1

G.R. No. 136292 January 15, 2002 CABALLES vs CA

RUDY CABALLES y A!"#, petitioner,
vs.
C#UR #$ A%%EALS an& %E#%LE #$ 'E %'!L!%%!NES,
respondents.
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision
1
of respondent Court of
Appeals dated September 15, 1998 which affirmed the ud!ment rendered by
the "e!ional Trial Court of Santa Cru#, $a!una, findin! herein petitioner, "udy
Caballes y Tai%o, !uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, and the
resolution
&
dated 'ovember 9, 1998 which denied petitioner(s motion for
reconsideration.
)n an )nformation
*
dated +ctober 1,, 1989, petitioner was char!ed with the
crime of theft committed as follows-
.That on or about the &8th day of /une, 1989, in the 0unicipality of
1a!sanan, and2or elsewhere in the 1rovince of $a!una, and within the
urisdiction of this 3onorable Court, the above4named accused, with
intent of !ain, and without the 5nowled!e and consent of the owner
thereof, the 'AT)+'A$ 1+67" C+"1+"AT)+', did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously ta5e, steal and carry away about
,*845! of Aluminum Cable Conductors, valued at 1&9, :58.88,
belon!in! to and to the dama!e and preudice of said owner 'ational
1ower Corp., in the aforesaid amount.
C+'T"A"; T+ $A6..
<urin! the arrai!nment, petitioner pleaded not !uilty and hence, trial on the
merits ensued.
The facts are summari#ed by the appellate court as follows-
.=At> about 9-15 p.m. of /une &8, 1989, S!t. ?ictorino 'ocea and 1at.
Ale@ de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Aaran!ay Sampalucan,
1a!sanan, $a!una, spotted a passen!er eep unusually covered with
.5a5awati. leaves.
Suspectin! that the eep was loaded with smu!!led !oods, the two
police officers fla!!ed down the vehicle. The eep was driven by
appellant. 6hen as5ed what was loaded on the eep, he did not answerB
he appeared pale and nervous.
6ith appellant(s consent, the police officers chec5ed the car!o and they
discovered bundles of *.88 mm aluminum2!alvani#ed conductor wires
e@clusively owned by 'ational 1ower Corporation C'1CD. The
conductor wires wei!hed 988 5ilos and valued at 155, &::.:5. 'ocea
as5ed appellant where the wires came from and appellant answered that
they came from Cavinti, a town appro@imately 8 5ilometers away from
Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the hi!h4volta!e
wires were brou!ht to the 1a!sanan 1olice Station. <anilo Cabale too5
pictures of the appellant and the eep loaded with the wires which were
turned over to the 1olice Station Commander of 1a!sanan, $a!una.
Appellant was incarcerated for 9 days in the 0unicipal ail.
)n defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. 3e testified that he is a
driver and resident of 1a!sanan, $a!unaB a 'A"C+0 civilian a!ent
since /anuary, 1988 althou!h his identification card C)<D has already
e@pired. )n the afternoon of /une &8, 1989, while he was drivin! a
passen!er eepney, he was stopped by one "esty Eernande# who
reFuested him to transport in his eepney conductor wires which were in
Cavinti, $a!una. 3e told "esty to wait until he had finished his last trip
for the day from Santa Cru#, $a!una. +n his way to Santa Cru#,
$a!una, he dropped by the 'A"C+0 headFuarters and informed his
superior, S!t. Callos, that somethin! unlawful was !oin! to happen. S!t.
Callos advised him to proceed with the loadin! of the wires and that the
former would act as bac54up and intercept the vehicle at the Sambat
1atrol Aase in 1a!sanan.
After receivin! those instructions, he went bac5 to see "esty. Althou!h
"esty had his own vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were
loaded in appellant(s eep and covered with 5a5awati leaves. The
loadin! was done by about five C5D mas5ed men. 3e was promised
11,888.88 for the ob. Gpon crossin! a brid!e, the two vehicles
separated but in his case, he was intercepted by S!t. 'ocea and 1at. <e
Castro. 6hen they discovered the cables, he told the police officers that
the cables were loaded in his eep by the owner, "esty Eernande#. Aut
2
despite his e@planation, he was ordered to proceed to police
headFuarters where he was interro!ated. The police officers did not
believe him and instead loc5ed him up in ail for a wee5..
