The Myth of a Central American Dictators' League

Author(s): Kenneth J. Grieb

Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Nov., 1978), pp. 329-345
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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. Lat. Amer. Stud.
10, 2,
329-345
Printed in Great Britain
The
Myth
of a Central American Dictators'
League
by
KENNETH J. GRIEB
A series of
military
dictators came to power in the four northern
republics
of Central America
during
the Great
Depression
of the
i93os
and
perpetu-
ated themselves in office
through
continusmo tactics
until
roughly
the con-
clusion of the Second World War: General
Jorge Ubico,
the first and
strongest
of these
caudillos,
ruled Guatemala from 1931 to
1944;
General
Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez
governed
El Salvador from December
I93I
to
1944;
General Tiburcio Carias Andino dominated Honduras from
I933
to
i946;
and General Anastasio Somoza Garcia controlled
Nicaragua
from
I936
to
I956.
Noting
the
apparent
surface similarities of militarist
regimes emphasizing
personalismo
and dedicated to continuismo,
contemporary
observers
pre-
sumed that some sort of mutual assistance
pact
united these
tyrants
in a bloc
dedicated to their
personal
aggrandizement and
perpetuation
in office. This
supposed
alliance became known as the Dictators'
League.
The term origi-
nated in
press
reports
during
1937
and
1938,
and was
promptly accepted
into the
vocabulary
of the
period. During
those
years
it was
employed
in
numerous well-known
newspapers,
news
magazines,
and wire services
throughout
the United
States,
Latin America, and
Europe.
Belief in the
existence of the
League
was fueled
by suspicion, rumor,
intuition, ceremonial
rhetoric,
and occasional circumstantial indications of actual
cooperation
between the
regimes.
It never occurred to
contemporary
observers to
ques-
tion the lack of
evidence,
for the
agreement
was assumed to be secret and
conspiratorial,
since it linked
tyrants
who were 'undesirable' in the North
American mind,
and hence
capable
of all sorts of
skullduggery.
The
reputa-
tion of the
periodicals
that
employed
the
term,
and the same
logic,
passed
it
into
history.
Recent
availability
of
documentary records, however,
renders
historical assessment
possible,
and careful
scrutiny
of Guatemalan Foreign
Ministry
Archives and United States State
Department Papers
reveals the
Dictators'
League
as a
myth.
It was both a figment of the
imagination
of
the contempora media and a masterstroke of
propaganda,
for it was
originally
conjured
up by
disgruntled
exiles.
Initial
reports
of a Dictators'
League
came from
newspapers
in Mexico
329
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330
Kenneth J. Grieb
and Costa Rica -
two countries which were havens for Central American
and
particularly
Guatemalan
emigres.
Those members of the exile com-
munity
who had suffered harassment and even
deportation
from
neighbor-
ing dictatorships
after
abandoning
their own nations harbored
suspicions
of an alliance and also
recognized
the
potential impact
of such
propaganda
in
damaging
the
image
of the
governments they sought
to undermine.
Consequently,
the exiles initiated
charges
of such a
pact through
the
press
of the nations in which
they
found themselves. The Guatemalan
Foreign
Ministry
Archives reveal that meticulous
investigations
of such
allegations
invariably
traced them to Guatemalan
expatriates.
The accusations surfaced
after the last of the four
strong
men,
Anastasio Somoza of
Nicaragua,
assumed
office,
and
during
the
period
when continuismo was
already
in
operation
in the other
republics,
for
by
this time each of the three
original
caudillos had extended his tenure.1
The
prevalence
of the
charges
was coincidental with alarm in the North
American
press
about the
spread
of Fascism. The
resulting sensitivity
caused
Yankees to
perceive
'Fascist influence'
throughout
the
world,
much as in
a
subsequent
era
they
would do the same with Communism. This
mentality
rendered the North American
press susceptible
to tales of a Central Ameri-
can Dictators'
League,
which was
presumed
to be the extension of some
vast
plot
hatched in
Germany
or
Italy,
since
dictatorship
was
equated
with
Fascism in the Yankee mind. Even
regimes
such as that of General
Jorge
Ubico,
who was
strongly pro-American
and
constantly proclaimed
himself
the United States' staunchest
ally
in the
Caribbean,
became
subject
to such
accusations.
Although
Ubico,
having realistically
concluded that Yankee
power
mandated a
posture
of
cooperation, effusively professed
his
friendship
for the Northern
Colossus,
the
wiley
caudillo
meticulously pursued
Guate-
malan national interests
throughout
his tenure of office. His
pro-American-
ism reflected his
perception
that these
interests,
as well as his
personal
ambitions,
frequently paralleled
Yankee
objectives
in the isthmus.2 He did
not
hesitate, however,
to
pursue
an
independent policy
when Guatemalan
and United States interests
diverged.
The initial references to a Dictators'
League
coincided with Central
1
It should be
noted, however,
that
reports
of the Dictators'
League
exhibited considerable
variance,
and while some included
Somoza,
others described it as a triumvirate
encompas-
sing only Ubico, Martinez,
and
Carias.
This
study
considers relations
among
all four
dictators. For an examination of the continuismo
campaign
in
Guatemala,
see Kenneth J.
Grieb,
'The United States and General
Jorge
Ubico's Retention of
Power',
Revista de
Historia de
Ame'rica, 71 (January
to
June I971),
pp.
II9-35.
2
The basic factors in Ubico's
pro-Americanism
are also discussed in Kenneth
J. Grieb,
'American
Involvement in the Rise of
Jorge
Ubico
',
Caribbean
Studies, x,
No. I
(April
I970), pp. 5, I7-20.
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The
Myth of
a Central American Dictators'
League 331
American
diplomatic
manoeuvers which North Americans
incorrectly
interpreted
as indications of
friendship
with the Fascist nations.
During
November
1936,
Guatemala became the first nation to extend
diplomatic
recognition
to Generalissimo Francisco Franco's rebel
regime
in
Spain.'
El
Salvador took a similar
step
a
day
later,
and
Nicaragua
announced its
recognition
in
January I937, although
the
press
failed to note that Honduras
did not follow this
pattern.4
Guatemala
subsequently
received the first
minister accredited
by
Franco's
government.5 During 1936,
Guatemala also
withdrew from the
League
of
Nations, and, unfortunately,
this announce-
ment came on the heels of the
Ethiopian
crisis.
Again,
El Salvador emulated
this
action,
in this case the
following year.6 Notwithstanding
North
American
press reports,
none of these
steps
reflected association with or
friendship
for the Fascist
bloc,
and
ideological
or alliance considerations
played
no role in the Guatemalan decisions. Guatemalan
recognition
of
Franco reflected a focus on
Spain,
the common
Hispanic
authoritarian
tradition,
and a militant anti-communism fueled
by
the abortive
I932
up-
rising
in Salvador.7 As in
many
Latin American
countries, friendship
for
Franco did not
necessarily
extend to the other Fascist leaders. Ubico admired
3
Gerald Drew
(United
States
Charge
in
Guatemala)
to Cordell Hull
(Secretary
of
State), 9
Nov.
