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Review: [untitled]

Author(s): David Harrah


Source: The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Dec., 1967), p. 548
Published by: Association for Symbolic Logic
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2270244 .
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548 =REVIEWS
Comment: The reviewer believes that, if the questioner-datum technique is to be used as the
basis for the logic of questions in a formal language, then, either the language will have to in-
clude enough of the usual set theory, syntax, and semantics to provide for questions like
" What
is a set of things such that . . ." and " What is a sentence such that . . ." where these questions
are interpreted as presupposing the existence of sets and sentences, or else the language will have
to include ostensible set-theoretical, syntactical, and semantical expressions interpreted by new
and relatively complex kinds of semantical rules. The author does not state it in these terms, but
his theory seems to suggest that: (1) understanding a question, and in particular knowing the
presuppositions and ontological commitments of the question, includes knowing the transfor-
mational history of the question; (2) the presuppositions and ontological commitments of a
question can be taken as a function of early stages in the transformational history; and (3) the
presuppositions of a question need not include the result of prefixing an existential quantifier
to the datum. The reviewer believes that it would be interesting and worthwhile to see whether a
formal semantics for questions, including a formal treatment of presupposition and commitment
of the kind suggested here, could be developed as part of a logic of questions for a formal
language.
DAVID HARRAH
GEROLD STAHL. Un diveloppement de} la logique des questions. Revue philosophique
de la
France et de l'tbranger, vol. 153 (1963), pp.
293-301.
The author presents an analysis of questions similar to the one presented in his XXVIII 259.
A higher-order functional system is assumed; certain classes of expressions of this system are
described in a meta-system and regarded as questions. E.g., "What individual satisfies the func-
tion H?" is symbolized by '[Hx?]'. Roughly, aperfect answer to [Hx?] is a consistent expression
of the form (Hal.- * *
-HaJ), (x)(H'x
5 Hx), or (x)'-Hx; a sufficient
answer to [Hx?]
is (1) a
theorem or (2) a consistent sentence which implies a perfect answer which is not a theorem. The
question [lx ?] is then the class of its sufficient answers. The author conjectures that all questions
of interest in science and daily life can be treated by his method.
Comment: The reviewer believes that most of the objections to the author's XXVIII 259
apply also to this work. Further, as Belnap has pointed out, any sentence (x)"-Gx which is not
the negation of a theorem is a sufficient answer to [Hx?], so the identification of questions with
classes of sufficient answers makes the concept of question much too wide. The reviewer believes
that it would be more plausible to drop the consistency requirements on answers and identify
questions with classes of perfect answers, but that in any case the author's basic idea-of
identifying questions with classes of answers of some kind-should prove to be a very fruitful
one.
DAVID HARRAH
TADEUSZ KUBI&SKI. Przeglqd
niekhorych zagadnieh logiki pytahr (A review of some problems
of the logic of questions). Polish, with Russian and English summaries. Stadia logical, vol. 18
(1966), pp. 105-137.
The most important attempts to establish a logic of questions (an "erotetic" or "interroga-
tive" logic, or if need be, semiotic) are reviewed in eight chapters. The author distinguishes in a
standard way between erotetic syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Stress is laid upon
the
necessity of studying the problems of erotetic logic on the basis of formalized languages.
The author analyzes four types of formalization of erotetic logic. First Harrah's theory is
discussed (see especially XXIX 136(2)). The reproduction of the main concepts of Harrah's
theory (which-like Stahl's theory-identifies questions with a kind of propositions) is faithful
and clear. Belnap's (see An analysis of questions, Preliminary report, Technical Memorandum,
System Development Corporation, Santa Monica 1963) six categories of questions (three of
them concerning " which-questions," the other three " whether-questions ")
are then reproduced
and some concepts of BeInap's theory compared with some of Harrah's theory. Stahl's theory
(see e.g. XXXII 548(1)) identifying questions with classes of answers to those questions is more
briefly mentioned and a problem is discussed which is implied by (not formulated in) Stahl's
theory and concerns the role of certain constant functors and functorial variables. A connection
between this problem and the protothetic of Legniewski is stated.
The fourth type of formalization of erotetic logic is represented by the work of the author
himself (see e.g. his earlier paper: Pewne pojkcia konsekwencji slabycb i ich zastosowania (Some

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