Got Political Skill?

The Impact of Justice on the Importance of Political

Skill for Job Performance
Martha C. Andrews
University of North Carolina Wilmington
K. Michele Kacmar
University of Alabama
Kenneth J. Harris
Indiana University Southeast
The present study examined the moderating effects of procedural and distributive justice on the
relationships between political skill and task performance and organizational citizenship behavior (OCB)
among 175 supervisorsubordinate dyads of a government organization. Using Mischels (1968) situ-
ationist perspective, high justice conditions were considered strong situations, whereas low justice
conditions were construed as weak situations. We found that when both procedural and distributive
justice were low, political skill was positively related to performance. Under conditions of both high
procedural and high distributive justice, political skill was negatively related to performance. Finally,
under conditions of low distributive justice, political skill was positively related to OCB, whereas under
conditions of high distributive justice, political skill had little effect on OCB. These results highlight the
importance of possessing political skill in weak but not strong situations.
Keywords: justice, political skill, performance, OCB
Organizational politics has been the subject of considerable
research over the past two decades. Organizational politics consists
of informal actions or behaviors not authorized by the organization
that are performed with the intention of promoting an individuals
goals (Aryee, Chen, & Budhwar, 2004). Research in this area has
focused primarily on individual reactions to perceptions of politics
(e.g., Gilmore, Ferris, Dulebohn, & Harrell-Cook, 1996; Randall,
Cropanzano, Bormann, & Birjulin, 1999), followed by a number of
studies suggesting ways to reduce negative reactions to these
perceptions (e.g., Byrne, 2005; Byrne, Kacmar, Stoner, &
Hochwarter, 2005; Harris & Kacmar, 2005; Hochwarter, Perrewe,
Ferris, & Guercio, 1999; Witt, Andrews, & Kacmar, 2000). Re-
cently, however, there has been a shift toward examining the
usefulness of politics and personal characteristics that help indi-
viduals succeed in political environments. One of the most fruitful
concepts in this research stream is political skill.
Political skill refers to the ability to effectively understand
others at work, and to use such knowledge to influence others to
act in ways that enhance ones personal and/or organizational
objectives (Ferris, Treadway, et al., 2005, p. 127). This research
stream has been fed in large part by the development and valida-
tion of the political skill construct and political skill inventory
(Ferris, Treadway, et al., 2005). The political skill inventory has
allowed researchers to explore both antecedents and outcomes of
being politically skilled in organizations.
An early framework advanced by Ferris and Judge (1991)
suggested that situational variables were a key determinant in
whether an actor could effectively enact political influence. Yet
much of the extant research has focused on individual variables,
including extraversion, proactive personality (Liu et al., 2007),
self-monitoring, and conscientiousness (Ferris, Treadway, et al.,
2005), with little research addressing the effectiveness of political
skill in different contexts (e.g., Valle & Perrewe, 2000). In a
continued effort to expand our knowledge and understanding of
political skill in organizations, Ferris et al. (2002) highlighted the
need to explore situations as one factor impacting the importance
of political skill in the workplace. Moreover, they also stated that
more precision is needed beyond antecedents and outcomes, in-
cluding moderators of political skilloutcome relationships.
Mischels (1968) situationist perspective suggests the environ-
ment serves as a stimulus that alters individuals behaviors. Ac-
cordingly, individuals adapt their behaviors to fit the situation. We
submit that the levels of procedural and distributive justice are
situational variables that may potentially influence the importance
of possessing political skill. Distributive justice reflects the level of
fairness in the workplace in terms of allocation of resources,
whereas procedural justice reflects the fairness of procedures used
to determine the allocation of resources (Colquitt, Conlon, Wes-
son, Porter, & Ng, 2001). More specifically, a high justice envi-
ronment can be viewed as a strong situation where rules dictate
actions and personality traits, such as political skill, are less vital
to succeed. This notion is consistent with Leventhals (1980)
procedural fairness rules, which include consistency and accuracy
of information. These rules are more likely to be seen in organi-
Martha C. Andrews, Department of Management, Cameron School of
Business, University of North Carolina Wilmington; K. Michele Kacmar,
Department of Management and Marketing, University of Alabama; Ken-
neth J. Harris, School of Business, Indiana University Southeast.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2008 Southern
Management Association Meetings in St. Petersburg, Florida.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to K. Michele
Kacmar, Department of Management and Marketing, University of Alabama,
Box 870225, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0225. E-mail: mkacmar@cba.ua.edu
Journal of Applied Psychology 2009 American Psychological Association
2009, Vol. 94, No. 6, 14271437 0021-9010/09/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0017154
1427
zations that are mechanistic, rigid, and hierarchical (Nowakowski
& Conlon, 2005), which could be expected to limit the effective-
ness of political skill. This type of environment weakens the
impact of individual traits and personalities so that they become
less prominent. Conversely, a low justice environment can be
viewed as a weak situation that enables those high in political
skill to flourish. This kind of environment creates uncertainty,
causing individuals with different characteristics to act in different
ways. In addition to the situationist perspective, uncertainty man-
agement theory (Lind & van den Bos, 2002) can help to explain
and predict how individuals with varying levels of political skill
will behave in uncertain environments. According to uncertainty
management theory, individuals pay close attention to fairness
when there is uncertainty about procedural and distributive issues
(van den Bos, 2001). When rules for actions are limited, individ-
uals with high political skill recognize what actions are appropriate
and rewarded and skillfully enact them. In addition, a weak situ-
ation may be especially harmful to those low in political skill, as
this is the type of environment in which political skill is needed in
order to be effective.
Following a situationist perspective, we believe a lack of polit-
ical skill in organizations may be particularly problematic for
individuals who work in what is perceived to be an unfair work
environment (i.e., weak situation). In environments that have few
rules, political skill can be used to influence procedures and create
desired outcomes. However, in fair environments (i.e., strong
situations), where rules and regulations exist and are followed and
outcomes are consistent and predictable, political skill is less
critical to successful performance.
We began our study with two goals in mind. These goals or
research questions came as a result of Ferris et al.s (2002) call to
explore moderators of the political skilloutcomes relationships
and investigate how situations influence these associations. First,
