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The most common criticism of Beckett's theatre is its supposed obscu rity. Early defenders of Godot and Endgame were themselves criti cised as formalists for their inability to say what these plays were 'about' and'meant'
The most common criticism of Beckett's theatre is its supposed obscu rity. Early defenders of Godot and Endgame were themselves criti cised as formalists for their inability to say what these plays were 'about' and'meant'
The most common criticism of Beckett's theatre is its supposed obscu rity. Early defenders of Godot and Endgame were themselves criti cised as formalists for their inability to say what these plays were 'about' and'meant'
CRITIQUE AND FORM: Adorno on "Godot" and "Endgame"
Author(s): Chris Conti
Source: Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd'hui, Vol. 14, After Beckett / D'aprs Beckett (2004), pp. 277-292 Published by: Editions Rodopi B.V. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25781472 . Accessed: 13/05/2013 17:46 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Editions Rodopi B.V. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd'hui. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CRITIQUE AND FORM: Adorno on Godot and Endgame Chris Conti The most common criticism of Beckett's theatre is its supposed obscu rity. Early defenders of Godot and Endgame were themselves criti cised as formalists for their inability to say what these plays were 'about' or 'meant'. Adorno's theory of the modernist artwork ex plained the historical development of art's opaque content and Beck ett's own reluctance to explain his plays, solving an impasse in Beck ett criticism with his account of the new historical role of aesthetic form as critique. 1. A play about nothing The unsolved antagonisms of reality return in artworks as immanent problems of form. This, not the insertion of ob jective elements, defines the relation of art to society. (Adorno, 1997, 6) The scandal of Waiting for Godot, as everyone knows, is that it is a play about nothing. Its clownish characters seem in search of a plot and the plot in search of an ending. Accounts of the play usually begin with a precis, as if the bare particulars of plot were all one could cling to with any certainty. The most famous remark about Godot, as a play "where nothing happens twice" (Mercier, 144), summarised the frus tration of reviewers attempting to grapple with its absence of content. Can a play without content (and plot, character, action) still be a play? To take the play seriously seemed a threat to meaning itself, as if it were an assault on the very categories required to make sense of it. Initial receptions of the play as plotless and chaotic were re vised when its rigorous use of dramatic forms like dialogue was rec ognised. Still, the intentionality implied by this use of form did not sit This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions well with the loss of meaning implied by the play's absence of con tent. No other play - with the possible exception of its successor, Endgame - has been so puzzled over as to what it means. Doubt con cerning the play's content (or lack of it) led many to believe the play a hoax, and like all hoaxes, the more one searched for a meaningful structure the more one was taken in by the hoax: "Waitingfor Godot is not a real carrot; it is a patiently painted, painstakingly formed plas tic job for the intellectual fruit bowl [...] asking for a thousand read ings [it] has none of its own to give" (Kerr, 20). But the devastated landscape suggested by Godofs emptied stage reawakened traumatic wartime memories, and many audiences felt they had glimpsed in the play the catastrophic outcome of western civilisation. Articulating this relation to historical reality proved diffi cult, because while the play seemed to be about occupied France, the holocaust, postwar devastation, the catastrophic fate of civilisation, it did not refer directly to any of these. The growing conviction in the universal importance of the play resisted articulation, as if Godot had divested itself of any connection to history beyond testifying to its catastrophic barbarism. But how could a play drained of content relate to the actual social dramas of the day? The absence of this direct rela tion encouraged the idea of the play as an allegory of the lamentable human condition, "a modern morality play, on permanent Christian themes" (Fraser, 84). Allegory established Godot's universality but at the risk of imposing redemptive religious meanings. So as well as a play about nothing, Godot became known as a play about anything and everything, meaning whatever you wanted it to mean because its symbols were pliable enough to meet the needs of theoretical or re ligious consolation. Godot's sheer variety of interpretations suddenly seemed suspi cious. Indeed the more critics enthused about the profundity of the play the more hollow it sounded. Uncertainty about the meaning of the play gathered around the absent character of Godot, as if the titular character might justify the dearth of stage action and confer at least symbolic unity on the disorder of the play. Alain Robbe-Grillet chafed at such attempts to dignify the poverty of Beckett's tramps and blocked the path to such affirmative criticism by asserting the play was not 'about' anything at all. It was about itself; the physical pres ence of the tramps on stage: 278 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Explanations