:
+n April &9, 199*, the court a quo rendered ud!ment
5
the dispositive portion of
which reads-
.637"7E+"7, findin! the accused !uilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Theft of property worth 155,&::.:5, the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer imprisonment from T6+ C&D =;7A"S>, E+G"
C:D 0+'T3S, and +'7 C1D <A; of 1rision Correccional, as minimum,
to T7' C18D ;7A"S of 1rision 0ayor, as ma@imum, to indemnify the
complainant 'ational 1ower Corporation in the amount of 155, &::.:5,
and to pay the costs..
+n appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ud!ment of conviction but
deleted the award for dama!es on the !round that the stolen materials were
recovered and modified the penalty imposed, to wit-
.637"7E+"7, the appealed decision is hereby AEE)"07< with the
modification that appellant "G<; CAAA$$7S is found !uilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in theft, defined and penali#ed under
Articles *88 and *89, par. 1, "evised 1enal Code, and there bein! no
modifyin! circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty
of Eour C:D years, 'ine C9D months and 7leven C11D days of prision
correccional, as minimum term, to 7i!ht C8D years, 7i!ht C8D months
and one C1D day of prision mayor, as ma@imum term. 'o civil indemnity
and no costs..
,
1etitioner comes before us and raises the followin! issues-
.CaD 6hether or not the constitutional ri!ht of petitioner was violated
when the police officers searched his vehicle and sei#ed the wires found
therein without a search warrant and when samples of the wires and
references to them were admitted in evidence as basis for his
convictionB
CbD 6hether or not respondent Court erred in reectin! petitioner(s
defense that he was en!a!ed in an entrapment operation and in
indul!in! in speculation and conecture in reectin! said defenseB and
CcD 6hether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the
!uilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome
the constitutional ri!ht of petitioner to presumption of innocence..
The conviction or acFuittal of petitioner hin!es primarily on the validity of the
warrantless search and sei#ure made by the police officers, and the admissibility
of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
)n holdin! that the warrantless search and sei#ure is valid, the trial court ruled
that-
.As his last straw of ar!ument, the accused Fuestions the
constitutionality of the search and validity of his arrest on the !round
that no warrant was issued to that effect. The Court cannot a!ain sustain
such view. )n the case of 1eople v. $o 3o =6in!>, H.". 'o. 88819,
/anuary &1, 1991, it has been held that (considerin! that before a warrant
can be obtained, the place, thin!s and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuin! ud!e 4 a reFuirement which
borders on the impossible in the case of smu!!lin! effected by the use
of a movin! vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity, a warrantless search of a movin! vehicle is
ustified on !rounds of practicability.( The doctrine is not of recent
vinta!e. )n the case of ?almonte vs. de ?illa, H.". 'o. 8*988, 0ay &:,
1998 C"esolution on 0otion for "econsideration, September &9, 1989D,
it was ruled that (automobiles because of their mobility may be searched
without a warrant upon facts not ustifyin! warrantless search of a
resident or office. @ @ @ To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be
arrested and searched for the evidence and to5ens of his crime without a
warrant, would be to leave society, to a lar!e e@tent, at the mercy of the
shrewdest, the most e@pert, and the most depraved of criminals,
facilitatin! their escape in many instances( C)bid.D. )n Gmil v. "amos,
189 SC"A *11, and 1eople vs. +rti#, 191 SC"A 8*,, the Supreme
Court held that a search may be made even without a warrant where the
accused is cau!ht in fla!rante. Gnder the circumstances, the police
3
officers are not only authori#ed but are also under obli!ation to arrest
the accused even without a warrant..
