FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 98107. August 18, 1997]

BENJAMIN C. JUCO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and NATIONAL HOUSING
CORPORATION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J .:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 14, 1991, which reversed the Decision
dated May 21, 1990 of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent National
Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. On May 14,
1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft
and/or malversation of public funds.
On March 25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC
with the Department of Labor.
On September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case.
[1]

Petitioner then elevated the case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on
December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
[2]

Dissatisfied with the decision of the NLRC, respondent NHC appealed before this
Court and on January 17, 1985, we rendered a decision, the dispositive portion thereof
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the
respondent National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Labor Arbiter dismissing the case before it for lack of jurisdiction is
REINSTATED.
[3]

On January 6, 1989, petitioner filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint
for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction.
[4]

On February 6, 1989, respondent NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the case.
[5]

On April 11, 1989, the Civil Service Commission issued an order dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It ratiocinated that:
The Board finds the comment and/or motion to dismiss meritorious. It was not
disputed that NHC is a government corporation without an original charter but
organized/created under the Corporate Code.
Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies
of the government, including government owned and controlled corporations with
original charters. (underscoring supplied)
From the aforequoted constitutional provision, it is clear that respondent NHC is not
within the scope of the civil service and is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this
board. Moreover, it is pertinent to state that the 1987 Constitution was ratified and
became effective on February 2, 1987.
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction, the instant complaint is hereby dismissed.
[6]

On April 28, 1989, petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a complaint for illegal
dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent NHC.
[7]

On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC thru Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled that
petitioner was illegally dismissed from his employment by respondent as there was
evidence in the record that the criminal case against him was purely fabricated,
prompting the trial court to dismiss the charges against him. Hence, he concluded that
the dismissal was illegal as it was devoid of basis, legal or factual.
He further ruled that the complaint is not barred by prescription considering that the
period from which to reckon the reglementary period of four years should be from the
date of the receipt of the decision of the Civil Service Commission promulgated on April
11, 1989. He also ratiocinated that:
It appears x x x complainant filed the complaint for illegal dismissal with the Civil
Service Commission on January 6, 1989 and the same was dismissed on April 11,
1989 after which on April 28, 1989, this case was filed by the complainant. Prior to
that, this case was ruled upon by the Supreme Court on January 17, 1985 which
enjoined the complainant to go to the Civil Service Commission which in fact,
complainant did. Under the circumstances, there is merit on the contention that the
running of the reglementary period of four (4) years was suspended with the filing of
the complaint with the said Commission. Verily, it was not the fault of the respondent
for failing to file the complaint as alleged by the respondent but due to, in the words
of the complainant, a legal knot that has to be untangled.
[8]

Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of the
complainant as illegal and ordering the respondent to immediately reinstate him to his
former position without loss of seniority rights with full back wages inclusive of
allowance and to his other benefits or equivalent computed from the time it is
withheld from him when he was dismissed on March 27, 1977, until actually
reinstated.
[9]

On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March
14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the decision of Labor
Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
[10]

The primordial issue that confronts us is whether or not public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the
Labor Code.
Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and /or controlled
corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code.
Hence,
Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided:
"The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including
employees of government-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations x x x.
The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other hand provided:
The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of
the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Although we had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation v. Juco,
[11]
that
employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by
special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed
by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by
the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the said Constitution now provides:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivision, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporations
with original charter. (Article IX-B, Section 2[1])
In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations
Commission,
[12]
we had the occasion to apply the present Constitution in deciding
whether or not the employees of NASECO are covered by the Civil Service Law or the
Labor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution
was still in effect. We ruled that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of
NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the
Constitution in place at the time of the decision. Furthermore, we ruled that the new
phrase with original charter means that government-owned and controlled
corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from
corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been
organized under the general incorporation stature and a subsidiary of the National
Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine
National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission.
We see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling in the aforesaid case.
In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned
corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise
known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its
shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the
Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The
government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance
System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the
National Investment and Development Corporation and the Peoples Homesite and
Housing Corporation.
[13]
Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under
act 1459, the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-
owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the
Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in recent case of Trade Union of the
Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National Housing Corporation,
[14]
where we
held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and
Employment, it being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an
original charter. Furthermore, we also held that the workers or employees of the NHC
(now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees organization and
that there is no impediment to the holding of a certification election among them as they
are covered by the Labor Code.
Thus, the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction
because the rule now is that the Civil Service now covers only government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
[15]
Having been incorporated under the
Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are governed by the Labor Code and
come under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.
One final point. Petitioners have been tossed from one forum to another for a
simple illegal dismissal case. It is but apt that we put an end to his dilemma in the
interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR-04-02036089 dated March
14, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 21,
1990 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-75038 August 23, 1993
ELIAS VILLUGA, RENATO ABISTADO, JILL MENDOZA, ANDRES ABAD, BENJAMIN
BRIZUELA, NORLITO LADIA, MARCELO AGUILAN, DAVID ORO, NELIA BRIZUELA,
FLORA ESCOBIDO, JUSTILITA CABANIG, and DOMINGO SAGUIT, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) and BROAD
STREET TAILORING and/or RODOLFO ZAPANTA, respondents.
Balguma, Macasaet & Associates for petitioners.
Teresita Gandionco Oledan for private respondents.

NOCON, J .:
A basic factor underlying the exercise of rights and the filing of claims for benefits under the
Labor Code and other presidential issuances or labor legislations is the status and nature of
one's employment. Whether an employer-employee relationship exist and whether such
employment is managerial in character or that of a rank and file employee are primordial
considerations before extending labor benefits. Thus, petitioners in this case seek a
definitive ruling on the status and nature of their employment with Broad Street Tailoring
and pray for the nullification of the resolution dated May 12, 1986 of the National Labor
Relations Commissions in NLRC Case No. RB-IV- 21558-78-T affirming the decision of
Labor Arbiter Ernilo V. Pealosa dated May 28, 1979, which held eleven of them as
independent contractors and the remaining one as employee but of managerial rank.
The facts of the case shows that petitioner Elias Villuga was employed as cutter in the
tailoring shop owned by private respondent Rodolfo Zapanta and known as Broad Street
Tailoring located at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. As cutter, he was paid a
fixed monthly salary of P840.00 and a monthly transportation allowance of P40.00. In
addition to his work as cutter, Villuga was assigned the chore of distributing work to the
shop's tailors or sewers when both the shop's manager and assistant manager would be
absent. He saw to it that their work conformed with the pattern he had prepared and if not,
he had them redone, repaired or resewn.
The other petitioners were either ironers, repairmen and sewers. They were paid a fixed
amount for every item ironed, repaired or sewn, regardless of the time consumed in
accomplishing the task. Petitioners did not fill up any time record since they did not observe
regular or fixed hours of work. They were allowed to perform their work at home especially
when the volume of work, which depended on the number of job orders, could no longer be
coped up with.
From February 17 to 22, 1978, petitioner Villuga failed to report for work allegedly due to
illness. For not properly notifying his employer, he was considered to have abandoned his
work.
In a complaint dated March 27, 1978, filed with the Regional Office of the Department of
Labor, Villuga claimed that he was refused admittance when he reported for work after his
absence, allegedly due to his active participation in the union organized by private
respondent's tailors. He further claimed that he was not paid overtime pay, holiday pay,
premium pay for work done on rest days and holidays, service incentive leave pay and 13th
month pay.
Petitioners Renato Abistado, Jill Mendoza, Benjamin Brizuela and David Oro also claimed
that they were dismissed from their employment because they joined the Philippine Social
Security Labor Union (PSSLU). Petitioners Andres Abad, Norlito Ladia, Marcelo Aguilan,
Nelia Brizuela, Flora Escobido, Justilita Cabaneg and Domingo Saguit claimed that they
stopped working because private respondents gave them few pieces of work to do after
learning of their membership with PSSLU. All the petitioners laid claims under the different
labor standard laws which private respondent allegedly violated.
On May 28, 1979, Labor Arbiter Ernilo V. Pealosa rendered a decision ordering the
dismissal of the complaint for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal and other money
claims except petitioner Villuga's claim for 13th month pay for the years 1976, 1977 and
1980. The dispositive portion of the decision states as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Broad Street Tailoring
and/or Rodolfo Zapanta are hereby ordered to pay complainant Elias Villuga
the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT PESOS AND
SIXTY-SIX CENTAVOS (P1,248.66) representing his 13th month pay for the
years 1976, 1977 and 1978. His other claims in this case are hereby denied
for lack of merit.
The complaint insofar as the other eleven (11) complainants are concerned should be, as
it is hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
1

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the questioned decision in a
resolution dated May 12, 1986, the dispositive portion of which states as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is, as it is hereby
AFFIRMED, and the appeal dismissed.
2

Presiding Commissioner Guillermo C. Medina merely concurred in the result while
Commissioner Gabriel M. Gatchalian rendered a dissenting opinion which states as follows:
I am for upholding employer-employee relationship as argued by the complainants before
the Labor Arbiter and on appeal. The further fact that the proposed decision recognizes
complainant's status as piece-rate worker all the more crystallizes employer-employee
relationship the benefits prayed for must be granted.
3

Hence, petitioners filed this instant certiorari case on the following grounds:
1. That the respondent National Labor Relations Commission abused its
discretion when it ruled that petitioner/complainant, Elias Villuga falls within
the category of a managerial employee;
2. . . . when it ruled that the herein petitioners were not dismissed by reason
of their union activities;
3. . . . when it ruled that petitioners Andres Abad, Benjamin Brizuela, Norlito
Ladia, Marcelo Aguilan, David Oro, Nelia Brizuela, Flora Escobido, Justilita
Cabaneg and Domingo Saguit were not employees of private respondents
but were contractors.
4. . . . when it ruled that petitioner Elias Villuga is not entitled to overtime pay
and services for Sundays and Legal Holidays; and
5. . . . when it failed to grant petitioners their respective claims under the provisions of
P.D. Nos. 925, 1123 and 851.
4

Under Rule 1, Section 2(c), Book III of the Implementing Rules of Labor Code, to be a
member of a managerial staff, the following elements must concur or co-exist, to wit: (1) that
his primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management
policies; (2) that he customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent
judgment in the performance of his functions; (3) that he regularly and directly assists in the
management of the establishment; and (4) that he does not devote his twenty per cent of
his time to work other than those described above.
Applying the above criteria to petitioner Elias Villuga's case, it is undisputed that his primary
work or duty is to cut or prepare patterns for items to be sewn, not to lay down or implement
any of the management policies, as there is a manager and an assistant manager who
perform said functions. It is true that in the absence of the manager the assistant manager,
he distributes and assigns work to employees but such duty, though involving discretion, is
occasional and not regular or customary. He had also the authority to order the repair or
resewing of defective item but such authority is part and parcel of his function as cutter to
see to it that the items cut are sewn correctly lest the defective nature of the workmanship
be attributed to his "poor cutting." Elias Villuga does not participate in policy-making.
Rather, the functions of his position involve execution of approved and established policies.
InFranklin Baker Company of the Philippines v. Trajano,
5
it was held that employees who
do not participate in policy-making but are given ready policies to execute and standard
practices to observe are not managerial employees. The test of "supervisory or managerial
status" depends on whether a person possesses authority that is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature but one that requires use of independent judgment. In other words, the
functions of the position are not managerial in nature if they only execute approved and
established policies leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement said policies or
not.
6

Consequently, the exclusion of Villuga from the benefits claimed under Article 87 (overtime
pay and premium pay for holiday and rest day work), Article 94, (holiday pay), and Article 95
(service incentive leave pay) of the Labor Code, on the ground that he is a managerial
employee is unwarranted. He is definitely a rank and file employee hired to perform the
work of the cutter and not hired to perform supervisory or managerial functions. The fact
that he is uniformly paid by the month does not exclude him from the benefits of holiday pay
as held in the case ofInsular Bank of America Employees Union v. Inciong.
7
He should
therefore be paid in addition to the 13th month pay, his overtime pay, holiday pay, premium
pay for holiday and rest day, and service incentive leave pay.
As to the dismissal of the charge for unfair labor practices of private respondent consisting
of termination of employment of petitioners and acts of discrimination against members of
the labor union, the respondent Commission correctly held the absence of evidence that Mr.
Zapanta was aware of petitioners' alleged union membership on February 22, 1978 as the
notice of union existence in the establishment with proposal for recognition and collective
bargaining negotiation was received by management only an March 3, 1978. Indeed, self-
serving allegations without concrete proof that the private respondent knew of their
membership in the union and accordingly reacted against their membership do not suffice.
Nor is private respondent's claim that petitioner Villuga abandoned his work acceptable. For
abandonment to constitute a valid cause for dismissal, there must be a deliberate and
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Mere absence is not
sufficient, it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the
employee simply does not want to work anymore.
8
At any rate, dismissal of an employee
due to his prolonged absence without leave by reason of illness duly established by the
presentation of a medical certificate is not justified.
9
In the case at bar, however,
considering that petitioner Villuga absented himself for four (4) days without leave and
without submitting a medical certificate to support his claim of illness, the imposition of a
sanction is justified, but surely, not dismissal, in the light of the fact that this is petitioner's
first offense. In lieu of reinstatement, petitioner Villuga should be paid separation pay where
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time or because of
the realities of the situation.
10
But petitioner should not be granted backwages in addition to
reinstatement as the same is not just and equitable under the circumstances considering
that he was not entirely free from blame.
11

As to the other eleven petitioners, there is no clear showing that they were dismissed
because the circumstances surrounding their dismissal were not even alleged. However, we
disagree with the finding of respondent Commission that the eleven petitioners are
independent contractors.
For an employer-employee relationship to exist, the following elements are generally
considered: "(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal and (4) the power to control the
employee's conduct."
12

Noting that the herein petitioners were oftentimes allowed to perform their work at home
and were paid wages on a piece-rate basis, the respondent Commission apparently found
the second and fourth elements lacking and ruled that "there is no employer-employee
relationship, for it is clear that respondents are interested only in the result and not in the
means and manner and how the result is obtained."
Respondent Commission is in error. The mere fact that petitioners were paid on a piece-
rate basis is no argument that herein petitioners were not employees. The term "wage" has
been broadly defined in Article 97 of the Labor Code as remuneration or earnings, capable
of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece or
commission
basis. . . ." The facts of this case indicate that payment by the piece is just a method of
compensation and does not define the essence of the
relation.
13
The petitioners were allowed to perform their work at home does not likewise
imply absence of control and supervision. The control test calls merely for the existence of a
right to control the manner of doing the work, not the actual exercise of the right.
14

In determining whether the relationship is that of employer and employee or one of an
independent contractor, "each case must be determined on its own facts and all the
features of the relationship are to be considered."
15
Considering that petitioners who are
either sewers, repairmen or ironer, have been in the employ of private respondent as early
as 1972 or at the latest in 1976, faithfully rendering services which are desirable or
necessary for the business of private respondent, and observing management's approved
standards set for their respective lines of work as well as the customers' specifications,
petitioners should be considered employees, not independent contractors.
Independent contractors are those who exercise independent employment, contracting to
do a piece of work according to their own methods and without being subjected to control of
their employer except as to the result of their work. By the nature of the different phases of
work in a tailoring shop where the customers' specifications must be followed to the letter, it
is inconceivable that the workers therein would not be subjected to control.
In Rosario Brothers, Inc. v. Ople,
16
this Court ruled that tailors and similar workers hired in
the tailoring department, although paid weekly wages on piece work basis, are employees
not independent contractors. Accordingly, as regular employees, paid on a piece-rate basis,
petitioners are not entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday/rest day
and service incentive leave pay. Their claim for separation pay should also be defined for
lack of evidence that they were in fact dismissed by private respondent. They should be
paid, however, their 13th month pay under P.D. 851, since they are employees not
independent contractors.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the assailed decision of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by awarding
(a) in favor of petitioner Villuga, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest
day, service incentive leave pay and separation pay, in addition to his 13th month pay; and
(b) in favor of the rest of the petitioners, their respective 13th month pay.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the National Labor Relations Commission for the
computation of the claims herein-above mentioned.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69870 November 29, 1988
NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO) AND ARTURO L. PEREZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE THIRD DIVISION, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MANILA AND EUGENIA C.
CREDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 70295 November 29,1988
EUGENIA C. CREDO, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL SERVICES
CORPORATION AND ARTURO L. PEREZ, respondents.
The Chief Legal Counsel for respondents NASECO and Arturo L. Perez.
Melchor R. Flores for petitioner Eugenia C. Credo.

