* A.

Petersen Page 1
IMPACT OF RECENT TRANSFORMER FAILURES AND FIRES
Australian and New Zealand Experiences

A Petersen* Powerlink,
P L Austin SPI PowerNet,
(Australia)

SUMMARY
Several Transformer failure surveys have been carried out in Australia and New Zealand since 1985.
The earlier surveys were wide ranging and general in scope, the latter with narrow focus on major
failures and failures causing fires. This paper presents the finding of these surveys; discusses major
causes of failures and specific failure cases of serious transformer failures resulting in oil fires. The
paper also makes recommendation on measures, which can be taken to reduce the risks of failures and
transformer fires.

KEY WORDS
Power transformers, failure survey, failures, failure rate, fire, oil spill.

1. INTRODUCTION
For ten years until 1995 the Australian CIGRE panel for transformers carried out annual transformer
reliability surveys. Survey information was collected from ten (10) major utility groupings,
representing most of the major utilities in Australia and New Zealand. The survey comprised failures
and defects causing forced outages on generation, transmission and sub-transmission transformers
with MVA and Voltage ratings >10MVA and > 60 kV. Five (5) of the participants were vertically
integrated utilities undertaking generation, transmission and distribution, two (2) were generation and
transmission utilities; the remaining participants comprised hydro generation and sub-
transmission/distribution utilities.
The Australian New Zealand CIGRE survey was similar to the 1980 CIGRE SC12 survey. However,
because of its smaller scale and because most of the contributors were represented on the Australian-
New Zealand CIGRE transformer panel, it was possible obtain more detailed information on the
causes and modes of failures. Follow up studies were initiated into causes of costly and common
modes of failure. Areas of focus included such topics as - earthing and insulation level of tertiary
winding, tapchangers failures and causes of explosive failures result ing in oil spills and fires.
The competition policies leading to privatisation and dis-aggregation of the major utilities and a
sharper focus on competition during the 1990-ties, brought with it less willingness to provide
resources for the survey and to supply details of operations and failures, consequently it was not
possible to continue the full survey beyond 1995. Since then, surveys by the Australian-New Zealand
CIGRE transformer panel have been ad-hoc, of anecdotal nature and focussed on obtaining
information on the major failures only. Nevertheless, they have contributed valuable information on
the causes, probability and consequences of failures.
Recent ad-hoc surveys have included:
A survey by the Australian and New Zealand CIGRE panel in 2002 focussed on major failures
causing fires with recent update to include fires up to end of 2004.
A survey done by staff from one of the major manufacturers, covered major failures on
transformers rated >100 MVA for the period from 1999 to 2004.
A survey on transformer oil spills done during 2004, by a staff member of one of the major
Australian utilities as part of the preparation of a Guide for Oil Containment for the Energy
Supply Association of Australia (ESAA). This survey covered oil spills for the previous five
years.
The key findings from these four surveys are summarised and presented below.
* A. Petersen Page 2
2. SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS
2.1 CIGRE Australia and New Zealand 1995 Survey
The data in this survey cover failures from 1975 to 1995 reported in the CIGRE Australia and New
Zealand 1995 Survey. (The 1985 survey requested utilities to include failures, which had occurred
between 1975 and 1985). The 1995 study was based on nearly 3000 transformers and slightly more
than 50 000 transformer years.
Definitions:
In this survey a failure is an event causing an outage of the transformer by a trip, or an alarm
requiring the transformer to be removed from service within 30 minutes of the alarm.
Costly failures are those requiring the transformer be removed from site, or outage with direct
repair cost in excess of 2 % transformer replacement cost.
Failure rate (% p.a.) = number of failures x 100 / (transformers in service x years in service).
The average rate of failure/defects for all transformers in this survey was found to be 0.97 % (per
transformer year). The failure rate during the first and early years of service was found to be higher for
the population entering service from 1985-95 than the transformer population entering service from
1975-85. The failure rate of the 1985-95 population was 2.25 % for the first year of service, falling
gradually towards around 1.2 % after 5 years of service, whereas the total population was found to
have a relatively constant rate of failure of approx. 1% per transformer year. It must be recognised that
this survey may under report failures, as the persons reporting may not know all failures, which have
occurred within each utility. Especially minor and pre1985 failures may have gone unreported as
record for such failures may not be available or they may not be remembered.
The failure rate in the 300<V<700 kV class of transformers is 1.73 %, which is nearly twice as high as
the overall average of 0.97 %. In part, this could be due to failures of larger and important
transformers are more likely to be known and reported.
The failure rate of the transformers remains fairly constant with age after the first five years in service.
The data shows no evidence of the failure rate increasing with age. This may be due to the fact that
many transformers in aged and poor condition are withdrawn from service before they fail.
The 1995 survey reports list a total of:
92 failures with expulsion of oil.
20 explosive failures with rupture of tank/explosion vent diaphragm.
5 oil fires.
The average rate for costly failures is 0.4%. This figure is fairly constant from the first year in service,
indicating that many of the early failures/defects may be minor in nature. The risk of transformer fires
was calculated as only 0.01% per service year. Table 1 below is a summary of some of the key data.
Table 1