is political skill equally effective under conditions of both high and
low procedural and distributive justice? Second, under what con-
ditions is a lack of political skill harmful to performance and
organizational citizenship behavior (OCB)?
The Situationist Perspective
Mischels (1968) situationist perspective suggests that individ-
uals modify their behavior in response to environmental stimuli.
Thus, individuals do not behave stably and independent of the
environment; rather, they are adaptive and responsive to the situ-
ation (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989). Mischel, among others, sug-
gested that individual responses would be somewhat strong in
weaker situations and rather weak in strong situations (e.g., Bem &
Funder, 1978; Monson, Hesley, & Chernick, 1982). Further, indi-
vidual traits or personality characteristics may be more prominent
in weak situations and less prominent in strong situations. Davis-
Blake and Pfeffer (1989) proposed that organizations can be
viewed as strong situations to the extent that three conditions exist.
First, there must be a common understanding about appropriate
behaviors, such that individuals behave according to prescribed
roles. Second, attitudes and behaviors must be able to be influ-
enced by the structure and processes of the organization, including
compensation and reinforcement patterns. Finally, organizational
culture must be able to have a powerful effect on behavior through
stories and rituals. Thus, formal policies, processes, and outcomes
that are fair represent a high justice organization and can be
construed as a strong situation. Conversely, an absence of fair
policies, processes, and outcomes can be construed as a weak
situation.
Organizational Justice
Organizational justice refers to the level of perceived fairness in
the organization. Two of the most predominantly studied forms of
justice are procedural and distributive justice (Colquitt et al.,
2001). Procedural justice is the perceived fairness of the policies
and procedures used to make decisions. Distributive justice is the
perceived fairness of the distribution of outcomes resulting from
those procedures (Greenberg, 1990). Although empirical evidence
confirms the distinctiveness between procedural and distributive
justice (Colquitt et al., 2001), both have been shown to predict
similar favorable outcomes. Positive outcomes for the organization
include higher task performance, OCB, and commitment, and
lower turnover and counterproductive work behaviors (Cohen-
Charash & Spector, 2001). Positive outcomes for individuals in-
clude increased job satisfaction, pay satisfaction, and supervisor
satisfaction (Colquitt et al., 2001).
Not only has justice served as a strong predictor of important
outcomes, more recent research has examined the role of justice as
a moderator in several predictoroutcome relationships (e.g.,
Choi, 2008; Harris, Andrews, & Kacmar, 2007; Wallace, Edwards,
Mondore, & Finch, 2008). For example, Choi (2008) found that
individuals global assessments of fairness of the organization
moderated the relationship between perceived fairness of a partic-
ular event and OCB, such that this relationship was enhanced when
the overall organization was considered to be just.
Political Skill
The notion of political skill was mentioned early on by Mint-
zberg (1983) and Pfeffer (1981). Both viewed organizations as
political arenas; as such, they consisted of individuals exercising
influence. In the past three decades, researchers have emphasized
the important role of political skill and similar constructs (e.g.,
emotional intelligence, political savvy, and social intelligence) in
enhancing individual success (Goleman, 1995; Luthans, Hodgetts,
& Rosenkrantz, 1988; Pfeffer, 1981; Semadar, Robins, & Ferris,
2006). Politically skilled individuals possess high self-awareness
and awareness of others. Thus, they are able to read others and
identify with them. Their interpersonal influence allows them to
alter their behavior with those around them to achieve their desired
goals. Their social astuteness enables them to select situationally
appropriate methods of influence (Ferris et al., 2007). Further, they
are able to develop critical alliances and coalitions as well as
successfully negotiate. These individuals are able to accomplish all
of this while portraying themselves as genuine, honest, and of high
integrity (Ferris, Davidson, & Perrewe, 2005).
Given that political skill enables individuals to effectively select
and execute appropriate tactics of influence based on the situation,
numerous positive outcomes have been found for those who pos-
sess political skill. For example, political skill has been found to be
positively related to subordinate performance (Hochwarter et al.,
2007; Liu et al., 2007; Semadar et al., 2006), career success
(Breland, Treadway, & Duke, 2007; Harvey, Harris, Harris, &
1428
ANDREWS, KACMAR, AND HARRIS
Wheeler, 2007), less emotional labor resulting from political be-
haviors (Treadway, Hochwarter, Kacmar, & Ferris, 2005), higher
managerial effectiveness (Ahearn, Ferris, Hochwarter, Douglas, &
Ammeter, 2004; Douglas & Ammeter, 2004), and the successful
use of impression management tactics (Harris, Kacmar, Zivnuska,
& Shaw, 2007; Treadway, Ferris, Duke, Adams, & Thatcher,
2007). For example, individuals high in political skill who exe-
cuted ingratiation behavior were less likely to have their behaviors
viewed as manipulative influence than those low in political skill
(Treadway et al., 2007). In addition, those high in political skill
who engaged in a variety of impression management tactics re-
ceived higher performance ratings than those low in political skill
(Harris, Kacmar, et al., 2007). Although research has demonstrated
the relationship between political skill and multiple positive out-
comes, little is known about when the environment may constrain
political skill or when a lack of political skill has a negative impact
on effective performance, which is the focus of the current study.
Present Study
A number of researchers have suggested that in addition to
intelligence and hard work, political skill is necessary to be suc-
cessful and can contribute to organizational efficiency (Ferris,
Davidson, & Perrewe, 2005; Pfeffer, 1981). It has been argued that
highly politically skilled individuals should be rated higher on
outcomes because they have the savvy and shrewdness to know
where, when, and how to get things done (Ferris et al., 2007).
Ultimately, this ability should lead to positive outcomes, such as
higher performance ratings. In work environments that are low in
organizational justice (i.e., weak situation), there is an absence of
the rules that are necessary to ensure consistency of procedures
across persons and time, which increases uncertainty. Decisions
may not be based on accurate information, which gives politically
skilled individuals the opportunity to effectively use influence so
that their performance is rated as effective (Ferris, Davidson, &
Perrewe, 2005). However, individuals who do not possess political
skill in a weak situation have little ability to influence and as a
result may be rated as less effective.
Uncertainty management theory (Lind & van den Bos, 2002)
holds that uncertainty causes anxiety and people will respond more
strongly when there are variations in justice. This theory has been
used to explain why personality variables interact with justice in
predicting performance (Colquitt, Scott, Judge, & Shaw, 2006).
For example, Colquitt et al. (2006) argued that uncertainty man-
agement underlies risk aversion and that this individual level
variable can account for much of the variation in performance as
