Bail 2008

The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries against Immigrants in Europe
Author(s): Christopher A. Bail

Reviewed work(s):
Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Feb., 2008), pp. 37-59
Published by: American Sociological Association
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The
Configuration
of
Symbolic
Boundaries
against Immigrants
in
Europe
Christopher
A. Bail
Harvard
University
Recent studies
report significant
cross-national variation in the
conceptual
distinctions
or
"symbolic
boundaries
"
used
by majority groups
to construct notions
of
"us
"
and
"them." Because this literature
compares only
a
handful of
countries,
the macro-level
forces by
which certain
symbolic
boundaries become more salient than others remain
poorly
understood. This article
provides
the
first panorama of
these
processes by
comparing
the relative salience or
"configuration
"
of multiple symbolic
boundaries in
21
European
countries. I use
fuzzy-set analyses of
data
from
the 2003
European
Social
Survey
to create a
typology of symbolic boundary configurations.
The results indicate
that the
symbolic
boundaries
deployed by
the
general public
do not
correspond
to the
official "philosophies of integration
"
emphasized
in the literature.
Moreover,
the data
suggest previous comparisons
have
focused
too
heavily
on Western
Europe, overlooking
important
variation in other
regions of Europe
where
immigration began
more
recently.
I
generate hypotheses
to
explain
this
newfound
variation
using demographic,
socioeconomic, institutional,
and historical data
from quantitative
and
qualitative
sources. The article concludes with
examples of
how these
hypotheses
can be combined
by future
studies toward a
theory of "boundary-work."
INTRODUCTION
Although
the boundaries of countries neat
ly
divide
people
into social
groups,
the
conceptual
distinctions used to construct notions
of "us" and "them" are an
equally important
component
of social identities
(Barth 1969;
Direct
correspondence
to
Christopher
A.
Bail,
541
William James
Hall,
Department
of
Sociology,
Harvard
University,
33 Kirkland
Street,
Cambridge,
MA 02138
(bail@fas.harvard.edu).
This research
was made
possible by fellowships
from the German
Marshall Fund and the National Science Foundation
(IGERT #98070661).
I thank Jason
Beckfield,
Eric
Bleich,
Rogers Brubaker, Cybelle Fox,
Riva
Kastoryano,
Neil
Gross,
Michele
Lamont,
Charles
Ragin,
Graziella
Silva,
William Julius
Wilson,
Christopher Winship,
and the ASR editors and review
ers for their
insightful
comments and
suggestions.
All
errors are
uniquely my
own. Previous drafts of this
article were
presented
at the ASA Annual
meeting
in
Montreal,
the Council of
European
Studies Annual
Meeting
in
Chicago,
and the International Conference
on
Comparative
Social Science in
Tokyo, Japan.
Douglas 1966;
Jenkins
1996). Explaining
cross
national variation in the relative salience of
these
"symbolic
boundaries" is the central
goal
of the
boundary-work
literature
(e.g.,
Kastoryano 2002;
Lamont and Molnar
2002;
Wimmer
2005).
This literature shows that social
identities are not
only
multidimensional but
also
highly
mutable. While
religion
is an
extremely
salient
symbolic boundary
in certain
countries,
it is
largely
irrelevant in others and
displaced by
race,
language,
or culture?in dif
ferent
configurations?still
elsewhere
(e.g.,
Lentin
2004;
Triandafyllidou 2001;
Wieviorka
1994). Although
a number of
idiosyncratic
explanations
have been
provided
for such vari
ation,
they
have
yet
to be
synthesized
into a
theory
of
boundary-work. Building
on
previous
small-scale
comparative studies,
this article
advances the
study
of
boundary-work by pro
viding
the first
panorama
of
symbolic
bound
aries toward
immigrants
in 21
European
countries.
Immigration
is of natural interest to scholars
of
boundary-work
because it reveals the
sym
bolic boundaries
deployed
when social bound
American Sociological
Review, 2008,
Vol. 73
(February:37-59)
38 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
aries are crossed. While
Europeans
once looked
askance at the U.S. "color
line,"
a recent influx
of non-Western
immigrants
has
brought
ten
sions to the fore. The murder of Theo Van
Gogh
in the Netherlands in
2004,
the fatal
beating
of
a Chinese student in Ireland in
2002,
and the
perennial
debate over laicite
(secularism)
in
France
exemplify
the
severity
and
variety
of
such tensions.
Today, Europe
is
perhaps
best
described as a set of "diverse
diversities,"
not
only
because of variation in the ethnic and cul
tural
background
of
minority populations
across
countries,
but also due to variation in their
understanding
of
diversity
itself.
Britain,
for
example, practices
multicultural race relations
(Favell 2001),
whereas the use of racial cate
gories
is
prohibited
under the tenets of
repub
licanisme in France
(Weil 2002).
Until
recently,
nationhood in
Germany
was cast in terms of
ancestry (Kastoryano 2002),
while thousands of
expatriates
are denied cultural and
legal
mem
bership
in Greece each
year (Kiprianos, Balias,
and Passas
2003).
So-called "Dutch tolerance"
rests on
religious
accommodation
(Rath
et al.
2001),
but Swedish multiculturalism has a dis
tinctly
secular
heritage (Runbolm 1994).
These
"philosophies
of
integration" (Favell
2001)
are central to the
"xenophobophelia"
(Stolcke 1995)
of
European policymakers wary
of
being compared
with the "race-obsessed"
United States. It is
yet
to be
determined,
how
ever,
whether these distinctions also
shape
the
configuration
of
symbolic
boundaries
deployed
by
the
general public.
This
question
is central
to numerous
comparisons
of "old"
immigra
tion countries in Western
Europe (e.g.,
France,
Germany,
and
Britain)
where
immigration began
in the immediate
postwar period (e.g.,
Brubaker
1992;
Favell
2001; Kastoryano 2002).
In con
trast,
the
emerging
literature on the "new"
immigration
countries of Southern and Eastern
Europe emphasizes
the absence of
philosophies
of
integration among
these
regimes (e.g.,
Lentin
2004; Triandafyllidou 2001;
Wieviorka
1994).
Because these small-scale
comparisons
are com
partmentalized by region, only idiosyncratic
explanations
for the
configuration
of
symbolic
boundaries have been
produced.
Macro-level
comparisons
within and between
regions
of
Europe
are needed not
only
to contextualize
previous
research,
but also to
explore significant
variation in the
historical, demographic,
socio
economic,
and institutional characteristics of
immigrants
and
immigration regimes
across
the Continent.
I
begin by developing
a framework for the
study
of
boundary-work
at the macro level and
providing
a brief overview of
immigration
to
Europe
from 1945 to 2003.1 then review the lit
erature on
symbolic
boundaries in three
regions
of
Europe, highlighting
macro-level factors
within and between
regions.
Next,
I
develop
a
typology
of
symbolic boundary configurations
by applying
a combination of
"fuzzy-set"
tech
niques
to data derived from
questions
about a
hypothetical immigrant
in the 2003
European
Social
Survey.
The results indicate that the
sym
bolic boundaries
deployed by
the
general pub
lic do not
correspond
to the official
philosophies
of
integration emphasized
in the literature.
Moreover,
the data
suggest previous compar
isons have focused too
heavily
on Western
Europe, overlooking
variation across other
regions
where
immigration began
more recent
ly.
I
develop hypotheses
to
explain
this new
found variation
using demographic,
socioeconomic, institutional,
and historical data
from a
variety
of
quantitative
and
qualitative
sources. The discussion and conclusion offer
examples
of how these
hypotheses
can be com
bined
by
future studies toward a
theory
of
boundary-work.
SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES
The recent "boom in
boundary
studies"
(Wimmer 2005) highlights
the
significance
of
social classification across a wide
variety
of
contexts. These studies show considerable vari
ation in the "boundaries"
developed by groups
to
separate
themselves from others
(Abbott
1995;
Barth
1969;
Baubock and Rundell
1998;
Douglas 1966;
Jenkins
1996).
Boundaries have
both social and
symbolic
dimensions;
this arti
cle examines the latter.
Symbolic
boundaries are
"conceptual
distinctions made
by
social actors
...
[that] separate people
into
groups
and
gen
erate
feelings
of
similarity
and
group
member
ship." Conversely,
"social boundaries are
objectified
forms of social differences mani
fested in
unequal
access to an
unequal
distri
bution of resources... and social
opportunities"
(Lamont
and Molnar
2002:168).
To be
sure,
symbolic
and social boundaries are
closely
relat
ed. While social boundaries are
institutionalized,
however, symbolic
boundaries shift
through
SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES IN 21 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 39
classification
struggles
where
majority groups
attempt
to maintain the
privileges
attached to
their status
(Eliasoph
and Lichterman
2003).
"Only
when
symbolic
boundaries are
widely
agreed upon
can
they
take on a
constraining
character
...
[and]
become social boundaries"
(Lamont
and Molnar
2002:168). Citizenship
laws,
for
example,
are
rigid
social
boundaries,
but
they
are
predicated
on the flexible distinc
tions of
symbolic
boundaries,
which are need
ed to define such exclusion
(Bryson 2006;
Sackmann, Peters,
and Faist
2003).
In this
way,
symbolic
boundaries are a
"necessary
but insuf
ficient" condition for the creation or modifica
tion of social boundaries and should therefore
be viewed as
"equally
real"
(Lamont 1992).
