International Journal of Engineering Trends and Technology (IJETT) - Volume4 Issue8- August 2013

ISSN: 2231-5381 http://www.ijettjournal.org Page 3336

Jamming Attacks and Secure Routing In Wireless Sensor Networks
G. Ravi Kumar
#1
, B. Uma Mahesh
*2

1#
M.Tech 2nd year, Dept of CSE, AITS, Tirupati, AP, India
2*
Assistant Professor, Dept of CSE, AITS, Tirupati, AP, India

Abstract we consider about routing security in wireless sensor
networks. Several sensor network routing protocols are planned;
however none of them are designed with security as a goal. we
tend to propose security goals for routing in sensor networks,
show however attacks against ad-hoc and peer-to-peer networks
is tailored into powerful attacks against sensor networks,
introduce 2 categories of novel attacks against sensor networks
sinkholes and hi oods, and analyze the protection of all the
main sensor network routing protocols. We tend to describe
incapacitating attacks against all of them and recommend
countermeasures and style concerns. This is often the rest such
analysis of secure routing in sensor networks.

Keywords wireless sensor, Networking, Security, Attacks.

I. INTRODUCTION

Our focus is on routing security in wireless sensor
networks. Current proposals for routing protocols in sensor
networks
Optimize for the restricted capabilities of the nodes and
therefore the application specific nature of the networks,
however don't take into account Security. Though these
protocols haven't been designed with security as a goal, we
have a tendency to feel it's vital to investigate their Security
properties. Once the defender has the liabilities of insecure
wireless communication, restricted node capabilities, and
possible insider threats, and therefore the adversaries will use
powerful laptops with high energy and long vary
communication to attack the network, planning a secure
routing protocol is non-trivial. We have a tendency to present
crippling attacks against all the foremost routing protocols for
sensor networks. As a result of these protocols haven't been
designed with security as a goal, it's expected they're all
insecure. However, this is often} non-trivial to fix: it's
unlikely a sensor network routing protocol can be created
secure by incorporating security mechanisms when design has
completed. Our assertion is that sensor network routing
protocols should be designed with security in mind, and this
can be the sole effective answer for secure routing in sensor
networks.

We build five main contributions. We have a tendency to
propose threat models and security goals for secure routing in
wireless sensor networks. We have a tendency to introduce 2
novel categories of antecedent unregistered attacks against
sensor networks1 swallow hole Attacks and howdy floods.
We show, for the primary time, however attacks against ad-
hoc wireless networks and peer-to-peer networks [1], [2] is
tailored into powerful attacks against sensor networks. We
have a tendency to present the primary detailed security
analysis of all the foremost routing protocols and energy
protective topology maintenance algorithms for sensor
networks. We have a tendency to describe sensible attacks
against all of them that may defeat any reasonable security
goals. We have a tendency to discuss countermeasures and
design concerns for secure routing protocols in sensor
networks.

II. SENSOR NETWORKS VS. AD-HOC WIRELESS
NETWORKS

Wireless sensor networks share similarities with ad-hoc
wireless networks. The dominant communication technique in
each is multi-hop networking, however many vital distinctions
is drawn between the 2. Ad-hoc networks generally support
routing between any combine of nodes [4], [5], [6], [7],
whereas sensor networks have an additional specialised
communication pattern. Most traffic in sensor networks is
classified into one in all 3 categories:

1) Many-to-one: Multiple sensor nodes send sensor readings
to a base station or aggregation purpose within the network.
2) One-to-many: one node (typically a base station) multicasts
or floods a question or control information to many
Sensor nodes.
3) Native communication: Neighbouring nodes send localized
messages to get and coordinate with one another. A node
could broadcast messages meant to be received by all
neighbouring nodes or uncast messages meant for a solely
single neighbor3. Nodes in ad-hoc networks have usually been
thought of to possess restricted resources, sensor nodes are
even additional forced. Of all of the resource constraints,
restricted energy is that the most pressing. When preparation,
several sensor networks are designed to be unattended for
long periods and battery recharging or replacement could also
be impossible or not possible. Nodes in sensor networks
typically exhibit trust relationships on the far side people who
are generally found in ad-hoc networks. Neighbour nodes in
sensor networks typically witness equivalent or correlative
environmental events. If every node sends a packet to the
bottom station in response, precious energy and
informationrmation measure are wasted. To prune these
redundant messages to cut back traffic and save energy, sensor
networks need in-network process, aggregation, and duplicate
elimination. This typically 3By neighbour we have a tendency
to mean a node at intervals normal radio vary.
International Journal of Engineering Trends and Technology (IJETT) - Volume4 Issue8- August 2013


ISSN: 2231-5381 http://www.ijettjournal.org Page 3337


Fig.:1. Representative sensor network architecture.
Necessitates trust relationships between nodes that are not
typically assumed in ad-hoc networks.