a result of justice perceptions. They suggested that risk-averse
people would be likely to respond to injustices in ways that would
not produce anxiety. A more passive response would be likely,
such as reducing their task performance (Colquitt et al., 2006).
In the context of our research, it can be argued that those with
political skill may experience less uncertainty because, by defini-
tion, political skill provides individuals with some control (Ferris
et al., 2007). Uncertainty management theory can explain the
positive effect of political skill on performance under conditions of
low justice (i.e., weak situations). In a low justice environment
(i.e., weak environment), those with low political skill may expe-
rience high uncertainty and respond as suggested by Colquitt et al.
(2006), with reduced task performance. Those with high political
skill are better equipped to manage the uncertainty and are able to
overcome it. Thus, they can achieve higher levels of performance.
In high justice environments (i.e., strong situations), those with
low political skill are merely responding to the situation, such that
the fair policies and procedures in place ensure performance.
However, this same rigid and mechanistic structure has the effect
of constraining the behaviors of those who possess political skill.
This type of environment may have the effect of neutralizing the
political skills they rely on to be effective. Taken together, these
arguments suggest a crossover interaction formally described in
our hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: (a) Procedural and (b) distributive justice will
moderate the relationship between political skill and task
performance, such that when justice is higher (i.e., strong
situations), the relationship between political skill and per-
formance will be negative; when justice is lower (i.e., weak
situations), the relationship between political skill and per-
formance will be positive.
Another form of individual performance is OCB, which is
defined as helpful behaviors that fall beyond ones formal job
responsibilities, are not explicitly rewarded by the organization,
and promote organizational effectiveness (Organ, 1988). The pos-
itive relationship between organizational justice perceptions and
OCB is well established (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). Ex-
amples include helping coworkers with heavy workloads, staying
late, and attending functions that are not required. Because OCBs
are not formally prescribed by the organization, individuals often
initiate these behaviors at their own discretion (Podsakoff, MacK-
enzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). Politically skilled individuals are
ideally suited to performing these behaviors, as they are socially
astute, effectively read others, and have the ability to self-regulate
and adapt to the situation. Further, there are no rules or policies in
place regarding OCBs, which gives politically skilled individuals
no constraints and a great deal of latitude in performing them. It
has been argued that to attain success, politically skilled individ-
uals are more likely to perform OCBs as one way of distinguishing
themselves from others (Jawahar, Meurs, Ferris, & Hochwarter,
2008; Liu, Perrewe, Hochwarter, & Kacmar, 2004). We suspect
that those high in political skill may be more inclined to enact
OCBs than their low political skill counterparts, regardless of the
level of justice in the work environment, as they can see how
OCBs may be beneficial to their goals. Those high in political skill
ultimately believe that they will, in fact, be rewarded for perform-
ing OCBs when the average person is not. Moreover, because
unfair environments create high levels of uncertainty (Lind & van
den Bos, 2002), individuals with high levels of political skill can
be expected to perform more OCB, because they are more
equipped to manage uncertainties. An earlier view advanced by
Organ (1990) suggested that OCBs could be regarded as an em-
ployee input that could be either increased or decreased in re-
sponse to the level of perceived fairness of the environment.
Employees would be expected to perform few OCBs in response to
unfair treatment but would repay the organization for fair treat-
ment by raising the level of OCBs they performed. Tepper, Lock-
hart, and Hoobler (2001) further suggested that although individ-
uals could restore equity by enhancing in-role performance or
1429
POLITICAL SKILL AND JUSTICE
extra-role performance, they would use OCBs, because these are
less likely to be limited by situational factors.
For individuals low in political skill, the decision to engage in
OCBs is likely determined by the strength of the situation. In high
justice environments (i.e., strong situations), those with low polit-
ical skill may be more likely to perform OCBs, as suggested by
Organ (1990) and Tepper et al. (2001). In essence, they are
responding to the environment and repaying the organization for
fair treatment through the performance of OCBs. However, in an
unjust environment (i.e., weak situation), those with low political
skill can be expected to perform few OCBs, as the environment
does not warrant repayment to the organization. Formally stated,
we expect that:
Hypothesis 2: (a) Procedural and (b) distributive justice will
moderate the positive relationship between political skill and
OCB, such that the relationship is stronger when justice is
lower (i.e., weak situations).
Method
Procedure
Data were collected from a division of a state government. The
division included a state hospital, and all employee jobs focused on
health issues for the residents of the state. With the dual purpose
of inviting potential respondents to participate and stressing that he
would act on the results from the study, the division director sent
an e-mail to all division employees (N 312) one week prior to
the beginning of data collection. Included in this e-mail was the
purpose of the study and the fact that participation was voluntary,
their individual responses would be kept confidential, and only
aggregated data would be reported back to the division. Our next
step was to send each potential respondent a personalized e-mail
that reiterated the information mentioned in the directors e-mail
and described how to access the online survey. Specifically, we
asked respondents to click on the hotlink offered in the e-mail and
complete the survey within 30 days of receiving the e-mail. To
encourage participation, one follow-up e-mail was sent by the
director and two were sent by the research team during the 30 days
the survey was available.
We collected our dependent variables from the respondents
immediate supervisors. Employees provided the name of their
supervisor so that we could match their responses to those of their
supervisor. We asked the division supervisors to give us ratings of
their direct reports during the same 30-day timeframe in which the
subordinates completed their surveys. The pen-and-paper supervi-
sor surveys were distributed on-site by one of the authors. Each
supervisor survey was personalized and contained only the names
of the subordinates the supervisor was to rate. We set up the
supervisor survey as a matrix; the items on which the subordinates
were rated were listed in the first column, and the subordinates
names were listed across the column headings. This approach was
used for three reasons. First, it allowed the supervisors to effi-
ciently rate their employees. They needed to read an item only
once and then rate all of their subordinates on this item. Second, it
gave the supervisor the ability to compare subordinates on each