To unravel the
complex relationship
between
symbolic
and social
boundaries,
studies of
boundary-work emphasize
the multidimen
sionality
and
mutability
of the former. Whereas
social
psychological
theories of social
identity
require
that
groups
be
categorized
as "in
groups"
or
"out-groups" (e.g., Tajfel 1981),
the
boundary-work approach
I
propose requires
attention to the relative salience or
configura
tion of
multiple symbolic
boundaries
(e.g.,
race,
religion, language,
culture,
or human
capital).
This not
only
adds much-needed
precision
to the
concept
of social
identity
but also enables one
to ask whether the
configuration
of
symbolic
boundaries reveals the interests of
groups
in
competition
for social resources. For
example,
previous
research
suggests
that
symbolic
bound
aries based on
race?increasingly stigmatized
through
the
growth
of international antiracist
discourse?have been
displaced by religion,
language, culture,
or even human
capital
(Goldberg
2006;
Lamont
2000). By examining
the entire
configuration
of
symbolic
bound
aries,
one can
identify
how the social boundaries
previously protected by
race are
renegotiated.
In
this
way,
the
boundary-work
literature
attempts
to
explain why majority groups
choose certain
symbolic boundaries,
incorporating
some
groups
while
excluding
others. The manner in
which
symbolic
boundaries are
policed
or made
permeable
reveals the
strategic?although
often
subconscious?interests of
majority groups.
BACKGROUND: IMMIGRATION IN
EUROPE,
1945 TO 2003
The
comparative study
of
immigration
in
Europe
is
ideally
suited to the
study
of bound
ary work,
given major
differences in the caus
es, sources,
and
scope
of interaction between
immigrants
and natives across countries.
Although
a
comprehensive
overview of such
variation is not feasible
here,
four
major
axes of
differentiation can be identified:
(1)
sources
and
timing
of
migration, (2)
the size and
origin
of
immigrant groups
and their
position
in the
labor
market, (3) citizenship
and civic inclusion
policies,
and
(4) philosophies
of
integration.
Timing and Sources of Migration
As Table 1
shows, postwar immigration gener
ally
occurred much earlier in Western
Europe
than in Southern and Eastern
Europe.
Castles
and Miller
(2003) identify
three
general
trends
of
immigration
to Western countries between
1945 and 1970:
(1) refugee
movements after
World War
II, (2) guest-worker migration
from
the
European periphery,
and
(3) postcolonial
migration. Germany accepted
the bulk of
refugees
in the immediate
postwar period,
most
of whom were
fleeing
Eastern
Europe.
Postwar
labor recruitment of Southern
Europeans, Turks,
and Moroccans was most
prominent
in
France,
Britain,
Germany, Switzerland,
Belgium,
Luxembourg,
the
Netherlands, Sweden,
and
Austria. Substantial
postcolonial migration
from
Africa, Asia,
the
Caribbean,
and the Middle
East occurred in
France, Britain, Belgium,
and
the Netherlands.
After
1970, European integration
and eco
nomic
restructuring
altered the sources and tim
ing
of
immigration
flows
(Brochmann 1996).
Although postwar
labor
migration
bolstered the
economies of
many
Western
European
coun
tries, global
economic decline in the 1970s led
many
to
tighten
their borders.
Large-scale
immi
gration continued, however, through family
reunification
policies. By
the
mid-1980s,
countries such as
France,
Germany,
and the
Netherlands had
significant second-generation
immigrant populations. Meanwhile,
Southern
European
countries
began
to
experience
sub
stantial
immigration
from Latin
America,
North
Africa,
and Eastern
Europe
for the first time.
The
collapse
of the Soviet Bloc and civil unrest
in Africa and the Middle East ushered in a new
Table 1.
Timing
of
Migration,
1960 to
2000_
Average
Net
Migration
(Weighted by
Total
Population)
1960 to 1970 1970 to 1980 1980 to 1990 1990 to 2000
Austria .08 .11 .18 .30
Belgium
.12 .11 .03 .14
Britain .01 -.04 .00 .11
Czech
Republic
-.19 -.02 -.04 .08
Denmark .06 .04 .09 .25
Finland -.37 .01 .09 .12
France .42 .12 .09 .04
Germany
.20 .19 .26 .41
Greece -.46 .28 .22 .68
Hungary
.01 -.02 -.16 .17
Ireland -.58 .33 -.58 .30
Italy
-.18 -.02 -.02 .07
Luxembourg
.48 .76 .42 .95
Netherlands .07 .24 .14 .24
Norway
.00 .10 .14 .23
Poland -.12 -.09 -.08 -.14
Portugal
-1.39 .42 -.21 .20
Slovenia .05 .34 .13 -.05
Spain
-.22 .04 -.06 .33
Sweden .03 .10 .20 .23
Switzerland_.58_-^14_.39_.36
Source: Eurostat.
Note:
Significant migration
occurred between 1945 and 1960 in several of the above countries but data are not
available for this
period.
wave of
refugee migration
in the mid-1990s. At
the same
time, illegal migration
of non
European
Union
(non-EU) immigrants
increased while
legal
obstacles
preventing
intra
European
Union
migration began
to dissolve.
Characteristics of the Foreign-Rorn
Today
Variation in the
timing
and sources of
postwar
migration
to
Europe
caused vast
discrepancies
in the size and
regional origin
of
foreign-born
populations.
Table 2 describes
foreign-born
populations
as a
percentage
of the total
popu
lation
by region
of
origin.
While the
foreign
born constitute 40.10
percent
of the total
pop
ulation in
Luxembourg
and 20.45
percent
in
Switzerland, they
make
up only
2.88 and 1.98
percent
of the
population
in
Hungary
and
Poland, respectively. Although
those born in
the Middle East and North Africa are
roughly
4.40
percent
of the
population
in
France,
they
constitute less than .03
percent
of the total Czech
population. Among many
other
possible
exam
pies
of such
variation, European immigrants
from non-EU countries make
up
6.83
percent
of
the Austrian
population
but
only
.47
percent
of
the French
population.
As Table 3
shows,
the
varied
timing
and sources of
immigration
have
also led to variation in the role of
immigrants
within
European
labor markets.
Citizenship and Civic Inclusion
Each of the above factors made the
development
of
citizenship
and civic inclusion
policies
more
pressing
in certain countries than in others.
While
citizenship policy
is well established in
"old"
immigration
countries such as France and
Germany, many
"new"
immigration
countries
such as
Spain
and
Italy
did not
develop
citizenship
laws until the mid-1980s.
Among
the
old
countries,
there is variation in the criteria
used for
citizenship
decisions and even the
very
definition of an
immigrant.
A now classic com
parison
is drawn between
France,
where all
second-generation immigrants
are entitled to
citizenship (jus soli),
and
Germany,
where until
recently
those without blood-based
ancestry
Table 2. Regional Origin of the Foreign Born as a Percentage of the Total Population, 2002
Europe Middle East and Sub-Saharan Latin North
Totala EU-15 (Non-EU-15) North Africa South Africa South Asia East Asia America America Caribbean Oceania
Austria 12.12 2.60 6.83 1.94 .06 .14 .33 .07 .11 .00 .02
Belgium 10.68 5.80 .70 2.21 1.00 .16 .39 .19 .18 .04 .01
Britain 8.11 2.41 .33 .45 1.27 1.75 .67 .11 .39 .44 .29
Czech Republic 4.38 .27 3.85 .03 .01 .01 .17 .01 .03 .01 .00
Denmark 6.72 2.00 1.07 1.58 .42 .56 .65 .17 .21 .02 .04
Finland 2.54 .81 1.02 .22 .14 .05 .17 .03 .08 .01 .01 France 10.01 3.30 .47 4.40 .90 .12 .52 .14 .10 .04 .01 ^ Germanyb 8.82 2.32 2.42 2.77 .20 .43 .39 .10 .15 .02 .01 rf Greece 10.24 1.58 6.44 1.19 .16 .22 .08 .05 .32 .01 .19 8
Hungary 2.88 .22 2.48 .04 .01 .01 .07 .01 .03 .00 .00 ?
Ireland 10.19 7.23 .62 .16 .60 .20 .42 .07 .65 .02 .21 O
Italy 3.91 1.23 .94 .57 .24 .14 .18 .39 .13 .04 .03 g
Luxembourg 40.10 34.28 2.75 .51 .99 .13 .69 .35 .31 .07 .03 g
Netherlands 10.07 1.98 .69 2.67 .63 .36 1.51 .20 .19 1.76 .08 ?
Norway 7.30 2.43 1.05 .96 .53 .71 .86 .33 .37 .03 .03 % Poland 1.98 .41 1.51 .01 .00 .00 .01 .00 .03 .00 .00 w
Portugal 6.32 1.66 .21 .02
3.38
.08 .08 .73 .14 .01 .01 2
Spain 5.33 1.55 .40 .89 .18 .05 .13 1.83 .06 .24 .01 j*
Sweden 12.03 4.29 2.84 2.36 .55 .37 .68 .67 .20 .03 .04 *
Switzerland 20.45 11.34 4.66 1.43 .57 .50 .67 .67 .41 .12 .07 C
- 5*
Source: OECD (data
not
available
for Slovenia). O
Note: Foreign-born populations were aggregated by region according to the World Bank coding scheme. Cross-national data on the regional origin of second-generation immigrant P
populations are not currently available. 2
a The sum of regional percentages does not equal the total because immigrants who are stateless or whose origin is unknown are not shown. ?
b Data for Germany are
from
Statistiches
Bundesamt. S
w
Table 3. Characteristics of
Immigrants
in the Labor Force
Percent of Total Labor Percent of
Immigrants
with
Change
in Percent of Total
Country_Force (2003)_Tertiary
Education
(2002)
Labor Force
(1998
to
2003)a
Austria 9.2 13.7 -.8
Belgium
7.7 22.0 -.4
Britain 5.1 43.6 +1.0
Czech
Republic
1.6 21.5 +1.1
Denmark 3.5 27.5 +.1
Finland 1.6 24.9 +.6
France 5.2 15.5 -1.0
Germany
9.0 14.7 +.3
Greece 9.5 17.0
?