1936,
United States State
Department Papers,
National
Archives,
Washington,
D.C.,
RG
59, 701.52I4/Io,
and for the
press account, Washington
Post,
II Nov.
I936.
Hereinafter
State
Department
Documents are cited
by
number
only.
4
Division of Inter-American Affairs
Memo.,
Sidney
E.
O'Donoghue
to R. Walton Moore
(Assistant Secretary
of
State)
i6 Nov.
1936,
I6.oo/Iooo
regarding
the Salvadoran action
and,
for the
Nicaraguan step,
Boaz
Long (United
States Minister in
Managua)
to
Hull, 9
Jan.
I937, 702.I752/Io.
On 2 March
I939
the New York Times
published
a tabulation of
nations that had
recognized
the Franco Government and those that had
not,
but this is the
only press
reference found that indicated the Honduran
action,
and articles
dealing
with the
so-called Dictators'
League consistently
failed to note this
policy
difference
among
its
supposed
members.
5
El
Imparcial, 17
July I937.
A Guatemalan
envoy
to the Franco Government was
dispatched
later the same
year,
New York
Times,
II Dec.
I937.
6
For the official notice of Guatemalan
withdrawal,
Lie.
Jose
Gonzalez
Campo (Acting
Minister of
Foreign Relations)
to the
Secretary
General of the
League
of
Nations, I4 May
1936, Papers
of the
Ministry
of Ralaciones
Exteriores,
Archivo General de
Centroamerica,
Guatemala
City, Guatemala, 1938,
C1.
340-L.
For the Costa Rican
action,
Diario Latino
(San Salvador), 27
July I937.
Hereinafter records from the Guatemalan
Foreign Ministry
are cited as
AGCA/RE
and the number.
7
All
newspapers
in the Guatemalan
capital
followed the
Spanish
civil war
intensely,
invari-
ably headlining
its action
daily.
This focus on
Spain
was reflected in El
Imparcial,
El
Liberal
Progresista,
and Nuestro Diario
throughout
the
period.
The Salvadoran
uprising,
which was
unquestionably communist-inspired
and
very serious,
served to alarm all of
Central
America,
and made the communist threat much more real to these
governments
than to other
regimes
in Latin America. The revolt is examined in Thomas P.
Anderson,
Matanza: El Salvador's Communist Revolt
of I932
(Lincoln, Nebraska, I97I).
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332
Kenneth J. Grieb
Franco as a
military
officer,
but considered Hitler a '
peasant
.8 Guatemalan
withdrawal from the world
organization
reflected financial
exigencies
which
rendered
payment
of the dues a strain on the national
treasury
and
disgust
regarding
the
League's
ineffective
response
to
aggression
in
Ethiopia.9
The
proximity
of this move to the
conquest
of
Ethiopia
and the fact that the
Italian
propaganda
machine was
quick
to acclaim the action distorted
Guatemalan motives.?1 The other isthmian nations
apparently
acted from
similar motives
and,
despite
the coincidence of
timing,
there were no con-
sultations or
attempts
to concert
policy among
the Central American
regimes.
The North American
press,
however,
focused on the surface
parallels,
the
Italian
statements,
and the
apparent timing,
to
interpret
these events in
terms of a
global
confrontation with
Fascism,
and
thereby helped spawn
the
myth
of the Dictators'
League.l1
Guatemalan
rivalry
with Mexico constituted another factor. A mutual
suspicion
had
long
characterized Guatemalan-Mexican
relations,
and the
Mexican Revolution had exacerbated this
aspect.
As a
result,
there were
recurring charges
that Guatemala aided or abetted counter-revolutions in
Mexico. These declarations were
frequently
combined with accusations of
8
Lie. Guillermo Saenz de
Tejada,
Minister of Gobernacion in the Ubico
Government,
to
author in a
personal
interview,
Guatemala
City,
15
July 1969,
and Lic.
Jose
Gonzalez.
Campo,
Minister of Hacienda in the Ubico
Government,
in a
personal
interview with the
author,
Guatemala
City, 17 July 1969.
The
quote,
which comes
directly
from
Ubico,
was
used
by
Lie. Saenz de
Tejada,
but both ministers
presented
similar accounts of Ubico's
view of the
European
leaders,
indicating
his
friendship
for
Franco,
a benevolent attitude
toward Benito
Mussolini,
and
contempt
for Hitler. Both ministers stressed Ubico's
preference
for
military
officers and the role this
played
in his attitude toward Franco. Lic. Ernesto
Rivas,
Private
Secretary
to President
Ubico,
also
presented
a similar account of Ubico's views
in an interview with the
author,
Guatemala
City, 23 August I969.
9
The official
government press
release
explaining
the financial factors
appeared
in El'
Imparcial, 15 May 1936,
and the New York
Times,
17 May 1936.
The Guatemalan Minister
to
Spain
and the
League
of
Nations,
Virgilio Rodriguez Beteta,
had
previously
issued a
similar
statement, 16
May 1938, AGCA/RE,
Cl.
342-L,
which was
printed
in the Panama
American, I8 May 1936.
The New York
Times
placed
the article on
page 36,
where its
location and small size ensured that it would not attract sufficient attention to counter the
Times'
previous charges
that the Guatemalan action reflected
friendship
with the Fascist
states,
and
particularly
Italy.
The Times
printed
several articles
speculating
on these factors
on
16
May 1936.
10
The
Washington
Post
quoted
'
official
League
sources
'
as
fearing
that the Guatemalan action
presaged
a
'stampede'
of
withdrawals,
and
charging
that it was based on Italian com-
merical
pressure (I6 May I936)
while the New
York
Times cited Italian
propaganda
state-
ments,
which were
quick
to seize
upon
the Guatemalan withdrawal and hail it as
indicating
solidarity
with the Italian
action,
on x6
May 1936.
11
The New
York
Times of x6
May 1936
even contended that the Guatemalan action could be
coupled
with the recent Salvadoran
recognition
of the
Japanese conquest
of
Manchukuo,
to
indicate that the entire isthmus was
going
Fascist,
overlooking
the fact that Guatemala
had withheld
recognition
of Manchukuo.
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The
Myth of
a Central American Dictators'
League 333
Fascism and contributed to the
concept
of a chimerical Dictators'
League.
This was
particularly
true
during 1938,
when
newspapers charged
that the
rebellion led
by
General Saturnino Cedillo had Fascist
connexions,
and
was
being supplied by Germany, through
Guatemala and the 'Fascist
oriented' Dictators'
League.l2
The
absurdity
of such a
charge
is
readily
apparent
from a
glance
at a
map,
since Cedillo's revolt was based in his
home state of San Luis
Potosi,
in northern Mexico,
meaning
that arms
crossing
the frontier from Guatemala would have had to traverse
virtually
all of Mexico to reach him. It is
significant
that initial
charges
about the
League
occurred
during
the
presidency
of Lazaro
Cardenas,
for Mexico
witnessed several revolts as
part
of the
power struggles
attendant on
his rise.