9
1etitioner contends that the fla!!in! down of his vehicle by police officers who
were on routine patrol, merely on .suspicion. that .it mi!ht contain smu!!led
!oods,. does not constitute probable cause that will ustify a warrantless search
and sei#ure. 3e insists that, contrary to the findin!s of the trial court as adopted
by the appellate court, he did not !ive any consent, e@press or implied, to the
search of the vehicle. 1erforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his ri!ht
a!ainst unreasonable search and sei#ure shall be deemed inadmissible.
7nshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable ri!ht of the people to be secure in
their persons and properties a!ainst unreasonable searches and sei#ures, as
defined under Section &, Article ))) thereof, which reads-
.Sec. &. The ri!ht of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects a!ainst unreasonable searches and sei#ures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e@cept upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the ud!e after e@amination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describin! the place to be searched and the persons or
thin!s to be sei#ed..
The e@clusionary rule under Section *C&D, Article ))) of the Constitution bars the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of such ri!ht.
The constitutional proscription a!ainst warrantless searches and sei#ures is not
absolute but admits of certain e@ceptions, namely- C1D warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest reco!ni#ed under Section 1&, "ule 1&, of the "ules
of Court and by prevailin! urisprudenceB
8
C&D sei#ure of evidence in plain viewB
9
C*D search of movin! vehiclesB
18
C:D consented warrantless searchB
11
C5D customs
searchB C,D stop and fris5 situations CTerry searchDB
1&
and C9D e@i!ent and
emer!ency circumstances.
1*
)n cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and
reiterated in the "ules of Court must be complied with. )n the e@ceptional events
where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or sei#ure, or when the
latter cannot be performed e@cept without a warrant, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or sei#ure is purely a udicial Fuestion,
determinable from the uniFueness of the circumstances involved, includin! the
purpose of the search or sei#ure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and sei#ure was made, the place or thin! searched
and the character of the articles procured.
1:
)t is not controverted that the search and sei#ure conducted by the police officers
in the case at bar was not authori#ed by a search warrant. The main issue is
whether the evidence ta5en from the warrantless search is admissible a!ainst the
appellant. 6ithout said evidence, the prosecution cannot prove the !uilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt.1wphi1.nt
I. Search of moving vehicle
3i!hly re!ulated by the !overnment, the vehicle(s inherent mobility reduces
e@pectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thorou!hfares
furnishes a hi!hly reasonable suspicion amountin! to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity.
15
Thus, the rules !overnin! search and
sei#ure have over the years been steadily liberali#ed whenever a movin! vehicle
is the obect of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considerin! that
before a warrant could be obtained, the place, thin!s and persons to be searched
must be described to the satisfaction of the issuin! ud!e I a reFuirement
which borders on the impossible in the case of smu!!lin! effected by the use of
a movin! vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity. 6e mi!ht add that a warrantless search of a movin! vehicle is
ustified on the !round that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be Fuic5ly moved out of the locality or urisdiction in which the
warrant must be sou!ht.
1,
Searches without warrant of automobiles is also
allowed for the purpose of preventin! violations of smu!!lin! or immi!ration
laws, provided such searches are made at borders or (constructive borders( li5e
chec5points near the boundary lines of the State.
19
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not !ive the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if
made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.
18

Still and all, the important thin! is that there was probable cause to conduct the
warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
4
Althou!h the term eludes e@act definition, probable cause si!nifies a reasonable
!round of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently stron! in
themselves to warrant a cautious man(s belief that the person accused is !uilty of
the offense with which he is char!edB or the e@istence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or obects
sou!ht in connection with said offense or subect to sei#ure and destruction by
law is in the place to be searched.
19
The reFuired probable cause that will ustify
a warrantless search and sei#ure is not determined by a fi@ed formula but is
resolved accordin! to the facts of each case.
&8
+ne such form of search of movin! vehicles is the .stop4and4search. without
warrant at military or police chec5points which has been declared to be not
ille!al per se,
&1
for as lon! as it is warranted by the e@i!encies of public order
&&

and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.
&*
A chec5point may either
be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an e@tensive search.
