Sunday, January 25, 2009

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO
arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached
on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.


Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still has
jurisdiction over the case


Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the
finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even
after the judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.

The power to control the execution of the SCs decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot
be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one
SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether
civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to
prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been
conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them
comform to law and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondents contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect
granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can
be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final
conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is
indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve
though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In
the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by
reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be
considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The
powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend
that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate
the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.

Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy
15 11 2010

Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been
finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations
in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law
allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum
products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream
oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to
monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims,
among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff
differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors
in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined
petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined
crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the
Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free
competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in
the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell
and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works
to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts
deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players
that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own
will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will
suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an
uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective
players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and
they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to
the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players
insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by
requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

(Sec. 5) Montemayor vs. Araneta, 1 L-44251, 77 SCRA 321
Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On 7/8/74, he was found guilty of
making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investigating committee. On
11/8/74, another committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a similar nature against
petitioner. Petitioner, through counsel, asked for the postponement of the hearing set for 11/18 and 19,
1974, but the motion was denied. The committee then proceeded to hear the testimony of the
complainants and on 12/5/74, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from the
University. On 12/12/74, the University applied w/ the NLRC for clearance to terminate petitioner's
employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and backwages.
Judgement was rendered in petitioner's favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found
petitioner's dismissal to be justified. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Does academic freedom include the right of schools to dismiss teachers?
RULING:
Yes. Institutional academic freedom was vindicated in this case, where, against the plea of academic
freedom and security of tenure of a professor, the school was allowed to separate a professor who after
due process had been found guilty of violating behavioral standards.
The stand taken by petitioner as to his being entitled to security of tenure is reinforced by the provision
on academic freedom which, as noted, is found in the Constitution. It was pointed out in Garcia v. The
Faculty Admission, Committee that academic freedom "is more often Identified with the right of a
faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish
the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his
conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political,
economic, or academic establishments. For the sociologist, Robert Maclver, it is 'a right claimed by the
accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his
conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these
conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution. Tenure,
according to him, is of the essence of such freedom. For him, without tenure that assures a faculty
member "against dismissal or professional penalization on grounds other than professional
incompetence or conduct that in the judgment of his colleagues renders him unfit" for membership in
the faculty, the academic right becomes non-existent, Security of tenure, for another scholar, Love joy,
is "the chief practical requisite for academic freedom" of a university professor. As with Maclver, he did
not rule out removal but only "for some grave cause," Identified by him as "proved incompetence or
moral delinquency."

Montemayor v. Araneta University, 77 SCRA 321 (1977) Lack of Due Process in Termination of
Employment Remedied by Hearing in the NLRC. F: ; Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University
Foundation. On 7/8/74, he was found guilty of making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara
by a faculty investating committee. On 11/8/74, another committee was appointed to investigate
another charge of a similar nature against petitioner. Petitioner, through cousel, asked for the
postponement of the hearing set for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the w/c motion was denied. The committe
then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on 12/5/74, submitted its report
recommending the separation of petitioner from the University. On 12/12/74, the University applied w/
the NLRC for clearance to terminate petitioner''''s employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint
w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and backwages. Judgement was rendered in petitioner''''s favor, but on
appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found petitioner''''s dismissal to be justified. Hence, this petition
for certiorari. HELD: The Consti. assures to workers security of tenure. In the case of petitioner, this
guarantee is reinforced by the provision on academic freedom. In denying petitioner''''s motion for
postponement of the hearing, the committee did not accord procedural due process to the petitioner.
This was, however, remedied at the mediation conference called at the Dept. of Labor during w/c
petitioner was heard on his evidence. There he was given the fullest opportunity to present his case.
Petition dismissed. &nbs p; Petitioner filed a MFR contending that the hearing in the NLRC did not
conform to ther requirements of due process as the witnesses against petitioner were not called so that
petitioner could cross-examine them. HELD: Pettioner did not object to the presentation of the
testimony of the complainant and the witnesses at the school investigation and did not assert his right
to cross-examine them. Petitioner waived his right to confront the witnesses, relying solely on the
strength of his evidence. Nor was it incumbent on resp. to present the witnesses in the NLRC.
Petitioner''''s only right is to be heard. VV. Tanada v. Phil. Atomic Energy Commission, 141 SCRA 307
(1986) Bias as Disqualification in Administrative Investigations F: &n bsp; Petition for prohibition brought
by taxpayers, questioning the competence of members of the PAEC to pass judgment on the safety of
the Bataan Power Plant and charging them w/ bias and prejudgment, based on their publications stating
that the plant was safe. HELD: (1) Where the validity of an appointment is not challenged in an
appropriate proceeding, the question of competence is not w/in the filed of judicial inquiry. The
question of competence is a matter addressed to the appointing power. (2) In these publications, PAEC
clearly indicated its prejudgement that the nuclear plant is safe. The first was published in 1985. The
other 2 were issued earlier, but as the majority of the PAEC commissioners even then were already
occupying responsible positions in the PAEC, they cannot escape responsibility for these publications. &
nbsp; Petition granted and PAEC restrained from acting in the proceedings for issuance of license.

Sabello v. DECS
Facts:
Isabelo Sabello was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and also the Assistant Principal of the
Talisay Barangay High School of the Division of Gingoog City. The barangay high school was in deficit at
that time due to the fact that the students could hardly pay for their monthly tuition fees. Since at that
time also, the President of the Philippines who was earnestly campaigning was giving aid in the amount
of P2,000.00 for each barrio, the barrio council through proper resolutions allotted the amount of
P840.00 to cover up for the salaries of the high school teachers, with the honest thought in mind that
the barrio high school was a barrio project and as such, was entitled to its share of the RICD fund. The
only part that Sabello played was his being authorized by the said barrio council to withdraw the above
amount and which was subsequently deposited in the City Treasurer's Office in the name of the Talisay
Barrio High School. That was a grave error on the part of Sabello as it involves the very intricacies in the
disbursement of government funds and of its technicalities. Thus, Sabello, together with the barrio
captain, were charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted to suffer a
sentence of one year and disqualification to hold public office. The Sabello appealed his case to the
Court of Appeals. CA modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in the payment of one-half of the amount being involved. The herein petitioner, being
financially battered, could no longer hire a lawyer to proceed to the highest court of the land.
Finally, Sabello was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President of the Republic of the Philippines,
restoring him to 'full civil and political rights.' With this instrument on hand, Sabello applied for
reinstatement to the government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a mere
classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School Principal I.
Issue:
WON Sabello should be reappointed to the position he held prior to his conviction
Held:
Yes. In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., this Court held that the absolute disqualification from office or
ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed under the penal code and that
pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil
rights. Although such pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not entitle him to automatic
reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said office.
In the present case after his absolute pardon, Sabello was reinstated to the service as a classroom
teacher by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice and equity dictate
that he be returned to his former position of Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a mere
classroom teacher.
However, his prayer for backwages cannot be granted. Sabello was lawfully separated from the
government service upon his conviction for an offense. Thus, although his reinstatement had been duly
authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to backwages. Such right is afforded only to those who have
been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge
against them.