flow in from all quarters, each more pointless than the last. Godot is God [...] Godot [...] is the earthly ideal of a better social order [...] Or else Godot is death [...] Godot is silence [...] Godot is the inaccessible self [...] But these suggestions are merely attempts to limit the damage, and even the most ridiculous of them cannot efface in any one's mind the reality of the play itself, that part of it which is at once most profound and quite superficial, and of which one can only say: Godot is the person two tramps are wait ing for at the side of the road, and who does not come. (110) This anti-criticism reduced the play to the barest of plot descriptions and aped Beckett's own refusal to say what the play meant or who Godot represented: "Those who are perplexed by the play's 'meaning' may draw at least some comfort from the author's assurance that it means what it says, neither more nor less" (Fletcher, 68). The sense of the play was to be found by feeling it in a performance, not by hunting down symbols in the text: "So the play is not 'about': it is itself; it is a play" (Kenner, 31). If the play was devoid of content, it was because the form was the content. What this meant was unclear, because it restated the problem: while everyone agreed there was an excessive use of form in the play, few agreed as to what this meant. If symbolic criticism made too much of the play this anti criticism made too little, confirming sceptics in their view of the play as a pretentious hoax. But as Robbe-Grillet suggests, Godot seemed to include the various perspectives of criticism and deflect each as in adequate to it. That an artwork is not exhausted by its interpretations is one of its definitions, but Godot offered shelter to grand interpreta tions precisely to scuttle them, defeating its symbolic accounts be cause it already contained a critique of the symbol. Theodor Adorno understood this negative moment as essential to the modernist artwork and its new critical function. 279 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 2. Difficulty and disintegration Artworks become nexuses of meaning, even against their will, to the extent that they negate meaning. (Adorno, 1997, 154) The difficulty of understanding Godot and Endgame is integral to each of them and not the perverse invention of academics. The confu sion regarding the content or meaning of these plays goes to the heart of both of them: the loss of meaning following the destruction of ex perience in modernity. The divided reception of Godot as either pro foundly significant or a pretentious hoax, as too meaningful or not meaningful enough, pointed to the antinomies or paradoxes borne by the modernist artwork. The modernist artwork burdened aesthetic form with the task of absorbing the self-destructive rationality, or 'logic of disintegration', which was unravelling the social fabric of modern life. For Adorno, Beckett's theatre, particularly Godot and Endgame, is exemplary in this regard. His defence of the pre-eminence of Beckett's theatre played a significant role in its critical reception - Lukacs had argued that Beckett's work was the product of a distorted mind, relevant only as a symptom of the distortions produced by capitalism - and is tied to an account of the catastrophic fate of civilisation after the war. Lukacs and Adorno agreed on a diagnosis of the disastrous social effects of the capitalist economic system but arrived at diametrically opposed views as to the consequences for art and critique. Adorno's defence of Beckett's theatre was a defence of artistic modernism and its critical relation to social reality. The burden of this defence lay in establishing the greater social relevance of the formal concerns of Beckett's theatre, which appeared to many a retreat from the social, over the more obviously social theatre of Brecht or Sartre. Adorno puts Lukacs in reverse: the social realist portrait of reconciliation was the forgery; the modernist portrait of alienation closer to the real state of affairs. The conditions for the realism Lukacs demanded - a more stable reality susceptible to con ventional forms and categories - no longer held. In this sense, the modernists had in fact inherited the mantle of realism, for it was not Kafka, for example, that distorted what reality had become; reality had become Kafkaesque. Blaming the nihilism of the twentieth century on 280 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Kafka's and Beckett's unheroic narratives was bad faith. The crisis of subjectivity was an objective situation; the categories conferring spe cious order on social development the real solipsism. The logic of disintegration thus describes the objective condi tions of modernity and how they affect subjective life. The authority of narrative recollection to order human experience into integral uni ties and meaningful wholes has been undermined by the success of science as a cognitive paradigm and the success of capital as an socio economic one. This undermining of the structure of experience has profound consequences for critique and aesthetic form. "The explo sion of metaphysical meaning" (1992, 242), as Adorno refers to Max Weber's disenchantment thesis, renders the older aesthetic unity which relied on it unavailable. To persist with conventional forms that implied the coherence of subjective life meant artistic ignorance (ex istentialist theatre), complicity in barbarism (culture industry) or both (socialist realism). The integral