question asked, resulting in more varied and perhaps more accurate
ratings. Finally, our guarantee of confidentiality was enhanced by
having the researcher personally distribute, collect, and leave with
the surveys.
Sample
We were able to match 175 supervisor and subordinate re-
sponses for a response rate of 56%. In terms of demographics, our
subordinate sample was 61% female, the average age was 42.94
years, the average job tenure was 4.00 years, and the average
organizational tenure was 5.92 years. The 57 supervisors (50%
male), on average, provided ratings on 3.07 subordinates. The
average age of the supervisors was 49.29 years, their average job
tenure was 6.37 years, and their average organizational tenure was
12.32 years.
Measures
A 5-point Likert scale with anchors of 1 (strongly disagree) and
5 (strongly agree) was used for responses to all survey items. Scale
items were summed and then averaged to create an overall value
for each construct. Responses were coded such that high levels of
the constructs are represented by high values.
Subordinate Measures
Procedural justice. We tapped procedural justice with Parker,
Baltes, and Christiansens (1997) four-item scale ( .82). A
sample item was People involved in implementing decisions have
a say in making the decisions.
Distributive justice. Distributive justice was measured with
Price and Muellers (1986) six-item scale ( .96). A sample
item was I am fairly rewarded for the amount of effort I put
forth.
Political skill. We used an 18-item political skill inventory
(Ferris, Treadway, et al., 2005) to measure political skill ( .89).
A sample item was I am good at using my connections and
networks to make things happen at work.
Supervisor Measures
Task performance. Supervisors used Podsakoff and MacKen-
zies (1989) five-item scale ( .91) to rate their subordinates
task performance. A sample item included This subordinate ful-
fills all responsibilities required by his/her job.
OCBs. Supervisors responded to Settoon and Mossholders
(2002) six-item scale ( .87) to measure subordinate task-
focused OCB. A sample item was This subordinate assists co-
workers with heavy work loads even though it is not part of the
job.
Control Variables
On the basis of our review of the extant literature, when running
our analyses we controlled for tenure with supervisor, job tenure,
organizational tenure, age, and hours worked per week, which was
coded as 1 (less than 30 hr), 2 (33 hr), 3 (36 hr), 4 (40 hr), 5 (45
hr), 6 (50 hr), and 7 (more than 50 hr). These variables have been
theoretically suggested and empirically shown to be related to
variables of interest in this study (e.g., Sturman, 2003; Weekley &
Ployhart, 2005); thus, we controlled for them to eliminate spurious
1430
ANDREWS, KACMAR, AND HARRIS
relationships. Subordinates supplied the data for all of the control
variables.
Analysis Approach
In this study, participants were nested within supervisors be-
cause supervisors provided task performance and citizenship rat-
ings for more than one subordinate. To account for the noninde-
pendence in our data, we used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM;
Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2004) to perform our
analyses.
To test our hypotheses, we ran a series of HLM analyses for
each dependent variable. In one series, procedural justice served as
the moderator; in the other, distributive justice served as the
moderator. In every set of analyses, we entered the control vari-
ables of tenure with supervisor, job tenure, organizational tenure,
age, and hours worked per week on the first step. We also con-
trolled for the form of justice not serving as the moderator. On the
second step, we entered the grand mean centered independent
variable of interest, political skill. On Step 3, we entered the grand
mean centered moderator, either procedural or distributive justice.
On the fourth step, we entered the grand mean centered interaction
term, political skill by either procedural or distributive justice.
However, prior to conducting any analyses, we first ran a null
model to confirm that there was sufficient between-supervisor
variance in the supervisors performance and citizenship ratings to
warrant using HLM.
Results
Table 1 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlation
matrix for the variables in this study. Not surprisingly, the corre-
lation between procedural and distributive justice was strong.
Procedural justice also was significantly correlated with political
skill and OCB, but distributive justice was not. In addition to
procedural justice, OCB was correlated with political skill and
performance. Finally, several of our control variables were signif-
icantly correlated with one another.
Prior to testing our hypotheses, we conducted confirmatory
factor analyses on our key variables, procedural justice, distribu-
tive justice, political skill, performance, and OCB to ensure that
they were independent and that the items produced the expected
factor structures. To conduct our confirmatory factor analyses, we
used LISREL 8.80 and a maximum likelihood estimation. We
estimated a five-factor solution with one factor representing each
of our scales. Fit indices showed that the five-factor model had
acceptable fit (CFI .91; NNFI .91; RMSEA .088), and all
of the standardized loadings were significant ( p .01). To con-
firm that a five-factor model was the most appropriate represen-
tation of our data, we estimated two four-factor alternative models.
The first model collapsed the two justice scales into one factor
(CFI .89; NNFI .88; RMSEA .101), whereas the second
model collapsed the two dependent variables (OCB and perfor-
mance) into one factor (CFI .88; NNFI .88; RMSEA .110).
Neither alternative model fit the data as well as the five-factor
model. In addition, the chi-square difference test between the
five-factor model and each of the alternative models was signifi-
cant,
diff
2
(4) 289, p .001; and
diff
2
(4) 492, p .001,
indicating the superiority of the five-factor model.
To further explore the discriminant validity of our scales, we
followed the procedure outlined by Fornell and Larcker (1981) and
calculated the square root of the average variance explained for
each of the scales in our study. This value, which we present on the
diagonal in Table 1, represents the variance accounted for by the
items that compose the scale. To demonstrate discriminant valid-
ity, this value must exceed the corresponding latent variable cor-
relations in the same row and column. If this condition is met, then
we have evidence that the variance shared between any two
constructs, the correlation, is less than the average variance ex-
plained by the items that compose the scale. As shown in Table 1,
this condition is met for all of our scales.
The HLM results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Before running
the full HLM analyses, a null model with no predictors was
estimated for our dependent variables to confirm that sufficient
between-supervisor variance existed in our supervisor-rated de-
pendent variables of performance and OCB. The results of this
analysis were significant: performance,
56
2
85.61, p .01;
OCB,
56
2
170.04, p .001. Further, 8% of the variance in
performance and 18% of the variance in OCB were due to a
supervisor effect, demonstrating the appropriateness of our deci-
sion to use HLM to conduct our analyses.
As shown on the left half of Table 2, when performance was the
dependent variable, organizational tenure was the only significant
Table 1
Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Procedural justice 3.34 0.80 .74
2. Distributive justice 2.99 1.05 0.45