Hungary
1.0 27.2 +.4
Ireland 6.5 50.1 +3.1
Italy
3.8
?
+1.1
Luxembourg
45.0 18.2 +4.3
Netherlands 3.8 24.8 +.3
Norway
3.6 39.2 +.9
Portugal
2.7 16.6 +1.3
Spain
3.7 28.2 +2.7
Sweden 4.6 30.9 +.2
Switzerland_2L9_2^0_+3_
Source: OECD
(data
not available for Slovenia and
Poland).
a
Weighted by
the total
population.
(jus sanguinis)
were treated as
foreigners
regardless
of their
birthplace (Alba 2005;
Brubaker
1992).
The distinction between these
"civic" and "ethnic"
citizenship regimes
has
been
applied throughout Europe (Weldon 2006),
although
it is
heavily
criticized for
failing
to
cap
ture the nuances within each
category (Kuzio
2Q02;
Kymlicka 1999).
A
growing
number of
studies
suggest
that most states now fall firm
ly
within the civic side of this
dichotomy (e.g.,
Brubaker
2001;
Joppke 2005).
Table 4 shows
each
country's
score on the Civic
Citizenship
and Inclusion Index
(Geddes
et al.
2005),
a
five-part
measure
gauging
the
generosity
of
immigration
and
integration policy. Again,
there
is considerable variation
along
each dimension.
For
example,
naturalization is
generously
award
ed to
immigrants
in France
regardless
of their
origin
but more
tightly
restricted in
Austria,
Luxembourg,
and Denmark.
Similarly,
Finland
and Sweden have flexible
family
reunification
policies,
whereas Greece and Austria do not.
Finally,
the index
suggests immigrants
have
more
easily integrated
into the labor markets of
Belgium
and
Spain
than those in
Germany,
Austria,
and Greece.
Philosophies of Integration
Citizenship policies
are
closely
related to the
philosophies
of
integration (Favell 2001),
or
public ideologies
about exclusion and inclu
sion of
immigrants,
that are created
by many
European governments (see
Table
4).
Most
philosophies
of
integration
draw
upon
the
lega
cy
of nation
building
or colonial
strategy.
For
example,
French
republicanisme
stresses total
assimilation of
immigrants,
while British mul
ticultural race relations follows a
pluralist
model
loosely
based
upon
a similar colonial
policy.
Until
2000, Germany's Ausldnderpolitik (for
eigner's policy)
treated
immigrants
and their
children as
"permanent guests"
entitled to
very
few benefits from the state.
Many
Southern and
Eastern
European
countries either do not have
philosophies
of
integration
or are in the
process
of
developing
them
(Carrera 2006).
Those coun
tries
currently developing philosophies
of inte
gration
are
responding
to
increasing
calls within
the EU to
design
a "Common
Agenda
for
Integration"
among
all member states
whereby
immigrants
obtain "basic
knowledge
of the host
society's language, history,
and institutions"
(European
Parliament
2005).
Table 4. Civic Citizenship Index and Philosophies of Integration
Civic
Citizenship
Index3
Country Antidiscrimination Naturalization Family Reunion
Long-Term
Residence Labor Market Inclusion Philosophy of Integration15
Austria 85.83 93.2 84.54
93.5
86.73 (Varies by region)
Belgium 133.51 107.77 111.11 111.41 122.45 (Varies by region)
Britain 99.46 107.77 99.03 99.47
102.04
Multicultural Race Relations
Czech Republic ? ? ? ? ? (In development) Denmark 69.48 78.64 77.29 103.45 81.63 (In development) Finland 100.82 99.03 115.94 107.43 102.04 (In development)
France 100.82 113.59 106.28 111.41 96.94 Republicanisme (Republicanism)
Germany 79.02 90.29 106.28
99.47
91.84 Auslanderpolitik
(Foreigner's
Policy) eg
Greece 79.02 84.47 86.96
81.56
81.63 (In development) g
Hungary ? ? ? ? ? (In development) g
Ireland 114.44 107.77 94.2
75.6
86.73 Inter-Culturalism E
Italy 95.37 101.94 99.03
95.49
102.04 (In development) g
Luxembourg 64.03 107.77
91.79
91.51 81.63 (In development) O
Netherlands 122.62 96.12 103.86
113.4
117.35 Gedogen (Dutch Tolerance) 5
Norway ? ? ? ? ? Diversity through Inclusion P
and
Participation
g
Poland ? ? ? ? ? None gj
Portugal 128.07 104.85 106.28 99.47 112.24 Lusotropicalism (Tolerance) g
Slovenia ? ? ? ? ? None *o
Spain 107.63 101.94 103.86
109.42
127.55 (In development) ?
Sweden 119.89 104.85 113.53
107.43
107.14 Mangkulturellt Samhalle g
(Multicultural Society) O
Switzerland ? ? ? ? ? (Varies by region) w
Source: Geddes and colleagues (2005), OECD, and qualitative sources listed in Table 5. ^
a Higher scores indicate more inclusiveness in each policy domain. Data are not available for Czech Republic, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, and Switzerland. For details on the meas- O
ures used to create indices see Geddes and colleagues (2005). ?
b Philosophies of integration have been created or modified in several countries since 2003. Germany's immigration policy was revised extensively in 2000; second generation Q
immigrants can now obtain citizenship regardless of
ancestry.
For an overview of recent changes see Carrera (2006). w
SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES AGAINST
IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE
Western and Northern Europe
While race is central to discussions of
symbol
ic boundaries in the United
States,
its relevance
is
highly
contested in Western
Europe,
where
race is not defined
through hypodescent
but
rather
through
nation
building, colonialism,
and
the Holocaust.
Analyses
of racism in Western
Europe
often focus on the
relationship
between
philosophies
of
integration
and
public
attitudes.
For
example,
Favell
(2001:226) emphasizes
the
"colorblind" ethic of
fepublicanisme
in France
vis-a-vis multicultural race relations in Britain:
"In
France,
racism is
public
and
spectacular;...
in Britain
...
it has become
privatized
and
unspoken."
Still others
suggest
that
"private"
racism is
equally prominent
in
France,
albeit dis
guised
as
republicanisme (Lapeyronnie
1993;
Todd
1994;
Wieviorka et al.
1992). Comparative
historical studies of France and
Germany sug
gest
race became
part
of national
identity
through
conflict between the two
nations, long
before the arrival of non-Western
immigrants
(Brubaker
1992;
Weil
2002).
Another strand of
the literature
compares
the
emergence
of
antiracist attitudes
(Lentin
2004;
Taguieff 1991)
and shows a more
general
denunciation of race
throughout
Western
Europe.
Given the
widespread stigmatization
of
racism in Western
Europe, religion
has become
a
primary
focus of the
boundary-work
literature
in this
region (Zolberg
and
Long 1999).
For
example, Goldberg (2006:349) argues
that
World War II created a "shift in
Europe's
dom
inant fixation of concern and resentment from
the
figure
of 'the black'
...
to that of 'the
Muslim.'"
Again,
however,
the literature shows
important
cross-national variation in the relative
salience of
religion
in the
configuration
of
sym
bolic boundaries.
Kastoryano (2004) argues
that anti-Muslim attitudes are more
public
in
France than in
Germany
because secularism is
an
integral aspect
of Civic
Republicanism,
whereas German secularism allows
religious
pluralism.
While the French
openly
demand the
"nationalization" of
Islam,
she
argues,
Germans
are more
likely
to view Muslims as Gastarbeiter
(guest workers)
whose cultural differences are
to be tolerated but not
incorporated. Comparing
anti-Muslim attitudes in the
Netherlands,
Belgium,
and
Britain,
Rath and
colleagues
(2001) suggest
the
legacy
of
"pillarisation,"
or
religious accommodation,
has
encouraged
reli
gious
tolerance in the former
countries,
where
as the
highly political
Muslim
community
in
Britain has
provoked public
backlash. Not unlike
racism, however,
there is evidence that overt
"Islamophobia"
has become
stigmatized
in
many
Western countries as well
(Cesari
and
McLoughlin
2005;
Kastoryano 2002).
Previous studies also
suggest
that
language
and culture are two of the most
important sym
bolic boundaries in Western
European
coun
tries.
Again,
the literature focuses on the
centrality
of
language
and culture in
philoso
phies
of
integration.
In
France,
for
example,
government
demands that
immigrants
learn the
language
and culture
through
le
creusetfrancais
(the
French
Melting Pot) provoked
a
public
backlash that stressed la droit a la
difference (the
right
to be
different) (Todd 1994).
More recent
ly,
Brubaker
(2001)
identified a
strong
resur
gence
of assimilationist rhetoric
spurred by
the
success of the far
right
in France.
