EnsuringAirworthinessforC130J30

AftPlugUpperBL61Longerons
DrHughStone,AustralianAerospace(AA)C130JEngineering
1. Abstract
ThispaperdescribesworkdonetoensuretheongoingstructuralintegrityofaftplugupperBL61Longeronsin
RAAFC130J30aircraft.TheworkaroseoutoffindingmultipleinstancesofdamageintheRAAFfleet.Whilstthe
damageitselfwasnotfatiguerelated,therepairsrequiredanassessmentoftheirlifeassomeofthedamage
detailswerewelloutsidetheboundsofnormalgoodpracticestructuraldesign.Themainaspectsofthework
includethedevelopmentofadetailedFEMmodeltorecoverbearingandbypassloadsinthejoint;the
developmentofasuiteofmaximumdamagemodelstoboundthefleetwideproblems;andtheuseofdamage
toleranceanalysistocalculateinspectionintervalsforthefleet,basedonthesemaximumdamagemodelsand
conservativespectrums.Thishasnowledtoalterationstothestructuralinspectionsforthesecomponents.This
safetybyinspectionapproachhasresultedintotalcostsavingsestimatedat3700manhoursofwork,or62%,in
comparisontolongeronreplacement.
1 Introduction
DuringdepotlevelmaintenanceforaC130J30aircraftin2010,severedamagetoholesintheAftplugupperBL61
longeronswasdiscovered.Thedamageconsistedofamixtureofoversized,elongatedordoubledrilledholes,often
withlowedgedistance.ApictureofoneofthedamagedlongeronendsonthefirstaircraftisshowninFigure1.The
damageledtolongeronreplacementandtheissuingofanSTI(ServiceBulletin)toinspectotheraircraft.Asaresult
of this inspection the majority of RAAF aircraft were found with similar instances of damage. Full longeron
replacement is expensive as it is hard to procure parts and requires a large number of manhours. To obviate the
need for full longeron replacement across the fleet, the possibility of cleaning out the damaged holes by use of
oversize fasteners or freezeplugs was investigated. As the degree of oversizing was extensive (increases of 6
oversizes: i.e. 6/64ths: 0.250 0.344), and remaining edgedistances were often less than 1D, a Damage
ToleranceAnalysis(DTA)wasconductedtodetermineappropriateinspectionintervalsfortherepairedstructure.
Figure1DamageatFS817ER/Hand737EL/Hon1staircraft:theLongeronswerereplacedinthiscase.Ascanbeseendamage
consistsofdoubledrilledholes,whichrequiresignificantoversizingtoclearthemout.
AircraftAirworthinessandSustainmentConference,Brisbane2012 1of14
The main features of the analysis were the development of a robust model of the joint which would allow the
extraction of accurate bearing and bypass loads at the fastener locations; the use of simplified Severity Factor
calculationstowinnowthedifferentdamageconditionsdowntoalimitedsetofcriticalconditions;andtheuseof
the DT tool AFGROW to model crackgrowth in the longeron outstanding flange for the critical conditions under
conservative spectrums. Although the analysis received the OEMs final blessing, it was performed entirely at AA,
withoutanyspecialtoolsorOEMdataabovewhatisavailabletotheRAAF.Theanalysisfoundthattherepairswere
acceptable, provided that slight enhancements to the longeron inspection regime were promulgated. This has
resultedinthesavingofthousandsofhoursofeffortinchanginglongeronsonmultipleaircraft.
2 DescriptionofStructure
The C130J30 Hercules is a 164,000 lb GW aircraft powered by four RollsRoyce AE2100 engines with a 132 7
wingspan.Thebasicstructureofthefuselageconsistsof6majorlongeronsandastructuralcargofloor,(SeeFigure
2). The external skin of the aircraft is only considered to transmit shear and pressure loads and is assumed
ineffective in compression. Unlike many aircraft the Hercules does not have a multiplicity of stringers around its
fuselage which leaves the longerons and the cargofloor the only structure available to resist primary fuselage
bendingloads.

