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ARMOR IN BATTLE
CDT
Leadership Branch
Lealei-ship and Training Div'ssiol
Command andSaf D epn~i-ment
Thbis d,_iilnvwx. h'-.s been Qpptcav8(i
for p-.. 'Ii- r.ca~lc and Sale; ils
di hutor~ unim.njI 'te d.
U.S. ARYARMOR SCHOOL
FORT KNOX, KENTUICKY
____MARCM.' 1986
C v
Ii ,.A.
TO THE READER
Should you have knowledge of a small unit armor
I
'' action you feel is particularly noteworthy, please
send a copy of it (along with copyright permission
to reprint, if necessary) to this address:
Command and Staff Department .
USAAMS
Pr. Leadership Branch I
, ATTN: ATSB-CS-LL
Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121-5211
If it is inconvenient to send us a copy, please
send at least the a-thor's name and title of
the article. All articles received will be con-
sidered for inclusion in the second printing.
fY.I'. Thank you.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1939, George C. Marshall, then a Colonel in the Infantry, wrote these
words in the Introduction to Infantry in Battle:
". There is much evidence to show that officers who have
received the best peacetime training available find themselves
surprised and confused by the difference between conditions
as pictured in map problems and those they encounter in campaign.
This is largely because our peacetime training in tactics tends
,"" c~~o become increasingly theoretical. In our schools we generally"z'"
assume that organizations are well-trained and at full strength,
that subordinates are competent, that supply arrangements
function, that communications work, that orders are carried
out. In war many or all of these conditions may be absent.
The veteran knows that this is noiuial and his mental processes -
are not paralyzed by it. He knows he must carry on in spite
of seemingly insurmountable difficulties and regardless of L
the fact that the tools with which he has to work may be
imperfect and worn. Moreover, he knows how to go about it.
This volume is designed to give the peace-trained officer
something of the viewpoint of the veteran.
His words are still valid today. The majority of military history is written . .-
at the division, corps, and echelons above corps level. Although the big
picture is also important, company level leaders can better understand and
"learn from small unit actions - military history at an applicable level.
Armor in Battle is not intended to be a carbon copy of Infantry in Battle,
although the initial concept came from it. The concept behind Armor in
Battle is to fill a void in military history. There has never been a dearth
of small unit infantry actions, yet small unit armor actions are few and
far between. This is an attempt to fill that void by providing an anthology
featuring armored action starting with the very first armor battle in 1916.
Additionally, Armor in Battle is designed to provide a turret's eye view
of armored conflict - military history at the small unit level. This
anthology mainly revolves around platoon and company level actions, for
it is from such accounts that company grade leaders can benefit most from
military history.
LEADERSHIP BRANCH
UNITED STATES ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."
George Santayana: The Life of Reason, 1906
)1.4-i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: World War I 4
The First Armor Battle: The Somme 1-1
Combined Armis: First Battle of Cambrai 1-3
Bapaume -11i
Epehy 1-14
"Hot Work, This." 1-17
Tank Versus Tank: Villers-Bcetonneux 1-19 F
CHAPTER 2: World War II
The Armored Roadblock 2-1 "-V"'.
Task Force Turner 2-8
Action at Schmidt 2-17
Reconnaissance in Force by Russian Armor 2-30
Technique of the Tank Platoon as the Point in 2-36
an Exploitation
An Armored Task Force Seizes Two Vital Bridges 2-44 "A
Tanks in Rough Terrain 2-51
Singling 2-59
808th TD Battalion: After-Action Report 2-88
Friendly Fire 2-92
Troyes - An Armored Attack 2-96
A Tank Platoon in Tunisia 2-106 L
Calculated Risk
2-116
''.
CHAPTER 3: Korea
Tank Action at Chongjui 3- 1
Task Force Crombez 3-7
Tank Support 3-17
Company A, 7"nd Tank Battalion: Combat Leadership 3-24
CHAPTER 4: Vietnam
Suoi Cat 4-1
Ambush 4-4
Tank to Tank 4-7
The Ruck of Dong Ila 4-11
The Affray at Slope 30 4-16
Ore Day's Combat 4-23 .
CHAPTER 5: Arab-israeli Conflicts
The Valley of Tears 5-i
Decision in Sinai 5-16 :ZI
Tank Warrior in the Golan 5-29
-'.::"'
6 WORLD WAR I
UK: "L-Ife W-14o 281 UK; Nk 1-Moth." 57mm 20. UK: ku $141 Ihjam) 57mm 284
IFN;Ii 5ChmnW d7brm 251 Of. ANV57mm 33t A
.3UK: UkV* IVMb.157mm 261 F01 S~hno.4.,CAI 75mm UK MAd MhA-OWh~et MG 14t
490
UK: Mk V Mawa 57mm 29% UK: PA V'Is~Iu57n, 341 UK. Mk V11 :Malt. b7mm~ 331 o
RA&t
"THE ENEMY,. IN THE LATEST FIGHT,, HAVE, EMPLOYED NEW 8
ENGINES OF WAR AS CRUEL AS (THEY ARE) EFFECTIVE." .e
~HIEF O STAFF
. WA6,
EEMAN HIRD ARMY GROUP 1916 ... ......
'WA' Av~iaiability Codes
Dist AVi rlo
Special
"'1b
ARMOR IN BATTLE. CHAPTER I
STHE FIRST ARMOR BATTLE:
4,i" he Somme, September 15, 1916.
iForty-nine mark I tanks were used by the British during the Battle of
the Somme, the first test of the tank in action. owing to t!he fact
? that these vehicles I-ad been secretly designed, built and delivered to
"the battlefield, little was known about them even by the troops who
were to use them. Many questions concerning the new wapon had to be
answered and many new problems pertaining to their tactical use,
control and supply were hastily solved. Naturally, considerable
confusion existed concerning the methods to be used since no precedent
. or past experience of any kind was available to serve as a guide.
It was finally decided that the tanks should start in time to
reach the first objective tivt minutes ahead of the infantry, that
they should be employed in groups of two or three against strong
points, and that the artillery barrages should leave lanes free from
fire through which the tanks could advance.
bb special reconnaissance was made by the tank personnel and,
consequently, the tank commanders were not well informed as to the
- situation prior to the attack. However, this was only one of the
links in the chain of circumstances which, as e look back at this"
first tank action, appears to have been designed to insure its certain
failure. In their book, The Tank Corp, Major C. Williams - Ellis and
SA. Williams - Ellis, refer to orders issued for the tanks: "For 1"
pfl every three tanks only one set of orders had been issued, and only one
map supplied; consequently we had to grasp these orders before we.
!,passed thein on to the other" two officers . .. ... . tbwever at; 5 "'
poePM on the day before the battle those orders were cancelled and newIm:
. .'" verbal instructions substituted."