Similar,
although perhaps
less
virulent,
debates about
assimilation have
emerged
in Britain
(Bleich
2003;
Favell
2001)
and
Germany (Kastoryano
2002).
The
question
of assimilation is
fiercely
con
tested in
France, Britain,
and
Germany,
but the
debate is less
prominent among
noncolonial
powers
where assimilation has no historical
precedent (Garner 2003;
Wimmer
2002;
Zolner
2000).
Zolner
(2000) argues
that Danes use the
principle
of
Grundtvigianism
or
"bounded
equality"
to
distinguish
themselves from the
colonial atrocities
perpetrated by
their
neigh
bors. Similar observations have been made of
"transethnic"
patriotism
in
Switzerland,
which
stresses
linguistic
and cultural
pluralism,
albeit
within strict
European
limits
(Wimmer 2002).
A final
question
in the literature on
symbol
ic boundaries in Western
Europe
concerns the
possible
convergence
of attitudes toward immi
grants
at the
regional
level. A number of stud
ies
point
to
growing
similarities in the
immigration policies
of Western
European
coun
tries
now that most face similar
challenges
of
immigrant integration (Brubaker
2001; Joppke
2005). Joppke (2005),
for
example, argues
that
most Western countries have shifted the crite
ria of
citizenship
decisions from the character
istics of
groups
to the credentials and
voluntarism of individuals. Such
arguments
are
provoked
in
part by
the
growing
harmoniza
tion of
immigration policy
at the EU level and
an international human
rights
discourse that
stresses civic criteria in
citizenship
decisions.
Although supranational pressures
have been
shown to
produce convergence
of
government
policies,
it is not
yet
clear whether these forces
have
produced
similar effects on
public opinion.
A number of studies describe an
emergent
tide
of
xenophobia
based on the notion of "fortress
Europe" (e.g.,
Geddes and Favell
1999;
Goldberg
2006; Kastoryano 2002),
but it is not
yet
clear which
symbolic
boundaries are most
salient in these
developing
attitudes. These find
ings
have
scarcely
been tested
empirically, par
ticularly
outside Western
Europe.
Southern Europe
The literature on
boundary-work
in Southern
Europe highlights
the
region's abrupt
transition
from
emigration
to
immigration
in recent
years.
Comparing
Greece, Italy,
and
Spain
with the old
immigration
countries of Western
Europe,
Triandafyllidou (2001)
concludes that
symbol
ic boundaries in Southern
European
countries
are much more unstable.
Indeed,
previous
research
suggests ethnicity
and culture in
Southern
Europe
have historical antecedents
based on the
unique
"mixed" character of the
Mediterranean,
marked
by
North African and
Middle Eastern influences
long
before Western
states came into existence.1 For these
reasons,
previous
studies have concluded that race is
less salient in Southern
Europe
than in Western
Europe (Medrano 2005; Triandafyllidou 2001;
Wieviorka
1994).
For
example,
Sniderman and
colleagues (2000) report
no difference in
Italians' attitudes toward
immigrants
from
Africa and Eastern
Europe. Similarly, previous
survey analysis suggests
that Greeks are the
least
likely
of all
Europeans
to describe them
1
For
instance,
race in Greece is derived from the
Megali
Idea
(Great Idea) through
which irredenta
were
incorporated
as "ethnic" Greeks based on shared
religion
and
language
but not
ancestry
(Triandafyllidou 2001). Similarly,
la razza italiana
(the
Italian
race)
and italianitd
(Italianess)
do not have
explicit
racial
connotations, although
there is evidence
of racist attitudes
among
Northern Italians toward
their southern
counterparts,
who often have darker
skin(Vasta 1993).
selves as racist
(Kiprianos
et al.
2003).
There is
tentative
evidence, however,
that
Western-style
racism is
being "imported"
to Southern
Europe
via
popular
culture
(Lentin 2004).
The role of
religion
in the
configuration
of
symbolic
boundaries is also
unclear,
even
though Christianity
has
historically enjoyed
a
pivotal place
in nationalism in the
Mediterranean
(Muro
and
Quiroga 2005). Only
recently
has the arrival of non-Christian immi
grants provoked
scholars to
analyze
the role of
symbolic
boundaries based on
religion (Zapata
Barrero
2003).
There is limited evidence that
religion
is a more
important symbolic
bound
ary
in Greece than in
Italy (Triandafyllidou
2001).
The relative salience of
symbolic
bound
aries based on
language
and culture has
yet
to
be studied in
detail, although
both were
strong
components
of colonial
strategies
in
Spain
and
Portugal (Medrano 2005;
Mendoza
2001).
Instead,
the literature on Southern
Europe
focus
es
primarily
on
perceptions
of economic threat
induced
by
the
abrupt
increase of
immigrants
in
the labor market and
high
levels of
unemploy
ment and
illegal migration (Apap 1997;
Baganha 1997).
Sniderman and
colleagues
(2000) report
that Italians have
negative
attitudes
toward
immigrants
with low human
capital.
Likewise, Kiprianos
and
colleagues' (2003)
analysis
of
multiple public opinion surveys sug
gests
that Greeks are
among
the most
likely
of
all
Europeans
to blame
immigrants
for
high
unemployment.
Previous research also
suggests
that human
capital
is an
important symbolic
boundary against
the
large
Albanian
popula
tion in
Italy (Vasta 1993)
and Greece
(Lazaridis
and Psimmenos
2000).
Eastern Europe
Because
immigration
to Eastern countries
began
very
recently,
the literature on
symbolic
bound
aries in Eastern
Europe primarily
focuses on the
ethnic
"unmixing" (Brubaker 1996)
of
people
brought together
under communism.
Complicating
these studies is the
migration
of
"national" minorities such as the Roma
(Brubaker
et al.
2006).
A small but
growing
literature has
begun
to
compare
how these fac
tors
shape
attitudes toward the
rapidly growing
population
of "new"
immigrants
from Asia and
the Middle East in Eastern
Europe (e.g., Nyiri
2003;
Phalet and
Orkeny 2001;
Wallace
2002).
Several studies conclude that of all
Europeans,
those in the East are the most hostile toward for
eigners (Nyiri
2003;
Wallace
2002).
The com
mon
assumption
is that cultural
membership
is
based on race or
ancestry
in these
countries,
although
this has been
challenged
in recent
years (Janmaat 2006; Nyiri 2003;
Szoke
1992).
Nevertheless,
Wallace
(2002) reports
racism is
higher
in Eastern
Europe
than in other
regions,
even
though non-European immigrants
make
up
an
extremely
small
proportion
of their total
population.
There is some evidence of
growing
racism toward Asian
immigrants
in the Czech
Republic
and
Hungary (Nyiri 2005), although
negative
attitudes are most
frequently
directed
toward African and Middle Eastern
immigrants
(Nyiri 2003).
Other studies
suggest
that
religion
is a more
important symbolic boundary
in the
Czech
Republic
than in
Hungary
and Poland
(Wallace 2002).
There is also evidence that lan
guage
is a
strong symbolic boundary
in Poland
(Nowicka 2006),
as is culture in
Hungary
and
the Czech
Republic (Nyiri 2003). Finally,
recent
studies show that
symbolic
boundaries based on
human
capital
are
particularly strong through
out Eastern
Europe (Nyiri
2003;
Phalet and
Orkeny
2001;
Wallace
2002).
A PANORAMA OF SYMBOLIC
BOUNDARIES AGAINST
IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE
Table 5 lists
comparative
studies of
symbolic
boundaries toward
immigrants
in
Europe
in
chronological
order. This
panorama
reveals sev
eral
patterns
that have inhibited the
progress
of
the
boundary-work
literature thus far.
First,
most studies
compare only
a handful of coun
tries. This is because
many
use
qualitative
meth
ods that are not conducive to broad
cross-national
comparison.
Second, compar
isons of Western
European
countries outnum
ber
comparisons
of Southern and Eastern
Europe.
While
comparisons
of
France, Britain,
and
Germany
are
commonplace,
the amount of
variation between these countries has
yet
to be
assessed in a wider
European
context. This is
important
not
only
because of variation in the
development
of social boundaries between
natives and
immigrants
within and between
regions,
but also because it limits assessment of
the
possible
convergence
of
symbolic
bound
aries in Western countries themselves.
Finally,
symbolic
boundaries based on
race,
religion,
language, culture,
and human
capital
are ana
lyzed
in the literature at
large,
but most studies
focus
only
on two or three of these dimensions.
Insofar as the
theory
of
boundary-work empha
sizes the
mutability
of
symbolic boundaries,
inattention to the entire
configuration
risks over
looking symbolic
boundaries that
displace
oth
ers.
Therefore,
the
primary goal
of this article
is to
produce
a
typology
of
symbolic boundary
configurations using
data on
multiple symbol
ic boundaries from countries in different
regions
of
Europe.
The
secondary goal
of this article is to iden
tify
new macro-level variables that can be used
to
explain
the
configuration
of
symbolic
bound
aries.
Although explanations
of variation in the
configuration
of
symbolic
boundaries routine
ly
cite
country-level phenomena,
the
compart
mentalization of the
boundary-work
literature
has
prohibited systematic analysis
of
historical,
demographic,
socioeconomic,
and institutional
variation
among
countries within and between
regions.
For
example,
most
comparisons
of
Western
European
countries focus on
citizenship
laws and
philosophies
of
integration,
but
they
neglect
the
demographic
and socioeconomic
factors
emphasized
in the literature on Southern
and Eastern
Europe. Conversely,
studies of
Southern and Eastern countries often overlook
the institutional factors central to the literature
on Western
Europe.