Figure2:FuselageStructureofC130J30aircraftshowingprimarystructuralelementsforresistingfuselagebending
moments,(basepicturefromwww.flightglobal.com)
The location of damage observed on RAAF aircraft is in the aft 80 plug. The plug longerons are joined to the
continuing structure fore and aft via backtoback double tension fittings. These in turn are joined to the longeron
via5x0.250HiLoksthroughthelongeronoutstandingflangeaswellas14x0.164HiLoksthroughthelongeron
skin flanges. At the joint the longeron is a Tshaped extrusion with the middle leg of the T pointing inwards and
the top of the T attached to the aircraft skin. The two tension fittings nestle in either side of the T as shown in
Figure3.

AircraftAirworthinessandSustainmentConference,Brisbane2012 2of14
3 DescriptionofDamage
The damageconsisted primarily of oversized, elongated or doubledrilled holes, oftenwith low edge distance. The
location of damage observed on RAAF aircraft was at the 5off 0.250 HiLoks in the longeron outstanding flange.
ThedamagelocationcanbeseeninFigure3.Althoughdamagewasobservedinboththefittingsandthelongeron
thefittingswererelativelyeasytoreplace.Thispaperwillonlyfocusonthelongeron.

Figure3:FS817EUpperBL61LongeronTensionJoint,withLowerTensionFittingRemovedforClarity.(NotethattheLongeron
skinflangeisnotvisibleinthispictureasitsitsoutsidetheskinoftheaircraft.)
Besides the damage shown in Figure 1, another example of damage is also shown in Figure 4. In this case the
damageconsistsofoversizeholeswithlowedgedistance.

Figure4:Furtherdamageobservedinthiscaseoversizeholesandlowedgedistances.(Thenominalconfigurationis0.250
holeswith0.370edgedistance).
AircraftAirworthinessandSustainmentConference,Brisbane2012 3of14

Repairs to the longerons consisted of the use of oversized fasteners and freezeplugs to cleanout the damaged
holes.Thispaperwillnotconsiderthecausesofthedamagedholes:ratheritwillfocusonthedeterminationofan
inspectionregimefortherepairedstructure.
4 SortingThroughDamageCases
A multistageprocess was used to sort through thedifferent damage scenarios encountered to arrive at a general
inspectionregimeforallaircraft.Ratherthandevelopingindividualinspectionsforeachaircraft,itwasdecidedthat
a general inspection would be more appropriate. This simplified both the analysis and the implementation of the
inspection regime and saved significantly on engineering time to determine appropriate inspection intervals. The
firstpartofarrivingatacommonintervalforallaircraftwastofindaworstcasedamagescenariothatcouldbe
usedtosettheinspectionregimeforthefleet.
This was done using a hierarchical assessment as shown in Figure 5. For all damaged aircraft, the damage at each
locationintheaftplug(fourpossiblelocations:BL737EL&R,BL817EL&R)wasinitiallyassessedqualitatively.Ifthe
damage was obviously noncritical in comparison to other aircraft, no further action was taken other than the
development of a normal static repair. If the damage could not be ruled as noncritical from this eyeball
assessment,itwasfurtheranalysedusingadetailedFEMModel(SeeSection6)toobtainfastenerloadsandbypass
stressesinthelongeron.ThefastenerloadswerethenusedwithaNiu
1
SeverityFactorstylecalculationtoobtaina
peakstress at each hole in the joint. These peakstress results were then compared and only the largest setaside
forDTanalysisusingAFGROW.

Figure5:FlowChartfordamageassessment
AircraftAirworthinessandSustainmentConference,Brisbane2012 4of14
5 MaximumDamageModels
Atthetimeoftheanalysis,manyaircrafthadnotbeeninspected.Itwasthusthoughtappropriatetotryandbound
theworstcasedamagewewouldexpecttoseebasedontheinitialaircraftinspected.Inspectionintervalsforsuch
aworstcasedamagemodelcouldthenbeusedasaboundingsolutionforthefleet.Theworstcasedamagemodels
focussedonthefollowingfactors.
Edgedistance.Lowedgedistancecauseshigherstressconcentrations,higherfactorsandreducedcrack
growth life in the ligament between the hole and the edge. The minimum edgedistance used in the
maximumdamagemodelswas0.9D.
Maximumfastenersizesusedinarepairbeforeplugging.Largerfastenersintheoutstandingflangeattract
load away from the skin flange of the longeron. Thus large fasteners (particularly in positions 2 thru 5 as
shown in Figure 6) cause higher bypass loads at the lead fastener. The largest fasteners installed without
freezeplugging the hole were 2
nd
oversize 5/16 or 0.344 diameter. (Baseline fasteners were .) Any
holesrequiringcleaningoutgreaterthanthiswerefreezepluggedandhadthenominal fastenerinstalled
throughtheplug.Thisisconsideredlessseverethanthelargefastenerconditionprovidededgedistances
arenotlessthan0.9D(basedonplugdiameter.)Thisisbecausewithaplugandnominalfasteners,thereis
lessloadattractionandthebearingstressesarelowerduetothelargerplug.
As later aircraft were inspected, providedtheir damage fell within themaximum damage bounds,no further work
wasnecessary.