Reports
of a 'Dictators'
League against
Communism' surfaced
during
1937
and
1938
in Costa Rican and Mexican
newspapers.
La Prensa of
Mexico
City
was the
principal
source,
printing
a
lengthy
series on the sub-
ject
and
openly attributing
the
story
to the so-called Guatemalan
Popular
Union,
an exile
organization
headed
by Joirge
Garcia
Granados,
which was
based in Mexico
Cilty.3
The United States Minister in Guatemala
City,
Fay
Allen Des
Portes,
denounced these
charges,
as
'part
of an
organized
campaign
from Mexico
against
Carias and Ubico' carried on
by emigres.
He concluded that there was no basis for the
allegations.14
The accusations reached the United States
through
the New
York Times,
which received the
story
from its Mexico
City correspondent,
Frank L.
Kluckhohn.l5
Relations between
Kluckhohn,
the
Times,
and the Ubico
Government had
previously
been strained
by
false
reports, stemming
from
an article of 26
September I934, alleging
a revolt
against
Ubico and a des-
12
Articles
alleging support
for Cedillo
appeared
in La Tribuna
(San Jose),
II
April I937,
El
Universal
Grdfica (Mexico City),
22
April 1937,
and La Prensa
(Mexico City),
I6, I7, I9,
20
May I937.
13
There were numerous such
reports
in several of the
papers
in San
Jose
and Mexico
City
during
both
periods.
For
examples,
see La Tribuna
(San Jose),
ii
April I937,
and El
Universal
Grdfica (Mexico City),
22
April I937.
The La Prensa series
appeared
on
i6, 17,
19,
20 and 21
May 1938.
The article of 21
May
cites the Guatemalan exiles. Articles also
appeared
in such
publications
as El Machete
(Mexico City), 5 February I938,
and Mediodia
(a weekly published
in Mexico
City), 9 May I938.
Mexican Minister of
Foreign
Relations,
Eduardo
Hay
issued a formal statement
denying
the
accusations, noting
that the Mexican
Government had
investigated charges
of Guatemalan assistance to Mexican
revolutionaries,
which constituted
part
of the
reports,
and found them baseless. His statement
appeared
in
Novedades
(Mexico City),
28
May I938.
14
Fay
Allen Des Portes
(United
States Minister in Guatemala
City)
to
Hull, 29 July 1937,
712.14/112.
15
New York
Times,
20
July I937.
Kluckhohn claimed that his
story
was based on an inter-
view with President Carias of
Honduras,
but Carfas denied the declarations Kluckhohn
quoted,
El Cronista
(Tegucigalpa), 17 Aug. I937.
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334
Kenneth
J.
Grieb
patch
of
25 September 1936, claiming
that Ubico was
seriously
ill.1
Accept-
ing
the exile
charges
about the 'Dictators'
League'
as
fact,
without indicat-
ing
that
they originated
with the
emigres,
Kluckhohn followed with a series
of
articles,
denouncing
what he called 'Fascist influence' in the Central
American
republics, alleging
that the
Rome-Berlin-Tokyo pact against
Com-
munism was 'received with
glee'
in the Central American 'semi-Fascist'
nations,
repeating
the
charges
of a Dictators'
League, comparing
it to the
Fascist
alliance,
and
speculating
on the likelihood that the Central American
dictatorships might formally join
the Axis bloc
through
adherence to the
Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Treaty.17 Throughout
the
period,
Kluckhohn's stories
were the
subject
of several
diplomatic protests.
An article of
7 January I938,
alleging
that a revolt was in
progress
in Guatemala and
characterizing
Ubico
as
having 'extremely friendly
relations' with Hitler and
Mussolini,
resulted
in a formal
protest.
Guatemalan
Foreign
Minister,
Carlos
Salazar,
charged
that the Times
'began
some time
ago
a
campaign,
which could
already
be
considered as
systematic, against
the Central American
Governments,
par-
ticularly.
.. Guatemala'.
Privately,
Guatemalan officials attributed the
articles to Kluckhohn's
personal pique
because
Ubico,
in accordance with his
normal
procedures,
refused to receive the
reporter
when he
journeyed
through
Central America. State
Department
memoranda
supported
the
Guatemalan
charges, characterizing
Kluckhohn's articles as
'irresponsible',
and
Undersecretary
of
State,
Sumner
Welles,
sent the Guatemalan
protest
'informally'
to Times
publisher,
Arthur
Hays Sulzberger
'for
your
infor-
mation'.
Sulzberger pledged
an
investigation
which resulted in a retraction
of the
report
of a
revolt,
on II
February 1938.18
Wire services and other
publications
based their information on the Times stories.
Newsweek
characterized the
pact
as 'a
private promise
to
help
each other remain in
power',
on the
principle
'You
jail my
enemies. I'll
jail yours
'.1
During
1938
an article in a short-lived Yankee anti-Fascist
propaganda journal
16
Regarding
the
1934 article,
which
again originated
in Mexico and Costa Rica via exile
sources,
see El Universal
Grdfica (Mexico City),
and Diario de Costa Rica
(San Jose),
both
26
Sept. I934.
The Kluckhohn articles are New
York Times,
26
Sept. 1934,
and
25 Sept.
I936.
17
New York
Times, 14
Nov.
I937.
18
New York
Times, 7 January 1938.
The
exchanges
are Carlos Salazar
(Guatemalan
Minister
of
Foreign Relations)
to Walter S.
McKinney (United
States
Charg6
in Guatemala
City),
and
Salazar to Adrian Recinos
(Guatemalan
Minister in
Washington),
I2 Jan.
1938, AGCA/RE,
C1.
795; McKinney
to
Hull, I2 Jan. 1938, 8I4.00 Revolutions/94; Unsigned
Latin American
Division Memoranda dated
14
and
24
Jan. 1938,
Sumner Welles
(Undersecretary
of
State)
to Arthur
Hays Sulzberger (Publisher,
New York
Times), 25
Jan. 1938,
all
814.00
Revolu-
tions/95,
and
Sulzberger
to
Welles,
8 Feb.
1938 814.00 Revolutions/97.
For the retraction
see New York Times,
II Feb.
I938.
19
Newsweek,
7 Aug. 1937.
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The
Myth of
a Central American Dictators'
League 335
entitled
Ken,
under the headline 'The Secret Fuse under Mexico ', charac-
terized Guatemala as 'the most
thoroughly organized
Fascist
country
in
Central or South
America',
and alleged that German arms were landed
there for
shipment
to Mexican rebels.20 The Guatemalan Government was
so incensed that the
Foreign
Minister directed the Consul-General in
Chicago,
where the
journal
was
based,
to retain a local
attorney
to
investigate
the
possibility
of
bringing
suit for libel.21
Despite
voices of
moderation,
attempting
to indicate the
inaccuracy
of these
articles,
such as the columns
of H. R. Knickerbocker in the Panama
Amnerican,
a new round of accus-
ations surfaced
during I940, through
another
propaganda
journal
entitled
Liberty,
and new
allegations by
Kluckhohn in the Times.22 In all instances
the articles linked
speculation regarding
the Dictators'
League
to
alleged
Fascist influence in the
region.