PADILLA, J .:
Consolidated special civil actions for certiorari seeking to review the decision * of the Third
Division, National Labor Relations Commission in Case No. 11-4944-83 dated 28
November 1984 and its resolution dated 16 January 1985 denying motions for
reconsideration of said decision.
Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a
domestic corporation which provides security guards as well as messengerial, janitorial and
other similar manpower services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies.
She was first employed with NASECO as a lady guard on 18 July 1975. Through the years,
she was promoted to Clerk Typist, then Personnel Clerk until she became Chief of Property
and Records, on 10 March 1980.
1

Sometime before 7 November 1983, Credo was administratively charged by Sisinio S.
Lloren, Manager of Finance and Special Project and Evaluation Department of NASECO,
stemming from her non-compliance with Lloren's memorandum, dated 11 October 1983,
regarding certain entry procedures in the company's Statement of Billings Adjustment. Said
charges alleged that Credo "did not comply with Lloren's instructions to place some
corrections/additional remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment; and when [Credo]
was called by Lloren to his office to explain further the said instructions, [Credo] showed
resentment and behaved in a scandalous manner by shouting and uttering remarks of
disrespect in the presence of her co-employees."
2

On 7 November 1983, Credo was called to meet Arturo L. Perez, then Acting General
Manager of NASECO, to explain her side before Perez and NASECO's Committee on
Personnel Affairs in connection with the administrative charges filed against her. After said
meeting, on the same date, Credo was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 1 5 days,
effective 8 November 1983.
3

Before the expiration of said 15-day leave, or on 18 November 1983, Credo filed a
complaint, docketed as Case No. 114944-83, with the Arbitration Branch, National Capital
Region, Ministry of Labor and Employment, Manila, against NASECO for placing her on
forced leave, without due process.
4

Likewise, while Credo was on forced leave, or on 22 November 1983, NASECO's
Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated and evaluated a number of past acts of
misconduct or infractions attributed to her.
5
As a result of this deliberation, said committee
resolved:
1. That, respondent [Credo] committed the following offenses in the Code of
Discipline, viz:
OFFENSE vs. Company Interest & Policies
No. 3 Any discourteous act to customer, officer and employee of client
company or officer of the Corporation.
OFFENSE vs. Public Moral
No. 7 Exhibit marked discourtesy in the course of official duties or use of
profane or insulting language to any superior officer.
OFFENSE vs. Authority
No. 3 Failure to comply with any lawful order or any instructions of a
superior officer.
2. That, Management has already given due consideration to respondent's [Credo]
scandalous actuations for several times in the past. Records also show that she was
reprimanded for some offense and did not question it. Management at this juncture, has
already met its maximum tolerance point so it has decided to put an end to respondent's
[Credo] being an undesirable employee.
6

The committee recommended Credo's termination, with forfeiture of benefits.
7

On 1 December 1983, Credo was called age to the office of Perez to be informed that she
was being charged with certain offenses. Notably, these offenses were those which
NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs already resolved, on 22 November 1983 to
have been committed by Credo.
In Perez's office, and in the presence of NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs, Credo
was made to explain her side in connection with the charges filed against her; however, due
to her failure to do so,
8
she was handed a Notice of Termination, dated 24 November 1983,
and made effective 1 December 1983.
9
Hence, on 6 December 1983, Credo filed a
supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal in Case No. 11-4944-83, alleging absence of
just or authorized cause for her dismissal and lack of opportunity to be heard.
10

After both parties had submitted their respective position papers, affidavits and other
documentary evidence in support of their claims and defenses, on 9 May 1984, the labor
arbiter rendered a decision: 1) dismissing Credo's complaint, and 2) directing NASECO to
pay Credo separation pay equivalent to one half month's pay for every year of service.
11

Both parties appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which,
on 28 November 1984, rendered a decision: 1) directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her
former position, or substantially equivalent position, with six (6) months' backwages and
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges appertaining thereto, and 2) dismissing
Credo's claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages. As a consequence, both
parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration,
12
which the NLRC denied in a
resolution of 16 January 1985.
13

Hence, the present recourse by both parties. In G.R. No. 68970, petitioners challenge as
grave abuse of discretion the dispositive portion of the 28 November 1984 decision which
ordered Credo's reinstatement with backwages.
14
Petitioners contend that in arriving at said
questioned order, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding that: 1)
petitioners violated the requirements mandated by law on termination, 2) petitioners failed in
the burden of proving that the termination of Credo was for a valid or authorized cause, 3)
the alleged infractions committed by Credo were not proven or, even if proved, could be
considered to have been condoned by petitioners, and 4) the termination of Credo was not
for a valid or authorized cause.
15

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 70295, petitioner Credo challenges as grave abuse of
discretion the dispositive portion of the 28 November 1984 decision which dismissed her
claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages and limited her right to backwages
to only six (6) months.
16

As guidelines for employers in the exercise of their power to dismiss employees for just
causes, the law provides that:
Section 2. Notice of dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a
worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission
constituting the grounds for his dismissal.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Answer and Hearing. The worker may answer the allegations
stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from
receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires.
Section 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in
writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
17

These guidelines mandate that the employer furnish an employee sought to be dismissed
two (2) written notices of dismissal before a termination of employment can be legally
effected. These are the notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought and the subsequent notice which informs the
employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.
Likewise, a reading of the guidelines in consonance with the express provisions of law on
protection to labor
18
(which encompasses the right to security of tenure) and the broader
dictates of procedural due process necessarily mandate that notice of the employer's
decision to dismiss an employee, with reasons therefor, can only be issued after the
employer has afforded the employee concerned ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself.
In the case at bar, NASECO did not comply with these guidelines in effecting Credo's
dismissal. Although she was apprised and "given the chance to explain her side" of the
charges filed against her, this chance was given so perfunctorily, thus rendering illusory
Credo's right to security of tenure. That Credo was not given ample opportunity to be heard
and to defend herself is evident from the fact that the compliance with the injunction to
apprise her of the charges filed against her and to afford her a chance to prepare for her
defense was dispensed in only a day. This is not effective compliance with the legal
requirements aforementioned.
The fact also that the Notice of Termination of Credo's employment (or the decision to
dismiss her) was dated 24 November 1983 and made effective 1 December 1983 shows
that NASECO was already bent on terminating her services when she was informed on 1
December 1983 of the charges against her, and that any hearing which NASECO thought of
affording her after 24 November 1983 would merely be pro forma or an exercise in futility.
Besides, Credo's mere non-compliance with Lorens memorandum regarding the entry
procedures in the company's Statement of Billings Adjustment did not warrant the severe
penalty of dismissal of the NLRC correctly held that:
... on the charge of gross discourtesy, the CPA found in its Report, dated 22 November
1983 that, "In the process of her testimony/explanations she again exhibited a conduct
unbecoming in front of NASECO Officers and argued to Mr. S. S. Lloren in a sarcastic
and discourteous manner, notwithstanding, the fact that she was inside the office of the
Acctg. General Manager." Let it be noted, however, that the Report did not even describe
how the so called "conduct unbecoming" or "discourteous manner" was done by
complainant. Anent the "sarcastic" argument of complainant, the purported transcript
19
of
the meeting held on 7 November 1983 does not indicate any sarcasm on the part of
complainant. At the most, complainant may have sounded insistent or emphatic about
her work being more complete than the work of Ms. de Castro, yet, the complaining
officer signed the work of Ms. de Castro and did not sign hers.
As to the charge of insubordination, it may be conceded, albeit unclear, that complainant
failed to place same corrections/additional remarks in the Statement of Billings
Adjustments as instructed. However, under the circumstances obtaining, where
complainant strongly felt that she was being discriminated against by her superior in
relation to other employees, we are of the considered view and so hold, that a reprimand
would have sufficed for the infraction, but certainly not termination from services.
20

As this Court has ruled:
... where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by
labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only because of the
law's concern for the working man. There is, in addition, his family to consider.
Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage-
earner.
21

Of course, in justifying Credo's termination of employment, NASECO claims as additional
lawful causes for dismissal Credo's previous and repeated acts of insubordination,
discourtesy and sarcasm towards her superior officers, alleged to have been committed
from 1980 to July 1983.
22

If such acts of misconduct were indeed committed by Credo, they are deemed to have been
condoned by NASECO. For instance, sometime in 1980, when Credo allegedly "reacted in
a scandalous manner and raised her voice" in a discussion with NASECO's Acting head of
the Personnel Administration
23
no disciplinary measure was taken or meted against her.
Nor was she even reprimanded when she allegedly talked 'in a shouting or yelling manner"
with the Acting Manager of NASECO's Building Maintenance and Services Department in
1980
24
or when she allegedly "shouted" at NASECO's Corporate Auditor "in front of his
subordinates displaying arrogance and unruly behavior" in 1980, or when she allegedly
shouted at NASECO's Internal Control Consultant in 1981.
25
But then, in sharp contrast to
NASECO's penchant for ignoring the aforesaid acts of misconduct, when Credo committed
frequent tardiness in August and September 1983, she was reprimanded.
26

Even if the allegations of improper conduct (discourtesy to superiors) were satisfactorily
proven, NASECO's condonation thereof is gleaned from the fact that on 4 October 1983,
Credo was given a salary adjustment for having performed in the job "at least
[satisfactorily]"
27
and she was then rated "Very Satisfactory"
28
as regards job performance,
particularly in terms of quality of work, quantity of work, dependability, cooperation,
resourcefulness and attendance.
Considering that the acts or omissions for which Credo's employment was sought to be
legally terminated were insufficiently proved, as to justify dismissal, reinstatement is proper.
For "absent the reason which gave rise to [the employee's] separation from employment,
there is no intention on the part of the employer to dismiss the employee
concerned."
29
And, as a result of having been wrongfully dismissed, Credo is entitled to
three (3) years of backwages without deduction and qualification.
30

However, while Credo's dismissal was effected without procedural fairness, an award of
exemplary damages in her favor can only be justified if her dismissal was effected in a
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.
31
A judicious examination of the
record manifests no such conduct on the part of management. However, in view of the
attendant circumstances in the case, i.e., lack of due process in effecting her dismissal, it is
reasonable to award her moral damages. And, for having been compelled to litigate
because of the unlawful actuations of NASECO, a reasonable award for attorney's fees in
her favor is in order.
In NASECO's comment
32
in G.R. No. 70295, it is belatedly argued that the NLRC has no
jurisdiction to order Credo's reinstatement. NASECO claims that, as a government
corporation (by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the National Investment and Development
Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
which in turn is a government owned corporation), the terms and conditions of employment
of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. In support of
this argument, NASECO cites National Housing Corporation vs. JUCO,
33
where this Court
held that "There should no longer be any question at this time that employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law and civil
service rifles and regulations."
It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in said case should not be given
retroactive effect, that is, to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17 January 1985.
To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated,
because under the same 1973 Constitution ,but prior to the ruling inNational Housing
Corporation vs. Juco, this Court had recognized the applicability of the Labor Code to, and
the authority of the NLRC to exercise jurisdiction over, disputes involving terms and
conditions of employment in government owned or controlled corporations, among them,
the National Service Corporation (NASECO).<re|| an1w>
34

Furthermore, in the matter of coverage by the civil service of government-owned or
controlled corporations, the 1987 Constitution starkly varies from the 1973 Constitution,
upon which National Housing Corporation vs. Juco is based. Under the 1973 Constitution, it
was provided that:
The civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
Government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. ...
35

On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution provides that:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charter.
36
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and expressed by the
Court in the National Housing . Corporation case in the following manner
The infirmity of the respondents' position lies in its permitting a circumvention or
emasculation of Section 1, Article XII-B of the constitution. It would be possible for a
regular ministry of government to create a host of subsidiary corporations under the
Corporation Code funded by a willing legislature. A government-owned corporation could
create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the
best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free
from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of
the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restrains
of the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment.
Conceivably, all government-owned or controlled corporations could be created, no
longer by special charters, but through incorporations under the general law. The
Constitutional amendment including such corporations in the embrace of the civil service
would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist.
37

appear relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987 Constitutional provision that the Civil
Service embraces government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter; and,
therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include government-owned or
controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or
controlled corporations under the general corporation law.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission also shed light on the
Constitutional intent and meaning in the use of the phrase "with original charter." Thus
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas) Commissioner
Romulo is recognized.
MR. ROMULO. I beg the indulgence of the Committee. I was
reading the wrong provision.
I refer to Section 1, subparagraph I which reads:
The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
My query: Is Philippine Airlines covered by this provision? MR. FOZ. Will the
Commissioner please state his previous question?
MR. ROMULO. The phrase on line 4 of Section 1,
subparagraph 1, under the Civil Service Commission, says:
"including government-owned or controlled corporations.' Does
that include a corporation, like the Philippine Airlines which is
government-owned or controlled?
MR. FOZ. I would like to throw a question to the Commissioner.
Is the Philippine Airlines controlled by the government in the
sense that the majority of stocks are owned by the
government?
MR. ROMULO. It is owned by the GSIS. So, this is what we
might call a tertiary corporation. The GSIS is owned by the
government. Would this be covered because the provision says
"including government-owned or controlled corporations."
MR. FOZ. The Philippine Airlines was established as a private
corporation. Later on, the government, through the GSIS,
acquired the controlling stocks. Is that not the correct situation?
MR. ROMULO. That is true as Commissioner Ople is about to
explain. There was apparently a Supreme Court decision that
destroyed that distinction between a government-owned
corporation created under the Corporation Law and a
government-owned corporation created by its own charter.
MR. FOZ. Yes, we recall the Supreme Court decision in the
case of NHA vs. Juco to the effect that all government
corporations irrespective of the manner of creation, whether by
special charter or by the private Corporation Law, are deemed
to be covered by the civil service because of the wide-
embracing definition made in this section of the existing 1973
Constitution. But we recall the response to the question of
Commissioner Ople that our intendment in this provision is just
to give a general description of the civil service. We are not
here to make any declaration as to whether employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations are barred from
the operation of laws, such as the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
MR. ROMULO. Yes.
MR. OPLE. May I be recognized, Mr. Presiding Officer, since
my name has been mentioned by both sides.
MR. ROMULO. I yield part of my time.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Trenas). Commissioner Ople
is recognized.
MR. OPLE. In connection with the coverage of the Civil Service
Law in Section 1 (1), may I volunteer some information that
may be helpful both to the interpellator and to the Committee.
Following the proclamation of martial law on September 21,
1972, this issue of the coverage of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and of the Civil Service Law almost immediately
arose. I am, in particular, referring to the period following the
coming into force and effect of the Constitution of 1973, where
the Article on the Civil Service was supposed to take immediate
force and effect. In the case of LUZTEVECO, there was a strike
at the time. This was a government-controlled and government-
owned corporation. I think it was owned by the PNOC with just
the minuscule private shares left. So, the Secretary of Justice
at that time, Secretary Abad Santos, and myself sat down, and
the result of that meeting was an opinion of the Secretary of
Justice which 9 became binding immediately on the
government that government corporations with original
charters, such as the GSIS, were covered by the Civil Service
Law and corporations spun off from the GSIS, which we called
second generation corporations functioning as private
subsidiaries, were covered by the Labor Code. Samples of
such second generation corporations were the Philippine
Airlines, the Manila
Hotel and the Hyatt. And that demarcation worked very well. In fact, all of
these companies I have mentioned as examples, except for the Manila Hotel,
had collective bargaining agreements. In the Philippine Airlines, there were, in
fact, three collective bargaining agreements; one, for the ground people or
the PALIA one, for the flight attendants or the PASAC and one for the pilots of
the ALPAC How then could a corporation like that be covered by the Civil
Service law? But, as the Chairman of the Committee pointed out, the
Supreme Court decision in the case of NHA vs. Juco unrobed the whole
thing. Accordingly, the Philippine Airlines, the Manila Hotel and the Hyatt are
now considered under that decision covered by the Civil Service Law. I also
recall that in the emergency meeting of the Cabinet convened for this purpose
at the initiative of the Chairman of the Reorganization Commission, Armand
Fabella, they agreed to allow the CBA's to lapse before applying the full force
and effect of the Supreme Court decision. So, we were in the awkward
situation when the new government took over. I can agree with Commissioner
Romulo when he said that this is a problem which I am not exactly sure we
should address in the deliberations on the Civil Service Law or whether we
should be content with what the Chairman said that Section 1 (1) of the
Article on the Civil Service is just a general description of the coverage of the
Civil Service and no more.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. ROMULO. Mr. Presiding Officer, for the moment, I would
be satisfied if the Committee puts on records that it is not their
intent by this provision and the phrase "including government-
owned or controlled corporations" to cover such companies as
the Philippine Airlines.
MR. FOZ. Personally, that is my view. As a matter of fact, when
this draft was made, my proposal was really to eliminate, to
drop from the provision, the phrase "including government-
owned or controlled corporations."
MR. ROMULO. Would the Committee indicate that is the intent
of this provision?
MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer, I do not think the
Committee can make such a statement in the face of an
absolute exclusion of government-owned or controlled
corporations. However, this does not preclude the Civil Service
Law to prescribe different rules and procedures, including
emoluments for employees of proprietary corporations, taking
into consideration the nature of their operations. So, it is a
general coverage but it does not preclude a distinction of the
rules between the two types of enterprises.
MR. FOZ. In other words, it is something that should be left to
the legislature to decide. As I said before, this is just a general
description and we are not making any declaration whatsoever.
MR. MONSOD. Perhaps if Commissioner Romulo would like a
definitive understanding of the coverage and the Gentleman
wants to exclude government-owned or controlled corporations
like Philippine Airlines, then the recourse is to offer an
amendment as to the coverage, if the Commissioner does not
accept the explanation that there could be a distinction of the
rules, including salaries and emoluments.
MR. ROMULO. So as not to delay the proceedings, I will
reserve my right to submit such an amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICE (Mr. Trenas) Commissioner Romulo
is recognized.
MR. ROMULO. On page 2, line 5, I suggest the following
amendment after "corporations": Add a comma (,) and the
phrase EXCEPT THOSE EXERCISING PROPRIETARY
FUNCTIONS.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). What does the
Committee say?
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
MR. MONSOD. May we have a suspension of the session?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). The session is
suspended.
It was 7:16 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 7:21 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). The session is resumed.
Commissioner Romulo is recognized.
MR. ROMULO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am amending my original proposed
amendment to now read as follows: "including government-owned or
controlled corporations WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS." The purpose of this
amendment is to indicate that government corporations such as the GSIS and
SSS, which have original charters, fall within the ambit of the civil service.
However, corporations which are subsidiaries of these chartered agencies
such as the Philippine Airlines, Manila Hotel and Hyatt are excluded from the
coverage of the civil service.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). What does the
Committee say?
MR. FOZ. Just one question, Mr. Presiding Officer. By the term
"original charters," what exactly do we mean?
MR. ROMULO. We mean that they were created by law, by an
act of Congress, or by special law.
MR. FOZ. And not under the general corporation law.
MR. ROMULO. That is correct. Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. FOZ. With that understanding and clarification, the
Committee accepts the amendment.
MR. NATIVIDAD. Mr. Presiding officer, so those created by the
general corporation law are out.
MR. ROMULO. That is correct:
38

On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is
the Constitution in place at the time of decision thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord
relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB,
the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.
Dr. Jorge Bocobo, in his Cult of Legalism, cited by Mr. Justice Perfecto in his concurring
opinion in Gomez vs. Government Insurance Board (L-602, March 31, 1947, 44 O.G. No. 8,
pp. 2687, 2694; also published in 78 Phil. 221) on the effectivity of the principle of social
justice embodied in the 1935 Constitution, said:
Certainly, this principle of social justice in our Constitution as generously
conceived and so tersely phrased, was not included in the fundamental law
as a mere popular gesture. It was meant to (be) a vital, articulate, compelling
principle of public policy. It should be observed in the interpretation not only of
future legislation, but also of all laws already existing on November 15, 1935.
It was intended to change the spirit of our laws, present and future. Thus, all
the laws which on the great historic event when the Commonwealth of the
Philippines was born, were susceptible of two interpretations strict or liberal,
against or in favor of social justice, now have to be construed broadly in order
to promote and achieve social justice. This may seem novel to our friends,
the advocates of legalism but it is the only way to give life and significance to
the above-quoted principle of the Constitution. If it was not designed to apply
to these existing laws, then it would be necessary to wait for generations until
all our codes and all our statutes shall have been completely charred by
removing every provision inimical to social justice, before the policy of social
justice can become really effective. That would be an absurd conclusion. It is
more reasonable to hold that this constitutional principle applies to all
legislation in force on November 15, 1935, and all laws thereafter passed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the challenged decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED
with modifications. Petitioners in G.R. No. 69870, who are the private respondents in G.R.
No. 70295, are ordered to: 1) reinstate Eugenia C. Credo to her former position at the time
of her termination, or if such reinstatement is not possible, to place her in a substantially
equivalent position, with three (3) years backwages, from 1 December 1983, without
qualification or deduction, and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
appertaining thereto, and 2) pay Eugenia C. Credo P5,000.00 for moral damages and
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees.
If reinstatement in any event is no longer possible because of supervening events,
petitioners in G.R. No. 69870, who are the private respondents in G.R. No. 70295 are
ordered to pay Eugenia C. Credo, in addition to her backwages and damages as above
described, separation pay equivalent to one-half month's salary for every year of service, to
be computed on her monthly salary at the time of her termination on 1 December 1983.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, J., is on leave.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142981. August 20, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CARMELITA
ALVAREZ, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
In illegal recruitment, mere failure of the complainant to present written receipts for
money paid for acts constituting recruitment activities is not fatal to the prosecution,
provided the payment can be proved by clear and convincing testimonies of credible
witnesses.
The Case
Before us is an appeal from the January 28, 2000 Decision
[1]
of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 93, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-58179. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises, the court finds the accused CARMELITA
ALVAREZ guilty of Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale constituting
economic sabotage. Accordingly, the court sentences her to serve [the] penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine [of] P100,000.00. She is further ordered to indemnify
the following complaining witnesses in the amounts indicated opposite their names:
Arnel Damian P 16,500.00
Joel Serna P 18,575 plus US$50.00
Antonio Damian P 6,975.00 plus US$50.00
Roberto Alejandro P 47,320.00
[2]