unity that once characterised art per sisted now as a forgery. Only a discordant aesthetic unity was equal to the extremities of the age: "Beckett's plays are absurd not because of the absence of any meaning, for then they would simply be irrelevant, but because they put meaning on trial; they unfold its history" (1997, 153). This history was the central concern of Adorno's aesthetic the ory and, if we are to believe Adorno, of Beckett's theatre. The diffi culty of understanding Godot and Endgame, Adorno contends, finds a counterpart in the difficulty of understanding the irrationality of con temporary society. The temptation to dispel the darkness of either play with the clarity of meaning must therefore be resisted (1997, 27). Once again, the onus is reversed: criticism must measure up to the plays, not the plays to criticism; it is not the plays that must yield in telligibility in conceptual terms, but conceptual terms that must yield before the irrationality of contemporary life. Reconstructing this un intelligibility brings the plays' content into view: the critique of the instrumentalisation of modern life. The difficulty facing an artist who accepted that the logic of disintegration did not stop at the door of the arts was to incorporate the fragmentation of meaning in forms that enacted the integral unity of meaning. It was not enough to write a play about absurdity (like Sartre's Huis Clos), as if art could take the measure of social rationali sation simply by making it a topic. Treating absurdity as a theme or making it a category imparted to it a coherency it did not possess, 281 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions thereby escaping the very experience it purported to treat. The mean ing lost from social life is in this way won back in art, reducing art to consolation. The integral unity of the pre-modernist artwork articu lated meanings positively and implied the unity of the social. The modernist artwork, alternatively, no longer represents the unity of the social because the social no longer constituted a unity (1992, 244). As the experience of the disintegration of experience evaded di rect presentation, it had to find expression at the level of form, in the logic of the material itself and not simply in the content. A new aes thetic unity would bear the wounds inflicted by the historical crisis of subjectivity, gathering up critique into the details of form by giving expression to the powerlessness of the subject. The materials com bined to produce the eviscerated reality of Godot and Endgame there fore carried an implicit critique. Becket's method was able to admit a negativity of meaning into the details of form, implicating the means of presentation in the negativity it sought to express, and in the proc ess revealed the shortcomings of the existentialism with which it is still often confused. Conventional dramatic categories are not rejected in this process, they are subjected to the experience of disintegration. The result is not chaos of form, but the search for a new unity capable of bearing this antinomy. A disrupted unity, bearing the wounds of the destruction of experience, defined a task demanding the same rigour that defined the integral unity of traditional artworks. For Adorno, the crisis of subjectivity was not a situation art could avoid; it had rather to bear it, and would be judged on its ability to do so. In Beckett's plainer terms, the task was "to find a form that ac commodates the mess" (Driver, 23). The mess, however, encompassed art as well, recoiling on the forms that sought to present it. Beckett understood the artist's implication in this task, this time in more para doxical terms that Adorno would have recognised, when 'B.' in "Three Dialogues" speaks of "the expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to ex press, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express" (17). The goal of a new aesthetic unity implied immersion in the material, for only here could the expression of the subject deprived of expression occur. Adorno and Beckett reinsert the question of commitment into the immanent dialectic of form. Critique in Go dot and Endgame proceeds via determinate negation of meaning - testing traditional categories against contemporary experience - not 282 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions its abstract negation. In this process, old and forgotten forms emerge as new possibilities. Music-hall gags and panto, stichomythia, the Greek messenger and medieval angel, the Japanese Noh play make up the materials of this new unity, just as the conversational games and rituals of the tramps, which seemed so strange to Godot's first audi ences, are some of its fruits. This formal experimentation is the means by which both plays put 'meaning on trial', and is the reason why Adorno saw in them the retrospective vision of the catastrophe of history that Walter Benjamin saw in Klee's Angelus Novus. 3. Damaged life Even the jokes of those who have been damaged are dam aged. (Adorno, 1992, 257) Simon Critchley (157) criticises Adorno's lack of humour as the chief failing of his 1961 essay on Endgame. Adorno's treatment of Beck ett's humour, however, is consistent with his entire approach: he re fuses to turn humour into exit from Beckett's negativity. Critchley mutes the play's critique when he restores agency to the characters that joke about having lost it. The jokes in both plays, invariably con cerning the absence or destruction of meaning, are ultimately on us: One daren't laugh anymore. Dreadful privation. This is really becoming insignificant. Not enough. We always find something, eh Didi, to give us the impres sion we exist? Yes yes, we're magicians. (1956, 11,68, 69) When was that? Oh way back, way back, when you weren't in the land of the living. 