Although
no Dictators'
League
ever
existed,
some brief
exploratory negoti-
ations were conducted
among
the Central American
regimes during 1936
and
1937.
The talks
proved
abortive due to the rivalries and
jealousies
that
more than
negated any urge
Ito
cooperate
but of which the North American
press
was
totally
unaware. The
timing
of these
negotiations suggests
that
the
original charges may
have been
based,
in
part,
on rumors of the dis-
cussions which reached the exiles. Somoza did
propose
an anti-communist
pact, though
withoult
result.2
Negotiations
between Guatemala and Salvador
seeking cooperation
to
prevent
rebellions were
attempted,
but Guatemalan
Foreign
Office Archives indicate that
they
never
progressed beyond
the
preliminary stages.24
The
pertinent
State
Department
files reveal that the
Department
con-
sistently rejected
the notion that
any
Central American Dictators'
League
ever
existed,
with both the
diplomats
in the various
capitals
and the Latin
American Division
personnel scarcely mentioning
the
idea,
except
for refer-
ences to
newspaper charges. Department
officers and American
diplomats
20
Ken,
21
April 1938, pp. I5-I6.
21
Salazar to Octavio Barrios Solis
(Guatemalan
Consul General in
Chicago), 27 April 1938.
Solis retained
McCullough, McCullough
and
McLaren,
but the
attorneys
found no
grounds
for a suit under United States
law,
Solis to
Salazar, 3 May I938,
and Frank
McCullough
to
Solis, 5 May I938, AGCA/RE, C1. 794.
Further action became
unnecessary
when the
magazine
was barred from the United States mails
by
Postmaster General
James
A.
Farley,
in a
totally
unrelated
matter,
for
printing
an
allegedly
'
obscene '
story, Chicago Daily
News,
4 May 1938.
22
Panama
American, 8, 9,
Io
April I939, Liberty,
21
Sept. 1940,
an article entitled ' Swastika
over Guatemala
',
and New York Times, 4
July
1940.
23
Guy
Ray (United
States
Charge
in
Managua)
to
Hull,
26 and 28 Nov.
I936,
8Io.ooB/II2
and
/Io7.
24 Francisco E. Toledo
(Guatemalan
Minister in San
Salvador)
to
Salazar,
28
April I937,
AGCA/RE,
C1.
549.
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336
Kenneth J. Grieb
were far too familiar with the numerous
disputes
among
the
regimes
to
credit such
stories,
as
they
were
constantly being
called
upon
to mediate and
cool
potentially explosive
situations.
In
reality,
the relations between the
mutually suspicious
and
always
ambi-
tious Central American
strongmen
were characterized
by
constant
manoeuvering
and contention rather than alliance or
cooperation.
The
emergence
of a series of caudillos did not eradicate the traditional national
rivalries in the
isthmus,
and each of the leaders found it
boith
necessary
and
expedient
to
operate
within his own domestic
exigencies. Jorge
Ubico,
the
first of the
strong
men to rise to
power,
was also the most
firmly
entrenched.
Recognized
as the
strongest,
most
dynamic
and most charismatic
personality
of the
group,
he
initially enjoyed
a
large personalista following
in
Guatemala,
and a
reputation
for administrative
efficiency
and
energy
that earned him
grudging
admiration
throughout
Central America. These
factors,
with his
firm control of the
largest,
most
powerful
nation in the
isthmus, inevitably
tempted
him to
pursue
the traditional Guatemalan
goal
of
dominating
the
region. Being
a
Liberal,
he had a
propensity
to aid the Liberal Parties in
neighboring republics, particularly Nicaragua
and Honduras. Yet these
same factors also
engendered
resentment and fear of Ubico. As the second
most
populous country
in Central
America,
El Salvador
traditionally
con-
stituted Guatemala's
principal
rival for dominance within the isthmus. It
was natural that the
regime
of General Martinez would
emerge
as a
prime
competitor
to that of Ubico and that it would focus its
activity
in the tradi-
tional Salvadoran
sphere
of Honduras.
In
considering
the
reports
of
cooperation
between
Jorge
Ubico and
Maximiliano Hernandez
Martinez,
it is
important
to realize that at the
outset Ubico
bitterly opposed
the rise of the Salvadoran
general.
The
installation of Martinez created a
grave
crisis
throughout
the
isthmus,
since
the United
Sltates
and the other Central American nations withheld
recogni-
tion for several
years, invoking
the
I923 Washington pact
which barred
revolutionary
leaders and cabinet members from office. Ubico became the
Central American leader of the resistance to
recognition
of Martinez.25
This stand
may
have reflected Ubico's
cognizance
that his own rise had
been made
possible by
enforcement of the
treaty,
and his concern with a
potentially strong
ruler in Salvador.26 As in
many
other
instances,
what
appeared
to be
support
of a United States
policy
in fact
comported
with
25
The
non-recognition controversy
is examined in Kenneth
J. Grieb,
'The United States and
the Rise of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez ', Journal of
Latin American Studies,
iI,
No. 2
(November 1971),
151-72.
26 See
Grieb,
'American Involvement in the Rise of
Jorge
Ubico', Caribbean Studies
(April
I970), pp.
8-io,
and
14-15.
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The
Myth of
a Central American Dictators'
League 337
Guatemalan
interests,
as well as
serving
Ubico's ends. The crisis lasted from
December
I93I
until
January 1934,
and
throughout
this
period
the relation
between the two
governments
was one of
antagonism.
At the
peak
of the
tension, the Guatemalan caudillo told an
envoy
from Martinez
'point
blank
that Martinez must
stop
all these
negotiations
and abandon the
Presidency
as
soon as
possible'.27
Nuestro
Diario,
at this time considered to reflect Ubico's
opinion, repeatedly
declared that the
only
course
open
to the Salvadoran
general
was
resignation.28
When Martinez
proved strong enough internally
to resist the
diplomatic pressure
and retain office
despite non-recognition,
the Guatemalan Government
proposed
'some further
step'
to the United
States,
hinting
at economic sanctions or even
joint military
intervention.29
Although Washington rejected
these
proposals, they
illustrate the
intensity
of the duel between the two
caudillos,
which soon
enveloped
the entire
isthmus as each
sought support
from other countries. A
two-year
'cold war'
scarcely
constituted a basis for future
cooperation
for,
whatever the sub-
sequent arrangements,
the scars and sensitivities remained.
A
similar,
though
not as
protracted,
situation occurred in
Honduras,
where Ubico
actively supported
the Liberal
Party
candidate,
Angel Ziuniiga-
Huete,
against
the Conservative
Party
candidate,
General Tiburcio
Carias
Andino.
Proceeding
on the time-honored formula of
seeking governments
of the same
party
in the
neighboring republics,
Ubico received
envoys
of the
Liberal candidate and
provided
financial aid to his
campaign.30
This
exacerbated Conservative sentiment
against
Ubico,
producing
editorial
attacks in El
Cronista,
the Conservative
party publication.31
On the eve of
the October
I932
elections,
Ubico informed the United States Minister that
he
expected Ziuiiga-Huete
to
triumph,
and that
any irregularities
would be
27
Sheldon Whitehouse
(United
States Minister in Guatemala
City)
to
Henry
L. Stimson
(Secretary
of
State), reporting
Ubico's
statement, 3
March
1932, 8I6.oo
Martinez,
Max/5.