.89
3. Political skill 3.81 0.45 0.42

0.08 .58
4. Performance 4.26 0.70 0.01 0.05 0.07 .88
5. OCB 3.94 0.63 0.22

0.12 0.21

0.48

.72
6. Supervisor tenure 2.28 2.30 0.14 0.24

0.16 0.14 0.17

7. Job tenure 4.00 4.12 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.54

8. Organization tenure 5.92 6.18 0.10 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.58

0.68

9. Age 42.94 10.43 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.26

0.37

0.42

10. Hours worked 3.86 0.96 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.12 0.01
Note. Values on the diagonal are the square root of the average variance explained, which must be larger than all zero-order correlations in the row and
column in which they appear to demonstrate discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). OCB organizational citizenship behavior. N 175.

p .05.

p .01.

p .001.
1431
POLITICAL SKILL AND JUSTICE
control variable once all of the variables had been entered. Neither
political skill nor procedural justice was significantly related to
task performance. Finally, procedural justice significantly inter-
acted with political skill when performance was the dependent
variable. On the right half of Table 2, after entering all the
variables the control variable of tenure with supervisor was a
significant predictor of OCB as was the main effect for political
skill. However, the main effect for procedural justice and the
political skillprocedural justice interaction were not significantly
related to OCB.
Turning to Table 3, on the left half of the table after all of the
variables have been entered (i.e., Step 4), organizational tenure
was the only significant control variable when performance was
the dependent variable. Political skill did not have a significant
main effect with performance, but distributive justice did. In
addition, the political skilldistributive justice interaction was
significant. Finally, on the right side of Table 3, tenure with
supervisor was the only significant control variable when OCB
was the dependent variable. Although political skill and distribu-
tive justice did not have significant main effects with OCB, their
interaction was significant.
To determine if the form of the interaction predicted in our
hypotheses was supported, we graphed the significant interaction
results. We did so by plotting two slopes, one at one standard
deviation above the mean and one at one standard deviation below
the mean (Stone & Hollenbeck, 1989). The resulting plots are
Table 2
HLM Results for Procedural Justice as a Moderator and Performance and Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) as the
Dependent Variables
Dependent variable
Performance OCB
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Control variables
Tenure with supervisor .03 .03 .03 .02 .05

.06

.06

.05

Job tenure .01 .01 .01 .01 .02 .02 .02 .02
Organizational tenure .02

.02

.02

.02

.00 .01 .01 .01

Age .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Hours worked per week .10

.10

.10

.10 .07 .08

.07 .07
Distributive justice .10

.10

.09 .09 .10

.09 .06 .05

Independent Variable
Political skill .03 .02 .04 .25

.19 .20

Moderator
Procedural justice .03 .05 .10 .11
Interaction
Political Skill Procedural Justice .40

.14
R
2
.04 .00 .00 .01 .06 .03 .01 .00
Note. N 175. R
2
values were calculated following Snijders and Boskers (1999) formulas. HLM hierarchical linear modeling.

p .05.

p .01.
Table 3
HLM Results for Distributive Justice as a Moderator and Performance and Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) as the
Dependent Variables
Dependent variable
Performance OCB
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Control variables
Tenure with supervisor .02 .02 .03 .02 .05

.05

.06

.05

Job tenure .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .02 .02
Organizational tenure .02

.02

.02

.02

.01 .01 .01 .00

Age .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Hours worked per week .09 .09 .10

.09 .05 .06 .07 .06

Procedural justice .09 .09 .03 .03 .18

.14

.10 .10
Independent variable
Political skill .01 .02 .00 .18 .19 .18
Moderator
Distributive justice .09 .10

.06 .07
Interaction
Political Skill Distributive Justice .19

.17

R
2
.02 .01 .00 .02 .08 .01 .01 .01
Note. N 175. R
2
values were calculated following Snijders and Boskers (1999) formulas.

p .05.

p .01.
1432
ANDREWS, KACMAR, AND HARRIS
shown in Figures 1 and 2 for performance and Figure 3 for OCB.
Figure 1 illustrates a disordinal interaction much like the one
predicted in Hypothesis 1. Specifically, when procedural justice is
high, the relationship between political skill and performance is
negative. Just the reverse is true when procedural justice is low, as
the relationship between political skill and performance is positive.
The graph in Figure 2 shows essentially the same relationship,
but the interaction is ordinal and weaker. Finally, Figure 3 shows
that the relationship between political skill and OCB is positive for
both high and low distributive justice, but the relationship is
stronger for low than high. Overall, these figures provide support
for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2b. Hypothesis 2a was not supported,
as the interaction between political skill and procedural justice was
not significant for OCB.
Although we were interested in seeing the independent effects
of each of the interactions, we also ran them together in a single
step. These results are presented in the Appendix. Only one of the
interactions was significant. We suggest that these results may be
attributable to the effects of multicollinearity, given that the main
effects results change little.
Discussion
The present study was designed to establish whether political
skill is equally effective under conditions of both high and low
justice. In addition, we sought to determine the conditions under
which a lack of political skill is harmful to performance and OCB.
In addressing these research questions, we used Mischels (1968)
situationist perspective and conceived of high justice environments
as strong situations and low justice environments as weak situa-
tions and uncertainty management theory to describe how weak
and strong situations would impact those with and without political
skill. Specifically, we tested the interaction of procedural and
distributive justice with political skill on both task performance
and OCB. Our findings indicate that political skill allows individ-
uals to overcome situational influences, as highly politically
skilled individuals were rated similarly regardless of the level of
distributive justice. However, we found the ratings for those with
a lack of political skill varied with the level of both procedural and
distributive justice present.
Hypothesis 1 stated that there would be a positive relationship
between political skill and performance when justice is lower (i.e.,
in weak situations) and a negative relationship between political
skill and performance when justice is higher (i.e., strong situation).
We found support for this hypothesis for both distributive and
procedural justice. Looking at the left side of Figures 1 and 2, it
can be seen that there is a dramatic difference in supervisor-rated
performance under high and low levels of procedural and distrib-
utive justice. When there is high procedural or distributive justice,
not having political skill does not deflate ones performance rat-
ings, as supervisors are likely following the performance appraisal
guidelines in place. These rules reflect a strong situation and
ensure that consistent performance ratings are being made. How-
ever, when there is low procedural and distributive justice, low
political skill does in fact seem to be harmful to performance
ratings. The lowest performance ratings occurred for those with
low political skill under conditions of low procedural and distrib-
utive justice. This suggests that political skill may in fact be
necessary to be viewed as an effective performer, particularly in
weak situations.
3.80
3.90
4.00
4.10
4.20
4.30
4.40
4.50
4.60
h g i H w o L
Political Skill
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e