283 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions God be with the days! Do you believe in the life to come? Mine was always that. What? Neither gone nor dead? In spirit only. Which? Both. (1958, 33,35, 45) In Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, Adorno's own black jokes carry the same sting, just as the subtitle glosses both plays. The destruction or "withering" of experience refers to: the vacuum between men and their fate, in which their real fate lies. It is as if the reified, hardened plaster cast of events takes the place of events themselves. Men are reduced to walk-on parts in a monster documentary film which has no spectators, since the least of them has his bit to do on screen. (1978, 55) When reality becomes unreal or "incommensurable with experience", art is forced to conspire with critique in an attack on art itself (1997, 30). Adorno saw a critical method in the conventional failure of Beck ett's drama, especially in the inability of his characters to move the plot. If the fate of Beckett's characters cannot be mapped out in ad vance according to psychology, as in naturalism, this is because the subject has been stripped of its interiority and is powerless to alter its fate. The depiction of this mutilated subject was art's loudest protest against it, a criterion for a new naturalism yet to be outmoded by cur rent developments in global capitalism. There is no false consciousness in this, for the characters are as aware of their condition as they are baffled by efforts to alter it. The constant play-acting and theatricality in both plays is not just theatri cal, in other words, but symptomatic of the crisis in subjectivity. With every joke we are reminded of the characters' struggle to cope with a suspended fate. "It is as if the two tramps were on stage without a part 284 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions to play", said Robbe-Grillet (113). Like the mime Act without Words that followed the first London production of Endgame, the tramps are trapped in a hellish repetition. As well as the source of comedy and the reinvention of old forms, then, the word-play and rituals represent attempts to cope with the 'withering of experience'. Even the play's darker remarks are framed as conversational diversions. Pozzo's pero ration, "That's how it is on this bitch of an earth", is delivered with an eye on his audience: "How did you find me? Good? Fair? Middling?" (38). Lucky's fragmented speech, also delivered as an entertainment for the other players, is the play's celebrated instance of the withering of experience. Though trapped in a present cut off from the past and future, the tramps constantly take their bearings, arguing over whether or not they are in the same spot as the day before, whether the tree has grown a leaf or two, whether Estragon remembers anything of the day before. Pozzo and Lucky provide a new set of diversions, and later on (in their absence) the subject of a game (72-73). The prospect of suicide or parting from each other also become games. Indeed anything can and does becomes the subject of a game, because the withering of experience encompasses everything. The games are designed to pass the time, and perhaps an entire life, but threaten to fail when needed most: VLADIMIR: (in anguish) Say anything at all! ESTRAGON: What do we do now? VLADIMIR: Wait for Godot. ESTRAGON: Ah! Silence. VLADIMIR: This is awful! ESTRAGON: Sing something. VLADIMIR: No no! (He reflects.) We could start all over again perhaps. ESTRAGON: That should be easy. VLADIMIR: It's the start that's difficult. ESTRAGON: You can start from anything. VLADIMIR: Yes, but you have to decide. ESTRAGON: True. Silence. VLADIMIR: Help me! 285 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ESTRAGON: I'm trying. Silence. (63-64) The effort to divert themselves is palpable, as is the absurdity of the predicament that defeats their efforts to do so, but a new word-game suggests itself: "That's the idea, let's contradict each other"; and "that's the idea, let's ask each other questions". As another pointless silence gapes, a game of hat-swapping ensues. When that game ex hausts itself, Vladimir asks "will you not play?" to which Estragon retorts "play at what?" (72). This is both entertaining and unsettling, as if it can only end in senility. We never forget for long the pathetic motivation for these games: to play at living, to pretend meaningful life is still possible. The play's concentration on the present moment is so telescoped as to defeat symbolism, for symbols place "a current perception in the con text of collected experience" (Winer, 76), conferring a coherence on events the tramps struggle to achieve with their ritualised banter. That loss of memory is an index of decline in the play is clearer in the 'se nile dialectic' of Pozzo and Lucky (Adorno 1997, 250). When asked where they are going, Pozzo replies simply "On". The trope of 'on wardness' recurs throughout the play (and Beckett's later prose) in a consistent parody of Victorian notions of material and moral progress (see Abbot, 32-42). We are left to guess what happened to Pozzo and Lucky between Acts I and II, though the 