomforts to the general public..
No individual citizen or group of citizens certainly has a right to claim the use of a public plaza
or public streets at such great expense and sacrifice on the part of the city and of the rest of the
community. Yet, by virtue of this Court's resolution any person or group of persons invoking
political, civil or religious freedom under the constitution is at liberty to stage a rally or parade or
a religious procession, with the mayor powerless to do anything beyond seeing to it that no two
meetings or parades were held in the same place or close to each other. No precedent in the
United States, after whose institutions ours are modelled, approaches this Court's resolution in its
disregard of the government's authority to control public streets and to maintain peace and order.
In an infant republic where the state of peace and order is still far from normal, where the forces
of law are far from adequate to cope with lawlessness; in a city where conditions of traffic are
among the worst if not the worst on earth, this Court sets down a principle that outstrips its
prototype in "liberality", forgetting that personal rights can only exist in a properly regulated
society. As Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said in Cox vs. New Hampshire, 61 S. Ct., 762, "Civil
liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lsot in the excesses of
unrestrained abuses. The authority of the municipality to impose regulations in order to assure
the safety and convenience of the people in the use public highways has never been regarded as
inconsistent with civil liberties, but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order
upon which they ultimately depend." To be logical, peddlers and merchants should be given, as a
matter of right, the freedom to use public streets and public squares to ply their trade, for the
freedom of expression and of assemblage is no more sacred than the freedom to make a living.
Yet no one has dared make such a claim..
The cases cited in the resolution are not applicable. It will be seen that each of these cases
involved the legality of a law and municipal ordinance. And if in some of said cases a law or an
ordinance was declared void, the grounds of invalidation were either discrimination or lack of
authority of the Legislature or the municipal council under the state constitution or under the law
to adopt the contested measure..
As applied to Manila, there are both a law and an ordiance regulating the use of public places
and the holding of meetings and parades in such places. As long as this law and this ordinance
are in force the mayor does not only have the power but it is his sworn duty to grant or refuse a
permit according to what he believes is in consonance with peace and order or is proper to
promote the general comfort and convenience of the inhabitants..
The Court says that section 2434 (m) of the Revised Administrative Code "is not a specific of
substantive power independent from the corresponding municipal ordinance which the Mayor, as
Chief Executive of the City, is required to enforceunder the same section 2434." The Court
advances the opinion that because section 2444 confers upon the municipal board "the police
power to regulates the use of streets and othe public places," "It is to be presumed that the
Legislature has not, in the same breath, conferred upon the Mayor in section 2434 (m), the same
power, specially if we take into account that its exercise may be in conflict with the exercise of
the same power by the municipal board.".
Section 2434 (m) is written in the plainest language for any casual reader to understand, and it is
presumed that it means what it says. This provision certainly was not inserted in the city charter,
which must have been drawn with painstaking care, for nothing. And I am aware of no
constitutional provision or constitutional maxim which prohibits the delegation by the
Legislature of part of its police power affacting local matters, directly upon the mayor instead of
through the municipal board. Nor is there incompatibilty between section 2434 (m) and section
2444 or the ordinance enacted under the latter. At any rate, section 2434 (m) is of special
character while section 2444 is general, so that, if there is any conflict between section 2434 (m)
and the ordinance passed under section 2444, the former is to prevail..
This Court has already set at rest the validity, meaning any scope of section 2434 (m) in a
unanimous decision with all the nine members voting, when it sustained the mayor's refusal to
grant a permit for a public meeting on a public plaza to be followed by a parade on public streets.
(Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil., 255) The reference to section 2434 (m) in that decision was
not an obiter dictum as the majority say. The sole question presented there, as we gather from the
facts disclosed, was the legality of the mayor's action, and the court pointed to section 2434 (m)
as the mayor's authority for his refusal. The fact that the mayor could have denied the petitioner's
application under the general power to prohibit a meeting for unlawful purposes did not make the
disposition of the case on the strength of section 2434 (m) obiter dictum. An adjudication on any
point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered a dictum; and this rule applies
as to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved, which are presented and
decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and lead up to the final conclusion,
and to any statement in the opinion as to a matter on which the decision is predicated.
Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the
disposition of the case is or might have been on some other ground, or even though, by reason of
other points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the
particular point, otherwise than it did. (1 C. J. S. 314-315.).
But the Court asserts that if the meaning of section 2434 (m) is what this Court said in
Evangelista-Earnshaw case, then section is void. I do not think that that provision is void--at
least not yet. Until it is invalidated in the proper case and in the proper manner, the mayor's
authority in respect of the issuance of permits is to be measured by section 2434 (m) and by the
municipal ordinance in so far as the ordinance does not conflict with the law. The validity of that
provision is not challenged and is nowhere in issue. It is highly improper, contrary to the
elementary rules of practice and procedure for this Court to say or declare that the provision is
void. Moreover, Article VIII, section 10, of the Constitution provides that "all cases involving
the constitutionality of a treaty or a law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court in
banc, and no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-
thirds of all the members of the court." Only seven voted in favor of the resolution...
1 El letrado Sr. D. Ramon Diokno, en representacion del recurrente, y el Fiscal Auxiliar de
Manila D. Julio Villamor, en representacion del recurrido..
2 Los hechos confirmaron plenamente esta presuncion; el mitin monstruo ques se celebro en la
noche del 22 de Noviembre en virtud de nuestra resolucion concediendo el presente recurso de
mandamus-- el mas grande que se ghaya celebrado jamas en Manila, segun la prensa, y al cual se
calcula que assistieron unas 80,000 personas--fue completamente pacifico y ordenado, no
registrandose el menor incidente desagradable. Segun los periodicos, el mitin fue un magnifico
acto de ciudadania militante y responsable, vindicatoria de la fe de todos aquellos que jamas
habian dudado de la sensatez y cultura del pueblo de Manila. .
3 Madame Roland..
4 En Mejico el lema, la consigna political es: "Sufragio efectivo, sin reelecion." Los que conocen
Mejico aseguran que, merced a esta consigna, la era de las convulsiones y guerras civiles en
aquella republica ha pasado definitivamente a la historia. .
5 "No puedo pasar por alto una magistratura que contribuyo mucho a sostener el Gobierno de
Roma; fue la de los censores. Hacian el censo del pueblo, y, ademas, como la fuerza de la
republica consistia en la disciplina, la austeridad de las costumbres y la observacion constante de
ciertos ritos, los censores corregian los abusos que la ley no habia previsto o que el magistrado
ordinario no podia castigar.....
"El Gobierno de Roma fue admirable, porque desde su nacimiento, sea por el espiritu del pueblo,
la fuerza del Senado o la autoridad de ciertos magistrados, estaba constituido de tal modo, que
todo abuso de poder pudo ser siempre corregido. .
"El Gobierno de Inglaterra es mas sabio, porque hay un cuerpo encargado de examinarlo
continuamente y de examinarse a si mismo; sus errores son de suerte que nunca se prolongan, y
por el espiritu de atencion que despiertan en el pais, son a menudo utiles. .
"En una palabra: un Gobierno libre, siempre agitado, no podria mantenerse, si no es por sus
propias leyes capaz de corregirse." ("Grandeza y decadencia de los romanos," por Montesquieu,
pags. 74, 76 y 77.) .

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-62270 May 21, 1984
CRISPIN MALABANAN, EVELIO JALOS, BEN LUTHER LUCAS, SOTERO
LEONERO, and JUNE LEE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ANASTACIO D. RAMENTO, in his capacity as the Director of
the National Capital Region of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, THE
GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION; CESAR MIJARES, in his
capacity as the President of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation,
GONZALO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as the Director for Academic Affairs of
the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; TOMAS B. MESINA, in his capacity
as the Dean of Student Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation;
ATTY. LEONARDO PADILLA, in his capacity as Chief Legal Counsel & Security
Supervisor of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation; ATTY. FABLITA
AMMAY, ROSENDO GALVANTE and EUGENIA TAYAO, in their capacities as
members of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, respondents.
Honesto N. Salcedo for petitioners.
The Solicitor General and Leonardo G. Padilla & Pablita G. Ammay for respondents.

FERNANDO, CJ .:
The failure to accord respect to the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable
assembly and free speech is the grievance alleged by petitioners, students of the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, in this certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
proceeding. The principal respondents are Anastacio D. Ramento, Director of the
National Capital Region of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports and the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. 1 The nullification of the decision of respondent Ramento affirming the
action taken by respondent Gregorio Araneta University Foundation finding petitioners guilty of illegal assembly and suspendi ng them is
sought in this petition.
The facts are not open to dispute. Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and were
granted by tile school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along
with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place
indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in
vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture.
At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by
their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities and using
megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within
hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held
liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were formed through a memorandum that they were under
preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof
was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus with damages against private
respondents
2
and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. On October 20, 1982, respondent
Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Region, found petitioners guilty of the charge of having
violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more specifically their holding of an illegal
assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of
classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition.
On November 16, 1982, this Court issued the following resolution: "Acting on the urgent ex-parte motion
for the immediate issuance of a temporary mandatory order filed by counsel for petitioners, dated
November 12, 1982, the Court Resolved to ISSUE A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining all
respondents or any person or persons acting in their place or stead from enforcing the order of the
Ministry of' Education and Culture dated October 20, 1982 finding the petitioners guilty of the charges
against them and suspending them for one (1) academic year with a stern warning that a commission of
the same or another offense will be dealt with utmost severity, effective as of this date and continuing until
otherwise ordered by this Court, thus allowing them to enroll, if so minded.
3

Both public and private respondents submitted their comments. Private respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the petition "for lack of factual and legal basis and likewise [prayed] for the lifting of the
temporary restraining order dated November 16, 1982."
4
Public respondent Ramento, on the other hand,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, prayed for the dismissal of the petition based on the following
conclusion: "Consequently, it is respectfully submitted that respondent Director of the MECS did not
commit any error, much less abused his discretion, when he affirmed the decision of respondent
University finding petitioners guilty of violations of the provisions of the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools and the Revised Student's Code of Discipline .and ordering their suspension for one (1)
academic school year. However, since said suspension has not been enforced except only briefly,
thereby enabling petitioners Leonero, Jr., Lucas and Malabanan to finish their courses, and allowing
petitioners Lee and Jalos to continue their schooling, if they so desire, this proceeding is now moot and
academic.
5

With the submission of such comments considered as the answers of public and private respondents, the
case was ready for decision.
This petition may be considered moot and academic if viewed solely from the fact that by virtue of the
temporary restraining order issued by this Court petitioners were allowed to enroll in the ensuing
semester, with three of them doing so and with the other two equally entitled to do so. Moreover, there is
the added circumstance of more than a year having passed since October 20, 1982 when respondent
Ramento issued the challenged decision suspending them for one year. Nonetheless, with its validity
having been put in issue, for being violative of the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly
and free speech, there is need to pass squarely on the question raised.
This Court accordingly rules that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free
speech calls for the setting aside of the decision of respondent Ramento, the penalty imposed being
unduly severe. It is true that petitioners held the rally at a place other than that specified in the permit and
continued it longer than the time allowed. Undeniably too, they did disturb the classes and caused the
work of the non-academic personnel to be left undone. Such undesirable consequence could have been
avoided by their holding the assembly in the basketball court as indicated in the permit. Nonetheless,
suspending them for one year is out of proportion to their misdeed. The petition must be granted and the
decision of respondent Ramento nullified, a much lesser penalty being appropriate.
1. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing,
6
the invocation of the right to freedom of
peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been
disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression which is Identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment
and which "is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing ... of a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent."
7

2. In the above case, a permit was sought to hold a peaceful march and rally from the Luneta public park
to the gates of the united States Embassy, hardly two blocks away, where in an open space of public
property, a short program would be held. Necessarily then, the question of the use of a public park and of
the streets leading to the United States Embassy was before this Court. We held that streets and parks
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and have been used for purposes of
assembly to communicate thoughts between citizens and to discuss public issues.
8

