Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government, NICANOR M.
PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local Government and SALVADOR
CABALUNA JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J .:p
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the
Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a
member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative
complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in
1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave
misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the
Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
1
The personalities involved are Joceleehn
Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr.
Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor;
Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia
Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay
tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the
respondent Court of Appeals.
2
We quote:
xxx xxx xxx
In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to
the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons,
having supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner
City Mayor, using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest
of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her qualifications
are best suited and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a
non-career service employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in
the office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the
complainant's duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. The
petitioner's act are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from her
permanent position or force her to resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner
handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City
Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any
explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld without cause
since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given
the run-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with
Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered
trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo
Villegas (Annex B).
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of
Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German
Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo are members of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out
from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was
unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without
an office, Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-
Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and decided to
do the same. However, the petitioner, together with its fully-armed security
men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong
denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio station
and decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and
there were so many people who gathered to witness the incident. However,
before the group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his
security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to the
people and the bystanders.
Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod,
appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without
the benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was
issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon
orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees
thereby causing injuries He was released only the following day.
3

The Mayor thereafter answered
4
and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The
opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events:
xxx xxx xxx
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for
hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the
Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through
telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties
received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a
postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and was
represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers,
Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come
all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually
held only on June 20,1988 in view of the inability and
unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same
venue-Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the
proceedings and moved for a postponement under the excuse that
he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers
denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties
were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).
In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the
complainants and their witnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a
preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until
October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the
petitioner again asked for a postponement to September 26,1988.
On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were
present, together with their respective counsel. The petitioner
sought for a postponement which was denied. In these hearings
which were held in Mala the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No.
C-10298 and 10299.
The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and
the complainants testified including their witnesses.
On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved
for a postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7
to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion for change of
venue as denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on November
7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated
his motion to change venue and moved for postponement anew.
The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition of
witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed.
However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties
were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December
13 to 15, 1988.
The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that
his witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to
lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner
was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.
On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion
for postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to
December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December 15,
1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were
considered submitted for resolution.
In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the
arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent
ordered the petitioner's second preventive suspension dated
October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was
able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City.
The second preventive suspension was not enforced.
5

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for
prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in
the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of
preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for
prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order,
preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in
twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting
mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court
of Appeals, a petition for prohibition,
6
(Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the
complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-
G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing
CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a
Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary
charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court. On June 26,1990, we issued a
Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing
the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two
decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our
Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of
Local Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process
of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile"
towards him
7
arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino party
8
and the running political rivalry they maintained in
the last congressional and local elections;
9
and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery
in Iloilo City.
10
He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension
since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of
November 14, 1988),
11
notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing
and meted out two more suspension orders of the aforementioned cases.
12
He
likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in
Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his
request.
13
He states that he asked for postponement on "valid and
justifiable"
14
grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which
required confinement; that his "vital"
15
witness was also hospitalized
16
but that the
latter unduly denied his request.
17
Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos.
93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event,
of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the
petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).
As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very
clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the
respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis-Santos were (are)
political rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure
speculation and although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions
(as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would
have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud"
has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints. The Mayor has failed
furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce
him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. Again,
although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them, at face
value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them
18
for the
same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say so's were never
corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary
Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his duties
regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to
him.
As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to
defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas
Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact
restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners.
19

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given
any compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found
no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides,
postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based
on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been
guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations
deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.
We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as
the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution
20
no longer allows the
President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of
suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the
Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and
second, by deleting the phrase
21
as may be provided by law to strip the President of
the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds
support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in question
reads as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities
with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of
their component units are within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions.
22

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we
quote:
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over
all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.
23

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is
significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided
by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.
It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of
Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas
Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed,
the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case
may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within
seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and
investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the
respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately
prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the
said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid
period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted.
24

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be
imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a
provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an
elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the
respondent is an elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are
joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is
strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance
in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases,
preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of
said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed
reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
against him until its termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of
the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not
be counted in computing the time of suspension.
25

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987
Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the
President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local
officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local
Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional
language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the
constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right
or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide
administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of
"as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local
governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local
government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local
autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local
government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or
Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal
corporations euphemistically to "small republics."
26
Autonomy, in the constitutional
sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the
legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself
suggest-is to wean local government units from over-dependence on the central
government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-
executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government
code,
27
a local tax law,
28
income distribution legislation,
29
and a national
representation law,
30
and measures
31
designed to realize autonomy at the local level.
It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally,
that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions
for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal
powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise
to the President. Thus:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.
32

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to
stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by
severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals,
like the power of local legislation.
33
The Constitution did nothing more, however,
and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of
Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the
Constitution contains no prohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President
mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and
denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary
authority as this Court has held,
34
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884,
this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the
power of control given to him over executive officials of our government
wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two
different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in
that case the Court has made the following digression: "In administration law
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be
reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his
opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section
64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. ...
35

xxx xxx xxx
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter."
36
"Supervision" on the
other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties.
37
As we held,
38
however, "investigating"
is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering".
The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least
three cases,Lacson v. Roque,
39
Hebron v. Reyes,
40
and Mondano v. Silvosa,
41
and
possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General.
42
In Lacson, this Court said that
the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided
by law,"
43
a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the
President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take
any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the
corresponding provincial board."
44
However,
neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive
from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control
powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus,
according to Lacson:
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or
suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken.
Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled
by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject
to constitutional limitations.
45

In Hebron we stated:
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer
is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and
adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to
the contrary-which does not et with respect to municipal officers
...
46

In Mondano, the Court held:
... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the
provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial
governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints
made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of
office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving
moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit
written charges touching the matter to the provincial board,
furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally
or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer
(not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if
in his opinion the charge by one affecting the official integrity of
the officer in question." Section 86 of the Revised Administration
Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by
the Department Head over the administration of ... municipalities
... . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the
same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section
79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional
power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l),
Article VII of the Constitution.
47

xxx xxx xxx
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local
officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative
Code.
48

Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to
suspend/remove) it was not because we did not think that the President can not
exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases ii which the law gave him the power, the Court, as
in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.
49

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of
the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes
that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although
Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the
President,
50
Commissioner Blas Ople would not.
51

The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the
Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are
not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the
stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held
that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and
effect.
52

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization."
53
The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to
break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local
governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments
from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the
relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and
local government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter
has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are
subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit
paradoxically, to enhance self- government.
As we observed in one case,
54
decentralization means devolution of national
administration but not power to the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable,"
and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but
only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He
has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be
autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
55

The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit
another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact
that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing
the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima
faciefindings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office
(assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another
question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend
him out of office. As we held:
56

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His
term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and
the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of
his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of
October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a basic assumption of the
electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to
the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or
malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against
administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, Ms culpability
must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the
constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be
justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a
due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the
meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be
in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is
injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga They were deprived of the
services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive
suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A
denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.
57

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above
reasons,
58
and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local
government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held,
59
is simply "to
prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his
influence and authority over possible witnesses"
60
or to keep him off "the records
and other evidence.
61

It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against
an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty
days,
62
which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period
is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if
prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the
accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the
respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found
guilty.Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides,
it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held,
63
a longer suspension is
unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote
possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest
of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension
permanent.It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the
Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because
needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated,
wiped out his tenure considerably. The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing
the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it
is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when
apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary
evidence to build a case against the Mayor without suspending him a day longer.
What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to
speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when
he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of
Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of
Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave
abuse of discretion. The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under
questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact
remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of
suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner
(which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code which brings to light a
pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure.
The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State
to perpetuate an arbitrary act.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third
suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier
issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the
Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake
steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal,
judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are
precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those
remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.
In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration,
not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the
manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant
but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from
legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of
autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by
law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not
signify "control" (which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may
no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or
request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of
suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the
petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges
are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension
shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under
subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are
AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made
to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative
charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The
Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases
pending against Mayor Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.

D E C I S I O N
DATU KIDA vs SENATE

BRION, J .:

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act
Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other
Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8
th
of August
2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to
coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The law as well
granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office
of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.

Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already
spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No.
2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied
after RA No. 10153 was passed.

Factual Antecedents

The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:

Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an
organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the granted
autonomy.

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the executive
department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be
elective and representative of the constituent political units. The
organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal,
family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions
of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. A
plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of
RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu
and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional
officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after
its ratification.

RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic
Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as Amended) was the next legislative act passed. This law provided
further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic
act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001.Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA
No. 9140
[1]
- on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally
scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite
to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.

RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.
The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date.

RA No. 9333
[2]
was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM
regional elections to the 2
nd
Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3
years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not
ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM
elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill
(HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled
on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No.
4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate
Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted
favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred
with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.
10153 into law.

As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition
filed with this Court G.R. No. 196271
[3]
- assailing the constitutionality of both HB
No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well for
non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter, petitioner
Basari Mapupuno inG.R. No. 196305 filed another petition
[4]
also assailing the
validity of RA No. 9333.

With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the
following petitions against its constitutionality:

a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
[5]
filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a
member of the House of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his
capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R.
No. 197221;

b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition
[6]
filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal
as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;

c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary
Injunction
[7]
filed by Louis Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC and
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392;
and

d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
[8]
filed by Jacinto Paras as a member
of the House of Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa,
Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454.

Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as
registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng
Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled
for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
[9]
against the
COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No.
9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines,
Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their own Motion for Leave to
Admit their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention dated July 18,
2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the
Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality of
HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16,
2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their respective memoranda
within twenty (20) days.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective
officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be
decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.

The Arguments

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert
that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority
vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of
RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of
Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged
violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to
adhere to the elective and representative character of the executive and legislative
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the
President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective
ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections
shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment
also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation
of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

The Issues
From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and
argued by the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:

I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization
of elections

II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority
vote and plebiscite

A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular
elections constitute an amendment to Section 7,
Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?

B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for
amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate
Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the corollary doctrine on
irrepealable laws?

C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the
creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2,
Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?

IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted
to the ARMM

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:

A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and
legal.

We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.
OUR RULING

We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.

I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate

The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the
Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites Sections
1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by
the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the
Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan
Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives
and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall
serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve
obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year and
the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice
President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes
of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June
30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1992.

We agree with this position.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can
be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution,
[10]
which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to
attain synchronization of elections.
[11]

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective
officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning
senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future
elections whether national or local to once every three years.
[12]
This intention
finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations.
[13]

These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of
the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the
second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.

This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the
national and local elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmea v. Commission
on Elections,
[14]
we explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987
Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the
Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour,
date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-
mentioned Sections that the term of synchronization is used
synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is
the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the
same day or occasion. This common termination date will
synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII)
will have to be synchronized with the election for President and
Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from
the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be
understood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary
meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails.
[15]
As this Court explained in People v.
Derilo,
[16]
[a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its language
should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that
primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or
minor political subdivision.
[17]
Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of
governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall within
this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the
limited region of ARMM.

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the
Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are established and
discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to
Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local
government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic
of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao, and theCordilleras as hereinafter provided.

Thus, we find the contention that the synchronization mandated by the
Constitution does not include the regional elections of the ARMM
unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions
below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in this
case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.


II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No.
10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution
[18]
which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the
Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days.
The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate
enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
[19]
explained the effect of
the Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to
the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section
26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a
law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii]
it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days
before it is finally approved.

xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the
requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari
jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate
version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and
third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day
[May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the President as
urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment
of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections.
[20]
Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted
both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate
enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or emergency that had to
be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII,
Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the
delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI,
Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights of
individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of
presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away
with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are
duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should
elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]

The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their
legislative discretion gave full recognition to the Presidents certification and
promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our
intrusion under our power of judicial review.
[21]


The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification
for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are not
bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due our
co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the Constitution,
caution a stay of the judicial hand.
[22]


In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that
underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of every bill must
always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending
bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect to
Members of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote
on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment
process.
[23]


We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both
advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to
present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the
cited ground.