The July 18, 1994 Information
[3]
was filed by State Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim. It
charged Carmelita Alvarez with illegal recruitment committed in large scale, under
Article 13(b) in relation to Articles 38(a), 34 and 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
as follows:
That sometime between the period from November, 1993 to March, 1994, in Quezon
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
recruit the herein complainants, namely: JESUS G. ESMA, JR., JOEL G. SERNA,
ARNEL C. DAMIAN, ANTONIO C. DAMIAN, RUBEN F. RIOLA, LORETA S.
BOLOTAOLA, EDGAR R. BARCENAS, DENO A. MANACAP, JERRY NEIL D.
ABANILLA, ROBERTO ALEJANDRO, ESTER S. BONDOC and JOSEPHINE
LOMOCSO as contract workers in Taiwan for and in consideration of the sum
ranging from P12,300.00 to P48,600.00, as placement and processing fees, and x x x
which the complainants delivered and paid to herein accused the said amount, without
said accused first having secured the necessary license or authority from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.
[4]

On arraignment, appellant, assisted by Atty. Donato Mallabo, pleaded not
guilty.
[5]
After trial in due course, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) as follows:
Arnel Damian is one of the complainants in the case at bar. He testified that he was
introduced to appellant by Reynaldo Abrigo, who was then the boyfriend of Teresita
Gonzales (daughter of appellant Carmelita Alvarez) at appellants house in 25-B West
Santiago St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. During said meeting, appellant
convinced complainant that if he could produce [t]wenty-[f]ive [t]housand [p]esos
(P25,000.00), he would be deployed to Taiwan as a factory worker and would be
receiving a salary of $600.00.
On December 27, 1993, complainant gave appellant [t]welve [t]housand [f]ive
[h]undred [p]esos (P12,500) for which he was issued a receipt (Exhibit A) with the
words FOR PROCESSING FEE written therein by appellant herself. Aside from
the processing fee, complainant also gave appellant [t]wo [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred
[p]esos ([P]2,500.00) for medical expenses and one thousand five hundred pesos
(P1,500.00) for the passport, but was not issued a receipt for said payments.
According to complainant, while waiting for the results of his medical examination,
he received a call informing him that appellant was arrested. Becoming suspicious,
complainant then went to the Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration
(POEA) to verify whether appellant had a license to recruit. As per Certification
issued by the POEA on June 1, 1994, he found out that appellant was not licensed to
recruit. Realizing that appellant would never be able to send complainant to Taiwan,
he filed a complaint against appellant with the POEA.
On cross-examination, complainant clarified that Reynaldo Abrigo did not actually
introduce him to appellant, but merely gave appellants address and telephone
number. Thereafter, complainant went to appellants house together with Ruben
Riola and Michael Lumahan. In addition, complainant stated under cross-examination
that appellant told him that according to the medical examination results, complainant
was unfit to work. Consequently, he demanded the return of his money but appellant
failed to do so.
Antonio Damian is also one of the complainants in the case at bar. He testified that
he is the brother of Arnel Damian and that when his brother failed the medical
examination, his brother Arnel immediately demanded from appellant the return of the
processing fee. However, appellant could not return the money to him
anymore. Instead, appellant asked Arnel to look for another applicant in order to save
the processing fee. For which reason, Arnel asked his brother Antonio to apply in his
stead. During his first meeting with appellant on January 4, 1994, complainant
Antonio Damian was asked to pay [t]wo [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred [p]esos
(P2,500.00) for medical examination. Subsequently, he also gave [n]ine [h]undred
[p]esos (P900.00) for insurance; [s]eventy-[f]ive [p]esos (P75.00) for Pre-departure
Orientation Seminar; [f]ifty [d]ollars ($50.00) as part of the processing fee; and
[t]hree [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred [p]esos (P3,500.00) for the birth certificate. All of
these were personally given to appellant but no receipts were issued by appellant. As
with all the other complainants, appellant promised Antonio that he would work as
factory worker in Taiwan and that he would receive a salary of [t]wenty-[f]ive
[t]housand [p]esos (P25,000.00). After waiting for two (2) months, Antonio learned
that appellant was arrested. Hence, he filed his complaint with the POEA against
appellant.
Joel Serna came to know of appellant also through Reynaldo Abrigo. He met
appellant at her house at 25-B West Santiago St., San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon
City on February 8, 1994. Like the others, Joel was promised employment in Taiwan
as factory worker and was also asked to pay various fees. Appellant gave him a list of
the fees to be paid which included: Processing fee P12,500.00; Medical
examination P2,395.00; Passport P1,500.00; Visa fee - $50.00; and Insurance
P900.00. Appellants telephone number was also included in said list. According to
complainant Joel, said list was personally prepared by appellant in his
presence. Complainant Joel paid the various fees but was never issued any receipt for
said payment despite demands from appellant. Upon learning that appellant was
arrested for illegal recruitment, he went to the POEA and filed his complaint against
appellant.
Roberto Alejandro testified that Onofre Ferrer, a provincemate, informed him that
there were applicants needed for the job in Taiwan. On March 6, 1994, both of them
went to appellants house where complainant Roberto was told by appellant that she
had the capacity to send him to Taiwan but he must first undergo medical
examination.
Later, when Roberto was informed that he passed the medical examination, appellant
told him to bring [f]orty [t]housand [p]esos (P40,000) as processing fee and other
documentary requirements. A receipt was issued by appellant for the payment of said
amount.
On March 9, 1994 appellant advised him to pay an additional [f]ive [t]housand
(P5,000.00) which he personally delivered to appellant on March 11, 1994. A receipt
was also issued by appellant for said amount.
After three (3) months of waiting and follow-up without any positive results,
complainant filed his complaint against appellant with the POEA.
David Umbao was presented on rebuttal by the prosecution and testified that on
June 1, 1994, an entrapment operation was conducted against Carmelita Alvarez
where Jerry Neil Abadilla and an agent by the name of Conchita Samones gave
appellant the amount of P5,000.00 with a P500.00 bill marked as payment for the
renewal of the promise of deployment. After appellant took the money, she was
immediately apprehended. Two witnesses were present during the entrapment
operations, one from the barangay and one from the homeowners association. The
affidavit of arrest setting out the details of the entrapment operation and the arrest
was collectively executed by the entrapment team.
[6]
(Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
In her Brief,
[7]
appellant submits her own version of the facts as follows:
CARMELITA ALVAREZ testified that sometime in 1991, she met Director
Angeles Wong at the Office of the Deputy Administrator of the POEA, Manuel
Quimson, who happened to be her compadre. Sometime in November 1993,
Director Wong called her about a direct-hire scheme from Taiwan which is a job order
whereby people who want to work abroad can apply directly with the POEA. The
said director told her that there were six (6) approved job orders from Labor Attache
Ellen Canasa. Seeing this as a good opportunity for her son, Edelito Gonzales, who
was then a new graduate, she recommended him and his sons friends, namely,
Reynaldo Abrigo, Renato Abrigo and two others surnamed Lucena, for
employment. Unfortunately, Director Wong called off the scheduled departure
because the quota of workers for deployment was not met. To remedy the situation,
she approached Josephine Lomocso and a certain recruiter named Romeo Dabilbil,
who also recommends people to Director Wong with ready passports. When the thirty
(30) slots needed for the direct-hiring scheme were filed up, Director Wong set the
tentative schedule of departure on February 23, 1994. In view of the said
development, Mr. Dabilbil contacted the recruits from Cebu who even stayed at her
(Conchitas) place in Capiz Street, Del Monte, Quezon City for three (3) days to one
(1) week while waiting to be deployed. On the night of their scheduled departure and
while they were having their despidida party, Director Wong sent a certain Ross to
inform them that a telex was received by him informing him (Director Wong) that the
factory where the recruits were supposed to work was gutted by a fire. She was later
advised by Director Wong to wait for the deployment order to come from
Taiwan. While the people from Cebu were staying in her house waiting for
development, the accused even advised them to file a complaint against Mr. Dabilbil
before the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission at Camp Crame. Surprisingly, she
was also arrested for illegal recruitment on May 31, 1994 and thereafter learned that
on June 1, 1994, the Damian brothers filed a complaint against her before the
POEA. After her apprehension, the accused further testified that there was some sort
of negotiation between her lawyer, Atty. Orlando Salutandre, and the apprehending
officer, Major Umbao, regarding her release. According to her, if she [would] be able
to raise the amount of [t]hirty [t]housand [p]esos (P30,000.00), Major Umbao [would]
not anymore refer her for inquest, but would only recommend her case for further
investigation and then she would be released. Since she failed to raise the said
amount, she was brought to the inquest fiscal.
REYNALDO ABRIGO testified that it was Director Angeles Wong who was
actually recruiting workers for deployment abroad because of a certain document
which Alvarez showed to them bearing the name of the said POEA Official.
EDELITO GONZALES testimony merely corroborated the testimony of defense
witnesses Carmencita Alvarez and Reynaldo Abrigo.
x x x x x x x x x
SUR-REBUTTAL EVIDENCE:
MARITES ABRIGO testified that while she was in the living room and her mother,
accused Carmelita Alvarez, was in her room inside their house on May 31, 1994, a
group of persons arrived and asked where her mother was. After telling them that her
mother was inside her room resting, a certain Major Umbao, together with some other
persons, went straight to her mothers room and knocked on the door. When her
mother opened it and peeped through the opening of the door, they immediately
grabbed her. She was not able to do anything also, other than to tell them that she has
to consult first her lawyer. When her mother was brought to the POEA office she was
told that they have to produce P30,000.00.
[8]
(Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court accorded full credibility to the prosecution witnesses. It held that
complainants had not been impelled by ill motives in filing the case against
appellant. They all positively identified her as the person who, without the requisite
license from the government, had collected from them processing and placement fees
in consideration of jobs in Taiwan.
The trial court was convinced that appellant had deceived complainants by making
them believe that she could deploy them abroad to work, and that she was thus able to
milk them of their precious savings. The lack of receipts for some amounts that she
received from them did not discredit their testimonies. Besides, her precise role in the
illegal recruitment was adequately demonstrated through other means.
Further affirming her illegal recruitment activities was the entrapment conducted, in
which she was caught receiving marked money from a certain Jerry Neil Abadilla, to
whom she had promised a job abroad.
Her defense that she merely wanted to provide jobs for her son-in-law and his
friends was rejected, because she had subsequently retracted her allegation implicating
Director Wong of the POEA in her illegal recruitment activities. As she victimized more
than three (3) persons, the RTC convicted her of illegal recruitment committed in large
scale.
Hence, this appeal.
[9]

Issue
Appellant submits this lone assignment of error:
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellant Carmelita Alvarez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for illegal recruitment in large scale.
[10]

More specifically, appellant questions the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence
showing the following: (1) that she engaged in acts of illegal recruitment enumerated in
Article 38 of the Labor Code, (2) that she was not licensed to recruit, (3) that she
received money from complainants despite the absence of receipts, and (4) that her
acts constituted illegal recruitment in large scale.
This Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Main Issue:
Bases for Her Conviction
Appellant denies that she engaged in any act of illegal recruitment and claims that
she only recommended, through Director Wong of the POEA, her son-in-law and his
friends for a direct-hire job in Taiwan.
We disagree. Prior to the enactment of RA No. 8042, the crime of illegal
recruitment was defined under Article 38(a) in relation to Articles 13(b) and 34 and
penalized under Article 39 of the Labor Code. It consisted of any recruitment activity,
including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Code, undertaken
by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. It is committed when two elements concur:
(1) the offenders have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) the offenders
undertake either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined
under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34.
[11]

Under Article 13(b), recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers[;] and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not. In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed when a
person, who is not authorized by the government, gives the impression that he or she
has the power to send workers abroad.
[12]

It is clear from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that appellant recruited
them. On direct examination, Arnel Damian testified thus:
Q When was that when Reynaldo Abondo introduced you to the accused?
A Last week of November. I cannot remember the exact date.
Q Where were you when you were introduced to the accused?
A At 25 V. West Santiago St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, in the house of Mrs.
Alvarez.
x x x x x x x x x
Q When you arrived at that place, whom did you see?
A Mrs. Alvarez.
Q What happened during your first meeting.
A We were recruited by her.
Q What did she tell you?
A That if we could come up with the amount of P25,000.00 but she was only asking
for P12,500.00 as processing fee.
Q What else did she tell you?
A That we were to act as replacement of three persons who backed out.
Q Did she tell you where were you going?
A We were told to go to Taiwan as factory worker.
Q Did she tell you how much salary will you receive?
A $600.00.
[13]

Appellant had also recruited for a similar job in Taiwan, Joel Serna who testified as
follows:
Q Will you please inform the Hon. Court why do you know Carmelita Alvarez?
A I came to know her when her daughter became the girlfriend of my friend and I was told
that she is recruiting workers for Taiwan.
Q After knowing that she was recruiting workers for Taiwan, what did you do, if any?
A I inquired from her and I was assured that the employment was not fake and I was told
to pay a processing fee.
Q When you said kanya or her to whom are you referring to?
A Carmelita Alvarez.
Q Do you still remember when was that?
A February 8, 1994.
Q Where did you meet?
A In her house at No. 25-B West Santiago St., SFDM, Quezon City.
Q What other things did she told you, if there was any?
A I would subject myself to a medical examination and after this, I would give her a
processing fee.
Q What was the purpose of that processing fee?
A So I could leave immediately for Taiwan.
Q Why are you going to Taiwan?
A I need a job.
Q If you give Mrs. Alvarez the processing fee, she will help you to go to Taiwan?
A Yes, sir.
[14]

Antonio Damian, brother of Arnel, also testified to the same effect.
ATTY. DIGNADICE:
Q Will you please tell this Hon. Court the circumstances why you came to know Carmelita
Alvarez?
A I met Carmelita Alvarez on January 4, 1994.
COURT: (to the witness)
Under what circumstances did you happen to know her?
A I went to her house.
ATTY. DIGNADICE:
Q Why did you go to her house?
A Because I applied to her for work abroad.
Q Why did you apply for work abroad to her?
A Because of a brother who applied to her but failed the medical examination.
x x x x x x x x x
Q Arnel Damian applied for work abroad with Carmelita Alvarez?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was he able to leave for abroad?
A No, sir.
Q Why?
A Because he failed the medical examination.
x x x x x x x x x
Q What happened next after that?
A Because my brother failed with the medical examination, Carmelita Alvarez cannot
return the processing fee in the amount of P12,000.00 so she told my brother to look for
another applicant.
ATTY. DIGNADICE:
Q Did your brother look for another applicant as his replacement?
A He asked me to take my place to save the P12,000.00.
[15]

Roberto Alejandro testified that appellant had also told him she could send him to
Taiwan to work.
Q When you reached that place whom did you see there?
A Mrs. Alvarez.
Q And what happened during that first meeting?
A She told me that she has the capacity of sending to Taiwan.
[16]

More telling is Ruben Riolas testimony on appellants specific acts constituting
illegal recruitment.
Q Can you tell the Hon. Court what transpired with that first meeting of yours with
Carmelita Alvarez at Capiz District?
A When I got there, I was with two companions, because we were replacements of the
three others who backed out. We were asked by the mother if we were the friends of
her daughter and son-in-law who is from the church?
Q What was your answer?
A I said yes.
Q Was there anything that transpired during that meeting?
A We were asked by her if we were interested to work as Factory workers in Taiwan.
Q What was your answer, if any?
A We said we are interested if it is true.
Q After knowing that you are interested to work as factory worker in Taiwan, what did
Carmelita Alvarez do if there was any?
A We were shown a document stating that such person was receiving $600.00 salary.
x x x x x x x x x
Q After knowing that you will be receiving the same amount if you work as factory worker
in Taiwan, what did you do, if any?
A We were told to immediately pay the processing fee.
Q Who told you to pay the processing fee?
A Mrs. Carmelita Alvarez.
Q This processing fee is for what?
A So that she could process the papers with the POEA, for the facilitation with the POEA[,]
so that we could be included in the first batch.
[17]

Q What happened on that date after paying the tax of P1,500.00.
A We were promised to leave on February 23, 1993.
Q Will you please elaborate more on the promise, what kind of promise was it, if you could
remember?
A That would be the latest date that we could leave for Taiwan.
Q Would you somehow remember the words of Carmelita Alvarez?
x x x x x x x x x
A Na papaalisin niya kami.
x x x x x x x x x
Q Why did you celebrate a dispededa?
A Because we were about to leave.
Q Who told you?
A Carmelita Alvarez.
x x x x x x x x x
Q Why were you celebrating this party?
A Because we will be leaving the following day.
[18]

Furthermore, appellant committed other acts showing that she was engaged in
illegal recruitment. Enumerated in People v. Manungas Jr.
[19]
as acts constituting
recruitment within the meaning of the law were collecting pictures, birth certificates, NBI
clearances and other necessary documents for the processing of employment
applications in Saudi Arabia; and collecting payments for passport, training fees,
placement fees, medical tests and other sundry expenses.
[20]

In this case, the prosecution proved that appellant had received varying amounts of
money from complainants for the processing of their employment applications for
Taiwan. Arnel Damian paid to appellant P12,500 for the processing fee,
[21]
P2,500 for
the medical fee and P1,500 for his passport.
[22]
Serna paid P12,000 for the processing
fee,
[23]
P3,000 for his birth certificate and passport,
[24]
P75 for a Departure and
Orientation Seminar,
[25]
P900 for the insurance fee and $50 for his visa.
[26]
Antonio
Damian paid P2,500 for the medical fee,
[27]
P900 for the insurance, P75 for the Pre-
Departure and Orientation Seminar (PDOS) fee, $50 for the processing fee and P3,500
for his birth certificate.
[28]
Roberto Alejandro paid P40,000 for the processing
fee
[29]
and P5,000 for the insurance.
[30]
Riola paid P1,900 for his passport, P12,500 for the
processing fee, P900 for the insurance fee, P75 for the PDOS fee, P1,500 for the
insurance and $50 for travel tax.
[31]

The trial court found complainants to be credible and convincing witnesses. We are
inclined to give their testimonies due consideration. The best arbiter of the issue of the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is the trial court. When the inquiry is on
that issue, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court,
considering that the latter was in a better position to decide the question, having heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial. Its finding thereon will not be disturbed, unless it plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, may affect the result of the
case.
[32]
We find no cogent reason to overrule the trial court in this case.
No License
Appellant denies that she engaged in acts of recruitment and placement without first
complying with the guidelines issued by the Department of Labor and
Employment. She contends that she did not possess any license for recruitment,
because she never engaged in such activity.
We are not persuaded. In weighing contradictory declarations and statements,
greater weight must be given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
than to the denial of the defendant.
[33]
Article 38(a) clearly shows that illegal recruitment
is an offense that is essentially committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority. A non-licensee means any person, corporation or entity to which the labor
secretary has not issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and
placement; or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by
the POEA or the labor secretary.
[34]
A license authorizes a person or an entity to operate
a private employment agency, while authority is given to those engaged in recruitment
and placement activities.
[35]

Likewise constituting illegal recruitment and placement activities are agents or
representatives whose appointments by a licensee or holder of authority have not been
previously authorized by the POEA.
[36]