3. The situation here is different. The assembly was to be held not in a public place but in private
premises, property of respondent University. There is in the Reyes opinion as part of the summary this
relevant excerpt: "The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of
the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required."
9
Petitioners did seek such
consent. It was granted. According to the petition: "On August 27, 1982, by virtue of a permit granted to
them by the school administration, the Supreme Student Council where your petitioners are among the
officers, held a General Assembly at the VMAS basketball court of the respondent university." 10 There was
an express admission in the Comment of private respondent University as to a permit having been granted for peti tioners to hold a student
assembly. 11 The specific question to be resolved then is whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the
penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens
the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case.
They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 12 "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 13 While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the
conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specif ic level there is
persuasive force to this formulation in the Fortas opinion: "The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students
during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the
students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process. A
student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus
during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without
'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding
with the rights of others. ... But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type
of behavior materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." 14
5. As tested by such a standard, what is the verdict on the complaint of petitioners that there was a disregard of their constitutional rights to
peaceable assembly and free speech. It must be in their favor, but subject to qualification in view of their continuing their demonstration in a
place other than that specified in the permit for a longer period and their making use of megaphones therein, resulting in the disruption of
classes and the stoppage of work by the non-academic personnel in the vicinity of such assembly.
6. Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the student leaders. That there would be a vigorous presentation
of views opposed to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture was to be expect ed. There was
no concealment of the fact that they were against such a move as it confronted them with a serious problem (iisang malaking suliranin.") 15
They believed that such a merger would result in the increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents ("isa na naman sakit sa
ulo ng ating mga magulang."). 16 If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances,
extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident types.
They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of
the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into
account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth, They may give the speakers the
benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of
public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker, "materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
7. Nor is this a novel approach to the issue raised by petitioners that they were denied the right to peaceable assembly. In a 1907 decision,
United States v. Apurado, 17 the facts disclosed that shortly before the municipal council of San Carlos, Occidental Negros, started its
session, some five hundred residents of the municipality assembled near the municipal building, and, upon the opening of the session, a
substantial number of such persons barged into the council chamber, demanding that the municipal treasurer, the municipal secretary, and
the chief of police be dismissed, submitting at the same time the proposed substitutes. The municipal council gave its confor mity. Such
individuals were wholly unarmed except that a few carried canes; the crowd was fairly orderly and well -behaved except in so far as their
pressing into the council chamber during a session of that body could be called disorder and misbehavior. It turned out that the movement
had its origin in religious differences. The defendant Filomeno Apurado and many other participants were indicted and convicted of sedition
in that they allegedly prevented the municipal government from freely exercising its duties. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Justice
Carson, who penned the opinion, correctly pointed out that "if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly
conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous risi ng against the
authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to
exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who t ook part therein to the severest
form of punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. " 18 The principle
to be followed is enunciated thus: "If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and
punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an
essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising." 19 A careful reading of this decision is in order before private respondents
attach, as they did in their comments, a subversive character to the rally held by the students under the leadership of petit ioners.
8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired. Admittedly, there was a violation of the
terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the
VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed. According to the decision of respondent
Ramento, the "concerted activity [referring to such assembly] went on until 5:30 p. m.
20
Private respondents could thus, take
disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an admonition, even a censure-certainly not a suspension-
could be the appropriate penalty. Private respondents could and did take umbrage at the fact that in view
of such infraction considering the places where and the time when the demonstration took place-there
was a disruption of the classes and stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. They would not be
unjustified then if they did take a much more serious view of the matter. Even then a one-year period of
suspension is much too severe. While the discretion of both respondent University and respondent
Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the
concept of proportionality between the offense connoted and the sanction imposed is not followed, an
element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question. To avoid this
constitutional objection, it is the holding of this Court that a one-week suspension would be punishment
enough.
9. One last matter. The objection was raised that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
That is true, but hardly decisive. Here, a purely legal question is presented. Such being the case,
especially so where a decision on a question of law is imperatively called for, and time being of the
essence, this Court has invariably viewed the issue as ripe for adjudication. What cannot be too
sufficiently stressed is that the constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are invoked
by petitioners. Moreover, there was, and very likely there will continue to be in the future, militancy and
assertiveness of students on issues that they consider of great importance, whether concerning their
welfare or the general public. That they have a right to do as citizens entitled to all the protection in the
Bill of Rights.
10. It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing,
21
for this Court to
lay down the principles for the guidance of school authorities and students alike. The rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise
to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous
restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a
substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is
accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an
assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever
grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly
is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the
power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions
as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-
academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated October 20, 1982 of respondent Ramento
imposing a one-year suspension is nullified and set aside. The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court in the resolution of November 18, 1982 is made permanent. As of that date, petitioners had been
suspended for more than a week. In that sense, the one-week penalty had been served. No costs.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr.,
and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes
1 The other respondents named are Cesar Mijares, in his capacity as the President of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation: Gonzalo del Rosario, in his capacity as the Director for Academic Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation; Tomas B. Mesina, in his capacity as the Dean of Student Affairs of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation; Atty. Leonardo Padilla, in his capacity as Chief Legal Counsel and Security Supervisor of the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation: Atty. Fablita Ammay, Rosendo Galvante and Eugenio Tayao, in their
capacities as members of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation.
2 After obtaining an order to allow petitioners to lift temporarily the suspension and allow their attendance at classes,
no further information as to what subsequently transpired was furnished this Court.
3 Resolution of this Court dated November 16, 1982.
4 Comment of Private Respondents, 18.
5 Comment of Public Respondent, 9-10.
6 G.R. No. 65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553.
7 Ibid, 561. Cf. Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 856-857.
8 Ibid, 563-564. Reference was made to Municipality of Roxas v. Cavite, 30 Phil. 602 (1915) and Primicias v. Fugoso,
80 Phil, 71 (1948). The above formulation of the immemorial use of public parks comes from the plurality opinion in
Hague vs. CIO, 307 US 495 (1937).
9 Ibid, 569.
10 Petition, par. 2, Annex A.
11 Comment of Private Respondents, par. 2.
12 393 US 503 (1969).
13 Ibid, 507.
14 Ibid, 513-514.
15 Comment of Private Respondents, Annex M.
16 Ibid.
17 7 Phil. 422.
18 Ibid, 426.
19 Ibid.
20 Petition, Annex J.
21 Cf. Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. 65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 126183 March 25, 1999
LUZVIMINDA DE LA CRUZ, MERCY DE LEON, TERESITA EUGENIO, CORAZON GOMEZ, ELENA GUEVARRA, ROSALINA JINGCO,
LOIDA IGNACIO, and EMERITA PIZARRO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE
AND SPORTS, respondents.
G.R. No. 129221 March 25, 1999
ROLANDO ALURA,CLARA ALVAREZ, POFIRIO AUSTRIA, VICENTE CARRANZA, ELMER DALIDA, ROSALINDA DALIDA, NELSON
DUL-DULAO, LEA POCONG, ENRICO RAYMUNDO, MARGIE SERRANO, SUSAN SIERTE, JESSIE VILLANUEVA, NORBERTO ABAD,
MARIA ACEJO, ELVIRA ALANO, SUSANA BANUA, CAROLINA BULACLAC, DANILO CABALLES, ECHELITA CALMA, JESUSA
CARAIG, CECILIA CASTILLO, ANACLETA CORRALES, GLORIA CUEVAS, CONCORDIA DE GUZMAN, ROWENA DEL ROSARIO,
MATILDE DINGLE, ROSARIO DULDULAO, CONRADA ENDRINA, LUZVIMINDA ESPINO, VIRGILIO ESTRADA, DAMIAN FETIZANAN,
DEMOCRITO FLORES, ROSALIA GARCENILA, CORAZON GONZALES, VIOLETA GUANIZO, SURENA GUNDRAN, HILARIA
HALAGO, NERISSA IGNACIO, LEONOR LACERNA, TERESITA LAGUMBAY, TERESTTA LAURENTE, CARMELITA LEGION,
LEONARDO LIMBO, EDGARDO LIWANAG, ERLINA MAGALLANES, NEDA MAGSULIT, AMELITA MANGAHAS, GUIA MORRIS,
HIPOLITA NATIVIDAD, NATIVIDAD NEPOMUCENO, ROSALINA NOCUM, MAXIMA NON, ESTELA PALILEO, ANA PALMA, GLICERIA
PANGINDIAN, MA. LUZ PEREZ, LYDIA QUINTANA, LORENZA REAL, BERNARDITA RINO, CELIA RONQUILLO, GLORIA
SALVADOR, CATHERINE SAN AGUSTIN, LIBERTY SISON, ERLINDA SOLAMO, ALMA TALAMANTE, GINA TIMBAS, BENJAMIN
VALBUENA, DONATO VALDEMORO, ROSEMARIE VEDEJA, RIZALINA VICTORIO, MYRNA VILLAMIN, FLORENDA VILLAREAL,
WILSON PEREZ, ENRICO PILANDE, JOSEPHINE PARMISANO, FELIPE ALACAR, JOSE FETAL ALVERO, JR., MYRNA BARLISO,
CAROLINA COLIGADO, ROLANDO CERBO and LORA CLEMENCIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and SECRETARY OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J .:
These consolidated petitions
1
are among several petitions filed with this Court arising from the much-publicized
public school teachers' mass actions of September/October 1990.
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously
charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D.
Cario of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), in decisions issued by him which
uniformly read
This is a mutu-propio administrative complaint separately filed by the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports against the following public school teachers . . . . based on
the report submitted by their respective school principals wherein it was alleged that the
above-named teachers participated in the mass action/illegal strike in Sept. 19-21, 1990
and subsequently defied the return-to-work order dated September 17, 1990 issued by
this Office, which acts constitute grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation
of Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to
perform official duty, gross insubordination conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and absence without official leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree
807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines.
Required to explain within a period of not less than 72 hours but not more than 5 days
from receipt of the complaint, respondents failed to submit the required answer within the
given time up to the present, and despite the denial of their request for extension of 30
days within which to submit their answers dated September 25, 1990 filed by their
counsel, Atty. Gregorio Fabros, in a letter of this Office to him dated Septmber 28, 1990,
respondents failed to submit the same, which failure, is considered a waiver on their part
of their right to answer the charges and to controvert the same.
Wherefore, after a careful evaluation of the records, this Office finds the respondents
guilty as charged.
In accordance with Memorandum Circular 30 s. 1989 of the Civil Service Commission on
Guidelines in the Application of Penalty in Administrative Cases, the herein respondents
are dismissed from Office effective immediately.
The decisions dismissing petitioners were immediately implemented.
Petitioners appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and then to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). In 1993 the CSC found petitioners guilty of "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service" for having participated in the mass actions and imposed upon them the reduced penalty of
six (6) months' suspension. However, in view of the length of time that petitioners had been out of the
service by reason of the immediate implementation of the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario, the CSC
likewise ordered petitioners' automatic reinstatement in the service without back wages.
Petitioners were unhappy with the CSC decision. They initially filed petitions for certiorari with this Court,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 111998,
2
114435-5506,
3
and 116312-19,
4
which were all referred to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95
5
and there re-docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
37620, CA-G.R. SP No. 37619 and CA-G.R. SP Nos. 37784, 37808-37014, respectively.
On 29 November 1995 the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals
6
rendered a joint decision in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 37619-20 dismissing the petitions for lack of merit.
7
The appellate court ruled that the
questioned resolutions of the Civil Service Commission finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service were based on reasonable and justifiable grounds; that petitioners'
perceived grievances were no excuse for them not to conduct classes and defy the return-to-work order
issued by their superiors; that the immediate execution of the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario was
sanctioned by Sec. 47, par. (2), of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292) as well as Sec. 37,
par. (b), Art. IX of PD No. 807,
8
and Sec. 32, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.
O. No. 292. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied on 15 May 1997,
9
petitioners then
appealed by certiorari to this Court on 26 June 1997, docketed as G.R. No. 129221.
Meanwhile, on 24 April 1998 the Tenth Division of the Court of
Appeals
10
rendered a joint decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37784 and Nos. 37808-14 likewise dismissing the
petitions for lack of merit.
11
The appellate court rejected petitioners' contention that they should not have
been penalized for participating in the September/October 1990 mass actions because they were merely
exercising their constitutional right to free assembly. In so ruling the Court of Appeals cited Manila Public
School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.
12
wherein this Court ruled that the public school teachers'
mass actions of September/October 1990 were "to all intents and purposes a strike . . . constitut[ing] a
concealed and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' duty to
perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons." Petitioners' contention.that secretary Cario's
decision to dismiss them was not supported by evidence was likewise rejected in view of petitioners'
admissions and/or failure to refute the factual finding that petitioners actually joined the mass actions
based on the report of absences submitted by their respective school principals. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied in the resolution of 20 August 1996,
13
petitioners then filed a petition
for review on certiorari with this Court on 1 October 1996, docketed as G.R. No. 126183.
By resolution of 7 October 1997 we granted petitioners' motion for the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 126183
and 129221 involving as they did common questions of fact and law.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals grievously erred in affirming the CSC resolutions finding
them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when their only "offense" was to
exercise their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of their
grievances. Moreover petitioners insist that the mass actions of September/October 1990 were not
"strikes" as there was no actual disruption of classes. Petitioners therefore ask for exoneration or, in the
alternative, award of back wages for the period of three (3) years when they were not allowed to work
while awaiting resolution of their appeals by the MSPB and CSC, deducting the period of six (6) months'
suspension eventually meted them.
The petitions must be denied in view of previous rulings of this Court already settling all the issues raised
by petitioners. It is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all
future cases where the facts are substantially the same.
14
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by
the decisions and disturb not what is settled.
15

As early as 18 December 1990 we have categorically ruled in the consolidated cases of Manila Public
School Teachers Association v.
Laguio Jr.,
16
and Alliance of Concerned Teachers v. Hon. Isidro Cario
17
that the mass actions of
September/October 1990 staged by Metro Manila public school teachers "amounted to a strike in every
sense of the term, constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or absence from
work which it was said teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried out for essentially economic reasons to
protest and pressure the Government to correct what, among other grievances, the strikers perceived to
be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of the salary standardization law insofar as they were
concerned, the non-payment or delay in payment of various fringe benefits and allowances to which they
were entitled, and the imposition of additional teaching loads and longer teaching hours." In Rolando Gan
v. Civil Service Commission,
18
we denied the claim that the teachers were thereby denied their rights to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances reasoning that this
constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised within reasonable limits so as
not to prejudice the public welfare. But the public school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions
did not exercise their constitutional rights within reasonable limits. On the contrary, they committed acts
prejudicial to the best interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days,
abandoning their classes and refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had the
teachers availed of their free time recess, after classes, weekends or holidays to dramatize their
grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one not the DECS,
the CSC or even the Supreme Court could have held them liable for their participation in the mass
actions.
19

With respect to our ruling in PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
20

invoked by petitioners, we have likewise already ruled in the Rolando Gan case
21
that the PBM ruling
that the rights of free expression and assembly could not be lightly disregarded as they occupy a
preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties was not applicable to defend the validity of the 1990
mass actions because what were pitted therein against the rights of free expression and of assembly
were inferior property rights while the higher consideration involved in the case of the striking teachers
was the education of the youth which must, at the very least, be equated with the freedom of assembly
and to petition the government for redress of grievances.
22

We affirmed the foregoing rulings in Bagana v. Court of Appeals
23
by denying a similar petition filed by
another group of teachers who participated in the 1990 mass actions but who claimed to have been
merely exercising their constitutional right to free assembly. We held in Bagana that the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in affirming the CSC resolutions finding the teachers guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposing penalties of six (6) months' suspension without
pay. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals
24
we added that the persistent refusal of the striking teachers to
call the mass actions by the conventional term "strike" did not erase the true nature of the mass actions
as unauthorized stoppages of work the purpose of which was to obtain a favorable response to the
teachers' economic grievances. We again stressed that the teachers were penalized not because they
exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such right was
exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various schools
in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon the students for whose education the teachers
were responsible. But herein petitioners contend that classes were not actually disrupted because
substitute teachers were immediately appointed by Secretary Cario. Besides being a purely factual
assertion which this Court cannot take cognizance of in a petition for review, the fact that the prompt
remedial action taken by Secretary Cario might have partially deflected the adverse effects of the mass
protests did not erase the administrative liability of petitioners for the intended consequences thereof
which were the very reason why such prompt remedial action became necessary.
Considering the foregoing, we find that respondent Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the CSC
resolutions finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
As an alternative prayer, petitioners ask that in the event their exoneration is not decreed they be
awarded back wages for the period when they were not allowed to work by reason of the supposed
unjustified immediate implementation of the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario while awaiting resolution
of their appeals by the MSPB and CSC.
The issue of whether back wages may be awarded to teachers ordered reinstated to the service after the
dismissal orders of Secretary Cario were commuted by the CSC to six (6) months' suspension is already
settled.
In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals
25
we resolved the issue in the negative on the ground that the teachers
were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, two (2) circumstances necessary for the grant of
back wages in administrative disciplinary cases. Like herein petitioners, those in Bangalisan were also
teachers who participated in the 1990 mass actions for which they were dismissed by Secretary Cario
but ordered merely suspended for six (6) months by the Civil Service Commission. On a plea that the
immediate implementation of the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario was unjustified, thus warranting an
award of back wages the Court said
As to the immediate execution of the decision of the Secretary against petitioners, the
same is authorized by Section 47, paragraph (2), of Executive Order No. 292, thus: "The
Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decision
shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or
fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a
bureau or office is appealable to the Commission, the same shall be executory except
when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
And since it was already the final dismissal orders of Secretary Cario which were being carried
out, immediate implementation even pending appeal was clearly sanctioned by the aforequoted
provision of the Administrative Code of 1987.
26
Hence, being legal, the immediate execution of
the dismissal orders could not be considered unjustified.
The cases cited by petitioners to support their prayer for back salaries, namely, Abellera v. City of Baguio
27
and Bautista v. Peralta
28
being cases which involved the unjustified immediate execution of the
dismissal orders of the then Civil Service Commissioner pending appeal to the Civil Service Board of
Appeals are therefore not applicable to justify petitioners' prayer. Neither could petitioners be considered
to have been exonerated from the charges levelled against them by Secretary Cario from the mere fact
that they were found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service by the CSC. It
must be remembered that Secretary Cario charged petitioners with grave misconduct, gross neglect of
duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations, etc., for having participated in the 1990
illegal mass actions. On appeal the CSC while affirming the factual finding that petitioners indeed
participated in the mass the factual finding that petitioners indeed participated in the mass actions found
them liable only for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Clearly the CSC decision did not
proceed from a finding that petitioners did not commit the acts complained of. Having been found to have
actually participated in the illegal mass actions although found answerable for a lesser offense, petitioners
could not be considered as fully innocent of the charges against them.
29
Being found liable for a lesser
offense is not equivalent to exoneration.
30

Thus in Bangalisan we denied the claim for back wages of those teachers who were found to have
actually participated in the 1990 mass actions but granted the claim of one Rodolfo Mariano who was
absent only because he attended the wake and interment of his grandmother. In Jacinto v. Court of
Appeals
31
we again denied the claim for back wages of teachers found to have given cause for their
suspension i.e., their unjustified abandonment of classes to the prejudice of their students but granted the
claim of Merlinda Jacinto who was absent because of illness.
Petitioners do not deny, nay they even admit, having participated in the 1990 mass actions. Thus having
given cause for their supension, their prayer for backwages must be denied conformably with settled
rulings of this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 1995 and 24 April 1996 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 In G.R. No. 126183, petitioners are Luzviminda de la Cruz, Mercy de Leon, Teresita Eugenio,
Corazon Gomez, Elena Guevarra, Rosalina Jingco, Loida Ignacio, and Emerita Pizarro, while
respondents are Court of Appeals, Civil Service Commission and the Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
In G.R. No. 129221 petitioners are Rolando Alura, Clara Alvarez, Pofirio Austria, Vicente
Carranza, Elmer Dalida, Rosalinda Dalida, Nelson Duldulao, Lea Pocong, Enrico Raymundo,
Margie Serrano, Susan Sierte, Jessie Villanueva, Norberto Abad, Maria Acejo, Elvira Alano,
Susana Banua, Carolina Bulaclac, Danilo Caballes, Echelita Calma, Jesusa Caraig, Cecilia
Castillo, Anacleta Corrales, Gloria Cuevas, Concondia de Guzman, Rowena del Rosario, Matilde
Dingle, Rosario Duldulao, Conrada Endrina, Luzviminda Espino, Virgilio Estrada, Damian
Fetizanan, Democrito Flores, Rosalia Garcenila, Corazon Gonzales, Violeta Guanizo, Surena
Gundran, Hilaria Hidalgo, Nerissa Ignacio, Leonor Lacerna, Teresita Lagumbay, Teresita
Laurenti, Carmelita Legion, Leonardo Limbo, Edgardo Liwanag, Erlina Magallanes, Neda
Magsulit, Amelita Mangahas, Guia Morris, Hipolita Natividad, Natividad Nepomuceno, Rosalina
Nocum, Maxima Non, Estela Palileo, Ana Palma, Gliceria Pangindian, Ma. Luz Perez, Lydia
Quintana, Lorenza Real, Bernadita Rino, Celia Ronquillo, Gloria Salvador, Catherine San
Agustin, Liberty Sison, Erlinda Solamo, Alma Talamante, Gina Timbas, Benjamin Valbuena,
Donato Valdemoro, Rosemarie Vedeja, Rizalina Victorio, Myrna Villamin, Florenda Villareal,
Wilson Perez, Enrico Pilande, Josephine Parmisano, Felipe Alacar, Jose Fetalvero, Jr., Myrna
Barliso, Carolino Coligado, Rolando Cerbo and Lora Clemencia, while respondents are Court of
Appeals, Civil Service Commision, and Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports.
2 Wilson Perez, et al. v. Civil Service Commission, et al.
3 Rolando Alura, et al. v. Civil Service Commission, et al.
4 Luzviminda dela Cruz, et al. v. Civil Service Commission, et al.
5 Re: Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from Judgments or Final Orders of the
Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judial Agencies.
6 Fidel R. Purisima (Chairman), JJ. Ruben T. Reyes, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr., and Romeo A. Brawner (Members).
7 G.R. No. 129221, Rollo, pp. 75-87.
8 Civil Service Law.
9 Rollo, pp. 95-96.
10 J. Alfredo L. Benipayo [ponente], JJ. Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Romeo A. Brawner
[concurring].
11 G.R. No. 126183, Rollo, pp. 64-77.
12 G.R. No. 95445, 6 August 1991, 200 SCRA 323.
13 Rollo, p. 78.
14 Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1988 Ed., p. 902, citing Government v. Jalandoni, 44 O. G.
1840.
15 Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397 (1947).
16 G.R. No. 95445, 6 August 1991.
17 G.R. No. 95590, 6 August 1991.
18 G.R. Nos. 110717 and 110721-22, 14 December 1993.
19 Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124540, 14 November 1997, 281 SCRA 657, 675.
20 No. L-31195, 5 June 1973, 51 SCRA 189.
21 See Note 18.
22 Ibid.
23 G.R. No. 126567, Minute Resolution dated 9 September 1997.
24 G.R. No. 124678, 31 July 1997, 276 SCRA 619.
25 See Note 24.
26 Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124540, 14 November 1997, 281 SCRA 657, 679-680.
27 No. L-23957, 18 March 1967, 19 SCRA 600.
28 No. L-21967, 29 September 1966, 18 SCRA 223.
29 Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124540, 14 November 1997, 281 SCRA 657, 682.
30 Ibid.
31 G.R. No. 126540, 14 November 1997, 281 SCRA 657.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO,
ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J .:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of
the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner
Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular
second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of
their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following
stipulation of facts of the parties parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at Malacaang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers
as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March
4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and
those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section
heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacaang on
March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon
in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union
has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration
is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru
Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers
of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company represented by Atty. C.S. de
Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the Malacaang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift
of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the
workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismiss; De Leon
reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacaang demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50
A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent
Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third
shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass
demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift,
charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of
the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur
L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by
Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent
Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their
constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September
15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano
de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for
perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent
Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29,
1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the
ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections
15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received
on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file
their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accor dingly dismissed,
invoking Bien vs. Castillo,
1
which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the
filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M",
pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11,
1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration
of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its
Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76,
rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969
and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15,
16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration
shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision,
resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order
dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was
due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and
of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes
"K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein
petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89,
rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the
case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality
is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man
as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the
citadel of his person."
2