III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged
because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in
amending this law. These provisions require:

Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this
Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the
Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the
House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.

Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall
become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not
earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the
approval of such amendment or revision.

We find no merit in this contention.

In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No.
9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for
the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and
thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA
No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not
change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA
No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular
elections.
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the
date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion finds support in
ARMMs recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the
ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did not fix the
date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first
ARMM elections,
[24]
leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment.
Consequently, RA No. 7647,
[25]
RA No. 8176,
[26]
RA No. 8746,
[27]
RA No.
8753,
[28]
and RA No. 9012
[29]
were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the
ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of
RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was
no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March
31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of
September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140
[30]
to reset the date of the
ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite
for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the
ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions
ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress
passed RA No. 9333,
[31]
which further reset the date of the ARMM regional
elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to
treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and
distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent
when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054
the character of an irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA
No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054
[32]
has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands.

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as long as
majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present,
these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a
quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no
less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this
2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage
of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or
repeal the laws it had passed. The Courts pronouncement in City of Davao v.
GSIS
[33]
on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic
principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions
of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are
regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary
powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired
in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall
future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under
delusions of omniscience.

xxx

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all
subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial
jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless
prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or
limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors
by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every
legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its
predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same
session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is
in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot
bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot
declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the
effect of subsequent legislation upon existing
statutes.
[34]
(Emphasis ours.)


Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a
limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is
constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators
room for action and flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVI I of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite
requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the Constitution

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted
supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its
Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement, we
find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18, Article
X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of
the Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required
only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces,
cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While the
settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite
requirement in order to become effective,
[35]
questions on the extent of the matters
requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms
of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to
be required for every statutory amendment.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation of
the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the votes
case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. With these
wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to,
or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation
of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution
which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a
plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the
basic structure of the regional government; (b) the regions judicial system, i.e.,
the special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the
grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
[36]


The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that
the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act.
Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite
requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a
substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with these
requirements.

IV. The synchronization issue

As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a
constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for and this synchronization must
include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact already exists
RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already
provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national and
congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for
local governments (with the exception
ofbarangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not
constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already reflected
in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by express
constitutional recognition.
[37]


To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarilyhas to reconcile the
schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August
2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local
elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).

During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to allow the elective
officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to
Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office;
[38]
(2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms
of those elected to expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume
office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA
No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office.

As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing
to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and passed
RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.

V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153

A. Basic Underlying Premises

To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material
premises must be fully understood. The first is the extent of the powers of Congress
to legislate; thesecond is the constitutional mandate for the synchronization of
elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and established
under the 1987 Constitution.

The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive.
[39]
The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of
civil government.
[40]
Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.
[41]
Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly,
legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general concern
or common interest.
[42]


The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or
implied. The express limitations are generally provided in some provisions of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of
Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and
referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of
Article X) provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are found
in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical
events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic
law.
[43]


The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21
of Article X of the Constitution constitute express limitations on legislative power
as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting what is
otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance of the
autonomous region.

Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations
posed by the prescribed basic structure of government i.e., that the government
must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both of which must
be elective and representative of the constituent political units; national government,
too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted under Section 20, Article
X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17, Article X, all powers and
functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall
be vested in the National Government.

The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a
standard that Congress must observe in dealing with legislation touching on the
affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no doubt on
what the Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in particular,
the power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and administrative
matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the permeating principles of
national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in the
above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.
[44]
In other words, the Constitution and
the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et
imperio
[45]
in the relationship between the national and the regional governments.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of
national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates,
with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the
difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole
country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower
regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.

These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of
Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To succinctly describe the legal situation
that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional elections with the
national, congressional and all other local elections (save
for barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how to
provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period between the
expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office
twenty-one (21) months away of those who will win in the synchronized elections
on May 13, 2013.

The problem, in other words, was for interim measuresfor this period,
consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its established supporting
jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim
measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape.
The Constitutions Transitory Provisions themselves collectively provide measures
for transition from the old constitution to the new
[46]
and for the introduction of new
concepts.
[47]
As previously mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms and of
elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the Transitory
Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far enough or deeply enough,
particularly into the problems that synchronizing regional autonomous elections
would entail; thus, the present problem is with us today.

The creation of local government units also represents instances when
interim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon del Sur
[48]
and Dinagat
Islands,
[49]
the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an interim
governor, vice-governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although
these positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive officials were to
serve until a new set of provincial officials shall have been elected and
qualified.
[50]
A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local
government from a sub-province to a province.
[51]


In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-
the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the
goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution
and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choice of measures
was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.

To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the
guideposts and markers in our discussion of the options available to Congress to
address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the ARMM elections,
properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide. The proper
understanding of the options as interim measures assume prime materiality as it is
under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured,
i.e., given the constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot legally be
faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the Constitution when
it addressed through RA No. 10153 the concomitant problems that the adjustment
of elections necessarily brought with it?

B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional

We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in
executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an
option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]


Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend
their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC:
[52]


It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term
of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in
effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the
Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin,
there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that
period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.

In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as
follows:

It has been broadly stated that the
legislature cannot, by an act postponing the
election to fill an office the term of which is
limited by the Constitution, extend the term of
the incumbent beyond the period as limited
by the Constitution. [Emphasis ours.]

Independently of the Osmea ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the
supreme law of the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself made a
determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated
should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or repeal
through the applicable constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none of
the three branches of government can deviate from the constitutional mandate except
only as the Constitution itself may allow.
[53]
If at all, Congress may only pass
legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional command or to
implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other hand,
may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called for.
[54]


In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and
unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to
the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this
Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years
as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to
appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective
term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it
cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
[55]
Congress cannot also create a new term
and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into
the constitutional appointment power of the President.
[56]
Hence, holdover
whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could
not have undertaken.

Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question
of holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court.
The present case though differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings,
particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC,
[57]
Adap v.
Comelec,
[58]
and Montesclaros v. Comelec,
[59]
where the Court ruled that the elective
officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.