III. RELATED WORK

Security problems in ad-hoc networks are kind of like that in
sensor networks and are well enumerated within the literature
[8], [9], however the defence mechanisms developed for ad-
hoc networks aren't directly applicable to sensor networks.
There are many reasons for why this is often thus, however all
of them relate to the variations between sensor and ad-hoc
networks enumerated within the previous section. Some ad-
hoc network security mechanisms for authentication and
secure routing protocols are supported public key
cryptography [8], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]. Public
key cryptography is just too high-priced for sensor nodes.
Security protocols for sensors networks should trust
completely on efficient even key cryptography. Secure routing
protocols for ad-hoc networks supported even key
cryptography are planned [17], [18], [19], [20]. These
protocols are supported supply routing or distance vector
protocols and are unsuitable for sensor networks. {They are
theyre} too high-priced in terms of node state and packet
overhead and are designed to seek out and establish routes
between any combine of nodesa mode of communication
not current in sensor networks. poet et al. [21] and Buchegger
and Boudec [22] take into account the matter of minimizing
the impact of is behaving or egotistical nodes on routing
through penalty, reporting, and holding grudges. These
application of those techniques to sensor networks is
promising; however these protocols are susceptible to
blackmailers. Perrig et al. [23] gift 2 building block security
protocols optimized to be used in sensor networks, SNEP and
TESLA. SNEP provides confidentiality, authentication, and
freshness between nodes and also the sink, and TESLA
provides attested broadcast.

IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Before diving into specific routing protocols, it helps to own a
clear statement of the routing security problem. Within the
following sections we tend to define our assumptions
regarding the underlying network, propose models for various
categories of adversaries, and take into account security goals
during this setting.

A. Network Assumptions as a result of sensor networks use
wireless communications; we tend to should assume that radio
links are insecure. At the very least, attackers will snoop on
our radio transmissions, inject bits within the channel, and
replay antecedent detected packets. we tend to assume that if
the defender will deploy several sensor nodes, then the human
can seemingly even be ready to deploy a number of malicious
nodes with similar hardware capabilities because the
legitimate nodes. The attacker might encounter these
malicious nodes by buying them singly, or by turning a
number of legitimate nodes by capturing them and physically
overwriting their memory. We tend to assume that the attacker
may need management of over one node, and these malicious
nodes may interact to attack the system. Also, in some cases
colluding nodes may need high-quality communications links
accessible for coordinating their attack (see, e.g., Section VI-E
for a method within which attackers may place such a
capability to use). We tend to don't assume sensor nodes are
tamper resistant. We tend to assume that if Associate in An
human compromises a node, she will be able to extract all key
material, data, and code hold on it node. Whereas tamper
resistance could be a viable defence for physical node
compromise for a few networks, we tend to don't see it as a
general purpose resolution. Extraordinarily effective tamper
resistance tends to feature important per-unit price, and sensor
nodes are meant to be very cheap.

B. Trust necessities:
Since base stations interface a sensor network to the outside
world, the compromise of a major variety of them will Render
the whole network useless. For this reason we tend to assume
that base stations are trustworthy, within the sense that they'll
Be trusty if necessary and are assumed to behave properly.
Most, however not all routing protocols rely upon nodes to
trust Messages from base stations. Aggregation points are also
trusty parts in sure protocols. Nodes might trust routing info
from aggregation points and trust that messages sent to
aggregation points are accurately combined with different
messages and forwarded to a base station. Aggregation points
are usually regular sensor nodes. Its potential that adversaries
might try and deploy malicious aggregation points or commit
to flip presently compromised nodes into aggregation points.
For this reason aggregation points might not essentially be
trustworthy.