'progress' of the story is measured by their deterioration, in Lucky's muteness and Pozzo's blindness and memory loss. Whether a day or more has passed is ir relevant to Pozzo, who reacts angrily to Vladimir's efforts to mark the passage of time: "It's abominable! When! When! One day, is that not good enough for you?" (89). Similar exchanges in Endgame likewise suggest the disintegration of subjective experience into 'one damn thing after another,' or into moments that do not add up to a life, just as grains of millet do not make a heap - the paradox referred to in the play: "Yesterday! What does that mean? Yesterday!" "That means that bloody awful day, long ago, before this bloody awful day" (32). Hamm's chronicle, though we may wonder who will ever set eyes on it, represents another failed attempt to uncover narrative meaning in recollection. 286 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions It is not just the jokes and one-liners that testify to damaged life; joke-telling itself becomes another coping technique, though hardly a successful one: ESTRAGON: You know the story of the Englishman in the brothel? VLADIMIR: Yes. ESTRAGON: Tell it to me. VLADIMIR: Ah stop it! ESTRAGON: An Englishman having drunk a little more than usual goes to a brothel. The bawd asks him if he wants a fair one, a dark one, or a red-haired one. Go on. VLADIMIR: STOP IT! (16) Jokes and joke-telling in Endgame, like the rest of the dialogue, inten sify Godot's sense of being rehearsed to kill the time. Nagg complains at one point, "I tell this story worse and worse" (21), as if the effort disclosed only his senility. The ostensible failure of these efforts to confer narrative coherence is the successful implication of critique in the constituents of dramatic form. Few would deny, however, that in Godot a certain dignity, even heroism, attaches to this failure. The possibility of such Stoic heroism accounts for the affirmative readings of the play and the greater popularity of Godot over Endgame, for in Endgame Beckett circumvents the possibility of heroism entirely. 4. The memory of wholeness An unprotesting depiction of ubiquitous regression is a pro test against a state of the world that so accommodates the law of regression that it no longer has anything to hold up against it (Adorno, 1992, 248). In the effort to harness the play's negativity to the purposes of social critique, Adorno risked reducing Endgame to "forlorn particulars that mock the conceptual" (1992, 252), as Robbe-Grillet had reduced Go dot (and theatre) to physical presence. The direction of this effort ex plains his suggestion that Nagg and Nell's trashcans are "emblems of 287 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions the culture built after Auschwitz" (1992, 267). The peculiar concrete ness of Beckett's objects - armchair, gaff, stepladder, bloody hand kerchief - possess something of the disenchanted character of modern life generally that calls for conceptual articulation, even as it evades it. The task facing criticism is to explore this tension between disen chanted particulars and the concept without releasing it altogether. This means resisting the temptation to construct a philosophy of the remainder out of Beckett's remains - a reduction Adorno risks when he reads Endgame as the deconstruction of the subject1 - for the more difficult task of articulating Beckett's method in connection with the eviscerated reality of postwar life, which unfolds with the logic of catastrophe. Godot proved Beckett's method adequate to the destruction of experience, the ne plus ultra of which is the inescapable prospect of nuclear annihilation. Reference to contemporary reality is once again withheld, giving the play the appearance of "an allegory whose inten tion has fizzled out" (1992, 269). Endgame is no more 'about' nuclear Armageddon than Godot is 'about' occupied France. A drama about nuclear catastrophe would only reveal the inadequacy of its constitu ents, "solely because its plot would comfortingly falsify the historical horror of anonymity by displacing it onto human characters and ac tions" (1992, 245). The bomb is never referred to - this would render it more amenable to the concept and to understanding itself - but the nihilism of technical reason represented by the bomb suffuses the linguistic and dramaturgical infrastructure of the play. The absurd dialogue and rehearsed patter, for example, is a re sponse to a collapsed world and not in itself absurd. Vladimir's cajol ery, "Come on, Gogo, return the ball, can't you, once in a way?" (12), becomes Hamm's shrill command, "Keep going, can't you, keep go ing!" (40). The word games this time possess a logic that cannot be mistaken for stoic endurance: HAMM: Open the window. CLOV: What for? HAMM: I want to hear the sea. CLOV: You wouldn't hear it. HAMM: Even if you opened the window? CLOV: No. HAMM: Then it's not worthwhile opening it? 288 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions CLOV: No. HAMM: [Violently.] Then open it! (43) This inverted logic seeps into the object-world of the play: HAMM: The alarm, is it working? CLOV: Why wouldn't it be working? HAMM: Because it's worked too much. CLOV: But it's hardly worked at all! HAMM: [Angrily.] Then because it's worked too little! (34) What does the reason for anything matter at this stage? The idea that this form of life could "mean something" provokes Clov's strangled laughter; a "rational being" returning to earth might make sense of this mockery (27), though not