"outine inspections are not re!arded as violative of an individual(s ri!ht a!ainst
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance
is limited to the followin! instances- C1D where the officer merely draws aside
the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is par5ed on the public fair !roundsB
&:
C&D
simply loo5s into a vehicleB
&5
C*D flashes a li!ht therein without openin! the car(s
doorsB
&,
C:D where the occupants are not subected to a physical or body searchB
&9
C5D where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspectionB
&8
and C,D where the routine chec5 is conducted in a fi@ed area.
&9
'one of the fore!oin! circumstances is obtainin! in the case at bar. The police
officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein
petitioner(s vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the 5a5awati leaves
and loo5 inside the sac5s before they were able to see the cable wires. )t cannot
be considered a simple routine chec5.
)n the case of Un()*& S)a)*s vs. %(*rr*,
*8
the Court held that the physical
intrusion of a part of the body of an a!ent into the vehicle !oes beyond the area
protected by the Eourth Amendment, to wit-
.The A!ent . . . stuc5 his head throu!h the driver(s side window. The
a!ent thus effected a physical intrusion into the vehicle. . . =6>e are
aware of no case holdin! that an officer did not conduct a search when
he physically intruded part of his body into a space in which the suspect
had a reasonable e@pectation of privacy. =The> A!ent=(s> . . . physical
intrusion allowed him to see and to smell thin!s he could not see or
smell from outside the vehicle. . . )n doin! so, his inspection went
beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be viewed from outside
the vehicle by either inFuisitive passersby or dili!ent police officers,
and into the area protected by the Eourth amendment, ust as much as if
he had stuc5 his head inside the open window of a home..
+n the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subected to an e@tensive
search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if
the officers conductin! the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe,
before the search, that either the motorist is a law4offender or they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertainin! to a crime in the vehicle to be searched.
*1
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a udicial
warrant an e@tensive search of movin! vehicles in situations where C1D there had
emanated from a pac5a!e the distinctive smell of mariuanaB C&D a!ents of the
'arcotics Command C.'arcom.D of the 1hilippine 'ational 1olice C.1'1.D had
received a confidential report from informers that a si#eable volume of
mariuana would be transported alon! the route where the search was
conductedB C*D 'arcom a!ents had received information that a Caucasian
comin! from Sa!ada, 0ountain 1rovince, had in his possession prohibited dru!s
and when the 'arcom a!ents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a
conspicuous bul!e in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other
identification papers when reFuested to do soB C:D 'arcom a!ents had received
confidential information that a woman havin! the same physical appearance as
that of the accused would be transportin! mariuanaB
*&
C5D the accused who were
ridin! a eepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier
received confidential reports that said accused would transport a lar!e Fuantity
of mariuanaB and C,D where the movin! vehicle was stopped and searched on
the basis of intelli!ence information and clandestine reports by a deep
penetration a!ent or spy 4 one who participated in the dru! smu!!lin! activities
of the syndicate to which the accused belon!ed 4 that said accused were brin!in!
prohibited dru!s into the country.
**
)n the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was fla!!ed down because the
police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw
5
that the bac5 of the vehicle was covered with 5a5awati leaves which, accordin!
to them, was unusual and uncommon.
1at. Ale@ de Castro recounted the incident as follows-
.ATT;. SA'T+S
J 'ow on said date and time do you remember of any unusual
incident while you were performin! your dutyK
A ;es, sir, at that time and date myself and 1olice S!t. 'ocea were
conductin! patrol in the said place when we spotted a suspicious
eepney so we stopped the eepney and searched the load of the eepney
and we found out CsicD these conductor wires.
J ;ou mentioned about the fact that when you saw the eepney you
became suspicious, +,y &(& you -*.o/* sus0(.(ous1
A B*.aus* ),* .ar2o +as .ov*r*& +(), 3*av*s an& -ran.,*s, s(r.
J 6hen you became suspicious upon seein! those leaves on top of
the load what did you do ne@t, if anyK
A 6e stopped the eepney and searched the contents thereof, sir..