(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the
assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and
the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles."
3

In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw
"certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights
to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."
4
Laski
proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which
its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to
exercise."
5

(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the
ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect
the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen.
6
And as Justice
Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not
safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
7

(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political
rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.
Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the
discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the
appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights
is recognized.
8
Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in
our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only
"with narrow specificity."
9

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human
rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities,
of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position
as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;
10
and such
priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
11

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable
or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or
impairs property rights.
12
On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights
requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice
Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer.
13
It
should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black
and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan,
14
believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as
well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against
public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall
be governed,"
15
even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test.
16
Chief Justice
Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. whether
the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is
necessary to avoid the danger.
17

II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of
work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining
agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by
foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The
demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely
and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and
petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief
Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political
rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was
the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro the
harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the
defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks
enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for
its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it
also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its
failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged
oppressive police who might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to
further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition
against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent
firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution
the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2
o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended
loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its
management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and
persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that
vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and
brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars
remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like
rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained.
18
Emphatic reiteration of
this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human
personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and
social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that
can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
19

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the
respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular
working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts
deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours,
constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation.
Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally
enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the
workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike.
20
The respondent Court of Industrial
Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as
the same not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the
demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2
P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed
appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the
complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to
generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately action on the part of
the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local
police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression.
21
If demonstrators are reduced by one-
third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more
the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of
one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will
enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the
company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made
arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its
workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift
employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their
telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass
demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of
the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its
mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the
Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as
unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for
redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in
relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid
or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent
firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of
which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common action
to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the
respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass
demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech."
22

Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the
concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with
immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban employees.
23

We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the
protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary
that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted
activity is for the furtherance of their interests.
24

As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated
September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and
"warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969)
shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the
employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against
the local police, were more important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the
demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's
wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much
to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day
salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But
management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech,
free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof
of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the
evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction
over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for
proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration
"paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present
evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or
that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the
demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver
the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to absence
of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of
wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings
could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of
the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to
petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers
for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of
social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of
the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6
of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of
Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and
substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these
constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial
Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the
causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-
organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and
economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial
Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to
keep faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction;
and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal
conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus
proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the
release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated
his constitutional right against self-incrimination;
25
or who is denied the right to present evidence in his
defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law,
26
even after the accused has already
served sentence for twenty-two years.
27

Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional
immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity
to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated
these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and
the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such
freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts
28
as well as private citizens and
corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule
promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a
law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no
time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one
speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be
invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to
be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be
vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a
race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses
because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required
diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal
services.
28
-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should
filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed
within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above
intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a
legislative delegation.
29

The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on
September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that
they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the
petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a
mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord
supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by
the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the
Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to
natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial
Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional
rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the
petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere
legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution
and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days
has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule
52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration
could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the
unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the
ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts
adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file
arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex
"G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14,
1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting
arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on
October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for
being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the
arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the
Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of
29
-a reconsideration becomes final and
unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be
specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such
pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first
time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of
the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete determination
of the dispute can be made.
30
It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court
gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial
Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein
petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their
defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a
most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such
human rights.
30
-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to
except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require."
30
-b Mr. Justice
Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo.
30
-c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning
itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case,
without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not
substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-
versa. In other words, when all the material facts are spread in the records before Us,
and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is
of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate judgment. Is
within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of
this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its authority,
in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any error of judgment of a court a
quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any
doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has found in the
decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this
Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here
and now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as
faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to
the lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal.
(Emphasis supplied).
30
-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar
would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers,
whose basic human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according supremacy over the
property rights of their employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when,
as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its
property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more
imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights
sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It
should be stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations
rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such application becomes
unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the
peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to
the case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which
enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo,
speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al.,
30
-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new
trial is not "newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for
the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial
Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial
Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as
generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any
duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner
as it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is disengaged
from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even
restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as
may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or
dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No.
46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For
these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the
respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute
a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of newly
discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46
Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to
rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the
sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel
erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of
September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only
one day late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of
justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this
score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta,
30
-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910].
The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84
Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy,
14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it
deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this
Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil.
124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should
never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than technicalities"
view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance
with which courts have organized and function, but as means conducive to the realization
the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained steadfastly
opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial
rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred
principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As
succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the
situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest
decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v.
Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier
formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843)
...
30
-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal
or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day
absence from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not
include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who
participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of
the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed and only the Union
itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice
charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30,
rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the
demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in
the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the
morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm
continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been simply to charge said
one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner
Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their
daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to
unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to
destroy our system of Government, but from men of goodwill good men who allow
their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish
involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember,
however, is that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of
liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only
protection against misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the
guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the
demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill
of Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure
because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that
our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good
conscience must be observe.
31

The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic
understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the
local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its
employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police
officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent
company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness,
if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R.,
32
where the petitioner Bank
dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank
president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and
favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro,
We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that
the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were
nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their
right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection,
(Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court.
For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group
of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected
by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their
grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of
self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324
U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine
Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied.
The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer
to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of
that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct,
identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a
retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor
practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act.
(Emphasis supplied.)
33

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic
Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no
less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all
the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not
against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated
September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their
separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have
realized from other sources during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J, took no part.



Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J ., dissenting:
I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense
of duty compels me to dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in
the stipulation of facts upon which the decision under
review is based. It is as follows:
1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills,
Company, Inc., is a corporation existing and
operating under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines with corporate address at 666 Muelle
de Binondo, Manila, which is the employer of
respondent;
2. That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization PBMEO for short, is a legitimate
labor organization, and the respondents herein
are either officers of respondent PBMEO or
members thereof;
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company
learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of
the Pasig Police Department to be participated by
the first shift (6:00 AM 2:00 PM workers as
well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00
A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM in the
morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on
March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the
Company's canteen, and those present were: for
the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang, (2) Atty.
Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all department
and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio
Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de
Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio
Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to
confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969.
PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as the
spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the
planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or
dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
that the demonstration is an inalienable right of
the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which
reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
warned the PBMEO representatives that workers
who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
without previous leave of absence approved by
the Company, particularly the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who
shall fail to report for work the following morning
(March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because
such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and,
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969,
another meeting was convoked. Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union
panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino,
Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3,
1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the
PBMEO representatives that while all workers
may join the Malacaang demonstration, the
workers for the first and regular shift of March 4,
1969 should be excused from joining the
demonstration and should report for work; and
thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts
in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA,
particularly Article XXIV "NO LOCKOUT NO
STRIKE". All those who will not follow this
warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De
Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the
officers shall be primarily liable being the
organizers of the mass demonstration. The union
panel countered that it was rather too late to
change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang
demonstration will be held the following morning;
and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of
PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which
was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the
contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING
REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES
JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.
Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected
demonstration did in fact occur and in the process
paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
complainant company". (p. 5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of
Industrial Relations filed with said court a complaint for
Unfair Labor Practice against petitioners charging that: .
3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents
(petitioners herein) particularly those in the first
shift, in violation of the existing collective
bargaining agreement and without filing the
necessary notice as provided for by law, failed to
report for work, amounting to a declaration of
strike;
4. That the above acts are in violation of Section
4(a) subparagraph 6, in relation to Sections 13,
14 and 15 of Republic Act No. 875, and of the
collective bargaining agreement. (Pars. 3 and 4,
Annex C.)
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the
dispositive part of which read's:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Employees Organization is found
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and is hereby
ordered to cease and desist from further
committing the same and its representatives
namely: respondent Florencio Padrigano, Rufino
Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor
Tolentino and Rodulfo Monsod who are directly
responsible for perpetrating this unfair labor
practice act, are hereby considered to have lost
their status as employees of the Philippine
Blooming Mills, Inc. (p. 8, Annex F.)
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners
were notified of this decision on September 23, 1969,
there seems to be no serious question that they were
actually served therewith on September 22, 1969. In fact,
petitioners admitted this date of notice in paragraph 2 of
their Petition for Relief dated October 30, 1969 and filed
with the industrial court on the following day. (See Annex
K.)
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29,
1969, or seven (7) days after they were notified of the
court's decision, that petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration with the industrial court; as it is also not
disputed that they filed their "Arguments in Support of the
Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration" only on
October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words,
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was filed two (2)
days after the lapse of the five (5) day period provided for
the filing thereof in the rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5)
days after the expiration of the period therefor also
specified in the same rules.
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the
one raised by respondent private firm, namely, that in view
of the failure of petitioners to file not only their motion for
reconsideration but also their arguments in support thereof
within the periods respectively fixed in the rules therefor,
the Court of Industrial Relations acted correctly and within
the law in rendering and issuing its impugned order of
October 9, 1969 dismissing petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely
applicable to the facts hereof is the decision of this Court
in Elizalde & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations
1
wherein
it was ruled that:
August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of the then Associate Judge
Arsenio I. Martinez, the dispositive part of which was set forth earlier in this opinion.
August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. No arguments were
advanced in support thereof.
August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file its arguments in support of its
motion to reconsider.
August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of its aforesaid motion seeking
reconsideration.
September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the motion for reconsideration.
Ground therefor was that the arguments were filed out of time.
October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at the same time lodged the
present petition with this Court.
Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief (respondents did not file their
brief), the case is now before us for resolution.
1. That the judgment appealed from is a final judgment not merely an interlocutory
order there is no doubt. The fact that there is need for computation of respondent
Perlado's overtime pay would not render the decision incomplete. This in effect is the
holding of the Court in Pan American World Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan
American Employees Association, which runs thus: 'It is next contended that in ordering
the Chief of the Examining Division or his representative to compute the compensation
due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial functions and thereby rendered an
incomplete decision. We do not believe so. Computation of the overtime pay involves a
mechanical function, at most. And the report would still have to be submitted to the
Industrial Court for its approval, by the very terms of the order itself. That there was no
specification of the amount of overtime pay in the decision did not make it incomplete,
since this matter should necessarily be made clear enough in the implementation of the
decision (see Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al.,
L-8718, May 11, 1956).
2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the sense that it can no longer,
be disturbed?
CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence of this Court both answer
the question in the affirmative.
Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to reconsider the judgment of
the trial judge must do so within five (5) days from the date on which he received notice
of the decision, subject of the motion. Next follows Section 16 which says that the motion
must be submitted with arguments supporting the same. But if said arguments could not
be submitted simultaneously with the motion, the same section commands the 'the
movant shall file the same within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for
reconsideration.' Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a movant that "(f)ailure to
observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion
for reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the supporting arguments, as the
case may be".
Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has since stabilized the
enforceability thereof. Thus, in Bien vs. Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro
forma motion for reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is in order pursuant to
CIR rules, regardless of whether the arguments in support of said motion were or were
not filed on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers & Tenants Association (PELTA) vs.
Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960) pronounced that where a motion to reconsider is filed
out of time, the order or decision subject of reconsideration comes final. And so also,
where the arguments in support of the motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the
ten-day reglementary period, the pre forma motion for reconsideration although
seasonably filed must nevertheless be denied. This in essence is our ruling in Local 7,
Press & Printing Free Workers (FFW) vs. Tabigne. The teaching in Luzon Stevedoring
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, is that where the motion for reconsideration is
denied upon the ground that the arguments in support thereof were filed out of time, the
order or decision subject of the motion becomes "final and unappealable".
We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and pronouncements of this Court in
the case before us. On August 6, petitioner received a copy of the judgment of Judge
Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner's motion to reconsider without arguments in
support thereof of August 12 was filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the five-day
reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the
written arguments in support of the said motion were submitted to the court on August 27.
The period from August 12 to August 27, is a space of fifteen (15) days. Surely enough,
said arguments were filed out of time five (5) days late. And the judgment had become
final.
3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August 21, 1963 seeking extension of time
within which to present its arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in his petition
before this Court pleads that the foregoing motion was grounded on the 'extremely busy
and difficult schedule of counsel which would not enable him to do so within the stated
ten-day reglementary period. The arguments were only filed on August 27 five (5)
days late, as aforesaid.
The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is to be noted that the motion
for expansion of time was filed only on August 21, that is, one day before the due date
which is August 22. It was petitioner's duty to see to it that the court act on this motion
forthwith or at least inquire as to the fate thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It did
not. It merely filed its arguments on the 27th.
To be underscored at this point is that "obviously to speed up the disposition of cases",
CIR "has a standing rule against the extension of the ten-day period for filing supporting
arguments". That no-extension policy should have placed petitioner on guard. It should
not have simply folded its arms, sit by supinely and relied on the court's generosity. To
compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments only on August 27, 1953, knowing
full well that by that time the reglementary period had expired.
Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of September 16, 1963 dismissing the
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the supporting arguments were filed out of
time. That ruling in effect denied the motion for extension.
We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and unappealable. We may not review the
same.
Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent, which has not been in any way modified,
much less revoked or reversed by this Court, the main opinion has chosen not only to go into the merits
of petitioners' pose that the respondent court erred in holding them guilty of bargaining in bad faith but
also to ultimately uphold petitioners' claim for reinstatement on constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are predicated on an exposition of the
constitutional guarantees of freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly for redress of grievances, so
scholarly and masterful that it is bound to overwhelm Us unless We note carefully the real issues in this
case, I am constrained, over and above my sincere admiration for the eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice
Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to dutifully state that as presented by petitioners themselves and in the
light of its attendant circumstances, this case does not call for the resolution of any constitutional issue.
Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional guarantee, particularly when it directly affects individual
freedoms enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the closest attention of this Court. It is my understanding
of constitutional law and judicial practices related thereto, however, that even the most valuable of our
constitutional rights may be protected by the courts only when their jurisdiction over the subject matter is
unquestionably established and the applicable rules of procedure consistent with substantive and
procedural due process are observed. No doubt no constitutional right can be sacrificed in the altar of
procedural technicalities, very often fittingly downgraded as niceties but as far as I know, this principle is
applied to annul or set aside final judgments only in cases wherein there is a possible denial of due
process. I have not come across any instance, and none is mentioned or cited in the well-documented
main opinion, wherein a final and executory judgment has been invalidated and set aside upon the
ground that the same has the effect of sanctioning the violation of a constitutional right, unless such
violation amounts to a denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any law or from any judicial precedent or reason
of principle, the main opinion nudely and unqualifiedly asserts, as if it were universally established and
accepted as an absolute rule, that the violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction;
and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights". Chavez vs. Court of Appeals,
24 SCRA 663, which is mentioned almost in passing, does uphold the proposition that "relief from a
criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas
corpus proceedings even after the finality of the judgment". And, of course, Chavez is correct; as is also
Abriol vs. Homeres
2
which, in principle, served as its precedent, for the very simple reason that in both of
those cases, the accused were denied due process. In Chavez, the accused was compelled to testify
against himself as a witness for the prosecution; in Abriol, the accused was denied his request to be
allowed to present evidence to establish his defense after his demurrer to the People's evidence was
denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in those cases are a far cry from the one
now before Us. Here, petitioners do not claim they were denied due process. Nor do they pretend that in
denying their motion for reconsideration, "the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and private firm
trenched upon any of their constitutional immunities ...," contrary to the statement to such effect in the
main opinion. Indeed, neither in the petition herein nor in any of the other pleading of petitioners can any
direct or indirect assertion be found assailing the impugned decision of the respondent court as being null
and void because it sanctioned a denial of a valued constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as follows:
Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be resolved is whether or not the
respondent Court en banc under the facts and circumstances, should consider the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of certiorari, humbly beg this
Honorable Court to treat this petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en banc of the strict and narrow
technical rules of procedure without taking into account justice, equity and substantial
merits of the case.
On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by petitioners on this point in their
brief runs thus:
III
ISSUES
1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a fundamental right to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances constitute bargaining in
bad faith? and,
Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration and conclusion that the union
was guilty of bargaining in bad faith meriting the dismissal of the persons allegedly
responsible therefore?
2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent court refused to act one way
or another on the petition for relief from the resolution of October 9, 1969?
IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petition union guilty of bargaining in bad faith
and consequently dismissing the persons allegedly responsible therefor, because such
conclusion is country to the evidence on record; that the dismissal of leaders was
discriminatory.
As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom to assemble and petition the
duly constituted authorities for redress of their grievances, the petitioners were charged
and then condemned of bargaining in bad faith.
The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad faith were not borne out by
the records. It was not even alleged nor proven by evidence. What has been alleged and
which the respondent company tried to prove was that the demonstration amounted to a
strike and hence, a violation of the provisions of the "no-lockout no strike" clause of
the collective bargaining agreement. However, this allegation and proof submitted by the
respondent company were practically resolved when the respondent court in the same
decision stated categorically:
'The company alleges that the walkout because of the demonstration is
tantamount to a declaration of a strike. We do not think so, as the same
is not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted act
and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work.' (Emphasis
supplied, p. 4, 5th paragraph, Decision.)
The respondent court's findings that the petitioner union bargained in bad
faith is not tenable because:
First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent company; .
Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and the respondent company
convened twice in a meeting to thresh out the matter of demonstration. Petitioners
requested that the employees and workers be excused but the respondent company
instead of granting the request or even settling the matter so that the hours of work will
not be disrupted, immediately threatened the employees of mass dismissal;
Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request of the company that the first
shift shall be excluded in the demonstration is not tantamount to bargaining in bad faith
because the company knew that the officers of the union belonged to the first shift, and
that the union cannot go and lead the demonstration without their officers. It must be
stated that the company intends to prohibit its officers to lead and join the demonstration
because most of them belonged to the first shift; and
Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the demonstration if allowed will
practically give the union the right to change the working conditions agreed in the CBA is
a conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any evidence on record. The
demonstration did not practically change the terms or conditions of employment because
it was only for one (1) day and the company knew about it before it went through. We can
even say that it was the company who bargained in bad faith, when upon representation
of the Bureau of Labor not to dismiss the employees demonstrating, the company tacitly
approved the same and yet while the demonstration was in progress, the company filed a
ULP Charge and consequently dismissed those who participated.
Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of the union participated in the
demonstration and yet, the respondent court selected the eight officers to be dismissed
from the union thus losing their status as employees of the respondent company. The
respondent court should have taken into account that the company's action in allowing
the return of more or less three hundred ninety two (392) employees/members of the
union is an act of condonation and the dismissal of the eight (8) officers is an act of
discrimination (Phil. Air Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines Employees Association, G.R. No. L-
8197, Oct. 31, 1958). Seemingly, from the opinion stated in the decision by the court,
while there is a collective bargaining agreement, the union cannot go on demonstration or
go on strike because it will change the terms and conditions of employment agreed in the
CBA. It follows that the CBA is over and above the constitutional rights of a man to
demonstrate and the statutory rights of a union to strike as provided for in Republic Act
875. This creates a bad precedent because it will appear that the rights of the union is
solely dependent upon the CBA.
One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected in proceedings before the
Court of Industrial Relations is that "the decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected." (Interstate Commerce Commission vs. L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct.
185, 57 Law ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their rights to know and meet the
case against them. (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.)
The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is no scintilla of evidence to
support the findings of the respondent court that the petitioner union bargained in bad
faith. Corollary therefore, the dismissal of the individual petitioners is without basis either
in fact or in law.
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:
1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners have been guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and consequently lost their status as employees of the respondent company did not
meet the meaning and comprehension of "substantial merits of the case." Bargaining in
bad faith has not been alleged in the complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during
the hearing of the can. The important and substantial merit of the case is whether under
the facts and circumstances alleged in respondent company's pleadings, the
demonstration done by the petitioners amounted to on "illegal strike" and therefore in
violation of the "no strike no lock out" clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Petitioners respectfully reiterate and humbly submit, that the respondent court had
altogether opined and decided that such demonstration does not amount to a strike.
Hence, with that findings, petitioners should have been absolved of the charges against
them. Nevertheless, the same respondent court disregarding, its own findings, went out
of bounds by declaring the petitioners as having "bargained in faith." The stand of the
respondent court is fallacious, as it follows the principle in logic as "non-siquitor";
2) That again respondents wanted to impress that the freedom to assemble peaceably to
air grievances against the duly constituted authorities as guaranteed in our Constitution is
subject to the limitation of the agreement in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The
fundamental rights of the petitioners to free speech and assembly is paramount to the
provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and such attempt to override the
constitutional provision would be null and void. These fundamental rights of the
petitioners were not taken into consideration in the deliberation of the case by the
respondent court;
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are not raising any issue of due process.
They do not posit that the decision of the industrial court is null and void on that constitutional ground.
True it is that they fault the respondent court for having priced the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement herein involved over and above their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition
for redress of their grievances against the abuses of the Pasig police, but in no sense at all do they allege
or contend that such action affects its jurisdiction in a manner that renders the proceedings a nullity. In
other words, petitioners themselves consider the alleged flaw in the court's action as a mere error of
judgment rather than that of jurisdiction which the main opinion projects. For this Court to roundly and
indignantly condemn private respondent now for the grievous violation of the fundamental law the main
opinion sees in its refusal to allow all its workers to join the demonstration in question, when that specific
issue has not been duly presented to Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust, for the
simple reason that the manner this case was brought to Us does not afford it the opportunity to be heard
in regard to such supposed constitutional transgression.
To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court committed an error of jurisdiction by finding
petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad faith when the charge against them alleged in the complaint was for
having conducted a mass demonstration, which "amounted to a strike", in violation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, but definitely, this jurisdictional question has no constitutional color. Indeed, We
can even assume for the sake of argument, that the trial judge did err in not giving preferential importance
to the fundamental freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the management and proprietary attributes
claimed by the respondent private firm still, We cannot rightly hold that such disregard of petitioners'
priceless liberties divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the premises. The unbending doctrine of this Court
is that "decisions, erroneous or not, become final after the period fixed by law; litigations would be
endless, no questions would be finally settled; and titles to property would become precarious if the losing
party were allowed to reopen them at any time in the future".
3