That appellant in this case had been neither licensed nor authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment was certified by Veneranda C. Guerrero, officer-in-
charge of the Licensing and Regulation Office; and Ma. Salome S. Mendoza, manager
of the Licensing Branch -- both of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration.
[37]
Yet, as complainants convincingly proved, she recruited them for jobs
in Taiwan.
Absence of Receipts
Appellant contends that the RTC erred when it did not appreciate in her favor the
failure of Complainants Serna and Antonio Damian to present, as proofs that she had
illegally recruited them, receipts that she had allegedly issued to them.
We disagree. The Court has already ruled that the absence of receipts in a case for
illegal recruitment is not fatal, as long as the prosecution is able to establish through
credible testimonial evidence that accused-appellant has engaged in illegal
recruitment.
[38]
Such case is made, not by the issuance or the signing of receipts for
placement fees, but by engagement in recruitment activities without the necessary
license or authority.
[39]

In People v. Pabalan,
[40]
the Court held that the absence of receipts for some of the
amounts delivered to the accused did not mean that the appellant did not accept or
receive such payments. Neither in the Statute of Frauds nor in the rules of evidence is
the presentation of receipts required in order to prove the existence of a recruitment
agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases. Such proof may
come from the testimonies of witnesses.
[41]

Besides, the receipts issued by petitioner to Arnel Damian and Roberto Alejandro
already suffice to prove her guilt.
[42]

Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale
Since only two complainants were able to show receipts issued by appellant,
petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove illegal recruitment in large scale.
We disagree. The finding of illegal recruitment in large scale is justified wherever
the elements previously mentioned concur with this additional element: the offender
commits the crime against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a
group.
[43]
Appellant recruited at least three persons. All the witnesses for the prosecution
categorically testified that it was she who had promised them that she could arrange for
and facilitate their employment in Taiwan as factory workers.
As for the defense that appellant had only referred complainants to Director Wong,
her public apology and retraction
[44]
belied her denials. After examining the transcripts,
we concur with the RTC that her averment that she was being prosecuted for her
refusal to give grease money to Major Umbao in exchange for her freedom does not
disprove the fact that she was caught in flagrante delicto in an entrapment operation.
We find appellants conviction for the crime charged sufficiently supported by
evidence; therefore, it should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 140067-71. August 29, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NENITA MARIA
OLIVIA GALLARDO (at large), and REMEDIOS
MALAPIT, accused,
REMEDIOS MALAPIT, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
Remedios Malapit and Nenita Maria Olivia Gallardo were charged with
one (1) count of illegal recruitment committed in large-scale, three (3) counts
of estafa, and one (1) count of simple illegal recruitment before the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3.
[1]
The Informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 15320-R (Illegal Recruitment Committed in Large Scale)
[2]

The undersigned (Public Prosecutor) accuses NENITA MARIA OLIVIA
GALLARDO and REMEDIOS MALAPIT of the crime of ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT COMMITTED IN LARGE SCALE, defined and penalized under
Article 13(b) in relation to Article 38(b), 34, and 39 of P.D. No. 442, otherwise known
as the New Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by P.D. No. 1693, 1920, 2018
and R.A. No. 8042, committed as follows:
That during the period from January 1997 to June, 1997, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment
as contract workers in Canada, to the herein complainants, namely: Rommel Suni,
Myrna Castro, Marilyn Mariano, Bryna Paul Wong, Mary Grace Lanozo, Ana Liza
Aquino, Marie Purificacion Abenoja, Florence Bacoco and Lorna Domingo, without
said accused having first secured the necessary license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment.
Criminal Case No. 15323-R (Estafa)
[3]

That in March 1997 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud one MARILYN MARIANO by way of false pretenses, which are executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows; to wit: the
accused knowing fully well that he/she they is/are not authorized job recruiters for
persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Marilyn Mariano and
pretended that he/she/they could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in
consideration of the sum of P36,500.00, when in truth and in fact they could not; the
said Marilyn Mariano deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed by the
accused parted away the total sum of P36,500.00, in favor of the accused, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Marilyn Mariano in the aforementioned amount of
THIRTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P36,500.00), Philippine
Currency.
Criminal Case No. 15327-R (Estafa)
[4]

That on June 6, 1997 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud one MARIE PURIFICACION ABENOJA by way of false pretenses, which
are executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows,
to wit: the accused knowing fully well that he/she they is/are not authorized job
recruiters for persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Marie
Purificacion Abenoja and pretended that he/she/they could secure a job for him/her
abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of P36,500.00, when in truth and in fact
they could not; the said Marie Purificacion Abenoja deceived and convinced by the
false pretenses employed by the accused parted away the total sum of P36,500.00 in
favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said Marie Purificacion
Abenoja in the aforementioned amount of THIRTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P36,500.00), Philippine currency.
Criminal Case No. 15570-R (Illegal Recruitment)
[5]

The under signed (Public Prosecutor) accuses NENITA MARIA OLIVIA-
GALLARDO and REMEDIOS MALAPIT of the crime of ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT, defined and penalized under Article 13(b) in relation to Article
38(b), 34, and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the New Labor
Code of the Philippines, as amended by R.A. No. 8042, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6
th
day of June, 1997, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment as contract
worker in Canada, to the herein complainant ARACELI D. ABENOJA, without said
accused having first secured the necessary license or authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment.
Criminal Case No. 15571-R (Estafa)
[6]

That on or about the 11
th
day of June, 1997 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating & mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud one ARACELI D. ABENOJA by way of false pretenses,
which are executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as
follows; to wit: the accused knowing fully well that he/she/they is/are not authorized
job recruiters for persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Araceli D.
Abenoja and pretended that he/she/they could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and
in consideration of the sum of P35,000.00, when in truth and in fact they could not;
the said Araceli D. Abenoja deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed
by the accused parted away the total sum of P35,000.00 in favor of the accused, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Araceli D. Abenoja in the aforementioned amount of
THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00), Philippine currency.
Only accused-appellant Remedios Malapit was brought to the jurisdiction
of the trial court. Her co-accused, Nenita Maria Olivia Gallardo, remained at
large.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all
charges. The five (5) cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Marie Purificacion Abenoja and Marilyn Mariano met accused-appellant at
her beauty parlor in Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City. Marie met
accused-appellant sometime in January 1997 through her friend, Florence
Bacoco. A month later, Marilyn was introduced to accused-appellant by
Grace Lanozo, a fellow nurse at the PMA Hospital.
Marie claims that accused-appellant enticed her to apply for work as a
caregiver in Canada. Accused-appellant showed her a piece of paper
containing a job order saying that Canada was in need of ten (10) caregivers
and some messengers. Accused-appellant also promised her that she will be
receiving a salary of CN$2,700.00 (Canadian Dollars) and will be able to leave
for Canada in a months time. Heeding accused-appellants guaranty, Marie
eventually applied for the overseas job opportunity.
On June 6, 1997, accused-appellant introduced Marie to co-accused
Nenita Maria Olivia-Gallardo in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. On the same
day, Marie submitted herself to a physical examination and personally handed
to Gallardo a partial payment of P18,000.00, for which the latter issued a
receipt.
[7]
Marie made another payment in the amount of P52,000.00, for which
accused-appellant issued a provisional receipt.
[8]
This amount included the
placement fee of her sister, Araceli Abenoja, who became interested in the
opportunity to work abroad. Accused-appellant issued to Marie the receipt
[9]
for
Araceli in the amount of P35,000.00, signed by Gallardo.
Three months lapsed without any news on Maries deployment to
Canada. Her sister, Araceli, had already left for work abroad through the
efforts of their other town-mate. The weekly follow-ups made by Marie to
accused-appellant pertaining to her application and that of Aracelis were to
no avail. Accused-appellant just promised Marie that she will return her
money. Realizing that she had been hoodwinked, Marie decided to file a
complaint against the accused-appellant and Gallardo with the National
Bureau of Investigation. She no longer verified the authority of both accused-
appellant and Gallardo in recruiting workers overseas because she was told
by Gallardo that she is a direct recruiter.
[10]

Marilyn Mariano, on the other hand, was told by accused-appellant that
she was recruiting nurses from Baguio City and was looking for one more
applicant to complete the first batch to fly to Canada. After giving her all the
information about the job opportunity in Canada, accused-appellant
encouraged her to meet Gallardo. Not long after, Grace Lanozo accompanied
her to meet Gallardo at the latters house in Quezon City.
Gallardo required her to undergo a medical check-up, to complete her
application papers within the soonest possible time and to prepare money to
defray the expenses for her deployment to Canada. Upon the instruction of
accused-appellant, Marilyn paid a total amount of P36,000.00 to Gallardo,
which was evidenced by a receipt. Of this amount, the P1,500.00
[11]
was for
her medical check-up, P20,000.00
[12]
for processing of papers and
P15,000.00
[13]
for her visa.
Marilyn was further made to accomplish a form, prepared by both
accused-appellant and Gallardo, at the residence of accused-appellant in
Baguio City. Thereafter, she was informed that the processing of her papers
abroad shall commence within the next three months. She was also made to
attend a meeting conducted by both accused-appellant and Gallardo at the
formers house in Baguio City, together with other interested applicants.
After three months of waiting with no forthcoming employment abroad,
Marilyn and the other applicants proceeded to the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency, Regional Administrative Unit, of the Cordillera
Administrative Region in Baguio City, where they learned that accused-
appellant and Gallardo were not authorized recruiters.
[14]
Marilyn confronted
accused-appellant about this, whereupon the latter assured her that it was a
direct hiring scheme. Thereafter, Marilyn reported accused-appellant and
Gallardo to the NBI.
[15]

After trial on the merits, accused-appellant was found guilty of the crimes
of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa on three (3) counts. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Remedios Malapit GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt with the crimes of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, and Estafa in
three (3) counts, and she is hereby sentenced as follows:
1. To suffer Life Imprisonment at the Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong
City in Criminal Cases Nos. 15320-R and 15770-R for Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale; to pay a Fine to the Government in the amount of One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos; and to pay private complainants, Marie Purificacion Abenoja,
the amount of Thirty Five Thousand (P35,000.00) Pesos; Araceli Abenoja also the
amount of Thirty Five Thousand (P35,000.00) Pesos; and Marilyn Mariano, the
amount of Thirty Six Thousand Five Hundred (P36,500.00) Pesos, all amounts with
legal interest.
2. To suffer Imprisonment at the same Institution from Six (6) Years, Five (5) Months,
and Eleven (11) Days as Minimum to Seven (7) Years, Eight (8) Months, and
Twenty (20) Days as Maximum of Prision Mayor for each Estafa case in Criminal
Cases Nos. 15323-R, 15327-R, and 15571-R.
3. To pay costs of suit.
[16]

Accused-appellant is now before us on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PROSECUTION
SUCCEEDED IN PROVING THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PROSECUTION
SUCCEEDED IN PROVING THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THREE COUNTS OF ESTAFA.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASES NOS.
15570-R AND 15571-R FOR ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE RESULTING FROM THE
FAILURE OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS TO APPEAR AND
SUBSTANTIATE HER COMPLAINT.
IV
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT COMMITTED
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING HER
OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE.
Accused-appellant maintains that she did not commit any of the activities
enumerated in the Labor Code on illegal recruitment in connection with the
applications of the private complainants. It was Nenita Maria Olivia Gallardo
who convinced and promised private complainants employment overseas. It
was also Gallardo who received and misappropriated the money of private
complainants. Accordingly, she cannot be convicted of estafa.
We do not agree.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) essential elements concur:
(1) that the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers, and
(2) that the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of recruitment and
placement defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of the Labor Code.
[17]

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as:
Any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
In the case at bar, the first element is present. Nonette Legaspi-
Villanueva, the Overall Supervisor of the Regional Office of the POEA in
Baguio City, testified that per records, neither accused-appellant nor Gallardo
were licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment in the
City of Baguio or in any part of the Cordillera Region.
The second essential element is likewise present. Accused-appellant
purported to have the ability to send Marie Purificacion Abenoja, Araceli
Abenoja and Marilyn Mariano for employment abroad through the help of her
co-accused Gallardo, although without any authority or license to do
so. Accused-appellant was the one who persuaded them to apply for work as
a caregiver in Canada by making representations that there was a job market
therefor.
[18]
She was also the one who helped them meet Gallardo in order to
process their working papers and personally assisted Marie, Araceli and
Marilyn in the completion of the alleged requirements.
[19]
Accused-appellant
even provided her house in Baguio City as venue for a meeting with other
applicants that she and Gallardo conducted in connection with the purported
overseas employment in Canada.
[20]
Accused-appellant, therefore, acted as an
indispensable participant and effective collaborator of co-accused Gallardo,
who at one time received placement fees
[21]
on behalf of the latter from both
Marie and Araceli Abenoja. The totality of the evidence shows that accused-
appellant was engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers for
overseas employment under the above-quoted Article 13 (b) of the Labor
Code. Hence, she cannot now feign ignorance on the consequences of her
unlawful acts.
Accused-appellants claim that the other private complainants in Criminal
Case No. 15320-R, for illegal recruitment in large scale, have executed their
individual affidavits of desistance pointing to Gallardo as the actual recruiter,
deserves scant consideration. The several Orders
[22]
issued by the trial court
show that the dismissal of the complaints of the other private complainants
were based on their failure to substantiate and prosecute their individual
complaints despite due notice.
*

The foregoing notwithstanding, the existence of the adverted affidavits of
desistance does not appear in the records of this case and, thus, may not be
given any probative weight by this Court. Any evidence that a party desires to
submit for the consideration of the court must be formally offered by him,
otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.
[23]
Evidence not formally offered before
the trial court cannot be considered on appeal, for to consider them at such
stage will deny the other parties their right to rebut them.
[24]
By opting not to
present them in court, such affidavits of desistance are generally hearsay and
have no probative value since the affiants thereof were not placed on the
witness stand to testify thereon.
[25]
The reason for the rule prohibiting the
admission of evidence that has not been formally offered is to afford the other
party the chance to object to their admissibility.
[26]

All told, the evidence against accused-appellant has established beyond a
shadow of doubt that she actively collaborated with co-accused Gallardo in
illegally recruiting the complainants in this case. As correctly pointed out by
the trial court, the private complainants in this case would not have been
induced to apply for a job in Canada were it not for accused-appellants
information, recruitment, and introduction of the private complainants to her
co-accused Gallardo.
Likewise untenable are accused-appellants claims that she did not
represent herself as a licensed recruiter,
[27]
and that she merely helped
complainants avail of the job opportunity. It is enough that she gave the
impression of having had the authority to recruit workers for deployment
abroad. In fact, even without consideration for accused-appellants services,
she will still be deemed as having engaged in recruitment activities, since it
was sufficiently demonstrated that she promised overseas employment to
private complainants.
[28]
Illegal recruitment is committed when it is shown that
the accused-appellant gave the private complainants the distinct
impression that she had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for
work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to
be employed.
[29]
To be engaged in the practice and placement, it is plain that
there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person
posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad.
[30]

Undoubtedly, the acts of accused-appellant showed unity of purpose with
those of co-accused Gallardo. All these acts establish a common criminal
design mutually deliberated upon and accomplished through coordinated
moves. There being conspiracy, accused-appellant shall be equally liable for
the acts of her co-accused even if she herself did not personally reap the fruits
of their execution.
While accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment, we do not agree
with the trial court that the same qualifies as large scale.
Accused-appellants conviction of the illegal recruitment in large scale was
based on her recruitment of Marie Purificacion Abenoja and Marilyn Mariano,
private complainants in Criminal Case No. 15320-R, and Araceli Abenoja,
private complainant in Criminal Case No. 15570-R. It was error for the trial
court to consider the three private complainants in the two criminal cases
when it convicted accused-appellant of illegal recruitment committed in large
scale. The conviction of illegal recruitment in large scale must be based on a
finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons, whether
individually or as a group. In People v. Reichl, et al.,
[31]
we reiterated the rule
we laid down in People v. Reyes
[32]
that:
x x x When the Labor Code speaks of illegal recruitment committed against three (3)
or more persons individually or as a group, it must be understood as referring to the
number of complainants in each case who are complainants therein, otherwise,
prosecutions for single crimes of illegal recruitment can be cumulated to make out a
case of large scale illegal recruitment. In other words, a conviction for large-scale
illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of
three or more persons whether individually or as a group. (Underscoring ours)
Accused-appellant likewise assails the decision of the trial court in
Criminal Cases Nos. 15570-R and 15571-R for simple illegal recruitment and
estafa, respectively, saying that these two criminal cases should have been
dismissed for lack of evidence. The only evidence presented in these cases
was the testimony of Marie Purificacion Abenoja, Araceli Abenojas sister, on
her alleged payment of the placement fees for Aracelis application. By
Aracelis failure to testify, she failed to prove the facts and circumstances
surrounding her alleged recruitment and the person accountable therefor.
We are not persuaded. In People v. Gallarde,
[33]
we held:
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The prosecution is not always
tasked to present direct evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of
direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an accused from any criminal
liability. Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, provided that the established circumstances constitute an
unbroken chain which leads one to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person,i.e., the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except
that of guilty.
The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (1) there must
be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and
(3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused.
The circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when scrutinized and taken
together, leads to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant and co-
accused Gallardo conspired in recruiting and promising a job overseas to
Araceli Abenoja. Moreover, Marie Purificacion Abenoja had personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the charges filed by
her sister, Araceli, for simple illegal recruitment and estafa. Marie was privy to
the recruitment of Araceli as she was with her when both accused-appellant
and Gallardo required Araceli to undergo physical examination to find out
whether the latter was fit for the job abroad.
[34]
Accused-appellant even
admitted that she was the one who introduced Marie and Araceli to Gallardo
when they went to the latters house.
[35]
Marie was the one who shouldered the
placement fee of her sister Araceli.
[36]

Furthermore, the private complainants in this case did not harbor any ill
motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant and Gallardo. Accused-
appellant failed to show any animosity or ill-feeling on the part of the
prosecution witnesses which could have motivated them to falsely accuse her
and Gallardo. It would be against human nature and experience for strangers
to conspire and accuse another stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify
their hurt feelings.
[37]
As such, the testimony of private complainants that
accused-appellant was the person who transacted with them, promised them
jobs and received money therefor, was correctly given credence and regarded
as trustworthy by the trial court.
In sum, accused-appellant is only guilty of two (2) counts of illegal
recruitment. Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8042
[38]
otherwise known as
the Migrant Workers Act of 1995, any person found guilty of illegal
recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6)
years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not
less than two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
The provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law are applicable, as held
in People v. Simon:
[39]

It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an
offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. We hold
that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special
law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the
Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be
said that the offense is punished under that law.
Guided by the foregoing principle, accused-appellant shall be made to
suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P200,000.00, for each count of
illegal recruitment.
The Court likewise affirms the conviction of accused-appellant for estafa
on three (3) counts. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under the
Revised Penal Code, Article 315, paragraph 2(a). As we held in People v.
Yabut:
[40]