*:
The testimony of ?ictorino 'ocea did not fare any better-
.ATT; SA'T+S
J 6hen you saw the accused drivin! the said vehicle, what did you
doK
A B*.aus* ! sa+ ),a) ),* v*,(.3* -*(n2 &ra+n -y Ca-a33*s +as
.ov*r*& -y 4a4a+a)( 3*av*s, ! -*.a/* sus0(.(ous s(n.* su., v*,(.3*
s,ou3& no) -* .ov*r*& -y ),os* an& ! 53a22*& ,(/, s(r.6
*5
6e hold that the fact that the vehicle loo5ed suspicious simply because it is not
common for such to be covered with 5a5awati leaves does not constitute
.probable cause. as would ustify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
)n %*o03* vs. C,ua 'o San,
*,
we held that the fact that the watercraft used by
the accused was different in appearance from the usual fishin! boats that
commonly cruise over the Aacnotan seas coupled with the suspicious behavior
of the accused when he attempted to flee from the police authorities do not
sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus-
.)n the case at bar, the Solicitor Heneral proposes that the followin!
details are su!!estive of probable cause 4 persistent reports of rampant
smu!!lin! of firearm and other contraband articles, C3GA(s watercraft
differin! in appearance from the usual fishin! boats that commonly
cruise over the Aacnotan seas, C3GA(s ille!al entry into the 1hilippines
@ @ @, C3GA(s suspicious behavior, i.e., he attempted to flee when he
saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which C3GA can
return to and navi!ate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards
the hi!h seas, beyond the reach of 1hilippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute .probable cause..
'one of the telltale clues, e.!., ba! or pac5a!e emanatin! the pun!ent
odor of mariuana or other prohibited dru!, confidential report and2or
positive identification by informers of courier of prohibited dru! and2or
the time and place where they will transport2deliver the same,
suspicious demeanor or behavior, and suspicious bul!e in the waist 4
accepted by this Court as sufficient to ustify a warrantless arrest e@ists
in this case. There was no classified information that a forei!ner would
disembar5 at Tammocalao beach bearin! prohibited dru! on the date in
Fuestion. C3GA was not identified as a dru! courier by a police
informer or a!ent. ,* 5a.) ),a) ),* v*ss*3 ),a) 5*rr(*& ,(/ )o s,or*
-or* no r*s*/-3an.* )o ),* 5(s,(n2 -oa)s o5 ),* ar*a &(& no)
au)o/a)(.a33y /ar4 ,(/ as (n ),* 0ro.*ss o5 0*r0*)ra)(n2 an
o55*ns*. @ @ @.. Cemphasis suppliedD
)n addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential
report or tipped information that petitioner was carryin! stolen cable wires in his
vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. +ur urisprudence
is replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable
6
cause to effect a warrantless search and sei#ure.
*9
Gnfortunately, none e@ists in
this case.
II. Plain view doctrine
)t cannot li5ewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner(s vehicle were
in plain view, ma5in! its warrantless sei#ure valid.
/urisprudence is to the effect that an obect is in plain view if the obect itself is
plainly e@posed to si!ht. 6here the obect sei#ed was inside a closed pac5a!e,
the obect itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be sei#ed without a
warrant. 3owever, if the pac5a!e proclaims its contents, whether by its
distinctive confi!uration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be sei#ed. )n other words,
if the pac5a!e is such that an e@perienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in
plain view. )t must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subect to
sei#ure.
*8
)t is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not e@posed to
si!ht because they were placed in sac5s
*9
and covered with leaves. The articles
were neither transparent nor immediately apparent to the police authorities.
They had no clue as to what was hidden underneath the leaves and branches. As
a matter of fact, they had to as5 petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. )n
such a case, it has been held that the obect is not in plain view which could
have ustified mere sei#ure of the articles without further search.