Below I
explore
the rela
tionship
between
my typology
and the four axes
of variation across countries identified above:
(1)
the sources and
timing
of
immigration, (2)
the size and
origin
of
immigrant groups
and
their
position
in the labor
market, (3) citizenship
and civic inclusion
policies,
and
(4) philosophies
of
integration.2
In this
way,
I
provide
the first
systematic analysis
of these variables in broad
cross-national
perspective
that can be used
by
future studies to
develop
a more
comprehensive
theory
of
boundary-work.
2
Part II of the Online
Supplement (on
the ASR Web
site:
http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2007/
toc061.html)
contains
analyses
of 21 additional
country-level
variables.
Table 5.
Comparative
Studies of
Symbolic
Boundaries
against Immigrants
in
Europe
Symbolic
Boundaries
Author(s)
Countries
Compared3 Analyzedb
Bovenkerk, Miles,
and Verbunt
Britain, France,
Netherlands Race
(1990)
Brubaker
(1992)
France, Germany Race, Religion, Language,
Culture
Lapeyronnie (1993)
Britain,
France
Race,
Culture
Wrench and Solomos
(1993)
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden,
Race
Netherlands
Ireland
(1994)
France,
Switzerland Human
Capital,
Race
Todd
(1994)
France, Britain, Germany, (United Race, Religion, Language,
Culture
States)
Wieviorka et al.
(1994)
France, Britain, Belgium, Italy Race, Religion,
Culture
Apap (1997) Italy, Spain
Human
Capital, Religion,
Race
Favell
(1998)
Britain,
France
Race, Culture, Language
Fetzer
(2000) France, Germany, (United States) Culture,
Human
Capital, Religion
Zolner
(2000)
Denmark,
France
Culture, Race, Language
Brubaker
(2001) France, Germany Language, Culture, Race, Religion
Mendoza
(2001) Spain, Portugal
Human
Capital, Language,
Culture
Phalet and
Orkeny (2001) Hungary,
Netherlands
Religion,
Race,
Human
Capital
Rath et al.
(2001) Belgium, Britain,
Netherlands
Religion
Triandafyllidou (2001) Greece, Italy, Spain, Britain, France, Religion, Race, Culture,
Germany
Kastoryano (2002) France, Germany, (United States) Religion,
Culture
Wallace
(2002) Poland, Hungary,
Czech
Republic,
Human
Capital, Race, Religion
Germany, Austria, (Slovakia)
Bleich
(2003) Britain,
France
Race, Language,
Culture
Garner
(2003) Ireland, Britain, (United States)
Race
Nyiri (2003) Poland, Hungary,
Czech
Republic, Race,
Human
Capital, Culture,
Slovenia, (Romania), (Slovakia), Language
(Belarus), (Russia)
Rydgren (2003) France,
Sweden
Race,
Culture
Sackman et al.
(2003) Germany, Netherlands,
Britain
Religion, Language,
Culture
Fetzer and
Soper (2004) Britain, France, Germany Religion
Koenig (2004) Britain, France, Germany Religion
Lentin
(2004) Britain, France,
Italy,
Ireland Race
Cesari and
McLoughlin (2005) Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Religion
Netherlands, Spain
a
Countries in
parentheses
are not included in
my study.
b
The vast
comparative
literature on social boundaries is not described in this table
(e.g.,
Alba
2005; Joppke 2005;
Soysal 1994).
MEASURES OF SYMBOLIC
BOUNDARIES
Data for this
study
are from the 2002/2003
round of the
European
Social
Survey (ESS),
a
cross-sectional,
multistage probability sample
of social attitudes
among people age
15 and
older in 21
European
countries. Because this
study
is
designed
to
probe
the
configuration
of
symbolic
boundaries
deployed by
native
popu
lations,
I
drop
all first- and
second-generation
immigrants
from the
sample.
In
addition,
I
exclude all
respondents
who indicated
they
are
members of an
ethnic
minority
in their
country.3
My
total
sample comprises 33,258
individuals
in 21
countries,
averaging
1,584
people per
country.
I derive measures of
symbolic
boundaries
from a
unique
set of
questions
in the ESS that
3
The
following
two
questions
were used to deter
mine
minority
status:
(1)
"Are
you
a member of a
minority group
in
your country?"
and
(2)
"Have
you
ever been discriminated
against
on the basis of
your
race/religion/ethnicity?"
ask
respondents
to evaluate a
hypothetical
immigrant. Respondents
were first asked:
"Please tell me how
important you
think each
of these
things
should be in
deciding
whether
someone
born,
brought up
and
living
outside
[country]
should be able to come and live here."
They
were then shown a card with the follow
ing
statements:
(1)
be
white, (2)
come
from a
Christian
background, (3) speak [one of]
the
official
languages
of
[country], (4)
be commit
ted to the
way
of life in
[country], (5)
have
good
educational
qualifications,
and
(6)
have work
skills that
[country]
needs.
Responses
were
coded
on a
10-point
Likert scale where '0' is
"extremely unimportant"
and' 10' is "extreme
ly important."
I refer to the six
symbolic
bound
aries measured in these
questions
as
race,
religion, language, culture, education,
and occu
pation.
The
"hypothetical immigrant"
module of the
ESS marks a considerable
improvement
over
previous
cross-national
surveys
of attitudes
toward
immigrants
in
Europe.
Whereas most
previous surveys
ask
respondents
to describe
their
feelings
toward
"immigrants," "immigrants
from outside
Europe,"
or "racial and ethnic
minorities,"
the ESS
questions
are
designed
to
capture important
variations within each of
these broad
categories. By disaggregating
atti
tudes toward
immigrants
into
multiple sym
bolic boundaries that are
compared
in the
boundary-work
literature
(see
Table
5),
the ESS
measures both the
intensity
and the form of
attitudes toward
immigrants.
It is thus
particu
larly
well suited to the conf
igurational approach
to
symbolic
boundaries
adopted
here. As with
all
survey-based
studies, however,
it is
possible
that ESS
respondents produced socially
desir
able
responses
to the
questions,
rather than the
intimate convictions that
might
be revealed
through ethnography.
This is
particularly
rele
vant for the
question
on race because the liter
ature demonstrates the
widespread
influence of
antiracist discourse in Western
Europe.
It
remains to be
determined, however, precisely
how much antiracism has
permeated
each coun
try (Lentin 2004) and,
more
importantly,
how
such
developments
have
shaped
the entire con
figuration
of
symbolic
boundaries in
response.
Table 6
presents descriptive
characteristics for
the six
symbolic
boundaries in each
country.
Language
and culture are
consistently among
the most
important symbolic
boundaries.
Conversely,
race is least
important
in all coun
tries,
although
in
varying degrees.
In
Luxembourg,
for
example,
the mean score for
racial
symbolic
boundaries is
.93,
but it is 4.12
in
Hungary. Religion
is
relatively
more
salient,
averaging
3.52 across all countries and
ranging
as
high
as 5.87 in Greece.
Symbolic
bound
aries based on human
capital (education
and
occupation) generally
fall between the most
important (language
and
culture)
and the least
important (race
and
religion) symbolic
bound
aries.
FUZZY-SET METHODOLOGY
Typologies
are
analytical
tools used to com
pare
cases?in this
case,
countries?with ideal
types
not observed
empirically.
In
practice,
however, many
of the
quantitative
methods used
to construct
typologies
create
mutually
exclu
sive
groups,
ignoring
the likelihood that
many
countries are in fact combinations of
multiple
types (Ragin 2000).
Traditional or
"crisp"
clus
ter
analysis,
for
example, ignores
countries "in
between"
types by forcing
them into the clus
ters
they
most
closely
resemble.
Although
this
is
inconsequential
for studies with
large sample
sizes,
failure to
identify
such cases
among
the
21 countries in this
study
risks misidentification
and
misinterpretation
of
typical symbolic
boundary configurations.
I address these issues
below
through
a combination of
"fuzzy-set"
techniques.
I use
"fuzzy
cluster
analysis" (FCA)
(Dimitriadou
et al.
2006)
to
produce
a
typolo
gy
of
symbolic boundary configurations
and
explore
its
relationship
to the
country-level
fac
tors above
using
measures of
"fuzzy
consisten
cy" (Ragin 2006).4
Crisp
cluster
analysis requires
that countries
belong
to one?and
only
one?group.
In con
trast,
FCA
assigns
countries
"membership
scores" that describe how much
they
resemble
multiple fuzzy
clusters or "sets." This is accom
plished by applying
a
"fuzzy
modifier" to the
traditional
c-means
clustering algorithm
(Dimitriadou
et al.
2006).
Consider the matrix
Xy
comprised
of 21 countries
(i)
and their mean
scores for the six
symbolic
boundaries above
4
For a detailed
comparison
of these
techniques
and
traditional or
"crisp" analyses
see the Online
Supplement.