Figure6:MaximumDamageModel"SadCase2".ModelSadCase1hasthesamegeometryexceptfastenerhole#1is0.250"
atanedgedistanceof0.225
6 FEMModellingofJointtoObtainBearingandBypassLoads
AsignificantamountofeffortwasexpendedtoobtainanaccurateFEMmodelofthetensionfittingjoint.Thiswas
required to obtain a good understanding of the bearingbypass loads at different fastener locations and thus find
thecriticaldamageconditionsacrossthefleet.Themainfeaturesofthemodelareasfollows.
Themodelsusedplateelementstorepresentboththefittingandlongeron;
Onlyasymmetrichalfmodelwasusedtakingadvantageofthesymmetryofthejoint;
Fastenerflexibilitywasbasedonstandardflexibilityequations;
AircraftAirworthinessandSustainmentConference,Brisbane2012 5of14
Contact constraints between both the longeronflanges and the fitting flanges were modelled using the
NASTRANImplicitNonLinearsolver;
Contactconstraintswiththebacktobackfittingwerealsomodelledasarigidsymmetricconstraintthis
wasimportantasiteffectivelyshiftstheoffsetmomentproducedbythetensionbolt.
Preloadforthetensionboltwasmodelledbutnotsignificant.
Themodelwasgivenlengthequaltothelocalframespacing(10)atwhichsimplesupportswereassumed.
AvarietyofpicturestakenfromthemodelareshowninFigure7thruFigure9.
After the eyeball assessment, five individual damage conditions (together with the nominal condition and two
Sad Case maximum damage scenarios were analysed using the FEM model to obtain fastener loads. Although
fastenerpositionsvariedsomewhatbetweenaircraft,nopositionalvariationwasusedinthemodels.Thismadeit
easytoupdatemodelsfordifferentfastenerconfigurations:onlythefastenerpropertiesneededtobevaried
*
.

Figure7:PictureofbasicjointmodelusingPATRAN"DisplayShellThickness"utilityfunction.(Note:Themodellingwasdone
with plate elements NOT solid elements the thickness has been shown here for display purposes only to confirm correct
separation of element midplanes and to relate actual solidparts to the 2Dplate representation shown in the following
figures)

*
Although fastener positions were not varied in the FEM loads models, actual edgedistances were used in
determiningstressconcentrationfactorsforSeverityFactorcalculationsandinperformingDTAnalyses.
AircraftAirworthinessandSustainmentConference,Brisbane2012 6of14

Figure8:BasicLongeronand(Model)FittingMeshes(separated).Fastenerelementsjoininglongeronandfittinghighlighted

Figure9:VonMisesStresses(maximumofbothsidesofplates)onax10deformationplotbasicconstraintsindicated
loadingisinthexdirectionviaaconstantstressalongtheLHedgeofthelongeronequivalenttoloadof11628lbf.Thisishalf
thejointload.Fittingisrestrainedattherighthandendbythetensionbolt.
AircraftAirworthinessandSustainmentConference,Brisbane2012 7of14

Theeffectsofdifferentmodellingoptionsonfastenerloadsforthenominalfastenerconfiguration(fasteners1thru
5are0.250HiLoks)isshowninTable1.Besidesshowingtheeffectsofthedifferentcontactconstraintsthistable
alsoshowstheeffectsofsomeminorcorrectionsmadeduringthedevelopmentofthemodel.Ascanbeseen,the
fastenerloadschangesignificantlywiththecontactconstraints.Thiscausesasignificantchangeinthebearingand
bypass loads at fastener 1. Comparing Model 6 with Model 1, the bearing load at thelead fastener is 8% lower in
model6butthebypassloadis39%higher.Itwasalsonotedthatsignificantdifferencesexistedbetweenthebolt
loadsfromtheFEMmodelandloadsgivenintheOEMstressnotes
4
,whichusedasimpleboltgroupanalysis.Whilst
this was expected, (given that the stressnotes are primarily concerned with ultimate strength) it shows that the
stressnotevaluescouldnothavebeenusedasthebasisfortheDTA.

