CHAPTER ONE: Statutes

IN GENERAL
Laws, generally
A whole body or system of law
Rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by
legitimate power of the state
Includes RA, PD, EO (president in the e of legislati!e
power", Presidential issuances (ordinance power"
#urisprudence, ordinances passed by sanggunians of local
go!ernment units$
%tatutes, generally
An act of legislature (Philippine &ommission, Phil$
Legislature, 'atasang Pambansa, &ongress"
PD(s of )arcos during the period of martial law *+,-
&onstitution
EO of A.uino re!olutionary period /reedom &onstitution
Public 0 affects the public at large
general 0 applies to the whole state and operates
throughout the state ali1e upon all people or all of
a class$
%pecial 0 relates to particular person or things of a
class or to a particular community, indi!idual or
thing$
Local Law 0 operation is confined to a specific
place or locality (e$g municipal ordinance"
Pri!ate 0 applies only to a specific person or sub2ect$
Permanent and temporary statutes
Permanent 3 one whose operation is not limited in duration
but continues until repealed$
4emporary 3 duration is for a limited period of time fied in
the statute itself or whose life ceases upon the happening of
an e!ent$
o E$g$ statute answering to an emergency
Other classes of statutes
Prospecti!e or retroacti!e 0 accdg$ to application
Declaratory, curati!e, mandatory, directory, substanti!e,
remedial, penal 0 accdg$ to operation
According to form
o Affirmati!e
o 5egati!e
)anner of referring to statutes
Public Acts 0 Phil &ommission and Phil Legislature *+6*3
*+-7
&ommonwealth Acts 0 *+-83 *+98
Republic Acts 0 &ongress *+983 *+,:, *+;, <
'atas Pambansa 0 'atasang Pambansa
Identification of laws 0 serial number and=or title
ENACTMENT OF STATUTES
Legislati!e power, generally
Power to ma1e, alter and repeal laws
>ested in congress 0 *+;, &onstitution
President 0 *+,- ? /reedom (PD and EO respecti!ely"
%angguniang barangay, bayan, panglungsod, panlalawigan 0
only within respecti!e 2urisdiction 0 ordinances
Administrati!e or eecuti!e officer
Delegated power
Issue rules and regulations to implement a specific
law
&ongress legislati!e power
4he determination of the legislati!e policy and its
formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule
of conduct$
Legislati!e power 3 plenary ecept only to such limitations
as are found in the constitution
Procedural re.uirements, generally
Pro!ided in the constitution (for 'ills, RA"
Pro!ided by congress 0 enactment of laws
Rules of both houses of congress (pro!ided also by the
&onstitution"
Passage of bill
Proposed legislati!e measure introduced by a member of
congress for enactment into law
%hall embrace only one sub2ect which shall be epressed in
the title
%inged by authors
/ile with the %ecretary of the @ouse
'ills may originate from either lower or upper @ouse
Eclusi!e to lower house
Appropriation
Re!enue= tariff bills
'ills authoriAing increase of public debt
'ills of local application
Pri!ate bills
After - readings, appro!al of either house (see Art 8 %ec :8
(*""
%ecretary reports the bill for first reading
/irst reading 0 reading the number and title, referral to the
appropriate committee for study and recommendation
&ommittee 0 hold public hearings and submits
report and recommendation for calendar for second
reading
%econd reading 0 bill is read in full (with amendments
proposed by the committee" 0 unless copies are distributed
and such reading is dispensed with
o 'ill will be sub2ect to debates, motions and
amendments
o 'ill will be !oted on
o A bill appro!ed shall be included in the calendar of
bills for -
rd
reading
4hird reading 0 bill appro!ed on :
nd
reading will be
submitted for final !ote by yeas and nays,
'ill appro!ed on the -
rd
reading will be transmitted to the
BOther @ouseC for concurrence (same process as the first
passage"
o If the BOther @ouseC appro!es without amendment
it is passed to the President
o If the BOther @ouseC introduces amendments, and
disagreement arises, differences will be settled by
the &onference &ommittees of both houses
o Report and recommendation of the : &onference
&ommittees will ha!e to be appro!ed by both
houses in order to be considered pass
President
o Appro!es and signs
o >etoes (within -6 days after receipt"
o Inaction
If the President !etoes 0 send bac1 to the @ouse where it
originated with recommendation
o :=- of all members appro!es, it will be sent to the
other house for appro!al
o :=- of the other house appro!es 0 it shall become a
law
o If president did not act on the bill with in -6 days
after receipt, bill becomes a law
%ummary D - ways of how a bill becomes a law$
President signs
inaction of president with in -6 days after receipt
!etoed bill is repassed by congress by :=- !otes of all its
members, each house !oting separately$
Appropriations and re!enue bills
%ame as procedure for the enactment of ordinary bills
Only difference is that they can only originate from the
Lower @ouse but the %enate may propose= concur with the
amendments
Limitations of passage (as per &onstitution" Art 8 %ec$ :, (:"
o congress may not increase the appropriation
recommended by the President EEE
o particular appropriation limited
o procedure for &ongress is the same to all other
department= agencies (procedure for appro!ing
appropriations "
o special appropriations 0 national treasurer= re!enue
proposal
o no transfer of appropriations authority to
augment
o discretionary funds 0 for public purposes
o general appropriations bills 0 when re3enacted
o President my !eto any particular item=s in an
appropriation re!enue, or tariff bill$
Authentication of bills
'efore passed to the President
Indispensable
'y signing of %pea1er and %enate President

Fnimpeachability of legislati!e 2ournals

#ournal of proceedings
&onclusi!e with respect to other matters that are re.uired by
the &onstitution
Disputable with respect to all other matters
'y reason of public policy, authenticity of laws should rest
upon public memorials of the most permanent character
%hould be public
Enrolled bill
'ills passed by congress authenticated by the %pea1er and
the %enate President and appro!ed by the President
Importing absolute !erity and is binding on the courts
o It carries on its face a solemn assurance that it was
passed by the assembly by the legislati!e and
eecuti!e departments$
&ourts cannot go behind the enrolled act to disco!er what
really happened
o If only for respect to the legislati!e and eecuti!e
departments
4hus, if there has been any mista1e in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officer of the assembly and
appro!ed by the &hief Eecuti!e, the remedy is by
amendment by enacting a curati!e legislation not by 2udicial
decree$
Enrolled bill and legislati!e 2ournals 3 &onclusi!e upon the
courts
If there is discrepancy between enrolled bill and 2ournal,
enrolled bill pre!ails$
Githdrawal of authentication, effect of
%pea1er and %enate President may withdraw if there is
discrepancy between the tet of the bill as deliberated and
the enrolled bill$
EffectD
o 5ullifies the bill as enrolled
o Losses absolute !erity
o &ourts may consult 2ournals
PARTS OF STATUTES
4itle of statute
)andatory law 3 E!ery bill passed by &ongress shall
embrace only one sub2ect which shall be epressed in the
title thereof (Art 8, %ec :8 (*" *+;, &onstitution"
: limitations upon legislation
o 4o refrain from conglomeration, under one statute,
of heterogeneous sub2ects
o 4itle of the bill should be couched in a language
sufficient to notify the legislators and the public
and those concerned of the import of the single
sub2ect$
Purposes of re.uirement (on * sub2ect"
Principal purposeD to apprise the legislators of the ob2ect,
nature, and scope of the pro!ision of the bill and to pre!ent
the enactment into law of matters which ha!e not recei!ed
the notice, action and study of the legislators$
o 4o prohibit duplicity in legislation
In sum of the purpose
o 4o pre!ent hodgepodge= log3rolling legislation
o 4o pre!ent surprise or fraud upon the legislature
o 4o fairly apprise the people, through publication of
the sub2ects of the legislation
o Fsed as a guide in ascertaining legislati!e intent
when the language of the act does not clearly
epress its purposeH may clarify doubt or
ambiguity$
@ow re.uirement construed
Liberally construed
If there is doubt, it should be resol!ed against the doubt and
in fa!or of the constitutionality of the statute
Ghen there is compliance with re.uirement
&omprehensi!e enough 3 Include general ob2ect
If all parts of the law are related, and are germane to the
sub2ect matter epressed in the title
4itle is !alid where it indicates in broad but clear terms, the
nature, scope and conse.uences of the law and its operations
4itle should not be a catalogue or inde of the bill
Principles apply to titles of amendatory acts$
o Enough if it states Ban act to amend a specific
statuteC
5eed not state the precise nature of the amendatory
act$
F% Legislators ha!e titles ending with the words Band for
other purposesC ( F% is not sub2ect to the same
&onstitutional restriction as that embodied in the Philippine
&onstitution"
Ghen re.uirement not applicable
Apply only to bills which may thereafter be enacted into law
Does not apply to laws in force and eisting at the time the
*+-7 &onstitution too1 effect$
5o application to municipal or city ordinances$
Effect of insufficiency of title
%tatute is null and !oid
Ghere, the sub2ect matter of a statute is not sufficiently
epressed in its title, only so much of the sub2ect matter as is
not epressed therein is !oid, lea!ing the rest in force, unless
the in!alid pro!isions are inseparable from the others, in
which case the nullity the former !itiates the latter
Enacting clause
Gritten immediately after the title
%tates the authority by which the act is enacted

I* 3 Phil &ommission 0 B 'y authority of the President of the

F%, be it enacted by the F% Philippine &ommissionC
I: 3 Philippine Legislature3 B by authority of the F%, be it
enacted by the Philippine LegislatureC
I- 3 Ghen I: became bicameralD B'e it enacted by the
%enate and @ouse of Representati!es of the Philippines in
legislature assembled and by authority of the sameC
I9 3 &ommonwealth3 B'e it enacted by the 5ational
Assembly of the Philippines
I7 0 when I9 became bicameralD Bbe it enacted by the %enate
and @ouse of Representati!es in congress assembledC 0 same
*+983*+,:=*+;,3present$
I8 0 'atasang PambansaD B'e it enacted by the 'atasang
Pambansa in session assembledC
I, 0 PD B 5OG 4@ERE/ORE, I JJJJJJ President of the
Philippines, by the powers !ested in me by the &onstitution
do hereby decree as followsC
I; 0 EO B5ow, therefore, I, JJJJ hereby orderC
Preamble
Defined 0 prefatory statement or eplanation or a finding of
facts, reciting the purpose, reason, or occasion for ma1ing
the law to which it is prefiedC
/ound after enacting clause and before the body of the law$
Fsually not used by legislations because content of the
preamble is written in the eplanatory note$
'ut PDs and EOs ha!e preambles$
Pur!iew of statute
that part which tells what the law is about
body of statute should embrace only one sub2ect should only
one sub2ect matter, e!en there pro!isions should be allied
and germane to the sub2ect and purpose of the bill$
%tatue is usually di!ided into section$ w=c contains a single
proposition$
Parts
o short title
o policy section
o definition section
o administrati!e section
o sections prescribing standards of conduct
o sections imposing sanctions for !iolation of its
pro!isions
o transitory pro!ision
o separability clause
o effecti!ity clause
%eparability clause
it states that if any pro!ision of the act is declared in!alid,
the remainder shall not be affected thereby$
It is not controlling and the courts may in!alidate the whole
statute where what is left, after the !oid part, is not complete
and wor1able
Presumption 0 statute is effecti!e as a whole
its effectD to create in the place of such presumption the
opposite of separability$
PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES, RULES AND ORDINANCES
Presidential issuances
are those which the president issues in the eercise of
ordinance power$
i$e$ EO, AO (administrati!e orders", proclamations, )O
(memorandum orders", )& (memorandum circulars", and
general or special orders$
@a!e force and effect of laws$
EO
o acts of the President pro!iding for rules of a
general or permanent character in the
implementation or eecution of constitutional=
statutory powers$
o do not ha!e the force and effect of laws enacted by
congress
o different from EO issued by the President in the e
of her legislati!e power during the re!olution
Presidential decree under the freedom constitution
AO
o acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of go!ernmental operations in pursuance of
his duties as administrati!e head
Proclamations
o acts of the President fiing a date or declaring a
statute or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the eistence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend
)O
o acts of the President on matters of administrati!e
details or of subordinate or temporary interest
which only concern a particular officer or office of
go!ernment
)&
o acts of the president on matters relating to internal
administration which the President desires to bring
to the attention of all or some of the departments,
agencies, bureaus, or offices of the go!ernment,
for information of compliance
Keneral or %pecific Order
o Acts and commands of the President in his
capacity as &ommander3in3&hief of the A/P
%upreme &ourt circularsH rules and regulations
%ee Art ;, %ec$ 7(7" *+;, &onstitution
%ee Art$ 8, %ec$ -6 *+;, &onstitution
It has been held that a law which pro!ides that a decision of
a .uasi32udicial body be appealable directly to the %&, if
enacted without the ad!ice and concurrence of the %&,
ineffecti!e
o Remedy or applicable procedure 0 go to &A
Rules of &ourt 0 product of the rule3ma1ing power of the %&
o Power to repeal procedural rules
o 5o power to promulgate rules substanti!e in nature
(unli1e the legislati!e department"
%ubstanti!e rules 0 if it affects or ta1es away !ested rightsH
right to appeal
Procedural rules 0 means of implementing eisting rightH
where to file an appeal for transferring the !enue
Rules and regulations issued by the administrati!e or
eecuti!e officers in accordance with and authoriAed by law,
ha!e the force and effect of law
o Re.uisites for !alidity
Rules should be germane to the ob2ects
and purposes of the law
Regulations be not in contradiction with,
but conform to, the standards that the
law prescribes
4he be for the sole purpose of carrying
into effect the general pro!isions of the
law
o Law cannot be restricted or etended
o Law pre!ails o!er regulations, if there are
discrepancies
Rule3ma1ing power of public administrati!e agency is a
delegated legislati!e power 0 if it enlarges or restricts such
statute is in!alid
Re.uisites for delegating a statute by legislati!e branch to
another branch of go!ernment to fill in details, eecution,
enforcement, or administration of lawL$ the law must beD
o &omplete in itself
o /i a standard which may be epress or implied
Eample of BstandardC 0 simplicity and
dignityH public interestH public welfareH
interest of law and orderH 2ustice and
e.uity and substantial merit of the caseH
ade.uate and efficient instruction
EampleD
o &hange of Band=orC to BorC 0 in!alid