28
Editorials in Nuestro
Diario, 4
and io Feb. and
29 April I932.
29
Whitehouse to
Stimson, reporting
the remarks of Guatemalan Minister of
Foreign Relations,
Alfredo Skinner
Klee, 27 April 1932, 8I6.0I/I69.
The
quote
is from Skinner Klee. The
Guatemalan
Foreign
Minister later told United States
Charge
George
K. Donald that
'Martinez has
put something
over on the United States
',
unless
stronger
action were
taken,
Donald' to-
Stimson,
I8
June 1932, 816.01/202.
For further discussion of Ubico's desire to
intervene,
see
Grieb,
'The United'States and the Rise of General Maximiliano Hernandez
Martinez
', Journal of
Latin American
Studies,
loc.
cit., p. I67.
30
Julius G.
Lay (United
States Minister in
Tegucigalpa)
to Stimson and
Whitehouse, 5 May
I932,
United States State
Department Papers,
National Archives,
Washington, D.C.,
RG
84,
Post
Records, Legation
in Guatemala
City, I932,
C1. 800,
and William
J. McCafferty
(United
States
Charge
in San
Salvador)
to
Stimson,
20
June 1932,
8i6.00 General Conditions
/32.
Hereinafter items from the Post Records are cited as PR Guatemala.
31 The articles
appeared
in El Cronista
(Tegucigalpa) throughout
June
I932
and were also the
subject
:to a
report by
Lawrence
Higgins (United
States
Charge
in
Tegucigalpa)
to
Stimson,
28
June I932,
8I4.00I Ubico,
Jorge/26.
L.A.S.-IO
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338
Kenneth J. Grieb
the fault of General Carias. Ubico even
expressed willingness
to send arms
to the Honduran Liberals in the event of 'disturbances'. The State
Depart-
ment felt
sufficiently
concerned to warn Ubico
against
such a measure.32
Thus relations between Ubico and
Carias
certainly
did not
begin
on a cordial
note.
Yet,
in this case the Guatemalan caudillo
quickly
re-considered his
stance after the election returns showed an
impressive triumph
for Carias.
Ubico's reversal in Honduras reflected the continued crisis with
Salvador,
for the Honduran situation
provided
an
opportunity
which Martfnez was
quick
to
grasp.
Both sides in Honduras
sought
arms and
support
through-
out the isithmus for the inevitable
post-election
confrontation.
Although
Ubico refused aid to the
Liberals,
he could not
quite bring
himself to assist
the Conservatives.3 Martinez
promptly
rushed into the
breach,
providing
Carias with half a million rounds of ammunition and
500
rifles,
which were
flown to
Tegucigalpa by
the Salvadoran Air Force.34 Thus Martinez chose
to back
Carias,
perhaps
on ithe
assumption
that Ubico would continue to
support
the Liberals.
This,
in
turn,
aroused the
suspicions
of the Guatemalan
Government,
which feared that Martinez had received a
pledge
of
recogni-
tion in return for his
aid,
and at worst
suspected
a Salvadoran-Honduran
alliance
against
Guatemala.35
Carias,
however,
resisted such
pledges,
and
apparently
Martinez was
sufficiently
concerned about the initial Guatemalan
support
for the Liberals to feel
compelled
to send the munitions without
securing
a firm commitment.
Martinez's
actions rendered it
expedient
for
Ubico to
drop
his
opposition
to Carias. Ubico
prudently
sent his
private
secretary
as the Guatemalan
special representative
to Carias'
inauguration.
In
private
discussions with
Carias,
the
envoy
secured assurances that the new
Honduran Government would not
align
itself with Salvador
against
Guatemala.
This, however,
was the extent of the
'understanding.36
32 Whitehouse to
Stimson, reporting
a conversation with
Ubico, 7
Oct.
1932, 815.00/4539;
Stimson to
Whitehouse, 27
Oct.
1932, 815.00/4539,
and Whitehouse to
Stimson,
31
Oct.
1932, 814.00
General
Conditions/59.
33
Matthew
Elting
Hanna
(United
States Minister in
Managua)
to
Stimson, 30
Nov.
1932,
815.00/4563.
An editorial in Nuestro
Diario, 15
Nov.
x932, condemning
the rebels in
Honduras, publicly
indicated the Guatemalan stand.
34
Lay
to
Stimson, x6, 17
and
I9
Nov.
1932, 815.00 Revolutions/345, /346,
and
/352,
and
McCafferty
to
Stimson, 23
Nov.
x932, 8I5.oo Revolutions/362.
35 Rafael Ordofiez Solis
(Guatemalan
Minister in
Tegucigalpa)
to Skinner
Klee,
i
June 1932,
AGCA/RE, x932,
Memorandum of Conversation between
George
K. Donald
(United
States
Charge
in
Guatemala)
and
Juan
Pinillos
(Guatemalan
Confidential
Agent
in San Salvador
home to consult his
government), 5 July 1932,
PR
Guatemala,
Cl.
80o;
Donald to
Stimson,
31
July I932, 814.00
General
Conditions/56,
and Conversation
Memorandum,
Edward P.
Lawton
(Third Secretary
of the United States
Legation
in
Guatemala)
with Lie. Eduardo
Gir6
(Guatemalan Undersecretary
of
Foreign Relations),
6
Sept. 1932,
PR
Guatemala,
C. 8oo00
36 The full
report
of the mission is in Antonio
Najera
Cabrera
(Private Secretary
to President
Ubico)
to Skinner
KI6e, 9
Feb.
1933, AGCA/RE,
B
99/28/II.
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The
Myth of
a Central American Dictators'
League 339
The Guatemalan-Salvadoran duel continued
during 1932
and
1933,
with
various border incidents and mutual recriminations
threatening
armed con-
flict.37
Throughout
this
dispute,
Honduras and
Nicaragua
adhered to non-
recognition,
and it was Costa
Rica,
which
traditionally
viewed Salvador as
a
counterweight
to Guatemalan
ambitions,
that broke the Central American
front,
denouncing
the
1923 treaty
and
extending recognition
to the Martinez
Government.38 At
length
the United States also reversed its
position, arrang-
ing
for a
Nicaraguan
initiative to mask the shift.39 Ubico
proved highly
resistant,
and direct Staite
Department
pressure
was
necessary
to secure his
reluctant assent to a
plan
for
recognition
of the Salvadoran
regime
and the
convocation of a Central American Conference in Guatemala
City.40
The
course of the
1934
conclave
scarcely improved
Guatemalan-Salvadoran rela-
tions,
for the
diplomats split
on
virtually every
issue,
rejecting
broad draft
treaties
proposed by
Ubico that were
designed
to lead to eventual Central
American
union,
presumably
under his
aegis. Consequently,
while the con-
ference
officially
terminated the
recognition controversy,
it served to exacer-
bate sensitivities and scars
remaining
between
Guatemala, Salvador,
and
Honduras,
and
certainly
did not foreshadow
any cooperation
between the
three dictators then in office.