Model: 1 2 3 4 6
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No No Yes Yes Yes
No No No Yes Yes
No No No No Yes
No No No No Yes
1 1607 1652 1424 1421 1487
2 1170 1286 1144 1141 1206
3 829 1056 990 990 1038
4 592 936 936 937 976
5 452 923 989 992 1021
(6,7) 994 981 1057 1058 1016
(8,9) 876 849 902 903 874
(10,11) 831 776 812 812 792
(12,13) 841 736 769 769 752
(14,15) 921 742 781 781 758
(16,17) 1107 812 867 867 832
(18,19) 1410 965 1044 1044 990
11630 11714 11715 11715 11742
Outstanding Flange Fastener Fx
Loads
Skin Flange Fastener Fx Loads
Longeron / Fitting Contact
Fitting / End-Pad Contact
Tension Bolt Pre-Load (18710 lbf)
Flange Height Corrected
Unfastened Flange Present
Table1:ComparisonbetweendifferentFEMmodels:thereasonthatthesummedloadsformodels2,3,4and6dontsumto
~11628lbfisbecausethereareminorxdirectioncontactloadsbetweenthefittingandlongeronthatsumtobetween86lbf
and112lbf.
Results from sorting through the 5 worst cases of aircraft damage are shown in Table 2. These results are derived
from running the FEM models with the fastener properties set to match the particular damage scenario. (As
mentioned, nominal fastener positions were always used). The bearing and bypass stresses have been calculated
from the fastener loads obtained in the model and the peakstresses have been obtained by applying appropriate
stressconcentration factors. See Niu
1
for further details. As can be seen the actual damage configurations only
exhibitpeakstresses~6%greaterthanthenominalcondition,whilethemaximumdamagecases(SadCases1and
2)showupto14%peakstressincrements.
AircraftAirworthinessandSustainmentConference,Brisbane2012 8of14

Nominal
Flange
Bypass
Stress
Bearing
Stress
Bearing /
Bypass
Ratio
Peak
Stress
Nominal D e e/D

bypass
(psi)

bearing
(psi)
BB
Ratio

max (psi)
Hole #1 0.250 0.370 1.480 7860 15141 1.926 54503
Hole #2 0.250 0.370 1.480 5621 12267 2.182 41676
Hole #3 0.250 0.370 1.480 3696 10548 2.854 32057
Hole #4 0.250 0.370 1.480 1889 9906 5.245 24845
Hole #5 0.250 0.370 1.480 0 10351 INF 19400
A/C #1
817E L/H D e e/D

bypass
(psi)

bearing
(psi)
BB
Ratio

max (psi)
Hole #1 0.281 0.310 1.103 8305 14841 1.787 57796
Hole #2 0.313 0.409 1.307 5526 12164 2.201 41517
Hole #3 0.267 0.244 0.914 3651 9618 2.634 32586
Hole #4 0.281 0.259 0.922 1700 9516 5.599 24435
Hole #5 0.250 0.278 1.112 0 9314 INF 17456
A/C #2
817E R/H D e e/D

bypass
(psi)

bearing
(psi)
BB
Ratio

max (psi)
Hole #1 0.328 0.518 1.579 8413 14453 1.718 54513
Hole #2 0.328 0.532 1.621 5722 11236 1.963 39586
Hole #3 (Frz-Plug) 0.410 0.518 1.263 4207 5065 1.204 24548
Hole #4 0.328 0.411 1.253 2105 8775 4.168 23599
Hole #5 0.313 0.425 1.358 0 9214 INF 17012
A97-Sad Case
Sad Case 1 D e e/D

bypass
(psi)

bearing
(psi)
BB
Ratio

max (psi)
Hole #1 0.250 0.225 0.900 9437 13235 1.402 63116
Hole #2 0.344 0.310 0.900 6582 11370 1.727 48160
Hole #3 0.344 0.310 0.900 4293 9116 2.123 34570
Hole #4 0.344 0.310 0.900 2211 8290 3.749 24484
Hole #5 0.344 0.310 0.900 0 8807 INF 16358
Sad Case 2 D e e/D