o &hange of BmayC(permissi!e" to BshallC
(mandatory" 0 in!alid (Krego ! &O)ELE& pp ::"
Administrati!e rule and interpretation distinguished
Rule 0 Bma1esC new law with the force and effect of a !alid
lawH binding on the courts e!en if they are not in agreement
with the policy stated therein or with its innate wisdom
Interpretation 0 merely ad!isory for it is the courts that
finally determine what the law means
Administrati!e construction is not necessarily binding upon
the courtsH it may be set aside by 2udicial department (if there
is an error of law, or abuse of power or lac1 of 2urisdiction or
KAD 0 gra!e abuse of discretion"
'arangay ordinance
%angguniang barangay 0 smallest legislati!e bodyH may pass
an ordinance by ma2ority of all its membersH sub2ect to
re!iew by %angguniang bayan= panglungsod
%angguniang bayan= panglungsod 0 ta1e action on the
ordinance within -6 days from submissionH if there(s
inaction, it is presumed to be consistent with the municipal
or city ordinanceH if inconsistency is found, it will remand to
the %angguniang barangay
)unicipal ordinance
Lodged in the %angguniang bayan
)a2ority of the .uorum !oting, ordinance is passed
Ordinance sent to )ayor within *6 days for appro!al or
!etoH if there(s mayor(s inaction, ordinance is presumed
appro!edH if !etoed and o!erridden by :=- of all members,
ordinance is appro!ed
Appro!ed ordinance is passed to %angguniang panlalawigan
for re!iew
o Githin -6 days may in!alidate in whole or in part
and its action is finalH if there(s inaction within -6
days, it is deemed !alid
&ity ordinance
>ested in %angguniang panglungsod
)a2ority of the .uorum !oting, ordinance is passed
%ubmitted to )ayor within *6 days
o Appro!e
o >eto 0 :=- of all members 0 appro!ed
o Inaction 0 deemed appro!ed
If city or component city 0 submit to %angguniang
panlalawigan for re!iew which shall ta1e action within -6
days, otherwise, it will be deemed !alid
Pro!incial ordinance
%angguniang panlalawigan 0 ma2ority of .uorum !oting,
passage of ordinance
/orwarded to the Ko!ernor who within *7 days from receipt
shall
o Appro!e
o >eto 0 :=- of all members 0 appro!ed
o Inaction 0 deemed appro!ed
VALIDITY
Presumption of constitutionality
E!ery statute is presumed !alid
o Lies on how a law is enacted
o Due respect to the legislati!e who passed and
eecuti!e who appro!ed
o Responsibility of upholding the constitution rests
not on the courts alone but on the legislati!e and
eecuti!e branches as well
&ourts cannot in.uire into the wisdom or propriety of laws
4o declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of the law
to the constitution must be clear and une.ui!ocal
All reasonable doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of the
constitutionality of lawH to doubt is to sustain
/inal arbiter of unconstitutionality of law is the %upreme
&ourt E5 'A5& (ma2ority who too1 part and !oted thereon"
5onetheless, trial courts ha!e 2urisdiction to initially decide
the issue of constitutionality of a law in appropriate cases
Re.uisites for eercise of 2udicial power
4he eistence of an appropriate case
Interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional .uestion
Plea that the function be eercised at the earliest opportunity
5ecessity that the constitutional .uestion be passed upon in
order to decide the case
Appropriate case
'ona fide case 0 one which raises a 2usticiable contro!ersy
#udicial power is limited only to real, actual, earnest, and
!ital contro!ersy
&ontro!ersy is 2usticiable when it refers to matter which is
appropriate for court re!iewH pertains to issues which are
inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds
recogniAed by law
&ourts cannot rule on Bpolitical .uestionsC 0 .uestions which
are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom (!$
legality" of a particular act or measure being assailed
o Bseparation of powersC
o @owe!er, &onstitution epands the concept of
2udicial re!iew 0 2udicial power includes the duty
of the courts of 2ustice to settle actual contro!ersies
in!ol!ing rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been KAD amounting to lac1 or ecess of
2urisdiction on the branch or the part of any
branch= instrumentality of the Ko!ernment
%tanding to sue
Legal standing or locus standi 0 personal= substantial interest
in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct in2ury as a result of go!ernmental act that is being
challenged
BinterestC 0 an interest in issue affected by the decree
&itiAen 0 ac.uires standing only if he can establish that he
has suffered some actual or threatened concrete in2ury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the go!ernment
o E$g$ tapayer 0 when it is shown that public funds
ha!e been illegally disbursed
)ember of the %enate or of the @ouse has legal standing to
.uestion the !alidity of the Presidential !eto or a condition
imposed on an item in an appropriations bills
%& may, in its discretion, ta1e cogniAance of a suit which
does not satisfy the re.uirement of legal standing
o E$g$ calling by the President for the deployment of
the Philippine )arines to 2oin the P5P in !isibility
patrols around the metro
Ghen to raise constitutionality
at the earliest possible opportunity 0 i$e$ in the pleading
it may be raised in a motion for reconsideration = new trial in
the lower courtH or
in criminal cases 0 at any stage of the proceedings or on
appeal
in ci!il cases, where it appears clearly that a determination of
the .uestion is necessary to a decision, and in cases where it
in!ol!es the 2urisdiction of the court below
5ecessity of deciding constitutionality
where the constitutional .uestion is of paramount public
interest and time is of the essence in the resolution of such
.uestion, adherence to the strict procedural standard may be
relaed and the court, in its discretion, may s.uarely decide
the case
where the .uestion of !alidity, though apparently has
become moot, has become of paramount interest and there is
undeniable necessity for a ruling, strong reasons of public
policy may demand that its constitutionality be resol!ed
4est of constitutionality
L is what the &onstitution pro!ides in relation to what can
or may be done under the statute, and not by what it has been
done under it$
o If not within the legislati!e power to enact
o If !ague 0 unconstitutional in : respects
>iolates due process
Lea!es law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its pro!isions
o Ghere there(s a change of circumstances 0 i$e$
emergency laws
Ordinances (test of !alidity are"D
o It must not contra!ene the &onstitution or any
statute
o It must not be unfair or oppressi!e
o It must not be partial or discriminatory
o It must not prohibit but may regulate trade
o It must be general and consistent with public
policy
o It must not be unreasonable
Effects of unconstitutionality
It confers no rights
Imposes no duties
Affords no protection
&reates no office
In general, inoperati!e as if it had ne!er been passed
: !iewsD
o Orthodo !iew 0 unconstitutional act is not a lawH
decision affect ALL
o )odern !iew 0 less stringentH the court in passing
upon the .uestion of unconstitutionality does not
annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict
with the &onstitutionH decisions affects parties
O5LM and no 2udgment against the statuteH
opinion of court may operate as a precedentH it
does not repeal, supersede, re!o1e, or annul the
statute
In!alidity due to change of conditions
Emergency laws
It is deemed !alid at the time of its enactment as an eercise
of police power
It becomes in!alid only because the change of conditions
ma1es its continued operation !iolati!e of the &onstitution,
and accordingly, the declaration of its nullity should only
affect the parties in!ol!ed in the case and its effects applied
prospecti!ely
Partial in!alidity
Keneral ruleD that where part of a statute is !oid as repugnant
to the &onstitution, while another part is !alid, the !alid
portion, if separable from the in!alid, may stand and be
enforced
Eception 0 that when parts of a statute are so mutually
dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant
a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the
nullity of one part will !itiate the rest 0 such as in the case of
Tatad v Sec of Department of Energy and Antonio v.
COMELEC
EFFECT AND OPERATION
Ghen laws ta1e effect
Art : && 3 B laws to be effecti!e must be published either
in the Official KaAette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the countryC
o 4he effecti!ity pro!ision refers to all statutes,
including those local and pri!ate, unless there are
special laws pro!iding a different effecti!ity
mechanism for particular statutes
%ec *; &hapter 7 'oo1 * of Administrati!e &ode
Effecti!ity of laws
o default rule 0 *73day period
o must be published either in the OK or newspaper
of general circulation in the countryH publication
must be full
4he clause Bunless it is otherwise pro!idedC 0 solely refers to
the *73day period and not to the re.uirement of publication
Ghen Presidential issuances, rules and regulations ta1e effect
4he President(s ordinance power includes the authority to
issue EO, AO, Proclamations, )O, )& and general or
specific orders
Re.uirement of publication applies ecept if it is merely
interpretati!e or internal in nature not concerning the public
: typesD
o 4hose whose purpose is to enforce or implement
eisting law pursuant to a !alid delegation or to fill
in the details of a statuteH re.uires publication
o 4hose which are merely interpretati!e in nature or
internalH does not re.uire publication
Re.uirements of filing (*+;, Administrati!e &ode"D
o E!ery agency shall file with the FP Law &enter -
certified copies of e!ery rule adopted by it$ Rules
in force on the date of effecti!ity of this &ode
which are not filed within - months from that date
shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party= persons
Ghen local ordinance ta1es effect
Fnless otherwise stated, the same shall ta1e effect *6 days
from the date a copy is posted in a bulletin board at the
entrance of the pro!incial capitol or city, municipality or
barangay hall, A5D in at least : other conspicuous places in
the local go!ernment unit concerned
4he secretary to the %angguinian concerned shall cause the
posting not later than 7 days after appro!alH tet will be
disseminated in English or 4agalogH the secretary to the
%angguinian concerned shall record such fact in a boo1 1ept
for that purpose, stating the dates of appro!al and posting
Kist of ordinance with penal sanctions shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation within the respecti!e
pro!ince concernedH if 5O newspaper of general circulation
in the pro!ince, PO%4I5K shall be made in all
municipalities and cities of the pro!ince where the
%anggunian of origin is situated
/or highly urbaniAed and independent component cities,
main features of the ordinance, in addition to the posting
re.uirement shall be published once in a local newspaper$ In
the absence of local newspaper, in any newspaper of general
circulation
o @ighly urbaniAed city 0 minimum population of
:66,666 and with latest annual income of at least
76) Php
%tatutes continue in force until repealed
Permanent= indefinite 0 law once established continues until
changed by competent legislati!e power$ It is not changed
by the change of so!ereignty, ecept that of political nature
4emporary 0 in force only for a limited period, and they
terminate upon epiration of the term stated or upon
occurrence of certain e!entsH no repealing statute is needed
4erritorial and personal effect of statutes
All people within the 2urisdiction of the Philippines
)anner of computing time
%ee Art$ *- &&
Ghere a statute re.uires the doing of an act within a
specified number of days, such as ten days from notice, it
means ten calendar days and 5O4 ten wor1ing days
E$g$ * year from Oct$ 9, *+98 is Oct$ 9, *+9,
If last day falls on a %unday or holiday, the act can still be
done the following day
Principle of Beclude the first, include the lastC DOE% 5O4
APPLM to the computation of the period of prescription of a
crime, in which rule, is that if the last day in the period of
prescription of a felony falls on a %unday or legal holiday,
the information concerning said felony cannot be filed on the
net wor1ing day, as the offense has by then already
prescribed
CHAPTER TWO: Construt!on an" Inter#retat!on
NATURE AND PURPOSE
&onstruction defined
&onstruction is the art or process of disco!ering and
epounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
law, where that intention rendered doubtfully reason of
ambiguity in its language or of the fact that the gi!en case is
not eplicitly pro!ided for in the law$
&onstruction is drawing of warranted conclusions beyond
direct epression of the tet epressions which are in spirit
though not within the tet$
ine!itably, there enters into the construction of statutes
the play of #FDI&IAL #FDK)E54 within the limits of the
rele!ant legislati!e materials
it in!ol!es the EEER&I%E O/ &@OI&E 'M 4@E
#FDI&IARM
&onstruction and interpretation distinguished
4hey are so ali1e in practical results and so are used
interchangeablyH synonymous$
&onstruction Interpretation
3 process of drawing warranted
conclusions not always
included in direct epressions,
or determining the application
of words to facts in litigation
3 art of finding the true
meaning and sense of any form
of words
Rules of construction, generally
Rules of statutory construction are tools used to ascertain
legislati!e intent$
5O4 rules of law but mere aioms of eperience
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to 1now the
rules of statutory construction, in case of doubt, be construed
in accordance with the settled principles of interpretation$
Legislature sometimes adopts rules of statutory construction
as part of the pro!isions of the statuteD 3 see eamples page
9+376
Legislature also defines to ascertain the meaning of !ague,
broad words= terms
Purpose of ob2ect of construction
4he purpose is to ascertain and gi!e effect to the intent of the
law$
4he ob2ect of all 2udicial interpretation of a statute is to
determine legislati!e intent, either epressly or impliedly, by
the language usedH to determine the meaning and will of the
law ma1ing body and disco!er its true interpretations of law$
Legislati!e intent, generally
L is the essence of the law
Intent is the spirit which gi!es life to legislati!e enactment$ It
must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the statute$ It has been held,
howe!er, that that the ascertainment of legislati!e intent
depend more on a determination of the purpose and ob2ect of
the law$
Intent is sometimes e.uated with the word Bspirit$C
Ghile the terms purpose, meaning, intent, and spirit are
oftentimes interchangeably used by the courts, not entirely
synonymous
Legislati!e purpose
A legislati!e purpose is the reason why a particular statute
was enacted by legislature$
Legislation Bis an acti!e instrument and go!ernment which,
for the purpose of interpretation means that laws ha!e ends
to be achie!edC
Legislati!e meaning
Legislati!e meaning is what the law, by its language, means$
Ghat it comprehendsH
Ghat it co!ers or embracesH
Ghat its limits or confines are$
Intent and )eaning 0 synonymous
If there is ambiguity in the language used in a statute, its
purpose may indicate the meaning of the language and lead
to what the legislati!e intent is
Kraphical illustration 0
Federation of Free Farmers v CA.
RA 5o$ ;6+ %ec$ * 0 BIn absence of a written milling
agreements between the ma2ority of the planters and the
millers, the unrefined sugar as well as all by3products shall
be di!ided between themC
RA ;6+ %ec$ + 0 B4he proceeds of any increase in
participation granted by the planters under this act and abo!e
their present share shall be di!ided between the planter and
his laborer in the proportion of 86N laborer and 96N
planterC
4o gi!e literal import in interpreting the two section will
defeat the purpose of the Act
4he purposeD
o &ontinuous production of sugar
o 4o grant the laborers a share in the increased
participation of planters in the sugar produce
4he legislati!e intent is, thus to ma1e the act operati!e
irrespecti!e of whether there eists a milling agreement
between central and the sugar planters$
)atters in.uired into in construing a statute
BIt is not enough to ascertain the intention of the statuteH it is
also necessary to see whether the intention or meaning has
been epressed in such a way as to gi!e it legal effect or
!alidityC
4husD 4he ob2ect of in.uiry is not only to 1now what the
legislature used sufficiently epresses that meaning$ 4he
legal act is made up of : elementsD
o internal 0 intention
o eternal3 epression
/ailure of the latter may defeat the former
Ghere legislati!e intent is ascertained
4he primary source of legislati!e intent is the statute itself$
If the statute as a whole fails to indicate the legislati!e intent
because of ambiguity, the court may loo1 beyond the statute
such asD
o Legislati!e history 0 what was in the legislati!e
mind at the time the statute was enactedH what the
circumstances wereH what e!il was meant to be
redressed
o Purpose of the statute 0 the reason or cause which
induced the enactment of the law, the mischief to
be suppressed, and the policy which dictated its
passage
o when all these means fail, loo1 into the effect of
the law$
If the -
rd
means (effect of the law" is first
used, it will be 2udicial legislation
POWER TO CONSTRUE
&onstruction is a 2udicial function
It is the court that has the final word as to what the law
means$
It construes laws as it decide cases based on fact and the law
in!ol!ed
Laws are interpreted in the contet of a peculiar factual
situation of each case
&ircumstances of time, place, e!ent, person and particularly
attendant circumstances and actions before, during and after
the operati!e fact ha!e ta1en their totality so that 2ustice can
be rationally and fairly dispensed$
)oot and academic 0
o Purpose has become stale
o 5o practical relief can be granted
o Relief has no practical effect
Keneral rule (on mootness" 0 dismiss the case
o EceptionD
If capable of repetition, yet e!ading
re!iew
Public interest re.uires its resolution
Rendering decision on the merits would
be of practical !alue
Legislati!e cannot o!errule 2udicial construction
It cannot preclude the courts from gi!ing the statute different
interpretation
Legislati!e 0 enact laws
Eecuti!e3 to eecute laws
#udicial3 interpretation and application
If the legislature may declare what a law means 0 it will
cause confusionLit will be !iolati!e of the fundamental
principles of the constitution of separation powers$
Legislati!e construction is called resolution or declaratory
act
Endencia v David
Eplains why legislati!e cannot o!errule %upreme &ourt(s
decision
Perfecto v. Meer
Art$ ; %ec$ + *+-7 &onstitution 0 %&(s interpretationD Bshall
recei!e such compensation as may be fied by law, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in officeC 0
eempt from income ta
Legislati!e passed RA 7+6 %ec$ *- 0 Bno salary whene!er
recei!ed by any public officer of the Republic shall be
considered eempt from the income ta, payment of which is
hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation
fied by the &onstitution or by lawC
%ource of confusion
>iolati!e of principle on separation of powers
RA 7+6 %ec *- 0 unconstitutional
Art ; %ec$ + *+-7 0 repealed by Art$ *7 %ec$ 8 *+,-
&onstitution 0 Bno salary or any form of emolument of any
public officer or employee, including constitutional officers,
shall be eempt from payment of income taC
4hus, 2udiciary is not eempt from payment of ta anymore
Ghen 2udicial interpretation may be set aside
BInterpretations may be set aside$C 4he interpretation of a
statute or a constitutional pro!ision by the courts is not so
sacrosanct as to be beyond modification or nullification$
4he %upreme &ourt itself may, in an appropriate case change
or o!errule its pre!ious construction$
4he rule that the %upreme &ourt has the final word in the
interpretation or construction of a stature merely means that
the legislature cannot, by law or resolution, modify or annul
the 2udicial construction without modifying or repealing the
!ery statute which has been the sub2ect of construction$ It
can, and it has done so, by amending or repealing the statute,
the conse.uence of which is that the pre!ious 2udicial
construction of the statute is modified or set aside
accordingly$
Ghen court may construe statute
B4he court may construe or interpret a statute under the
condition that 4@ERE I% DOF'4 OR A)'IKFI4MC
Ambiguity 0 a condition of admitting : or more meanings$
%usceptible of more than one interpretation$
Only when the law is ambiguous or doubtful of meaning
may the court interpret or construe its intent$
&ourt may not construe where statute is clear
A statute that is clear and unambiguous is not susceptible of
interpretations$
/irst and fundamental duty of court 0 to apply the law
&onstruction 0 !ery last function which the court should
eercise
Law is clear 0 no room for interpretation, only room for
application
&ourts cannot enlarge or limit the law if it is clear and free
from ambiguity (e!en if law is harsh or onerous
A meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected
in the !ery language of the statute cannot be placed therein
by construction
Manikan v. Tanodbayan
%ec$ , PD *,*83A 0 Bsole police authorityC of EPOA
officials may not be construed as an eception to, or
limitation on, the authority of the 4anodbayan to in!estigate
complaints for !iolation of the anti3graft law committed by
the EPOA officials
EPOA(s power 0 not eclusi!eH BsoleC refers to police
authority not emplyed to describe other power
Lapid v. CA
IssueD whether or not the decision of the Ombudsman
imposing a penalty of suspension of one year without pay is
immediately eecutory
Administrati!e &ode and LK& 0 not suppletory to
Ombudsman Act
4hese three laws are related or deal with public officers, but
are totally different statutes
An administrati!e agency tas1ed to implement a statute may
not construe it by epanding its meaning where its pro!isions
are clear and unambiguous
Land ank v. CA
DAR interpreted BdepositsC to include trust accountsC
%& held that BdepositsC is limited only to cash and L'P
bonds
Libanan v. !"ET
IssueD whether ballots not signed at the bac1 by the chairman
of the 'oard of Election Inspectors ('EI" are spurious, since
it !iolated %ec$ :9 RA ,*88
@eldD not spuriousH only renders the 'EI accountable
Rulings of %upreme &ourt part of legal system
Art$ ; && 0 B#udicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the &onstitution shall form part of the legal system of
the PhilippinesC
Legis interpretato #egis vim obtinet 0 authoritati!e
interpretation of the %& of a statute ac.uires the force of law
by becoming a part thereof as of the date of its enactment ,
since the court(s interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislati!e intent that the statute thus
construed intends to effectuate
Stare decisis et non $%ieta novere & when the %& has once
laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
casese where the facts are substantially the same
o /or stability and certainty
%upreme &ourt becomes, to the etent applicable, the criteria
that must control the actuations not only of those called upon
to abide thereby but also of those duty3bound to enforce
obedience thereto$
%& rulings are binding on inferior courts
#udicial rulings ha!e no retroacti!e effect
Le prospicit not respicit 3 the law loo1s forward, not
bac1ward
RationaleD Retroacti!e application of a law usually di!est
rights that ha!e already become !ested or impairs he
obligations of contract and hence is unconstitutional$
Peo !$ #abinal
Peo ! )acarandang 0 peace officer eempted from issuance
of license of firearms 0 included a secret agent hired by a
go!ernor
Peo$ !$ )apa 0 abandoned doctrine of )acarandang in *+8,
4he present case, #abinal was arraigned while the
)acarandang Doctrine was still pre!ailing, howe!er, the
decision was promulgated when the )apa doctrine was in
place
4he &ourt held that #abinal is ac.uitted using stare decisis
doctrine and retroacti!ity doctrine
Co. v. CA
On 'P ::, &o is ac.uitted in relying on the &ircular issuedH
Pue doctrine, which con!icted Pue under 'P ::, was not
gi!en retroacti!e application
"oa v. Co##ector of C%stoms
Fsed 2us soli (place of birth"
%& fa!ored 2us sanguinis (by blood"
@owe!er, the abandonment of the principle of 2us soli did
not di!est the citiAenship of those who, by !irtue of the
principle before its re2ection, became of were declared
citiAens of the Philippines
en'onan v. CA
IssueD when to count the 73year period to repurchase land
granted &A *9*
)onge ! Angeles (*+7," and 4upas ! Damaso (*+;9" 0 from
the date of con!eyance or foreclosure sale
'elisario !$ IA& (*+;;" 0 from the period after the epiration
of the *3year period of repurchase
4he %& held that the doctrine that should apply is that which
was enunciated in )onge and 4upas because the transactions
in!ol!ed too1 place prior to 'elisario and not that which was
laid down in the latter case which should be applied
prospecti!ely
&ourt may issue guidelines in construing statute
In construing a statute, the enforcement of which may tread
on sensiti!e areas of constitutional rights, the court may
issue guidelines in applying the statute, not to enlarge or
restrict it but to clearly delineate what the law is$
Peo. v. Ferrer
Ghat acts that may be considered liable under the Anti3
%ub!ersion Act
Mora#es v. Enri#e
Rights of a person under custodial in!estigation
"P v. CA( Mo#ina
Kuidelines for ascertaining psychological incapacity of an
erring spouse in a !oid marriage under Art$ -8 /&
LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE
&ourts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes
&ourts are not authoriAed to insert into the law what they
thin1 should be in it or to supply what they the legislature
would ha!e supplied if its intention had been called to the
omission$
4hey should not by construction, re!ise e!en the most
arbitrary or unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the
law to conform to what they thin1 should be the law$
5either should the courts construe statutes which are
perfectly !ague for it !iolates due process
o /ailure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct
to a!oid
o Lea!e law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its pro!isions
: leading stars on 2udicial construction
o Kood faith
o commonsense
an utterly !ague act on its face cannot be clarified by either a
sa!ing clause or by construction
&ourts not to be influenced by .uestions of wisdom
&ourts do not sit to resol!e the merit of conflicting theories
&ourts do not pass upon .uestion of wisdom, 2ustice or
epediency of legislation, for it(s not within their pro!ince to
super!ise legislation and 1eep it within the bounds of
common sense$
4he court merely interpret regardless of whether or not they
wise or salutary$
CHAPTER THREE: A!"s to Construt!on
IN GENERAL
Kenerally
Ghere the meaning of a statue is ambiguous, the court is
warranted in a!ailing itself of all illegitimate aids to
construction in order that it can ascertain the true intent of
the statute$
4he aids to construction are those found in the printed page
of the statute itselfH 1now as the intrinsic aids, and those
etraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page,
called e)trinsic aids$
4itle
It is used as an aid, in case of doubt in its language to its
construction and to ascertaining legislati!e will$
If the meaning of the statute is obscure, courts may resort to
the title to clear the obscurity$
4he title may indicate the legislati!e intent to etend or
restrict the scope of law, and a statute couched in a language
of doubtful import will be constructed to conform to the
legislati!e intent as disclosed in its title$
Resorted as an aid where there is doubt as to the meaning of
the law or as to the intention of the legislature in enacting it,
and not otherwise$
%er!e as a guide to ascertaining legislati!e intent carries
more weight in this 2urisdiction because of the constitutional
re.uirement that Be!ery bill shall embrace only one sub2ect
who shall be epressed in the title thereof$
4he constitutional in2unction ma1es the title an indispensable
part of a statute$
ag%io v. Marcos
4he .uestion raised is when to count the 96 yr period to file a
petition for reopening of cadastral proceedings (to settle and
ad2udicate the titles to the !arious lots embraced in the
sur!ey" as authoriAed by RA +-* co!ering the lands that
ha!e been or about to be declared land of public domain, by
!irtue of 2udicial proceedings instituted w=in the 96 years
net preceding the appro!al of this act$
4he .uestion is as1ed if the proceeding be reopened
originally instituted in court April *:, *+*: or 5o!ember :7,
*+::, the counted date form which the decision therein
rendered became final$ Petition was filed on #uly :7, *+8*
4itle of the Law BAn Act to authoriAe the filing in the proper
court under certain conditions of certain claims of title to
parcels of land that ha!e been declared public land, by !irtue
of the appro!al of this act$C
4here was an apparent inconsistency between the title and
body of the law$
It ruled that the starting date to count the period is the date
the final decision was rendered$
It recites that it authoriAes court proceedings of claims to
parcels of land declared public by !irtue of 2udicial decisions
rendered within forty years net preceding the appro!al of
this act$
4hat title written in capital letters by &ongress itselfH such
1ind of title then is not to be classed with words or titles used
by compilers of statues because it is the legislature spea1ing$
Gords by !irtue of 2udicial decisions rendered in the title of
the law stand in e.ual importance to the phrase in %ections *
thereof by !irtue of 2udicial proceedings instituted$
4he court ruled that eamining Act no$ :;,9 in detail was
intended to apply to public lands only for the title of the act,
always indicati!e of legislati!e intent$
5o bill shall embrace more than one sub2ect, which sub2ect
shall be epressed in the title of the bill, the words and for
other purposes( when found in the title ha!e been held to be
without force or effect whatsoe!er and ha!e been altogether
discarded in construing the Act$
Ebar#e v. S%ca#dito
4he issue is raised whether Eecuti!e order no$ :89 entitled
B Outlining the procedure by which complaints charging
go!ernment officials and employees with commission of
irregularities should be guidedC applies to criminal actions,
to the end that no preliminary in!estigation thereof can be
underta1en or information file in court unless there is
pre!ious compliance with the eecuti!e order$
EO only applies to administrati!e and not to criminal
complaints$
4he !ery title spea1s of commission of irregularities$
Ghen resort to title not authoriAed
4he tet of the statute is clear and free from doubt, it is
improper to resort to its title to ma1e it obscure$
4he title may be resorted to in order to remo!e, but not to
create doubt$
Preamble
It is a part of the statute written immediately after its title,
which states the purpose, reason for the enactment of the
law$
Fsually epress in whereas clauses$
Kenerally omitted in statutes passed byD
Phil$ &ommission
Phil$ Legislature
5ational Assembly
&ongress of the Phil
'atasang Pambansa
4hese legislati!e bodies used the eplanatory note to eplain
the reasons for the enactment of statutes$
Etensi!ely used if Presidential decrees issued by the
President in the eercise of his legislati!e power$
Ghen the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither epand nor restrict its operation, much
less pre!ail o!er its tet$ 5or can be used as basis for gi!ing
a statute a meaning$
Ghen the statute is ambiguous, the preamble can be resorted
to clarify the ambiguity$
Preamble is the 1ey of the statute, to open the minds of the
lawma1ers as to the purpose is achie!ed, the mischief to be
remedied, and the ob2ect to be accomplished, by the
pro!isions of the legislature$
)ay decide the proper construction to be gi!en to the statute$
)ay restrict to what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of
law$
It may epress the legislati!e intent to ma1e the law apply
retroacti!ely in which case the law has to be gi!en
retroacti!e effect$
Illustration of rule
Peop#e v. P%risima
A person was charged w= !iolation of PD + which penaliAes,
among others, the carrying outside of one(s residence any
bladed, blunt or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool
or implement for li!elihood, with imprisonment ranging
from fi!e to ten years$
Puestion rose whether the carrying of such weapon should
be in relation to sub!ersion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
!iolence, criminality, chaos or public disorder as a necessary
element of the crime$
4he mere carrying of such weapon outside one(s residence is
sufficient to constitute a !iolation of the law
Pursuant to the preamble which spelled out the e!ents that
led to the enactment of the decree the clear intent and spirit
of the decree is to re.uire the moti!ation mentioned in the
preamble as in indispensable element of the crime$
4he se!erity of the penalty for the !iolation of the decree
suggests that it is a serious offense, which may only be
2ustified by associating the carrying out of such bladed of
blunt weapon with any of the purposes stated in its preamble$
Peo v. Ec*ave'
IssueD whether a person who s.uatted on a pastoral land
could be held criminally liable for the !iolation of PD ,,:
Bany person who, with the use of force, intimidation or
threat, or ta1ing ad!antage of the absence or tolerance of the
land owner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the
property of the latter against his will for residential,
commercial or any other purposes$
4he decree was promulgated to sol!e the s.uatting problem
which according to its preamble is still a ma2or problem in
urban communities all o!er the country and because many
persons and entities found to ha!e been unlawfully
occupying public and pri!ate lands belong to the affluent
class$
4he court said that crime may only be committed in urban
communities and not in agricultural and pastural lands
because the preamble of the decree shows that it was
intended to apply for s.uatting in urban lands, more
particularly to illegal constructions$
&ontet of whole tet
4o ascertain legislati!e intent is the statute itself ta1en as a
whole and in relation to one another considering the whole
contet of the statute and not from an isolated part of the
pro!ision$
4he meaning dictated by the contet pre!ails$
E!ery section, pro!ision, or clause of the statute must be
epounded by reference to each other in order to arri!e at the
effect contemplated by the legislature$
Punctuation mar1s
%emi3 colon 0 used to indicate a separation in the relation of
the thought, what follows must ha!e a relation to the same
matter it precedes it$
&omma and semi3 colon are use for the same purpose to
di!ide sentences, but the semi 0 colon ma1es the di!ision a
little more pronounce$ 'oth are not used to introduce a new
idea$
Punctuation mar1s are aids of low degree and can ne!er
control against the intelligible meaning of written words$
An ambiguity of a statute which may be partially or wholly
sol!ed by a punctuation mar1 may be considered in the
construction of a statute$
4he .ualifying effect of a word or phrase may be confined to
its last antecedent if the latter is separated by a comma from
the other antecedents$
An argument based on punctuation is not persuasi!e$
Illustrati!e eamples
F#orentino v. P+
Bwho may be willing to accept the same for such settlementC
0 this implies discretion
%& heldD only the last antecedent 0 Bany citiAen of the
Philippines or any association or corporation organiAed
under the laws of the PhilippinesC
pursuant to which bac1pay certificate3holders can
compel go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said certificates
for payment of their obligations subsisting at the time of the
amendatory act was appro!ed
+era v. ,arcia
Bif the charge against such subordinate or employee in!ol!es
dishonesty, oppression, or gra!e misconduct or neglect in the
performance of his dutyC
BdishonestyC and BoppressionC 0 need not be committed in
the course of the performance of duty by the person charges
Peo. v. S%bido
%ubsidiary imprisonment in case of insol!ency .ualifies both
non3payment of indemnity and non3payment of fine
&apitaliAation of letters
An aid of low degree in the construction of statute$
@eadnotes or epigraphs
%econdary aids
4hey are prefied to sections, or chapters of a statute for
ready reference or classification$
5ot entitled too much weight, and inferences drawn there
from are of little !alue and they can ne!er control the plain
terms of the enacting clauses, for they are not part of the law$
4he pro!isions of each article are controlling upon the
sub2ect thereof and operate as a general rule for settling such
.uestions as are embraced therein$
Ghen the tet of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is
neither necessity nor propriety to resort to the headings or
epigraphs of a section for interpretation of the tet, especially
when they are mere reference aids indicating the general
nature of the tet that follows$
Lingual tet
Rule is that, unless pro!ided, where a statute is promulgated
in English and %panish, English shall go!ern but in case of
ambiguity, %panish may be consulted to eplain the English
tet$
A statute is officially promulgated in %panish or in English,
or in /ilipino
BIn the interpretation of a law or administrati!e issuance
promulgated in all the official languages, the English tet
shall control, unless otherwise pro!ided$
Intent or spirit of law
It is the law itself$
&ontrolling factor, leading star and guiding light in the
application and interpretation of a statute$
A statute must be according to its spirit or intent$
4he courts cannot assume an intent in no way epressed and
then construe the statute to accomplish the supposed
intentionH otherwise they would pass beyond the bounds of
2udicial power to usurp legislati!e power$
Policy of law
%hould be gi!en effect by the 2udiciary$
One way to accomplish this mandate is to gi!e a statute of
doubtful meaning, a construction that will promote public
policy$
Tinio v. Francis
Policy of the law 0 to conser!e the land of the homesteader
not be sub2ect to encumbrance= alienation from the date
of the appro!al of the application and for a term of 7 years
from and after the date of the issuance of the patent or grant
o from the ORDER for the issuance of patent
o if literal interpretation is to be used, policy will be
defeated
Ca-i%at v. Mat*ay
policy 0 against double pensions for the same ser!ices
a law which grants retirable employees certain gratuity Bin
addition to other benefits which they are entitled under
eisting lawsC &A55O4 be construed as to authoriAe the
grant of double gratuity
Bother benefitsC may be
o Refund of contributions
o Payment of the money !alue of accumulated
!acation and sic1 lea!es
Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed
Intended to be remo!ed or suppressed and the causes which
induced the enactment of the law are important factors to be
considered in this construction$
o Purpose or ob2ect of the law
o )ischief intended to be remo!ed
o &auses which induced the enactment of the law
)ust be read in such a way as to gi!e effect to the purpose
pro2ected in the statute$
4he purpose of the general rule is not determinati!e of the
proper construction to be gi!en to the eceptions$
Purpose of statute is more important than the rules of
grammar and logic in ascertaining the meaning
Dictionaries
A statute does not define word or phrases used$
Kenerally define words in their natural plain and ordinary
acceptance and significance$
&onse.uences of !arious constructions
In.uired as an additional aid to interpretation$
A construction of a statute should be re2ected that will cause
in2ustice and hardship, result in absurdity, defeat legislati!e
intent or spirit, preclude accomplishment of legislati!e
purpose or ob2ect, render certain words or phrases a
surplusage, nullify the statute or ma1e any of its pro!isions
nugatory$
Presumptions
'ased on logic, eperience, and common sense, and in the
absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, doubts as to
the proper and correct construction of a statute will be
resol!ed in fa!or of that construction which is in accord with
the presumption on the matter$
o &onstitutionality of a statute
o &ompleteness
o Prospecti!e operation
o Right and 2ustice
o Effecti!e, sensible, beneficial and reasonable
operation as a whole
o Against inconsistency and implied repeal
unnecessary changes in law
impossibility
absurdity
in2ustice and hardship
incon!enience
ineffecti!eness$
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Kenerally
A statute is susceptible of se!eral interpretations or where
there is ambiguity in the language, there is no better means
of ascertaining the will and intention of the legislature than
that which is afforded by the history of the statute$
Ghat constitutes legislati!e history
@istory of a statute refers to all its antecedents from its
inception until its enactment into law$
Its history proper co!ers the period and the steps done from
the time the bill is introduced until it is finally passed by the
legislature$
Ghat it includesD
o President(s message if the bill is enacted in
response thereto,
o 4he eplanatory note accompanying the bill
o &ommittee reports of legislati!e in!estigations
o Public hearings on the sub2ect of the bill
o %ponsorship speech
o Debates and deliberations concerning the bill
o Amendments and changes in phraseology in which
it undergoes before final appro!al thereof$
o If the statute is based from a re!ision, a prior
statute, the latter(s practical application and
2udicial construction,
o >arious amendments it underwent
o &ontemporary e!ents at the
President(s message to legislature
4he president shall address the congress at the opening of its
regular session or appear before it at any other time$
Fsually contains proposed legal measures$
Indicates his thin1ing on the proposed legislation, when
enacted into law, follows his line of thin1ing on the matter$
Eplanatory note
A short eposition of eplanation accompanying a proposed
legislation by its author or proponent$
Ghere there is ambiguity in a statute or where a statute is
susceptible of more than one interpretation, courts may resort
to the eplanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain
the purpose or intent of the statute$
Fsed to gi!e effect to the purpose or intent as disclosed in its
eplanatory note$
A statute affected or changed an eisting law and the
eplanatory note to the bill which has e!entually enacted into
a law states that the purpose is too simply to secure the
prompt action on a certain matter by the officer concerned
and not to change the eisting lawH the statute should be
construed to carry out such purpose$
It may be used as a basis for gi!ing a statute a meaning that
is inconsistent with what is epressed in the tet of the
statute$
Legislati!e debates, !iews and deliberations
&ourts may a!ail to themsel!es the actual proceedings of the
legislati!e body to assist in determining the construction of a
statute of doubtful meaning$
4here is doubt to what a pro!ision of a statute means, that
meaning which was put to the pro!ision during the
legislati!e deliberation or discussion on the bill may be
adopted$
>iews epressed are as to the bill(s purpose, meaning or
effect are not controlling in the interpretation of the law$
It is impossible to determine with authority what
construction was put upon an act by the members of the
legislati!e body that passed the bill$
4he opinions epressed by legislators in the course of
debates concerning the application of eisting laws are not
also gi!en decisi!e weight, especially where the legislator
was not a member of the assembly that enacted the said laws$
Ghen a statute is clear and free from ambiguity, courts will
not in.uire into the moti!es which influence the legislature
or indi!idual members, in !oting for its passageH no indeed
as to the intention of the draftsman, or the legislators, so far
as it has not been epressed into the act$
Reports of commissions
&ommissions are usually formed to compile and collate all
laws on a particular sub2ect and to prepare the draft of the
proposed code$
Prior laws from which statute is based
&ourts are permitted to prior laws on the same sub2ect and to
in!estigate the antecedents of the statute in!ol!ed$
4his is applicable in the interpretation of codes, re!ised or
compiled statutes, for the prior law which ha!e been
codified, compiled or re!ised will show the legislati!e
history that will clarify the intent of the law or shed light on
the meaning and scope of the codified or re!ised statute$
Peo. v. Manantan
IssueD whether or not 2ustice of peace is included
&ontention of )anantan, who is a 2ustice of peace, is that the
omission of B2ustice of peaceC re!ealed the intention of the
legislature to eclude such from its operation
@eldD contention denied$ In holding that the word B2udgeC
includes B2ustice of peaceC, the &ourt said that Ba re!iew of
the history of the Re!ised Election &ode will help 2ustify and
clarify the abo!e conclusionC
Director of Lands v. Abaya
Ghen to count the *63year period, either from the date the
decision was rendered or from the date 2udicial proceedings
instituted in cadastral cases
@eldD court resol!ed the issue by referring to 9 older laws
which ha!e in common that counting of the period starts
from the date of the institution of the 2udicial proceeding and
not from the date the 2udgment is rendered
Sa#aysay v. Castro
BActually holdingC < Blastly electedC
4hus, a !ice mayor acting as mayor is not included in the
pro!ision
&hange in phraseology by amendments
Intents to change the meaning of the pro!ision$
A statute has undergone se!eral amendments, each
amendment using different phraseology, the deliberate
selection of language differing from that of the earlier act on
the sub2ect indicates that a change in meaning of the law was
intended and courts should so construe that statute as to
reflect such change in meaning$
Commissioner of C%stoms v. CTA
Bnational portC (new law" not the same as Bany portC (old
law"H otherwise, BnationalC will be a surplusage
Amendment by deletion
Deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute indicates
that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the
statute, for the presumption is that the legislation would not
ha!e made the deletion had the intention been not effect a
change in its meaning$
A statute containing a pro!ision prohibiting the doing of a
certain thing is amended by deleting such pro!ision$
,#oria v. CA
IssueD whether a public officer or employee, who has been
pre!enti!ely suspended pending in!estigation of the
administrati!e charges against him, is entitled to his salary
and other benefits during such pre!enti!e suspension
@eldD &ourt answered in the negati!e because such pro!ision
with regard to payment of salaries during suspension was
deleted in the new law
%enaseda v. F#avier
Ombusman and his deputy can only pre!enti!ely suspend
respondents in administrati!e cases who are employed in his
office, and not those who are employees in other department
or offices of the go!ernment
Eceptions to the rule (of amendment by deletion"
An amendment of the statue indicates a change in meaning
from that which the statute originally had applies only when
the intention is clear to change the pre!ious meaning of the
old law$
Rules don(t apply when the intent is clear that the
amendment is precisely to plainly epress the construction of
the act prior to its amendment because its language is not
sufficiently epressi!e of such construction$
/re.uently, words do not materially affect the sense will be
omitted from the statute as incorporated in the code or
re!ised statute, or that some general idea will be epressed in
brief phrases$
Adopted statutes
/oreign statutes are adopted in this country or from local
laws are patterned form parts of the legislati!e history of the
latter$
Local statutes are patterned after or copied from those of
another country, the decision of the courts in such country
construing those laws are entitled to great weight in the
interpretation of such local statutes$
Limitations of rule
A statute which has been adopted from that of a foreign
country should be construed in accordance with the
construction gi!en it in the country of origin is not without
limitations$
Principles of common law
Qnown as Anglo3American 2urisprudence which is no in
force in this country, sa!e only insofar as it is founded on
sound principles applicable to local conditions and is not in
conflict with eisting law, ne!ertheless, many of the
principles of the common law ha!e been imported into this
2urisdiction as a result of the enactment of laws and
establishment of institutions similar to those of the F%$
&onditions at time of enactment
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to ha!e
ta1en into account the eisting conditions of things at the
time of its enactment$
In the interpretations of a statute, consider the physical
conditions of the country and the circumstances then obtain
understanding as to the intent of the legislature or as to the
meaning of the statute$
@istory of the times
A court may loo1 to the history of the times, eamining the
state of things eisting when the statute was enacted$
A statute should not be construed in a spirit as if it were a
protoplasm floating around in space$
In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or
constitutional pro!ision, the history of the times of which I
grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear
some direct relationship, the e!ils intended to be remedied
and the good to be accomplished are proper sub2ects of
in.uiry$
Law being a manifestation of social culture and progress
must be interpreted ta1ing into consideration the stage of
such culture and progress including all the concomitant
circumstances$
Law is not a watertight compartment sealed or shut off from
the contact with the drama of life which unfolds before our
eyes$
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
Kenerally
Are the constructions placed upon statutes at the time of, or
after their enactment by the eecuti!e, legislati!e or 2udicial
authorities, as well as by those who in!ol!e in the process of
legislation are 1nowledgeable of the intent and purpose of
the law$
&ontemporary construction is strongest in law$
Eecuti!e construction, generallyH 1inds of
Is the construction placed upon the statute by an eecuti!e or
administrati!e officer$
4hree types of interpretation
o &onstruction by an eecuti!e or administrati!e
officer directly called to implement the law$
o &onstruction by the secretary of 2ustice in his
capacity as the chief legal ad!iser of the
go!ernment$
o @anded down in an ad!ersary proceeding in the
form of a ruling by an eecuti!e officer eercising
.uasi32udicial power$
Geight accorded to contemporaneous construction
Ghere there is doubt as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, the uniform construction placed upon it by the
eecuti!e or administrati!e officer charged with its
enforcement will be adopted if necessary to resol!e the
doubt$
4rue epression of the legislati!e purpose, especially if the
construction is followed for a considerable period of time$
+est#e P*i#ippines. /nc. v. CA
Reasons for why interpretation of an administrati!e agency
is generally accorded great respect
o Emergence of multifarious needs of a moderniAing
society
o Also relates to eperience and growth of
specialiAed capabilities by the administrati!e
agency
o 4hey ha!e the competence, epertness, eperience
and informed 2udgment, and the fact that they
fre.uently are the drafters of the law they interpret
P*i#ippine S%gar Centra# v. Co##ector of C%stoms
IssueD whether the go!ernment can legally collect duties Bas
a charge for wharfageC re.uired by a statute upon all articles
eported through pri!ately3owned whar!es
@eldD the court reasoned in the affirmati!e by saying Bthe
language of the Act could ha!e been made more specific and
certain, but in !iew of its history, its long continuous
construction, and what has been done and accomplished by
and under it, we are clearly of the opinion that the
go!ernment is entitled to ha!e and recei!e the money in
.uestion, e!en though the sugar was shipped from a pri!ate
wharf
Geight accorded to usage and practice
&ommon usage and practice under the statute, or a course of
conduct indicating a particular underta1ing of it, especially
where the usage has been ac.uiesced in by all the parties
concerned and has etended o!er a long period of time$
Optim%s interpres rer%m %s%s & the best interpretation of the
law is usage$
&onstruction of rules and regulations
4his rule3ma1ing power, authorities sustain the principle that
the interpretation by those charged with their enforcement is
entitled to great weight by the court in the latter(s
construction of such rules and regulations$
Reasons why contemporaneous construction is gi!en much weight
It is entitled to great weight because it comes from the
particular branch of go!ernment called upon to implement
the law thus construed$
Are presumed to ha!e familiariAed themsel!es with all the
considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the
law, and to ha!e formed an independent, conscientious and
competent epert opinion thereon
Ghen contemporaneous construction disregarded
Ghen there is no ambiguity in the law$
If it is clearly erroneous, the same must be declared null and
!oid$
Erroneous contemporaneous construction does not preclude correction
nor create rightsH eceptions
4he doctrine of estoppel does not preclude correction of the
erroneous construction by the officer himself by his
successor or by the court in an appropriate case$
An erroneous contemporeaneous construction creates no
!ested right on the part of those relied upon, and followed
such construction$
Legislati!e interpretation
4a1e form of an implied ac.uiescence to, or appro!al of, an
eecuti!e or 2udicial construction of a statute$
4he legislature cannot limit or restrict the power granted to
the courts by the constitution$
Legislati!e appro!al
Legislati!e is presumed to ha!e full 1nowledge of a
contemporaneous or practical construction of a statute by an
administrati!e or eecuti!e officer charged with its
enforcement$
4he legislature may appro!e or ratify such contemporaneous
construction$
)ay also be showmen by the legislature appropriating
money for the officer designated to perform a tas1 pursuant
to interpretation of a statute$
Legislati!e ratification is e.ui!alent to a mandate$
Reenactment
)ost common act of appro!al$
4he re3enactment of a statute, pre!iously gi!en a
contemporaneous construction is persuasi!e indication of the
adoption by the legislature of the prior construction$
Re3enactment if accorded greater weight and respect than the
contemporaneous construction of the statute before its
ratification$
%tare decisis
#udicial interpretation of a statute and is of greater weight
than that of an eecuti!e or administrati!e officer in the
construction of other statutes of similar import$
It is an in!aluable aid in the construction or interpretation of
statutes of doubtful meaning$
%tare decisis et non .uieta mo!ere 0 one should follow past
precedents and should not disturb what has been settled$
%upreme &ourt has the constitutional duty not only of
interpreting and applying the law in accordance with prior
doctrines but also of protecting society from the
impro!idence and wantonness wrought by needless
uphea!als in such interpretations and applications
In order that it will come within the doctrine of stare decisis,
must be categorically stated on an issue epressly raised by
the partiesH it must be a direct ruling, not merely an obiter
dictum
Obiter dictum 0 opinion epressed by a court upon some
.uestion of law which is not necessary to the decision of the
case before itH not binding as a precedent
4he principle presupposes that the facts of the precedent and
the case to which it is applied are substantially the same$
Ghere the facts are dissimilar, then the principle of stare
decisis does not apply$
4he rule of stare decisis is not absolute$ It does not apply
when there is a conflict between the precedent and the law$
4he duty of the court is to forsa1e and abandon any doctrine
or rule found to be in !iolation of law in force
Inferior courts as well as the legislature cannot abandon a
precedent enunciated by the %& ecept by way of repeal or
amendment of the law itself
CHAPTER FOUR: A"$erene to, or "e#arture %ro&, 'an(ua(e o%
statute
LITERAL INTERPRETATION
Literal meaning or plain3meaning rule
Keneral ruleD if statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be gi!en its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation
o >erba legis
o Inde animi sermo 0 speech is the inde of
intention
o Gords employed by the legislature in a statute
correctly epress its intent or will
o >erba legis non est recedendum 0 from the words
of a statute there should be no departure
o 4hus, what is not clearly pro!ided in the law
cannot be etended to those matters outside its
scope
#udicial legislation 0 an encroachment upon legislati!e
prerogati!e to define the wisdom of the law
o &ourts must administer the law as they find it
without regard to conse.uences
+ationa# Federation of Labor v. +L"C
Employees were claiming separation pay on the basis of Art$
:;- Labor &ode which states that Bemployer )AM also
terminate the employment of an employeeC for reasons
therein by ser!ing notice thereof and paying separation pay
to affected employees
4here was compulsory ac.uisition by the go!ernment of the
employer(s land (Patalon &oconut Estate" for purposes of
agrarian reform which forced the employer to cease his
operation
IssueD whether or not employer is liable for separation payR
@eldD 5O, employer is not liable for separation payS
o It is a unilateral and !oluntary act by the employer
if he wants to gi!e separation pay
o 4his is gleaned from the wording B)AMC in the
statute
o B)AMC denotes that it is directory in nature and
generally permissi!e only
o Plain3meaning rule is applicable
o Ano yun, ipapasara ng go!ernment tapos
magbabayad pa ang employer ng separation payRSR
Ang daya3dayaS Lugi na nga si employer, 1i1ita pa
si employeeRSR FnfairS &annot beS 5oS 5oS
o 4o depart from the meaning epressed by the
words is to alter the statute, to legislate and not
interpret
o )aledicta est eposition .uae corrumpit tetum 0
dangerous construction which is against the tet
Dura le sed le
Dura le sed le 0 the law may be harsh but it is still the law
Absoluta sentential epositore non indigent 0 when the
language of the law is clear, no eplanation of it is re.uired
Ghen the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation$
It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, e!en if
it may be harsh or onerous
@oc .uidem per.uam durum est, sed ital e scripta est 0 it is
eceedingly hard but so the law is written
A decent regard to the legislati!e will shoud inhibit the court
from engaging in 2udicial legislation to change what it thin1s
are unrealistic statutes that do not conform with ordinary
eperience or practice (respeto nalang sa ating mga
mambabatasS Ghate!erRSR @aha 2o1e only"
If there is a need to change the law, amend or repeal it,
remedy may be done through a legislati!e process, not by
2udicial decree
Ghere the law is clear, appeals to 2ustice and e.uity as
2ustification to construe it differently are una!ailing 0
Philippines is go!erned by &I>IL LAG or PO%I4I>E
LAG, not common law
E.uity is a!ailable only in the absence of law and not its
replacement 0 (so, pag may law, walang e.uity e.uityS Pero
pag walang law, pwedeng mag3e.uity, getsRSR$$$ important
toS"
Ae.uitas nun.uam contra!enit legis 0 e.uity ne!er acts in
contra!ention of the law
DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION
%tatute must be capable of interpretation, otherwise inoperati!e
If no 2udicial certainty can be had as to its meaning, the court
is not at liberty to supply nor to ma1e one
Santiago v. COMELEC
In this case, the &ourt adopted a literal meaning thus,
concluded that RA 8,-7 is inade.uate to implement the
power of the people to amend the &onstitution (initiati!e on
amendments" for the following reasonsD
o Does not suggest an initiati!e on amendments on
to the &onstitution because it is silent as to
amendments on the &onstitution and the word
B&onstitutionC is neither germane nor rele!ant to
said section
o Does not pro!ide for the contents of a petition for
initiati!e on the &onstitution
o Does not pro!ide for subtitles for initiati!e on the
&onstitution
o RA is incomplete and does not pro!ide a sufficient
standard
#ustice Puno (anoRSR #ustice 4reeRS" dissentsD
o Legislati!e intent is also shown by the
deliberations on the bill that became RA 8,-7L
(there are 9 more reasons 0 see page *-63*-*,
which are not so important"
Interpretation of RA 8,-7 was not in 1eeping with the
maim interpretation fienda est ut res magis !aleat .uam
pereat 0 that interpretation as will gi!e the thing efficacy is
to be adopted
Ghat is within the spirit is within the law
Don(t literally construe the law if it will render it
meaningless, lead to ambiguity, in2ustice or contradiction
4he spirit of the law controls its letter
Ratio legis 0 interpretation according to the spirit or reason
of the law
%pirit or intention of a statute pre!ails o!er the letter
A law should accordingly be so construed as to be in
accordance with, and not repugnant to, the spirit of the law
PresumptionD undesirable conse.uences were ne!er intended
by a legislati!e measure
Literal import must yield to intent
>erba intentioni, non e contra, debent inser!ire 0 words
ought to be more subser!ient to the intent and not the intent
to the words (ahhh parang intent is to woman as word is to
man 0 so man is subser!ient to womanL logicalS"
Kuide in ascertaining intent 0 conscience and e.uity
%o it is possible that a statute may be etended to cases not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent
Limitation of rule
&onstrue (intent o!er letter" only if there is ambiguityS
&onstruction to accomplish purpose
PFRPO%E or REA%O5 which induced the enactment of the
statute 0 1ey to open the brain of the legislature= legislati!e
intentS
%tatutes should be construed in the light of the ob2ect to be
achie!ed and the e!il or mischief to be suppressed
As between two statutory interpretations, that which better
ser!es the purpose of the law should pre!ail
Sarcos v. Casti##o
4his case eplains why legislati!e purpose to determine
legislati!e intent
/ran1furter
o Legislati!e words are not inert but deri!ed !itality
from the ob!ious purposes at which they are aimed
o Legislation 0 wor1ing instrument of go!ernment
and not merely as a collection of English words
'en2amin 5atham &ardoAo
o Legislation is more than a composition
o It is an acti!e instrument of go!ernment which
means that laws ha!e ends to be achie!ed
@olmes
o Gords are fleible
o 4he general purpose is a more important aid to the
meaning than any rule which grammar or formal
logic may lay down
o &ourts are apt to err by stic1ing too closely to the
words of law where those words import a policy
that goes beyond them
Soriano v. Offs*ore S*ipping and Manning Corp
A literal interpretation is to be re2ected if it would be un2ust
or lead to absurd results
Illustration of rule
0ing v. !ernande'
IssueD whether or not a &hinese (parang si RA and %erge"
may be employed in a non3control position in a retail
establishment, a wholly nationaliAed business under RA
**;6 Retail 4rade Law (btw, wala na tong law na Tto$ It has
been repealed by the Retail 4rade LiberaliAation Act 0 my
thesisS "
@eldD 5oS (1asi duduraan 1a lang ng mga intsi1S #o1e onlyS"
the law has to be construed with the Anti3Dummy Law 0
prohibiting an alien from inter!ening in the management,
operation, administration or control thereof
Ghen the law says you cannot employ such alien, you
cannot employ an alienS 4he unscrupulous alien may resort
to flout the law or defeat its purposeS (maggulang daw mga
intsi1L ultimo tubig sa pasig ri!er, which is supposed to be
free, bottles it and then sells itS @uwatRSR"
It is imperati!e that the law be interpreted in a manner that
would sta!e off any attempt at circum!ention of the
legislati!e purpose
%stamante v. +L"C
IssueD how to compute for bac1wages to which an illegally
dismissed employee would be entitled until his actual
reinstatement (ta1e note of this case$$ it(s a labor caseL 1iliti
ni Kolangco"
- waysD
o *
st
0 before Labor &ode 0 to be deducted from the
amount of bac1wages is the earnings elsewhere
during the period of illegal dismissal
o :
nd
0 Labor &ode Art$ :,+ 0 the amount of
bac1wages is fied without deductions or
.ualifications but limited to not more than - years
o -
rd
0 amended Art$ :,+ 0 full bac1wages or without
deductions from the time the laborer(s
compensation was withheld until his actual
reinstatement
4he clear legislati!e intent of the amendment in RA 8,*7
(Labor &ode" is to gi!e more benefits to wor1ers than was
pre!iously gi!en them under the )ercury Drug rule or the *
st
way
1S v. Toribio
4he prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption so long as these animals are fit for agricultural
wor1= draft purposes was a Breasonable necessary limitationC
on pri!ate ownership
Purpose or ob2ect of the law 0 to protect large cattle against
theft and to ma1e easy reco!ery and return of such cattle to
their owners, when lost, strayed or stolen
IssueD whether the slaughter of large cattle outside the
municipal slaughterhouse without a permit by the municipal
treasurer is prohibitedR
@eldD ME%S Outside or inside without permit is prohibited
ocobo v. Estanis#ao
IssueD whether the &/I and a municipal court in the capital of
a pro!ince ha!e concurrent 2urisdiction o!er the crime of
libel
RP& 0 grants 2urisdiction with &/I
#udiciary Act grants 2urisdiction with the municipal court in
the capital of a pro!ince in offenses where the penalty is not
more than prission correctional or fine not eceeding
8,666Php (penalty for libel"
%o ano naRSR
,odines v. CA
Patent Law 0 grants the patentee the eclusi!e right to ma1e,
use, and sell his patented machine, article or product
Doctrine of e.ui!alents 0 when a de!ice appropriates a prior
in!ention by incorporating its inno!ati!e concept, and albeit
with some modification and change, performs substantially
the same function in substantially the same way to achie!e
substantially the same result (ano ba TtoRSR Puro
substantiallyR"
P#anters Association of So%t*ern +egros. /nc. v. Ponferrada
: apparently conflicting pro!isions should be construed as to
realiAe the purpose of the law
4he purpose of the law is to I5&REA%E the wor1er(s
benefits
'enefits under RA 8+;: shall be I5 ADDI4IO5 to the
benefits under RA ;6+ and PD 8:*
B%ubstitutedC cannot be gi!en literal interpretation
Ghen reason of law ceases, law itself ceases
4he reason which induced the legislature to enact a law is the
heart of the law
&essante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa le 0 when the reason of
the law ceases, the law itself ceases
Ratio legis est anima 0 reason of the law is its soul
Peo v. A#m%ete
Agricultural 4enancy Act is repealed by the Agricultural
Land Reform &ode
Agricultural 4enancy Act 0 punishes prereaping or
prethreshing of palay on a date other than that pre!iously set
without the mutual consent of the landlord and tenant
o %hare tenancy relationship
Agricultural Land Reform &ode 0 abolished share tenancy
relationship, thus does not punish prereaping or prethreshing
of palay on a date other than that pre!iously set without the
mutual consent of the landlord and tenant anymore
o Leasehold system
Commendador v. De 2i##a
IssueD whether PD -+, which withdrew the right to
peremptorily challenge members of a military tribunal, had
been rendered inoperati!e by PD :697 proclaiming the
termination of a state of martial law
@eldD ME%S 4he termination of the martial law and the
dissolution of military tribunals created thereunder, the
reason for the eistence of PD -+ ceased automatically and
the decree itself ceased
2as$%e' v. ,iap
Ghere the mischief sought to be remedied by a statute has
already been remo!ed in a gi!en situation, the statute may no
longer apply in such case
4he law bans aliens from ac.uiring and owning lands, the
purpose is to preser!e the nation(s lands for future
generations of /ilipinos
A sale of land in fa!or of an alien, in !iolation of the said
law, no longer be .uestioned after the alien becomes a
/ilipino citiAen
%upplying legislati!e omission
if it is clearly ascertainable from the &O54EE4S
)ay supply legislati!e omission to ma1e the statute conform
to ob!ious intent of the legislature or to pre!ent the act from
being absurd
5oteD differentiate from 2udicial legislation
&orrecting clerical errors
As long as the meaning intended is apparent on the face of
the whole enactment and no specific pro!ision is abrogated
4his is not 2udicial legislation
Illustration rule
"%fino Lope' 3 Sons. /nc. v. CTA
&ourt change the phrase Bcollector of customsC to
Bcommissioner of customsC to correct an ob!ious mista1e in
law
%ec , 0 Bcommissioner of customsC 0 grants the &4A
2urisdiction to re!iew decisions of the &ommissioner of
&ustoms
%ec ** 0 Bcollector of customsC 0 refers to the decision of the
&ollector of &ustoms that may be appealed to the ta court
B&ommissionerC pre!ails 0 &ommissioner of &ustoms has
super!ision and control o!er &ollectors of &ustoms and the
decisions of the latter are re!iewable by the &ommissioner of
&ustoms
Lamp v. P*ipps
BOrdinary &OFR4% of lawC to BOrdinary &OFR%E of lawC
Farinas v. arba
IssueD who is the appointing power to fill a !acancy created
by the sanggunian member who did not belong to any
political party, under the pro!ision of the Local Ko!ernment
&ode
Blocal chief eecuti!eC 0 a misnomer
It should be Bauthorities concernedC
'ecause the President is not a Blocal chief eecuti!eC but
under %ec$ 76 of the Local Ko!ernment &ode, the BPresident,
Ko!ernor, )ayor ha!e the eecuti!e power to appoint in
order to fill !acancies in local councils or to suspend local
officials
Pualification of rule (of correcting clerical errors"
Only those which are clearly clerical errors or ob!ious
mista1es, omissions, and misprintsH otherwise, is to rewrite
the law and in!ade the domain of the legislature, it is 2udicial
legislation in the guise of interpretation
&onstruction to a!oid absurdity
ReasonD it is always presumed that the legislature intended
eceptions to its language which would a!oid conse.uences
of this character
4hus, statutes may be etended to co!er cases not within the
literal meaning of the terms if their eact and literal import
would lead to absurd or mischie!ous results
Interpretation talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut e!itetur
incon!eniens et absurdum 0 where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will a!oid incon!enience and absurdity is to
be adopted
&ourts test the law by its results 0 if law appears to be
arbitrary, courts are not bound to apply it in sla!ish
disobedience to its language
&ourts should construe a statute to effectuate, and not to
defeat, its pro!isionsH nor render compliance with its
pro!isions impossible to perform
Peo v. D%$%e
%urplusageSSS
%ec$ : of Act 5o$ --:8 0 prescription of offenses
o Prescription shall begin to run from
4he day of the commission of the
!iolation
/rom the time of disco!ery A5D
institution of 2udicial proceedings for
in!estigation and punishment
'ut the pre!ailing rule is that prescripti!e period is tolled
upon the institution of 2udicial proceedings 0 an act of grace
by the %tate
&ourt held that the phrase Binstitution of 2udicial proceedings
for its in!estigation and punishmentC may be either
disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by
the word BuntilC
O#iveros v. 2i##a#%'
IssueD whether or not the suspension order against an electi!e
official following an information for !iolation of the Anti3
Kraft law filed against him, applies not only to the current
term of office but also to another term if the accused run for
reelection and won
%ec *- of the Anti3Kraft Law 0 suspension unless ac.uitted,
reinstatedS
@eldD only refers to the current term of the suspended officer
(and not to a future un1nown and uncertain new term unless
supplemented by a new suspension order in the e!ent of
reelection" for if his term shall ha!e epired at the time of
ac.uittal, he would ob!iously be no longer entitled to
reinstatementH otherwise it will lead to absurdities
Peo v. 4% !ai
IssueD when does a crime punishable by arresto menor
prescribeR
%tate says *6 years as pro!ided for in Art +6 RP&
o Art$ :8 (correctional offenses" 0 ma fine of
:66Php 0 correctional penalty 0 prescribes in *6
years (Art$ +6"
&ourt held that this is not rightSSSS It is wrongS
o Art$ + (light offenses" 0 not more than :66Php 0
light felonies 0 : months
o *Php ma1es a difference of + years and *6 monthsS
(huwatRSR"
o Arresto mayor (correctional penalty" prescribes in
7 years
o Less gra!e 0 prescribe e!en shorter
o Also, prescripti!e period cannot be ascertained not
until the court decides which of the alternati!e
penalties should be imposed 0 imprisonment ba or
fine langL yun lang poS
Peo v. "eyes
Dangerous Drugs Act
RA ,87+
o E U :66 grams 0 ma penalty is reclusion perpetua
o E V :66 grams 0 min penalty is reclusion
perpetua
&ourt ruled thatD
o E U :66 grams 0 penalty ranging from prision
correctional to reclusion temporal
*-93*++grams 0 reclusion temporal
883*-- 0 prison mayor
Less than 88 grams 0 prision correcional
%tat&on 0 duty of the court to harmoniAe conflicting
pro!isions to gi!e effect to the whole lawH to effectuate the
intention of legislature
Ma#on'o v. 5amora
&ontentionD the &ity &ounsel of &aloocan cannot !alidly
pass an ordinance appropriating a supplemental budget for
the purpose of epropriating a certain parcel of land, without
first adopting or updating its house rules of procedure within
the first +6 days following the election of its members, as
re.uired by %ecs$ 76 and 7: of the LK&
&ourt said this is absurdSSSS &ontention is re2ectedS
o Adoption or updating of house rules would
necessarily entail wor1L local council(s hands
were tied and could not act on any other matter if
we hold the absurd contentionS
o %o much incon!enienceS %hioS And this could not
ha!e been intended by the law
&onstruction to a!oid in2ustice
Presumption 0 legislature did not intend to wor1 a hardship
or an oppressi!e result, a possible abuse of authority or act of
oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose
hardship on the other
Ea est accipienda interpretation .uae !itio caret 0 that
interpretation is to be adopted which is free from e!il or
in2ustice
Amatan v. A%-ero
Rodrigo Fmpad was charged with homicide
Pursuant to some pro!ision in criminal procedure, he entered
into a plea bargaining agreement, which the 2udge appro!ed
of, downgrading the offense charge of homicide to attempted
homicide to which Fmpad pleaded guilty thereto$
@elloRSR 5amatay na nga tapos attempted langRSR
)ababaliw a1o sayo, 2udge, whoe!er you areSSS
/iat 2usticia, ruat coelum 0 let the right be done, though the
hea!ens fall (ano dawRSR"
%tated differently, when a pro!ision of the law is silent or
ambiguougs, 2udges ought to in!o1e a solution responsi!e to
the !ehement urge of conscience (ahhhL ano daw ulitRSR"
Peo v. P%risima
It was contended that PD +(-" 0 is a malum prohibitumH thus
intent to use such prohibited weapons is immaterial by
reason of public policy
&ourt said that use the preamble to construe such act whether
penaliAed or not
)oreo!er the court said that legislature did not intend
in2ustice, absurdity and contradiction
&ourt ga!e an eampleL
o %o if I borrowed a bolo then I return this to my
lender, then in the course or my 2ourney I(m
caught, I(m penaliAed under the Decree for 73*6
years imprisonmentS (ang labo namanS"
1rs%a v. CA
IssueD whether or not the isolated use, at one instance, of a
name other than a person(s true name to secure a copy of a
document from a go!ernment agency, constitutes !iolation
of &A *9: 0 Anti3alias Law
@eldD 5OS (isang beses lang naman eh$$ hehehe 2o1e langS"
o 4he purpose of the Anti3alias Law is to pre!ent
confusion and fraud in business transactions
o %uch isolated use of a different name is not
prohibited by the lawH otherwise, in2ustice,
absurdity and contradiction will result
&onstruction to a!oid danger to public interest
Co 0im C*am v. 2a#de' Tan 0e*
%a &onsti Tto ahS La langL hehe (yihee, %ergeS"
BprocessesC in the proclamation that Ball laws regulations
and processesC of the so3called RP during the #apanese
occupation of the country Bare null and !oid and without
legal effectC )AM 5O4 be construed to embrace #FDI&IAL
PRO&E%%E% as this would lead to great incon!enience and
public hardship and public interest would be endangered
o &riminals freed
o >ested right, impaired
&onstruction in fa!or of right and 2ustice
Art$ *6 &&D In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the law3ma1ing body
intended right and 2ustice to pre!ail
Art$ + &&D 4he fact that a statute is silent, obscure, or
insufficient with respect to a .uestion before the court will
not 2ustify the latter from declining to render 2udgment
thereon
In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is percei!ed to tip
the scales which the court belie!es will best promote the
public welfare is its probable operation as a general rule or
principle
Sa#vacion v. SP
Kreg 'artelli raped his alleged niece *6 times and detained
her in his apartment for 9 days
&ourt ga!e a fa!orable 2udgment of more than *)Php
'%P re2ected the writ of attachment alleging %ec **- of the
&entral 'an1 &ircular 5o$ +86 (applicable to transient
foreigners"
IssueD whether the dollar ban1 deposit in a Philippine ban1 of
a foreign tourist can be attached to satisfy the moral damages
awarded in fa!or of the latter(s *:3year3old rape !ictim
'%P did not honor the writ of attachment pursuant to
RA89:8 %ec ; 0 Bforeign currency deposits shall be eempt
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process
of any court, legislati!e body, go!ernment agency or any
administrati!e body whatsoe!erC
&ourt held thatD A5O 'ARSR 5a3rape na nga ayaw pang
magbayad ng moral damages dahil lang sa isang silly lawRSR
(hehe$$ 2o1e lang$$ I(m so bored na ehS"
o &ourt applied the principles of right and 2ustice to
pre!ail o!er the strict and literal words of the
statute
o 4he purpose of RA 89:8 to eempt such assets
from attachmentD at the time the said law was
enacted, the country(s economy was in a shambles$
'ut in the present time it is still in shambles$$$ hehe
2o1e langL but in the present time, the country has
reco!ered economically$ 5o reason why such
assets cannot be attached especially if it would
satisfy a 2udgment to award moral damages to a
*:3year3old rape !ictimS
%urplusage and superfluity disregarded
Ghere a word, phrase or clause in a statute is de!oid of
meaning in relation to the contet or intent of the statute, or
where it suggests a meaning that nullifies the statute or
renders it without sense, the word, phrase or clause may be
re2ected as surplusage and entirely ignored
%urplusagium non noceat 0 surplusage does not !itiate a
statute
Ftile per inutile non !itiatur 0 nor is the useful !itated by the
non3useful
Demafi#es v. COMELEC
IssueD whether a pre3proclamation election case has become
moot because the proclaimed winner had immediately ta1en
his oath pursuant to %ec : RA 9;,6 which pro!ides that the
Bfirst mayor, !ice3mayor and councilors of the municipality
of %ebaste shall be elected in the net general elections for
local officials and shall ha!e .ualifiedC
It was contended that Bshall ha!e .ualifiedC begins
immediately after their proclamationS
&ourt held that this is wrongS
o 4he said phrase is a 2argon and does not warrant
the respondent(s reading that the term of office of
the first municipal officials of %ebaste begins
immediately after their proclamation
o 4he Qing in TAlice in Gonderland(D if there is no
meaning in it, that sa!es a world of trouble, you
1now, as we need not try to find any
o Apply the general rule when such term begin 0 the
term of municipal officials shall begin on the *
st
day of #anuary following their election
Redundant words may be re2ected
%elf3eplanatory, ano buAAAARSR
Obscure or missing word or false description may not preclude
construction
/alsa demonstration non nocet, cum de corpore constat 0
false description does not preclude construction nor !itiate
the meaning of the statute which is otherwise clear
Eemption from rigid application of law
Ibi .uid generaliter conceditur 0 e!ery rule is not without an
eception
Inest haec eception, si non ali.uid sit contras 2us bas.ue 0
where anything is granted generally, this eception is
implied
&ompelling reasons may 2ustify reading an eception to a
rule e!en where the latter does not pro!ide anyH otherwise
the rigor of the law would become the highest in2ustice 0
summum 2us, summa in2uria
Law does not re.uire the impossible
5emo tenetur ad impossible 0 the law obliges no one to
perform an impossibility
Impossibilium nulla obligation est 0 no obligation to do an
impossible thing
Impossible compliance !ersus %ubstantial compliance (as
re.uired by law"
Lim co C*%i v Posadas
Publication in the Official KaAette wee1ly, for three times
and consecuti!ely, to ac.uire 2urisdiction o!er naturaliAation
case
It was an impossibility to fulfill such re.uirement as the OK
was not, at the time, published wee1ly
4hus, &ourt held that compliance with the other :
re.uirements would be deemed sufficient to ac.uire
2urisdiction o!er the naturaliAation case
Akbayan v. COMELEC
4his case is about the statutory grant of stand3by power to
the &O)ELE& as pro!ided for in %ec$ :; RA ;9-8
Petitioners were as1ing the respondent to eercise such
power so as to accommodate potential !oters who were not
able to register for the upcoming election
&O)ELE& denied the petition alleging the impossibility of
late registration to accommodate potential !oters
&ourt ruled that the pro!ision must be gi!en such
interpretation that is in accordance with logic, common
sense, reasonableness and practicality
Ghere time constraint and the surrounding circumstances
ma1e it impossible or the &O)ELE& to conduct special
registration of !oters, the &O)ELE& cannot be faulted for
refusing to do so, for the law does not re.uire the impossible
to be doneH there is no obligation to ho the impossible thing
&O)ELE&(s decision is sustained
5umber and gender of words
Ghen the contet of a statute so indicates, words in plural
include the singular, and !ice !ersa$