All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for
in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local elective
officials the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term
limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally
limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the term for which they
were originally elected.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had
been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the
past,
[60]
we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an
available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
[61]


Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the
intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by
completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly
within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers; this Court cannotpass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation,
[62]
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.

C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections

Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this
Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant to
Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as
evident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the Constitution:

Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the
regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]


Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President
and Vice-President, states:
xxxx

Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the
regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on
the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government
code which shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]

These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on
any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress
and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon
orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power
or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.
[63]


Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the
scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for
regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of
its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment
measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act
to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court
is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion.
[64]
But
our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act
of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus,
contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel
COMELEC to call for special elections.

Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the
COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to set the date of,
elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election.
[65]
Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the
holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant. True,
Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to
postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited to, and can only
be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law.
We quote:

Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any
serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of
election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other
analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free,
orderly and honest election should become impossible in any
political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a
verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and
hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a
date which should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause
for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to
elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law
for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election
would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on
the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect
on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]


A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address
instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but have to
bepostponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of such a
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become
impossible in any political subdivision. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the
term analogous causes will be restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected events
that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. These analogous causes are
further defined by the phrase of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and
honest election should become impossible.

Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where
elections have already been scheduled but do not take place because of (a) force
majeure, (b)violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous causes the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. As in
Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections do not occur
or had to be suspended because of unexpectedand unforeseen circumstances.

In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law
i.e., by congressional policy and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of
synchronization of national and local elections. By no stretch of the imagination can
these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by
Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct
the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute
under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor intended by
the lawmakers.
[66]
Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the
present case and this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to
hold special elections.

D. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials


Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the
COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the
newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials
elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective
officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective
officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials,
[67]
is
specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as
shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the
least votes,
[68]
and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President
[69]
in
order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The
settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere
statute.
[70]
More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the
authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more,
than the constitutionally mandated three years
[71]
as this tinkering would directly
contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration
date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This
is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for special elections
shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to
be elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on their term (where the term
means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another, while
the tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the
office).
[72]
As with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has
any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would
commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they do so.

E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs

The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure
RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM
during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as
the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be
examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly
construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized.
[73]
The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers
of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment
of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts,
or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
[emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can
appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public
ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank
of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.
[74]



Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.
10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint
pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to
appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution
requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an
express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment
of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional
problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153
were to bemistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative
character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of
structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor
and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the
assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.

As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and
plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA
No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections
and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how
RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based on its
unambiguous facial terms.
[75]
Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely
and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.

Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an
unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the
synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and based on
the above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a
holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or
shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the Presidents
power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as
allowed under Section 16, Article VI I of the Constitution an unconstitutional or
unreasonable choice for Congress to make?

Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other
situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the adjustment
period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not democratic
and republican. For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them
may be said to besystemicallywithdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic
regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the elective and
representative governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.

But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances
contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the
terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA
No. 9054 will not systemicallybe touched nor affected at all. To repeat what has
previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with
full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and
temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.

Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt
the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys
choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an
interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in
the creation of local government units
[76]
and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the
status of provinces.
[77]
These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national
demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis--vis the regional
interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different
from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the State, where one
of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of the
given circumstances.

Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not
necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a
function of the appointment process; only the elective aspect shall be supplanted
by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to
address concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4
and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and
Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.

Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its
proper context is a law that is not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its
autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.

VI. Other Constitutional Concerns

Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments
that upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous
precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in the
country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation
of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the President, to address. It is a power
that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its legislative
powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively
undertake with respect to elections.

If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a
very specific and limited purpose the synchronization of elections. It was a
temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No.
10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and
specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the cancellation
of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for special
elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by
Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.

Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in
a holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot compel
the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal with the
dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.

To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten
that a period of 21 months or close to 2 years intervenes from the time that the
incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired and the time the new ARMM
elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao history
past and current teach us, many developments, some of them critical and adverse,
can transpire in the countrys Muslim areas in this span of time in the way they
transpired in the past.
[78]
Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the presence of an
acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully functioning Regional
Legislative Assembly can be done away with even temporarily. To our mind, the
appointment of OICs under the present circumstances is an absolute necessity.

Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:
[79]


It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588
and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is
empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws
deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we
see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the
two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The
respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct
appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the
President who has supervision over local governments as provided
by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-
governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President,
until the law provides otherwise.

A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no
approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their
right of representation and governance in their own local
government.

In a republican form of government, the majority rules
through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or
absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that
extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent
delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if
the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.
[80]
(Emphasis
ours.)

As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor,
and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost
2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services
to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional government,
and in responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this
context, allowing the President in the exercise of his constitutionally-recognized
appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to
take.

B. Autonomy in the ARMM

It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally
mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that the
Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume that
there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates
synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one over
the other.

We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in
constitutional construction ut magis valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole,
[81]
and one mandate should not be given importance over
the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear.
[82]
We refer to
the Courts declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,
[83]
thus:

A provision of the constitution should not be construed in
isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be interpreted
as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be
reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of
them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]

Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional
autonomy. They are interests that this Court should reconcile and give effect to, in
the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to transit to
synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that must
be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of being
sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing
features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by the attendant
circumstances.

Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be
synchronized with the national and local elections in order to maintain the autonomy
of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough and tumble of
nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far from convinced of its
merits.

As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are
granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy
with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within
the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national policies set by the
national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution
for regional autonomous determination. As reflected during the constitutional
deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:

Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete
separation from the central government, but rather an efficient
working relationship between the autonomous region and the
central government. We see this as an effective partnership, not a
separation.

Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really
thought of as complete independence.

Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government
within the larger political framework of the
nation.
[84]
[Emphasis supplied.]

This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted Section
17, Article X of the Constitution, and by the express reservation under Section 1 of
the same Article that autonomy shall be within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines.

Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove
Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration of
powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provision in order to
make it clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of the
autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised by
the national government[.]
[85]
Of note is the Courts pronouncement in Pimentel,
Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre
[86]
which we quote:

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the
national government has not completely relinquished all its powers
over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance
more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn,
economic, political and social development at the smaller political
units are expected to propel social and economic growth and
development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole,
the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated
and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus,
policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President
and Congress. [Emphasis ours.]