:8
III. Consented search
1etitioner contends that the statement of S!t. ?ictorino 'ocea that he chec5ed
the vehicle .with the consent of the accused. is too va!ue to prove that
petitioner consented to the search. 3e claims that there is no specific statement
as to how the consent was as5ed and how it was !iven, nor the specific words
spo5en by petitioner indicatin! his alle!ed .consent.. At most, there was only
an implied acFuiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no .consent. at all
within the purview of the constitutional !uarantee.
<oubtless, the constitutional immunity a!ainst unreasonable searches and
sei#ures is a personal ri!ht which may be waived. The consent must be
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise ille!al detention and search, i.e., the
consent is uneFuivocal, specific, and intelli!ently !iven, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion.
:1
3ence, consent to a search is not to be li!htly inferred, but
must be shown by clear and convincin! evidence.
:&
The Fuestion whether a
consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a Fuestion of fact to be determined
from the totality of all the circumstances.
:*
"elevant to this determination are
the followin! characteristics of the person !ivin! consent and the environment
in which consent is !iven- C1D the a!e of the defendantB C&D whether he was in a
public or secluded locationB C*D whether he obected to the search or passively
loo5ed onB
::
C:D the education and intelli!ence of the defendantB C5D the presence
of coercive police proceduresB C,D the defendant(s belief that no incriminatin!
evidence will be foundB
:5
C9D the nature of the police Fuestionin!B C8D the
environment in which the Fuestionin! too5 placeB and C9D the possibly
vulnerable subective state of the person consentin!.
:,
)t is the State which has
the burden of provin!, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily !iven.
:9
)n the case at bar, S!t. ?ictorino 'ocea testified on the manner in which the
search was conducted in this wise-
.6)T'7SS
J +n /une &8, 1989, where were youK
A 6e were conductin! patrol at the poblacion and some baran!ays,
sir.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @
J After conductin! the patrol operation, do you remember of any
unusual incident on said date and timeK
A ;es, sir.
J 6hat is that incidentK
7
A 6hile ) was conductin! my patrol at baran!ay Sampalucan, ) saw
"udy Caballes drivin! a vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum
wires, sir.
@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @
J 6hen you saw the accused drivin! the said vehicle, what did you
doK
A Aecause ) saw that the vehicle bein! driven by Caballes was
covered by 5a5awati leaves, ) became suspicious since such vehicle
should not be covered by those and ) fla!!ed him, sir.
J <id the vehicle stopK
A Y*s, s(r, an& a5)*r sa(& v*,(.3* s)o070*&8, ! r*/ov*& ),* .ov*r
o5 sa(& v*,(.3* an& -y so &o(n2, ! sa+ ),* a3u/(nu/ +(r*s.
J Aefore you saw the aluminum wires, did you tal5 to the accusedK
A ;es, sir, ) as5ed him what his load was.
J 6hat was the answer of CaballesK
A '* &(& no) ans+*r an& ! o-s*rv*& ,(/ )o -* 0a3*,
6na20a0a/u)3a6 9sic:, so ! )o3& ,(/ ! +(33 3oo4 a) ),* .on)*n)s o5 ,(s
v*,(.3* an& ,* ans+*r*& (n ),* 0os()(v*.
J And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the
eep, what did you doK
A ) as5ed him where those wires came from and he answered those
came from the Cavinti area, sir..
:8
This Court is not unmindful of cases upholdin! the validity of consented
warrantless searches and sei#ure. Aut in these cases, the police officers( reFuest
to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such
lan!ua!e that left no room for doubt that the latter fully understood what was
reFuested. )n some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the reFuest
demonstratin! that he also understood the nature and conseFuences of such
reFuest.