Table 6. Mean Scores of Six
Symbolic
Boundaries
against Immigrants
in 21
European
Countries
Country
Race
Religion Language
Culture Education
Occupation
Austria 2.04 3.27 7.57 7.14 6.67 6.92
Belgium
2.26 2.71 6.99 8.25 6.09 6.25
Britain 2.39 3.26 7.40 7.51 6.29 6.87
Czech
Republic
3.64 3.69 6.29 8.24 6.33 7.42
Denmark 1.84 3.57 6.41 6.88 6.28 6.39
Finland 2.81 3.89 6.23 8.18 6.34 6.91
France 2.34 3.20 7.33 7.47 6.30 6.38
Germany
1.52 2.49 7.77 8.00 6.77 7.07
Greece 3.64 5.87 7.78 8.18 7.79 8.22
Hungary
4.12 4.69 7.68 8.95 6.83 8.13
Ireland 2.40 3.47 6.38 6.68 6.12 6.82
Italy
2.55 4.44 5.77 7.17 5.73 6.52
Luxembourg
.93 2.01 8.45 7.95 6.19 6.67
Netherlands 1.90 2.67 7.42 7.90 5.58 6.05
Norway
2.27 3.39 6.25 6.57 5.10 5.89
Poland 2.95 4.79 6.82 6.45 6.38 6.92
Portugal
2.94 3.83 6.00 7.08 6.08 7.47
Slovenia 2.95 3.45 7.50 7.98 6.32 7.21
Spain
2.94 3.91 5.92 7.35 6.09 6.67
Sweden 1.31 2.32 4.35 7.73 4.48 4.84
Switzerland 1.55 2.92 6.15 7.25 6.13 5.98
Mean
(all countries)
2.44 3.52 6.78 7.57 6.19 6.74
Min .93 2.01 4.35 6.45 4.48 4.84
Max 4.12 5.87 8.45 8.95 7.79 8.22
SD_180_191_.94_.65_.65_.76
Note: 0
=
extremely unimportant;
10
=
extremely important.
(j).5
When
applied
to matrix
Xtj,
the
fuzzy
c
means
algorithm produces
a matrix of mem
bership
scores M for 21 countries and k
sets,
and
akx 6 matrix of "set cenrroids" C that describes
the
configuration
of
symbolic
boundaries in
each
fuzzy
set. This is
accomplished by
mini
mizing
the
objective
function:
n k
(M,C)
=
X^fjdtj i
J
where
uij
is the
membership
coefficient of coun
try
/ in set
j,
and
dtj
is the Euclidean distance
between observation / and center
j.
The
researcher must
specify
a
value
greater
than 1
for k and m, the fuzziness index.6 The function
51
performed fuzzy clustering
of the entire distri
bution to assess bias from
kurtosis,
but it did not
yield
substantially
different results
(available
from the
author).
6
Here a value of m
=
2 is
chosen,
following
Bezdek
and Pal
(1995)
who show that values lower than 1.5
and
higher
than 2.5
produce
unstable results in most
is constrained such that each
country's
mem
bership
cannot be
negative,
and the total mem
bership
across all sets is normalized. The
strength
of
membership
scores
increases from
0 to
1,
and the sum of each
country's
member
ship
scores
equals
1.
Unlike factor
scores,
FCA
membership
scores
describe
relationships
between
cases,
not vari
ables.
Therefore,
countries with
strong
mem
bership
in a
given
set axe
prototypical,
whereas
those with weak
membership
in all sets are sim
ply atypical.
The characteristics of each set are
identified
through inspection
of the cluster cen
troids. A
country's membership
scores describe
how
closely
its
configuration
of
symbolic
boundaries resembles the
configuration
of clus
ter centroids in each set.
By plotting
member
applications.
I used the Xie-Beni index to determine
the
appropriate
number of sets
(k).
Different values
of m and k
produced very
similar results
(available
from the
author).
I used the R software to conduct all
analyses.
ship
scores in multidimensional
space,
one can
assess how exclusive each set is.
Moreover,
one
can
easily identify
countries in between sets as
well. The
"crisp" clustering
solution can be
deduced for reference
simply by grouping
coun
tries
according
to their
strongest membership.
The
range
of
membership
scores within each
crisp
set,
as well as the amount of
overlap
between
them,
reveals the
integrity
of the
crisp
clustering
solution. In most
applications,
there
is considerable variation within and between
crisp
clusters. In most
cases,
FCA therefore
provides
more
precise
measures of structure in
data than
crisp
cluster
analysis.
Fuzzy
sets cannot be
analyzed
in tandem
with
non-fuzzy
variables unless the latter are
transformed into
fuzzy
sets as well. I calibrate
the
country-level
variables
presented
in the
background
sections into
fuzzy
sets
using
the
method
proposed by Ragin (forthcoming)
and
detailed in the Online
Supplement.
Even after
all variables are transformed into
fuzzy
sets,
standard correlational
techniques
cannot be
used to
explore
the
relationship
between
fuzzy
sets
(Ragin 2006).
This is because correlations
describe the covariation of
variables,
whereas
the
fuzzy-set approach
asks whether cases are
subsets of one another. Consider
Figure
1,
which
describes the
relationship
between two
fuzzy
sets: X and Y. The
figure
shows that member
ship
in X is almost
always greater
than mem
bership
in Y. Traditional correlational
techniques,
however,
would not reveal a
signif
icant correlation between the two because the
points
in the lower
right-hand
corner are con
sidered
error. In the
fuzzy approach,
however,
a consistent subset
relationship
exists between
X and
Y; meaning
that
membership
in X is
almost
always
a
necessary
condition for Y7 The
points
in the lower
right-hand
corner are sim
ply
considered
cases in which
membership
in Y
must be
explained through
additional
pathways
other than X.
7
For a discussion of the distinction between nec
essary
and sufficient conditions see
Ragin (2000).
I
calculated
only necessary
conditions due to
space
constraints,
as well as the
exploratory goals
of this
study.
More
rigorous analysis
would
explore
combi
nations of
necessary
and sufficient conditions as
well as their set-theoretic
"coverage" (Ragin 2006).
As
Ragin (2006) shows,
the
consistency
with
which one set is a
necessary
condition for anoth
er can be calculated as follows:
Consistency (Y< X)
=
^(miniY.Xd)/^)
This formula measures not
only
the
frequency
of X
being greater
than
Y,
but also the
magni
tude of this difference.
Large
inconsistencies are
penalized,
but "near misses" are also acknowl
edged
as such. Scores .80 and
higher
indicate
increasingly
consistent
relationships. Below,
I
calculate the
consistency
of the
country-level
variables
(from
the
background sections)
with
the sets
produced by
FCA to
develop hypothe
ses to
explain
the
configuration
of
symbolic
boundaries at the macro level.
THREE SYMBOLIC BOUNDARY
CONFIGURATIONS
I identified three
typical symbolic boundary
configurations
via FCA.8 Table 7 describes the
value of each
boundary
for Sets
A, B,
and C cen
tered around the mean for all countries.
Set A is characterized
by: (1) stronger
than
average
racial and
religious symbolic
bound
aries, (2)
weaker than
average
cultural and lin
guistic symbolic
boundaries, (3) slightly
weaker
than
average
educational
symbolic
boundaries,
and
(4) slightly stronger
than
average occupa
tional
symbolic
boundaries.
Set B is characterized
by: (1) stronger
than
average linguistic
and cultural
symbolic
bound
aries, (2)
weaker than
average religious
and
racial
symbolic
boundaries, (3) slightly stronger
than
average
educational
symbolic
boundaries,
and
(4) slightly
weaker than
average occupa
tional
symbolic
boundaries.
Set C is characterized
by: (1)
weaker than
average
scores on
every symbolic boundary,
(2) extremely
weak racial
symbolic
boundaries,
(3) extremely
weak education and
occupation
symbolic
boundaries,
and
(4)
weaker than aver
age religious symbolic
boundaries
(but slight
ly stronger
than those in Set
B).
Figure
2 is a three-dimensional
scatter-plot
of
each
scores in Sets
A, B,
8
For further details on cluster
validity,
see Part I
of the Online
Supplement.
1.0-1
0.9
0.8
0.7
I
0.6
.g
?
0.5
-
g
0.4
0.3
-
#
0.2-
%
0.1- ?
%
%
0.0 -\-\-1-1-1-1-1-1-\-1-1
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Membership
in Set X
Figure
1.
Example
of a Subset
Relationship
Table 7. Characteristics of Three Sets of
Symbolic Boundary Configurations
Race
Religion Language
Culture Education
Occupation
Mean
(All Countries)
2.44 3.52 6.78 7.57 6.19 6.74
Fuzzy
Sets Cluster Centroids
SetA +.43 +.42 -.68 -.37 -.16 +.16
SetB -.41 -.57 +.67 +.15 +.16 -.10
SetC_-.75 -.46_-M_Il57_-M_-.91
Note: Cluster centroids are centered around the mean for all countries.
and C.9 The three
ellipses depict
the
crisp
clus
tering
solution for reference.
Spain, Portugal,
Italy,
Finland, Poland,
the Czech
Republic,
and
Ireland most
closely
resemble Set A
(in
order of
the
strength
of their
membership). Britain,
9
See Table S2 in the Online
Supplement
for a
complete
list of
membership
scores.
France, Austria, Germany, Belgium,
the
Netherlands,
Luxembourg,
and Slovenia most
closely
resemble Set B.
Finally, Switzerland,
Norway, Denmark,
and Sweden most
closely
resemble Set C. While
Spain, Britain,
and
Switzerland are
nearly prototypical
of Sets
A,
B,
and
C,
respectively,
countries closer to the ori
gin
of the axes
(e.g.,
Greece and
Hungary)
are
scarcely
related to the three sets. Most countries
iBB_-__9____-___r:"'
^
"
""
M__^_^__i_itt___. -jjJJJ^^IfBPP^
__B_H______^__^_HP^ ^^^^^i^__^^^^Hn__^_^_H__H_S-L.
jJl____________P^^*
'
*
-
^
"VH____^_BP^^'
*
f^BBP^^
*
--. .iiiiiiiii.