In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to
defeat national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not
just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional
autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having to
act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the Constitution.


Conclusion

Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate
the synchronization of national and local elections when it enacted RA No.
10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this
task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation.
[87]
As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law and,
despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.
[88]


Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should
address what is essentially a legislative problem. It is not within the Courts power to
enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the exclusive
prerogative of Congress.
[89]
The petitioners, in asking this Court to compel
COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so, are
essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is
abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic
government the separation of powers.

The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with
grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
[90]


We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its
constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional
bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that
synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a
positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord
merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only
reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed valid.
[91]
Congress, thus,
has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party
challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this
presumption.
[92]
Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality.
[93]
As this Court declared in Garcia v.
Executive Secretary:
[94]


The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption
is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins
upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and
the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully
studied and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.
[95]
[Emphasis
ours.]

Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated
petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the
constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we
issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.

SO ORDERED.


[G. R. No. 119775. October 24, 2003]
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, MATEO CARIO
FOUNDATION INC., CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS
FOUNDATION INC., REGINA VICTORIA A. BENAFIN
REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS. ELISA
BENAFIN, IZABEL M. LUYK REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY
HER MOTHER MRS. REBECCA MOLINA LUYK, KATHERINE PE
REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER ROSEMARIE G.
PE, SOLEDAD S. CAMILO, ALICIA C. PACALSO ALIAS
KEVAB, BETTY I. STRASSER, RUBY C. GIRON, URSULA C.
PEREZ ALIAS BA-YAY, EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL,
CARMEN CAROMINA, LILIA G. YARANON, DIANE
MONDOC, petitioners, vs. VICTOR LIM, PRESIDENT, BASES
CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; JOHN HAY PORO
POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY OF BAGUIO,
TUNTEX (B.V.I.) CO. LTD., ASIAWORLD INTERNATIONALE
GROUP, INC., DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
By the present petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with
prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
petitioners assail, in the main, the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No.
420, Series of 1994, CREATING AND DESIGNATING A PORTION OF THE
AREA COVERED BY THE FORMER CAMP JOHN [HAY] AS THE JOHN HAY
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7227.
Republic Act No. 7227, AN ACT ACCELERATING THE CONVERSION OF
MILITARY RESERVATIONS INTO OTHER PRODUCTIVE USES, CREATING
THE BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY FOR THIS
PURPOSE, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, which
was enacted on March 13, 1992, set out the policy of the government to accelerate
the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the former
military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military Bases
Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their
extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay or the camp) in the City
of Baguio.
[1]

As noted in its title, R.A. No. 7227 created public respondent Bases Conversion
and Development Authority
[2]
(BCDA), vesting it with powers pertaining to the
multifarious aspects of carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas
in accordance with the declared government policy.
R.A. No. 7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port]
Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and bounds of which were to be delineated in a
proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines.
[3]

R.A. No. 7227 granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free
importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other
hallmarks of a liberalized financial and business climate.
[4]

And R.A. No. 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create through
executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government units
directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered
respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San
Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay.
[5]

On August 16, 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and
Escrow Agreement with private respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.) Co., Ltd (TUNTEX)
and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corporations
registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation
of a joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John
Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. Four months later or on
December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORD executed a Joint Venture
Agreement
[6]
whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint venture company
known as the Baguio International Development and Management Corporation
which would lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of
turning such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally
envisioned by the parties under their Memorandum of Agreement.
The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in
response to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John
Hay.
By Resolution
[7]
of September 29, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Baguio City (the sanggunian) officially asked BCDA to exclude all the barangays
partly or totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of any
plan or program for its development.
By a subsequent Resolution
[8]
dated January 19, 1994, the sanggunian sought
from BCDA an abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots
being occupied by residents of nine (9) barangays surrounding the military
reservation.
Still by another resolution passed on February 21, 1994,
the sanggunian adopted and submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for the
development of Camp John Hay.
[9]
The sangguniansvision expressed, among other
things, a kind of development that affords protection to the environment, the making
of a family-oriented type of tourist destination, priority in employment opportunities
for Baguio residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed participation of the
city government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the
previously named nine barangays from the area for development, and liability for
local taxes of businesses to be established within the camp.
[10]

BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified
the other proposals of the sanggunian.
[11]
They stressed the need to declare Camp
John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full development in accordance with
the mandate of R.A. No. 7227.
[12]

On May 11, 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to
order the determination of realty taxes which may otherwise be collected from real
properties of Camp John Hay.
[13]
The resolution was intended to intelligently guide
the sanggunian in determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared a
SEZ, it (the sanggunian) being of the view that such declaration would exempt the
camps property and the economic activity therein from local or national taxation.
More than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255,
(Series of 1994),
[14]
seeking and supporting, subject to its concurrence, the issuance
by then President Ramos of a presidential proclamation declaring an area of 288.1
hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.
7227. Together with this resolution was submitted a draft of the proposed
proclamation for consideration by the President.
[15]