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be
charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and
estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the
accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does
not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for
estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction
for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the
crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.
The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellant was guilty of estafa under the Revised Penal Code, Article 315
paragraph (2) (a), which provides that estafa is committed:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The evidence is clear that in falsely pretending to possess the power to
deploy persons for overseas placement, accused-appellant deceived Marie,
Araceli and Marilyn into believing that the recruitment would give them
greener opportunities as caregivers in Canada. Accused-appellants
assurance constrained the private complainants to part with their hard-earned
money in exchange for a slot in the overseas job in Canada. The elements of
deceit and damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present. Hence,
the conviction of accused-appellant for three (3) counts of estafa in Criminal
Cases Nos. 15323-R, 15327-R and 15571-R should be upheld.
Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused found guilty of estafa shall be
sentenced to:
x x x The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; x x x.
In applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we had
occasion to reiterate our ruling in People v. Ordono
[41]
in the very recent case
of People v. Angeles,
[42]
to wit:
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. The penalty next lower should
be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the
crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound
discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term
of the indeterminate sentence.
Similarly, in People v. Saulo,
[43]
we further elucidated on how to apply the
Indeterminate Sentence Law for the charge of estafa:
Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant
is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower
in degree is prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of
the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day
to four (4) years and two (2) months.
In fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time, each
of which portion shall be deemed to form one period, as follows
Minimum Period: From 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5
months and 10 days
Medium Period: From 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months
and 20 days
Maximum Period: From 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years
pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code.
When the amounts involved in the offense exceeds P22,000, the penalty prescribed in
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, although the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years.
In Criminal Case No. 15323-R, Marilyn Mariano testified that upon
instruction of accused-appellant she gave accused Gallardo a total of
P36,500.00.
In Criminal Case Nos. 15327-R and 15571-R, Marie Purificacion Abenoja
testified that she gave the amounts of P18,000.00 and P52,000.00 to accused
Gallardo and accused-appellant. Out of the amount of P52,000.00,
P35,000.00 was intended to answer for the placement fee of her sister Araceli
Abenoja, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 15571-R. The
remaining P17,000.00 formed part of the balance of Maries placement
fee. Accordingly, accused-appellant shall be criminally liable for the amount
of P35,000.00 in Criminal Cases No. 15327-R and P35,000.00 in Criminal
Case No. 15571-R.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 15320-R, accused-appellant Remedios Malapit is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Illegal Recruitment only,
and is sentenced to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P200,000.00.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 15323-R, accused-appellant Remedios Malapit is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a
prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, and
is ORDERED to indemnify Marilyn Mariano the amount of P36,500.00.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 15327-R, accused-appellant Remedios Malapit is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a
prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, and
is ORDERED to indemnify Marie Purificacion Abenoja the amount of P35,000.00.
(4) In Criminal Case No. 15570-R, accused-appellant Remedios Malapit is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Illegal Recruitment and is
sentenced to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P200,000.00.
(5) In Criminal Case No. 15571-R, accused-appellant Remedios Malapit is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a
prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, and
is ORDERED to indemnify Araceli Abenoja the amount of P35,000.00
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 115338-39. September 16, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LANIE ORTIZ-
MIYAKE accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J .:
Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment
in large scale in the Regional Trial Court of Makati on a complaint initiated by
Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. In addition,
she was indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in the same court, the
offended party being Elenita Marasigan alone.
The information in the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale in
Criminal Case No. 92-6153 reads as follows:
That in or about the period comprised from June 1992 to August 1992, in the
Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, falsely representing herself to have
the capacity and power to contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment abroad
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously collect for a fee, recruit and
promise employment/job placement abroad to the following persons, to wit: 1)
Rosamar del Rosario; 2) Elenita Marasigan; 3) Imelda Generillo, without first
securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment, thus amounting to illegal recruitment in large scale, in violation of the
aforecited law.
[1]

The information in the charge for estafa in Criminal Case No. 92-6154
alleges:
That in or about or sometime in the month of August, 1992, in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of false pretenses executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, falsely pretending to have the
capacity and power to send complainant Elenita Marasigan to work abroad, succeeded
in inducing the latter to give and deliver to her the total sum of P23,000.00, the
accused knowing fully well that the said manifestations and representation are false
and fraudulent and calculated only to deceive the said complainant to part with her
money, and, once in possession thereof, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, apply and convert the same to her own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Elenita Marasigan,
in the aforementioned amount of P23,000.00.
[2]

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges and the
cases were tried jointly in Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Of the three complainants in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale,
Marasigan was the only one who testified at the trial. The two other
complainants, Generillo and Del Rosario, were unable to testify as they were
then abroad.
Marasigan testified that she was a 32 year-old unmarried sales
representative in 1992 when she was introduced to appellant by her co-
complainants.
[3]
Appellant promised Marasigan a job as a factory worker in
Taiwan for a P5,000.00 fee. At that time, Marasigan had a pending
application for overseas employment pending in a recruitment
agency. Realizing that the fee charged by appellant was much lower than that
of the agency, Marasigan withdrew her money from the agency and gave it to
appellant.
[4]

Marasigan paid appellant P5,000.00, but she was later required to make
additional payments. By the middle of the year, she had paid a total
of P23,000.00 on installment basis.
[5]
Save for two receipts,
[6]
Marasigan was
not issued receipts for the foregoing payments despite her persistence in
requesting for the same.
Marasigan was assured by appellant that obtaining a Taiwanese visa
would not be a problem.
[7]
She was also shown a plane ticket to Taiwan,
allegedly issued in her name.
[8]
Appellant issued Marasigan a photocopy of
her plane ticket,
[9]
the original of which was promised to be given to her before
her departure.
[10]

Marasigan was never issued a visa.
[11]
Neither was she given the promised
plane ticket. Unable to depart for Taiwan, she went to the travel agency which
issued the ticket and was informed that not only was she not booked by
appellant for the alleged flight, but that the staff in the agency did not even
know appellant.
Later, Marasigan proceeded to the supposed residence of appellant and
was informed that appellant did not live there.
[12]
Upon verification with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), it was revealed that
appellant was not authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment.
[13]
Marasigan wanted to recover her money but, by then,
appellant could no longer be located.
The prosecution sought to prove that Generillo and Del Rosario, the two
other complainants in the illegal recruitment case, were also victimized by
appellant. In lieu of their testimonies, the prosecution presented as witnesses
Lilia Generillo, the mother of Imelda Generillo, and Victoria Amin, the sister of
Del Rosario.
Lilia Generillo claimed that she gave her daughter P8,000.00 to cover her
application for placement abroad which was made through appellant.
[14]
Twice,
she accompanied her daughter to the residence of appellant so that she could
meet her; however, she was not involved in the transactions between her
daughter and appellant.
[15]
Neither was she around when payments were
made to appellant. Imelda Generillo was unable to leave for abroad and Lilia
Generillo concluded that she had become a victim of illegal recruitment.
The prosecution presented Victoria Amin, the sister of Rosamar Del
Rosario, to show that the latter was also a victim of illegal
recruitment. Victoria Amin testified that appellant was supposed to provide
her sister a job abroad. She claimed that she gave her sister a total
of P10,000.00 which was intended to cover the latters processing fee.
[16]

Victoria Amin never met appellant and was not around when her sister
made payments. She assumed that the money was paid to appellant based
on receipts, allegedly issued by appellant, which her sister showed her.
[17]
Del
Rosario was unable to leave for abroad despite the representations of
appellant. Victoria Amin claimed that her sister, like Marasigan and Generillo,
was a victim of illegal recruitment.
The final witness for the prosecution was Riza Balberte,
[18]
a representative
of the POEA, who testified that appellant was neither licensed nor authorized
to recruit workers for overseas employment, POEA certificate certification.
[19]

Upon the foregoing evidence, the prosecution sought to prove that
although two of the three complainants in the illegal recruitment case were
unable to testify, appellant was guilty of committing the offense against all
three complainants and, therefore, should be convicted as charged.
On the other hand, appellant, who was the sole witness for the defense,
denied that she recruited the complainants for overseas employment and
claimed that the payments made to her were solely for purchasing plane
tickets at a discounted rate as she had connections with a travel agency.
[20]

She denied that she was paid by Marasigan the amount of P23,000.00,
claiming that she was paid only P8,000.00, as shown by a receipt. She
further insisted that, through the travel agency,
[21]
she was able to purchase
discounted plane tickets for the complainants upon partial payment of the
ticket prices, the balance of which she guaranteed. According to her, the
complainants were supposed to pay her the balance but because they failed
to do so, she was obliged to pay the entire cost of each ticket.
The evidence presented by the parties were thus contradictory but the trial
court found the prosecutions evidence more credible. On December 17,
1993, judgment was rendered by said court convicting appellant of both
crimes as charged.
[22]

In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court
adopted a previous decision of Branch 78 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Paraaque as a basis for the judgment. Said previous decision was a
conviction for estafa promulgated on July 26, 1993,
[23]
rendered in Criminal
Cases Nos. 74852-53, involving the same circumstances in the instant case,
wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with two
counts of estafa. This decision was not appealed and had become final and
executory.
In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment case, the decision
therein of the Regional Trial Court stated that the facts in the foregoing estafa
cases were the same as those in the illegal recruitment case before it. It,
therefore, adopted the facts and conclusions established in the earlier
decision as its own findings of facts and as its rationale for the conviction in
the case before it.
[24]

In Criminal Case No. 92-6153, the Makati court sentenced appellant to
serve the penalty of life imprisonment for illegal recruitment in large scale, as
well as to pay a fine ofP100,000.00. Appellant was also ordered to reimburse
the complainants the following payments made to her, viz.: (a)
Marasigan, P23,000.00; (b) Generillo, P2,500.00; and (c) Del
Rosario, P2,500.00.
In the same judgment and for the estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 92-
6154, the Makati court sentenced appellant to suffer imprisonment of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
In the instant petition, appellant seeks the reversal of the foregoing
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati convicting her of illegal
recruitment in large scale and estafa. Specifically, she insists that the trial
court erred in convicting her of illegal recruitment in large scale as the
evidence presented was insufficient.
Moreover, appellant claims that she is not guilty of acts constituting illegal
recruitment, in large scale or otherwise, because contrary to the findings of
the trial court, she did not recruit the complainants but merely purchased
plane tickets for them. Finally, she contends that in convicting her of estafa,
the lower court erred as she did not misappropriate the money paid to her by
Marasigan, hence there was no damage to the complainants which would
substantiate the conviction.
We uphold the finding that appellant is guilty but we are, compelled to
modify the judgment for the offenses she should be convicted of and the
corresponding penalties therefor.
Appellant maintains that her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale
is erroneous. It is her view that in the prosecution of a case for such offense,
at least three complainants are required to appear as witnesses in the trial
and, since Marasigan was the only complainant presented as a witness, the
conviction was groundless.
The Solicitor General also advocates the conviction of appellant for simple
illegal recruitment which provides a lower penalty. The Court finds the
arguments of the Solicitor General meritorious and adopts his position.
The Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as x x x any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not x x x.
[25]

Illegal recruitment is likewise defined and made punishable under the
Labor Code, thus:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. -
(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority
shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x x x.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.
x x x Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against
three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
Art. 39. Penalties. -
(a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) shall be imposed if Illegal Recruitment constitutes economic sabotage
as defined herein;
x x x
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title
found violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall,
upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4)
years nor more than eight (8) years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more
than P100,000.00, or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court.
x x x
[26]

During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, was
passed increasing the penalty for illegal recruitment. This new law, however,
does not apply to the instant case because the offense charged herein was
committed in 1992, before the effectivity of said Republic Act No.
8042. Hence, what are applicable are the aforecited Labor Code provisions.
It is evident that in illegal recruitment cases, the number of persons
victimized is determinative. Where illegal recruitment is committed against a
lone victim, the accused may be convicted of simple illegal recruitment which
is punishable with a lower penalty under Article 39(c) of the Labor
Code. Corollarily, where the offense is committed against three or more
persons, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which provides a
higher penalty under Article 39(a) of the same Code.
The position of the Solicitor General is that the conviction of appellant
should be merely for the lesser offense of simple illegal recruitment. He
submits that the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in convicting appellant of
illegal recruitment in large scale because the conviction was based on an
earlier decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque where appellant
was found guilty of estafa committed against Generillo and Del Rosario.
It is argued that the Makati court could not validly adopt the facts
embodied in the decision of the Paraaque court to show that illegal
recruitment was committed against Generillo and Del Rosario as well. Illegal
recruitment was allegedly proven to have been committed against only one
person, particularly, Elenita Marasigan. Appellant, therefore, may only be
held guilty of simple illegal recruitment and not of such offense in large scale.
He further submits that the adoption by the Makati court of the facts in the
decision of the Paraaque court for estafa to constitute the basis of the
subsequent conviction for illegal recruitment is erroneous as it is a violation of
the right of appellant to confront the witnesses, that is, complainants Generillo
and Del Rosario, during trial before it. He cites the pertinent provision of Rule
115 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be entitled:
x x x
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party
may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of
or cannot, with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise
unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
x x x
It will be noted that the principle embodied in the foregoing rule is likewise
found in the following provision of Rule 130:
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or
deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter,
may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-
examine him.
Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed
the right of confrontation. Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the
opportunity of cross-examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe
the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying.
[27]

This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes
impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already testified in a
previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is made
admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay
rule.
[28]
The previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the
administration of justice orderly and expeditious.
[29]

Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated
in the decision of the Paraaque trial court does not fall under the exception to
the right of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers only
the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous
proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or
judgments.
In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by
complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in the previous estafa case. Instead,
what was offered, admitted in evidence, and utilized as a basis for the
conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was the previous
decision in the estafa case.
A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only
prove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime.
[30]
It may not be
used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent
case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as
said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for
conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the
accused to confront the witnesses against him.
As earlier stated, the Makati courts utilization of and reliance on the
previous decision of the Paraaque court must be rejected. Every conviction
must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its
appreciation of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely
on the findings of fact of another court, especially where what is presented is
only its decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who
testified therein and upon which the decision is based.
Furthermore, this is not the only reason why appellant may not be held
liable for illegal recruitment in large scale. An evaluation of the evidence
presented before the trial court shows us that, apart from the adopted decision
in the previous estafa case, there was no other basis for said trial courts
conclusion that illegal recruitment in large scale was committed against all
three complainants.
The distinction between simple illegal recruitment and illegal recruitment in
large scale are emphasized by jurisprudence. Simple illegal recruitment is
committed where a person: (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined
under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Articles 34
and 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a license or authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.
[31]
On the other
hand, illegal recruitment in large scale further requires a third element, that is,
the offense is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.
[32]

In illegal recruitment in large scale, while the law does not require that at
least three victims testify at the trial, it is necessary that there is sufficient
evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more
persons. This Court agrees with the trial court that the evidence presented
sufficiently proves that illegal recruitment was committed by appellant against
Marasigan, but the same conclusion cannot be made as regards Generillo
and Del Rosario as well.
The testimonies of Generillos mother, Lilia Generillo, and Del Rosarios
sister, Victoria Amin, reveal that these witnesses had no personal knowledge
of the actual circumstances surrounding the charges filed by Generillo and Del
Rosario for illegal recruitment in large scale. Neither of these witnesses was
privy to the transactions between appellant and each of the two
complainants. The witnesses claimed that appellant illegally recruited
Generillo and Del Rosario. Nonetheless, we find their averments to be
unfounded as they were not even present when Generillo and Del Rosario
negotiated with and made payments to appellant.
For insufficiency of evidence and in the absence of the third element of
illegal recruitment in large scale, particularly, that the offense is committed
against three or more persons, we cannot affirm the conviction for illegal
recruitment in large scale. Nonetheless, we agree with the finding of the trial
court that appellant illegally recruited Marasigan, for which she must be held
liable for the lesser offense of simple illegal recruitment.
Appellants defense that she did not recruit Marasigan but merely
purchased a plane ticket for her is belied by the evidence as it is undeniable
that she represented to Marasigan that she had the ability to send people to
work as factory workers in Taiwan. Her pretext that the fees paid to her were
merely payments for a plane ticket is a desperate attempt to exonerate herself
from the charges and cannot be sustained.
Furthermore, no improper motive may be attributed to Marasigan in
charging appellant. The fact that Marasigan was poor does not make her so
heartless as to contrive a criminal charge against appellant. She was a
simple woman with big dreams and it was appellants duplicity which reduced
those dreams to naught. Marasigan had no motive to testify falsely against
appellant except to tell the truth.
[33]

Besides, if there was anyone whose testimony needed corroboration, it
was appellant as there was nothing in her testimony except the bare denial of
the accusations.
[34]
If appellant really intended to purchase a plane ticket and
not to recruit Marasigan, she should have presented evidence to support this
claim. Also, in her testimony, appellant named an employee in the travel
agency who was allegedly her contact person for the purchase of the
ticket. She could have presented that person, or some other employee of the
agency, to show that the transaction was merely for buying a ticket. Her
failure to do the foregoing acts belies her pretensions.
The Court likewise affirms the conviction of appellant for estafa which was
committed against Marasigan. Conviction under the Labor Code for illegal
recruitment does not preclude punishment under the Revised Penal Code for
the felony of estafa.
[35]
This Court is convinced that the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant violated Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that estafa is committed:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits.
The evidence is clear that in falsely pretending to possess power to deploy
persons for overseas placement, appellant deceived the complainant into
believing that she would provide her a job in Taiwan. Her assurances made
Marasigan exhaust whatever resources she had to pay the placement fee
required in exchange for the promised job. The elements of deceit and
damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present, hence the conviction
for estafa in Criminal Case No. 92-6154 should be affirmed.
Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused found guilty of estafa shall be
sentenced to:
x x x The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos x x x.
[36]

The amount involved in the estafa case is P23,000.00. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the
maximum period of the foregoing basic penalty, specifically, within the range
of imprisonment from six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
to eight (8) years.
On the other hand, the minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that provided
by law, without considering the incremental penalty for the amount in excess
of P22,000.00.
[37]
That penalty immediately lower in degree is prison
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, with a duration of six (6)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. On these
considerations, the trial court correctly fixed the minimum and maximum terms
of the indeterminate sentence in the estafa case.
While we must be vigilant and should punish, to the fullest extent of the
law, those who prey upon the desperate with empty promises of better lives,
only to feed on their aspirations, we must not be heedless of the basic rule
that a conviction may be sustained only where it is for the correct offense and
the burden of proof of the guilt of the accused has been met by the
prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant
Lanie Ortiz-Miyake guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal
recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. 92-6153) and estafa (Criminal
Case No. 92-6154) is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
1) Accused-appellant is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple illegal
recruitment, as defined in Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended. She is hereby
ordered to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, as minimum, to eight (8)
years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P100,000.00.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-6154 for estafa, herein accused-appellant is ordered to
serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years ofprision mayor, as maximum, and to
reimburse Elenita Marasigan the sum of P23,000.00.
In all other respects, the aforestated judgment is AFFIRMED, with costs
against accused-appellant in both instances.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 121179 July 2, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONINE B. SALEY a.k.a. ANNIE B. SALEY, accused-appellant.