Transformer
function
Transformer
units
Failure rate 60<V<100 kV 100<V<300 kV 300<V<700 kV Total
Pop. unit years 75 7376 1568 9019 Powerstation
Dble wound
482
Fail. Rate pa. % 1.33 0.88 2.36 1.14
Pop. unit years 12073 22567 222 34862 Substation
Dble wound
2040
Fail. Rate pa. % 0.73 0.90 1.8 0.79
Pop. unit years 537 3584 3063 7184 Auto
Transformer
363
Fail. Rate pa. % 2.42 1.0 1.40 1.28
Pop. unit years 192 87 0 Voltage
regulators
21
Fail. Rate pa. % 1.04 0.0 0
Pop. unit years 12877 33614 4853 51344
Fail. Rate pa. % 0.85 0.90 1.73 0.97
Total 2906
Fail. Rate for costly failures % 0.4

* A. Petersen Page 3
The average age of the survey population was 28.6 years in 1995. The average age of the transformer
population in Australia and New Zealand is now approx. 32 years, representing an increase in average
age of 3.4 years over ten years. As there is no evidence of an increase in failure rate with age, it can be
concluded that the increase in average age does not pose a major problem for the industry, although it
may signal an increase in scheduled replacements.
The scope of the 1985-95 survey did not include shunt reactors. The consequences of the failure of oil
immersed shunt reactors are very similar to transformer failures and the risk of reactor failures should
therefore also had been included. The authors are aware of four (4) major shunt reactor failures having
occurred in Australia within the 1985-95 survey period. Three of these failures were due to failure of
300 kV bushings and the fourth due to dielectric failure of a barrier board. Two of the failed bushings
were caused by bushings of the oil impregnated paper (OIP) type. Both of these bushings failed
explosively with wide scattering of porcelain, major oil fires, loss of reactor and collateral fire damage
to adjacent plant. The third bushing failure was in a Synthetic Resin Bonded Paper (SRBP) type
bushing. This failure was not explosive and did not cause scattering of porcelain or fire; and neither
did the winding barrier board failure, although it did cause expulsion of oil and distortion of the tank.
Graph 7 from the survey shown below depicts a break-up of the survey data into the causes of failure.
It should be noted that Windings are failures involving the winding conductor. Failures involving
end insulation, winding to windings and winding to core insulation are included under winding
accessories. Bushing leads and tapping leads outside the windings are grouped in with others.