On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420,
[16]
the title
of which was earlier indicated, which established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John
Hay and which reads as follows:
x x x
Pursuant to the powers vested in me by the law and the resolution of concurrence by
the City Council of Baguio, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Philippines, do
hereby create and designate a portion of the area covered by the former John Hay
reservation as embraced, covered, and defined by the 1947 Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended,
as the John Hay Special Economic Zone, and accordingly order:
SECTION 1. Coverage of John Hay Special Economic Zone. The John
Hay Special Economic Zone shall cover the area consisting of Two Hundred Eighty
Eight and one/tenth (288.1) hectares, more or less, of the total of Six Hundred
Seventy-Seven (677) hectares of the John Hay Reservation, more or less, which have
been surveyed and verified by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) as defined by the following technical description:
A parcel of land, situated in the City of Baguio, Province of Benguet, Island of
Luzon, and particularly described in survey plans Psd-131102-002639 and Ccs-
131102-000030 as approved on 16 August 1993 and 26 August 1993, respectively,
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, in detail containing :
Lot 1, Lot 2, Lot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, Lot 7, Lot 13, Lot 14, Lot 15, and Lot 20 of
Ccs-131102-000030
-and-
Lot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, Lot 7, Lot 8, Lot 9, Lot 10, Lot 11, Lot 14, Lot 15, Lot 16,
Lot 17, and Lot 18 of Psd-131102-002639 being portions of TCT No. T-3812, LRC
Rec. No. 87.
With a combined area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT AND ONE/TENTH
HECTARES (288.1 hectares); Provided that the area consisting of approximately Six
and two/tenth (6.2) hectares, more or less, presently occupied by the VOA and the
residence of the Ambassador of the United States, shall be considered as part of the
SEZ only upon turnover of the properties to the government of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Sec. 2. Governing Body of the John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant
to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7227, the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority is hereby established as the governing body of the John Hay Special
Economic Zone and, as such, authorized to determine the utilization and disposition
of the lands comprising it, subject to private rights, if any, and in consultation and
coordination with the City Government of Baguio after consultation with its
inhabitants, and to promulgate the necessary policies, rules, and regulations to
govern and regulate the zone thru the John Hay Poro Point Development
Corporation, which is its implementing arm for its economic development and
optimum utilization.
Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to
Section 5(m) and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7227, the John Hay Poro Point
Development Corporation shall implement all necessary policies, rules, and
regulations governing the zone, including investment incentives, in consultation with
pertinent government departments. Among others, the zone shall have all the
applicable incentives of the Special Economic Zone under Section 12 of Republic
Act No. 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing
Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991,
and new investment laws that may hereinafter be enacted.
Sec. 4. Role of Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities. All
Heads of departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
government are hereby directed to give full support to Bases Conversion and
Development Authority and/or its implementing subsidiary or joint venture to
facilitate the necessary approvals to expedite the implementation of various projects
of the conversion program.
Sec. 5. Local Authority. Except as herein provided, the affected local government
units shall retain their basic autonomy and identity.
Sec. 6. Repealing Clause. All orders, rules, and regulations, or parts thereof, which
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Proclamation, are hereby repealed,
amended, or modified accordingly.
Sec. 7. Effectivity. This proclamation shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5
th
day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and ninety-four.
The issuance of Proclamation No. 420 spawned the present petition
[17]
for
prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief which was filed on April 25, 1995
challenging, in the main, its constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of the
Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between public
respondent BCDA and private respondents TUNTEX andASIAWORLD.
Petitioners allege as grounds for the allowance of the petition the following:
I. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, SERIES OF 1990
(sic) IN SO FAR AS IT GRANTS TAX EXEMPTIONS IS INVALID
AND ILLEGAL AS IT IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE
BY THE PRESIDENT OF A POWER GRANTED ONLY TO THE
LEGISLATURE.
II. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, IN SO FAR AS IT
LIMITS THE POWERS AND INTERFERES WITH THE
AUTONOMY OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO IS INVALID, ILLEGAL
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
III. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, SERIES OF 1994 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT IT VIOLATES THE RULE
THAT ALL TAXES SHOULD BE UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE.
IV. THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY
AND BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RESPONDENTS
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY HAVING
BEENENTERED INTO ONLY BY DIRECT NEGOTIATION IS
ILLEGAL.
V. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC RESPONDENT BASES CONVERSION
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS (sic) ILLEGAL.
VI. THE CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF
RESPONDENTS NOT HAVING UNDERGONE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IS BEING
ILLEGALLY CONSIDERED WITHOUT A VALID
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT.
A temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction was prayed
for to enjoin BCDA, John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation and the city
government from implementing Proclamation No. 420,
and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD from proceeding with their plan respecting Camp
John Hays development pursuant to their Joint Venture Agreement with BCDA.
[18]

Public respondents, by their separate Comments, allege as moot and academic
the issues raised by the petition, the questioned Memorandum of Agreement and
Joint Venture Agreement having already been deemed abandoned by the inaction of
the parties thereto prior to the filing of the petition as in fact, by letter of November
21, 1995, BCDA formally notified TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD of the revocation of
their said agreements.
[19]

In maintaining the validity of Proclamation No. 420, respondents contend that
by extending to the John Hay SEZ economic incentives similar to those enjoyed by
the Subic SEZ which was established under R.A. No. 7227, the proclamation is
merely implementing the legislative intent of said law to turn the US military bases
into hubs of business activity or investment. They underscore the point that the
governments policy of bases conversion can not be achieved without extending the
same tax exemptions granted by R.A. No. 7227 to Subic SEZ to other SEZs.
Denying that Proclamation No. 420 is in derogation of the local autonomy of
Baguio City or that it is violative of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection,
respondents assail petitioners lack of standing to bring the present suit even as
taxpayers and in the absence of any actual case or controversy to warrant this Courts
exercise of its power of judicial review over the proclamation.
Finally, respondents seek the outright dismissal of the petition for having been
filed in disregard of the hierarchy of courts and of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Replying,
[20]
petitioners aver that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies finds no
application
herein since they are invoking the exclusive authority of this Court under Section 21
of R.A. No. 7227 to enjoin or restrain implementation of projects for conversion of
the base areas; that the established exceptions to the aforesaid doctrine obtain in the
present petition; and that they possess the standing to bring the petition which is a
taxpayers suit.
Public respondents have filed their Rejoinder
[21]
and the parties have filed their
respective memoranda.
Before dwelling on the core issues, this Court shall first address the preliminary
procedural questions confronting the petition.
The judicial policy is and has always been that this Court will not entertain
direct resort to it except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper
courts, or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Courts primary
jurisdiction.
[22]
Neither will it entertain an action for declaratory relief, which is
partly the nature of this petition, over which it has no original jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, as it is only this Court which has the power under Section
21
[23]
of R.A. No. 7227 to enjoin implementation of projects for the development of
the former US military reservations, the issuance of which injunction petitioners pray
for, petitioners direct filing of the present petition with it is allowed. Over and
above this procedural objection to the present suit, this Court retains full
discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly to it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant.
[24]
Besides,
remanding the case to the lower courts now would just unduly prolong adjudication
of the issues.
The transformation of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay into a
SEZ is not simply a re-classification of an area, a mere ascription of a status to a
place. It involves turning the former US military reservation into a focal point for
investments by both local and foreign entities. It is to be made a site of vigorous
business activity, ultimately serving as a spur to the countrys long awaited economic
growth. For, as R.A. No. 7227 unequivocally declares, it is the governments policy
to enhance the benefits to be derived from the base areas in order to promote the
economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in
general.
[25]
Like the Subic SEZ, the John Hay SEZ should also be turned into a self-
sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center.
[26]