Low Procedural Justice
High Procedural Justice
Figure 1. Interactive effect of political skill and procedural justice on
supervisor-rated performance.
3.80
3.90
4.00
4.10
4.20
4.30
4.40
4.50
4.60
h g i H w o L
Political Skill
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e

Low Distributive Justice
High Distributive Justice
Figure 2. Interactive effect of political skill and distributive justice on
supervisor-rated performance.
1433
POLITICAL SKILL AND JUSTICE
The positive slope for the low justice conditions was found in
both Figure 1 and Figure 2. The finding that political skill has a
positive effect on supervisor ratings of performance under condi-
tions of low justice suggests that when the environment is vague or
uncertain (e.g., low justice), political skill can overcome it. Indi-
viduals high in political skill likely thrive in this type of environ-
ment, as they have the ability to understand others and effectively
use influence that enables them to get the job done. Further,
political skill may be helpful in finding a way to make others see
you as a good performer on multiple levels, including both task
performance and OCB. In this same unjust environment, those
who lack political skill were rated lowest in performance. This is
likely due to the lack of policies guiding performance appraisals,
which allowed managers to factor nonperformance aspects (i.e.,
political skill ability) into their ratings. Apparently, an absence of
political skill is only harmful when there is an absence of justice as
well.
The negative slope for the high justice conditions was found for
both Figure 1 and Figure 2. This implies that the behaviors of those
with high political skill may be constrained by the rules and
policies in place, thereby limiting their effectiveness. It is also
possible that the supervisors have difficulty rating subordinates
task performance, as the subordinates political skill is clouding
the supervisors ability to make accurate ratings. Thus, they may
be overcorrecting in a sense by providing lower ratings. Finally,
we examined the interactive effects of procedural and distributive
justice with political skill on the outcome of OCB (Hypothesis 2).
We found support only for distributive justice. This finding is
somewhat similar to the distributive justice finding for perfor-
mance in that the highest ratings of OCB were under conditions of
high distributive justice, regardless of the level of political skill.
However, political skill was again positively related to OCB under
conditions of low distributive justice. This suggests that politically
skilled individuals can (indirectly) affect the distribution of re-
wards. Although by definition OCB is not explicitly rewarded, it is
assumed that political skill will pay off and in some way benefit
those who are politically skilled.
Implications for Practice
The findings of the present study have a number of implications
for practice. First, managers may wish to seek candidates who
possess some level of political skill, as these individuals may be
more likely to perform OCB and are able to effectively adapt to
any work environment. Second, it should be noted that under
conditions of high distributive justice, OCB ratings were strong
regardless of the level of political skill. This underscores the
importance of creating a fair reward system, as the performance of
OCB by everyone (regardless of their level of political skill) is in
the best interest of the organization. Finally, managers and em-
ployees should be aware of the potential problems of staffing
individuals who are low in political skill in situations where justice
is low; low levels of political skill are not necessarily a problem,
but when combined with low justice, negative outcomes are likely
to result.
Strengths
There are several strengths in this study that warrant mention-
ing. First, the data collected were dyadic in nature, with the
subordinates providing the data for the independent variables and
their immediate supervisors providing the data for the dependent
variables. Such a design provides some confidence that the results
are not due to common method variance. Second, we offer a strong
test of the hypotheses by including multiple control variables to
eliminate plausible alternative explanations for our results, as well
as using an analysis technique that controlled for a supervisor
rating effect in our data. Third, we offer a constructive replication
(Lykken, 1968) of our interactive results by testing two different
dependent variables.
Limitations and Future Research
In addition to the above strengths, there are limitations that must
be acknowledged when interpreting our findings. One potential
weakness is that our respondents worked in a state governmental
agency. Empirical evidence suggests that there are differences
between employees in the public and private sectors (Utgoff,
1983). Thus, it is unclear whether the results from the current study
are generalizable to the private sector. Future research examining
these relationships in the private sector is needed to address this
issue. Another possible limitation in our study was the weak or
insignificant relationship found between justice and our outcomes.
Although three of the four justiceconsequence associations were
significant when entered in Step 1, the significance levels dropped
when included in the full model, and in general they are not as
strong as meta-analytic results have reported (Cohen-Charash &
Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001). One potential explanation for
this difference may be found in how we measured justice. In
3.40
3.50
3.60
3.70
3.80
3.90
4.00
4.10
4.20
h g i H w o L
Political Skill
O
C
B