bypass
(psi)

bearing
(psi)
BB
Ratio

max (psi)
Hole #1 0.344 0.310 0.900 8820 13731 1.557 61743
Hole #2 0.344 0.310 0.900 6222 10350 1.664 44786
Hole #3 0.344 0.310 0.900 4091 8484 2.074 32567
Hole #4 0.344 0.310 0.900 2119 7852 3.705 23293
Hole #5 0.344 0.310 0.900 0 8441 INF 15678
Table2:LimitLoadfastenerbearingandbypassstressesfromFEManalysisshowingthetwoworstaircraftconfigurations
(LabelledA/C#1and#2)and"SadCase"configurations.Themaximumstressshownisthepeakholestressbasedon
applyingappropriatebypassandbearingstressconcentrationfactors
1,5
toholes.
AircraftAirworthinessandSustainmentConference,Brisbane2012 9of14
7 DamageToleranceAnalysis(DTA)
BasedontheresultsfromtheFEManalysisoffastenerloads,aseriesofDTanalyseswereconductedtodetermine
crackgrowthlivesintherepairedstructure.PerMILA83444,0.050x0.050circularquadrantprimarycrackswere
assumed,with0.005x0.005secondaryones.ForallcasesshowninTable2,theprimarycrackwasplacedtowards
theligament.Twoadditionalcaseswerealsorun,usingtheSadCase1and2loadsbutwiththepositionsofthe
primary and secondary cracks reversed. Such cases can be more critical in low edgedistance holes as the large
primarycrackisnotwastedingrowinginathinligament

.ThesecaseswerelabelledasSadCases1(alt)and2
(alt). The DTA tool used was AFGROW v5
3
. Although this allows for primary and secondary cracks to be grown
simultaneously, the solution databases in AFGROW do not allow appropriate coverage for 0.005 continuing
damagecracksinthepresentstructure.HenceclassicAFGROWmodelswereusedasoutlinedinFigure10tocover
theprimarycrackgrowthandcontinuingdamageuptoligamentfracture.ThenewAFGROWv5crackwithaslot
modelswerethenusedforthefinalphases(IIIandIV)ofgrowthuntilfracture.Althoughthepresenceoftheskin
flange of the longeron may be expected to retard crackgrowth during phase IV, this was conservatively ignored.
ThissolutiontechniqueissummarizedinFigure10.ThecrackgrowthsolutionphasesareshowninFigure11.

Figure10:AFGROWsolutionTechnique(seeFigure11forlabelingofcrackgrowthphases)

Wastedinthissenseismeantinthecontextofproducingthecriticalorshortestcrackgrowthlife.Ifthelarger
crackisplacedoppositetheligamenttheneffectivelywhileitgrowstheligamentwillcrackthroughanyway.Ifthe
situationisreversed,thecontinuingdamagecrackoppositetheligamenttakesanextremelylongtimetogrowasit
isgrowingfromarelativelyshallowslotanddoesnotincreaseinsizemuchduringthetimetheprimarycrackbreaks
throughtheligament.
AircraftAirworthinessandSustainmentConference,Brisbane2012 10of14

Figure11:CrackGrowthScenarioforLongeron.NotethatthecrackgrowthphaselabellingherefollowsthatoftheOEM.
PhaseIistheligamentcornercrackgrowinguntilittransitionstoathroughcrackorcausesligamentfracture;PhaseII(not
shown)istheligamentthroughcrackgrowinguntilligamentfracture;PhaseIIIisthecornercrackoppositetheligament
growinguntilittransitionstoathroughcrack;andPhaseIVisthenonligamentthroughcrackgrowinguntilfailure.Most
modelsinthepresentanalysisdonthaveaPhaseIIsegmentbecausetheligamentcornercrack,causesligamentfracture
beforeittransitionstoathroughcrack.
ThecasesshownwereaugmentedbytwoextraSadCaseconditionsinwhichthesameloadswereusedbutthe
edgedistanceswereincreasedtomaximum(0.57)ratherthanminimumvalues.Thiswasdonebecauselargeedge
distances cause the slot formed at the end of ligament breakthrough to be larger, which in turn significantly
reducesthelifeduringthelatterstagesofcrackgrowth.Giventhattheproposedinspectionregimefortherepairsis
toperformanEddyCurrentSurfaceScan(ECSS)alongtheexposededgeofthelongeronflange,suchconditionswill
give the lowest inspectable life as it is not possible to find a crack prior to ligament breakthrough (without
mandatingBoltHoleEddyCurrent[BHEC]inspections).ThesecaseswerelabelledSadCases3and4.
Having determined the loadshare in the joint and knowing the geometry and material of the longeron