More than the economic interests at stake, the development of Camp John Hay
as well as of the other base areas unquestionably has critical links to a host of
environmental and social concerns. Whatever use to which these lands will be
devoted will set a chain of events that can affect one way or another the social and
economic way of life of the communities where the bases are located, and ultimately
the nation in general.
Underscoring the fragility of Baguio Citys ecology with its problem on the
scarcity of its water supply, petitioners point out that the local and national
government are faced with the challenge of how to provide for an ecologically
sustainable, environmentally sound, equitable transition for the city in the wake of
Camp John Hays reversion to the mass of government property.
[27]
But that is why
R.A. No. 7227 emphasizes the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and
Subic military reservations and their extensions consistent with ecological
and environmental standards.
[28]
It cannot thus be gainsaid that the matter of
conversion of the US bases into SEZs, in this case Camp John Hay, assumes
importance of a national magnitude.
Convinced then that the present petition embodies crucial issues, this Court
assumes jurisdiction over the petition.
As far as the questioned agreements between BCDA
and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD are concerned, the legal questions being raised
thereon by petitioners have indeed been rendered moot and academic by the
revocation of such agreements. There are, however, other issues posed by the
petition, those which center on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420, which
have not been mooted by the said supervening event upon application of the rules for
the judicial scrutiny of constitutional cases. The issues boil down to:
(1) Whether the present petition complies with the requirements for
this Courts exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional issues;
(2) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for
national and local tax exemption within and granting other
economic incentives to the John Hay Special Economic Zone; and
(3) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or
interfering with the local autonomy of Baguio City;
It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the
court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.
[29]

An actual case or controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory.
[30]
The
controversy needs to be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of
parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests.
[31]
There
is in the present case a real clash of interests and rights between petitioners and
respondents arising from the issuance of a presidential proclamation that converts a
portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay into a SEZ, the former insisting that
such proclamation contains unconstitutional provisions, the latter claiming
otherwise.
R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local
government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the
country.
[32]
The grant by the law on local government units of the right of
concurrence on the bases conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on
them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or
surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of
petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation No.
420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the government act being challenged.
[33]
Theirs is a material
interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an interest
in the question involved or an incidental interest,
[34]
for what is at stake in the
enforcement of Proclamation No. 420 is the very economic and social existence of
the people of Baguio City.
Petitioners locus standi parallels that of the petitioner and other residents of
Bataan, specially of the town of Limay, in Garcia v. Board of Investments
[35]
where
this Court characterized their interest in the establishment of a petrochemical plant in
their place as actual, real, vital and legal, for it would affect not only their economic
life but even the air they breathe.
Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly
elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governance of Baguio
City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the
question of whether to concur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by
Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, petitioners Claravall and Yaranon, as city
officials who voted against
[36]
the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994)
supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation No. 420, have legal
standing to bring the present petition.
That there is herein a dispute on legal rights and interests is thus beyond
doubt. The mootness of the issues concerning the questioned agreements between
public and private respondents is of no moment.
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act,
the dispute is deemed to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any
other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law
is enough to awaken judicial duty.
[37]

As to the third and fourth requisites of a judicial inquiry, there is likewise no
question that they have been complied with in the case at bar. This is an action filed
purposely to bring forth constitutional issues, ruling on which this Court must take
up. Besides, respondents never raised issues with respect to these requisites, hence,
they are deemed waived.
Having cleared the way for judicial review, the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 420, as framed in the second and third issues above, must now be
addressed squarely.
The second issue refers to petitioners objection against the creation by
Proclamation No. 420 of a regime of tax exemption within the John Hay
SEZ. Petitioners argue that nowhere in R. A. No. 7227 is there a grant of tax
exemption to SEZs yet to be established in base areas, unlike the grant under
Section 12 thereof of tax exemption and investment incentives to the therein
established Subic SEZ. The grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ, petitioners
conclude, thus contravenes Article VI, Section 28 (4) of the Constitution which
provides that No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.
Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, the challenged provision, reads:
Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to
Section 5(m) and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7227, the John Hay Poro Point
Development Corporation shall implement all necessary policies, rules, and
regulations governing the zone, including investment incentives, in consultation with
pertinent government departments. Among others, the zone shall have all the
applicable incentives of the Special Economic Zone under Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export
Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign
Investment Act of 1991, and new investment laws that may hereinafter be
enacted. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 provides:
x x x
(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the
Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic
Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial,
commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities
in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments;
b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a
separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital
within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide
incentives such as tax and duty free importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the
Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be
subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other
relevant tax laws of the Philippines;
(c) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic
Special Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three percent (3%) of the gross
income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic
Zone shall be remitted to the National Government, one percent (1%) each to the
local government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their
population area, and other factors. In addition, there is hereby established a
development fund of one percent (1%) of the gross income earned by all businesses
and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone to be utilized for the
Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous to be base areas. In case
of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption privileges
in the Subic Special Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor of the
latter;
(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign
exchange, gold, securities and futures shall be allowed and maintained in the Subic
Special Economic Zone;
(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise and regulate
the operations of banks and other financial institutions within the Subic Special
Economic Zone;
(f) Banking and Finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign
currency depository units of local commercial banks and offshore banking units of
foreign banks with minimum Central Bank regulation;
(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose continuing
investment shall not be less than Two Hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000),
his/her spouse and dependent children under twenty-one (21) years of age, shall be
granted permanent resident status within the Subic Special Economic Zone. They
shall have freedom of ingress and egress to and from the Subic Special Economic
Zone without any need of special authorization from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority referred to in Section 13 of this
Act may also issue working visas renewable every two (2) years to foreign
executives and other aliens possessing highly-technical skills which no Filipino
within the Subic Special Economic Zone possesses, as certified by the Department of
Labor and Employment. The names of aliens granted permanent residence status
and working visas by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within thirty (30) days after issuance
thereof;
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic SEZ
which was granted by Congress with tax exemption, investment incentives and the
like. There is no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be
created at the time via presidential proclamation.
The deliberations of the Senate confirm the exclusivity to Subic SEZ of the tax
and investment privileges accorded it under the law, as the following exchanges
between our lawmakers show during the second reading of the precursor bill of R.A.
No. 7227 with respect to the investment policies that would govern Subic SEZ which
are now embodied in the aforesaid Section 12 thereof:
x x x
Senator Maceda: This is what I was talking about. We get into problems here
because all of these following policies are centered around the concept of free
port. And in the main paragraph above, we have declared both Clark and Subic as
special economic zones, subject to these policies which are, in effect, a free-port
arrangement.
Senator Angara: The Gentleman is absolutely correct, Mr. President. So we must
confine these policies only to Subic.
May I withdraw then my amendment, and instead provide that THE SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONE OF SUBIC SHALL BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE FOLLOWING POLICIES. Subject to style, Mr. President.
Thus, it is very clear that these principles and policies are applicable only to Subic as
a free port.
Senator Paterno: Mr. President.
The President: Senator Paterno is recognized.
Senator Paterno: I take it that the amendment suggested by Senator Angara would
then prevent the establishment of other special economic zones observing these
policies.
Senator Angara: No, Mr. President, because during our short caucus, Senator
Laurel raised the point that if we give this delegation to the President to establish
other economic zones, that may be an unwarranted delegation.
So we agreed that we will simply limit the definition of powers and description of
the zone to Subic, but that does not exclude the possibility of creating other
economic zones within the baselands.
Senator Paterno: But if that amendment is followed, no other special economic
zone may be created under authority of this particular bill. Is that correct, Mr.
President?
Senator Angara: Under this specific provision, yes, Mr. President. This provision
now will be confined only to Subic.
[38]