Low Distributive Justice
High Distributive Justice
Figure 3. Interactive effect of political skill and distributive justice on
supervisor-rated organizational citizenship behavior (OCB).
1434
ANDREWS, KACMAR, AND HARRIS
particular, our procedural justice measure from Parker et al. (1997)
appears to focus most heavily on the voice or decision control
component of procedural justice. Perhaps if we had used a more
general measure of procedural justice our results would align more
closely with extant research.
Finally, the data were collected at one point in time, eliminating
the possibility of exploring causality. We hope future researchers
will examine potential alternative representations of the variables
in our study with longitudinal data, objective performance mea-
sures, and other relevant variables to help determine if there are
other complexities that we did not investigate and if recursive
relationships exist between our constructs. One such complexity
could be that individuals infer justice from the relationship be-
tween political skill and performance. For example, if the highly
politically skilled receive higher performance evaluations than
their less politically skilled counterparts, individuals may conclude
that procedural and distributive justice are low. Similarly, if indi-
viduals lower in political skill receive higher performance ratings
than those who are high in political skill, employees may conclude
that justice is high. Unfortunately, we are unable to test this idea,
but we hope future research efforts will design studies that better
test these causality and alternative model predictions.
Another avenue for additional research is one that explores other
potential contextual and situational variables that may alter polit-
ical skilloutcome relationships. For example, the political skill
performance and OCB relationships could be examined under
varying conditions of uncertainty, such that political skill might
prove more beneficial under conditions of uncertainty and less
beneficial under conditions of certainty. Additional potential mod-
erators include formalization, centralization, and leadermember
exchange relationships.
Conclusion
Overall, this study contributes to the political skill literature by
demonstrating its differential effects in strong versus weak situa-
tions. Specifically, these results draw attention to the importance
of political skill in low justice environments for successful task
performance and OCB. This study makes an additional contribu-
tion by providing empirical evidence of the relationship between
political skill and OCB. Further, these results highlight the condi-
tions under which a lack of political skill can be detrimental to
ones task performance and OCB ratings. As the political skill
stream of research continues to expand, it is important to continue
to identify situations in which political skill enhances performance
and a lack of political skill may harm performance.
References
Ahearn, K. K., Ferris, G. R., Hochwarter, W. A., Douglas, C., & Ammeter,
A. P. (2004). Leader political skill and team performance. Journal of
Management, 30, 309327.
Aryee, S., Chen, Z. X., & Budhwar, P. S. (2004). Exchange fairness and
employee performance: An examination of the relationship between
organizational politics and procedural justice. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 94, 114.
Bem, D., & Funder, D. (1978). Predicting more of the people more of the
time: Assessing the personality of situations. Psychological Review, 85,
485501.
Breland, J. W., Treadway, D. C., & Duke, A. B. (2007). The interactive
effect of leadermember exchange and political skill on subjective
career success. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 13,
114.
Byrne, Z. (2005). Fairness reduces the negative effects of organizational
politics on turnover intentions, citizenship behavior, and job perfor-
mance. Journal of Business and Psychology, 20, 175200.
Byrne, Z. S., Kacmar, C., Stoner, J., & Hochwarter, W. (2005). The
relationship between perceptions of politics and depressed mood at
work: Unique moderators across three levels. Journal of Occupational
Health Psychology, 10, 330343.
Choi, J. (2008). Event justice perceptions and employees reactions: Per-
ceptions of social entity justice as a moderator. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 93, 513528.
Cohen-Charash, Y., & Spector, P. E. (2001). The role of justice in orga-
nizations: A meta-analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Deci-
sion Processes, 86, 278321.
Colquitt, J. A., Conlon, D. E., Wesson, M. J., Porter, C., & Ng, K. Y.
(2001). Justice at the millennium: A meta-analytic review of 25 years of
organizational justice research. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 425
445.
Colquitt, J. A., Scott, B., Judge, T., & Shaw, J. (2006). Justice and
personality: Using integrative theories to derive moderators of justice
effects. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 100,
110127.
Davis-Blake, A., & Pfeffer, J. (1989). Just a mirage: The search for
dispositional effects in organizational research. Academy of Manage-
ment Review, 14, 385400.
Douglas, C., & Ammeter, A. P. (2004). An examination of leader political
skill and its effect on ratings of leader effectiveness. Leadership Quar-
terly, 15, 537550.
Ferris, G. R., Davidson, S. L., & Perrewe, P. L. (2005). Political skill at
work. Palo Alto, CA: Davies-Black.
Ferris, G. R., Hochwarter, W. A., Douglas, C. Blass, F. R., Kolodinsky,
R. W., & Treadway, D. C. (2002). Social influence processes in orga-
nizations and human resources systems. In G. R. Ferris & J. J. Martoc-
chio (Eds.), Research in personnel and human resources management
(Vol. 21, pp. 65127). Oxford, England: JAI/Elsevier Science.
Ferris, G. R., & Judge, T. A. (1991). Personnel/human resources manage-
ment: A political influence perspective. Journal of Management, 17,
447488.
Ferris, G. R., Treadway, D. C., Kolodinsky, R. W., Hochwarter, W. A.,
Kacmar, C. J., Douglas, C., & Frink, D. D. (2005). Development and
validation of the political skill inventory. Journal of Management, 31,
126152.
Ferris, G., Treadway, D., Perrewe, P., Brouer, R., Douglas, C., & Lux, S.
(2007). Political skill in organizations. Journal of Management, 33,
290320.
Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. (1981). Evaluating structural equation models
with unobservable variables and measurement error. Journal of Market-
ing Research, 28, 3950.
Gilmore, D. C., Ferris, G. R., Dulebohn, J. H., & Harrell-Cook, G. (1996).
Organizational politics and employee attendance. Group and Organiza-
tion Management, 21, 481494.
Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional intelligence. New York, NY: Bantam
Books.
Greenberg, J. (1990). Organizational justice: Yesterday, today, and tomor-
row. Journal of Management, 16, 399432.
Harris, K. J., Andrews, M., & Kacmar, K. (2007). The moderating effects
of justice on the relationship between organizational politics and work-
place attitudes. Journal of Business & Psychology, 22, 135144.
Harris, K. J., & Kacmar, K. M. (2005). Easing the strain: The buffer role
of supervisors in the perceptions of politicsstrain relationship. Journal
of Occupational & Organizational Psychology, 78, 337354.
Harris, K. J., Kacmar, K. M., Zivnuska, S., & Shaw, J. D. (2007). The
1435
POLITICAL SKILL AND JUSTICE
impact of political skill on impression management effectiveness. Jour-
nal of Applied Psychology, 92, 278285.
Harvey, P., Harris, R. B., Harris, K. J., & Wheeler, A. R. (2007). Social
stressors, political skill, and job outcomes. Journal of Occupational
Health Psychology, 12, 105115.
Hochwarter, W. A., Ferris, G. R., Gavin, M. B., Perrewe, P. L., Hall, A. T.,
& Frink, D. D. (2007). Political skill as neutralizer of felt accountabil-
ityJob tension effects on job performance ratings: A longitudinal