While
intensifying ill-feeling among
the various
caudillos,
these
episodes
also caused Ubico to
modify
his
policy.
The
rejection
of his
proposals
at the
1934
conclave
apparently
wounded his
pride,
as the
following year,
when a
Guatemalan
envoy reported
rumors of a
projected
economic
conference,
Foreign
Minister Alfredo Skinner Klee characterized the idea as a
'farce',
referring
to the
previous
conference,
and
commenting: 'Experience ought
to serve for
something.'
41 Ubico
consequently began
to stress the
principles
37
See,
for
example,
New York
Times,
28
June 1932; McCafferty
to
Stimson,
5 Sept. I932,
714.16/50
and Donald to
Stimson,
8
Sept. 1932, 714.16/51.
38
For the announcement of the Costa Rican denunciation of the
treaty,
Charles C. Eberhardt
(United
States Minister in San
Jose)
to
Stimson, I4
Dec.
1932, 7I3.I311/142. According
to
the
treaty stipulations,
one
year's
notice was
required
for
denunciation,
and
consequently
the
Costa Rican action took effect in
January 1934,
at which time Costa Rica extended
recogni-
tion to the Martinez
regime.
El Salvador followed Costa Rica's lead and also denounced the
treaty, McCafferty
to
Stimson,
27
Dec.
1932, 713.II/I44.
39
William
Phillips (Under Secretary
of
State)
to Arthur Bliss Lane
(United
States Minister in
Managua),
8
January 1934, 816.01/349,
and Lane to
Hull,
io
Jan. I934, 8I6.o0/356,
II
Jan., 713.1311/I95, 13 Jan., 816.0I/355,
and
13 Jan., 8I6.o0/356.
See also
Grieb,
'The
United States and the Rise of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez
',
loc.
cit.,
pp.
169-70.
40
It
proved necessary
to reveal the
Department's
role to Ubico in order to
persuade
him to
consider the
proposal
for a new Conference:
Phillips
to
Whitehouse,
I2 Jan.
I934,
8i6.oi
/355, I5 Jan., 8I6.0o/355,
and Whitehouse to
Hull, 15
Jan.
1934, 816.01/360.
41
Skinner Klee to Lic. Alfonso Carrillo
(Guatemalan
Minister in San
Jos6), 15 Aug. I935,
AGCA/RE,
B
99/23/I.
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340
Kenneth J. Grieb
of
'neutrality',
'non-intervention',
and 'Good
Neighborhood',
emphasiz-
ing pointedly
that these were
coupled
with a firm defence of national
sovereignty,
and the
rejection
of
foreign
intervention in Guatemala.42 This
attitude
may
have been intended to
suggest
the
type
of conduct Ubico
sought
from his
neighbors,
in return for his
assumption
of a similar stance.
The re-election
campaign
of President Martinez in Salvador
provided
Ubico with an
opportunity
to demonstrate his
sincerity. Despite
the
linger-
ing hostility
between the two
strongmen,
Ubico
studiously
refrained from
any
moves *that could be
interpreted
as
assisting
or
resisting
Martinez's
candidacy. Apparently,
Ubico had concluded that since he had failed to
unseat Martinez
during
the
early phase
of his
regime,
he had best
accept
the fact that at least his continuance in office assured a
strong regime
that
would
prevent
internal disorders which
might spill
over into Guatemala.
Lic. Eduardo
Giron,
the Guatemalan Minister in
Salvador,
visited Martinez
immediately
after the returns were announced to
congratulate
him on his
triumph,
and
reported
a
lengthy
discussion in which the Salvadoran
caudillo,
obviously appreciative
of Ubico's
stance,
expressed
a desire to
improve
rela-
tions between the two
governments
and to confer with Ubico
personally.
Guatemalan
Foreign
Minister Alfredo Skinner Klee
replied
that he and
Ubico shared Martinez's desire for more cordial
relations,
and even indicated
that Ubico was
willing
to meet his Salvadoran
counterpart.
The
Foreign
Minister
surprisingly apologized profusely
for his
inability
to attend
Martinez's
inauguration personally, emphasizing pressure
of work.43 Since
he had never attended
any
other
inaugurations,
and Ubico had not
yet
met
with
any
of his
neighboring
caudillos,
these declarations indicate a consider-
able Guatemalan
willingness
to seek a
rapprochement. Despite
several
expansive
statements
by
the Salvadoran
Foreign
Minister, however,
nothing
ever resulted from the references to
meetings.
There were some indications
of
improving
relations
during 1935,
such as an effusive letter of
congratula-
tions
by
Martinez on the occasion of the
inauguration
of Ubico's second
term. The Salvadoran Government also
deported
a number of Guatemalan
exiles,
and hinted at a
willingness
to
prevent
anti-Ubico
propaganda.44
42
Such statements
appear
recurrently' throughout
the Guatemalan
Foreign
Office
correspon-
dence,
and the
public
statements of its
officials,
and of President Ubico.
See,
for
example,
a
compilation
of
' Information About Guatemala,'
designed
for release to the
press during
I935
to
explain
Guatemalan
progress
and
objectives, AGCA/RE, 1939,
Cl.
75I.
43 Lie. Eduardo Girn
'(Guatemalan
Minister in San
Salvador)
to Skinner Klee, 9
Feb.
I935,
and Skinner Klee to
Gir6n,
12 Feb.
1935, AGCA/RE,
B
99/28/II.
44
Frank P.
Corrigan
(United States Minister in San
Salvador)
to
Hull,
30
Sept. 1935, 8I4.00
/I264,
and
Sidney E.' O'Donoghue (United
States
Charg'
in
Guatemala)
to
Hull, I
Oct.
'935, 814.00./'264,
both
commenting
on the
cordiality
of Martinez's letter, and for the
incidents: with the Guatemalan exiles and the
glowing
statements
regarding friendship
between the
regimes,
Gir6n to Skinner
Klee, 5
June
'935, AGCA/RE,
B
99/30/4,
and
I3
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The
Myth of
a Central American Dictators'
League 341
This new-found
spirit
of
cordiality proved
shortlived, however,
due to
differences
regarding
continuismo in Honduras and the rise of Somoza in
Nicaragua. By January 1936,
when a Constituent
Assembly
extended Ubico's
new term several
years,
Martinez
pointedly
stated
publicly
that he was
opposed
to the extension of his own term. The American Minister in San
Salvador noted that the
implication
of the declaration was obvious due to
its
timing
in relation to Guatemalan
events,
commenting
that it 'did little
to
improve
relations between the two countries '.5
The
expiration
of Carias' term in Honduras and the usual continuismo
campaign brought
renewed strains.