From the graph 7 it can be seen-
Windings and winding accessories account for 25% of all failures, probably approx. 30% if
tapping and bushing leads were included.
Tapchangers (excluding motor drives) account for 25% of all failures.
Bushing and Terminal accounts for 19 % of all failures.
In total these components accounts for just over 2/3 of all failures.
2.2 CIGRE Australia 2002 Survey on Major Transformer Failures and Fires
Since 1995 significant changes have occurred within the major utilities and whilst it was felt that a
repeat of survey carried out from 1985 to 95 would have been beneficial this was not possible, given
the constraint on resources and less willingness among utilities to report on failure data.
* A. Petersen Page 4
The Australian New Zealand CIGRE panel therefore decided to collect information on major failures
and fires only, in an attempt to determine the risk of major failures and transformer fires.
A survey on transformer fires was carried out in late 2002 covering a five-year period 1997-2002.
Replies were received from six (6) utilities. This survey did not include any generator utilities, but
included all Australian and New Zealand transmission utilities and approximately 2/3 of the sub-
transmission/distribution utilities, which participated in the 1985-95 survey. This survey was therefore
based on a smaller transformer population than the 1985-95 survey (approx. 1800 vs. 3000).
The number of transformer fires recorded from 1997 to 2002 was 8. Three transformer fires have
occurred since making it a total of 11 fires over seven years. The average transformer population
covered by this survey is estimated to be approx 1800 transformers for seven years = 12600
transformer service years, resulting in a major oil fire risk of 0.09 % per transformer service year. This
figure, whilst still low, is 9 times higher than the figure from the 1985-95 survey. Anecdotal evidence
supports the finding that transformer fires are now more common, even when allowing for possible
under reporting in the 1985-95 survey.
2.3 Surveys on Major Transformer Failures by Manufacturer
One of the major manufacturers reported the following failures of transformers rated above 100MVA,
based on repairs and investigations they have carried out over the last five years on transformers
owned by Australian utilities.
Twenty two (22) major failures (excluding fires) caused total loss or necessitating major repairs.18
transformers suffered damage with repair costing in excess of 50 % of new replacement cost. The
manufacturer considers that these failures represents approx 70 % of all failures for transformers rated
>100 MVA. Based on estimated population over the time of these failures, the rate of serious failures
would be approx. 1.0 % per transformer year.
The failure rate for major failures found in this survey is therefore 2.5 times higher than reported for
costly failures in the 1985-95 survey. The causes for this increase is not evident from the survey,
however, based on observations of practising utility engineers the following changes have occurred
between the surveys:
OIP bushings are now more common than they were in the 1975-1995 transformer population.
Plant utilisation - (average loading) has increased.
Utilities are more prepared to overload transformers now than in the past.
The amount of maintenance has reduced and the number of maintenance technicians and their
skill level in primary plant maintenance has reduced due to lesser degree of specialization.
The average consumer has experience an increased in loss of supply events and an increase in
duration taken to restore supply.
(The assessment of the over all cost benefit of reduced maintenance cost versus loss of supply is
considered outside scope of this paper.)
2.4 Survey on Transformer Oil Spills
One of the risks associated with transformer failures is spillage of oil. In the past spill of oil was seen
as an acceptable risk, this is no longer the case and significant improvements has been made in recent
years on oil containment. Most of the major Australian transmission utilities now have effective oil
containment systems. Nonetheless, many distribution and sub-transmission utilities still need to
improve their oil containment, especially in their older substations.
Installations for medium and larger transformers typically have oil bunding designed to hold all oil
contained in the transformer. For newer transmission and large bulk supply transformer installations,
oil bunding is normally connected to an underground oil/water separation tank with storage capacity,
at least equal to the amount of oil contained in the largest transformer on site. A number of progressive
utilities have also retrofitted such systems in older substations.
Energy Supply Association of Australia (ESAA) recently prepared a Guide for Oil Containment for
the Electricity Supply Industry. In the lead up to the preparation of the guide, a survey on oil spills and
* A. Petersen Page 5
oil containment practises was performed among (ESAA) members. This survey was sent to 30
members comprising transmission and sub-transmission/distribution utilities and covered oil spills for
the period from 1998 to 2003. Eighty of the members 80 % responded to the survey.
The survey provided the following information on oil spills:
811 oil spills were reported by the utilities responding to the survey.
15 oil spills were very serious and 9 of these were not contained on site.
100 oil spills were major 16 were not contained on site.
696 oil spills were minor 81were not contained on site.
Whilst most of oil spilled was contained on site, it is evident that some utilities need to do more to
contain oil spills. The legislative, regulatory and community view today is: An oil spill is not an
unforeseeable event, therefore utilities and management who dont prepare for it, should expect to be
prosecuted. Heavy fines now apply for negligent failure to contain spilled oil and causing
environmental pollution.
3. CASE STUDIES OF TRANSFORMER FAILURES WITH FIRES
3.1 Case 1 - Bushing Failure (OIP) Porcelain Shattering, Fire and Oil spill - (1986)
This fire occurred before the introduction of oil bunding, drainage and oil separation tanks. The 220
kV oil impregnated paper bushing of a 330/240/22 kV 75 MVA 27 year old single phase
autotransformer failed explosively resulting in porcelain pieces being scattered up 150 m away from
the transformer. Porcelain fragments penetrated the wall of a building, damaged porcelain of bus
insulators and damaged bushings on adjacent phases. Pieces of partly burnt bushing paper were also
found in the switchyard. The failure led to a flashover from the bushing to the pressure relief pipe and
a fire was initiated which destroyed the transformer (shell type design).