Figure
2.
Fuzzy Membership
Scores in Three Sets
Notes: A
scores describe how
closely
its
configuration
of
symbolic
boundaries resembles the
sets described in Table 7. Countries with
high membership
in a
given
set are
prototypical;
those with low member
ship
are
simply atypical. Ellipses depict
the
"crisp" clustering
solution: the
major
diameter or
"length"
describes
the
range
of
membership
scores within each
crisp
cluster whereas the minor diameter or "width" describes
overlap
between them.
fall somewhere in
between,
and several are best
described as in-between sets. The
Netherlands,
for
example,
has
significant membership
in
both Set B
(.56)
and Set C
(.28). Likewise,
Ireland has
significant membership
in Sets A
(.51)
and C
(.29)
and Slovenia has
significant
membership
in Sets B
(.50)
and A
(.25).
In
sum,
FCA shows
significant
variation within and
between sets that would not be
recognized by
crisp
cluster
analysis.
EXPLORING THE CONFIGURATIONS
Perhaps
the most
striking
feature of
Figure
2 is
the
geographic pattern
of countries across the
three sets. Countries that most
closely
resemble
Set A
(Spain, Portugal, Italy,
Finland, Poland,
Czech
Republic, Ireland, Greece,
and
Hungary)
are each located on the
periphery
of
Europe.
Set
B countries
(Britain,
France, Austria, Germany,
Belgium,
the
Netherlands,
Luxembourg,
and
Slovenia)
are
geographically
continuous in the
"core" of Western
Europe?if
one
ignores
the
English
Channel?and all but one of the Set C
countries
(Switzerland, Norway,
Denmark,
and
Sweden)
are
part
of Scandinavia. The in
between countries
roughly
follow this
pattern
as
well. Slovenia sits between the "core" coun
tries of Set B and the
"peripheral"
countries of
Set A. Ireland sits between Sets A and
C,
and
the Netherlands sits between Sets B and C.
Because a
theory
of
boundary-work
does not
yet exist,
a
variety
of different
hypotheses
could
be
developed
to further
explain
the FCA results.
Below I
develop hypotheses by exploring
the
consistency
of Sets
A, B,
and C with the four
country-level
factors discussed in the back
ground
sections:
(1)
the sources and
timing
of
immigration, (2)
the size and
origin
of immi
grant groups
and their
position
in the labor mar
ket,
(3) citizenship
and civic inclusion
policies,
and
(4) philosophies
of
integration.
Consistency Calculations
Table 8 describes the
consistency
between Sets
A, B,
and C and the four
fuzzy
sets that describe
increases in
migration by
decade
proportional
to the total
population.
Set C is
highly
consis
tent with countries that
experienced high
net
migration
between 1960 and
1970,
1980 and
1990,
and 1990 to 2000. Set B is
highly
con
sistent with
high
net
migration
between 1960
and 1970 and consistent with
high
net
migration
between 1980 and 1990.
Although consistency
increases between Set A and net
migration by
decade,
it never reaches the .80 benchmark.
Returning
to Table
1,
one finds that the Set A
countries
(Spain, Portugal, Italy, Finland, Poland,
Czech
and
Hungary)
were all once countries of
emigration
and
only
recently experienced large-scale immigration.
In
contrast,
the countries in Sets B and C all
expe
rienced sizeable
postcolonial
or
guest
worker
migration
in the decades after World War II.
Given the
timing
of
migration,
it is not sur
prising
that Sets B and C are consistent with
countries that have
large immigrant populations
(proportional
to the total
population),
while Set
A is not
(see
Table
8).
Set B is consistent with
countries that have
from the Middle East and North
Africa,
sub
Saharan
Africa,
South and East
Asia,
and
Oceania. Set C is consistent with countries that
have
from all
regions except
the Caribbean and Oceania. Set
Table 8.
Consistency
of
Country-Level
Sets with Sets
A, B,
and C
Symbolic Boundary Configurations
_Set A_SetB_Set
C
Timing
of
Immigration (N
=
21)
1960 to 1970
.590 .932** .938**
1970 to 1980 .630 .719 .684
1980tol990 .587 .851* .942**
1990 to 2000 .743 .766 .966**
Characteristics of
Immigrant Population (N
=
20)
Total
Immigrant Population
.541 .891 .904**
EU-15
.536 .754 .896*
Europe (non-EU-15)
.646 .684 .946**
Middle East & North Africa .566 .880* .900**
Sub-Saharan Africa .680 .812* .906**
South Asia
.563 .818* .926**
East Asia
.526 .825* .927**
Latin America .704 .622 .883*
North America
.500 .678 .929**
Caribbean
.500 .637 .673
Oceania
.466 .558 .756
Immigrant
Percent of Labor Force3 .592 .833* .863*
Tertiary
Education15 .906** .557 .872*
Change
in
Immigrant
Percent of Labor Force
(1998
to
2003)b
.895* .641 .714
Civic
Citizenship
Policies
(N
=
15)
Antidiscrimination
.851* .642 .770
Naturalization
.807* .756 .827*
Family
Reunion
.689 .840* .742
Long-Term
Residence
.759 .764 .908**
Labor Market
Inclusion_.873*_^44_.754
aN=19
bN=18
*
Consistent
(.80 Benchmark)
**
Highly
Consistent
(.90 Benchmark)
A is not consistent with countries that have
large immigrant populations regardless
of
region.
Sets B and C are consistent with coun
tries in which
immigrants
make
up
a consider
able
part
of the labor
market,
while Set A is not.
Sets A and C are consistent with countries in
which a substantial
part
of the
immigrant pop
ulation holds
tertiary
education.
Only
Set A is
consistent with countries that
experienced
an
abrupt
increase in the
percentage
of
immigrants
in the labor force between 1998 and 2003.
Table 8
presents
the
consistency
of sets
A, B,
and C and five
fuzzy
sets
generated
from
Geddes and
colleagues' (2005)
Civic
Citizenship
Index. Because the index is not
available for the Czech
Republic, Hungary,
Norway, Poland, Slovenia,
or Switzerland
(see
Table
4),
these results should be considered
highly
tentative. Set A is consistent with coun
tries that have
generous antidiscrimination,
nat
uralization,
and labor market inclusion
policies.
Set B is
only
consistent with countries that have
generous family
reunion
policies.
Set C is con
sistent with countries that have
generous
natu
ralization
policies
and
highly
consistent with
countries that have
generous long-term
resi
dence
policies.
Philosophies of Integration in
Context
Surprisingly,
the results
suggest
that official
philosophies
of
integration
do not
correspond
to the
configuration
of
symbolic
boundaries
deployed by
the
general public.
France, Britain,
and
Germany's philosophies
of
integration
are
compared
in the literature more often than those
of
any
other combination of countries
(see
Table
5). Figure 2, however, suggests
the
configura
tion of
symbolic
boundaries used
by
the
gener
al
public
in these three countries is
nearly
identical. All three countries are
closely
affili
ated with Set
B,
which is characterized
by strong
linguistic
and cultural
symbolic
boundaries and
weak racial and
religious
boundaries. While
this
configuration
mirrors the
emphasis
on
assimilation in French
republicanism^
it runs
counter to the
pluralist
tenets of British multi
cultural race relations. The results are even less
compatible
with
Germany's
historical
emphasis
on
ancestry, despite
a modest
growth
of assim
ilationist rhetoric in
government
discourse
described in recent studies
(Brubaker
2001;
Carrera
2006). Moreover,
there is no discernable
pattern
across Sets A and C
apart
from the lack
of
philosophies
of
integration among
most coun
tries that resemble Set A.
DISCUSSION
Set A: New Immigration Countries on
the European Periphery
Countries most
closely
affiliated with Set A
(Spain, Portugal, Italy,
Finland, Poland,
Czech
and
Hungary)
share
the
following
characteristics:
(1) They
are locat
ed on the
periphery
of the
European
Union.
(2)
They
were all once sources of
emigration
and
only recently began receiving
considerable
immigration. Nevertheless, (3) immigrants
remain a small
proportion
of the overall
popu
lation.
Therefore, (4)
discourses about immi
grant integration
are
relatively unsophisticated
compared
with those in the old
immigration
countries of Western and Northern
Europe.
It remains to be determined
why
racial and
religious symbolic
boundaries are
stronger
than
average
in Set A
(see
Table
7).
One
hypothesis
is that
phenotype
and
religious
dress
provide
visual cues about
group membership
that are
particularly conspicuous
in new
immigration
countries,
precisely
because of their homo
geneity.
These cues
may
limit
positive
contact
between
groups, allowing
racial and
religious
stereotypes
to
go unchallenged (Allport 1958).
An
abrupt
increase in the
visibility
of a minor
ity population may
also
provoke perceptions
of
"group
threat"
(Blumer 1958),
as
majority group
members come to realize that certain
privileges
and status are attached to their race or
religion.
These
perceptions
may
be reinforced
by
eco
nomic
insecurity
as
well,
and Set A is consis
tent with countries that
experienced
an influx of
immigrants
into their labor markets in recent
years.10
The results
might
also
suggest
that
antiracist discourse has not
yet permeated
the
periphery
of
Europe
as
thoroughly
as it has
Europe's
core. Note that these
hypotheses
are not
10
This
may
also
explain why occupational sym
bolic boundaries
are
stronger
than
average
in Set A.