Despite
the fact that Ubico
expressed
some doubts about whether Carias had a sufficient
following
or was a
strong
enough personality
to maintain himself in
office,
the Guatemalan Govern-
menit
rejected
his
opponents'
appeals
for aid.46 This
time, ironically,
it was
Martinez
who aided
Zuniiga-Huete,
now
leading
an
opposition
movement
from exile, and Ubico who backed Carias - a
precise
reversal of the roles
in the
previous
election,
but one which still
preserved
the Guatemalan-
Salvadoran
antagonism. Apparently,
Martinez still resented the earlier with-
holding
of
recognition by
Carias,
and felt
that,
since this administration was
weaker than that of
Ubico,
it
migh,t
be unseated.47 When a revolution broke
out in
Honduras,
Ubico
dispatched
a
police
official to
supervise
the re-
organization
of the Honduran secret
police
to introduce Guatemalan
efficiency,
and also rushed
troops
to the border with orders to intern
anyone
who crossed the line.48
Mounting
indications of
support by
Martinez for
June I935, AGCA/RE,
B
99/34/9;
Skinner Klee to
Miguel Angel Araujo (Minister
of
Foreign
Relations of El
Salvador),
i8
June 1935, AGCA/RE,
B
99/34/9,
and
Araujo
to
Giron,
8
Aug. 1935,
AGCA/RE,
B
99/30/4.
45
Corrigan
to
Hull,
15
Jan. 1936, 8i6.00/997.
46
Reports
of
Carias' appeals
to Ubico for
support
and Ubico's reservations about
Carias'
strength
came from
Julius
G.
Lay (United
States Minister in
Tegucigalpa)
to
Hull,
7
March
1935, 8I5.00/4612, Raleigh
A. Gibson
(United
States
Charge
in
Tegucigalpa)
to
Hull,
2
May 1935, 815.00/64I4,
and Leo
J.
Keena
(United
States Minister in
Tegucigalpa)
to
Hull, 15
Nov.
1935, 815.00/4640.
The Guatemalan
Charge
in
Tegucigalpa
also
expressed
doubt about Carias'
strength,
Mauricio Rosal to Skinner
Klee,
2
Sept. 1935, AGCA/RE,
B
99/23/i.
47
The United States Minister in
Tegucigalpa
noted that Salvadoran-Honduran relations were
strained ' because of the close
relationship
between Honduras and
Guatemala,
and President
Martinez' rather
unfriendly
attitude toward General Ubico
',
Keena to
Hull, 15
Nov.
1935,
815.00/4640.
The Minister in San Salvador
reported
that members of the Salvadoran
Foreign
Office indicated that their stance in relation to Honduras was
governed by
their
fear of
Guatemala; Corrigan
to
Hull, 5 Sept. 1936, 815.oo
Revolutions/537.
A
Legation
report
from
Tegucigalpa
noted that the Salvadoran Government
'
would
change
its attitude
'
of
friendship
for
Carias
'the moment that it feels the
opposition
is
strong enough
to offer
effective armed
resistance';
Keena to
Hull,
7
Feb.
I936, 8I5.00/4671.
Zuiiga
Hueste was in
Salvador
during
much of the
manoeuvering,
Keena to
Hull,
17 Aug. 1936, 815.00/47I3.
48
Keena to
Hull, 24 April I937, 815.00/4730.
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342
Kenneth J. Grieb
the rebels caused Ubico to
dispatch
a
warning telegram
to San
Salvador,
expressing
'the
hope
and conviction that El Salvador would maintain strict
neultrality
in the face of the Honduran trouble'.49
Naturally,
Martinez was
outraged,
but he took the hint at least to the extent of
refraining
from overt
actions. The Honduran revolt
collapsed
after its
military
leader, General
Justo
Umana,
was
apprehended by
Guatemalan
troops
after
crossing
the
line,
and
subjected
to the
ley fuga, again infuriating
Martinez.50 In addition to
cooling
relations between Ubico and Martinez still
further,
the Salvadoran
caudillo's
support
for the Honduran rebels exacerbated the
hostility
between
Martinez and Carias.
The rise of General Anastasio Somoza Garcia in
Nicaragua
also intensified
Salvadoran-Guatemalan tensions. As in all such
crises,
envoys
of President
Juan
Bautista Sacasa and General Somoza
sought support
in all
neighbor-
ing
countries,
and
particularly
in Guatemala.51
Ubico,
who
though
aiding
Sacasa's initial
campaign
was never enthusiastic about his
qualities,
viewed
Somoza
favorably.
The Guatemalan caudillo
preferred military
men to
civilians,
and saw in Somoza the
strength
he felt Sacasa lacked.52 Martinez,
who
regarded
Somoza as a
potential competitor,
backed the Sacasa faction.53
Various Salvadoran statements and 'mediation'
proposals
led Ubico to
indicate his views
through
the
press,
and Guatemalan editorialists
praised
Somoza as 'the
type
of man of action as
against
that of the theoretical
politician',
a
'quieting
influence for the
country',
and an individual whom
Guatemalans were 'in a
position
to
appreciate'.
5
Once
again
the two
49
Corrigan
to
Hull, 5 Sept. I936, 8i5.oo Revolutions/537.
50
Fay
Allen Des Portes
(United
States Minister in
Guatemala)
to
Hull, 5 Aug. 1937, 815.00
/4736,
and
I9 Aug. 1937, 815.00/474I, reporting
the incident and
noting
that rumors
indicated that General Umafia was shot on Ubico's orders. For
press
accounts,
see Panama
American,
io
Aug. I937.
51
Reports
of
Nicaraguan
factions
seeking
aid came from Guatemala. Hanna to
Hull,
22
Jan.
1935, 8I7.00/8I80,
Memorandum
by O'Donoghue, 4
Oct.
I935,
PR
Guatemala, I935,
Cl. 800,
O'Donoghue
to Hull
I6
Oct.
1935,
PR
Guatemala, 1935,
Cl.
800,
and Hanna to
Hull, 9
Dec.
1935, 8I7.00/8345; Tegucigalpa,
Gibson to
Hull,
2
June 1936, 8I7.00/8489,
and Conversa-
tion
Memorandum,
Willard L. Beaulac
(Latin
American
Division)
and
Julio
Lozano
(Honduran
Minister in
Washington), I June 1936, 817.00/8506;
and San Salvador,
Corrigan
to
Hull,
4
June 1936, 817.00/8490.
52
Ubico's
preference
for
military
men was
emphasized by
two of his cabinet ministesrs in
interviews with the
author,
Lie. Guillermo Saenz de
Tejada,
Minister of
Gobernacion, 15
July 1969,
and Lic.
Jose
Gonzalez
Campo,
Minister of
Hacienda,
17 July I969.
53
Reports
of Salvadoran
opposition
to Somoza and to ' mediation '
proposals,
came from Boaz
Long (United
States Minister in
Guatemala) reporting
a conversation with the Salvadoran
Minister in
Guatemala,
8
May 1936, 8I7.00/8405, Corrigan
to
Hull, 14 May 1936, 8I7.00
/84i6,
and
Corrigan
to
Hull, reporting
a conversation with
Martinez,
and
quoting
the
Salvadoran President as
stating
that Somoza would never come to the
Presidency by proper
methods and
hinting
at the
prospect
of a
revolt, 19
Aug. I935, 815.00/462I.