VITUG, J .:
The case before the Court focuses on the practice of some "illegal recruiters" who would
even go to the extent of issuing forged tourist visas to aspiring overseas contract workers.
These unsuspecting job applicants are made to pay exorbitant "placement" fees for nothing
really since, almost invariably, they find themselves unable to leave for their purported
country of employment or, if they are able to, soon find themselves unceremoniously
repatriated. This Court once described their plight in a local proverb as being "naghangad
ng kagitna, isang salop ang nawala."
1

In this appeal from the 3rd March 1995 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet, Branch 10,
2
appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal
of the verdict finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa
punishable under the Revised Penal Code and six counts of illegal recruitment, one
committed in large scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.
Appellant was indicted in eleven separate informations for estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(1), of the Revised Penal Code. The cases (naming the complainants and
stating the amounts therein involved) include: (1) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-
1397
3
(Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00); (2) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414
(Victoria Asil P33,000.00); (3) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 (Cherry Pi-ay
P18,000.00); (4) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 (Corazon del Rosario P40,000.00); (5)
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 (Arthur Juan P24,200.00); (6) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-
1644 (Alfredo C. Arcega P25,000.00); (7) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646 (Brando B.
Salbino P25,000.00); (8) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647 (Mariano Damolog
P25,000.00); (9) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649 (Lorenzo Belino P25,000.00); (10)
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651 (Peter Arcega P25,000.00) and (11) Criminal Case No.
93-CR-1652 (Adeline Tiangge P18,500.00).
Except for the name of the offended party, the amount involved and the date of the
commission of the crime, the following information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652
typified the other informations for the crime of estafa:
That in or about the month of December, 1991, and sometime prior to or
subsequent thereto, at Buyagan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of
Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to defraud ADELINE TIANGGE y
MARCOS and by means of deceit through false representations and
pretenses made by her prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the
fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud said
ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS, by then and there representing herself as a
duly authorized or licensed recruiter for overseas employment, when in truth
and in fact she was not, thereby inducing the said ADELINE TIANGGE y
MARCOS to give and deliver to her the total amount of EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P18,500.00), Philippine Currency, for
placement abroad and after having received it, she appropriated and
misappropriated the same for her own use and benefit and despite-repeated
demands made upon (her) to return the same, she refused, failed, neglected,
and still refuses, fails and neglects to comply therewith, all to the damage and
prejudice of ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS in the total sum aforesaid.
Contrary to law.
4

For the violation of Article 38, in relation to Article 39, of the Labor Code, five separate
informations were also instituted against appellant on various dates. These cases (with the
names of the complainants) include: (1) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396 (Francisco T.
Labadchan); (2) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 (Cherry Pi-ay); (3) Criminal Case No. 92-
CR-1416 (Victoria Asil); (4) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 (Corazon del Rosario) and (5)
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 (Arthur Juan). The typical information in these indictments
read:
That sometime in the month of April, 1991 and subsequent thereto at
Buyagan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit one ARTHUR JUAN
for overseas employment, by then and there ably misrepresenting herself as
a duly authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she fully knew
it to be false but by reason of her said misrepresentations which were
completely relied upon by Arthur Juan, she was able to obtain from the latter
the total amount of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS
(P24,200.00), Philippine Currency, all to the damage and prejudice of Arthur
Juan in the total sum aforesaid.
Contrary to Law.
5

The information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale under
Article 38, paragraph 1, of Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code), as amended, filed on
16 April 1993, read:
That in or about the months of August and September, 1992, in the
Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit the following: PETER
ARCEGA, LORENZO BELINO, MARIANO DAMOLOG, FIDEL OPDAS,
BRANDO B. SALBINO, DEMBER LEON and ALFREDO C. ARCEGA for
overseas employment, by then and there misrepresenting herself as a duly
authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she was not and by
reason of her said misrepresentation which was completely relied upon by the
said complainants whom she recruited, either individually or as a group
amounting to illegal recruitment in large scale causing economic sabotage,
she was able to obtain and received from them the aggregate total amount of
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P175,000.00),
Philippine Currency, all to the damage and prejudice of the foregoing
complainants in the total sum aforesaid.
Contrary to law.
6

Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges of illegal recruitment and estafa. The criminal
cases filed were raffled off to two (2) branches of the Regional Trial Court of Benguet; later,
however, the cases were consolidated at the instance of the prosecution.
Parenthetically, appellant jumped bail pending trial but she was soon arrested by agents of
the Criminal Investigation Service ("CIS").
The Evidence for the Prosecution.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396
Francisco Labadchan, a 25-year-old employee in the Navy Base in Pacdal, Baguio City,
was introduced to appellant by Crispin Perez. In September 1991, the two went to the
house of Conchita Tagle at Kilometer 3, La Trinidad, Benguet, who was known to be
recruiting workers for abroad. After Labadchan had expressed interest in applying for a job
in Korea, Tagle told Labadchan to prepare P45,000.00, P30,000.00 of which was to be paid
that month and the balance of P15,000.00 before his departure for abroad. Labadchan paid
Tagle the amount of P30,000.00 on 23 September 1991. Appellant, in turn, received that
amount when she went to La Trinidad to "brief" him. She told Labadchan that his flight
would be on the 9th of October 1991 and that he should have paid by then the balance of
P15,000.00 of the fees. He paid Tagle the P15,000.00 balance on 05 October 1991. When
he requested her to make a receipt, Tagle included the amount in the old receipt for the
P30,000.00 previously given. Appellant handed over to Labadchan some papers to fill up
and gave last-minute instructions before she boarded a green-colored aircraft.
On 08 October 1991, Labadchan and his wife went to Manila and stayed, as so instructed
by Tagle, at the Prince Hotel near the terminal of the Dangwa bus company in Dimasalang,
Manila. There, he met other people, among them, his co-complainant Arthur Juan. In the
morning of 09 October 1991, Labadchan and the others were told to go to the airport with
Tagle, where appellant was supposed to give the travel papers including passports and
plane tickets for Korea. At the airport, however, appellant told the group that their flight had
been re-scheduled for 11 October 1991. Labadchan returned to Baguio City.
On 11 October 1991, Labadchan returned to the airport only to be told this time, however,
that his passport was still with the Department of Foreign Affairs. Appellant told her husband
to accompany Labadchan to the Foreign Affairs office. When Labadchan received the
passport, he saw that while his picture appeared on it, the passport was made out in the
name of a person from Negros Occidental. Labadchan had to imitate the signature on the
passport just so he could get it. Back at the airport, he was allowed inside the terminal but
only to be later sent out because the ticket he had was one intended for passage from
Korea and not to Korea. Asserting that he and company were mere "chance passengers,"
appellant sent them all home with a promise that another departure date would be set. She
also took back the "show money" of US$1,000.00.
Appellant would repeatedly schedule a departure date but nothing tangible came out of her
assurances. Finally, Labadchan was able to get appellant to promise that the money he had
given her would be refunded. When this promise neither materialized, Labadchan finally
reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"). In that office, appellant
executed a promissory note stating that she would return the amount of P46,500.00, which
included the amount of P1,500.00 allegedly used for getting a passport, to Labadchan.
7

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416
Victoria Asil, a 40-year-old housewife from Imelda Village, Roxas Street, Baguio City, heard
from her elder sister, Feling Derecto, that appellant was recruiting workers for abroad.
During the second week of January 1992, she, along with her husband Gabriel, went to
appellant's house in Buyagan, La Trinidad. Appellant assured her that she could have a job
in a factory in Korea. Appellant asked for an advance fee of P25,000.00 of the P40,000.00
agreed fee. Victoria gave appellant the "advance fee" on 13 January 1992 at her (Victoria's)
shop in Shopper's Lane, Baguio City which appellant acknowledged by issuing a receipt for
the amount. She told Victoria to be at appellant's house in Buyagan after three weeks.
When Victoria went to appellant's house as so directed, appellant told her that her flight had
been postponed supposedly because prior applicants had to be accommodated first.
Victoria met appellant seven more times only to be ultimately told that the latter had been
allegedly "fooled" by the "main office" in Manila. Appellant, nevertheless, demanded an
additional P5,000.00 from Victoria so that she could leave on 18 April 1992. Victoria gave
appellant the amount of P5,000.00 at her shop on 31 March 1992 for which appellant gave
a corresponding receipt.
When on 18 April 1992 still "nothing happened," Victoria demanded from appellant a refund.
Appellant gave her an "advance" of P15,000.00. An acknowledgment receipt with
appellant's signature affixed thereon would evidence that payment. Appellant, however,
failed to return the rest of the promised refund.
8

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 and Criminal Case No 92-CR-1415
Cherry Pi-ay, a 26-year-old nursing student from Acop, Tublay, Benguet, was visited once
in March 1991 by appellant who encouraged Cherry to apply for work in a textile or a plastic
factory in Korea with a monthly salary of US$800.00. Appellant told Cherry that the moment
she would pay the amount of P45,000.00, she could be deployed in Korea. Cherry prepared
her bio-data and gave it to appellant at the latter's residence during the first week of April
1991.
Cherry was able to leave the country on 04 July 1991 after having paid the total amount of
P45,000.00. Appellant told her that a certain Ramil would meet her at the airport in Korea.
When she arrived, a Filipina, named Marlyn, instead met her. Marlyn introduced herself as
appellant's friend and accompanied Cherry to a certain house owned by a Korean. There,
Cherry met, among other compatriots, Corazon del Rosario and Jane Kipas. Cherry soon
realized that she was not going to have a job in the factory promised by appellant. Instead,
she was made to work for the Korean applying rugby on and folding leather jackets. About a
month later, men from the Korean Immigration accosted her and the others. Brought in for
questioning by Immigration officials, Cherry and her companions were informed that they
were illegal workers. After the investigation, Cherry and her group were allowed to go but on
08 August 1991, all were deported.
Back to the Philippines, the deportees were assured by appellant that they would get a
refund of their money. Cherry executed a sworn statement narrating her experience in
Korea.
9

Ayson Acbaya-an, Cherry's "boyfriend" who later was to become her husband, corroborated
Cherry's testimony that appellant first received P18,000.00 from Cherry. Thereafter,
appellant also received P27,000.00 from Cherry, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) of
which amount came from him. In both instances, appellant signed receipts for the
payments. The receipts were among Cherry's papers confiscated in Korea.
10

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426
Corazon del Rosario, a 34-year-old housemaid from 48 Happy Homes, Baguio City, had
known appellant, an acquaintance, since 1980. One day in December 1990, she happened
to chance upon appellant at a PLDT telephone booth in Kilometer 4, La Trinidad, Baguio
City. Appellant, representing herself to be an authorized recruiter, tried to persuade
Corazon to work abroad. Corazon showed interest. From then on, appellant would visit
Corazon in her brother's house in Kilometer 4. Ultimately, appellant was able to convince
Corazon that, for a fee of P40,000.00, she could be sent to Korea. Corazon gave appellant
the amount of P15,000.00. She paid the balance of P25,000.00 in May 1991. The payments
were both made in the presence of Cherry Pi-ay and Jane Kipas. Appellant issued the
corresponding receipts for these amounts.
Corazon took the flight for Korea on 28 June 1991. Appellant had instructed Corazon, upon
landing in Korea, to call up a certain Ramil. At the airport, Corazon, including her
companions among them Jane Kipas, kept on dialing the number but each time only a
Korean woman would answer the call. Later, that evening, a certain Marlyn, who introduced
herself as appellant's friend, took them to a hotel. There, Marlyn took their "show money" of
US$1,000.00. The group stayed overnight in the hotel and the following morning, a Korean
took them to a house proximately two hours away by car from the airport. For about a
month, they did nothing but apply rugby on leather jackets, for which they were not paid,
until a policeman arrived and took all ten of them to the airport. All that the immigration and
airport personnel would tell them was that they should be thankful they were only being
repatriated home. Immigration and airport authorities confiscated everything that they had.
At home, appellant promised to return Corazon's money. Not having received the promised
refund, Corazon went to the CIS stationed at Camp Dangwa where, on 28 July 1992, she
executed her sworn statement.
11

Avelina Velasco Samidan, a friend of Corazon and in whose house the latter would stay
whenever she was in Baguio, corroborated the testimony of Corazon that she gave to
appellant the amount of P15,000.00, ten thousand pesos of which amount Corazon
borrowed from Avelina, and that some time in April 1991, Corazon withdrew P25,000.00
from the bank which she likewise paid to appellant.
12

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428
Arthur Juan, a 30-year-old farmer from Dumulpot, Tublay, Benguet, first met appellant in her
house at Buyagan, La Trinidad, Benguet, when he, together with Maxima Gomez, Tirso
Gomez and Francisco Labadchan, went to see appellant who was said to be recruiting
workers for Korea. Juan promptly submitted his bio-data form after being told that he could
work in a factory in Korea at US$400.00 a month. Appellant quoted a processing fee of
P40,000.00. Juan initially paid the amount of P6,500.00 in April 1991. On 09 October 1991,
the scheduled date of the flight, Juan went to the airport and gave appellant another
P15,000.00; the final balance of the fees were, by their agreement, to be remitted to
appellant on a salary deduction basis. Appellant then told Juan that he could not leave on
that day (09 October 1991) because the airplane was already full. Appellant took back
Juan's passport, telling Juan that he should be able to depart in a few days. Appellant,
however, kept on rescheduling the flight for about five more times until it became clear to
Juan that he had been deceived. Juan paid out a total amount of P24,200.00, including the
US$100.00 that would have been his pocket money, to appellant. The latter executed
receipts for the amounts.
Juan executed a sworn statement narrating the unfortunate incident.
13

In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652
Adeline Tiangge, a 43-year-old housekeeper from Bangao, Buguias, Benguet, learned that
appellant was recruiting workers for abroad. Adeline, accompanied by her sister, went to
see appellant at her house in Buyagan some time in December 1991. There were others,
like her, who also went to see appellant. When she produced the required identification
pictures and P1,500.00 for passport processing, appellant told Adeline that she could be a
factory worker in Korea with a monthly salary of US$350.00. Appellant agreed to be paid by
Adeline the additional P35,000.00 balance by installment. The first installment of
P17,000.00 was paid on 15 February 1992, evidenced by a receipt signed by "Antonine
Saley," with the remaining P18,000.00 being payable before getting on her flight for abroad.
Adeline waited in Baguio City for word on her departure. Adeline, together with some other
applicants, thrice went to appellant's office at the Shopper's Lane to check. She also went to
Dimasalang, Manila, in front of the Dangwa terminal, for a like purpose. Appellant informed
her that she just had to wait for her flight. Adeline, exasperated, finally demanded a refund
of the amount she had paid but appellant merely gave her P100.00 for her fare back to
Benguet.
14

0
The sum of the evidence, infra., in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in
large scale had been submitted to likewise constitute the evidence to establish the People's
case, respectively, in
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644
Alfredo Arcega, a 42-year-old hotel employee from 16 Q.M. Subdivision, Baguio City, heard
from a former co-worker, Fidel Opdas, that appellant was recruiting workers for overseas
employment. Interested, he, in the company of his nephew, Peter Arcega, went to
appellant's house in Buyagan, La Trinidad. There, he met job applicants Dembert Leon,
Mariano Damolog and Brando Salbino. Appellant assured the group that they could get
employed in Taiwan for a monthly salary of P12,000.00 to P15,000.00. She told them that
the processing and placement fees would amount to P40,000.00 each. Arcega and his
companions agreed.
On 17 August 1992, Arcega paid appellant P10,000.00 in Dimasalang, Manila. Appellant
issued a cash voucher for the amount. She told Arcega to just wait "for the results." On 30
September 1992, appellant asked Arcega for another P15,000.00 which amount he paid.
With him at the time were his nephew Peter Arcega, as well as Dembert Leon, Mariano
Damolog, Lorenzo Belino and Brando Salbino. Appellant issued a receipt and affixed
thereon her signature. Appellant told Arcega that with the payment, his employment abroad
was assured. She stressed, however, that the balance of P15,000.00 should be paid before
his departure for Taiwan. After following up the matter with appellant in October 1992 and
then in December 1992, he finally gave up. Arcega went to the POEA office in Magsaysay
Avenue, Baguio City, and when he learned that appellant had pending cases for illegal
recruitment, he also filed his own complaint and executed an affidavit before Atty. Justinian
Licnachan.
15

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646
Brando Salbino, a 36-year-old resident of East Quirino Hill, Baguio City, used to be a
"forester" of the DENR. In July 1992, he met appellant at her Buyagan residence after his
brother-in-law, Fidel Opdas, had said that she was recruiting workers for abroad. Appellant
told him that she could help him get employed in Taiwan with a P12,000.00 monthly salary.
Salbino submitted various documents required by appellant. On 11 August 1992, Salbino
paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang "temporary office" so that,
according to her, his travel papers could be processed. The payment was receipted. On 30
September 1992, he paid her another P15,000.00, for which appellant again issued an
acknowledgment receipt.
Appellant told Salbino to merely wait in Baguio City. When she failed to show up, he went to
appellant's house in Buyagan to verify. She was not there. The following week, he went to
Manila with Fidel Opdas hoping to see her. Appellant's where abouts could not be
determined. Having failed to locate her, Salbino and his companions went to the POEA
office in Magsaysay, Baguio City. It was at the POEA office that they were to learn that
appellant was not in the list of licensed recruiters. He, along with the others, then executed
an affidavit-complaint before Atty. Licnachan.
16

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647
Mariano Damolog, a 33 year-old farmer from 26 P. Burgos Street, Baguio City, went to
appellant's residence in Buyagan in July 1992 when informed by Fidel Opdas, his co-worker
at the MIDO Restaurant, that appellant was recruiting workers for Taiwan. Appellant herself
later told Damolog that she was licensed to recruit workers. He forthwith applied for a
position at a factory in Taiwan with a salary of between US$400.00 and US$500.00 a
month. He, after being required to pay a processing fee, paid the amount of P10,000.00 to
appellant at her Manila office. Appellant gave him a cash voucher. Damolog was then
supposed to just wait in Baguio City for a telegram.
When he did not receive word from appellant, Damolog went to Manila to see what had
happened to his application. Appellant was again told to simply stand by in Baguio City.
After several days, Opdas, who had meanwhile gone to Manila, told Damolog to see
appellant in Manila. In Manila, appellant told Damolog to sign a bio-data form for "screening
purposes." Like Peter Arcega, Fred Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo Belino, he was
also asked to pay another P15,000.00. The group went back to Baguio City to raise the
amount of P15,000.00 each. On 30 September 1992, he, together with Fred and Peter
Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo Belino, returned to Manila. Damolog handed over his
P15,000.00 to appellant who issued an acknowledgment receipt, signed by "Annie Saley"
which, according to appellant, was her name. Appellant assured him that he would be
among the first to go to Taiwan by December 1992.
December 1992 came but no word was received prompting Damolog and his companions
to repair to appellant's house in Buyagan. She was not home. Damolog proceeded to
Manila where appellant told him to wait a few more days. When still "nothing happened,"
Damolog and his companions went to the POEA office where Atty. Licnachan issued a
certification stating that appellant was not authorized to recruit workers. Damolog and his
companions filed a joint affidavit-complaint executed before Atty. Licnachan
17
against
appellant.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649
Lorenzo Belino, a 37-year-old farmer from Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet, was in Manila in
August 1992 looking for employment. Fidel Opdas, a companion in his trip to Manila,
mentioned that perhaps appellant could help. Belino saw appellant who then told him about
the prospect of getting employed in Taiwan. Appellant invited him to see her on 20
September 1992 in Buyagan.
On the appointed date, Belino found Mariano Damolog, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino,
Dembert Leon, Alfredo Arcega and Peter Arcega already in appellant's residence in
Buyagan. Appellant asked P10,000.00 from each of them if they wanted her to be
"responsible for representing" them to get themselves employed in Taiwan with a monthly
income of P15,000.00. When the group agreed, appellant made them fill up and sign a bio-
data form. Appellant also made them understand that they would each have to pay her the
total amount of P40,000.00, P10,000.00 of which was to be forthwith paid and the balance
to be paid as and when everything would have been arranged for their flight to Taiwan.
On 23 September 1992, Belino paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang
office. Appellant issued a cash voucher therefor. Belino returned to Baguio City. Five days
later, Belino went down to Manila after appellant had sent word that he had to come to
Manila. On 30 September 1992, Belino paid in Manila the amount of P15,000.00 demanded
by appellant. Appellant signed her name as "Annie Saley" on the receipt. Appellant
informed Belino that he should wait for her telephone call regarding the schedule of his
flight. He waited but when no calls came, Belino and Opdas decided to visit appellant in her
house in Buyagan. Appellant asked to be given until January to deploy them in Taiwan.
February 1993 came, and still there was no news from appellant. In March 1993, Belino and
others, namely, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon and Alfredo Arcega,
18
decided
to file a complaint against appellant with the POEA in Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City,
where their sworn statements were taken.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651
Peter Arcega, a 27-year-old cashier from 317 Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, also paid
the amount of P10,000.00 to appellant for a promised job overseas. A cash voucher was
signed by appellant to acknowledge the payment. Peter, subsequently, also paid the
amount of P15,000.00 to appellant for which the latter issued a receipt signed by "Annie
Saley." He was among those who signed the affidavit-complaint before the POEA.
Testifying in Criminal Case No. 93-CN-1645,
19
as a corroborative witness, Dembert Leon, a
25 year-old unemployed from 52-F Tandang Sora Street, Baguio City, said that he, desiring
to get an employment abroad, likewise went to see appellant at her residence in Buyagan.
Accompanied by Fidel Opdas, Leon was told by appellant to complete the necessary
papers, including his bio-data, barangay clearance, ID and NBI clearance. Leon applied to
be a factory worker in Taiwan. He was assured a monthly salary of P12,000.00, but first,
appellant told him, he should commit to pay a placement fee of P40,000.00 of which amount
P10,000.00 had to be paid forthwith. Leon paid and a cash voucher, dated 08 September
1992, was issued by appellant. On 30 September 1992, he paid appellant another
P15,000.00 for which another acknowledgment receipt was issued. The remaining
P15,000.00 was agreed to be paid at the airport before his flight to Taiwan. No further word
came from appellant. Finally, in December 1992, when he and the others called her up,
appellant informed them to wait until January 1993. January came and still nothing
happened. In March 1993, Leon and the others went to the POEA office to lodge a
complaint against appellant.
20