I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the interpretation, construction or application of a
constitutional precept not constituting a denial of due process, should not make any difference. Juridically,
a party cannot be less injured by an overlooked or erroneously sanctioned violation of an ordinary statute
than by a misconstrued or constitutional injunction affecting his individual, freedoms. In both instances,
there is injustice which should be intolerable were it not for the more paramount considerations that
inform the principle of immutability of final judgments. I dare say this must be the reason why, as I have
already noted, the main opinion does not cite any constitutional provision, law or rule or any judicial
doctrine or principle supporting its basic holding that infringement of constitutional guarantees, other than
denial of due process, divests courts of jurisdiction to render valid judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of Philippine Association of Colleges and
Universities vs. Secretary of Education,
4
following Santiago vs. Far Eastern Broadcasting,
5
is that "it is
one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically
raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will not consider it". In the case at bar, the
petitioners have not raised, they are not insisting upon, much less have they adequately argued the
constitutional issues so extendedly and ably discussed in the main opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court to hold that the erroneous resolution by
a court of a constitutional issue not amounting to a denial of due process renders its judgment or decision
null and void, and, therefore, subject to attack even after said judgment or decision has become final and
executory. I have actually tried to bring myself into agreement with the views of the distinguished and
learned writer of the main opinion, if only to avoid dissenting from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious
incongruity with settled jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could go along with petitioners under the
authority of our constitutionally irreducible appellate jurisdiction under Section 2(5) of Article VII of the
Philippines
6
(reenacted practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) of the 1973 Constitution), only to
realize upon further reflection that the very power granted to us to review decisions of lower courts
involving questions of law(and these include constitutional issues not affecting the validity of statutes,
treaty, executive agreement, etc.) is not unqualified but has to be exercised only in the manner provided
in the law of the Rules of Court. In other words, before We can exercise appellate jurisdiction over
constitutional issues, no matter how important they may be, there must first be a showing of compliance
with the applicable procedural law or rules, among them, those governing appeals from the Court of
Industrial Relations involved herein. Consequently, if by law or rule, a judgment of the industrial court is
already final and executory, this Court would be devoid of power and authority to review, much less alter
or modify the same, absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of jurisdiction. It must be borne in
mind that the situation confronting Us now is not merely whether or not We should pass upon a question
or issue not specifically raised by the party concerned, which, to be sure, could be enough reason to
dissuade Us from taking pains in resolving the same; rather, the real problem here is whether or not We
have jurisdiction to entertain it. And, in this regard, as already stated earlier, no less than Justice Conrado
Sanchez, the writer of Chavez, supra., which is being relied upon by the main opinion, already laid down
the precedent in Elizalde vs. Court, supra, which for its four-square applicability to the facts of this case,
We have no choice but to follow, that is, that in view of reconsideration but even their argument
supporting the same within the prescribed period, "the judgment (against them)has become final, beyond
recall".
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the finality and enforceability of their judgments
are made contingent on the correctness thereof from the constitutional standpoint, and that in truth,
whether or not they are correct is something that is always dependent upon combined opinion of the
members of the Supreme Court, which in turn is naturally as changeable as the members themselves are
changed, I cannot conceive of anything more pernicious and destructive to a trustful administration of
justice than the idea that, even without any showing of denial of due process or want of jurisdiction of the
court, a final and executory judgment of such court may still be set aside or reopened in instances other
than those expressly allowed by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud under Article 1146(1) of the Civil
Code.
7
And just to emphasize the policy of the law of respecting judgments once they have become final,
even as this Court has ruled that final decisions are mute in the presence of fraud which the law abhors,
8

it is only when the fraud is extrinsic and not intrinsic that final and executory judgments may be set aside,

9
and this only when the remedy is sought within the prescriptive period.
10

Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Those vs. Go Sin Kaw, 82 Phil. 776:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result.
Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any
attempt to prolong them.
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy Cay v. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus:
... Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very
object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this
purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set
up to spur on the slothful. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were allowed to thus keep
causes ever within his power, to determine and redetermine them term after term, to
bandy his judgments about from one party to the other, and to change his conclusions as
freely and as capriciously as a chamelon may change its hues, then litigation might
become more intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to redress.' (See Arnedo vs.
Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil., 257.).
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de los Angeles,
L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the unalterability and invulnerability of final
judgments but rather on the correct interpretation of the contents of the judgment in question therein.
Relevantly to this case at bar, I said then:
The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not escaped my attention.
Neither am I overlooking the point of the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and
inimical implications of a ruling that would authorize the revision, amendment or alteration
of a final and executory judgment. I want to emphasize that my position in this opinion
does not detract a whit from the soundness, authority and binding force of existing
doctrines enjoining any such modifications. The public policy of maintaining faith and
respect in judicial decisions, which inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the highest
order. I am not advocating any departure from them. Nor am I trying to put forth for
execution a decision that I believe should have been rather than what it is. All I am doing
is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco but the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-
20950, as it is and not as I believe it should have been, and, by opinion, I would like to
guide the court a quo as to what, in my own view, is the true and correct meaning and
implications of decision of this Court, not that of Judge Tengco's.
The main opinion calls attention to many instant precisely involving cases in the industrial court, wherein
the Court refused to be constrained by technical rules of procedure in its determination to accord
substantial justice to the parties I still believe in those decisions, some of which were penned by me. I am
certain, however, that in none of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment already final and
executory. It too obvious to require extended elucidation or even reference any precedent or authority that
the principle of immutability of final judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it may considered to be in
a sense a procedural rule, it is one that is founded on public policy and cannot, therefore, yield to the
ordinary plea that it must give priority to substantial justice.
Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of due process to hold on, the main opinion goes far
as to maintain that the long existing and constantly applied rule governing the filing of motions for
reconsideration in the Court of Industrial Relations, "as applied in this case does not implement on
reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected, but instead constricts the same to the point of
nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court on Industrial Relations Rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond
the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion
for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieve workers, who usually do not have the ready
funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, a
period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or reconsideration
(Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the
motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This
fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations Rule insofar as circumstances
of the instant case are concerned."
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the conclusion suggested. Viewed
objectively, it can readily be seen that there can hardly be any factual or logical basis for such a critical
view of the rule in question. Said rule provides:
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies, within five (5) days from the date
on which he receives notice of the order or decision, object of the motion for
reconsideration, the same to be verified under oath with respect to the correctness of the
allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof, personally or by registered mail, on the
adverse party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies, duly verified under oath.
Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted with arguments supporting
the same. If the arguments can not be submitted simultaneously with said motions, upon
notice Court, the movant shall file same within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of
his motion for reconsideration. The adverse party shall also file his answer within ten (10)
days from the receipt by him of a copy of the arguments submitted by the movant.
Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after ten (10) days from the
receipt of the arguments in support of said motion having been filed, the motion shall be
deemed submitted for resolution of the Court in banc, unless it is considered necessary
to bear oral arguments, in which case the Court shall issue the corresponding order or
notice to that effect.
Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of
the motion for reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the supporting
arguments, as the case may be. (As amended April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial
Relations.).
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as everyone acquainted with proceedings in
the industrial court well knows, precisely permits the party aggrieved by a judgment to file no more than a
pro-forma motion for reconsideration without any argument or lengthy discussion and with barely a brief
statement of the fundamental ground or grounds therefor, without prejudice to supplementing the same
by making the necessary exposition, with citations laws and authorities, in the written arguments the be
filed (10) days later. In truth, such a pro-forma motion has to effect of just advising the court and the other
party that the movant does not agree with the judgment due to fundamental defects stated in brief and
general terms. Evidently, the purpose of this requirement is to apprise everyone concerned within the
shortest possible time that a reconsideration is to sought, and thereby enable the parties concerned to
make whatever adjustments may be warranted by the situation, in the meanwhile that the litigation is
prolonged. It must borne in mind that cases in the industrial court may involve affect the operation of vital
industries in which labor-management problems might require day-to-day solutions and it is to the best
interests of justice and concerned that the attitude of each party at every imports juncture of the case be
known to the other so that both avenues for earlier settlement may, if possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by the rule is short or inadequate. In fact, the
motion filed petitioners was no more than the following:
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this Honorable Court most
respectfully moves for the RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable Court
dated September 17, 1969 on the ground that the same is not in accordance with law,
evidence and facts adduced during the hearing of the above entitled case.
Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file their respective arguments
within ten (10) days pursuant to Section 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for Reconsideration be admitted.
Manila, September 27, 1969.
To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the filing of such a motion is to me
simply incomprehensible. What worse in this case is that petitioners have not even taken
the trouble of giving an explanation of their inability to comply with the rule. Not only that,
petitioners were also late five (5) days in filing their written arguments in support of their
motion, and, the only excuse offered for such delay is that both the President of the
Union and the office clerk who took charge of the matter forgot to do what they were
instructed to do by counsel, which, according to this Court, as I shall explain anon "is the
most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the
procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court". (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs.
Arca, infra). And yet, very indignantly, the main opinion would want the Court to overlook
such nonchalance and indifference.
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the rules fixing periods for the finality of
judgments are in a sense more substantive than procedural in their real nature, for in their operation they
have the effect of either creating or terminating rights pursuant to the terms of the particular judgment
concerned. And the fact that the court that rendered such final judgment is deprived of jurisdiction or
authority to alter or modify the same enhances such substantive character. Moreover, because they have
the effect of terminating rights and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that said rules partake of the
nature also of rules of prescription, which again are substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription
are inaction or abandonment and the passage of time or a prescribed period. On the other hand,
procrastination or failure to act on time is unquestionably a form of abandonment, particularly when it is
not or cannot be sufficiently explained. The most valuable right of a party may be lost by prescription, and
be has no reason to complain because public policy demands that rights must be asserted in time, as
otherwise they can be deemed waived.
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-evident principles to the case of petitioners.
Hence, I feel disinclined to adopt the suggestion that the Court suspend, for the purposes of this case the
rules aforequoted of the Court of Industrial Relations. Besides, I have grave doubts as to whether we can
suspend rules of other courts, particularly that is not under our supervisory jurisdiction, being
administrative agency under the Executive Department Withal, if, in order to hasten the administration of
substance justice, this Court did exercise in some instances its re power to amend its rules, I am
positively certain, it has done it for the purpose of reviving a case in which the judo has already become
final and executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred their petition, in a belated effort to salvage their
Petitioners filed in the industrial court on October 31, 1969 a Petition for relief alleging that their failure to
file "Arguments in Support of their Motion for Reconsideration within the reglementary period or five (5), if
not seven (7), days late "was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the
President of the respondent Union and on office clerk of the counsel for respondents as shown attested in
their respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, and K-2) which in brief, consisted allegedly of the President's
having forgotten his appointment with his lawyer "despite previous instructions and of the said office
employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to do the work instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio"
because he "was busy with clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked these allegations, for, under
probably more justification circumstances, this Court ruled out a similar explanation previous case this
wise:
We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered respondent Santos as reason for his
failure to perfect in due time appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that
counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the most hackneyed and habitual
subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe procedural requirements prescribed
by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of this kind of common place excuses, in
the face of the Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are neither credible nor
constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L-4039, 29 January 1952;
Mercado vs. Judge Domingo, L-19457, December 1966) is certainly such whimsical
exercise of judgment to be a grave abuse of discretion. (Philippine Air Lines, Inc. Arca, 19
SCRA 300.)
For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court sought to be reviewed in the present
case has already become final and executory, nay, not without the fault of the petitioners, hence, no
matter how erroneous from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is already beyond recall, I vote to
dismiss this case, without pronouncement as to costs.
TEEHANKEE, J ., concurring:
For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged
abuses of the Pasig police department, upon two days' prior notice to respondent employer company, as against the
latter's insistence that the first shift
1
should not participate but instead report for work, under pain of dismissal, the
industrial court ordered the dismissal from employment of the eight individual petitioners as union officers
and organizers of the mass demonstration.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on respondent's complaint of bargaining in bad
faith and unfair labor practice for having so carried out the mass demonstration, notwithstanding that it
concededly was not a declaration of strike nor directed in any manner against respondent employer, and
ordering the dismissal of the union office manifestly constituted grave abuse of discretion in fact and in
law.
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair labor practice since respondent firm
conceded that "the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed' by the Constitution" and
the union up to the day of the demonstration pleaded by cablegram to the company to excuse the first
shift and allow it to join the demonstration in accordance with their previous requests.
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective bargaining agreement's "no-strike" clause
as would warrant the union leaders' dismissal, since as found by respondent court itself the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike, there being no industrial dispute between the
protagonists, but merely the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to enable the workers to
exercise their constitutional rights of free expression, peaceable assembly and petition for redress of
grievance against alleged police excesses.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been
filed two days late, after expiration of the reglementary five-day period fixed by its rules, due to the
negligence of petitioners' counsel and/or the union president should likewise be set aside as a manifest
act of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief from the normal adverse consequences of
the late filing of their motion for reconsideration due to such negligence which was not acted upon by
respondent court should have been granted, considering the monstrous injustice that would otherwise
be caused the petitioners through their summary dismissal from employment, simply because they sought
in good faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by the Constitution. It should be noted
further that no proof of actual loss from the one-day stoppage of work was shown by respondent
company, providing basis to the main opinion's premise that its insistence on dismissal of the union
leaders for having included the first shift workers in the mass demonstration against its wishes was but an
act of arbitrary vindictiveness.
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual petitioners and the constitutional injunction
to afford protection to labor be given true substance and meaning. No person may be deprived of such
basic rights without due process which is but "responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience
to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided ... Due process
is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness."
2

Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the respondent court and concur in the
judgment for petitioners as set forth in the main opinion.


Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J ., dissenting:
I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of duty compels me to dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in the stipulation of facts upon which the decision
under review is based. It is as follows:
1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc., is a corporation existing
and operating under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines with corporate address at
666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila, which is the employer of respondent;
2. That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization PBMEO for short, is a
legitimate labor organization, and the respondents herein are either officers of
respondent PBMEO or members thereof;
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police
Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM 2:00 PM workers as well as
those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM in the
morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at
the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang,
(2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all department and section heads. For the
PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion
Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who
acted as the spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and
stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been
agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing
to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed
PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not
unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company,
thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to
the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration,
who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked. Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor
Tolentino, Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon
meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the Malacaang demonstration, the
workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the
demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd
shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV "NO
LOCKOUT NO STRIKE". All those who will not follow this warning of the Company
shall be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be
primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel
countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang
demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as
follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.
Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected demonstration did in fact occur and in the process
paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company". (p. 5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial Relations filed with said court a
complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against petitioners charging that: .
3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners herein) particularly those in the first
shift, in violation of the existing collective bargaining agreement and without filing the
necessary notice as provided for by law, failed to report for work, amounting to a
declaration of strike;
4. That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a) subparagraph 6, in relation to
Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective bargaining
agreement. (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which read's:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization is
found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
further committing the same and its representatives namely: respondent Florencio
Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Monsod who are directly responsible for
perpetrating this unfair labor practice act, are hereby considered to have lost their status
as employees of the Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (p. 8, Annex F.)
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were notified of this decision on September 23,
1969, there seems to be no serious question that they were actually served therewith on September 22,
1969. In fact, petitioners admitted this date of notice in paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief dated
October 30, 1969 and filed with the industrial court on the following day. (See Annex K.)
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days after they were notified of
the court's decision, that petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration with the industrial court; as it is
also not disputed that they filed their "Arguments in Support of the Respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration" only on October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was filed two (2) days after the lapse of the five (5) day period provided for the filing
thereof in the rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5) days
after the expiration of the period therefor also specified in the same rules.
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one raised by respondent private firm, namely,
that in view of the failure of petitioners to file not only their motion for reconsideration but also their
arguments in support thereof within the periods respectively fixed in the rules therefor, the Court of
Industrial Relations acted correctly and within the law in rendering and issuing its impugned order of
October 9, 1969 dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely applicable to the facts hereof is the decision of
this Court in Elizalde & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations
1
wherein it was ruled that:
August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of the then Associate Judge
Arsenio I. Martinez, the dispositive part of which was set forth earlier in this opinion.
August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. No arguments were
advanced in support thereof.
August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file its arguments in support of its
motion to reconsider.
August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of its aforesaid motion seeking
reconsideration.
September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the motion for reconsideration.
Ground therefor was that the arguments were filed out of time.
October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at the same time lodged the
present petition with this Court.
Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief (respondents did not file their
brief), the case is now before us for resolution.
1. That the judgment appealed from is a final judgment not merely an interlocutory
order there is no doubt. The fact that there is need for computation of respondent
Perlado's overtime pay would not render the decision incomplete. This in effect is the
holding of the Court in Pan American World Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan
American Employees Association, which runs thus: 'It is next contended that in ordering
the Chief of the Examining Division or his representative to compute the compensation
due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial functions and thereby rendered an
incomplete decision. We do not believe so. Computation of the overtime pay involves a
mechanical function, at most. And the report would still have to be submitted to the
Industrial Court for its approval, by the very terms of the order itself. That there was no
specification of the amount of overtime pay in the decision did not make it incomplete,
since this matter should necessarily be made clear enough in the implementation of the
decision (see Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al.,
L-8718, May 11, 1956).
2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the sense that it can no longer,
be disturbed?
CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence of this Court both answer
the question in the affirmative.
Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to reconsider the judgment of
the trial judge must do so within five (5) days from the date on which he received notice
of the decision, subject of the motion. Next follows Section 16 which says that the motion
must be submitted with arguments supporting the same. But if said arguments could not
be submitted simultaneously with the motion, the same section commands the 'the
movant shall file the same within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for
reconsideration.' Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a movant that "(f)ailure to
observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion
for reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the supporting arguments, as the
case may be".
Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has since stabilized the
enforceability thereof. Thus, in Bien vs. Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro
forma motion for reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is in order pursuant to
CIR rules, regardless of whether the arguments in support of said motion were or were
not filed on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers & Tenants Association (PELTA) vs.
Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960) pronounced that where a motion to reconsider is filed
out of time, the order or decision subject of reconsideration comes final. And so also,
where the arguments in support of the motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the
ten-day reglementary period, the pre forma motion for reconsideration although
seasonably filed must nevertheless be denied. This in essence is our ruling in Local 7,
Press & Printing Free Workers (FFW) vs. Tabigne. The teaching in Luzon Stevedoring
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, is that where the motion for reconsideration is
denied upon the ground that the arguments in support thereof were filed out of time, the
order or decision subject of the motion becomes "final and unappealable".
We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and pronouncements of this Court in
the case before us. On August 6, petitioner received a copy of the judgment of Judge
Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner's motion to reconsider without arguments in
support thereof of August 12 was filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the five-day
reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the
written arguments in support of the said motion were submitted to the court on August 27.
The period from August 12 to August 27, is a space of fifteen (15) days. Surely enough,
said arguments were filed out of time five (5) days late. And the judgment had become
final.
3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August 21, 1963 seeking extension of time
within which to present its arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in his petition
before this Court pleads that the foregoing motion was grounded on the 'extremely busy
and difficult schedule of counsel which would not enable him to do so within the stated
ten-day reglementary period. The arguments were only filed on August 27 five (5)
days late, as aforesaid.
The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is to be noted that the motion
for expansion of time was filed only on August 21, that is, one day before the due date
which is August 22. It was petitioner's duty to see to it that the court act on this motion
forthwith or at least inquire as to the fate thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It did
not. It merely filed its arguments on the 27th.
To be underscored at this point is that "obviously to speed up the disposition of cases",
CIR "has a standing rule against the extension of the ten-day period for filing supporting
arguments". That no-extension policy should have placed petitioner on guard. It should
not have simply folded its arms, sit by supinely and relied on the court's generosity. To
compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments only on August 27, 1953, knowing
full well that by that time the reglementary period had expired.
Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of September 16, 1963 dismissing the
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the supporting arguments were filed out of
time. That ruling in effect denied the motion for extension.
We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and unappealable. We may not review the
same.
Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent, which has not been in any way modified,
much less revoked or reversed by this Court, the main opinion has chosen not only to go into the merits
of petitioners' pose that the respondent court erred in holding them guilty of bargaining in bad faith but
also to ultimately uphold petitioners' claim for reinstatement on constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are predicated on an exposition of the
constitutional guarantees of freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly for redress of grievances, so
scholarly and masterful that it is bound to overwhelm Us unless We note carefully the real issues in this
case, I am constrained, over and above my sincere admiration for the eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice
Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to dutifully state that as presented by petitioners themselves and in the
light of its attendant circumstances, this case does not call for the resolution of any constitutional issue.
Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional guarantee, particularly when it directly affects individual
freedoms enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the closest attention of this Court. It is my understanding
of constitutional law and judicial practices related thereto, however, that even the most valuable of our
constitutional rights may be protected by the courts only when their jurisdiction over the subject matter is
unquestionably established and the applicable rules of procedure consistent with substantive and
procedural due process are observed. No doubt no constitutional right can be sacrificed in the altar of
procedural technicalities, very often fittingly downgraded as niceties but as far as I know, this principle is
applied to annul or set aside final judgments only in cases wherein there is a possible denial of due
process. I have not come across any instance, and none is mentioned or cited in the well-documented
main opinion, wherein a final and executory judgment has been invalidated and set aside upon the
ground that the same has the effect of sanctioning the violation of a constitutional right, unless such
violation amounts to a denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any law or from any judicial precedent or reason
of principle, the main opinion nudely and unqualifiedly asserts, as if it were universally established and
accepted as an absolute rule, that the violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction;
and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights". Chavez vs. Court of Appeals,
24 SCRA 663, which is mentioned almost in passing, does uphold the proposition that "relief from a
criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas
corpus proceedings even after the finality of the judgment". And, of course, Chavez is correct; as is also
Abriol vs. Homeres
2
which, in principle, served as its precedent, for the very simple reason that in both of
those cases, the accused were denied due process. In Chavez, the accused was compelled to testify
against himself as a witness for the prosecution; in Abriol, the accused was denied his request to be
allowed to present evidence to establish his defense after his demurrer to the People's evidence was
denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in those cases are a far cry from the one
now before Us. Here, petitioners do not claim they were denied due process. Nor do they pretend that in
denying their motion for reconsideration, "the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and private firm
trenched upon any of their constitutional immunities ...," contrary to the statement to such effect in the
main opinion. Indeed, neither in the petition herein nor in any of the other pleading of petitioners can any
direct or indirect assertion be found assailing the impugned decision of the respondent court as being null
and void because it sanctioned a denial of a valued constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as follows:
Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be resolved is whether or not the
respondent Court en banc under the facts and circumstances, should consider the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of certiorari, humbly beg this
Honorable Court to treat this petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en banc of the strict and narrow
technical rules of procedure without taking into account justice, equity and substantial
merits of the case.
On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by petitioners on this point in their
brief runs thus:
III
ISSUES
1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a fundamental right to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances constitute bargaining in
bad faith? and,
Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration and conclusion that the union
was guilty of bargaining in bad faith meriting the dismissal of the persons allegedly
responsible therefore?
2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent court refused to act one way
or another on the petition for relief from the resolution of October 9, 1969?
IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petition union guilty of bargaining in bad faith
and consequently dismissing the persons allegedly responsible therefor, because such
conclusion is country to the evidence on record; that the dismissal of leaders was
discriminatory.
As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom to assemble and petition the
duly constituted authorities for redress of their grievances, the petitioners were charged
and then condemned of bargaining in bad faith.
The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad faith were not borne out by
the records. It was not even alleged nor proven by evidence. What has been alleged and
which the respondent company tried to prove was that the demonstration amounted to a
strike and hence, a violation of the provisions of the "no-lockout no strike" clause of
the collective bargaining agreement. However, this allegation and proof submitted by the
respondent company were practically resolved when the respondent court in the same
decision stated categorically:
'The company alleges that the walkout because of the demonstration is
tantamount to a declaration of a strike. We do not think so, as the same
is not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted act
and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work.' (Emphasis
supplied, p. 4, 5th paragraph, Decision.)
The respondent court's findings that the petitioner union bargained in bad
faith is not tenable because:
First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent company; .
Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and the respondent company
convened twice in a meeting to thresh out the matter of demonstration. Petitioners
requested that the employees and workers be excused but the respondent company
instead of granting the request or even settling the matter so that the hours of work will
not be disrupted, immediately threatened the employees of mass dismissal;
Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request of the company that the first
shift shall be excluded in the demonstration is not tantamount to bargaining in bad faith
because the company knew that the officers of the union belonged to the first shift, and
that the union cannot go and lead the demonstration without their officers. It must be
stated that the company intends to prohibit its officers to lead and join the demonstration
because most of them belonged to the first shift; and
Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the demonstration if allowed will
practically give the union the right to change the working conditions agreed in the CBA is
a conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any evidence on record. The
demonstration did not practically change the terms or conditions of employment because
it was only for one (1) day and the company knew about it before it went through. We can
even say that it was the company who bargained in bad faith, when upon representation
of the Bureau of Labor not to dismiss the employees demonstrating, the company tacitly
approved the same and yet while the demonstration was in progress, the company filed a
ULP Charge and consequently dismissed those who participated.
Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of the union participated in the
demonstration and yet, the respondent court selected the eight officers to be dismissed
from the union thus losing their status as employees of the respondent company. The
respondent court should have taken into account that the company's action in allowing
the return of more or less three hundred ninety two (392) employees/members of the
union is an act of condonation and the dismissal of the eight (8) officers is an act of
discrimination (Phil. Air Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines Employees Association, G.R. No. L-
8197, Oct. 31, 1958). Seemingly, from the opinion stated in the decision by the court,
while there is a collective bargaining agreement, the union cannot go on demonstration or
go on strike because it will change the terms and conditions of employment agreed in the
CBA. It follows that the CBA is over and above the constitutional rights of a man to
demonstrate and the statutory rights of a union to strike as provided for in Republic Act
875. This creates a bad precedent because it will appear that the rights of the union is
solely dependent upon the CBA.
One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected in proceedings before the
Court of Industrial Relations is that "the decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected." (Interstate Commerce Commission vs. L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct.
185, 57 Law ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their rights to know and meet the
case against them. (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.)
The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is no scintilla of evidence to
support the findings of the respondent court that the petitioner union bargained in bad
faith. Corollary therefore, the dismissal of the individual petitioners is without basis either
in fact or in law.
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:
1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners have been guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and consequently lost their status as employees of the respondent company did not
meet the meaning and comprehension of "substantial merits of the case." Bargaining in
bad faith has not been alleged in the complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during
the hearing of the can. The important and substantial merit of the case is whether under
the facts and circumstances alleged in respondent company's pleadings, the
demonstration done by the petitioners amounted to on "illegal strike" and therefore in
violation of the "no strike no lock out" clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Petitioners respectfully reiterate and humbly submit, that the respondent court had
altogether opined and decided that such demonstration does not amount to a strike.
Hence, with that findings, petitioners should have been absolved of the charges against
them. Nevertheless, the same respondent court disregarding, its own findings, went out
of bounds by declaring the petitioners as having "bargained in faith." The stand of the
respondent court is fallacious, as it follows the principle in logic as "non-siquitor";
2) That again respondents wanted to impress that the freedom to assemble peaceably to
air grievances against the duly constituted authorities as guaranteed in our Constitution is
subject to the limitation of the agreement in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The
fundamental rights of the petitioners to free speech and assembly is paramount to the
provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and such attempt to override the
constitutional provision would be null and void. These fundamental rights of the
petitioners were not taken into consideration in the deliberation of the case by the
respondent court;
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are not raising any issue of due process.
They do not posit that the decision of the industrial court is null and void on that constitutional ground.
True it is that they fault the respondent court for having priced the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement herein involved over and above their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition
for redress of their grievances against the abuses of the Pasig police, but in no sense at all do they allege
or contend that such action affects its jurisdiction in a manner that renders the proceedings a nullity. In
other words, petitioners themselves consider the alleged flaw in the court's action as a mere error of
judgment rather than that of jurisdiction which the main opinion projects. For this Court to roundly and
indignantly condemn private respondent now for the grievous violation of the fundamental law the main
opinion sees in its refusal to allow all its workers to join the demonstration in question, when that specific
issue has not been duly presented to Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust, for the
simple reason that the manner this case was brought to Us does not afford it the opportunity to be heard
in regard to such supposed constitutional transgression.
To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court committed an error of jurisdiction by finding
petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad faith when the charge against them alleged in the complaint was for
having conducted a mass demonstration, which "amounted to a strike", in violation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, but definitely, this jurisdictional question has no constitutional color. Indeed, We
can even assume for the sake of argument, that the trial judge did err in not giving preferential importance
to the fundamental freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the management and proprietary attributes
claimed by the respondent private firm still, We cannot rightly hold that such disregard of petitioners'
priceless liberties divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the premises. The unbending doctrine of this Court
is that "decisions, erroneous or not, become final after the period fixed by law; litigations would be
endless, no questions would be finally settled; and titles to property would become precarious if the losing
party were allowed to reopen them at any time in the future".
3