See the Online
Supplement
for a more
comprehen
sive
application
of
"group
threat" and "contact" the
ory following Quillian (1995).
mutually
exclusive. For
example, positive
con
tact
may
limit
perceptions
of
group
threat or
facilitate the diffusion of antiracist discourse.
Nevertheless,
additional research is needed to
explore
these
hypotheses
in different combina
tions and to
provide
alternative
explanations
for the
strength
of racial and
religious symbol
ic boundaries in Set A countries.
Set R: Old Immigration Countries in
the Core of Western Europe
Countries most
closely
affiliated with Set B
(Britain, France, Austria,
Germany, Belgium,
the
Netherlands,
Luxembourg,
and
Slovenia)
share
the
following
characteristics:
(1) They
are locat
ed in the core of Western
Europe (except
Slovenia). (2) They
received substantial immi
gration
in the decades after World War
I,
either
from
guest
worker
agreements
with countries on
the
European periphery (including Turkey
and
North
Africa)
or from former colonies. Because
of
this, (3) immigrants
now constitute a
sizeable
portion
of the overall
population,
and
(4) pub
lic discourse about
immigration
has evolved
over
decades and is therefore more
sophisticat
ed than that of the new
immigration
countries.
The
emphasis
on
language
and culture in Set
B countries
may
result from natives'
acceptance
of the
permanency
of
immigration.
As second
generations
of nonwhite and non-Christian
immigrants
come of
age,
racial and
religious
distinctions
may
not
only
become less con
spicuous
but also less
politically
tenable. While
public
discourse
necessarily
shifts from the
accommodation to the
integration
of
immigrant
populations,
natives
may
become more con
cerned about the
longevity
of their
linguistic
and
cultural
identity.
Or,
natives
may
realize that
language
and culture
guarantee
the
privileges
of
group
status that were
previously "protected" by
race or
religion.
These attitudes
may
be rein
forced
by
recent
reports
of
"segmented"
or
"downward" assimilation of
second-generation
immigrants (e.g.,
Alba
2005;
Crul and
Vermeulen
2003; Silberman, Alba,
and Fournier
2007),
whose
difficulty crossing
social bound
aries
may
inhibit their
"symbolic" integration
as
well. There is
growing controversy,
for exam
ple,
about "reactive
ethnicity" among
second
generation
Turks in
Germany (Diehl
and Schnell
2006)
and their North African
counterparts
in
France
(Beaud
and Pialoux
2003).
Regardless
of the extent of
second-generation
disenchantment,
the
"integration question"
is
perceived
as a common "social
problem"
across
most Set B countries
(e.g.,
Tissot
2007).
With
the
exception
of
Slovenia,
Set B countries are
long-standing participants
in discussions about
the harmonization of
immigration policy
at the
EU
level,
and
they
are
highly
aware of each
other's
integration strategies (Carrera 2006).n
This
may
have
produced convergence
in the
configuration
of
symbolic
boundaries
deployed
by
the
general public,
because these discus
sions are
constrained within a universal human
rights
discourse that
stigmatizes group-based
exclusion but sanctions individual-level exclu
sion based on
language, culture,
and human
capital (Joppke 2005). Nevertheless,
addition
al research is needed to
explain why
such
supra
national discourse
appears
to have
permeated
Set B countries more
deeply
than countries in
Set A.
Set C: Accommodating Isolationists
Countries most
closely
affiliated with Set C
(Switzerland, Norway, Denmark,
and
Sweden)
share the
following
characteristics:
(1) They
are
located in Scandinavia
(except Switzerland).
(2) They
each received considerable
migration
after World War
II,
although they
had no
colonies from which to recruit. Because these
countries
initially
had
relatively
small
popula
tions, (3) immigrants
from a
variety
of differ
ent
regions
constitute a
relatively large
proportion
of the overall
population. Finally,
(4) they
are
politically
isolated from the core of
Western
Europe,
and discourse about immi
grant integration
has evolved
independently
(Runbolm 1994;
Wimmer
2002).
As
above,
the weak racial and
religious sym
bolic boundaries characteristic of Set C coun
tries could be
explained
as
resulting
from
strong
antiracist
discourse, positive
contact
among
natives and
non-European immigrants,
or the
absence of
competition
between them. None of
these
hypotheses, however,
explain why
racial
linguistic
and cultural
symbolic
boundaries are
far weaker in Set C countries than in all others.
Here,
deeper
historical
analysis may
be war
1 x
I am indebted to an
anonymous
reviewer for
pro
posing
this
hypothesis.
ranted.
Tagil (1995),
for
instance,
shows that
intergroup
differences were
accommodated in
the
early history
of Scandinavian countries to
provide stability against
the threat of cultural
ly homogenous
rivals. This was also true of
Switzerland,
where
geistige Landesverteidigung
(spiritual
defense of the
country)
united dis
parate linguistic
and
religious groups
into a sin
gle republic
in the face of threats from its more
powerful neighbors.12
In
contrast,
linguistic
and cultural differenti
ation was central to the
nation-building
strate
gies
of
many
Set B countries.
Consider,
for
example,
the Herderian tradition in
Germany
(Calhoun 1993)
or France's virulent
"Anglophobia,"
which Britain
repaid
in kind
(Greenfeld 1992). Likewise,
race and
religion
were
particularly important
distinctions in the
nation-building strategies
of several countries on
the
European periphery
that defined themselves
against
the threat of
non-European
and non
Christian
empires.
This line of
reasoning
builds on Gellner's
(1983) theory
of
nationalism,
which
suggests
that different
components
of
group identity
become salient based on threats from external
groups.
When "human chasms" such as race or
religion
do not
separate
insiders from
outsiders,
Gellner's
theory predicts
that
linguistic
and cul
tural boundaries become the
primary
mecha
nism of
intergroup
exclusion. While it is not
clear whether
European publics today
are aware
that such
processes might
affect their attitudes
toward
immigrants,
the national self-under
standings produced during
nation
building may
be
path dependent.
As
many
Western
European
countries forced their
language
and culture on
colonies,
Scandinavian
countries,
for
example,
condemned them for
doing
so
(Z0lner 2000)
and
welcomed a
disproportionate
number of
refugees
from those colonies.13 In this
way,
Gellner's
theory
is not
incompatible
with the
other
hypotheses developed
above. For
instance,
historical
emphasis
on
accommodating
dis
parate groups may
have
encouraged positive
12
Note that the Netherlands and
Belgium adopt
ed similar
nation-building strategies.
While
they
are
most
closely
affiliated with Set
B,
their second clos
est affiliation is with Set C.
13
Part II of the Online
Supplement
shows that
Set C is
highly
consistent with
large refugee popu
lations.
contact between natives and
immigrants
or
reduced
perceptions
of threat between them.
Or the coincidence of these national self-under
standings
with international antiracist discourse
may
have rendered ethnocentric attitudes less
politically
tenable than elsewhere.
Again,
much
additional research is needed to
explore
these
hypotheses
more
rigorously.
Directions for Future Research
To be
sure,
the
configuration
of
symbolic
boundaries is but one of
many
factors that
shape
the
integration
of
immigrants
into host soci
eties. While the socioeconomic and
legal seg
regation
of
immigrants
cannot be
ignored,
neither can the role of
symbolic
boundaries in
creating
and
maintaining
social boundaries.
Due to the cross-sectional nature of the
data,
it
is not
possible
to establish whether the
config
urations of
symbolic
boundaries revealed above
are the
product
or the source of social
inequal
ity.
While it is
likely
that
causality
works in
both
directions,
longitudinal
data and historical
case studies are needed to
explore my hypothe
ses in
greater
detail and in different combina
tions. In
addition, ethnography
and
in-depth
qualitative
research are needed to further ana
lyze
the content of these
symbolic
boundaries
across different situations. For
example,
it is
possible
that
linguistic
and cultural
symbolic
boundaries are used
publicly
to mask
private
racism or
Islamophobia.
This
study provides
new theoretical and
methodological
tools for the
study
of
boundary
work. I
argue
that
treating immigrants
as a sin
gle out-group neglects important
cross-national
variation in the
conceptual
distinctions used
by
natives to create notions of "us" and "them." The
typology
of
symbolic
boundaries
presented
above
provides
much needed context for
previ
ous
comparisons
of two or three Western
European
countries and identifies new variations
in other
regions
of
Europe.
This discussion also
identifies new
historical, demographic,
and
socioeconomic variables that
appear
to be more
promising
in
explaining
the
logic
of
boundary
work than the
philosophies
of
integration
emphasized
in the literature.
Together,
these
contributions constitute
a
preliminary step
toward a
theory
of
boundary-work
that must be
explored
more
rigorously by
future studies in
Europe
and
beyond.
Christopher
A. Bail is a PhD Candidate in the
Department of Sociology
at Harvard
University
and
a Doctoral Fellow in the
Multidisciplinary Program
on
Inequality
and Social
Policy
at the
Kennedy
School
of
Government. His other research
explores
the con
nection between
symbolic
boundaries and collective
violence,
the
global diffusion of
culture,
and the
pol
itics
ofantiracism
in cross-national
perspective.
He
is an
affiliate of
the Weatherhead Center
for
International
Affairs
and the Minda de
Gunzburg
Center
for European
Studies.
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The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries against Immigrants in Europe

Author(s): Christopher A. Bail

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