Burnt out transformer Burning oil and water flowed away from the transformer to drains
and toward cable trench

There was no fire suppression equipment erected around this transformer and before the fire was
extinguished by the local fire brigade it caused further damage including:
Melted a section of tubular copper busbar forming the tertiary delta connection.
Melted the aluminium conductors of the ACSR 220 kV overhead connection.
Damaged the concrete foundation making it unsafe.
Burning oil flowed towards cable ducts and was stopped only by makeshift soil bund.
Burning oil destroyed a cubicle and its wiring.
Water plus oil flowed out of the station into a dam on an adjoining property.
* A. Petersen Page 6
Further points:
Gasketed joints damaged by the heat, fed oil into the fire.
The fire although intense, caused minimal damage to adjacent phases (centre phase failed).
The insulation continued to smoulder for a number of days after the flames were extinguished.
One month prior to the failure the 220 kV bushing developed oil leak at the magnetic oil level
gauge, a common problem with this design of bushing for which there was a repair procedure.
In retrospect this was likely to have been the onset of an internal fault. Three months after the
failure the 220 kV bushing in the replacement transformer developed oil leak from its oil level
gauge oil. The oil was found to have 11 000 ppm of hydrogen (was only a few ppm before
being placed into service) and the bushing was removed averting another major failure. The
remaining 4 bushings of this design were replaced.
Lessons learnt:
Any bushing abnormality/defects should always be investigated thoroughly.
Oil containment should be provided for all large transformer.
3.2 Case 2 Bushing Failure (OIP) and Fire, Oil Contained 2001
A 110 kV bushing on an 80 MVA 110/33 kV transformer failed catastrophically, causing spillage and
ignition of transformer oil and consequentially fire. The fire developed into a major oil fire fed by oil
spilling from the main conservator through the bushing flange/turret. The transformer was installed in
an open top, concrete block sound enclosure. The transformer had been in service for only 11months.
Incorrect assembly of the bushing stem during installation, most probably caused the failure of the
bushing. The bushing stem design could be described as a high risk design and a contributing factor.
The fire brigade arrived within approx. 20 minutes, but necessary switching, isolation and earthing of
the substation delayed the fire-brigade access for approx 1 hour. The fire brigade was unable to
extinguish the fire until all oil had drained from the conservator, after which they injected foam and
water into the tank via the bushing turret. The fire was extinguished 4.5 hours after the initiating fault.