Jose B. Matias, an Attorney II at the POEA Regional Station Unit in Baguio City, received a
request for verification on whether or not appellant was a licensed recruiter. In response, he
advised that appellant was not authorized to recruit "in the City of Baguio and in the region"
from 1989 "to the present." Atty. Matias issued a certification to that effect.
0
The Case for the Defense.
The defense posited the theory that appellant merely assisted the complainants in applying
for overseas employment with duly accredited travel agencies for and from which she
derived a commission.
21

According to the 37-year-old appellant, she used to be the liaison officer of the Friendship
Recruitment Agency from 1983 to 1986. In that capacity, she would submit to the POEA
"contracts for processing job orders for applicants" and assist applicants prior to their
departure at the airport. When the licensed agency closed in 1986, she went to Baguio
where she engaged in the purchase and sale of vegetables and flowers. Even then,
however, she would not hesitate extending help to applicants for overseas employment by
recommending licensed agencies which could assist said applicants in going abroad. She
named the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the Mannings International as such licensed
agencies. She had, in the process, been able to help workers, like Cherry Pi-ay, Corazon
del Rosario, Arthur Juan and Francisco Labadchan to name some, sent abroad.
22

Cherry Pi-ay was able to leave for Kuwait. In 1991, Cherry went to see her again, this time
asking for assistance in getting an employment in Korea. She accompanied Cherry to the
Dynasty Travel and Tours in Manila that enabled her to get a tourist visa to Korea. Appellant
herself later gave Cherry her tourist visa. For Cherry's visa and plane ticket, appellant
received from Cherry P15,000.00 and US$250.00. Appellant issued a receipt therefor and
delivered the amounts to the Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn, issued her a receipt.
The CIS men who arrested her in Manila confiscated that receipt. In August 1991, Cherry
came back and asked her to look for another travel agency saying she did not like the work
she had in Korea.
23

Norma Bao-idang, a former client of the Friendship Recruitment Agency, introduced
Corazon del Rosario to appellant. Since the agency had already been closed, appellant
referred Corazon to Mannings International in Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila. Corazon was
able to leave for Abu Dhabi where she worked as a domestic helper. In 1991, Corazon
again sought appellant's assistance in getting an employment in Korea. Appellant
introduced her to Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn, helped Corazon get a
tourist visa for Korea. She did ask for P15,000.00 and US$250.00 from Corazon but these
amounts, being for Corazon's ticket and hotel accommodation, were turned over to Dynasty
Travel and Tours. She also knew that Corazon was able to leave for Korea because she
herself handed over to Corazon her tourist visa and ticket. Appellant received P2,000.00
from Dynasty Travel and Tours by way of commission. She was also issued a receipt by
that travel agency showing that she had turned over to it the amounts received from
Corazon but the CIS men took the receipts and other documents from her. When Corazon
returned home in 1991 after going to Korea, she again sought appellant's help in looking for
a travel agency that could assist her in going back to that country.
24

Appellant came to know Arthur Juan through a vegetable vendor named Maxima Gomez.
He asked her for help in securing a tourist visa. Appellant was able to assist him and others,
like Francisco Labadchan, Tirso Gomez and Romeo Balao, by referring them to the Dynasty
Travel and Tours. Appellant asked from them the amounts of P15,000.00 and US$250.00
which she turned over to the travel agency. Again, she was issued a receipt by that agency
but that, too, was confiscated by the CIS agents who arrested her. Of the men who sought
her help in going abroad, seven "were able to leave." The others had been re-scheduled to
leave but they failed to arrive at the airport.
Labadchan and Juan met appellant during the first week of January 1993. She gave them
back the plane ticket and the amount of US$250.00 so that they could ask for a refund from
the travel agency. The next time she saw Labadchan was at the NBI office when NBI
Director Limmayog invited her for questioning. Appellant tried her best to look for a job for
Labadchan but the transaction she had with Fast International failed to push through.
25

Appellant helped Victoria Asil secure a tourist visa. The latter's sister was a former client at
the Friendship Recruitment Agency who was able to work in Saudi Arabia in 1985. She
introduced Victoria to the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant asked Victoria to advance
P15,000.00 and US$250.00 for her ticket and hotel accommodation. Victoria gave appellant
the amount, and the latter issued corresponding receipts. She turned over the amount to the
travel agency which, in turn, issued a receipt to appellant. The CIS, however, confiscated all
the documents in her attache case.
26
Appellant was able to process Victoria's visa for
Korea but when someone informed the latter that she could have a visa for Taiwan, Victoria
opted to change her destination. Appellant told Victoria that her visa and ticket for Korea
had already been obtained but Victoria insisted on a refund of her money. Appellant
returned to her P15,000.00 that was supposed to be the amount to be exchanged into
dollars for her "show money." Victoria issued a receipt for the amount but appellant
entrusted it to her former lawyer. Appellant handed over the plane ticket to Victoria.
27

Mercedes Quimson (Kimson) introduced appellant to Adeline Tiangge. When Adeline said
that she was interested in securing a tourist visa for Korea, appellant took her to the
Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant asked from Adeline the amount of P17,000.00 for her
plane ticket. Appellant was able to buy a plane ticket and to get a passport for Adeline. The
latter, however, later said that she was no longer interested in going to Korea and that her
passport application should, instead, be "diverted to Hongkong." In fact, Adeline was able to
leave for Hongkong. Adeline filed a case against appellant because when Adeline sought a
refund from Dynasty Travel and Tours, the agency only gave her P5,000.00 or just a half of
the P10,000.00 she wanted.
28

Fidel Opdas was appellant's client at the Friendship Agency who was able to leave for
Saudi Arabia. He asked her if she could find a job for him in Taiwan. When appellant told
him that she knew someone who could help, Opdas brought along Mariano Damolog.
Appellant introduced them to Marites Tapia and Carol Cornelio of Dynasty Travel and Tours
who told Opdas and Damolog to submit the necessary documents for their application for
work in Taiwan. In May 1993, Opdas returned with Brando Salbino who also talked to
Marites and Carol. Opdas submitted to appellant the documents required by Marites and
Carol. Appellant, in turn, gave the papers to Marites and Carol. When, later, Opdas went to
see appellant, he brought along Dembert Leon and Lorenzo Belino. Appellant requested
Opdas to accompany the two to Marites and Carol with whom they discussed what would
be necessary "for their application for Taiwan. Still later when Opdas came back with Peter
and Alfredo Arcega to see appellant, she again referred them to Marites and Carol. The job
applicants each gave appellant P10,000.00 which the latter turned over to Marites and
Carol. The two gave her receipts but these were in the same attache case that was seized
by the CIS agents and never returned. The group subsequently withdrew their applications
although it was only Opdas who received a P15,000.00 refund.
29

In a bid to prove that CIS agents indeed took away her attache case containing documents
that could bail her out of the charges, appellant presented Danilo A. Deladia, one of the
three policemen who arrested her. Equipped with a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Luis
Dictado of Branch 8, the policemen went to the house of appellant's cousin at 2320-B San
Antonio, Sampaloc, Manila at 3:00 p.m. of 25 August 1993. According to Deladia, however,
they did not get anything from appellant because their mission was only to arrest her. At the
counter intelligence branch of the CIS, he did not even hear appellant requesting for the
return of a brief case.
30
Apparently because of what had turned out to be Deladia's adverse
testimony, the defense presented George Santiago who claimed to be at the boarding
house when appellant was arrested. Santiago said that he had allowed the CIS agents to
enter the boarding house. Santiago did not see what might have happened in appellant's
room but what he did see was that when the agents all came out, they had with them an
attache case. Santiago, accompanied by his cousin Atty. Lomboan, went to the CIS in
Camp Crame where one of the men asked P50,000.00 for the release of appellant.
Santiago did not see any brief case in the office but one of the men told them that they
would "produce" appellant and the attache case if they could "produce" the amount of
P50,000.00.
31

On cross-examination, however, Santiago admitted that the P50,000.00 was meant for
"bonding purposes" and that they did not make a formal request for the release of the brief
case.
32

The defense next attempted to shift, albeit unsuccessfully, the responsibility for the crime
from appellant to Maritess and Carol. Presented at the witness stand was Oscar Gaoyen, a
30-year-old farmer, who testified that appellant had failed to assist him in going to Korea to
work "because it was difficult." While following up his application in Manila, he met Marites
and Carol in front of the Dangwa station in Dimasalang and he was told that they knew
someone who could "transfer his application to Taiwan." He said that even after he had paid
appellant P50,000.00, nothing happened constraining him to file charges against her.
Appellant returned P15,000.00 of the money to him.
33

Appellant filed, before the trial court could promulgate its decision, a "Motion to Reopen
Trial" with an urgent motion to defer promulgation on the ground of newly discovered
evidence.
34
In its order of 03 March 1995, the trial court, noting that the "newly discovered
evidence" consisted of affidavits of desistance of seven complainants, found no merit in the
motion. It held that "presentation of the same does not give valid ground for possible
amendment of the decision as the private complainants had already testified." It agreed with
the prosecutor that "the affidavits of desistance only (had) the effect of satisfying the civil
liability."
35

The Judgment of the Trial Court.
On 03 March 1995, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. It found implausible appellant's claim that she was
merely an agent of Dynasty Travel and Tours and/or Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio. If
what she claimed were true, said the court, appellant could have presented her principals;
instead, that failure exposed her to the "adverse inference and legal presumption that
evidence suppressed would be adverse if produced." It also found "hard to believe," the
"self-serving" claim of appellant that her brief case, supposedly containing receipts of her
remittances to the travel agencies, was confiscated by the CIS and remained unaccounted
for. The trial court concluded:
In fine, accused gave the distinct assurance, albeit false, that she had the ability to send
the complainants abroad for work deployment, thereby employing false pretenses to
defraud them. This was despite her knowing very well that she was not legally
authorized. The complainants willingly parted with their money in the hope of overseas
employment deceitfully promised them by the accused. What makes matters worse is
that these amounts given to the accused come from hard-earned money, or worse, could
have been borrowed from money lenders who have no qualms about collecting usurious
interest rates. Complainants who faithfully relied on the accused did not hesitate to
painstakingly raise or even beg or borrow money just so they could give a decent future
to their families even to the extent of leaving them for far-off lands. But now, all their
dreams are gone, their hopes shattered. Some may not have even been able to pay back
what they borrowed nor recoup their losses. Now, more than ever, their future appears
bleaker. But this time, a glimmering light appears at the end of the tunnel as the Court
steps in to lay down the iron fist of the law so as to serve the accused a lesson, a bitter
one, with the hope that those who are trekking or those who are about to trek the same
pilfered path that the accused took will reconsider their pursuits before it would be too
late, and in the end, this form of fraud which invariably victimizes the poor will forever be
stopped.
36

All given, the trial court then decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in all the above-mentioned cases, the Court finds accused
Antonine B. Saley, also known as Annie B. Saley, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the corresponding crime as charged in the informations
and hereby sentences her in each case, except in Criminal Case NO. 93-CR-
1645 where an indeterminate sentence is not applicable, to suffer an
indeterminate sentence for the duration hereunder given, and to pay the
costs, as well as the damages due the private complainants, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396
Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6)
Years as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan
P45,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397
Imprisonment from Three (3) Years, Six (6) Months and
Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to
Seven (7) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day ofprision
mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan
P45,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413
Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6)
Years as MAXIMUM and to pay Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 for
moral damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414
Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-
One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5)
Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision
correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria As-il P15,000.00
for actual damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415
Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-
One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5)
Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision
correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00
for moral damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416
Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6)
Years as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria As-il P15,000.00 for
actual damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425
Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6)
Years as MAXIMUM and to pay Corazon del Rosario
P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426
Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Seven (7) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years,
Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision mayor as
MAXIMUM and to pay Corazon del Rosario P20,000.00 for
moral damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427
Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6)
Years as MAXIMUM and to pay the costs.
Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428
Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-
One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5)
Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision
correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay the costs.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644
Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-
One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5)
Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision
correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo C. Arcega
P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645
To suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. She
shall also pay Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) each
to Peter Arcega, Lorenzo Belino, Mariano Damolog, Brando
Salbino, Dembert Leon and Alfredo Arcega for actual damages,
plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646
Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-
One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5)
Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision
correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando B. Salbino
P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647
Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-
One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5)
Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision
correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano Damolog
P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649
Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-
One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5)
Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision
correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo Belino
P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651
Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-
One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5)
Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision
correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega
P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652
Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-
One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5)
Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision
correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline Tiangge y
Marcos P17,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.
With respect to accused Conchita Tagle in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-CR-1396
and 92-CR-1397, let these cases be sent to the files without prejudice to their
revival as soon as she shall have been arrested and brought to the
jurisdiction of this Court.
In order that Conchita Tagle may not escape the clutches of the law,
let Alias Warrants of Arrest issue addressed to the PNP Chief of Police, La
Trinidad, Benguet and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila
and in Baguio City. Further, the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID), Manila is ordered to include her name in the its Hold-Departure List.
SO ORDERED.
37

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision asserting that the trial court had
erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and in finding her
guilty of the crimes charged despite the "failure" of the prosecution to fully establish the
elements of the crimes beyond reasonable doubt.
38
Finding no merit in the motion, the trial
court, on 03 April 1995, denied a reconsideration of its decision.
39
The following day,
appellant filed a notice of appeal.
40
The trial court gave due course to the appeal on 17
April 1995.
41

The Instant Appeal.
Appellant continues to profess before this Court her innocence of the accusation. She
reiterates her assertion that the trial court has erred in giving credence to the testimonies of
the complaining witnesses and in finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the various
offenses she has been charged with by the prosecution.
42
She avers that her transactions
with the complainants have been "limited to her assisting them secure their respective
travelvisa specifically for tourist" and that "her assistance to them (has been) only to refer
them to travel agencies" such as the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the Mannings
International. She insists that she has remitted the amounts solicited from the complainants
to the travel agencies, or to Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio, earning only the
commissions "for bringing in clients interested in getting tourist visas."
43

At the outset, it might be explained that this appeal involves the conviction of appellant not
only for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale for which the penalty of life
imprisonment is imposed but also for other offenses for which lesser penalties have been
meted by the trial court upon appellant. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over ordinary
appeals in criminal cases directly from the Regional Trial Courts when the penalty imposed
isreclusion perpetua or
higher.
44
The Rules of Court, allows, however, the appeal of criminal cases involving
penalties lower thanreclusion perpetua or life imprisonment under the circumstances stated
in Section 3, Rule 122, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but involving offenses
committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that
gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death or life
imprisonment is imposed shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance
with paragraph (a) of this Section.
In giving due course to the notice of appeal filed by appellant, the trial court has
directed that the "entire records of the seventeen cases" should be forwarded to this
Court.
45
It might be observed that this appeal, which has been assigned only one
docket number, involves cases, although spawned under different circumstances
could be said to somehow be linked to the incident giving rise to the case for illegal
recruitment in large scale. The cases have thus been correctly consolidated and
heard jointly below. The appeal made directly to this Court of the seventeen cases,
each of which incidentally should have been assigned a separate docket number in
this Court, is properly taken.
Art. 38 (a) of the Labor Code considers illegal any recruitment activity "undertaken by non-
licensees or non-holders of authority." Recruitment is defined by Article 13, paragraph (b),
of the same Code as referring
. . . to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur:
1) That the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable one to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers;
and
2) That the offender undertakes either any activity within
the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under
Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34.
46

Any person who commits the prohibited acts enumerated in Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code shall be liable under Article 38(a) thereof.
47
The proviso in Article 13(b)
"lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a
promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or
entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and
placement."
48
The article also provides that recruitment includes the act of referral or
"the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial
interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement
officer or bureau."
49

The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant, indeed, violated the law against illegal
recruitment.
The prosecution was able to prove by overwhelming evidence that appellant did represent
herself as being in a position to get for the aspiring overseas contract workers good-paying
jobs abroad. Appellant was thus able to demand and receive various amounts from the
applicants. The latter would then be briefed by appellant on the requirements for
employment overseas. Appellant herself testified, thus:
Q From 1986 when separated from Friendship Recruitment
Agency and before you were put to jail did you have any
occupation?
A Yes, sometimes we brought vegetables and flowers to Manila
for resale.
Q Aside from buying and selling vegetables down in Manila did
you have any other source of income?
A Sometimes I helped some applicants who are interested to
go abroad and asked if I know some agencies who can assist
them to go abroad.
Q Were you able to assist some people to look for an agency to
assist them to go abroad?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you being paid when you assist these people applying
for overseas employment?
A Yes, sir.
Q By whom?
A The travel agencies give me some amount of commission.
Q What are the names of these agencies which you know?
A Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Do you know also if this Dynasty Travel and Tours and
Mannings International is duly licensed by the government to
recruit applicants abroad?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you have any document to prove that it is registered?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where is that?
A Mannings International is a licensed agency and Dynasty
Travel and Tours is licensed to issue tickets for applicants to go
abroad.
Q You said that Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to issue
tickets for applicants going abroad what do you mean by
applicants going abroad?
A Those applicants to work as a contract worker and who are
ready to leave for abroad and they are being issued tickets.
Q Were you actually able to help or assist some overseas
worker-applicants?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you remember some of them?
A Cherry Piay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan, Francisco Labadchan
and others." (Emphasis supplied.)
50

Appellant at one point claimed that she had helped complainants only in acquiring
for them plane tickets and tourist visas. On cross-examination, however, she
admitted that she had made referrals of job applicants to recruitment
agencies.
51
She evidently knew all along that the persons she was dealing with were
applicants for employment abroad.
The law requires that the above activities of appellant should have first been authorized by
the POEA.
52
Rule II, Book II, of the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas
Employment provides:
Sec. 11. Appointment of Representatives. Every appointment of
representatives or agents of licensed agency shall be subject to prior
approval or authority of the Administration.
The approval may be issued upon submission of or compliance with the
following requirements:
a. Proposed appointment or special power of
attorney;
b. Clearances of the proposed representative or
agent from NBI;
c. A sworn or verified statement by the
designating or appointing person or company
assuming full responsibility for all acts of the
agent or representative done in connection with
the recruitment and placement of workers.
Approval by the Administration of the appointment or designation does not
authorize the agent or representative to establish a branch or extension office
of the licensed agency represented.
Any revocation or amendment in the appointment should be communicated to
the Administration. Otherwise, the designation or appointment shall be
deemed as not revoked or amended.
The claim that appellant did not categorically represent herself as a licensed recruiter, or
that she merely helped the complainants secure "tourist visas," could not make her less
guilty of illegal recruitment,
53
it being enough that he or she gave the impression of having
had the authority to recruit workers for deployment abroad.
54

The fact that, with the exception of the cases involving Cherry Pi-ay and Corazon del
Rosario, only the complainant in each of the cases, have testified against appellant in the
illegal recruitment cases does not thereby make the case for the prosecution weak. The rule
has always been that the testimony of witnesses is to be weighed, not that the witnesses be
numbered, and it is not an uncommon experience to have a conclusion of guilt reached on
the basis of the testimony of a single witness.
55
Corroborative evidence is necessary only
when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness has perjured himself or
that his observations have veered from the truth.
56

The absence of receipts to evidence payment to an indictee in a criminal case for illegal
recruitment does not warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to
the prosecution's cause. As long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible
testimonial evidence that the accused has involved himself in an act of illegal recruitment, a
conviction for the offense can very well be justified.
57

Altogether, the evidence against appellant has established beyond any discernible shadow
of doubt that appellant is indeed guilty of illegal recruitment on various counts. Being neither
a licensee nor a holder of authority to recruit, appellant must suffer under Article 39(c) of the
Labor Code the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight
years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00 or both such
imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court. In imposing the penalty, the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on the application of the circumstances that could modify the
criminal liability of an accused cannot be considered, these provisions being inapplicable to
special laws.
58

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
59
whenever the offense is punishable by a special
law, the court shall impose on the accused an indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term
of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same."
60
Accordingly, in imposing the penalty of
four (4) years to six (6) years on appellant for each of the five cases of illegal recruitment,
the trial court has acted correctly.
Illegal recruitment is committed in large scale if it is perpetrated against three or more
persons "individually or as a group." Its requisites are that: (1) the person charged with the
crime must have undertaken recruitment activities as so defined by law, (2) the same
person does not have a license or authority to do that, and (3) the questioned act is
committed against three or more persons.
61
The prosecution has been able to successfully
show that, for a fee, appellant, not being authorized to recruit workers for abroad, did so in
Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 against seven complainants. For this offense, Article 39(a)
of the Labor Code imposes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of one hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00). This penalty was thus likewise aptly meted out upon
appellant by the trial court.
Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment of
the offender for estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction while estafa is malum in se which
requires criminal intent to warrant conviction.
62
Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a),
63
of the
Revised Penal Code, the elements of the offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused has
defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person.
64
Clearly, these elements have sufficiently been shown in the cases under review.
The penalty for the crime is prescribed by Article 315, first to fourth paragraphs, of the
Revised Penal Code as follows:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does
not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed
200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed
by any of the following means: . . . .
In the case of People vs. Gabres,
65
the Court has had occasion to so state that
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty
shall be "that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed" under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be "within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed" for the offense. The
penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for
the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to
the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left
by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the
range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into
which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered
only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be
considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter
should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords
with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the
penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision
correccionalmaximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then
be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years and two (2) months . . . .
66

The Court reiterates the above rule, however, in fixing the maximum term, the
prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum period to prision
mayor minimum period should be divided into "three equal portions of time," each of
which portion shall be deemed to form one period; hence
Minimum Period Medium Period Maximum Period
From 4 years, 2 months From 5 years, 5 months From 6 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 5 years, and 11 days to 6 years, and 21 days to 8 years
5 months and 10 days 8 months and 20 days
in consonance with Article 65,
67
in relation to Article 64,
68
of the Revised Penal
Code.
When the amount involved in the offense exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty prescribed in
Article 315 of the Code "shall be imposed in its maximum period," adding one year for each
additional P10,000.00 although the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20
years. The maximum penalty should then be termed as prision mayor or reclusion
temporal as the case may be. In fine, the one year period, whenever applicable, shall be
added to the maximum period of the principal penalty of anywhere from 6 years, 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years.
Accordingly, with respect to the cases of estafa filed by the complainants who individually
charged appellant with illegal recruitment, the applicable penalties would, respectively, be,
as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 where appellant defrauded Francisco T. Labadchan in
the amount of P45,000.00, two years for the additional amount of P23,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayorminimum (or added to
anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years). As such, aside from paying
Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages, the Court deems it proper
to sentence appellant to the indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccionalmedium to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor medium.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, appellant defrauded Victoria Asil in the amount of
P15,000.00. Hence, aside from paying Victoria Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by way of
actual damages, appellant shall also suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium to five (5) years, five
(5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 where appellant defrauded Cherry Pi-ay in the amount of
P18,000.00, appellant, besides paying Cherry Pi-ay that amount by way of actual damages,
shall also suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 where appellant defrauded Corazon del Rosario in the
amount of P40,000.00, appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium to seven (7) years, eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 where appellant fraudulently solicited the amount of
P24,200.00 from Arthur Juan, appellant shall pay him actual damages in that amount and
shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days (imposed by the court a quo) of prision correccionalminimum period to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum.
In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652 where appellant defrauded Adeline Tiangge the amount
of P18,500.00, appellant shall pay her the same amount as actual damages and shall suffer
the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccional maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645, the prosecution has successfully established its case
against appellant for illegal recruitment in large scale. Evidently banking on her reputation in
the community as a job recruiter, appellant was able to make the seven complainants
believe that they could land various jobs in Taiwan. Confident of her assurances, each
complainant parted with P25,000.00 for supposed processing and placement fees.
It would appear that of the seven complainants for illegal recruitment in large scale, only
five
69
of them filed separate charges of estafa against appellant. Accordingly, appellant was
only and could only be held liable for five counts of estafa arising from the charge of illegal
recruitment in large scale. Since appellant collected the amount of P25,000.00 from each of
the five (5) victims, she must be held subject to the penalty in its maximum period orprision
mayor in its minimum period (not any higher on account of the fact that the amount in
excess of P22,000.00 provided for by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is less than
P10,000.00).
70
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no attending
circumstances, appellant shall bear, the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium as minimum penalty to six
(6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum as
maximum penalty for each offense. In addition, appellant should pay the five (5) victims the
amount of P25,000.00 each as actual damages.
The actual damages awarded here shall be subject to diminution or cancellation should it be
shown that appellant had already paid the complainants.
WHEREFORE, the Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of illegal recruitment, illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED
subject to the modifications hereunder specified, and only to the extent thereof, in the
following cases:
1) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of from three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional medium period as MINIMUM, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor medium period as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco
T. Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven
(11) days of prision correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria Asil the
amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual damages.
3) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven
(11) days of prision correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM.
4) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional medium period as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-
one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM.
5) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-
one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM.
6) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-
one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo Arcega
the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
7) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-
one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando Salbino
the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
8) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-
one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano Damolog
the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
9) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-
one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo Belino
the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
10) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-
one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega the
amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.
11) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven
(11) days of prision correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline
Tiangge the amount of P17,000.00 by way of actual damages.
The awards of damages in Criminal Cases No. 92-CR-1396, No. 92-CR-1413, No. 92-CR-
1416, No. 92-CR-1425, and No. 92-CR-1427, all for illegal recruitment, as well as No. 93-
CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale, except for the award of P25,000.00 by way of
actual damages to Dember Leon (no estafa case having been instituted), are DELETED,
either because similar awards have already been provided for by the trial court, or for
insufficiency of proof, in the estafa cases aforenumbered.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125903. November 15, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMULO
SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ, and CLODUALDO DE LA
CRUZ, accused.
ROMULO SAULO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J .:
Accused-appellant, together with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz, were
charged with violation of Article 38 (b) of the Labor Code
[1]
for illegal recruitment in large
scale in an information which states
CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21911
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO,
AMELIA DE LA CRUZ and CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ, of the crime of
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE (ART. 38(b) in relation to Art.
39(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by P.D. No. 2018,
committed as follows:
That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990 in Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
one another, by falsely representing themselves to have the capacity to
contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment abroad, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to LEODEGARIO MAULLON, BENY
MALIGAYA and ANGELES JAVIER, without first securing the required license
or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, in violation of
said law.
That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was
perpetrated against three (3) persons individually or as [a] group penalized
under Articles 38 and 39 as amended by PD 2018 of the Labor Code (P.D.
442).
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[2]

In addition, accused were charged with three counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos.
Q-91-21908, Q-91-21909 and Q-91-21910). Except for the names of the complainants,
the dates of commission of the crime charged, and the amounts involved, the
informations
[3]
were identical in their allegations
CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21908
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO,
AMELIA DE LA CRUZ AND CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ of the crime of
ESTAFA (Art. 315, par. 2 (a) RPC), committed as follows:
That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, by means of false pretenses
and/or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud one BENY MALIGAYA, in the following manner, to wit: on the date
and in the place aforementioned, accused falsely pretended to the offended
party that they had connection and capacity to deploy workers for overseas
employment and that they could secure employment/placement for said Beny
Maligaya and believing said misrepresentations, the offended party was later
induced to give accused, as in fact she did give the total amount of
P35,000.00, Philippine Currency, and once in possession of the said amount
and far from complying with their commitment and despite repeated demands
made upon them to return said amount, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and with intent to defraud, misappropriate, misapply and
convert the same to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said offended party in the aforementioned amount and in such
amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against
him. Meanwhile accused Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz have remained at
large.
During trial, the prosecution sought to prove the following material facts and
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes:
Benny Maligaya, having learned from a relative of accused-appellant that the latter
was recruiting workers for Taiwan, went to accused-appellants house in San Francisco
del Monte, Quezon City, together with Angeles Javier and Amelia de la Cruz, in order to
discuss her chances for overseas employment. During that meeting which took place
sometime in April or May, 1990, accused-appellant told Maligaya that she would be able
to leave for Taiwan as a factory worker once she gave accused-appellant the fees for
the processing of her documents. Sometime in May, 1990, Maligaya also met with
Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz at their house in Baesa, Quezon City and
they assured her that they were authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) to recruit workers for Taiwan. Maligaya paid accused-appellant
and Amelia de la Cruz the amount of P35,000.00, which is evidenced by a receipt dated
May 21, 1990 signed by accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz (Exhibit A in Crim.
Case No. Q-91-21908). Seeing that he had reneged on his promise to send her to
Taiwan, Maligaya filed a complaint against accused-appellant with the POEA.
[4]

Angeles Javier, a widow and relative by affinity of accused-appellant, was told by
Ligaya, accused-appellants wife, to apply for work abroad through accused-
appellant. At a meeting in accused-appellants Quezon City residence, Javier was told
by accused-appellant that he could get her a job in Taiwan as a factory worker and that
she should give him P35,000.00 for purposes of preparing Javiers passport. Javier
gave an initial amount of P20,000.00 to accused-appellant, but she did not ask for a
receipt as she trusted him. As the overseas employment never materialized, Javier was
prompted to bring the matter before the POEA.
[5]

On April 19, 1990, Leodigario Maullon, upon the invitation of his neighbor Araceli
Sanchez, went to accused-appellants house in order to discuss his prospects for
gaining employment abroad. As in the case of Maligaya and Javier, accused-appellant
assured Maullon that he could secure him a job as a factory worker in Taiwan if he paid
him P30,000.00 for the processing of his papers. Maullon paid P7,900.00 to accused-
appellants wife, who issued a receipt dated April 21, 1990 (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No.
Q-91-21910). Thereafter, Maullon paid an additional amount of P6,800.00 in the
presence of accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz, which payment is also evidenced
by a receipt dated April 25, 1990 (Exhibit B in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Finally,
Maullon paid P15,700.00 to a certain Loreta Tumalig, a friend of accused-appellant, as
shown by a receipt dated September 14, 1990 (Exhibit C in Crim. Case No. Q-91-
21910). Again, accused-appellant failed to deliver on the promised employment.
Maullon thus filed a complaint with the POEA.
[6]

The prosecution also presented a certification dated July 26, 1994 issued by the
POEA stating that accused are not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment
(Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21911).
[7]

In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was also applying with Amelia de
la Cruz for overseas employment. He asserts that it was for this reason that he met all
three complainants as they all went together to Amelia de la Cruz house in Novaliches,
Quezon City sometime in May, 1990 in order to follow up their applications. Accused-
appellant flatly denied that he was an overseas employment recruiter or that he was
working as an agent for one. He also denied having received any money from any of
the complainants or having signed any of the receipts introduced by the prosecution in
evidence. It is accused-appellants contention that the complainants were prevailed
upon by accused-appellants mother-in-law, with whom he had a misunderstanding, to
file the present cases against him.
[8]

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of three counts of estafa and of illegal
recruitment in large scale. It adjudged:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Romulo Saulo:
A. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court
hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Beny
Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, with interest thereon at 12% per
annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against the said accused.
B. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court
hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Angeles Javier in the
amount of P20,000.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said
amount is fully paid, with costs against said accused.
C. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court
hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Leodigario Maullon in
the amount of P30,400.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the
said amount is fully paid, with costs against said accused.
D. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale as defined and punished under Article 38 (b) in
relation to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, and
this Court sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00).
Being a detention prisoner, the accused Romulo Saulo shall be entitled to the
benefits of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
SO ORDERED.
[9]

The Court finds no merit in the instant appeal.
The essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b)
of the Labor Code and penalized under Art. 39 of the same Code, are as follows:
(1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, as
defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of
the Labor Code;
(2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license
or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, whether locally or overseas; and
(3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually
or as a group.
[10]

Under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
After a careful and circumspect review of the records, the Court finds that the trial
court was justified in holding that accused-appellant was engaged in unlawful
recruitment and placement activities. The prosecution clearly established that accused-
appellant promised the three complainants - Benny Maligaya, Angeles Javier and
Leodigario Maullon employment in Taiwan as factory workers and that he asked them
for money in order to process their papers and procure their passports. Relying
completely upon such representations, complainants entrusted their hard-earned money
to accused-appellant in exchange for what they would later discover to be a vain hope
of obtaining employment abroad. It is not disputed that accused-appellant is
not authorized
[11]
nor licensed
[12]
by the Department of Labor and Employment to engage
in recruitment and placement activities. The absence of the necessary license or
authority renders all of accused-appellants recruitment activities criminal.
Accused-appellant interposes a denial in his defense, claiming that he never
received any money from the complainants nor processed their papers. Instead,
accused-appellant insists that he was merely a co-applicant of the complainants and
similarly deceived by the schemes of Amelia and Clodualdo de la Cruz. He contends
that the fact that Benny Maligaya and Angleles Javier went to the house of Amelia and
Clodualdo de la Cruz in Novaliches, Quezon City, to get back their money and to follow-
up their application proves that complainants knew that it was the de la Cruz who
received the processing fees, and not accused-appellant. Further, accused-appellant
argues that complainants could not have honestly believed that he could get them their
passports since they did not give him any of the necessary documents, such as their
birth certificate, baptismal certificate, NBI clearance, and marriage contract.
Accused-appellants asseverations are self-serving and uncorroborated by clear
and convincing evidence. They cannot stand against the straightforward and explicit
testimonies of the complainants, who have identified accused-appellant as the person
who enticed them to part with their money upon his representation that he had the
capability of obtaining employment for them abroad. In the absence of any evidence
that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.
[13]

The fact that accused-appellant did not sign all the receipts issued to complainants
does not weaken the case of the prosecution. A person charged with illegal recruitment
may be convicted on the strength of the testimonies of the complainants, if found to be
credible and convincing.
[14]
The absence of receipts to evidence payment does not
warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions
cause.
[15]

Accused-appellant contends that he could not have committed the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale since Nancy Avelino, a labor and employment officer at the
POEA, testified that licenses for recruitment and placement are issued only to
corporations and not to natural persons. This argument is specious and illogical. The
Labor Code states that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement.
[16]
Corrolarily, a nonlicensee or nonholder of authority is any person,
corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in
recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has
been suspended, revoked, or canceled by the POEA or the Secretary.
[17]
It also bears
stressing that agents or representatives appointed by a licensee or a holder of authority
but whose appointments are not previously authorized by the POEA fall within the
meaning of the term nonlicensee or nonholder of authority.
[18]
Thus, any person, whether
natural or juridical, that engages in recruitment activities without the necessary license
or authority shall be penalized under Art. 39 of the Labor Code.
It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted
for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason for this is that illegal recruitment is
a malum prohibitum, whereas estafa is malum in se, meaning that the criminal intent of
the accused is not necessary for conviction in the former, but is required in the latter.
[19]

The elements of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code
are: (1) that the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by deceit,
and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.
[20]
The trial court was correct in holding accused-appellant
liable for estafa in the case at bench. Owing to accused-appellants false assurances
that he could provide them with work in another country, complainants parted with their
money, to their damage and prejudice, since the promised employment never
materialized.
Under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of estafa is as
follows:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed for the offense. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the
estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum, the penalty next lower in degree is prision correccional minimum to
medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere
within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
In fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time, each of
which portion shall be deemed to form one period, as follows
Minimum Period : From 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5
years, 5 months and 10 days
Medium Period : From 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8
months and 20 days
Maximum Period : From 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years
pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code.
When the amounts involved in the offense exceeds P22,000, the penalty prescribed
in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, although the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years.
[21]

Accordingly, the following penalties shall be imposed upon accused-appellant:
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny
Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional amount of
P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years, and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9)
years of prision mayor as maximum.
[22]
Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya
P35,000.00 by way of actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded Angeles
Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by
way of actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded Leodigario
Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as
minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
[23]
Accused-appellant shall
also pay Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages.
In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. Q-
91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, accused-appellant shall
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the March 6, 1996 Decision of the trial court finding accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the following modifications:
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny
Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional amount of
P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years, and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine
(9) years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny
Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded Angeles
Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by
way of actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded Leodigario
Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as
minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also
pay Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages.
In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. Q-
91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, accused-appellant shall
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00).
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.