the key
unknownrequiredtorunaDTAistheloadspectrum.UnfortunatelyAustralianAerospaceandtheRAAFdonothave
accesstoOEMspectrumdatausedintheC130J30damagetoleranceanalysis
2
.Furthermorethatanalysisdoesnot
givecrackgrowthcurvesatthepresentdamagelocation.Rathertheaftpluglongeronfittinglocationsarecurrently
visuallyinspectedeverythreeyearsbasedonaDTAoftheBL20fittingatFS737(thecontrolpointforthisregion).
Onesolutiontotheproblemofsettinganinspectionintervalontherepairswouldhavebeentoperformarelative
analysisusingtheexistinginspectionintervalasabaseline.ByassumingthattheaftplugupperBL61longeronsare
equally critical as the controlpoint and running a DTA with a nominal spectrum for both the damaged and
undamaged configurations a crackgrowth life knockdown factor could have been developed. This would have
resulted in a very burdensome inspection regime because the extreme damage compared to the nominal
configurationwouldhaveledtoasignificantknockdownfactor.Thereasonthissolutiontechniqueisoflimiteduse

The RAAF DTA

2
gives material da/dN curves for the 7075T6 extrusion material used for the longeron. This OEM
datawasusedinpreferencetootherdatasources.
AircraftAirworthinessandSustainmentConference,Brisbane2012 11of14
isbecauseweareforcedtoassumethatthebaselinecrackgrowthlifeatthedamagelocationisequallycriticalas
thatoftheFS737BL20fittingthatformstheDTAcontrolpointusedinsettingitsinspectionlimits.
An alternative approach to performing a relative analysis was to perform an absoluteanalysis using a spectrum
thatisknowntobeconservative.Thiswasdonebyusingaconstantamplitudelimitloadspectrumwitheachload
cycle representing 1 average flight

. Based on the existing RAAF DTA

2
, and current usage patterns this was
convertedtoanequivalentnumberofflighthours.Thisisaveryconservativespectrumandeffectivelyassumesthat
foreachaverageflightthedamageisequivalenttoonelimitloadevent.
Although it is not possible to quantify exactly how conservative this assumption is, it is possible to gain a rough
assessment by considering other DTA locations in the aircraft for which the RAAF DTA report
2
gives crackgrowth
curves, geometry and limitloads. By rerunning these cases with constantamplitude limitload spectrums, the
influence of the unknown LM spectrums (as well as differences in modelling) can be quantified. Doing this on a
limitednumberofcasesshowsthattheuseoflimitloadspectrumsisconservativebyafactoroftypicallybetween
2.0and5.0
**
intermsofcrackgrowthlife.Whilethismayseemtobringintoquestionthewholeanalysis(i.e.why
botherifwearebeingsoconservative?)itisunlikelythattherepairtothelongeronswouldhavebeenacceptedby
theRAAFwithoutsomerobustdurabilityanalysisthatsetinspectionlimits,giventhattheyweresofaroutsidethe
boundsofgooddesignpractice.Asnotedearlier,arelativeanalysiswouldhaveinvolvedanevenmoreburdensome
inspection regime. This is because such an analysis effectively assumes that the nominal crackgrowth life at the
present damage location (a 7075T6 extruded longeron) is the same as that of the control point which is a fitting
madefromadifferentmaterial,subjecttodifferentloadsinadifferentpartoftheaircraft,(BL20vsBL61).
8 Results
ResultsforthedifferentmaximumdamagecasesareshowninFigure12.Thesecaseswereallmorecriticalthanthe
twoactualdamagecasesalsorun.TheseresultsshowthattheSadCase2(alt)configurationwascriticalfortotal
life (~16000 Hours), while Sad Case 3 was critical for inspectable life (~6000 Hrs). This is expected as this model
hasasmallerleadfastenerandalargeedgedistancewhichgivesitthedeepestandnarrowestslotandhencethe
lowestlifeaftertheligamentfractures.
The final inspection mandated for the aftplug longeron was based on this inspectable life and set at 3000 AFHRs.
This can be conservatively aligned with the existing threeyearly visual inspections of these joints, so the overall
increase in inspection burden is limited and simply consists of performing an ECSS inspection of the exposed
longeron flange in the vicinity of the four joints once every three years. Whilst we could also have set an initial
inspection threshold of ~8000 Hrs based on the worstcase total life, this was not done for simplicity of
implementation.