:9
)n Asun.(on vs. Cour) o5 A00*a3s,
58
the apprehendin! officers sou!ht the
permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the latter a!reed. 1etitioner
therein himself freely !ave his consent to said search. )n %*o03* vs. La.*rna,
51

the appellants who were ridin! in a ta@i were stopped by two policemen who
as5ed permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily a!reed. )n
upholdin! the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant
himself who was .urbani#ed in mannerism and speech. e@pressly said that he
was consentin! to the search as he alle!edly had nothin! to hide and had done
nothin! wron!. )n %*o03* vs. Cu(;on,
5&
the accused admitted that they si!ned a
written permission statin! that they freely consented to the search of their
lu!!a!e by the 'A) a!ents to determine if they were carryin! shabu. )n %*o03*
vs. <on)(33a,
5*
it was held that the accused spontaneously performed affirmative
acts of volition by himself openin! the ba! without bein! forced or intimidated
to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his ri!ht.
)n %*o03* vs. #/a+*n2,
5:
the police officers as5ed the accused if they could
see the contents of his ba! to which the accused said .you can see the contents
but those are only clothin!s.. Then the policemen as5ed if they could open and
see it, and accused answered .you can see it.. The Court said there was a valid
consented search.1wphi1.nt
)n case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional !uarantee a!ainst
obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that C1D the ri!ht e@istsB C&D that the person involved had 5nowled!e,
either actual or constructive, of the e@istence of such ri!htB and C*D the said
person had an actual intention to relinFuish the ri!ht.
55
)n the case at bar, the evidence is lac5in! that the petitioner intentionally
surrendered his ri!ht a!ainst unreasonable searches. The manner by which the
two police officers alle!edly obtained the consent of petitioner for them to
conduct the search leaves much to be desired. 6hen petitioner(s vehicle was
fla!!ed down, S!t. 'ocea approached petitioner and 6)o3& ,(/ ! +(33 3oo4 a)
),* .on)*n)s o5 ,(s v*,(.3* an& ,* ans+*r*& (n ),* 0os()(v*.6 6e are hard put
to believe that by utterin! those words, the police officers were as5in! or
reFuestin! for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of
petitioner. Eor all intents and purposes, they were (n5or/(n2, nay, (/0os(n2
8
upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The .consent. !iven
under intimidatin! or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview
of the constitutional !uaranty. )n addition, in cases where this Court upheld the
validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities e@pressly
as5ed, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And
the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. )n the
case of herein petitioner, the statements of the police officers were no) as4(n2
5or ,(s .ons*n)B they were &*.3ar(n2 to him that they will loo5 inside his
vehicle. Aesides, it is doubtful whether permission was actually reFuested and
!ranted because when S!t. 'ocea was as5ed durin! his direct e@amination what
he did when the vehicle of petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the
cover of the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. )t was only after he was as5ed
a clarificatory Fuestion that he added that he told petitioner he will inspect the
vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthou!ht. $i5ewise, when 1at. de
Castro was as5ed twice in his direct e@amination what they did when they
stopped the eepney, his consistent answer was that they searched the vehicle.
3e never testified that he as5ed petitioner for permission to conduct the search.
5,
'either can petitioner(s passive submission be construed as an implied
acFuiescence to the warrantless search. )n %*o03* vs. Barros,
59
appellant Aarros,
who was carryin! a carton bo@, boarded a bus where two policemen were ridin!.
The policemen inspected the carton and found mariuana inside. 6hen as5ed
who owned the bo@, appellant denied ownership of the bo@ and failed to obect
to the search. The Court there struc5 down the warrantless search as ille!al and
held that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search
conducted simply because he failed to obect, citin! the rulin! in the case of
%*o03* vs. Bur2os,
58
to wit:
.As the constitutional !uaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative
act of the citi#en, the courts do not place the citi#ens in the position of
either contestin! an officer(s authority by force, or waivin! his
constitutional ri!htsB but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to
a search or sei#ure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely
a demonstration of re!ard for the supremacy of the law..
Castin! aside the cable wires as evidence, the remainin! evidence on record are
insufficient to sustain petitioner(s conviction. 3is !uilt can only be established
without violatin! the constitutional ri!ht of the accused a!ainst unreasonable
search and sei#ure.
='ERE$#RE, the impu!ned decision is RE>ERSED and SE AS!DE, and
accused "udy Caballes is hereby AC?U!ED of the crime char!ed. Cost de
oficio.