Fire contained within sound encl. Top of transformer the day after No oil film on water exiting from
oil separator

The exterior of the transformer was severely fire damaged. The transformer core and coils had not
suffered any visible damage from the fault or the fire. Given however, that the windings had been
contaminated by foam and water it was decided to scrap the transformer. Other losses were, loss of
supply from the substation for approximately five hours, loss of 110 kV surge arresters, bus leads,
33kV AL-busbars and surge arresters and a neutral earthing reactor mounted within the sound
enclosure. The sound enclosure prevented collateral damage to adjacent plant external to the sound
enclosure, but the enclosure walls did suffer some structural damage.
Approximately 2500 litres oil from the conservator was spilled and burned. Minor spills also occurred
from gasketed flanges damaged by fire. The main tank did not rupture and most of the 29 000 litres of
oil remained in the main tank during the fire. 40005000 litres of oil would have spilled through fire
damaged gaskets prior to the remaining of the oil being recovered from the tank.
* A. Petersen Page 7
The oil containment system functioned correctly and no oil was spilled into the environment or even
on the substation soil.
Key points:
Approx 160 MW supply was lost to local area for 5.5 hours.
All oil spilled was contained within the underground oil/water separation tank.
A seven months old transformer totally destroyed.
Total financial loss of 1.8 times cost of the transformer, not including community cost from
loss of supply.
Cause of failure:
Incorrect installation of bushing, - contributing cause - bushing design.
Lessons learnt:
Be more critical in design evaluation and preparation of installation procedures.
Open roof sound enclosures can provide very good fire containment.
3.3 Case 3 Tertiary Cable Termination/ Box Failure - Fire, Oil Contained 2002
This failure was initiated as phase to ground / phase to phase fault in an air insulated tertiary cable box
of a 100 MVA 132/69/11kV autotransformer. The forces generated by the arcing pressures within the
cable box buckled the cable box, sheared off the gland plate, bend the cable box busbars and broke the
tertiary bushings, which resulted in release and ignition of oil spilling from the transformer. The fire
burned fiercely, fed by oil spilling from conservator and the main tank. The fire quickly melted the
aluminium casing of the Buchholz relay causing oil to spill over the top of the transformer and
destruction of all bushings. The fire also caused cracking of the lower cooling bank header valve,
which provided addit ional fuel to the fire.


2 hours fault 8 hours after fault
4
th
day after fault fire still
burning slowly inside tank

The failed transformer was one of two transformers in the substation which provided 66 kV supply to
a Zinc smelter and a Copper smelter in addition to general supply for the area. Whilst the fire brigade
was on site within less than an hour, it was decided not to de-energise the second busbar / transformer
to maintain supply to the smelters and just allow the transformer to burn and defer fire fighting until
after daybreak.
By then all bushings were destroyed and the internal fire had settled to relatively steady burn rate at
the internal oil surface with the burn rate largely controlled by the supply of oxygen through the
bushing openings and an external fire fuelled from the cracked valve casing. The external fire was
quenched later in the day by application of foam and water. Injection of water and foam into the tank
was difficult through the small openings and could not extinguish the fire in the tank. The fire inside
the tanks continued as a controlled burn for five days. During this period the fire brigade sprayed the
tank with water to control its temperature and avoid a meltdown of the tank and limited oil spillage to
the amount leaking from burnt gaskets and the cracked header valve. By the fifth day it was decided to
open the 50mm bottom drain valve and let the remaining oil drain into the bunded area and from there
into the underground oil/water separation tank. By then there was only approx 6000 litres of oil and a
similar amount of water in the tank. The draining of water and oil did cause a flare up of the fire inside
* A. Petersen Page 8
the tank and a for short period outside the tank. The fire was eventually extinguished within 2-3 hours
of the drain valve being opened to drain the oil into the oil bund and onto the oil/water separation tank.
Key points:
Supply was maintained to Zinc and Copper smelters.
All oil spilled was contained within the underground oil/water separation tank.
A 100 MVA Transformer, 132 and 66 kV Busbars with steel gantry, 145 kV circuit breaker
145 kV post CTs,local supply transformer and other minor bay items were destroyed.
Total financial loss - approx. 2 times replacement cost of transformer.
Cause:
Either vermin ingress through non-vermin proof vent holes in cable box, or defective cable
termination.
Lessons learnt:
Use cover mounted bushings for tertiary winding and connect terminals to cable termination
pothead via busbars.
Or provide explosion venting of air insulated cable boxes if cable box are used.