ThelongeronlimitloadsareconvertedtoDTAlimitloadsthroughtheFEManalysis.Effectivelyitprovidesbearing
andbypassfasteneroutputloadsgiveninputlongeronloadsforthedifferentdamagescenarios.
**
It should be noted that this ratio will vary for different parts of the aircraft. As previously mentioned, no OEM
crackgrowthcurvesareavailableatthedamagelocationasitwasnotassessedasacriticallocationintheoriginal
analysis.
AircraftAirworthinessandSustainmentConference,Brisbane2012 12of14

Figure12:DTAResults
9 Cost
Asignificantamountofengineeringeffortwasexpendedonthedevelopmentoftheinspectionrequirementsforthe
aftplug longerons. This was mainly done by AA Engineering but also involved review by the OEM. The most
significant instances of damage were confined to 6 aircraft, ignoring the original aircraft on which the longerons
werechanged.AnapproximatelabourcostingofthepresentSafetyByInspectionsolutionversusafullreplacement
solutionisasfollows,(basedonballparkcostingsonly).
SafetyByInspectionCostincludes:
DevelopmentofEngineeringSafetyByInspectionintervals;
Developmentofstaticanalysisforrepairson6aircraft;
FreezeplugandO/Srepairsaswellasfittingreplacementon6aircraft
ExtraInspectionsofall12aircraftoverthenext21000Hrsat3000hourintervals
Total=2300Hrs
Alternativecostofreplacing6setsofdiscrepantlongeronsandfittings(assumingsomelearningaswegoon):
ReplacementofbothLongeronson6aircraft:~2*6*500=6000Hours
Thusthenettsavingis3700Hrs(~62%hoursavingcomparedwithreplacement).Thetruesavingis greaterasthe
abovefigurestakenoaccountofaircraftdowntimeandtheimpactsthiswouldhaveonRAAFcapabilityduringan
extensivelongeronreplacementeffort.Toobtainthistruecost,considerationwouldhavetobegiventothecostsof
aircraftdowntimeaswellasthedirectlabourcostsinvolved.
AircraftAirworthinessandSustainmentConference,Brisbane2012 13of14
AircraftAirworthinessandSustainmentConference,Brisbane2012 14of14
10 Conclusion
TheuseofDTAtoolsandindepthanalysishasallowedAustralianAerospaceandtheRAAFtoseeasignificantcost
saving through the implementation ofa SafetybyInspection program on repairs to aftplugupper BL61 longerons
onC130J30aircraft.Duetotheextensivenatureofdamagefoundacrossmanyaircraftinthefleet,theonlyother
optionwasfulllongeronreplacement.ItcouldbearguedthatinthepresentcaseaDTanalysiswasnotrequiredas
the locations of damage were not existing DTA locations and the stresses were relatively low. As against this, the
damage conditions were severe and wellbeyond what would be normally accepted in repair designs. Given the
extentofthedamage,itisunlikelyaconvincingcasecouldhavebeenmadetoacceptthedesignsasis.Althoughthe
DTanalysisperformedwasextremelyconservative,ithasallowedustodemonstratethatitisacceptabletorepair
thelongeronsinsituwithacombinationofoversizefastenersandfreezeplugs.Thishasresultedinaconsiderable
timesavingoverrepairingthe6mostdamagedaircraftvialongeronreplacement.
11 References
1. Niu,M.C.Y,,AirframeStructuralDesign,ConmilitPress,1988.
2. LMReportA61A08A626,RAAFC130J30DamageToleranceAssessment,May2005
3. AFGROWv5.01.05.16,,LerTechInc.,26/July/2010
4. LG95ER0038,C130JandC130J30CenterFuselageStressAnalysis,May2000
5. PetersonsStressConcentrationFactors,2
nd
Edition,W.D.Pilkey,JohnWiley,1997