I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the interpretation, construction or application of a
constitutional precept not constituting a denial of due process, should not make any difference. Juridically,
a party cannot be less injured by an overlooked or erroneously sanctioned violation of an ordinary statute
than by a misconstrued or constitutional injunction affecting his individual, freedoms. In both instances,
there is injustice which should be intolerable were it not for the more paramount considerations that
inform the principle of immutability of final judgments. I dare say this must be the reason why, as I have
already noted, the main opinion does not cite any constitutional provision, law or rule or any judicial
doctrine or principle supporting its basic holding that infringement of constitutional guarantees, other than
denial of due process, divests courts of jurisdiction to render valid judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of Philippine Association of Colleges and
Universities vs. Secretary of Education,
4
following Santiago vs. Far Eastern Broadcasting,
5
is that "it is
one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically
raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will not consider it". In the case at bar, the
petitioners have not raised, they are not insisting upon, much less have they adequately argued the
constitutional issues so extendedly and ably discussed in the main opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court to hold that the erroneous resolution by
a court of a constitutional issue not amounting to a denial of due process renders its judgment or decision
null and void, and, therefore, subject to attack even after said judgment or decision has become final and
executory. I have actually tried to bring myself into agreement with the views of the distinguished and
learned writer of the main opinion, if only to avoid dissenting from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious
incongruity with settled jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could go along with petitioners under the
authority of our constitutionally irreducible appellate jurisdiction under Section 2(5) of Article VII of the
Philippines
6
(reenacted practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) of the 1973 Constitution), only to
realize upon further reflection that the very power granted to us to review decisions of lower courts
involving questions of law(and these include constitutional issues not affecting the validity of statutes,
treaty, executive agreement, etc.) is not unqualified but has to be exercised only in the manner provided
in the law of the Rules of Court. In other words, before We can exercise appellate jurisdiction over
constitutional issues, no matter how important they may be, there must first be a showing of compliance
with the applicable procedural law or rules, among them, those governing appeals from the Court of
Industrial Relations involved herein. Consequently, if by law or rule, a judgment of the industrial court is
already final and executory, this Court would be devoid of power and authority to review, much less alter
or modify the same, absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of jurisdiction. It must be borne in
mind that the situation confronting Us now is not merely whether or not We should pass upon a question
or issue not specifically raised by the party concerned, which, to be sure, could be enough reason to
dissuade Us from taking pains in resolving the same; rather, the real problem here is whether or not We
have jurisdiction to entertain it. And, in this regard, as already stated earlier, no less than Justice Conrado
Sanchez, the writer of Chavez, supra., which is being relied upon by the main opinion, already laid down
the precedent in Elizalde vs. Court, supra, which for its four-square applicability to the facts of this case,
We have no choice but to follow, that is, that in view of reconsideration but even their argument
supporting the same within the prescribed period, "the judgment (against them)has become final, beyond
recall".
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the finality and enforceability of their judgments
are made contingent on the correctness thereof from the constitutional standpoint, and that in truth,
whether or not they are correct is something that is always dependent upon combined opinion of the
members of the Supreme Court, which in turn is naturally as changeable as the members themselves are
changed, I cannot conceive of anything more pernicious and destructive to a trustful administration of
justice than the idea that, even without any showing of denial of due process or want of jurisdiction of the
court, a final and executory judgment of such court may still be set aside or reopened in instances other
than those expressly allowed by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud under Article 1146(1) of the Civil
Code.
7
And just to emphasize the policy of the law of respecting judgments once they have become final,
even as this Court has ruled that final decisions are mute in the presence of fraud which the law abhors,
8

it is only when the fraud is extrinsic and not intrinsic that final and executory judgments may be set aside,

9
and this only when the remedy is sought within the prescriptive period.
10

Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Those vs. Go Sin Kaw, 82 Phil. 776:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result.
Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any
attempt to prolong them.
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy Cay v. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus:
... Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very
object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this
purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set
up to spur on the slothful. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were allowed to thus keep
causes ever within his power, to determine and redetermine them term after term, to
bandy his judgments about from one party to the other, and to change his conclusions as
freely and as capriciously as a chamelon may change its hues, then litigation might
become more intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to redress.' (See Arnedo vs.
Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil., 257.).
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de los Angeles,
L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the unalterability and invulnerability of final
judgments but rather on the correct interpretation of the contents of the judgment in question therein.
Relevantly to this case at bar, I said then:
The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not escaped my attention.
Neither am I overlooking the point of the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and
inimical implications of a ruling that would authorize the revision, amendment or alteration
of a final and executory judgment. I want to emphasize that my position in this opinion
does not detract a whit from the soundness, authority and binding force of existing
doctrines enjoining any such modifications. The public policy of maintaining faith and
respect in judicial decisions, which inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the highest
order. I am not advocating any departure from them. Nor am I trying to put forth for
execution a decision that I believe should have been rather than what it is. All I am doing
is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco but the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-
20950, as it is and not as I believe it should have been, and, by opinion, I would like to
guide the court a quo as to what, in my own view, is the true and correct meaning and
implications of decision of this Court, not that of Judge Tengco's.
The main opinion calls attention to many instant precisely involving cases in the industrial court, wherein
the Court refused to be constrained by technical rules of procedure in its determination to accord
substantial justice to the parties I still believe in those decisions, some of which were penned by me. I am
certain, however, that in none of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment already final and
executory. It too obvious to require extended elucidation or even reference any precedent or authority that
the principle of immutability of final judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it may considered to be in
a sense a procedural rule, it is one that is founded on public policy and cannot, therefore, yield to the
ordinary plea that it must give priority to substantial justice.
Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of due process to hold on, the main opinion goes far
as to maintain that the long existing and constantly applied rule governing the filing of motions for
reconsideration in the Court of Industrial Relations, "as applied in this case does not implement on
reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected, but instead constricts the same to the point of
nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court on Industrial Relations Rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond
the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion
for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieve workers, who usually do not have the ready
funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, a
period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or reconsideration
(Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the
motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This
fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations Rule insofar as circumstances
of the instant case are concerned."
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the conclusion suggested. Viewed
objectively, it can readily be seen that there can hardly be any factual or logical basis for such a critical
view of the rule in question. Said rule provides:
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies, within five (5) days from the date
on which he receives notice of the order or decision, object of the motion for
reconsideration, the same to be verified under oath with respect to the correctness of the
allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof, personally or by registered mail, on the
adverse party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies, duly verified under oath.
Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted with arguments supporting
the same. If the arguments can not be submitted simultaneously with said motions, upon
notice Court, the movant shall file same within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of
his motion for reconsideration. The adverse party shall also file his answer within ten (10)
days from the receipt by him of a copy of the arguments submitted by the movant.
Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after ten (10) days from the
receipt of the arguments in support of said motion having been filed, the motion shall be
deemed submitted for resolution of the Court in banc, unless it is considered necessary
to bear oral arguments, in which case the Court shall issue the corresponding order or
notice to that effect.
Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of
the motion for reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the supporting
arguments, as the case may be. (As amended April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial
Relations.).
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as everyone acquainted with proceedings in
the industrial court well knows, precisely permits the party aggrieved by a judgment to file no more than a
pro-forma motion for reconsideration without any argument or lengthy discussion and with barely a brief
statement of the fundamental ground or grounds therefor, without prejudice to supplementing the same
by making the necessary exposition, with citations laws and authorities, in the written arguments the be
filed (10) days later. In truth, such a pro-forma motion has to effect of just advising the court and the other
party that the movant does not agree with the judgment due to fundamental defects stated in brief and
general terms. Evidently, the purpose of this requirement is to apprise everyone concerned within the
shortest possible time that a reconsideration is to sought, and thereby enable the parties concerned to
make whatever adjustments may be warranted by the situation, in the meanwhile that the litigation is
prolonged. It must borne in mind that cases in the industrial court may involve affect the operation of vital
industries in which labor-management problems might require day-to-day solutions and it is to the best
interests of justice and concerned that the attitude of each party at every imports juncture of the case be
known to the other so that both avenues for earlier settlement may, if possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by the rule is short or inadequate. In fact, the
motion filed petitioners was no more than the following:
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this Honorable Court most
respectfully moves for the RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable Court
dated September 17, 1969 on the ground that the same is not in accordance with law,
evidence and facts adduced during the hearing of the above entitled case.
Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file their respective arguments
within ten (10) days pursuant to Section 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for Reconsideration be admitted.
Manila, September 27, 1969.
To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the filing of such a motion is to me
simply incomprehensible. What worse in this case is that petitioners have not even taken
the trouble of giving an explanation of their inability to comply with the rule. Not only that,
petitioners were also late five (5) days in filing their written arguments in support of their
motion, and, the only excuse offered for such delay is that both the President of the
Union and the office clerk who took charge of the matter forgot to do what they were
instructed to do by counsel, which, according to this Court, as I shall explain anon "is the
most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the
procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court". (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs.
Arca, infra). And yet, very indignantly, the main opinion would want the Court to overlook
such nonchalance and indifference.
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the rules fixing periods for the finality of
judgments are in a sense more substantive than procedural in their real nature, for in their operation they
have the effect of either creating or terminating rights pursuant to the terms of the particular judgment
concerned. And the fact that the court that rendered such final judgment is deprived of jurisdiction or
authority to alter or modify the same enhances such substantive character. Moreover, because they have
the effect of terminating rights and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that said rules partake of the
nature also of rules of prescription, which again are substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription
are inaction or abandonment and the passage of time or a prescribed period. On the other hand,
procrastination or failure to act on time is unquestionably a form of abandonment, particularly when it is
not or cannot be sufficiently explained. The most valuable right of a party may be lost by prescription, and
be has no reason to complain because public policy demands that rights must be asserted in time, as
otherwise they can be deemed waived.
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-evident principles to the case of petitioners.
Hence, I feel disinclined to adopt the suggestion that the Court suspend, for the purposes of this case the
rules aforequoted of the Court of Industrial Relations. Besides, I have grave doubts as to whether we can
suspend rules of other courts, particularly that is not under our supervisory jurisdiction, being
administrative agency under the Executive Department Withal, if, in order to hasten the administration of
substance justice, this Court did exercise in some instances its re power to amend its rules, I am
positively certain, it has done it for the purpose of reviving a case in which the judo has already become
final and executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred their petition, in a belated effort to salvage their
Petitioners filed in the industrial court on October 31, 1969 a Petition for relief alleging that their failure to
file "Arguments in Support of their Motion for Reconsideration within the reglementary period or five (5), if
not seven (7), days late "was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the
President of the respondent Union and on office clerk of the counsel for respondents as shown attested in
their respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, and K-2) which in brief, consisted allegedly of the President's
having forgotten his appointment with his lawyer "despite previous instructions and of the said office
employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to do the work instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio"
because he "was busy with clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked these allegations, for, under
probably more justification circumstances, this Court ruled out a similar explanation previous case this
wise:
We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered respondent Santos as reason for his
failure to perfect in due time appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that
counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the most hackneyed and habitual
subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe procedural requirements prescribed
by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of this kind of common place excuses, in
the face of the Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are neither credible nor
constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L-4039, 29 January 1952;
Mercado vs. Judge Domingo, L-19457, December 1966) is certainly such whimsical
exercise of judgment to be a grave abuse of discretion. (Philippine Air Lines, Inc. Arca, 19
SCRA 300.)
For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court sought to be reviewed in the present
case has already become final and executory, nay, not without the fault of the petitioners, hence, no
matter how erroneous from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is already beyond recall, I vote to
dismiss this case, without pronouncement as to costs.
TEEHANKEE, J ., concurring:
For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged
abuses of the Pasig police department, upon two days' prior notice to respondent employer company, as against the
latter's insistence that the first shift
1
should not participate but instead report for work, under pain of dismissal, the
industrial court ordered the dismissal from employment of the eight individual petitioners as union officers
and organizers of the mass demonstration.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on respondent's complaint of bargaining in bad
faith and unfair labor practice for having so carried out the mass demonstration, notwithstanding that it
concededly was not a declaration of strike nor directed in any manner against respondent employer, and
ordering the dismissal of the union office manifestly constituted grave abuse of discretion in fact and in
law.
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair labor practice since respondent firm
conceded that "the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed' by the Constitution" and
the union up to the day of the demonstration pleaded by cablegram to the company to excuse the first
shift and allow it to join the demonstration in accordance with their previous requests.
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective bargaining agreement's "no-strike" clause
as would warrant the union leaders' dismissal, since as found by respondent court itself the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike, there being no industrial dispute between the
protagonists, but merely the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to enable the workers to
exercise their constitutional rights of free expression, peaceable assembly and petition for redress of
grievance against alleged police excesses.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been
filed two days late, after expiration of the reglementary five-day period fixed by its rules, due to the
negligence of petitioners' counsel and/or the union president should likewise be set aside as a manifest
act of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief from the normal adverse consequences of
the late filing of their motion for reconsideration due to such negligence which was not acted upon by
respondent court should have been granted, considering the monstrous injustice that would otherwise
be caused the petitioners through their summary dismissal from employment, simply because they sought
in good faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by the Constitution. It should be noted
further that no proof of actual loss from the one-day stoppage of work was shown by respondent
company, providing basis to the main opinion's premise that its insistence on dismissal of the union
leaders for having included the first shift workers in the mass demonstration against its wishes was but an
act of arbitrary vindictiveness.
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual petitioners and the constitutional injunction
to afford protection to labor be given true substance and meaning. No person may be deprived of such
basic rights without due process which is but "responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience
to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided ... Due process
is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness."
2

Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the respondent court and concur in the
judgment for petitioners as set forth in the main opinion.
Footnotes
1 L-7428, May 24, 1955.
2 American Com. vs. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 421.
3 Justice Cardoso, Nature of Judicial Process, 90-93; Tanada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 1952 ed.,
71.
4 West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638, Emphasis supplied.
5 Laski, The State in Theory and Practice, 35-36.
6 See Chafee on Freedom of Speech and Press, 1955, pp. 13-14.
7 Justice Douglas, A Living Bill of Rights (1961), p. 64, cited by Justice Castro in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24
SCRA, 663, 692.
8 March vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509; Tucker vs. Texas, 326 U.S. 517, 519-520.
9 NACCP vs. Button (Jan. 14, 1963), 371 U.S. 415, 433, 9 L. Ed. 2nd 405, 418.
10 Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1.
11 Thomas vs. Collins (1945), 323 U.S., 516, 530, cited by Mr. Justice Castro in his concurring opinion in Gonzales vs.
Comelec, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 895.
12 Edu vs. Ericta, L-32096, Oct. 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 489; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1165-66, 1175.
13 L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835; L-32432, Sept. 11, 1970, 35 SCRA 28; Ignacio vs. Ela (1965), 99 Phil. 346;
Primicias vs. Fugoso (1948), 80 Phil. 71; Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1; Virginia State Board of Education vs.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639; 87 Law. Ed. 1628, 1638.
14 March 9, 1964, 376 U.S. 254, 270; Greenbelt, etc. vs. Bresler (May 18, 1970), 398 U.S. 6, 20; see also Justice
Fernando, Bill of Rights, 1970 Ed., pp. 78-81, 96-113.
15 Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra.
16 Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra.
17 Dennis vs. U.S. (1951), 341 U.S. 494.
18 March vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501; Tucker vs. Texas, 326 U.S. 517.
19 Pickering vs. Board of Education 391 U.S. 563, 574, (1968).
20 Security Bank Employees Union-NATU vs. Security Bank and Trust Co., April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 503, 515; Caltex
vs. Lucero, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1196, 1198-99; Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO vs. ESSO July 30, 1965, 14
SCRA 801,806, 807, De Leon vs. National Labor Union, 100 Phil., 792; PAFLU vs. Barot, 99 Phil. 1008 Continental
Manufacturing Employees Assoc., et. al. vs. C.I.R., et al., L-26849, Sept. 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 204.
21 Sotto vs. Ruiz, 41 Phil. 468; Shuttleworth vs. Birmingham (1969), 394 U.S. 147; Largent vs. Texas, 318 U.S. (1943)
418; Jamison vs. Texas, (1943) 318 U.S. 413; Lovell vs. Griffin (1938) 303 U.S. 444; Grosjean vs. American Press Co.
(1936) 297 U.S. 233; Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil., 393; Justice Fernando, Bill of Rights, 1970 Ed., pp. 90-93.
22 Pickering vs. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574, 20 L. Ed. 2nd, 811, 820.
23 Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R. et. al., Sept. 27, 1967, 21 SCRA 226, 232, 233, 661, 662, 663-664, 211 21 SCRA
233.
25 Justice Sanchez in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 692, Aug. 19, 1968; see also concurring opinion of
Justice Castro; Camasura vs. Provost Marshall, 78 Phil. 131.
26 Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525, 1949.
27 Fay vs. Noia 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
28 West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, supra.
28-a Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. W.C.C. L-25665, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285-298.
29 Sec. 20, Com. Act No. 103, as amended.
29a Elizalde & Co., Inc. vs. C.I.R., et. al., September 23, 1968, 25 SCRA 58, 61-63; Bien vs. Castillo, 97 Phil. 956;
Pangasinan Employees, etc. vs. Martinez, May 20, 1960, 108 Phil. 89, Local 7, etc. vs. Tabigne, Nov. 29, 1960, 110
Phil. 276; Luzon Stevedoring vs. C.I.R., July 26, 1963, 8 SCRA, 447; Manila Metal, etc. vs. C.I.R., July 31, 1963, 8
SCRA 552.
30 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 82; Mercado vs. Go Bio, 48 O.G. 5360.
30-a See Workmen's Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Augusto, L-31060, July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 123, 127.
30-b Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, L-11621, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 304, 312, 312; Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275.
30-c L-30570, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 890, 933-34.
30-d 28 SCRA 933-934.
30-e L-28714, June 13, 1970, 33 SCRA 887, 907-908.
30-f L-27807, Aug. 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 738, 742-3.
30-g 34 SCRA 742-743.
31 A Living Bill of Rights (1961), pp. 61, 62, 64; 24 SCRA, 690-692; Emphasis supplied.
32 21 SCRA 226-241. Sept. 27, 1967.
33 21 SCRA 232-237.
BARREDO, dissenting:
1 25 SCRA 58.
2 86 Phil. 525.
3 Daquis vs. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913, reiterated in Maramba vs. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474. See also Vicente vs. Lucas, 95
Phil. 716.
4 97 Phil. 806, at p. 816.
5 73 Phil. 408.
6 Under which this case was filed.
7 Mauricio vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil. 1159, cited by Moran in Vol. 11, p. 246 (1970 ed.).
8 Garchitorena vs. Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25.
9 Amuran vs. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29; Javier vs. Parades, 52 Phil. 910; Domingo vs. David, 68 Phil. 134.
10 Quion v. Claridad, 74 Phil. 100.
TEEHANKEE, concurring:
1 The first shift comprised the workers from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. Respondent company had no objection to the two regular
shifts workers (7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.) being excused from work for the mass demonstration.
2 Ermita-Malate Hotel Operators Ass'n. vs. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849(1967), per Fernando, J.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006
BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP),
GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar,
Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO
ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO,
NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief Gen.
PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 169848 April 25, 2006
Jess Del Prado, Wilson Fortaleza, Leody de Guzman, Pedro Pinlac, Carmelita Morante,
Rasti Delizo, Paul Bangay, Marie Jo Ocampo, Lilia dela Cruz, Cristeta Ramos, Adelaida
Ramos, Mary Grace Gonzales, Michael Torres, Rendo Sabusap, Precious Balute, Roxanne
Magboo, Ernie Bautista, Joseph de Jesus, Margarita Escober, Djoannalyn Janier,
Magdalena Sellote, Manny Quiazon, Ericson Dizon, Nenita Cruzat, Leonardo De los Reyes,
Pedrito Fadrigon, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary and in his
personal capacity, ANGELO REYES, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior
and Local Governments, ARTURO LOMIBAO, in his official capacity as the Chief,
Philippine National Police, VIDAL QUEROL, in his official capacity as the Chief, National
Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO), PEDRO BULAONG, in his official capacity as
the Chief, Manila Police District (MPD) AND ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS
GARCIA, and AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL,
SUPERVISION AND INSTRUCTIONS, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 169881 April 25, 2006
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG and
Secretary General JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR
UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National
President, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T.
CARRANZA, GILDA SUMILANG, FRANCISCO LASTRELLA, and ROQUE M. TAN,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP DIRECTOR GENRAL ARTURO
LOMIBAO, HONORABLE MAYOR LITO ATIENZA, and PNP MPD CHIEF SUPT.
PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J .:
Petitioners come in three groups.
The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838,
1
allege that they are citizens and
taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated
when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen
implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in G.R. No.
169848,
2
who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action
they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They
further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacaang to
protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country under an "undeclared" martial
rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and
suffered injuries.
The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No. 169881,
3
allege
that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their
individual members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas
Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to
implement it.
KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at
the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly
dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October
6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along
Espaa Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge.
Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further.
They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.
4
Three other rallyists were
arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4,
5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of
rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced.
B.P. No. 880, "The Public Assembly Act of 1985," provides:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880
An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right Peaceably To Assemble And
Petition The Government [And] For Other Purposes
Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and
stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without
prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.
Sec. 3. Definition of terms. For purposes of this Act:
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any
other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of
presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular
issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or
social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for
religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the
declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in
strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the
Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang
227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or
other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where
the people are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police
and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same.
(d) "Modification of a permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public
assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound
system and similar changes.
Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required. A written permit shall be required for any
person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit
shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established
by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the
one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and
operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said
educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as
provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
Sec. 5. Application requirements. All applications for a permit shall comply with the following
guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and
place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons
participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of the applicant under
Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality
in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days
before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the
office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals
or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two
(2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall
be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the
applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been
filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within
twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court
of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court,
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate
court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours
after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A
decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall
be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24)
hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the
executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
Sec. 7. Use of Public throroughfare. Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for
an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the
mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate
the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another
direction so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce
and trade.
Sec. 8. Responsibility of applicant. It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and
organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the
intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the
permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;|avvphi|.net
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from
disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that
the public assembly may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in
the permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act
unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public
assembly.
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement agencies shall not
interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a
law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed
and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to
maintain peace and order at all times.
Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies,
when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always
mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right
peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law
enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be
in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed
prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of
"maximum tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms
but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas
masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be
used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of
violence, or deliberate destruction of property.
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. No public assembly with a permit shall be
dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public
assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter
to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the
participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing
damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be
dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph
should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a
reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public
assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any
provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended;
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public
assembly shall not constitute a ground for dispersal.
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. When the public assembly is held
without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully
dispersed.
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall constitute violations of the Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer
without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office
concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set
out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally
liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the
provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf;
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the
application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or
any person to disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area
of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox,
bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly
by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
Sec. 14. Penalties. Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined
in the immediately preceding section shall be punished as follows:
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and
one day to six months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be
punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six
months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential
Decree No. 1866;
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
imprisonment of one day to thirty days.
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months
after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall
in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the
poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any
prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the
freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.
Sec. 16. Constitutionality. Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected
thereby.
Sec. 17. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders,
ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
Sec. 18. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, October 22, 1985.
CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacaang dated September
21, 2005, shown in Annex "A" to the Petition in G.R. No. 169848, thus:
Malacaang Official
Manila, Philippines NEWS
Release No. 2 September 21, 2005
STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
On Unlawful Mass Actions
In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame
the political situation, sow disorder and incite people against the duly constituted authorities, we
have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a "no permit, no
rally" policy, disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the
laws of the land as well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations.
The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The
authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass
of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind
of the national community.
Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to
be protected by a vigilant and proactive government.
We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting
of a democratic society.
The Presidents call for unity and reconciliation stands, based on the rule of law.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
5

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless
of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and
is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly
form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-
neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful
cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused
by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to
assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based
legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it
puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies
without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are
not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two
standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are
inconsistent.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of
maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack
of publication.
Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to
assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And
even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are
unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a
clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a
permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the
issue would possibly wane.
As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even
before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports
the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and
violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169838 are Eduardo Ermita, as Executive Secretary, Manila City
Mayor Lito Atienza, Chief, of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Gen. Arturo Lomibao,
National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) Chief, PNP Maj. Gen. Vidal Querol, and
Manila Police District (MPD) Chief Gen. Pedro Bulaong.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169848 are Eduardo Ermita as Executive Secretary and in his
personal capacity; Angelo Reyes, as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments; Arturo
Lomibao, as Chief Vidal Querol, as Chief, NCRPO; Pedro Bulaong, as Chief, MPD, and all
other public officers and private individuals acting under their control, supervision and
instruction.
Respondents in G.R. No. 169881 are the Honorable Executive Secretary, PNP Director
General Arturo Lomibao, the Honorable Mayor Joselito Atienza, and PNP MPD Chief Pedro
Bulaong.
Respondents argue that:
1. Petitioners have no standing because they have not presented evidence that they had
been "injured, arrested or detained because of the CPR," and that "those arrested stand to
be charged with violating Batas Pambansa [No.] 880 and other offenses."
2. Neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on its face. Petitioners cannot honestly claim
that the time, place and manner regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the three-
pronged test for such a measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral, i.e., it has no
reference to content of regulated speech; (b) B.P. No. 880 is narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, i.e., the interest cannot be equally well served by a
means that is less intrusive of free speech interests; and (c) B.P. No. 880 leaves open
alternative channels for communication of the information.
6

3. B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law. Section 5 requires the
statement of the public assemblys time, place and manner of conduct. It entails traffic re-
routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the
free flow of commerce and trade. Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes the
denial of a permit on the basis of a rallys program content or the statements of the
speakers therein, except under the constitutional precept of the "clear and present danger
test." The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-neutral regulation has been recognized in
Osmea v. Comelec.
7

4. Adiong v. Comelec
8
held that B.P. No. 880 is a content-neutral regulation of the time,
place and manner of holding public assemblies and the law passes the test for such
regulation, namely, these regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to
support them.
5. Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court
9
held that a local chief executive has the
authority to exercise police power to meet "the demands of the common good in terms of
traffic decongestion and public convenience." Furthermore, the discretion given to the
mayor is narrowly circumscribed by Sections 5 (d), and 6 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), 13 and 15
of the law.
6. The standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent. "Clear and convincing evidence
that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public
safety, public convenience, public morals or public health" and "imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil" both express the meaning of the "clear and present danger
test."
10

7. CPR is simply the responsible and judicious use of means allowed by existing laws and
ordinances to protect public interest and restore public order. Thus, it is not accurate to
call it a new rule but rather it is a more pro-active and dynamic enforcement of existing
laws, regulations and ordinances to prevent chaos in the streets. It does not replace the
rule of maximum tolerance in B.P. No. 880.
Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza, for his part, submitted in his Comment that the petition in
G.R. No. 169838 should be dismissed on the ground that Republic Act No. 7160 gives the Mayor
power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880; that his denials of permits were under the
"clear and present danger" rule as there was a clamor to stop rallies that disrupt the economy and
to protect the lives of other people; that J. B. L. Reyes v. Bagatsing,
11
Primicias v. Fugoso,
12
and
Jacinto v. CA,
13
have affirmed the constitutionality of requiring a permit; that the permit is for
the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-
based regulation because it covers all rallies.
The petitions were ordered consolidated on February 14, 2006. After the submission of all the
Comments, the Court set the cases for oral arguments on April 4, 2006,
14
stating the principal
issues, as follows:
1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12
13(a) and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160:
(a) Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations?
(b) Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness?
(c) Do they constitute prior restraint?
(d) Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors?
(e) Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?
2. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response
(CPR):
(a) Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness?
(b) Is it void for lack of publication?
(c) Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and
October 4, 5 and 6, 2005?
During the course of the oral arguments, the following developments took place and were
approved and/or noted by the Court:
1. Petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions
of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P.
No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6,
2005.
2. The Solicitor General agreed with the observation of the Chief Justice that CPR should
no longer be used as a legal term inasmuch as, according to respondents, it was merely a
"catchword" intended to clarify what was thought to be a misunderstanding of the
maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880 and that, as stated in the affidavit
executed by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and submitted to the Ombudsman, it
does not replace B.P. No. 880 and the maximum tolerance policy embodied in that law.
The Court will now proceed to address the principal issues, taking into account the foregoing
developments.
Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful
assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected
by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nations
streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the
required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating
the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as
contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.
Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys
primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a
functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA,
15
the Court, as early as the onset of this century, in U.S.
v. Apurado,
16
already upheld the right to assembly and petition, as follows:
There is no question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government
for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not
contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed
by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5)
of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed
pronouncements defending and promoting the peoples exercise of these rights. As early as the
onset of this century, this Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and
petition and even went as far as to acknowledge:
"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people
to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is
always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the grievance and the more intense
the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such
disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly
as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to
petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to
exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all
those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes
which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If
instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought
out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line
between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a
tumultuous uprising."
Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso,
17
the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech
and to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks.
Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In
Primicias, this Court said:
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed
by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature
of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such
and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is the power to
prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government
through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional
and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities
and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact
ordinances for the purpose.
18

Reyes v. Bagatsing
19
further expounded on the right and its limits, as follows:
1. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights
to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The
Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government
for redress of grievances." Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the libert y
to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or
punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages,
or contempt proceedings unless there be a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that [the State] has a right to prevent." Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the
people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It
is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much
less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the
1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary
consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To
paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American
Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights
to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights
of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore,
where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon
to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for
a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic
institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable
assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It
must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the
Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to
reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert
force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the
guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of
violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument
of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution." What was
rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal or printed,
being in a context of violence. It must always be remembered that this right likewise
provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views,
even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of
communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only
alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It means more than
just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with
things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing
from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-
defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder
in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The
Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is
ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not
required. As pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United
States v. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the
public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary,
because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and
the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will
be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers." It bears
repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to
property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to ones destructive
urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by
intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.
There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start.
The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939
vintage, of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: "Whenever the title of streets and parks may
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has,
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of
citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is
not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but must not, in the
guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." The above excerpt was quoted with approval
in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of
Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically affirmed that plazas or
parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that
leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. Reference was made to such plaza "being
a promenade for public use," which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve.
To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the
proposed march and rally starting from a public park that is the Luneta.
4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US
embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has
resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the
City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo,
this Court categorically declared: "Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the
case of Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of
New Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that no parade or procession upon
any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first
be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee, was construed
by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board
unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court
of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the
judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that a statute requiring persons using the
public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the
local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of
freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of
the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the
public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are
not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *. "Nor should the
point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored:
"Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized
society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses
of unrestricted abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to
assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never
been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of
safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on
the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need.
Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the
public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted
exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to
protection."
x x x
6. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice
Hughes in these words: "The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held
but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects." There
could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by
turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty
parties should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent
Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be
granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a
realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given
all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the assembly is
scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the assembly being
held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for
the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised
in some other place."
x x x
8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform
the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable
the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the
grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the
standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter,
his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest
opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are
highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed
that on the judiciary, -- even more so than on the other departments rests the grave and
delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No
verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so
felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of judgment."
Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the
side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. x x x.
B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes.
The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes:
Reyes v. Bagatsing
(G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983,
B.P. No. 880
Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not
required.-- A written permit shall be required
125 SCRA 553, 569)
8. By way of a summary. The applicants for
a permit to hold an assembly should inform
the licensing authority of the date, the public
place where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required. Such application
should be filed well ahead in time to enable
the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the
grant of the permit or to its grant but at
another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that
the clear and present danger test be the
standard for the decision reached. If he is of
the view that there is such an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they
can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority.
for any person or persons to organize and
hold a public assembly in a public place.
However, no permit shall be required if the
public assembly shall be done or made in a
freedom park duly established by law or
ordinance or in private property, in which
case only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required, or
in the campus of a government-owned and
operated educational institution which shall
be subject to the rules and regulations of said
educational institution. Political meetings or
rallies held during any election campaign
period as provided for by law are not covered
by this Act.
Sec. 5. Application requirements.-- All
applications for a permit shall comply with
the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in
writing and shall include the names
of the leaders or organizers; the
purpose of such public assembly; the
date, time and duration thereof, and
place or streets to be used for the
intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the
transport and the public address
systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate
the duty and responsibility of
applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with
the office of the mayor of the city or
municipality in whose jurisdiction the
intended activity is to be held, at least
five (5) working days before the
scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application,
which must be duly acknowledged in
writing, the office of the city or
municipal mayor shall cause the same
to immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or
municipal building.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application.