C. Threat Models
An important distinction may be created between mote-class
attackers and laptop-class attackers. Within the former case,
the attacker has access to a number of sensor nodes with
similar capabilities to our own, however not rather more than
this. In distinction, a laptop-class attacker might have access
to additional powerful sensors, like laptops or their equivalent.
Thus, within the latter case, malicious nodes have a bonus
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ISSN: 2231-5381 http://www.ijettjournal.org Page 3338

over legitimate nodes: they will have larger battery power, an
additional capable central processing unit, a high-energy
transmitter, or a sensitive antenna. Associate in An attacker
with laptop-class sensors will do over Associate in An
attacker with solely standard sensor nodes. A standard sensor
node may solely be ready to jam the link in its immediate neck
of the woods, whereas a laptop-class attacker could be ready
to jam the whole sensor network exploitation its stronger
transmitter. A single laptop-class attacker could be ready to
snoop on a complete network, whereas sensor nodes would
usually have a Limited vary. Also, laptop-class attackers may
need a high information measure, low-latency
communications channel not accessible to standard sensor
nodes, permitting such attackers to coordinate their efforts. A
second distinction may be created between outsider attacks
and insider attacks. Weve got to date been discussing outsider
attacks, wherever the attacker has no special access to the
sensor network. One may take into account insider attacks,
wherever a certified participant within the sensor network has
gone dangerous. insider attacks is also mounted from either
compromised sensor nodes running malicious code or
adversaries who have purloined the key material, code, and
information from legitimate nodes, and who then use one or
additional laptop-class sensors to attack the network.

D. Security Goals:

In the ideal world, a secure routing protocol ought to
guarantee the integrity, believability, and convenience of
messages within the presence of adversaries of discretionary
power. Each eligible receiver ought to receive all messages
meant for it and be ready to verify the integrity of each
message similarly because the identity of the sender. In our
read, protection against eavesdropping isn't a definite security
goal of a secure routing algorithmic program. Secrecy is
sometimes most relevant to application information, and it's
arguably not the responsibility of a routing protocol to supply
it. However, we tend to do take into account it the
responsibility of a routing protocol to stop eavesdropping
caused by misuse or abuse of the protocol itself.
Eavesdropping achieved by the biological research or
rerouting of an information flow ought to be prevented, as an
example. Similarly, we tend to believe protection against the
replay of information packets shouldn't be a security goal of a
secure routing protocol. This practicality is best provided at
the appliance layer as a result of solely the appliance will
absolutely and accurately discover the replay of information
packets (as hostile retransmissions, for example).

In the presence of solely outsider adversaries, it's conceivable
to realize these idealised goals but, within the presence of
compromised or insider attackers, particularly those with
laptop computer category capabilities, it's possible that some
if not all of these goals aren't absolutely gettable. Rather,
rather than complete compromise of the whole network, the
most effective we will hope for within the presence of insider
adversaries is swish degradation.

V. COUNTER MEASURES

A. Outsider attacks and link layer security

The majority of outsider attacks against sensor network
routing protocols may be prevented by straightforward link
layer cryptography and authentication employing a globally
shared key. The Sybil attack is not any longer relevant as a
result of nodes are unwilling to simply accept even one
identity of the oppose. The bulk of selective forwarding and
swallow wormhole attacks arent potential as a result of the
oppose is prevented from connection the topology. Link layer
acknowledgements will currently be authenticated. Major
categories of attacks not countered by link layer cryptography
and authentication mechanisms are wormhole attacks and
hello flood attacks. though AN oppose is prevented from
connection the network, nothing prevents her from employing
a wormhole to tunnel packets sent by legitimate nodes in one
half of} the network to legitimate nodes in Another pared to
convert them their neighbours or by amplifying an overheard
broadcast packet with enough power to be received by each
node within the network. The attacks against TinyOS
beaconing illustrate these techniques, and link layer security
mechanisms will do nothing to prevent them. If a wormhole
has been established, cryptography might create some
selective forwarding attacks against packets using the
wormhole harder, however clearly will do nothing to prevent
black wormhole selective forwarding. Link layer security
mechanisms employing a globally shared key are completely
ineffective in presence of insider attacks or compromised
nodes. Insiders will attack the network by spoofing or
injecting bestirred routing data, making sink wormholes, by
selection forwarding packets, using the Sybil attack, and
broadcasting hello floods. A lot of refined defence
mechanisms are required to supply affordable protection
against wormholes and insider attacks. We have a tendency to
specialize in countermeasures against these attacks within the
remaining sections.