54
Nuestro
Diario, 25
Nov.
1935.
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The
Myth of
a Central American Dictators'
League 343
northern
republics effectively parried
each other's
thrusts,
preventing outright
intervention
by
either.
To be
sure,
there were some
signs
of
rapprochement during I937
and
1938.
Salvador and Guatemala
signed
a new trade
treaty,
abolished tourist
cards for
Itraffic
on their
frontier,
and dedicated a new
highway bridge
to
facilitate travel and commerce.55 Ubico once
again
maintained a 'benevolent
neutrality' during
Martinez's next election
campaign
in
1938.
President
Somoza's
trip
to the United
Sltates
in
i939,
which included
stops
in all the
Central American
capitals
en
route,
served as the occasion for
grandiose
rhetoric
regarding
Central American Union and effusive
praise
between the
respective presidents
that fostered rumors of new
attempts
at union.56 A
Guatemalan
campaign
to build
up
Latin American
support
for its claims to
Belice also received unanimous endorsement
throughout
Central
America,
with the various
legislatures passing
resolutions of
solidarity
and the
press
editorializing enthusiastically
about Guatemalan
righ,ts.57
These, however,
were
merely
surface manifestations.
Throughout
the
period,
border incidents
continued and the old
jealousies
and rivalries
persisted among
all the
isthmian
republics, particularly
between Guatemala and Salvador.
The mistaken
impression
of mutual
cooperation occasionally
led to
gross
distortion of events in the
area,
based on
supposition.
For
example, during
the
I944
revolt in
Salvador,
rumors of aid from
neighboring dictatorships
abounded.
Apparently over-reacting hastily
in the
crisis,
the State
Depart-
menlt
telegraphed
the American Minister in
Tegucigalpa, directing
him to
investigate
a
report
that Honduras had
dispatched
several tanks to Salvador
to aid the
government
forces.
Obviously
incensed,
the Minister
replied:
'Since Honduras has no
(repeat no)
tanks,
it could not have
supplied any
to El Salvador.'58 A
subsequent
request
to check on
reports
that the
Honduran Air Force was
assisting
the Salvadoran Government
brought
another
sharp
retort that revealed the minister's
disgust: 'Despite
sinister
and absurd rumors to the
contrary,
the downstream Honduran lamb is not
(repeat not) muddying
the waters of the
upstream
Guatemalan and Salva-
55
For the trade
treaty,
El
Imparcial, 15
Dec.
I937,
and
25 May 1938;
for the Tourist
Cards,
El Diario de Occidente
(Santa Ana,
El
Salvador),
6 and
12 Jan.
and 6 June
I938;
and
regarding
the
bridge,
El
Imparcial, I7 Sept. 1937.
56
The
Nicaraguan
President's visits in all of the Central American
capitals engendered
con-
siderable
press coverage
in each
nation,
and can be followed in all the
papers
of each
country.
57
For details see Kenneth
J. Grieb, 'Jorge
Ubico and the Belice
Boundary Dispute',
The
Americas
xxx,
No.
4 (April I974), pp. 448-74.
58
Edward R.
Stettinius, Jr.
(Secretary
of
State)
to
John
S. Erwin
(United
States Ambassador
in
Tegucigalpa), 17
Nov.
I944, 8I3.00/II-I744,
Erwin to
Stettinius, I7
Nov.
813.00/II-
I744.
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344
Kenneth
1.
Grieb
doran wolves.' He concluded: 'The
only
non-routine
activity
of the
Honduran Air Force in the
past
week has been assiduous attendance at
numerous cocktail
parties
given
in honor of the
departing secretary
of
my
Acting Military
Attache.' 5
It is
apparent
from a
survey
of
relations
between the Central American
regimes
ithat a Dictators'
League
never existed. Incidents
produced by
the
historic national rivalries continued
throughout
the
I93os.
To be
sure,
there
was some
transitory 'cooperation'
to the extent of
supplying
arms or
expelling
exiles from a
neighboring country,
but this
scarcely
constituted an
alliance. Such actions reflected
temporary expediency,
and
represented
a
recognition
of
reality
which came
only
after or between
repeated attempts
to aid revolutionaries.
Eventually
the internal
strength
of each of the
respec-
tive
regimes imposed
a kind of
stability, by rendering
it
impossible
lto
pur-
sue
objectives
of dominance and
aggrandizement
without
assuming
un-
acceptable
risks. The result was a
grudging acceptance
of
reality,
and a
local 'balance of
power'.
The so-called
'cooperation'
was based on fear
rather than
friendship,
and did not reduce the normal incidents and tensions
of the historic rivalries. It
simply
meant that each of the dictators
relinquished
the traditional ambition to dominate the isthmus, and settled for the fact
that his
neighbors
had done
likewise,
thus
reducing any
menace to his
regime.
Yet even this 'mutual toleration' was at best
sporadic
and chimeri-
cal. Each of the dictators
clearly pursued
his own ends whenever there
appeared
to be
any prospect
for
advantage.
This was
particularly
evident in
Martinez's: shifts in
supporting
the various Honduran and Nicaraguan
factions,
It is difficult to
categorize
the
resulting
situation. In a
sense,
the dictators
merely
forced each other to
apply
the
principles
of non-intervention con-
tained in the
I907
and
1923 Washington
Treaties. This
degree
of '
coopera-
tion' has
frequently
existed in Central
America,
both before and after the
period
under discussion.
Certainly noithing approaching
an
alliance,
formal
or
informal,
ever existed
among
the dictators of the
I930S
and
I940S.
Diplomatically,
one is
tempted
to
suggest
that the situation could at best be
characterized
by
the term entente cordiale,
but even that would be mislead-
ing,
for
cordiality
was
conspicuously
absent,
except
in formalities.
The French
equivalent
of
'grudging'
would
appear
more
appropriate.
Even modus vivendi and detente
presume
more
negotiation
than was the
case. What existed can best be stated in a kind of
perverse 'golden
rule'
-
namely
that
having
failed to do one's
neighbor
in,
it became
prudent
to
59 Stettinius to
Erwin, 15
Dec.
1944, 8I6.O0/I2-1544,
and Erwin to Stettinius, 15
Dec.
1944,
816.00/I2-I544.
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The
Myth of
a Central American Dictators'
League 345
refrain from
doing
unto him as he would do unto
you,
in the
hope
that he
would
reciprocate.
This
produced
a tenuous balance based on mutual
tolerance,
but it must be realized that it stemmed not from
friendship,
but
from mutual
frustration,
and from fear rather than
respect.
It never
gene,r-
ated a
degree
of
cooperation meriting
so broad a term as
league.
Indeed,
the
reports
of the existence of the
phan,tom
Dictators'
League
were
closely
related to an
attempt
to
identify
these
regimes
with Fascism and
employ
phraseology
that would
play
on the new-found
phobia
of the United States.
The
origin
of the term must be credited to
imaginative
exiles,
efficient
propagandists,
the
hysteria
of an
era,
and
gullible journalists.
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