investigation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
102, 226239.
Hochwarter, W. A., Perrewe, P. L., Ferris, G. R., & Guercio, R. (1999).
Commitment as an antidote to the tension and turnover consequences of
organizational politics. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 55, 277297.
Jawahar, I., Meurs, J., Ferris, G., & Hochwarter, W. (2008). Self-efficacy
and political skill as comparative predictors of task and contextual
performance: A two-study constructive replication. Human Perfor-
mance, 21, 138157.
Leventhal, G. S. (1980). What should be done with equity theory? New
approaches to the study of fairness in social relationships. In K. Gergen,
M. Greenberg, & R. Willis (Eds.), Social exchange: Advances in theory
and research (pp. 2755). New York, NY: Plenum Press.
Lind, E. A., & van den Bos, K. (2002). When fairness works: Toward a
general theory of uncertainty management. In B. M. Staw & R. M.
Kramer (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 24, pp. 181
223). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Liu, Y., Ferris, G. R., Zinko, R., Perrewe, P. L., Weitz, B., & Xu, J. (2007).
Dispositional antecedents and outcomes of political skill in organiza-
tions: A four-study investigation with convergence. Journal of Voca-
tional Behavior, 71, 146165.
Liu, Y., Perrewe, P. L., Hochwarter, W. A., & Kacmar, C. J. (2004).
Dispositional antecedents and consequences of emotional labor at work.
Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 10, 1225.
Luthans, F., Hodgetts, R. M., & Rosenkrantz, S. A. (1988). Real managers.
Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Lykken, D. (1968). Statistical significance in psychological research. Psy-
chological Bulletin, 70, 151159.
Mintzberg, H. (1983). Power in and around organizations. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Mischel, W. (1968). Personality and assessment. New York, NY: Wiley.
Monson, T., Hesley, J., & Chernick, L. (1982). Specifying when person-
ality traits can and cannot predict behavior: An alternative to abandoning
the attempt to predict single-act criteria. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 43, 385399.
Nowakowski, J., & Conlon, D. (2005). Organizational justice: Looking
back, looking forward. International Journal of Conflict Management,
16, 429.
Organ, D. W. (1988). Organizational citizenship behavior: The good
soldier syndrome. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Organ, D. W. (1990). The motivational basis for organizational citizenship
behavior. In B. M. Staw & L. L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in orga-
nizational behavior (Vol. 12, pp. 4372). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Parker, C. P., Baltes, B. B., & Christiansen, N. D. (1997). Support for
affirmative action, justice perceptions, and work attitudes: A study of
gender and racial-ethnic group differences. Journal of Applied Psychol-
ogy, 82, 376389.
Pfeffer, J. (1981). Power in organizations. Boston, MA: Pitman.
Podsakoff, P. M., & MacKenzie, S. B. (1989). A second generation
measure of organization citizenship behavior. Unpublished manuscript,
Indiana University, Bloomington.
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Paine, J. B., & Bachrach, D. G.
(2000). Organizational citizenship behavior: A critical review of the
theoretical and empirical literature and suggestions for future research.
Journal of Management, 26, 513563.
Price, J. L., & Mueller, C. W. (1986). Handbook of organizational mea-
surement. Marshfield, MA: Pitman.
Randall, M. L., Cropanzano, R., Bormann, C. A., & Birjulin, A. (1999).
Organizational politics and organizational support as predictors of work
attitudes, job performance, and organizational citizenship behaviors.
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 20, 159172.
Raudenbush, S., Bryk, A., Cheong, Y. F., & Congdon, R. (2004). HLM6:
Hierarchical linear and nonlinear modeling. Lincolnwood, IL: Scien-
tific Software International.
Semadar, A., Robins, G. L., & Ferris, G. R. (2006). Social effectiveness
and managerial performance. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 27,
443461.
Settoon, R. P., & Mossholder, K. W. (2002). Relationship quality and
relationship context as antecedents of person- and task-focused interper-
sonal citizenship behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 255267.
Snijders, T., & Bosker, R. (1999). Multilevel analysis. London, England:
Sage.
Stone, E. F., & Hollenbeck, J. R. (1989). Clarifying some controversial
issues surrounding statistical procedures for detecting moderating vari-
ables: Empirical evidence and related matters. Journal of Applied Psy-
chology, 74, 310.
Sturman, M. C. (2003). Searching for the inverted U-shaped relationship
between time and performance: Meta-analyses of the experience/perfor-
mance, tenure/performance, and age/performance relationships. Journal
of Management, 29, 609640.
Tepper, B., Lockhart, D., & Hoobler, J. (2001). Justice, citizenship, and
role definition effects. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 789796.
Treadway, D., Ferris, G., Duke, A., Adams, G., & Thatcher, J. (2007). The
moderating role of subordinate political skill on supervisors impres-
sions of subordinate ingratiation and ratings of subordinate interpersonal
facilitation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 848855.
Treadway, D. C., Hochwarter, W. A., Kacmar, C. J., & Ferris, G. R.
(2005). Political will, political skill, and political behavior. Journal of
Organizational Behavior, 26, 229245.
Utgoff, K. C. (1983). Compensation levels and quit rates in the public
sector. The Journal of Human Resources, 18, 394406.
Valle, M., & Perrewe, P. L. (2000). Do politics perceptions relate to
political behaviors? Tests of an implicit assumption and expanded
model. Human Relations, 53, 359386.
van den Bos, K. (2001). Uncertainty management: The influence of un-
certainty salience on reactions to perceived procedural fairness. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 80, 931941.
Wallace, J., Edwards, B., Mondore, S., & Finch, D. (2008). Employee
discrimination claims and employee-initiated lawsuits: Does procedural
justice climate moderate the claims 3disputes relationship? Journal of
Managerial Issues, 20, 313326.
Weekley, J. A., & Ployhart, R. E. (2005). Situational judgment: Anteced-
ents and relationships with performance. Human Performance, 18, 81
104.
Witt, L. A., Andrews, M. C., & Kacmar, K. M. (2000). The role of
participation in decision-making in the organizational politicsjob sat-
isfaction relationship. Human Relations, 53, 341358.
1436
ANDREWS, KACMAR, AND HARRIS
Appendix
Table A1
Results Comparing Interactions Entered Separately and Simultaneously
Dependent variables: Final step
Performance OCB
DJ PJ DJ and PJ DJ PJ DJ and PJ
Control variables
Tenure with supervisor .02 .02 .02 .05

.05

.05

Job tenure .01 .01 .01 .02 .02 .02

Organizational tenure .02

.02

.02

.00 .01 .00

Age .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Hours worked per week .09 .10 .09 .06 .07 .06
Independent variable
Political skill .00 .04 .04 .18 .20

.18
Moderators
Distributive justice .10

.09 .09 .07 .05 .06

Procedural justice .03 .05 .04 .10 .11 .11
Interactions
Political Skill Distributive Justice .19

.09 .17

.15
Political Skill Procedural Justice .40

.36

.14 .07
Note. N 175. OCB organizational citizenship behavior; DJ distributive justice; PJ procedural justice.

p .05.

p .01.
Received September 5, 2008
Revision received June 12, 2009
Accepted June 24, 2009
E-Mail Notification of Your Latest Issue Online!
Would you like to know when the next issue of your favorite APA journal will be available
online? This service is now available to you. Sign up at http://notify.apa.org/ and you will be
notified by e-mail when issues of interest to you become available!
1437
POLITICAL SKILL AND JUSTICE