B. The Sybil attack

An insider can't be prevented from collaborating
within the network; however she ought to only be able to do
thus using the identities of the nodes she has compromised.
Employing a globally shared key permits AN insider to
masquerade as any (possibly even nonexistent) node.
Identities should be verified. Within the ancient setting, this
could be done using public key cryptography, however
generating and confirmative digital signatures is on the fare
side the capabilities of sensor nodes. One resolution is to own
each node share a singular even key with a trustworthy base
station. 2 nodes will then use a Needham-Schroeder like
protocol to verify every others identity and establish a shared
key. A combine of neighbour nodes will use the ensuing key
to implement AN authenticated, encrypted link between them.
So as to prevent AN insider from wandering around a
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stationary network and establishing shared keys with each
node within the network, the bottom station will fairly limit
the quantity of neighbours a node is allowed to own and send
a slip message once a node exceeds it. Thus, once a node is
compromised, it's restricted to (meaningfully) communication
only with its verified neighbours. This is often to not say that
nodes are taboo from causing messages to base stations or
aggregation points multiple hops away, however they're
restricted from using any node except their verified
neighbours to try to thus. Additionally, AN oppose will still
use a wormhole to make a man-made link between 2 nodes to
convert them their neighbours, however the oppose won't be
able to listen in on or modify any future communications
between them.

C. hello flood attacks
The simplest defence against hello flood attacks is to verify
the bidirectionality of a link before taking meaning action
supported a message received over that link. The
identification protocol described in Section VIII-B is enough
to prevent hello flood attacks. Not only will it verify the
bidirectionality of the link between 2 nodes, however even
though a well-funded oppose had a sensitive receiver or had
wormholes to a multiple locations within the network, a
trustworthy base station that limits vareiety|the amount|the
quantity} of verified neighbours for every node can still
forestall hello flood attacks on large segments of the network
once a tiny low number of nodes are compromised.

D. WORMHOLE AND SWALLOW WORMHOLE
ATTACKS

Wormhole and swallow wormhole attacks are terribly tough to
defend against, particularly once the 2 are utilized in
combination. Wormholes are laborious to observe as a result
of they use a non-public, out-of-band channel invisible to the
underlying sensor network.
Sink wormholes are tough to defend against in protocols that
use publicised data like remaining energy or AN estimate of
end-to-end dependability to construct a routing topology as a
result of this data is tough to verify. Routes that minimize the
hop-count to a base station are easier to verify, but hop-count
may be completely distorted through a wormhole. Once routes
are established merely supported the reception of a packet as
in TinyOS beaconing or directed diffusion, sink wormholes
are straightforward to make as a result of there's no data for a
defender to verify. A method for sleuthing wormhole attacks
is given in [1]; however it needs extraordinarily tight time
synchronization and is so unfeasible for many sensor
networks. As a result of its extraordinarily tough to retrofit
existing protocols with defences against these attacks, the
most effective resolution is to fastidiously style routing
protocols during which wormholes and sink wormholes are no
meaningful. As an example, one category of protocols proof
against these attacks is geographic routing protocols.
Protocols that construct a topology initiated by a base station
are most prone to wormhole and swallow wormhole attacks.
Geographic protocols construct a topology on demand using
only localized interactions and knowledge and while not
initiation from the bottom station. As a result of traffic is of
course routed towards the physical location of a base station,
it's tough to draw in it elsewhere to make a swallow
wormhole. A wormhole is simplest once accustomed produce
sink wormholes or artificial links that attract traffic. Artificial
links are simply detected in geographic routing protocols as a
result of the neighbouring nodes can notice the gap between
them is well on the fare side traditional radio varies.

E. investment international data
A significant challenge in securing large sensor networks is
their inherent self-organizing, localised nature. Once the
network size is proscribed or the topology is well-structured
or controlled, international data may be leveraged in security
mechanisms. Take into account a relatively little network of
around a hundred nodes or less. If it may be assumed that no
nodes are compromised throughout preparation, then once the
initial topology is created, every node may send data like
neighbour nodes and its geographic location (if known) back
to a base station. Using this data, the bottom station(s) will
map the topology of the wormhole network. To account for
topology changes attributable to radio interference or node
failure, nodes would sporadically update a base station with
the suitable data. Forceful or suspicious changes to the
topology may indicate a node compromise, and therefore the
acceptable action may be taken. Weve mentioned why
geographic routing may be relatively secure against
wormhole, sink wormhole, and Sybil attacks, however the
most remaining drawback is that location data publicised from
neighbour nodes should be trustworthy. A compromised node
advertising its location on a line between the targeted node
and a base station can guarantee it's the destination for all
forwarded packets from that node. Probabilistic choice of a
next hop from many acceptable destinations or multipath
Routing to multiple base stations will facilitate with this
drawback, however it's not good. Once a node should route
around a wormhole, AN oppose will help by showing to
be the sole affordable node to forwarded packets to.
Sufficiently limiting the structure of the topology will
eliminate the need for nodes to advertise their locations if all
nodes locations are acknowledge. As an example, nodes may
be organized in a very grid with sq., triangular, or hex shaped
cells. Each node will simply derive its neighbours locations
from its own, and nodes may be self-addressed by location
instead of by a symbol.