enough to enjoy "a good guffaw" (41). While everything has to be explained to the creatures (32), no expla nation could possibly suffice (47). This logic is turned against life itself, as if Hamm and Clov were the last men and given the task of overseeing the extinction of the species. Both take an ironic pleasure executing this duty: HAMM: A flea! Are there still fleas? CLOV: On me there's one. [Scratching.] Unless it's a crablouse. HAMM: [Very perturbed] But humanity might start from there again! Catch him, for the love of God! (27) Not even the kitchen rat can escape (37). Clov powders his groin with insecticide aimed at the flea, though the earth went sterile long before he did. The play's drive to sterility, or ironic solidarity with the tech nical reason that culminates in lead waves (25) and stinking corpses 289 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions (33), justifies Hamm's denial of help to the interlocutor of his chroni cle, who wants food for his son ("as if the sex mattered"): HAMM: [...] Bread? But I have no bread [...] Then per haps a little corn? [Pause. Normal tone.] That should do it. [Narrative tone.] Corn, yes I have corn [...] But use your head. I give you some corn [...] and you bring it back to your child and you make him - if he's still alive - a nice pot of porridge [...] full of nourishment. Good. The colours come back to his cheeks - perhaps. And then? [Pause.] I lost patience. [Violently.] Use your head, can't you, use your head, you're on earth, there's no cure for that! (36-37) The last sentence might be the refrain of the play. When Clov spies a boy through the window he prepares to exterminate him as he had the flea: CLOV: I'll go and see. I'll take the gaff. HAMM: No! [CLOV halts.] CLOV: No? A potential procreator? HAMM: If he exists he'll die there or he'll come here. And if he doesn't... [Pause.] CLOV: You don't believe me? You think I'm invent ing? (49-50) The boy, like the flea, the rat, and Hamm's interlocutor, may be in vented for the purpose of distraction, especially when Hamm's appar ent direction of the action is considered: "It's the end Clov, we've come to the end" (50). The interruptions and rehearsed narrative tone of Hamm's story suggest not its unreality, however, but the narrative scenery required to relate the moral vacuum at the centre of it. In Go dot this could still be done in the slapstick antics of Vladimir and Es tragon's long-winded responses to Pozzo's cries for help, but End game's theatricality is a darker reminder of the fafade required to 290 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions conceal the broken social bond. Hamm and Clov live on, or play out their lives, with no wish for self-preservation but only to ensure the end is not miscarried, lest the agony start all over again. That a design, any design, may be at work in this is a hope that can only be whis pered: "Something is taking its course" (17, 26). The missing ends in Endgame are moral as well as narrative, for characters in search of an ending find their counterpart in lives with out ethical and meaningful ends. Just as the bomb exceeds all con ceivable ends, so Beckett's endlessness is our own. Note 1. Adorno sought confirmation from Beckett in person over whether 'Hamlet', and thus the dramatic subject as such, is deliberately echoed in 'Hamm'; Beckett rejected the idea (see Knowlson, 428). Adorno dedicated his Endgame essay and his magnum opus Aes thetic Theory to Beckett. Works Cited Abbott, H. Porter, Beckett Writing Beckett: The Author in the Autograph (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1996). Adorno, Theodor W., Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Min neapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997). -, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. J.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1978). -, "Trying to Understand Endgame", Notes on Literature, vol. 2, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia UP, 1992), 241 275. Beckett, Samuel, Endgame (London: Faber and Faber, 1956). -, Waiting for Godot (London: Faber and Faber, 1958). -, and Georges Duthuit, "Three Dialogues", in Samuel Beckett: A Collection of CriticalEssays, ed. Martin Esslin (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), 16-22. Critchley, Simon, Very Little... Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy and Literature (London and New York: Routledge, 1997). Driver, Tom F., "Beckett by the Madeleine", Columbia University Forum 4.3 (1961), 23. 291 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Fletcher, John, and John Spurling, Beckett: A Study of His Plays (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972). Fraser, G.S., The Times Literary Supplement (10 Feb. 1956), 84. Kenner, Hugh, A Reader's Guide to Samuel Beckett (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973). Kerr, Walter, in Eric Bentley, New Republic (14 May 1956), 20-21. Knowlson, James, Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (New York: Simon &Schuster, 1996). Mercier, Vivian, "The Mathematical Limit", The Nation 188 (14 Feb. 1959), 144-45. Robbe-Grillet, Alain, "Samuel Beckett, or 'Presence' in the Theatre", in Martin Esslin, 108-116. Winer, Robert, "The Whole Story", in The World of Samuel Beckett, ed. Joseph J. Smith (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1991), 73-85. 292 This content downloaded from 131.179.45.172 on Mon, 13 May 2013 17:46:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions