Protection for DC Substations and AC Track Feeder Stations

D. C. Knights BSc, CEng, MIRSE, CMILT, FIEE

RSSB (Rail Safety and Standards Board), Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London, EC1V 1NY. david.knights@rssb.co.uk
Keywords: protection, safety, switchgear, railway
Abstract
This paper describes the principal means of mitigating the
electrical risks that are inherent in an electrified railway. Topics
covered include preventing access to live electrical equipment,
earthing, the types of electrical switchgear, and protective
devices that will detect and remove electrical faults. The paper
covers a wide range of systems and references more detailed
sources of information.
1 Electrical safety
Electrification has many benefits as a source of traction energy
for operating a railway; however it brings with it some inherent
dangers that must be managed. The most obvious of these
dangers is the live exposed parts of the contact systems and
current collection devices, whether placed overhead or at ground
level, but there is also the return current path through the
running rails, other exposed metalwork, and the power
distribution systems to be considered.
The railway must comply with legislation, but the use of an
electric traction system requires compliance with the Electricity
at Work Regulations [1] in respect of that system. With
particular regard to an electrified railway, these regulations
require inter alia that:
The system is designed, constructed, operated and
maintained in such a manner as to prevent the risk of injury
from the use of the electrical system;
Conductors are insulated, placed out of reach, or access is
controlled through safe systems of work;
Systems are earthed as appropriate and provided with
protective devices to detect and intervene during dangerous
system faults;
When access is required, safe systems of work are put in
place;
Work is only done with the system isolated unless there is
compelling justification for the system to remain alive.
Railway electrification has some unique challenges inherent in
its function. By necessity, the interface between the
infrastructure and the train is a sliding contact between the
pantograph or collector shoe on the train and a bare conductor
on the infrastructure. This immediately introduces issues of safe
access to the railway, and heightens the likelihood of faults
occurring on the system because of the relative ease of
vegetation and debris coming into contact with the exposed
conductor systems. The railway is a linear electrical system
with multiple sources of supply, at either fixed sites or from
moving trains during regenerative braking, and this introduces
challenges in detecting faults on the system. The nature of the
electrical load is also unusual in that it has a high, but variable
power demand that is mobile.
2
2.1 Protection against direct contact
When it is not practical to fully insulate equipment, electrical
safety can be brought down to two key principles to separate
the individual from the exposed live parts, or to limit the
exposure to a level that gives rise to no danger. In most railway
traction applications the voltages used are such that any direct
contact with the live parts of the traction system will be a danger
to life, so protection against direct contact needs to be
provided by either:-
2.2 Protection by clearance / position
Live conductors are placed in such a position that it is not
possible, under normal conditions, for passengers, public or
railway staff to become close enough to the live conductors for
any danger to arise.
2.3 Protection by obstacles
Applied when it is not possible to give adequate clearance to live
parts by spacing. Solid barriers or mesh screens can be used
depending upon the application. Solid barriers offer the
opportunity to minimise the clearance to live parts, but the less
expensive mesh screens can be applied if a greater clearance is
available. With mesh screens the mesh size (and the risk of
penetration) will determine the additional clearance necessary.
In each of these cases, it is also necessary to consider the work
being done in the area, and if it is appropriate to require
additional clearance for staff using tools and other equipment.
2.4 Earthing, bonding and protection against indirect
contact
Electrical bonding is installed firstly to maintain the traction
return circuit by which the traction current returns from the
traction unit to the power source. And secondly, to prevent the
risk of injury from electric shock through indirect contact with
the system by accessible and touch voltages and to minimise the
risk of explosion from arcing when flammable gases and liquids
are being transferred; and minimise the export of stray current
from d.c. electrification systems. The design must take into
account the need to avoid interference with train control and
communications systems and any special requirements at
interfaces with other railways and tramways.
3 Switchgear and circuit breakers
The purpose of a circuit breaker is to ensure the unimpeded flow
of current in a network under normal operating conditions; to
allow the switching of power within the network for operational
reasons, when it may also be required to interrupt load current;
and to automatically interrupt the flow of excessive current in a
faulted or overloaded network. Circuit breakers are required to
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withstand multiple open-close-open sequences on to a fault,
through automatic re-closure or by manual operation from a
control room.
The successful achievement of these duties relies upon the
availability of good and reliable mechanical design to meet the
onerous demands of repeated opening and closing the circuit
breaker contacts, and good electrical design to ensure that the
circuit breaker can satisfy the electrical stress whilst making and
breaking the circuit.
During the opening and closing sequence an electric arc occurs
between the contacts of the circuit breaker, and advantage is
taken of this discharge to assist in the circuit-interruption
process. For instance, in an a.c. network, the arc is tolerated in a
controlled manner until a natural current zero of the waveform
occurs when the discharge is rapidly quenched by the
introduction of insulating medium between the contacts.
As with other areas of technology, the equipment available to
the railway engineer has developed over time. The basic
principles have remained unchanged, but the development of
new insulating materials has allowed the replacement of bulky
oil filled switches with much smaller vacuum and SF
6
devices.
In the development, the mechanical components are lighter and
therefore operation is quicker, and the switchgear now requires
significantly less maintenance. Electrical equipment has a long
economic lifetime, and all the types of circuit breakers
mentioned below will be found in use in the 25kV a.c. systems
or in the HV distribution networks of d.c. railways.
3.1 Oil filled circuit breaker (a.c.) [2]
The oil filled circuit breaker has been used extensively in the
UK, both in the rail network and in other industries, but has been
largely superseded by the Vacuum and SF
6
circuit breaker
technologies. There are many examples still in use, as the
equipment was widely used over an extensive period of time.
The circuit breaker contains a separating contact assembly
contained within a container of insulating oil. In all designs, the
arc created by opening the contacts within the circuit breaker is
cooled and extinguished by the oil. Early examples achieved this
by the use of a large volume of oil relying upon the production
of gas and heat to bring cool and non ionised oil into the
conductive path, such that after reaching a current zero, the arc
does not re-strike, and the circuit is broken. Improvements in
design reduced the volume of oil required, through the
introduction of mechanisms to forcibly move the oil through the
arc region such that the extinguishing of the arc is achieved
more efficiently. The reduction in size of the mechanism
improved the speed of operation of the breaker.
As the oil was raised to high temperatures during the
interruption process, it deteriorated, and required regular
inspection and renewal. Circuit breakers of this type are often
inspected after a relatively few instances of operation on fault
current. The presence of considerable volumes of inflammable
oil within substations and the high maintenance burdens has lead
to pressure to replace existing oil switchgear with safer and more
economic designs.
3.2 Vacuum circuit breaker (a.c.) [3]
The concept was developed in the 1920s but it is only in more
recent times that the technology has become widespread. The
circuit breaker design, whilst essentially fairly straightforward,
belies the amount of technology behind the apparent simplicity.
The chamber, commonly referred to as a bottle, has metallic
ends with a glass-ceramic body. One contact is fixed, whilst the
second contact is permitted a small movement due to its
mounting in a steel bellows fixed to one metallic end of the
chamber. A metallic shield - the sputter shield - surrounds the
contact region and serves to prevent metallic particles liberated
during arcing from reaching and adhering to the inside glass-
ceramic surface with the attendant risk of a short circuit.
Similarly a sputter shield surrounds the bellows so as to prevent
metallic emissions from the arc adhering to its surface, and
interfering with its operation. Grading shields controlling the
field distribution during arcing are also fitted. The dielectric
strength of the vacuum is very high, so only a short contact
separation of 8 to 10mm is required. Present designs in this
country allow 3mm for contact erosion with a 3mm extra
allowance on the actuator so that the actuating mechanism has a
stroke of about 14mm.
The advantages of a vacuum circuit breaker over the oil breaker
and the air blast breaker include - simplicity in construction,
silence in operation, no maintenance requirements, reduction of
fire risk, lighter than any other breaker for a given rating,
minimum of auxiliary apparatus required, low opening time
[typical 18 milliseconds], short stroke of actuating mechanism,
low inertia, and low operating energy requirement. It is feasible
to mount vacuum circuit breakers on fairly light gantries with
the minimum of weather protection and the fast operating time
can limit damage caused by faults and improve the ability to
achieve discrimination in fault clearance.
3.3 SF
6
Circuit breakers (a.c.) [4]
The SF
6
circuit breaker uses the ability of the colourless,
odourless, tasteless, non-toxic, chemically stable gas as a
quenching medium. The outstanding characteristic of the SF
6
is
its chemical inertness under normal conditions. SF
6
also
possesses compressive and thermal absorption properties, which
are sufficiently different from those of other interrupter media
such as oil and air, which allows it to be utilised in an interrupter
environment. These characteristics have led to the development
of the puffer, suction, self-pressurising and rotary arc types of
SF
6
interrupters.
SF
6
switch gear was initially used in high voltage grid
applications where reductions in size were substantial over past
designs, but the concept has proved extremely popular and has
replaced oil and air circuit breakers in industrial and traction
distribution networks. SF
6
switchgear is now widely used due to
its excellent insulation strength, cost effectiveness and reduced
size. The SF
6
breaker has a high level of mechanical and
electrical endurance, and internal overhaul is unnecessary during
economic service life in all except the most onerous systems.
There is, however, some concern that the decomposition
products of the SF
6
gas produced when switching occurs or
during a fire, are highly toxic.
3.4 Vacuum SF
6
circuit breaker (a.c.)
The prime focus amongst the manufacturers of high voltage
switchgear is towards a reduction in overall size and cost. The
use of Vacuum or SF
6
interrupters achieves this, but in the
simplest format, the switchgear conductors remain air insulated.
Some manufacturers have taken advantage of the insulating
properties of the SF
6
gas to insulate the internal conductors of
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the switchgear. The conductors are contained within sealed
chambers, which contain low pressure SF
6
gas, to provide the
main insulation. The interrupter itself is a separate component
contained within one of the chambers. This allows the use of
either SF
6
or vacuum devices. A popular choice is to use a
vacuum interrupter in combination with the SF
6
insulation. This
arrangement allows the size of the equipment to be reduced by
about 30%, and whilst space is not always at a premium in
railway applications, in other markets for the same switchgear,
there may be considerable advantage in minimising the space
taken up with switchgear. This design however, increases the
complexity of the equipment with the bus-bars being contained
within gas-tight chambers.
3.5 Use of standard products
It should be remembered that railway applications are, in market
terms, relatively small. The cost of bringing a new design of
switchgear to the market can be considerable because of the
testing and assurance processes that are required. For d.c.
railways, the high voltage a.c. switchgear is usually a standard
three phase product for the distribution market at 11 kV, 22 kV
(less common), 33 kV or 66 kV, and requires little or no
modification to make it suitable for railway application.
On the other hand, the single phase 25 kV or, in the case of an
Auto - Transformer system, 25 kV-0-25 kVtwo-pole switchgear
are not standard products, and are sometimes adaptations of a
three phase design, with the omission of some components and
appropriate adjustments to the mechanism to accommodate this.
The track feeder circuit breakers in an a.c. railway need to be
highly robust and reliable as they form the main safety device
for the railway in the event of an electrical fault on the line. In
this position in the network, the circuit breaker may be required
to operate, often under fault or heavy load, a considerable
number of times during its lifetime. This is an onerous switching
duty compared to that performed by a circuit breaker within a
distribution network.
3.6 d.c. circuit breaker.
The standard railway d.c. circuit breaker is an air break device
operating at 630V, 750V, 1500V or 3000V. As with any other
type of circuit breaker, the object is to control, and then
extinguish the arc caused by the separation of the contacts of the
circuit breaker. There are significant differences in this device,
from those described above. Unlike the a.c. circuit breaker, there
are no natural current zeros to aid the process, and the currents
involved at relatively low voltages can be significant.
The railway traction circuit breaker normally has two sets of
contacts. The main contacts to carry the current during normal
operation, and arcing contacts, which open after the main
contacts, to withstand the effects of the arcing at the point at
which the circuit is broken. The main contacts are therefore free
from the erosion caused by the arc. The arcing contacts are
designed to allow the arc to form and to move away from the
main contacts. They are shaped such that the arc moves upward
and into the arc-chute, where the arc can be controlled and
extinguished. The arc-chute is made of insulating material
capable of resisting high temperatures. Some types of circuit
breaker have an air puffer to blow the arc upwards and into
the arc-chute, particularly at low current levels.
Once inside the arc-chute, the resistance of the arc is increased
until the system voltage can no longer sustain the arc, which will
then extinguish. Commercial devices adopt differing techniques
or combination of techniques:
Increasing the arc length
Cooling the arc
Splitting the arc
The traditional approach is to apply a strong magnetic field
across the arc by passing the current through a few turns either
side of the arc chute. The resulting magnetic field is such that the
arc rapidly lengthened and cooled, literally being blown out of
the top of the arc-chute. The arc chute was often fitted with
insulated plates parallel to the current flow to assist with
dividing and cooling the arc.
More recently, the approach has been to use arc chutes with
plates across the line of the arc. These cold cathode arc-chutes
uses steel plates that are insulated at the top of the arc-chute.
When the breaker opens, an arc is established on arc runners
that lengthen the arc, and transfer it to the steel plates. The single
arc breaks down into a series of smaller arcs between the plates,
which tend to rise up the plates, but cannot escape from the arc-
chute because of the insulation. Each separate arc now has a
voltage drop at the point of contact with the steel plates of about
30V per arc. The breaker is designed such that the arc voltage is
increased to a point where it can no longer be maintained by the
system voltage, and will extinguish.
A similar design utilises insulating plates within the arc-chute, in
combination with a magnetic field to lengthen the arc to a degree
where the resistance of the arc is such that the source voltage can
no longer sustain sufficient current to maintain the arc.
The mechanical design of traditional d.c. circuit breakers
requires the fast movement of a substantial moving contact
assembly. The circuit breaker is usually closed by a powerful
solenoid, but is fitted with a toggle mechanism so that a trip can
be initiated at any time during the closing cycle so that the
breaker does not have to fully close before it can open. This is
particularly important if there is the possibility that the breaker
could close onto a fault. Some modern circuit breakers are fitted
with a detection device to check there is no fault present before
closing.
More recently circuit breakers are fitted with magnetic actuators
and the size and weight of the moving components further
reduced.
3.7 Switchgear location
The location and technology used are inter-linked. Historically,
all railway switchgear was of an indoor type enclosed in a
traditional building, often being re-used when the electrical plant
is updated. For a period, British Rail used a metal sectional
building in which the vacuum switchgear was integral. Later
designs dispensed with a building altogether and Structure
Mounted Outdoor Switchgear (SMOS) of vacuum or SF
6
type
was incorporated in the overhead line support structures. Recent
applications have seen the use of modular buildings which can
be fully equipped and tested before delivery to site, a concept
which can have significant advantage in minimising on-site
activities. The decision as to the design applicable to a particular
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location can often be influenced by factors unrelated to
technology.
3.8 Operational power supplies
The majority of switchgear is closed by an electrical solenoid
with the energy for tripping contained within springs, actuated
by a small trip solenoid. The substation requires a battery of
sufficient capacity to close the switch, and to tension the tripping
spring. With larger installations, it is common to provide a
closing battery (110V) and a tripping / remote control battery
(50V), but the voltages of the batteries may vary depending
upon the policy of the operator concerned.
More recently, spring charge mechanisms have become a
common feature of a.c. switchgear, storing within each circuit
breaker sufficient energy for a trip-close-trip cycle. The spring is
tensioned over a over a period of several seconds which limits
the peak demand on the battery, so it is possible to reduce the
size of the battery supplies required to operate the substation.
4 Protection equipment
As with advances in switchgear, electro-mechanical relays have
given way to microprocessor based electronic devices which are
more precise and are not constrained by mechanical inertia,
enabling the engineer to apply more subtle settings to the relays.
The trend is towards single multifunctional relays capable of
being programmed to the required function.
4.1 Why protection?
Protection is vital to ensure both the safe and economic
operation of a power system that will be threatened both by
failures of the equipment that forms part of the system, and from
external threats posed by such events as accidents or by external
interference with the components of the power system. It is
necessary to consider both likely failure modes of the system
components, and events that might happen on the system, both
accidental and deliberate. Protection benefits of electrical
equipment are two-fold, firstly it limits the damage to plant
caused by faults or overloads and any consequential damage that
may arise, it also provides protection for personnel who are
working on or in the vicinity of the power system.
Safety: Protection will minimise risk to staff and public by
minimising touch voltages; limit damage to equipment and
reduce any consequential damage.
Fire: Faults often result in the release of large amounts of
energy at an inappropriate location, which, if not immediately
detected and switched off, will inevitably lead to a fire or
damage from arcing.
System: Faults endanger the system as a whole, and it is
therefore important to remove the fault to minimise effect on
remainder of system, without disconnecting healthy parts of the
system.
Financial Loss: Although it may not be immediately apparent,
the cost of repairing the effects of system faults can be
significant and therefore protection should minimise damage -
hence repair cost. It should also minimise cost to system in terms
of loss of supply and hence loss of income (the recent industry
changes that introduce formal contracts, with financial payments
for service interruptions highlights this point). There is a need to
balance costs of provision and maintenance of protection against
the possible consequences of not providing the protection,
however this is a judgement to be made on many factors
including the importance of the equipment, the likelihood of a
fault, the time and cost to repair, the potential consequences, the
danger to people, and the legal obligations on the supplier.
4.2 What does it not do?
In most cases protection cannot prevent faults from occurring,
but it can limit their effects. Protection is able to prevent
overloads, which would exceed the design ratings of the supply
network and is able to minimise interference with or damage to
other utilities, either by induced currents corrupting
communications or by stray return currents corroding steel
structures, water and gas mains.
4.3 Railways a unique problem
As with the protection of a conventional power system, the
equipment has not only to detect all faults, but it must also apply
discrimination to ensure that only the faulty section is isolated,
however there are a number of factors that are peculiar to a
railway supply system:
The "load" is travelling along a protected section of railway
makes it impractical in most cases, to balance all the in-
feeds and out-feeds of the section. The load may also act
as a source of energy back into the system if regenerative
braking is employed.
If a number of locomotives and multiple-units are in the
section and each starts simultaneously, then the magnitude
of the peak load current may be of the same order as that of
the fault current for a fault at the end of a section
(particularly applicable to d.c. railways). It is essential that
the protection system discriminates between these
conditions and for overhead line systems, also operates in
the event of the required current being in excess of the
rating of the overhead conductors, which could cause over
heating of the contact wire.
The variable nature of the load causes the voltage on the
system to vary significantly.
The exposed nature of the contact systems means that they
are susceptible to more short circuit conditions, but these
are often transient in nature.
For good discrimination and minimum damage to the
electrical equipment, high-speed fault clearance is
imperative, and the system protection should discriminate
with train mounted protection devices, but in the event of an
un-cleared fault on a locomotive or multiple-unit then the
system protection must operate.
Under fault conditions, current may flow from more than
one-track feeder supply.
Should two different phases of an a.c. supply system be
inadvertently connected together, then the protection must
operate.
Fairly simple protection methods would result in the isolation of
a larger section of route and the control room staff would then
have to apply a trial and error method to locate the fault by re-
84
closing the circuit breakers protecting the system. However, this
can be avoided by employing a closely co-ordinated system of
circuit breakers with highly discriminative protective equipment,
complete with back-up protection. This system ensures that
tripping is closely confined to the two ends of the faulty section,
preventing any temporary supply interruptions to traffic on other
sections.
4.4 What does protection do? [5]
A protection scheme comprises a number of individual
elements. The first component is a device to detects faults or
abnormal conditions, usually some form of comparator or level
detector. The second component is a mechanism to allow
selectivity of the part of the system that is isolated, often in the
form of a time element or logic arrangement, followed by the
device that causes switching to occur to remove the fault from
the system. The process could be undertaken in a single device
such as a fuse (where all the processes are determined by the
melting characteristics of the fuse element), or by a combination
of devices that ultimately trip a circuit breaker.
The aim of any protection scheme is to remove the fault or
abnormal condition from the system as quickly and safely as
possible, yet to limit the effect on the system and to minimise the
area made dead. Unlike many other systems, where loss of
power is an inconvenience, the effect of loss of power to a
railway, and in particular an underground railway, may in itself
create a danger to life by making trains come to a stand in tunnel
sections.
The protection system must remain stable under load conditions,
a challenging requirement on railways when load and fault
current magnitudes can be similar in magnitude.
Discrimination. A fault may occur at any point in a power
supply system, and the protection scheme must be designed to
detect the position of the fault and to operate appropriate circuit
breakers so that the fault is isolated. The process of separating
the faulted component from the system whilst leaving the
healthy parts functioning is known as protection co-ordination.
Unit protection. This is usually the first line of defence (main
protection) in any protection scheme, and gives absolute
discrimination, because it is specific to a particular item or part
of item (in zone) and insensitive to remote faults (out of
zone). Although, in railway applications, the main protection
for the track feeders (both a.c. and d.c. can not be of this type
because of the need to protect a moving load). Unit protection
schemes usually function on a comparison technique and are
therefore fast acting, these can be overlapped to give full
coverage and have low setting values. However, these schemes
are relatively expensive. Examples of these schemes include:
Feeder Translay [6]; Solkor [7]; and directional relays
Transformer - biased differential; restricted earth fault;
reverse power; Buchholz devices and directional relays.
Busbars - bus zone protection; frame earth leakage relays
Generators differential; earth leakage; and directional
relays
Unrestricted protection. This usually forms the second line of
defence (backup) and is not specific in that the device will see
all fault conditions in the system beyond its location. The
detector makes a measurement at a specific point, and
discrimination is achieved by time, which may be variable with
current level detected (inverse definite minimum time) or a fixed
time (definite time). It may also be possible to discriminate by
the magnitude or direction (reverse power, reverse current) of
current flowing past the detector, in which case, the protection
might become plant specific. Voltage, power and frequency can
also be used for detection.
The big disadvantages of this form of protection are that the
relays are unspecific in the location of the fault that they detect,
and if time grading is implemented to give discrimination, then
the fault location with the highest prospective fault has longest
operating time. In a complex network, it may not be possible to
achieve full discrimination, because of the limited number of
grading steps available before the fault duration exceeds the
rating of system components such as cables.
This type of equipment is relatively cheap, and will provide a
backup to unit protection and are themselves backed up by other
relays in the system. It is normal practice for every relay to have
a backup device in the event of failure to operate, or the failure
of a circuit breaker to trip. Railways have not usually gone as far
in this respect as the grid supply operators, who routinely
duplicate complete unit protection schemes, using two differing
devices operating in parallel, with duplicated trip batteries and
circuit breaker trip coils. Supervision of the trip circuit is
sometimes fitted on major switchboards, where a failure to trip
would be extremely damaging.
4.5 Detection techniques
The protection engineer cannot measure the fault directly, and
therefore has to measure a proxy for the fault condition.
Physical. The closest to a direct measurement is to measure a
physical parameter of the device. The simplest technique here is
temperature which can be applied to transformers, rectifiers,
motors (thermistors embedded in windings), cables (linear
detectors) and by using thermal replica models to estimate the
temperature such as are used for overhead line equipment.
Temperature can also give a warning that equipment is
overloaded, or that a fault is imminent, such that the electrical
control room operator can mitigate a potential failure condition.
Similarly, pressure can indicate a problem in transformers and
oil cables. The slow generation of gas within an oil filled
transformer or reactor is a clear warning of a potential fault,
whilst a sudden surge of gas is indicative a definite fault to be
cleared from the system immediately.
Other parameters, such a loss of air flow (transformer cooling),
gas pressure (cables, SF
6
switchgear), and controlled melting
(fuses and circuit breakers) can also be used in appropriate
locations.
Electrical. The majority of applications use current transformers
to scale the actual primary current to a standard level, usually 1
Amp or 5 Amp at the full rating of the circuit. Similarly, voltage
transformers are used to reduce voltage to a nominal 110 V. The
protection devices, universally called relays, are then standard
across a range of applications, and system configurations, with
the actual operating settings of the devices being referred back
from the applied settings through the transformation ratios.
Devices operating on comparison principles require the
85
transformers to be of higher quality and to be matched, than
those used for unrestricted protection schemes.
4.6 Relay setting
To provide the correct discrimination between of protection
devices and thus minimise the area affected by the fault, relays
are set with a time grading between their settings. This
comprises the detection time of the relay and the complete
operating time of the circuit breaker. With modern equipment
this is in the range of 60-100 ms, but with older oil filled
switchgear and mechanical relays, it can be as long as 150-
200ms, because of mechanical inertia and the larger movement
required. Electronic relays are far more precise than
electromechanical relays, and if used together with vacuum and
SF
6
Switchgear the grading margin can be substantially reduced.
Relay Setting Factors. There are a number of factors to
consider when determining the settings to be applied to
individual relays within the protection scheme. The prime factor
is the fault level of the system, since it is this that determines the
current that can possibly flow under fault conditions. The
calculation has to be undertaken at both the maximum level
(typically winter) and the minimum level (typically summer).
However on an isolated system the fault level may vary from
day to night as the plant in service changes. The configuration of
the supply system may also have a significant effect, for instance
in emergency extended feeding arrangements. As faults are
cleared, the system characteristics change, and this effect can be
use to minimise the tripping time of circuit breakers still feeding
a fault. Sophisticated modelling tools are available to study these
conditions.
The factors that need to be considered in the setting calculation
include: the current transformer Ratio, characteristic, class,
rating; the burden imposed by connecting leads; the value of any
instantaneous setting required; the value of any fixed time delay;
the characteristic curve of the relay; and if the operation is for
current flow in one or both directions.
Some electronic relays can be programmed with multiple
settings that can be applied remotely from the control room, or
locally from switchgear contacts. For instance, the effect of
closing a bus-bar coupler can be taken into account by using a
contact to toggle the relays to alternative settings. The use of
blocking inputs can enable additional functionality to be
achieved without the cost of additional relays.
It is normal to set the unit protection to operate in the shortest
time, and at the minimum settings that still allow stability for out
of zone faults. Backup relays are set, starting at most remote
point, and allowing for discrimination against unit protection.
The backup relay current settings are applied to detect the fault,
but not normal conditions (including harmonic currents), and the
time delay is determined. Relays are set to operate in a sequence
allowing a time grading margin between each step where this is
practical. The relays must not be set to exceed the equipment
fault ratings. In a complex network, full grading may not be
possible under all fault conditions. The use of directional
elements may assist, particularly in the first feeder from the main
feeding site.
4.7 Relay construction
Electromechanical. Protection relays are sophisticated and
precise devices, and the electro-mechanical devices are robust
and reliable, but do require regular maintenance, which is done
on site. The characteristics of the relays are fixed by the
mechanical design, and therefore, if a different characteristic is
needed, a new relay will be required. The relays tend to be
slower due to mechanical inertia and are less accurate than
electronic relays, but are usually self powered.
Electronic / Digital. These devices are equally robust and
reliable, but offer the advantages that many protection functions
elements are available in a single relay (over current, earth fault,
high set instantaneous, very high set instantaneous, and timers),
and many pre-programmed operating curves are selectable.
Optional features including a self monitoring "watchdog",
communication and links to SCADA, time tagging, disturbance
recorder function, multiple settings, remote control interfaces,
metering and other logic functions. The relays are low
maintenance, but are not user repairable. A small disadvantage is
that the relays generally require a power supply.
5 Supply protection on a.c. railways.
5.1 Particular applications
This section describes a few particular applications of protection
schemes that are commonly used within the UK railway 25 kV
system.
5.2 Supply transformer protection
The incoming feed to railway supply transformers are normally
rated at 132/25 kV. The supply authority substations are
equipped to protect the transformers against excessive damage
due to a variety of faults and also to prevent excessive overloads
being drawn by traction loads.
Differential protection: The differential protection works on
the principle of current balance and compares the currents in the
primary and secondary windings, with due consideration of the
turns ratio taken into account. If a high level of correlation exists
there is no fault condition in the transformer, likewise the
converse means a fault condition exists. Transformers with taps
will upset the balance between the primary to secondary and the
differential protection should have proportional bias that exceeds
the unbalance created by the maximum tapping range. This will
stabilise the protection under through fault conditions while still
having good sensitivity.
The current transformer connections are arranged to compensate
for phase differences between line currents on the each side of
the transformer.
Over-current protection: Transformer winding faults can
occur within a winding, or between two adjacent windings, or
from the winding to earth, i.e. the tank or core. A winding fault
can cause severe damage if not interrupted as quickly as
possible and for this purpose an instantaneous over-current
relay is used, which will trip rapidly once the relay setting is
reached. The setting of the relay should be slightly greater than
the level of the normal permitted load current. Magnetising
inrush current to a transformer can be up to 10 times full load
current for the few cycles after switch on, therefore the setting of
the over-current relay must take this into consideration. It is
important that a specially designed relay is used that can
disregard the inrush current thus allowing a lower setting nearer
to the maximum legitimate load value.
86
Earth fault protection: live parts of the transformer may
become connected to the core or tank and therefore to earth.
Earth fault protection can take several different forms. Normally
with earth fault protection the whole fault current is measured
thus allowing an instantaneous relay to be used with a low
setting. It is quite common to use the same current transformers
for earth fault protection and over-current relays.
Buchholz protection: Breakdown of the transformer winding
insulation can give rise to slow gassing within the tank due to
the products of electrical breakdown. The relay is designed to
have two stages, the first stage detects low levels of gas
formation associated with slowly evolving faults and gives an
alarm only, a sudden increase in gassing associated with
catastrophic failure will be detected by the second stage and the
appropriate a.c. circuit breaker tripped out acting as unit
protection. If the warning given by this device is acted upon a
costly future failure can be avoided.
Over temperature winding protection: Over temperature
winding protection is required if the transformer winding
overheats due to an excessive traction load, the transformer
cooling system not working correctly, or if the ambient
temperature is too high.
Coolant over-temperature protection: If the coolant overheats
a two-stage oil over temperature device is activated. The first
stage is an alarm, with the second stage at a higher setting
tripping out the transformer. Such devices can take the form of a
temperature indicator, visible on the outside of the tank, with
contacts at adjustable settings.
5.3 Overhead contact system protection
Distance Impedance Protection. For a stationary power supply
system, a pilot-wire protective scheme comparing the incoming
and outgoing currents for each section could be used, but with a
mobile load taking power between relaying points this is not
possible. To overcome this problem a three-zone definite -
distance scheme of protection was developed as the main
protection against catenary faults.
Recent developments include a multi-functional relay combining
distance protection with over-current protection; thermal
overload protection; voltage monitoring and which provides
better protection distance characteristics to cater for regenerative
braking and the avoidance of traction loads (load blinding).
Communication features allow integration between protection
functions and SCADA.
Distance protection is set in three zones. Zone 1 extends from
the protected circuit breaker to cover 85% of the track section
towards the next switching site. The protection is limited to
approximately 85% to provide a margin against possible over-
reach, due to measurement tolerances. Zone 1 is set to operate
with no intentional time delay as a fault detected by this
characteristic will always be in this zone of protection.
Zone 2 is set to cover the final 15% of the section, and operates
after a short time delay of around 0.2 seconds, long enough to
ensure that, had the fault been in the section beyond the next
switching site, that the Zone 1 protection of the circuit breaker at
site B would have isolated the fault before Zone 2 of circuit
breaker at A had time to operate. If for some reason, this fault is
not cleared by the closest circuit breaker, then it will be cleared
after the lapse of the second zone time delay acting as a backup
device.
The third zone is provided solely as a backup for the remainder
of the section B to C, should it fail to clear the fault correctly and
operates after a delay of about 0.5 seconds.
The equipment may be modified by including an inter-trip
function in order that the circuit breakers at the two ends of the
fault section are opened simultaneously. This prevents the delay
introduced in the clearance time from one end when the fault is
in the last 15 percent of the protected section.
The majority of faults that occur on the overhead equipment are
non-persistent, e.g. birds short-circuiting insulators or bridging
air gaps; or vegetation blowing onto the wires. Automatic re-
closing of the circuit breakers could be fitted, however, as the
loss of a supply to the trains for a few seconds has no serious
consequences, most railways rely on manual re-closing of the
circuit breakers through SCADA systems. It is considered that
this gives greater flexibility and allows operators to decide if an
attempted re-closure is appropriate.
Thermal overload relay. To provide protection on track feeder
circuits against sustained fault currents of low magnitude which
are of insufficient value to trip the distance-impedance
protection but if maintained could cause overheating of the
contact wire, a thermal relay is fitted. The relay provides some
protection against overloading of the equipment and is operated
from the same current transformer as the distance protection and
comprises two bi-metal strips and a heater winding to replicate
the thermal inertia of the conductors.
Out of phase protection. To prevent phases being paralleled at
a feeder station or mid-point switching location, voltage relays
are supplied from voltage transformers connected to either side
of the bus coupler. The close circuit of the circuit breaker is so
arranged that the bus coupler can only be closed if only one of
these voltage transformers are energised.
Inverse definite minimum time (IDMT) relay. Protection of
the feeder station incoming 25 kV supplies and protection of
spur overhead lines is carried out by provision of inverse
definite minimum time relays. Discriminative protection on the
graded time limit principle is therefore applied to bus-bars and
the distribution network in the event of a fault to earth.
The type of relay commonly used is non-directional, i.e. it
operates independently of the direction of the fault power, it is
only suitable for application as a discriminative relay at points
on a system where fault power always flows in a known
direction.
5.4 Supply cable protection
The 25 kV a.c. supply cables are usually protected by unit
protection employing a balanced voltage protection technique,
with provision for inter-tripping. The basic principle is that the
input current to an item of equipment is only equal to the output
current when it is healthy. The protection functions by
determining the difference of these two currents, operation being
permitted when the resultant current is above a particular value.
The protection relay generates a voltage equivalent to the line
current. Under healthy conditions the voltage at one end of the
feeder is balanced by an equal and opposite voltage in the
apparatus at the other end of the feeder and the relay does not
87
operate. If, for some reason, the feeder currents are not identical
the voltage will not cancel out and relay operation results.
Several proprietary versions of the system are available, but the
particular systems usually used for traction supply cable
protection are Solkor and Translay. Within each range, there
are variants, in both electromechanical and electronic versions,
but overall the application remains the same.
6 Supply protection on d.c. railways
6.1 Particular applications
This section describes a few particular applications of protection
schemes that are commonly used within the d.c. railway system.
6.2 Transformer protection
A high set instantaneous over-current relay is used to disconnect
faults rapidly to limit damage on major faults, with time delayed
over-current and earth fault protection to provide discrimination
with remote faults, and to protect against sustained overload.
Differential Protection is generally applied to the main
transformers, a Biased Differential relay being used where the
turns ratio of the transformer will vary due to tap changing. The
scheme may also include differential earth fault or restricted
earth fault protection system. All transformers will be provided
with over temperature detection and in oil-filled devices a
Buchholz relay is normally fitted. The a.c. rectifier feeder
breakers provide the means to isolate and protect the rectifier
transformer and rectifier. Rectifier transformers are normally
naturally circulated oil or air convection cooling.
6.3 Rectifier sub station protection
The rectifier is protected by the IDMT and instantaneous over-
current relays, which will prevent any excessive loads being
drawn and will trip on the instantaneous high set limit in the
event of a short circuit occurring within the unit. In addition the
rectifier may have thermostats to detect any overheating of the
diode cooling fins, these thermostats being arranged to trip out
the a.c. circuit breaker.
In most substations there will be two or more rectifiers, to give
standby capacity, and it is possible to split the bus-bars with a
bus-bar coupler circuit breaker. To take maximum advantage of
this arrangement the switchboard may be fitted with separate
protection for earth faults on each side of the bus-bar coupler so
that one half can continue in service in the event of an earth fault
on the other.
6.4 DC Switchboard and Track Protection
The output from the rectifiers is fed to the d.c. switchboard via
high-speed d.c. circuit breakers. The d.c. circuit breaker is
mainly to control switching and does not normally have forward
overload protection fitted. If a fault develops in the rectifier,
current will flow from the other rectifier unit or an adjacent
substation, into the fault, so a reverse current trip feature is fitted
to the rectifier d.c. breaker, usually set at a low level of about
10% of the full load rating of the breaker.
The d.c. switchboard can be split into two sections with a bus
coupler to give maximum reliability to the d.c. electrification
system. Power is fed to the track through high-speed d.c. track
feeder circuit breakers. The major protection for the d.c. supply
to the railway is fitted to these track feeder breakers. The
protection on the feeder breaker is intended to trip out a faulted
section of the track, while leaving all healthy tracks energised,
and therefore, it is important for the protection to discriminate
between d.c. feeder breakers and a.c. rectifier breakers if the
supply is to be maintained to healthy sections.
6.5 Calculating d.c. distribution protection system settings
In determining the settings for traction feeder protection on a
d.c. railway, the following factors need to be considered:
The conductor rail or overhead contact system resistance.
The arrangement of the return conductors in terms of how
many running rails are available to return current to the sub-
station.
The running rail resistance including negative bonds and
impedance bonds where they are used.
The maximum fault level of the sub-station assuming all
transformer rectifier units are feeding.
Reduced fault level conditions under plant outage and
feeding arrangements that give minimum fault currents.
6.6 Track fault discrimination
Fault currents can be divided into two categories, faults which
occur close up to the substation (<500 m), and faults which
occur remote from the substation (>500 m). The problem with
those faults remote from the substation is that the fault current
level may be less than the normal starting current of the train.
The fault current for remote faults is mainly determined by the
impedance of the rails, whilst faults close up to the substation
are mainly determined by the substation characteristics.
Resistive or arcing faults are difficult to detect, as their
characteristics are little different from the load current of a train.
Direct acting overload. This device is an integral part of the
circuit breaker, and trips the circuit breaker by a direct
mechanical linkage, or by opposing the magnetic field of a
holding magnet. The device is fast and reliable requiring no
additional relays or power supplies, but the ability to set the
relay may not be greater than +/- 10% of the setting. The
characteristic is such that it will detect the peaks of instantaneous
current caused by trains starting, and so, the setting is
determined by the load current of trains close to the substation. It
may be necessary to set this device higher than the maximum
fault current at the remote end of a double end fed section. In
these instances additional protection is required to provide a full
protection scheme.
Impedance relay measures the impedance of the track feeder
section. the relay setting is obtained by assuming a short circuit
at the far end of the track section and calculating the impedance.
With this setting installed in the relay characteristic only faults
nearer to the substation will give a lower impedance value and
trip out the appropriate track feeder breaker.
Under-voltage inter-tripping. track faults on d.c. mass rapid
transit systems may be detected by under-voltage relays, giving
good discrimination between track faults and train starting
currents anywhere in the protected section. Under-voltage relays
are fitted at each feeding substation (and possibly at mid points),
to detect the depressed line voltage caused by the fault, rather
than the fault current itself. Used to detect faults remote from a
88
substation where the direct acting over-current setting of the
circuit breaker is above the potential fault current, allowing
trains taking load current close to the substation. On a double
end fed section, the circuit breaker closest to the fault must trip
either on the direct acting over-current device or another form of
protection. The under-voltage relay trips the remote circuit
breaker over a communications circuit.
Rate-of-rise detector [di/dt protection]. Faults are
characterised by an unusually high and persistent rise in the
traction current, which can be used as the basis for rapid
detection. However, some normal traction operating conditions
exhibit similar characteristics (for example train starting
currents) and might give rise to breaker operation but these
high starting currents persist for a relatively short period
compared with a sustained fault current. It is therefore essential
that discrimination between these two conditions be effected in
order that correct circuit breaker operation occurs only to isolate
the sustained fault.
Train starting current has a high initial rate-of-rise, but this is of
short duration though the magnitude continues to increase,
whereas the distant fault current has a lower rate-of-rise, but
continues to rise. The rate-of-rise of the notching slope, falls to
zero at time t
1
, but the fault slope does not reach zero until its
final current. The detector has two settings - one for di/dt and
one for time duration T, thus allowing the detector to trip the
circuit breaker if the high rate of change of the current persists
beyond the time setting. Proprietary relays may also combine a
di/dt element with a I element (see below).
This type of device has been applied on a number of transit
systems to good effect, however, the performance of the both
di/dt and I schemes can both be adversely affected by a load
that existed on the track feeder at the time the fault was initiated
or by regenerative braking.
I [change of magnitude] current protection. this protection
is based on the change in magnitude of the track feeder current.
Under a fault load condition a change in current is very short
when compared to a legitimate load current. In some relays, I
can be initiated by a di/dt setting. The relay is tripped if it detects
a change in magnitude of the current within a short time.
Time delayed over-current. A current sensing relay, combined
with a timer element can provide effective protection, but with a
significant time delay. Trains and trams, take full current during
acceleration for a relatively short period. A combination of a
current setting that will pick up during the acceleration period
but reset before the time setting elapses, will trip the section if
the current is sustained beyond this time. Some schemes allow
for the setting of two current settings with time delays that will
allow for the detection of currents that will exceed the thermal
ratings of the conductor system, whilst remaining stable for
normal running conditions.
Thermal overload protection. Thermal Overload protection of
d.c. systems with overhead catenary conductors is designed with
a current time curve that nearly matches the thermal
performance of the overhead conductor. The thermal element
within the relay models the heating and cooling of the overhead
line over an extended period. A similar protection may be fitted
on systems with conductor rails to provide thermal protection for
track feeder cables.
Regenerative braking. on a railway in which stock capable of
using regenerative braking is operated, additional protection
may be necessary to account for the power that is being supplied
into the railway from a braking train. A train slowing using
regenerative brake might mask or alter the characteristics of a
fault delaying the detection of the fault, or a train that is
regenerating might run onto a section of line that has been
isolated. The provision of additional protection such as under-
voltage inter-tripping, control circuits on the train and operating
procedures can mitigate these risks to gain the economies of
reduced energy consumption and reduced mechanical brake
maintenance.
7 Earth fault detection and protection
7.1 a.c. electrified railways
In a railway supplied at a high a.c. voltage, the return path for
the traction is through the running rails which are electrically
connected to earth, supplemented by return conductors and
booster transformers, and, in the case of auto-transformer
systems, feeder wires. In all cases the return conductors are
connected to earth at the supply point. The structures supporting
the live conductors are bonded together, and connected to the
return path at appropriate locations. Thus, the majority of faults
that can occur on the system will be seen by the protection at the
feeder-station as a short circuit or very heavy load and will be
detected and cleared by a standard protection device. There is no
real possibility of a connection to earth that is the equivalent of
an earth fault in a three phase system as all credible earth
paths are bonded to the traction return system.
7.2 d.c. electrified railways
In high-density urban d.c. electrification systems there is no one
unique earthing arrangement applicable for all electrification
schemes. Unlike a.c. schemes, where all components of the
system, other than the main live conductors are earthed, the
effect of doing this on a d.c. railway would be to generate
substantial stray current that would cause problems for adjacent
systems, and is potentially highly corrosive if flowing in
utilities conductors or the reinforcements of structures.