4. MAJOR CAUSES OF FAILURES & FIRES AND THEIR MITIGATION
4.1 Transformers
4.1.1 Windings
Winding and winding accessory failures accounted for 25 % of all failures in the 1985-95 survey
To minimise risk of winding failures the following should be considered:
Buy from a reputable manufacturer with experience in the size transformer being purchased. If
a novel design (beyond previous experience) is required carefully consider ways to prove the
design and monitor manufacture
Err on the high side when specifying capitalised cost of losses and do not buy on lowest
capital cost alone. Carefully evaluate the options when specifying transformer that will result
in a design determined by transport limitations.
Perform design review, discuss and assess technique for transposition, joint, cooling and stress
control.
Specify and perform the impulse test, induced voltage with Pd test as routine tests.
Perform temperature rise test at full overload capacity (1.3 or 1.5 load pu, to140
o
C) with
DGA acceptance limits as routine test.
4.1.2 Bushings
Bushing and terminal failures account for 19 % of all failures in the 1985-95 survey. Only one bushing
failure resulted in fire in the 1985-95 survey, whereas 90 % of the failures causing fires in the CIGRE
Australia 2002-04 survey were caused by a bushing or a cable box/cable termination failures. It is
therefore evident that if the risk of fires is to be reduced, then the focus must be on bushings and cable
boxes.
All the bushing fires were caused by oil impregnated paper (OIP) - porcelain insulator bushings. A
high proportion of bushing failures are explosive failures with porcelain fragments ejected up to more
than 50m away: Once the fire has been initiated by an OIP bushing failure, the fire is fed by oil from
the transformer. Failure of plain hollow porcelain bushings can cause a similar result. It is considered
that dry Resin Impregnated Paper (RIP) bushings with a Silicone Polymer Insulator will have a
much lower risk of explosive failure, oil fire and will not distribute fragments of porcelain over the
switchyard.
Best practice could include:
Use dry Resin Impregnated Paper (RIP) bushings with a Silicone Polymer Insulator.
* A. Petersen Page 9
If OIP bushings are nevertheless used then consider:
Increase insulation level for bushings one step above transformer test voltage.
Test older bushings every four years for Tan and capacitance, or use Online Monitoring of
bushing leakage current. (increase in C
1
> 3% would be cause for further investigation).
4.1.3 Cable Boxes and Cable Termination
The most effective way to eliminate the risk of cable termination fault causing transformer fires is
separate the cable termination from the transformer. I.e. terminate cables on a separate free standing
structure instead of in a cable box!
If air insulated cable box is nevertheless used then the following should be considered: -
Provide large explosion vent panel.
Internal air space should be cross-flow ventilated.
Ventilation openings should be covered with stainless steel mesh to guard against ingress of
vermin; the cable box should otherwise air-tight.
Surfaces should slope away from flanges to prevent water accumulating near gaskets.
Bushings should provide a seal at the flange that will not allow oil to flow out of the
transformer if the air end is damaged.
Bolt spacings should be close enough to compress the gaskets firmly at all places.
Use surge arresters unless deletion has been positively determined to be safe.
For surge arresters fitted within cable box, use the highest quality, polymer type LDC3,
Externally mounted arresters may be LDC2 class.
Use outdoor type cold shrink terminations kits for cables terminated in a cable box.
Busbars/busbar supports within a cable box should be able withstand the short-circuit forces.
Clearances should not be less than as per IEC 60076.3.1.
For Oil/liquid filled cable boxes
Ensure design has adequate pressure withstand strength and large, fast acting pressure relief.
Monitor oil filled cable boxes with Buchholz Relay.
For Tertiary delta windings:
i. Loaded - preferably earthed symmetrically (starpoint) and fitted with surge arresters.
ii. Non-loaded tertiary delta windings - Earth one corner; ensure transferred voltage is less than
