22 t e c hni c a l r he t or i c

says his divisions included a pistis and epipistis, or proof and supple-
mentary proof, followed by a refutation (elenchos) and supplementary
refutation (epexelenchos). Socrates ironically claims that Tisias and Gor-
gias showed how much more important probabilities were than facts
and could make small things great, great things small, new things old,
old things new, and discuss anything for any length. Such amplication
suggests matters of style, and Socrates goes on to note categories of
diction identied by Polus, Licymnius, and Protagoras. Included are
proper words, gurative words, poetic words, and devices for securing
pathos that were illustrated by Thrasymachus. Finally, we are told that a
speech is supposed to have an epilogos, or conclusion, in which there is a
recapitulation of the argument.
From Platos account we should not conclude that the early hand-
books were theoretical discussions of the nature and uses of rhetoric.

They only suggested an outline of a speech into four or more parts that
could give a clear organization to the subject, and they probably con-
sisted largely of examples of what one might say in each of the parts: how
to win the audiences good will and interest in the proemium; how to
give a clear and brief statement of a case in the narration; how to
construct or refute an argument in the proof; or how to recapitulate the
argument in the epilogue. It is clear that the handbooks were intended to
be used as preparation for speaking in courts of law, though some of the
procedures could be applied to deliberative speeches in the assembly.
They probably did not treat word choice or aspects of style. For that, one
went to the works by Polus, Licymnius, or Protagoras, as noted by Plato,
and these were probably simple lists of dierent kinds of words that
might be useful in some context.
The most important part of a speech is usually the argument, and the
technique taught by the early handbooks focused on what is called eikos
in Greek, argument from probability. A few pages later in the Phaedrus
(273ac) Socrates says that by eikos Tisias meant that which seems true
to the multitude, and he quotes the following example:
If a weak and brave man, having beaten up a strong and cowardly
man, is brought into court, neither must tell the truth. The coward
must claim that he was not beaten by a single brave man: that is, he
must claim to have been attacked by two or more; whereas the other