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or
any official acting in his behalf to
issue or grant a permit unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that
the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public
health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting
in his behalf shall act on the
application within two (2) working
days from the date the application
was filed, failing which, the permit
shall be deemed granted. Should for
any reason the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf refuse to accept
the application for a permit, said
application shall be posted by the
applicant on the premises of the
office of the mayor and shall be
deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that
there is imminent and grave danger of
a substantive evil warranting the
denial or modification of the permit,
he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the
matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be
in writing and served on the
applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting
in his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his
permit, the applicant may contest the
decision in an appropriate court of
law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, the
Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the Regional
Trial Court, or the Intermediate
Appellate Court, its decisions may be
appealed to the appropriate court
within forty-eight (48) hours after
receipt of the same. No appeal bond
and record on appeal shall be
required. A decision granting such
permit or modifying it in terms
satisfactory to the applicant shall be
immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this
section shall be decided within
twenty-four (24) hours from date of
filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be
immediately endorsed to the
executive judge for disposition or, in
his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed
by formal appeals are hereby
allowed.
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted
to in Osmea v. Comelec,
20
where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the
time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.
21

A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of
public assemblies
22
that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make
it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not
be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and
"influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any
subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the
rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, thus:
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 20
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
x x x
Article 29
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of
his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 19.
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but
these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of
public health or morals.
Contrary to petitioners claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions.
"Public" does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Websters Dictionary
defines it, thus:
23

public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of people x x x 3: a group of people distinguished by
common interests or characteristics x x x.
Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to "rally, demonstration,
march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place."
So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and
petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils
Congress has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard
the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to "imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent
standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic
Act No. 7160
24
is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the
parties in their arguments.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum
through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and
petition at any time:
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months
after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall
in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the
poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any
prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the
freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.
This brings up the point, however, of compliance with this provision.
The Solicitor General stated during the oral arguments that, to his knowledge, only Cebu City
has declared a freedom park Fuente Osmea.
That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since been converted into a golf course, he added.
If this is so, the degree of observance of B.P. No. 880s mandate that every city and municipality
set aside a freedom park within six months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, would be
pathetic and regrettable. The matter appears to have been taken for granted amidst the swell of
freedom that rose from the peaceful revolution of 1986.
Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential part of the laws system of
regulation of the peoples exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is
constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no prior permit
may be required for the exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a city or
municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the law. For
without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right. Advance
notices should, however, be given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly
proceedings.
The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the Solicitor General has
conceded that the use of the term should now be discontinued, since it does not mean anything
other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit
of respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, submitted by the Solicitor General, thus:
14. The truth of the matter is the policy of "calibrated preemptive response" is in consonance
with the legal definition of "maximum tolerance" under Section 3 (c) of B.P. Blg. 880, which is
the "highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peacekeeping authorities shall
observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same." Unfortunately, however, the
phrase "maximum tolerance" has acquired a different meaning over the years. Many have taken
it to mean inaction on the part of law enforcers even in the face of mayhem and serious threats to
public order. More so, other felt that they need not bother secure a permit when holding rallies
thinking this would be "tolerated." Clearly, the popular connotation of "maximum tolerance" has
departed from its real essence under B.P. Blg. 880.
15. It should be emphasized that the policy of maximum tolerance is provided under the same
law which requires all pubic assemblies to have a permit, which allows the dispersal of rallies
without a permit, and which recognizes certain instances when water cannons may be used. This
could only mean that "maximum tolerance" is not in conflict with a "no permit, no rally policy"
or with the dispersal and use of water cannons under certain circumstances for indeed, the
maximum amount of tolerance required is dependent on how peaceful or unruly a mass action is.
Our law enforcers should calibrate their response based on the circumstances on the ground with
the view to preempting the outbreak of violence.
16. Thus, when I stated that calibrated preemptive response is being enforced in lieu of
maximum tolerance I clearly was not referring to its legal definition but to the distorted and
much abused definition that it has now acquired. I only wanted to disabuse the minds of the
public from the notion that law enforcers would shirk their responsibility of keeping the peace
even when confronted with dangerously threatening behavior. I wanted to send a message that
we would no longer be lax in enforcing the law but would henceforth follow it to the letter. Thus
I said, "we have instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a no
permit, no rally policy . . . arrest all persons violating the laws of the land . . . unlawful mass
actions will be dispersed." None of these is at loggerheads with the letter and spirit of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 880. It is thus absurd for complainants to even claim that I ordered my co-
respondents to violate any law.
25

At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880,
CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it
means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the
law itself, namely, maximum tolerance, which specifically means the following:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms. For purposes of this Act:
x x x
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other
peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
x x x
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement agencies shall not
interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a
law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed
and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to
maintain peace and order at all times.
Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies,
when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always
mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right
peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial.1avvphil.net Towards this
end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be
in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed
prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of
"maximum tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms
but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas
masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be
used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of
violence, or deliberate destruction of property.
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. No public assembly with a permit shall be
dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public
assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter
to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the
participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing
damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be
dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph
should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a
reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public
assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any
provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended;
(d) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public
assembly shall not constitute a ground for dispersal.
x x x
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. When the public assembly is held
without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully
dispersed.
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall constitute violations of the Act:
(e) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly;
(f) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any
person to disperse the public assembly;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of
activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
x x x
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a
motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do
not act on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could
not produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary
consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application
duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their
application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under
the law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the
application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of
maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.
In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people,
especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to
nurture their prosperity. He said that "in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should
weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized,
the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to
the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected
to heightened scrutiny."
26

For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal
firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our
people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880
cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it
merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far
from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government.
The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to
the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local
governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided
under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with
Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in
effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an
assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayors
office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for
the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment
or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the
country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance
notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition
in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15
of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport
to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are
ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of
maximum tolerance. The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
(On Leave)
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Asscociate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-
SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-
GUTIERREZ
Asscociate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Asscociate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Asscociate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Asscociate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Asscociate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order filed by Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid Ng Pilipinas (KMP),
COURAGE, GABRIELA, Fr. Jose A. Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza,
and Fahima Tajar.
2
Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, Restraining Order and other Just and Equitable
Reliefs filed by Jess Del Prado, Wilson Fortaleza, Leody de Guzman, Pedro Pinlac,
Carmelita Morante, Rasti Delizo, Paul Bangay, Marie Jo Ocampo, Lilia dela Cruz,
Cristeta Ramos, Adelaida Ramos, Mary Grace Gonzales, Michael Torres, Rendo
Sabusap, Precious Balute, Roxanne Magboo, Ernie Bautista, Joseph de Jesus, Margarita
Escober, Djoannalyn Janier, Magdalena Sellote, Manny Quiazon, Ericson Dizon, Nenita
Cruzat, Leonardo De los Reyes, Pedrito Fadrigon.
3
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of
Restraining Order filed by Kilusang Mayo Uno, represented by its Chairperson Elmer C.
Labog and Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, National Federation of Labor Unions
Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President, Joselito V.
Ustarez, Antonio C. Pascual, Salvador T. Carranza, Gilda Sumilang, Francisco Lastrella,
and Roque M. Tan.
4
Petitioner Gilda Sumilang.
5
Petition, G.R. No. 169838, p. 29.
6
Citing Adiong v. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 712 (1992); United States v.
OBrien, 391 U.S. 367, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1968); see R.D. Rotunda, et al., TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE (1986) citing Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed. 2d 221
(1984).
7
G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998, 288 SCRA 447.
8
G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712.
9
G.R. No. 71169, August 25, 1989, 176 SCRA 719.
10
Citing Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, 259
SCRA 529.
11
G. R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553.
12
80 Phil. 71 (1948).
13
G.R. No. 124540, November 14, 1997.
14
Resolution dated March 28, 2006.
15
346 Phil. 665-666 (1997).
16
7 Phil. 422 (1907).
17
80 Phil. 71 (1948).
18
Ibid at 75-76 (Emphasis supplied).
19
G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553.
20
G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998, 288 SCRA 447.
21
Ibid, p. 478.
22
Except picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees
resulting from a labor dispute, which are governed by the Labor Code and other labor
laws; political meeting or rallies held during any election campaign period, which are
governed by the Election Code and other election related laws; and public assemblies in
the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution, which shall be
subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. (Sec. 3[a] and Sec. 4 of
B.P. No. 880).
23
WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (1993 Ed)., p. 1836.
24
The Local Government Code. Specifically, Section 16 stating the general welfare
clause, thus:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity
and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace
and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
25
Respondents Consolidated Memorandum, pp. 30-31 (Emphasis supplied by
respondents).
26
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, Liberty and Prosperity, February 15, 2006.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175241 February 24, 2010
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its National President, Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines
1
(IBP) and lawyers H. Harry L. Roque and Joel R.
Butuyan appeal the June 28, 2006 Decision
2
and the October 26, 2006 Resolution
3
of the Court
of Appeals that found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Jose "Lito" Atienza,
the then mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the one applied for
by the IBP.
On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz),
filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application
4
for a permit to rally at the
foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by
IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
Respondent issued a permit
5
dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date
but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the
IBP received on June 19, 2006.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94949.
6
The petition having been unresolved within 24 hours from
its filing, petitioners filed before this Court on June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari docketed as
G.R. No. 172951 which assailed the appellate courts inaction or refusal to resolve the petition
within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
7

The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006, August 30, 2006 and November 20, 2006,
respectively, denied the petition for being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition
be heard on the merits in view of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, and denied the motion
for reconsideration.
The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with
P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier
barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily
dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program.
The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action,
8
docketed as I.S. No. 06I-
12501, against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not
indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadiz filed a Counter-Affidavit of August 3, 2006.
In the meantime, the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, by the first assailed
issuance, that the petition became moot and lacked merit. The appellate court also denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration by the second assailed issuance.
Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari, to which respondent filed his
Comment of November 18, 2008 which merited petitioners Reply of October 2, 2009.
The main issue is whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue
in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners assert that the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act
and violates their constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly.
The Court shall first resolve the preliminary issue of mootness.
Undoubtedly, the petition filed with the appellate court on June 21, 2006 became moot upon the
passing of the date of the rally on June 22, 2006.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
However, even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar and public. Moreover, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will
decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.
9

In the present case, the question of the legality of a modification of a permit to rally will arise
each time the terms of an intended rally are altered by the concerned official, yet it evades
review, owing to the limited time in processing the application where the shortest allowable
period is five days prior to the assembly. The susceptibility of recurrence compels the Court to
definitively resolve the issue at hand.
Respecting petitioners argument that the issues presented in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 pose a
prejudicial question to the criminal case against Cadiz, the Court finds it improper to resolve the
same in the present case.
Under the Rules,
10
the existence of a prejudicial question is a ground in a petition to suspend
proceedings in a criminal action. Since suspension of the proceedings in the criminal action may
be made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge or the investigating prosecutor,
11

the latter cannot take cognizance of a claim of prejudicial question without a petition to suspend
being filed. Since a petition to suspend can be filed only in the criminal action,
12
the
determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the
criminal action, and not before this Court in an appeal from the civil action.
In proceeding to resolve the petition on the merits, the appellate court found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent because the Public Assembly Act does not categorically
require respondent to specify in writing the imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
which warrants the denial or modification of the permit and merely mandates that the action
taken shall be in writing and shall be served on respondent within 24 hours. The appellate court
went on to hold that respondent is authorized to regulate the exercise of the freedom of
expression and of public assembly which are not absolute, and that the challenged permit is
consistent with Plaza Mirandas designation as a freedom park where protest rallies are allowed
without permit.
The Court finds for petitioners.
Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals
or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two
(2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall
be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the
applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been
filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application [sic] within
twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court
of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court,
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate
Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours
after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A
decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall,
be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24)
hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the
executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
(underscoring supplied)
In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita,
13
the Court
reiterated:
x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation
and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference
and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with
freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has
a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress
that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of
free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the
American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the
rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of
the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All
these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a
limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects
of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the
exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the
danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
14
(emphasis supplied)
The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of 1985 practically
codified the 1983 ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing.
15
In juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the Public
Assembly Act with the pertinent portion of the Reyes case, the Court elucidated as follows:
x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be valid objections to the
grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to
such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have
recourse to the proper judicial authority.
16
(italics and underscoring supplied)
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The
opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to
court after an unfavorable action on the permit.1avvphi1
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the
standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition
to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the
appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in
determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion.
While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of
what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially
so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the
assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts,
speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may
be exercised in some other place."
17
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his action. It
smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for an assembly
that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not to
have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory
provision, not to have modified the permit "in terms satisfactory to the applicant."
18

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
94949 are REVERSED. The Court DECLARES that respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in modifying the rally permit issued on June 16, 2006 insofar as it altered the venue
from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Represented by its National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz.
2
Penned by Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal with Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos and
Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta concurring; rollo, pp. 50-54.
3
Penned by Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal with Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and
Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta concurring; id. at 56.
4
Id. at 62-63.
5
Id. at 64. It was signed by Business Promotion and Development Office Director Gerino
Tolentino, Jr. by authority of the Mayor.
6
Id. at 65-74.
7
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 (October 22, 1985), Sec. 6(g).
8
Rollo, pp. 81-82. The Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Manila City Prosecutors
Office was signed by Police Superintendents Teodorico Perez, Danilo Estapon and Jose
Asayo.
9
Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.
10
Rules of Court, Rule 111, Secs. 6-7.
11
Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. v. Lichauco, G.R. 134887, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA
588, 598; Yap v. Paras, G.R. No. 101236, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 625, 629.
12
Vide Yap v. Paras, id. at 630, holding that it is the issue in the civil action that is
prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal action, not the criminal action that is
prejudicial to the civil action.
13
G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA 226.
14
Id. at 251.
15
Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553.
16
Supra note 13 at 256.
17
Id. at 254-255.
18
Vide supra note 7 at Sec. 6(f).

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880
AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT
PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."
Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and
stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without
prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.
Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any
other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of
presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular
issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or
social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for
religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the
declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in
strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the
Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang
227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or
other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where
the people are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police
and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the
dispersal of the same.
(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public
assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound
system and similar changes.
Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be required for
any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no
permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-
owned and operated educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of
said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election campaign
period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.
Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with the
following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and
place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons
participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under
Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality
in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days
before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the
office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals
or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two
(2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall
be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the
applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been
filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within
twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court
of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court,
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate
Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours
after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A
decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall,
be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24)
hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the
executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for
an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the
mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate
the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another
direction so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce
and trade.
Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and
organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the
intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the
permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from
disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that
the public assembly may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in
the permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act
unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public
assembly.
Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall
not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety,
a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed
and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meter away from the area of activity ready to
maintain peace and order at all times.
Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law enforcement
agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties
always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their
right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law
enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be
in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed
prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of
"maximum tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms
but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas
masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be
used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of
violence, or deliberate destruction of property.
Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a permit shall be
dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public
assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter
to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the
participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing
damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be
dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph
should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a
reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public
assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any
provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended:
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or branch of the peace during the public
assembly shall not constitute a group for dispersal.
Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is held
without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully
dispersed.
Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer
without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office
concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set
out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally
liable for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the
provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf.
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the
application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or
any person to disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area
of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof;
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox,
bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly
by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts
defined in the immediately preceding Section shall be punished as follows:
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and
one day to six months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be
punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six
months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential
Decree No. 1866;
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
imprisonment of one day to thirty days.
Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months
after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall
in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the
poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any
prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the
freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected
thereby.
Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders,
ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, October 22, 1985.