x x x (Underscoring supplied).
As gathered from the earlier-quoted Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the privileges
given to Subic SEZ consist principally of exemption from tariff or customs duties,
national and local taxes of business entities therein (paragraphs (b) and (c)), free
market and trade of specified goods or properties (paragraph d), liberalized banking
and finance (paragraph f), and relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors
(paragraph g). Yet, apart from these, Proclamation No. 420 also makes available to
the John Hay SEZ benefits existing in other laws such as the privilege of export
processing zone-based businesses of importing capital equipment and raw materials
free from taxes, duties and other restrictions;
[39]
tax and duty exemptions, tax
holiday, tax credit, and other incentives under the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987;
[40]
and the applicability to the subject zone of rules governing foreign
investments in the Philippines.
[41]

While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the creation and
success of SEZs, free trade zones and the like, the grant thereof to the John Hay SEZ
cannot be sustained. The incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only to the
Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no support
therein. Neither does the same grant of privileges to the John Hay SEZ find support
in the other laws specified under Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, which laws
were already extant before the issuance of the proclamation or the enactment of R.A.
No. 7227.
More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is one of tax
exemption. It is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state
constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of
property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to
tax.
[42]
Other than Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for specific tax
exemptions,
[43]
or local governments may pass ordinances on exemption only from
local taxes.
[44]

The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitutions
imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of Congress.
[45]
In the same vein, the other kinds of
privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ are by tradition and usage for Congress to
legislate upon.
Contrary to public respondents suggestions, the claimed statutory exemption
of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the
language of the law on which it is based; it must be expressly granted in a statute
stated in a language too clear to be mistaken.
[46]
Tax exemption cannot be implied as
it must be categorically and unmistakably expressed.
[47]

If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ the same tax
exemption and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it would have so expressly
provided in the R.A. No. 7227.
This Court no doubt can void an act or policy of the political departments of the
government on either of two groundsinfringement of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion.
[48]

This Court then declares that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax
exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ is void for being violative of the
Constitution. This renders it unnecessary to still dwell on petitioners claim that the
same grant violates the equal protection guarantee.
With respect to the final issue raised by petitioners that Proclamation No.
420 is unconstitutional for being in derogation of Baguio Citys local autonomy,
objection is specifically mounted against Section 2 thereof in which BCDA is set up
as the governing body of the John Hay SEZ.
[49]

Petitioners argue that there is no authority of the President to subject the John
Hay SEZ to the governance of BCDA which has just oversight functions over SEZ;
and that to do so is to diminish the city governments power over an area within its
jurisdiction, hence, Proclamation No. 420 unlawfully gives the President power of
control over the local government instead of just mere supervision.
Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit. Under R.A. No. 7227, the BCDA is
entrusted with, among other things, the following purpose:
[50]

x x x
(a) To own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air Station,
Wallace Air Station, ODonnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval
Communications Station, Mt. Sta. Rita Station (Hermosa, Bataan) and those portions
of Metro Manila Camps which may be transferred to it by the President;
x x x (Underscoring supplied)
With such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDA over Camp
John Hay, BCDA virtually has control over it, subject to certain limitations provided
for by law. By designating BCDA as the governing agency of the John Hay SEZ,
the law merely emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role or functions it has been
granted.
The unconstitutionality of the grant of tax immunity and financial incentives as
contained in the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420
notwithstanding, the entire assailed proclamation cannot be declared
unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant to law or the
Constitution. The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by
Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President to do so by
means of a proclamation.
[51]
The requisite prior concurrence by the Baguio City
government to such proclamation appears to have been given in the form of a duly
enacted resolution by the sanggunian. The other provisions of the proclamation had
been proven to be consistent with R.A. No. 7227.
Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while another
part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced.
[52]
This Court finds that the other provisions in Proclamation No. 420
converting a delineated portion of Camp John Hay into the John Hay SEZ are
separable from the invalid second sentence of Section 3 thereof, hence they stand.
WHEREFORE, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is
hereby declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly declared of no legal force and
effect. Public respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the aforesaid void
provision.
Proclamation No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and
effective.
SO ORDERED.