F. SELECTIVE FORWARDING

Even in protocols resistant to sink wormholes, wormholes,
and therefore the Sybil attack, a compromised node contains
an important chance of as well as itself on an information flow
to launch a selective forwarding attack if it's strategically set
close to the supply or a base station. Multipath routing may be
accustomed counter these varieties of selective forwarding
attacks. Messages routed over methods whose nodes are
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completely disjoint are completely protected against selective
forwarding attacks involving at the most compromised nodes
and still provide some probabilistic protection once over
nodes are compromised. However, completely disjoint
methods could also be tough to make. Adorned methods [30]
might have nodes in common; however haven't any links in
common (i.e., no 2 consecutive nodes in common). The
employment of multiple adorned methods might give
probabilistic protection against selective forwarding and use
only localized data. Permitting nodes to dynamically opt for a
packets next hop probabilistically from a collection of
potential willdidates can more scale back the possibilities of
AN oppose gaining complete management of an information
flow.

G. AUTHENTICATED BROADCAST AND FLOODING

Since base stations are trustworthy, adversaries
should not be able to spoof broadcast or flooded messages
from any base station. This needs some level of asymmetry:
since each node within the network will probably be
compromised, no node ought to be able to spoof messages
from a base station; nevertheless each node ought to be able to
verify them. Authenticated broadcast is additionally helpful
for localized node interactions. Several protocols need nodes
to broadcast hello messages to their neighbours. These
messages ought to be authenticated and not possible to spoof.
Proposals for authenticated broadcast supposed to be used in a
very a lot of typical setting either use digital signatures and/or
have packet overhead that well exceed the length of typical
sensor network packet. TESLA [23] could be a protocol for
economical, authenticated broadcast and flooding that uses
only even key cryptography and needs lowest packet
overhead. TESLA achieves the imbalance necessary for
authenticated broadcast and flooding by using delayed key
revealing and unidirectional key chains made with a publically
calculable cryptographically secure hash perform. Replay is
prevented as a result of messages authenticated with
antecedent disclosed keys are unnoticed.
_
TESLA additionally needs loose time synchronization.
Flooding [36] may be a strong suggests that for data
dissemination in hostile environments as a result of it needs
the set of compromised nodes to create a vertex cut on the
underlying topology to prevent a message from reaching each
node within the network. The downsides of flooding embody
high messaging and corresponding energy prices, furthermore
as potential losses caused by collisions. SPIN [37] and gossip
mongering algorithms [38], [39] are techniques to cut back the
messaging prices and collisions that still bring home the bacon
sturdy probabilistic dissemination of Messages to each node
within the network.

H. STEP OUTLINE
Link-layer cryptography and authentication, multipath
routing, identification, bidirectional link verification, and
authenticated broadcast will shield sensor network routing
protocols against outsiders, bestirred routing data, Sybil
attacks, hello floods, and acknowledgement spoofing, and it's
possible to enhance existing protocols with these mechanisms.
Swallow wormhole attacks and wormholes create important
challenges to secure routing protocol style, and its unlikely
there exists effective countermeasures against these attacks
that may be applied once the look of a protocol has completed.
Its crucial to style routing protocols during which these
attacks are no meaningful or ineffective. Geographic routing
protocols are one category of protocols that holds promise.

VII. FINAL LIMITATIONS OF SECURE MULTI-HOP
ROUTING

A final limitation of building a multi-hop routing topology
around a set of base stations is that those nodes inside one or 2
hops of the bottom stations are significantly enticing for
compromise. Once a major range of those nodes are
compromised, all is lost. This means that clustering protocols
like LEACH wherever cluster-heads communicate directly
with a base station might ultimately yield the foremost secure
solutions against node compromise and insider attacks. An
alternative choice could also be to own an every which way
rotating set of virtual base stations to make AN overlay
network. Once a collection of virtual base stations are elect, a
multi-hop topology is built using them. The virtual base
stations then communicate directly with the important base
stations. The set of virtual base stations ought to be modified
oft enough to create it tough for adversaries to decide on the
right nodes to compromise.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Secure routing is important to the acceptance and use of
sensor networks for several applications; however we've
incontestable that presently proposed routing protocols for
these networks are insecure. We have a tendency to leave it as
AN open drawback to style a sensor network routing protocol
that satisfies our proposed security goals. Link layer
cryptography and authentication mechanisms may be an
affordable 1st approximation for defence against mote-class
outsiders, however cryptography isn't enough to defend
against laptop-class adversaries and insiders: careful protocol
style is required furthermore.

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