specified and tested BIL, otherwise fit surge arresters.
Where surge arresters are required fit arresters to the two non earthed terminals and also
from terminal to terminal across the non-earthed phase winding.
Surge arresters and bushings to be rated for line voltage for corner earthed delta windings.
Provide caution labels stating how tertiary winding is/should be earthed.
4.1.4 Tapchangers
OLTCs failures accounted for 25 % of all failures in the 1985-95 survey, many of the costly failures
in the manufacturers survey, but for only one of the 11 fires in the 2002+04) surveys.
It is evident that special care also needs to applied to the selection and maintenance of Tapchangers, if
failure rates are to be reduced.
Best practice would include:
Select OLTCs of design proven by type test and in service history
Select OLTCs, which operate well within their current and step voltage capability.
Specify current rating so it provides for intended overload at maximum current tap and never
exceed rated current by more than 1.2 pu during overloads operation.
Install overcurrent lockout to prevent change of tapping during faults or high overload.
Ensure OLTC maintenance is only performed by well-trained and competent staff.
Be aware of manufacturers maintenance advisory notes for the specific model, before OLTC
commencing OLTC maintenance.
* A. Petersen Page 10
4.1.5 Tanks, Conservators and Cooler banks
Prevent tank, cooler bank or cable box from rupturing electrical arcing faults.
Specify tank/cooler bank withstand pressure with good safety margin and verify it by tests.
Specify fast acting, large opening self re-sealing pressure relief valve(s) or low inertia rupture
disks with oil /gas venting.
Direct oil and gasses released by pressure relief operations away from transformer enclosures.
4.2 Substation Stations
Fire suppression systems are normally provided for generator transformers and for other transformers
located at city sub stations. However, total elimination of fire risks is generally not be possible with
oil-immersed transformers. The alternative would be to use dry type or Gas Insulated Transformer.
For non-city centre substations it will often be economic to accept the low risk of an oil spill/fire and
just provide oil/fire containment so an oil spill does not contaminate the environment and a fire cant
spread to adjacent transformers or other equipment.
The following would be considered good practice:
Provide oil bunds with drainage via an oil separation tank, which should have capacity to hold
all oil from the largest transformer on site to avoid contamination of the environment and
minimise fire risk.
All cable ducts/trenches to be fire protected. Openings should be raised above bunding height
and sealed to prevent oil ingress and fire spreading along cable duct/trenches.
Fire/blast walls should be provided to protect adjacent transformers, if separation distance is
less than 15m for transformers < 60 MVA and 25 m for larger transformers.
If a sound enclosure is required, then an open roof reinforced concrete block construction can
provide very good fire protection for adjacent plant.

5. CONCLUSION
It is evident from the surveys carried out that the major contributors to failures are windings,
tapchangers and Bushing/cable terminations in that order. If reliability is to be improved, then the
main effort needs to be directed to improve specification, design and testing of these components.
The authors found from their 2002+04 surveys that 91 % of transformer oil fires was initiated by
explosive failures in OIP bushings and/or cable termination housed within cable boxes. Only one fire
was caused by an OLTC failure. None of the winding failures caused fire and only one fire in the
1985-95 survey is known to be caused by a winding failure.
The most effective mean to reduce transformer fires would probably be to use dry RIP bushings
only and terminate cables on a separate structure away from the transformer.
6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution from:
Members of the Australian CIGRE Panel A2.
J. Brander AREVA, Queensland.
A. Leslie Powerlink Queensland.
7. REFERENCES:
[1] Australia New Zealand CIGRE Reliability Survey 1995.
[2] Energy Supply Association of Australia Guideline for Oil Containment, Electricity Supply
Industry.