The railway normally uses the train wheels and running rails as
the traction current return path to the d.c. substation. The rails
are not normally insulated from the sleepers or structures on
which they are fixed. The earth return is considerably more
complex than is at first perceived since the leakage current that
flows out of the rails will return at some other point, and this is
referred to as stray current.
The negative of third rail d.c. electrified railway is not
intentionally earthed at the substation, being connected only to
the traction return system. It is necessary to minimise the
leakage of electrical charge from the intended return path and
the consequential damage that may be caused by corrosion, and
to control the touch and accessible voltages. The railway system
returns the traction current to the substation via one or both of
the running rails with leakage to the earth via the track and
sleepers. To minimise stray d.c. current the railway
infrastructure is earthed independently.
The typical types of arrangement in use in systems using the
running rails as the return conductor:
Control by system design
89
o Totally floating Earth.
o Earth connected directly to the substation
negative.
o Drainage diode earth.
Control by switching
o Floating earth with Rail Potential Control Devices.
o Floating Negative Automatic Ground Switches.
o Over Voltage Protection Device.
If the track is insulated from the ground to minimise leakage,
the presence of insulation means that voltages between the track
and ground will occur. These voltages are a potential hazard to
passengers and railway staff when coming into contact with rail
or anything connected to it and the ground. Protection of
personnel takes precedence over control of stray current.
Reduction of rail touch voltages can be achieved by clamping
the rail to ground if a dangerous voltage is reached and resetting
as soon as possible afterwards. It is necessary to have quick
detection of the high voltage, which then activates a "clamp", by
a thyristor device, GTO device or contactor, to short out the
potentially dangerous voltages. However, whilst operated a solid
connection exists for the passage of stray current to the earth.
Computer studies have indicated that a totally floating earth is
the most effective in terms of stray current control, with an
earthed neutral scheme producing the highest leakage. A totally
floating d.c. system with Rail Potential Control Devices to
minimise risk of dangerous levels of Accessible and Touch
Voltage has proved to be an effective scheme for stray current
and rail potential control.
Stray current collection system. A stray current mat can be
constructed in the bed of the track, by the inclusion of steel
reinforcing bars below the rails. This mat is bonded together to
form a continuous electrical conductor for intercepting the stray
current and providing a path back to the substation. The stray
current system can be equipped with current detectors or voltage
monitors to give warning to the operator of excessive stray
current flow.
a.c./d.c. electrification interface. It is necessary in some
locations to operate a.c. overhead lines and d.c. conductor rails
on the same track, adjacent tracks or crossing one another. At
these points, it is necessary to bond the system in such a manner
as to protect both systems, and to ensure that in the event of a
fault on either system switching to ensure safety will occur.
On tracks equipped with both a.c. overhead and d.c. conductor
rails, the design for the earthing and bonding shall be to provide
safety to persons in the presence of the 25kV electrification
system in both normal and short circuit conditions. The bonding
shall ensure rapid clearance of short circuits, and yet not provide
a path for d.c. return current to flow in the railway or third party
metallic structures.
It is sometimes necessary to omit bonds that would normally be
provided, and in these instances, excess voltage can be limited
under short circuit conditions using voltage-limiting devices
such as spark gaps and non-linear resistors to ensure compliance
with limits stated in appropriate earthing standards.
7.3 Conductor rail systems employing insulated return.
The HSE [8] requires that a system which employs separate
electric traction supply and return conductors, with both
conductors insulated from earth and the running rails, should be
provided with equipment to detect and indicate the location of a
fault to earth involving either conductor. The London
Underground 630/750V d.c. traction power system is one of few
d.c. electrified railways not using the running rails as the return
path for the traction current.
The system dates back to the original electrification of the
Metropolitan District Railway in 1905, and to regulations
designed to limit accessible voltage and interference with other
undertakings in force at the time [9]. The supply is insulated
from earth, (except for reference connections to facilitate
monitoring) and under normal operating conditions, there is little
or no stray current, so the usual problems that are experienced
with mitigating stray current in a d.c. 3
rd
rail system are not
present. The freeing of the traction conductors from earth also
has the advantage that the system can operate for a short time
with either pole solidly connected to earth without the system
being brought to a halt, an important consideration where trains
run in deep tube or subsurface tunnels.
Operating with an earth fault present will allow stray current to
leak from the running rails, which are in contact with earth, and
flow in unplanned locations. Earth fault detectors are provided
to facilitate timely removal of earth fault conditions.
Removing an earth fault quickly is important as, if within the
same d.c. section, a positive pole earth fault, and a negative pole
earth fault exist together, then substantial, and damaging
currents can flow, that may not be detected by conventional
protection devices [10]. A system of unbalanced current
detection based upon the principle of measuring imbalances
between the outgoing circuits at a substation has been used in
some instances to detect the existence of these simultaneous
earth faults.
8 Acknowledgment
The author is grateful for the assistance given by his industry
colleagues in preparing this paper, and his employers support.
9 References
[1] Memorandum of Guidance on the Electricity at Work
Regulations 1989, HSE Books HSR 25.
[2] For more detail see C. Flurscheim (Ed.), Power circuit
breaker theory and design, IEE, London, 1982.
[3] For more detail see A. Greenwood, Vacuum Switchgear,
IEE, London.
[4] For more detail see - H. M. Ryan and G. R. Jones, SF
6
Switchgear, IEE, London.
[5] For more detail see Power System Protection (Edited by the
Electricity Training Association), IEE, London, (Four volumes);
and Protective Relay Application Guide (PRAG), GEC Alstom,
now available in electronic format as Network Protection &
Automation Guide from Areva T&D.
[6] A trade name of Areva T&D.
[7] A trade name of Reyrolle Protection.
[8] Railway Safety Principals and Guidance, Part 2, Section C,
Guidance on Electric Traction Systems HSE Books HS (G)
153/4.
[9] Reproduced as Appendix 1 in Dover, A. T., Electric
Traction, 2
nd
Edition - 1929, Pitman, London.
[10] Report on the fire that occurred on 11th August 1982 on a
passenger train between Wood Green Station and Bounds
90
Green Station on the Piccadilly line of London Transport
Railways Department of Transport Railway Accident Report;
HMSO.
91