A plural word in a statute may thus apply to a singular
person or thing, 2ust as a singular word may embrace two or
more persons or things
Art$ ++8 && 0 (law on succession" such article also applies
to a situation where there is only one child because
BchildrenC includes BchildC
Election &ode 0 BcandidateC comprehends Bsome
candidatesC or Ball candidatesC
On gender 0 the masculine, but not the feminine, includes all
genders, unless the contet in which the word is used in the
statute indicates otherwise
IMPLICATIONS
Doctrine of necessary implication
%o3called gaps in the law de!elop as the law is enforced
%tat&on ruleD to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary
implication
Doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a
part thereof as that which is epressed
E necessitate legis 0 from the necessity of the law
E!ery statutory grant of power, right or pri!ilege is deemed
to include all incidental power, right or pri!ilege
In eo .uod plus sit, simper inest et minus 0 greater includes
the lesser
5ecessity 0
o includes such inferences as may be logically be
drawn from the purpose or ob2ect of the statute,
from what the legislature must be presumed to
ha!e intended, and from the necessity of ma1ing
the statute effecti!e and operati!e
o ecludes what is merely plausible, beneficial, or
desirable
must be consistent with the &onstitution or to eisting laws
an implication which is !iolati!e of the law is un2ustified or
unwarranted
C*%a v. Civi# Service Commission
IssueD whether a coterminous employee, or one whose
appointment is co3eistent with the duration of a go!ernment
pro2ect, who has been employed as such for more than :
years, is entitled to early retirement benefits under %ec : RA
88;-
&ourt held that ME%, &hua is entitledS
o A coterminous employee is no different from a
casual or temporary employee, and by necessary
implication, the inclusion of the latter in the class
of go!ernment employees entitled to the benefits
of the law necessarily implies that the former
should also be entitled to such benefits
o Grong application of the maim Bepresio
uniusest eclusion alteriusC
Remedy implied from a right
Fbi 2us, ibi remedium 3 where there is a right, there is a
remedy for !iolation thereof
Right 3V Obligation 3V Remedy
4he fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does not
preclude him from !indicating his right, for such remedy is
implied from such right
Once a right is established, the way must be cleared for its
enforcement, and technicalities in procedure, 2udicial as well
as administrati!e, must gi!e way
Ghere there is Bwrong,C (depri!ation or !iolation of a right"
there is a remedy
If there(s no right, principle does not apply
at%ngbaka# v +ationa# Deve#opment Co
Petitioner was suspended and remo!ed from office which
pro!ed to be illegal and !iolati!e not only of the
Administrati!e &ode but of the &onstitution itself
&ourt ruled that to remedy the e!il and wrong committed,
there should be reinstatement and payment of bac1wages,
among other things
@owe!er, there was a legal problem as to his reinstatement,
for when he was suspended and e!entually dismissed,
somebody was appointed to his position
IssueD whether remedy is denied petitioner
@eldD position was ne!er B!acantC$ %ince there is no
!acancy, the present incumbent cannot be appointed
permanently$ 4he incumbent is only holding a temporary
position$ )oreo!er, the incumbent(s being made to lea!e the
post to gi!e way to the employee(s superior right may be
considered as remo!al for cause
Krant of 2urisdiction
&onferred only by the &onstitution or by statute
&annot be conferred by the Rules of &ourt
&annot be implied from the language of a statute, in the
absence of clear legislati!e intent to that effect
Pimente# v. COMELEC
&O)ELE& has appellate 2urisdiction o!er election cases
filed with and decided by the R4& in!ol!ing municipal
electi!e officials DOE% 5O4 I)PLM the grant of authority
upon the &O)ELE& to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus concerning said election cases
Peo v. Pa#ana
%tatute grants a special court 2urisdiction o!er criminal cases
in!ol!ing offenders under *8 at the time of the filing of the
action, a subse.uent statute defining a youthful offender as
one who is o!er + but below :* years of age may not be so
construed as to confer by implication upon said special court
the authority to try cases in!ol!ing offenders *8 but below
:* years of age
Ghat may be implied from grant of 2urisdiction
4he grant of 2urisdiction to try actions carries with it all
necessary and incidental powers to employ all writs,
processes and other means essential to ma1e its 2urisdiction
effecti!e
Ghere a court has 2urisdiction o!er the main cause of action,
it can grant reliefs incidental thereto, e!en if they would
otherwise be outside its 2urisdiction
o E$g$ forcible entry and detainer is cogniAable in
)4&L )4& can order payment of rentals e!en
though the amount eceeds the 2urisdictional
amount cogniAable by them, the same merely
incidental to the principal action
%tatutes conferring 2urisdiction to an administrati!e agency
must be liberally construed to enable the agency to discharge
its assigned duties in accordance with the legislati!e purpose
o E$g$ the power granted the 5@A to hear and decide
claims in!ol!ing refund and any other claims filed
, include attorney(s fees and other damages
Krant of power includes incidental power
Ghere a general power is conferred or duty en2oined, e!ery
particular power necessary for the eercise of one or the
performance of the other is also conferred
4he incidental powers are those which are necessarily
included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power
granted
o Eamples
Power to establish an office includes
authority to abolish it, unless
Garrant issued shall be made upon
probable cause determined by the 2udge
implies the grant of power to the
2udge to conduct preliminary
in!estigations
Power to appro!e a license includes by
implication the power to re!o1e it
Power to re!o1e is limited by
the authority to grant license,
from which it is deri!ed
Power to deport includes the power to
arrest undesirable aliens after
in!estigation
Power to appoint !ested in the President
includes the power to ma1e temporary
appointments , unless
Power to appropriate money includes
power to withdraw unepended money
already appropriated
EtcL see page *,*3*,:
Krant of power ecludes greater power
4he principle that the grant of power includes all incidental
powers necessary to ma1e the eercise thereof effecti!e
implies the eclusion of those which are greater than that
conferred
o Power of super!ision DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE
power to suspend or remo!al
o Power to reorganiAe DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE the
authority to depri!e the courts certain 2urisdiction
and to transfer it to a .uasi32udicial tribunal
o Power to regulate business DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE
power to prohibit
Ghat is implied should not be against the law
Power to appoint includes power to suspend or remo!e 0
o &onstitutional restriction of &I>IL %ER>I&E
E)PLOMEE%, that it must be a cause pro!ided for
by law precludes such implication (unless the
appointment was made outside the ci!il ser!ice
law
Power to appoint a public officer by the President includes
power to remo!e
o Pro!ided that such remo!al is made with 2ust cause
o Ecept is such statute pro!ides that term of office
to be at the pleasure of the appointing officer,
power to appoint carries with it power to remo!e
anytime
Power to in!estigate officials DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE the
power to delegate the authority to ta1e testimony of
witnesses whose appearance may be re.uired by the
compulsory process of subpoena$ 5or does such power to
in!estigate include the power to delegate the authority to
administer oath
Authority to charge against public funds may not be implied
It is well3settled that unless a statute epressly so authoriAes,
no claim against public funds may be allowed
o %tatute grants lea!e pri!ileges to APPOI54I>E
officials, this cannot be construed to include
ELE&4I>E officials
o BemployerC to pay *-
th
month pay, does not imply
that it includes Bgo!ernment
Illegality of act implied from prohibition
In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis 3 where a
statute prohibits the doing of an act, the act done in !iolation
thereof is by implication null and !oid
Prohibited act cannot ser!e as foundation of a cause of action
for relief
E dolo malo non oritur actio 0 no man can be allowed to
found a claim upon his own wrongdoing or ine.uity
5ullus coomodum capere potest de in2uria sua propria 0 no
man should be allowed to ta1e ad!antage of his own wrong
Public policy re.uires that parties to an act prohibited by
statute be left where they are, to ma1e the statute effecti!e
and to accomplish its ob2ect
o Party to an illegal contract cannot come to court of
law and as1 that his illegal ob2ect be carried out
o A citiAen who sold his land to an alien in !iolation
of the constitutional restriction cannot annul the
same and reco!er the land, for both seller and
buyer are guilty of ha!ing !iolated the &onstitution
4wo (:" Eceptions to the rule
Pari delicto doctrine will not apply when its enforcement or
application will !iolate an a!owed %un"a&enta' #o'!) or
#u*'! !nterest
De#os Santos v. "oman Cat*o#ic C*%rc*
@omestead Law 0 to gi!e and preser!e in the homesteader
and his family a piece of land for his house and culti!ation
4he law prohibits the alienation of a homestead within 7
years following the issuance of the patent and pro!ides that
any contract of a con!eyance in contra!ention thereof shall
be null and !oid
4he seller or his heirs, although in pari delicto, may reco!er
the land sub2ect of such illegal sale
arsobia v. C%enco
Another eception is that when the transat!on !s not !''e(a'
#er se *ut &ere') #ro$!*!te" and the prohibition by law is
designed for protection of one party, the court may grant
relief in fa!or of the latter
Ghat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly
Puando ali.uid prohibetur e directo, prohibetur et per
obli.uum 0 what cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be
done indirectly
Peo v. Concepcion
Ghere a corporation is forbidden from doing an act, the
prohibition etends to the board of directors and to each
director separately and indi!idually
Ghere the board of directors is prohibited from granting
loans to its director, a loan to a partnership of which the wife
of a director is a partner falls within the prohibition
Peop#es ank and Tr%st Co. v. P+
Ghere a statute prohibits the payment of the principal
obligation during a fied period, the interest thereon during
the eistence of the restriction is not demandable
Cr%' v. Tant%ico
Law eempts retirement benefits of a public officer or
employee from attachment, garnishment etc
Earlier law authoriAes the go!ernment to withhold an amount
due such officer or employee to pay his indebtedness to the
go!ernment %@OFLD 5O4 'E &O5%4RFED to withhold
so much of his retirement benefits as this amount to
attachment garnishment etc$
Tant%ico. 6r. v Domingo
Law eempts retirement benefits of a public officer or
employee from attachment, garnishment etc
Ko!ernment cannot withhold payment of retirement benefits
of a public officer until his accountabilities with the
go!ernment shall ha!e been cleared, as such action is doing
indirectly what the go!ernment is prohibited from doing
directly
4here should be no penalty from compliance with law
A person who complies with what a statute re.uires cannot,
by implication, be penaliAed thereby
/or Bsimple logic and fairness and reason cannot
countenance an eaction or a penalty for an act faithfully
done in compliance with the lawC
CHAPTER FIVE: Inter#retat!on o% +or"s an" #$rases
IN GENERAL
Kenerally
A word or phrase used in a statute may ha!e an ordinary,
generic, restricted, technical, legal, commercial or trading
meaning
)ay be defined in the statute 0 if this is done, use such
definition because this is what the legislature intended
4as1D
o ascertain intent from statute
o ascertain intent from etraneous ? rele!ant
circumstance
o construe word or phrase to effectuate such intent
Keneral rule in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term
used in the lawD
o Re!iew of the G@OLE law in!ol!ed as well as the
I54E5D)E54 of law (not of an isolated part or a
particular pro!ision alone"
%tatutory definition
Ghen statute defines words ? phrase3 legislati!e definition
controls the meaning of statutory word, irrespecti!e of any
other meaning word ha!e in ordinary usual sense$
Ghere a statute defines a word or phrase, the word or phrase,
should not by construction, be gi!en a different meaning$
Legislature restricted meaning as it adopted specific
definition, thus, this should be used
4erm or phrase specifically defined in particular law,
definition must be adopted$
5o usurpation of court function in interpreting but it merely
legislates what should form part of the law itself
2ictorias Mi##ing Co. v. Socia# Sec%rity Commission 7compensation8
RA **8*, %ec$ ;(f"V
9compensation: to inc#%de a## ren%merations. e)cept
bon%ses. a##o;ances 3 overtime pay
Definition was amendedD deleted BeceptionsC
Legislati!e IntentD the amendment shows legislati!e intent
that bonuses ? o!ertime pay now included in employee(s
renumeration$
PrincipleD by !irtue of epress substantial change in
phraseology, whate!er prior 2udicial or eecuti!e
construction should gi!e way to mandate of new law$
Peo. v. 2envia-e 7 C*iropractic<
IssueD Ghether person who practiced chiropractic without
ha!ing been duly licensed, may be criminally liable for
!iolation of medical law$
@eldD 4hough term Bpractice of medicine,C chiropractic may
in ordinary sense fall within its meaningH statutorily defined 3
includes manipulations employed in chiropracticH thus, one
who practices chiropractic without license is criminally
liable$
C*ang 4%ng Fa v. ,ian'on7 a#ien<
IssueD whether alien who comes into country as temporary
!isitor is an BimmigrantRC
@eldD while BimmigrantC in ordinary definition3 Ban alien
who comes to the Philippines for permanent residenceCH 4he
Immigration Act ma1es own definition of term, which is
Bany alien departing from any place outside the Philippines
destined for the Philippines, other than a non3immigrant$
(so 1elangan part siya nung Bother than a non3immigrantC$"
3V yep yep, %ergeS 'ut more importantly, the definition
emphasiAes an immigrant, who is an alien, who comes to the
Philippines either to reside 4E)PORARILM or
PER)A5E54LM 0 no distinction
definition of terms gi!en weight in construction
terms ? phrases, being part ? parcel of whole statute, gi!en
effect in their E54IR4M, as harmonious, coordinated, and
integrated unit
words ? phrases construed in light of contet of G@OLE
statute$
Pualification of rule
%tatutory definition of word or term controlling only as used
in the ActH
not conclusi!e as to the meaning of same word or term in
other statutes
Especially to transactions that too1 place prior to enactment
of act$
%tatutory definition controlling statutory words does not
apply whenD
o application creates incongruities
o destroy its ma2or purposes
o becomes illogical as result of change in its factual
basis$
Ernest v. CA 7 RA 9*88 ? EO +66, +6*V
Bsugarcane planterC is defined as a planter3owner of
sugarcane plantation w=in particular sugar mill district, who
has been allocated eport and=or domestic ? reser!e sugar
.uotas$
%tatutory definition ecludes emergency, non3.uota, non3
district and accommodation planters, they ha!ing no sugar
.uota$ @owe!er, in *+77, .uota system abolished
Gith change in situation, illogical to continue adhering to
pre!ious definition that had lost their legal effect$
Amadora v. CA
@owe!er, where statute remains unchanged, interpreted
according to its clear and original mandateH until legislature
ta1ing into account changes sub2ected to be regulated, sees
fit to enact necessary amendment$
Gords construed in their ordinary sense
Keneral ruleD In the absence of legislati!e intent, words and
phrases should be gi!en their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning$
%hould be read and considered in their natural, ordinary,
commonly accepted, and most ob!ious signification,
according to good and appro!ed usage and without resulting
to forced or subtle construction$
Centra# A'%carera Don Pedro v. Centra# ank
A statute Beempts certain importations from ta and foreign
echange, which are actually used in the manufacture or
preparation of local products, forming part thereof$C
B/orming part thereofC not to mean that the imported
products ha!e to be mied mechanically, chemically,
materially into the local product ? lose its identity$
)eans that the imported article is needed to accomplish the
locally manufactured product for eport$
C/" v. Mani#a %siness Lodge =>?
BbusinessC (if un.ualified" in ta statuteD plain and ordinary
meaning to embrace acti!ity or affair where profit is the
purpose ? li!elihood is the moti!e$
In this case, a fraternal social club selling li.uor at its
clubhouse in a limited scale only to its members, without
intention to obtain profit
5ot engaged in business$
P*iippine# Association of ,overnment "etirees v. ,S/S
7 9present va#%e:<
%tatuteD Bfor those who are at least 87 yrs of age, lump sum
payment of present !alue of annuity for the first 7 years, and
future annuity to be paid monthly$ Provided *o;ever. that
there shall be no discount from annuity for the first 7 yrs$ of
those who are 87 yrs or o!er, on the day the law too1 effect$C
>ocabularyD
o lump sum 3 amount of money gi!en in single
payment
o annuity 3 amount of money paid to somebody
yearly or at some other regular inter!al
%hould there be discount from the present !alue of his
annuityR
5O$ Fsed in ordinary sense as said law grants to the retired
employee substantial sum for his sustenance considering his
age$ Any doubt in this law should be ruled in his fa!or$
Mat%g%ina /ntegrated @ood Prod%cts /nc. v. CA
Ghether transferee of a forest concession is liable for
obligations arising from transferor(s illegal encroachment
into another forest concessionaire, which was committed
prior to the transfer
%ec$ 8* of PD ,67 Bthe transferee shall assume all the
obligations of the transferor$C
&ourt held that the transferee is 5O4 liable and eplainedD
BObligationsC construed to mean obligations incurred by
transferor in the ordinary course of business$ 5ot those as a
result of transgressions of the law, as these are personal
obligations of transferor$
PrincipleD &onstrue using ordinary meaning ? a!oid
absurdity$
M%stang L%mber. /nc. v CA
%tatuteD %ec$ 8; PD ,67 3 penaliAes the cutting, gathering ?
or collecting timber or other forest products without a
license$
Is BlumberC included in BtimberC
Re!ersing *
st
ruling, %& says lumber is included in timber$
B4he Re!ised /orestry &ode contains no definition of timber
or lumber$ 4imber is included in definition of forestry
prod%cts par (." %ec$-$ Lumber 3 same definitions as
Bprocessing plantsC
Processing plant is any mechanical set3up, machine or
combination of machine used for processing of logs ? other
forest raw materials into #%mber !eneer, plywood etcL p$
*;-$
%imply means, #%mber is a processed log or forest raw
material$ 4he &ode uses lumber in ordinary common usage$
In *++- ed$ of Gebster(s International Dictionary, #%mber is
defined as timber or logs after being prepared for the mar1et$
4herefore, lumber is a processed log or timber$ %ec 8; of PD
,67 ma1es no distinction between raw ? processed timber$
Keneral words construed generally
,enera#ia verba s%nt genera#iter inte##igenda A what is
generally spo1en shall be generally understoodH general
words shall be understood in a general sense$
,enera#e dict%m genera#iter est interpretand%m A a general
statement is understood in a general sense
In case word in statute has both restricted and general
meaning, KE5ERAL must pre!ailH Fnless nature of the
sub2ect matter ? contet in which it is employed clearly
indicates that the limited sense is intended$
Keneral words should not be gi!en a restricted
meaning when no restriction is indicated$
RationaleD if the legislature intended to limit the
meaning of a word, it would ha!e been easy for it to
ha!e done so$
Application of rule
,atc*a#ian v. COMELEC
BforeignerC3 in Election &ode, prohibiting any foreigner
from contributing campaign funds includes 2uridical person
BpersonC3 comprehends pri!ate 2uridical person
BpersonC3 in penal statute, must be a Bperson in law,C an
artificial or natural person
2argas v. "i##aro'a
B2udgeC without any modifying word or phrase
accompanying it is to be construed in generic sense to
comprehend all 1inds of 2udgesH inferior courts or 2ustices of
%&$
C 3 C Commercia# Corp v. +A@ASA
Bgo!ernmentC 3 without .ualification should be understood
in implied or generic sense including KO&&s$

Centra# ank v. CA
B5ational Ko!ernmentC 3 refers only to central go!ernment,
consisting of eecuti!e, legislati!e and 2udiciary, as well as
constitutional bodies ( as distinguished from local
go!ernment ? other go!ernmental entities" 2ers%sA<
94he Ko!ernment of the Republic of the PhilippinesC or
BPhilippine Ko!ernmentC 0 including central go!ernments as
well as local go!ernment ? KO&&s$
"ep%b#ic F#o%r Mi##s v. Commissioner of C%stoms
Bproduct of the PhilippinesC 0 any product produced in the
country, e$g$ bran (ipa" ? pollard (dara1" produced from
wheat imported into the country are Bproducts of the
PhilippinesC
Keneric term includes things that arise thereafter
Progressi!e interpretation 3 A word of general signification
employed in a statute, in absence of legislati!e intent, to
comprehend not only peculiar conditions obtaining at its
time of enactment but those that may normally arise after its
appro!al as well
Progressi!e interpretation etends to the application of
statute to all sub2ects or conditions within its general purpose
or scope that come into eistence subse.uent from its
passage
RationaleD to 1eep statute from becoming ephemeral (short3
li!ed" and transitory (not permanent or lasting"$
%tatutes framed in general terms apply to new cases and
sub2ects that arise$
Keneral rule in %tat&onD Legislati!e enactments in general
comprehensi!e operation, apply to persons, sub2ects and
businesses within their general pur!iew and scope coming
into eistence subse.uent to their passage$
,eotina v. CA
Barticles of prohibited importationC 3 used in 4ariff and
&ustoms &ode embrace not only those declared prohibited at
time of adoption, but also goods and articles sub2ect of
acti!ities underta1en in subse.uent laws$
,atc*a#ian v. COMELEC
Bany electionC 3 not only the election pro!ided by law at that
time, but also to future elections including election of
delegates to &onstitutional &on!ention
Gords with commercial or trade meaning
Gords or phrases common among merchants and traders,
ac.uire commercial meanings$
Ghen any of words used in statute, should be gi!en such trade or
commercial meaning as has been generally understood
among merchants$
Fsed in the followingD tariff laws, laws of commerce, laws for
the go!ernment of the importer$
4he law to be applicable to his class, should be construed as
uni!ersally understood by importer or trader$
Asiatic Petro#e%m Co. v. C/"
5o ta shall be collected on articles which, before its ta1ing
effect, shall ha!e been Bdisposed ofC
LayD parting away w= something
)erchantD to sell (this must be used"
San Mig%e# Corp. v. M%nicipa# Co%nci# of Manda%e
Bgross !alue of moneyC
)erchantD Bgross selling priceC which is the total amount of
money or its e.ui!alent which purchaser pays to the !endor
to recei!e the goods$
Gords with technical or legal meaning
Keneral ruleD words that ha!e, or ha!e been used in, a technical
sense or those that ha!e been 2udicially construed to ha!e a
certain meaning should be interpreted according to the sense
in which they ha!e been PRE>IOF%LM used, although the
sense may !ary from the strict or literal meaning of the
words
PresumptionD language used in a statute, which has a technical or
well31nown meaning, is used in that sense by the legislature
Mani#a !era#d P%b#is*ing Co. v. "amos
%ec *9 of Rule 7+ of Rules of &ourt which prescribes the steps
to be ta1en when property attached is claimed by a person
other than the defendant or his agent
%tatuteD Bnothing herein contained shall pre!ent such third
person from !indicating his claim to the property by any
proper action.C
IssueD Bproper actionC limits the -
rd
party(s remedy to
inter!ene in the action in which the writ of attachment is
issued
@eldD BactionC has ac.uired a well3defined meaning as an
Bordinary suit in a court of 2ustice by which one party
prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a
right or pre!ent redress or wrongL
GhileL
%ec : Rule : of Rules of &ourtH B&ommencement of ActionC
%tatuteD B&i!il action may be commenced by filing a complaint
with the proper courtC
GordD commencement 3 indicates the origination of entire
proceeding
It was appropriate to use proper action (in *
st
statute" than
inter!ention, since asserted right of -
rd
party claimant
necessarily flows out of pending suitH if the word
Tinter!ention( is used, it becomes strange$
Ma#anyaon v. Lising
%ec$ *- of Anti3Kraft Law
%tatuteD B if a public officer is ac.uitted, he shall be entitled
to reinstatement and to his salaries and benefits which he
failed to recei!e during the suspensionC
IssueD Gill a public officer whose case has been dismissed
not Bac.uittedC be entitled to benefits in %ec$ *-R
@eldD 5o$ Ac.uittal B#ega# meaningC A finding of not guilty
based on the merit$
Dismissal does not amount to ac.uittal ecept when, the
dismissal comes after the prosecution has presented all its
e!idence and is based on insufficiency of such e!idence$
"%ra v. Lopena
Probation law 3 Dis.ualified from probation thoseD Bwho ha!e
been pre!iously con!icted by final 2udgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than * month ? a fine
of no less than Php :66$C
IssueD Bpre!iously con!ictedC
@eldD it refers to date of con!iction, not date of commission of
crimeH thus a person con!icted on same date of se!eral
offenses committed in different dates is not dis.ualified$
@ow identical terms in the statute construed
Keneral ruleD a word or phrase repeatedly used in a statute
will bear the same meaning throughout the statuteH unless a
different intention is clearly epressed$
RationaleD word used in statute in a gi!en sense presumed to
be used in same sense throughout the law$ 4hough rigid and
peremptory, this is applicable where in the statute the words
appear so near each other physically, particularly where the word
has a technical meaning and that meaning has been defined in
the statute$
De #a Pa' v. Co%rt of Agrarian "e#ations UBRicelandCV
share tenancy 3 a!erage produce per hectare for the -
agricultural years net preceding the current har!est
leasehold 3 according to normal a!erage har!est of the -
preceding yrs
BMearC3 agricultural year not calendar year
BAgricultural yearC 3 represents * cropH if in * calendar yr :
crops are raised that(s : agricultural years$
0rivenko v. "egister of Deeds
%tatuteD In %ec$* , Art$ EIII of *+-7 &onstitution 3 Bpublic
agricultural lands shall not be alienatedC ecept in fa!or of
/ilipinos, %A)E as %ec$ 7 Bno pri!ate agricultural land shall
be transferred or assigned$C
both ha!e same meaning being based on same policy of
nationaliAation and ha!ing same sub2ect$

)eaning of word .ualified by purpose of statute
Purpose may indicate whether to gi!e word, phrase,
ordinary, technical, commercial restricted or epansi!e
meaning$
In construing, court adopts interpretation that accords best
with the manifest purpose of statuteH e!en disregard technical
or legal meaning in fa!or of construction which will
effectuate intent or purpose$
Gord or phrase construed in relation to other pro!isions
Keneral ruleD word, phrase, pro!ision, should not be
construed in isolation but must be interpreted in relation to
other pro!isions of the law$
4his is a >ARIA4IO5 of the rule that, statute should be
construed as a whole, and each of its pro!ision must be gi!en
effect$
C#a%dio v. COMELEC
%tatute (LK&"D B5o recall shall ta1e place within * yr from
the date of the official(s assumption of office or * year
immediately preceding a regular electionC
IssueD Does the *
st
limitation embraces the entire recall
proceedings (e$g$ preparatory recall assemblies" or only the
recall electionR
@eldD the &ourt construed BrecallC in relation to %ec$8+
which states that, Bthe power of recallL shall be eercised
by the registered !oters of an LKF to which the local
electi!e official belongs$C
@ence, not apply to all recall proceedings since power !ested
in electorate is power to elect an official to office and not
power to initiate recall proceedings$
Gord or pro!ision should not be construed in isolation form
but should be interpreted in relation to other pro!isions of a
statute, or other statutes dealing on same sub2ect in order to
effectuate what has been intended$
,arcia v. COMELEC
@istory of statuteD
o In the &onstitution, it re.uires that legislature shall
pro!ide a system of initiati!e and referendum
whereby people can directly appro!e or re2ect any
act or law or part thereof passed by &ongress or
local legislati!e body$
o Local Ko!t$ &ode, a later law, defines #oca#
initiative as Bprocess whereby registered !oters of
an LKF may directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance$C
It is claimed by respondents that since
resolution is not included in this
definition, then the same cannot be
sub2ect of an initiati!e$
IssueD whether a local resolution of a municipal council can
be sub2ect to an initiati!e and referendumR
@eldD Ge re2ect respondent(s narrow and literal reading of
abo!e pro!ision for it will collide with the &onstitution and
will sub!ert the intent of the lawma1ers in enacting the
pro!isions of the Local Ko!ernment &ode (LK&" of *++* on
initiati!e ? referendum
4he subse.uent enactment of the LK& did not change the
scope of its co!erage$ In %ec$ *:9 of the same code$ It statesD
(b" /nitiative s*a## e)tend on#y to s%b-ects or matters ;*ic*
are ;it*in t*e #ega# po;ers of t*e Sangg%nians to enact.:
4his pro!ision clearly does not limit the application of local
initiati!e to ordinances, but to all Bsub2ects or matters which
are within the legal powers of the Sangg%nians to enact,
which undoubtedly includes resolutions$C
,e#ano v. C.A.
In &orporation Law, authoriAes a dissol!ed corporation to
continue as a body corporate for - yrs$ for the purpose of
defending and prosecuting suits by or against it, and during
said period to con!ey all its properties to a BtrusteeC for
benefits of its members, stoc1holders, creditors and other
interested persons, the transfer of the properties to the trustee
being for the protection of its creditors and stoc1holders$
Gord BtrusteeC 3 not to be understood in legal or technical
sense, but in KE5ERAL concept which would include a
lawyer to whom was entrusted the prosecution of the cases
for reco!ery of sums of money against corporation(s debtors$
"ep%b#ic v. As%ncion
IssueD Ghether the Sandiganbayan is a regular court within
the meaning of R$A$ 8+,7R
%tatuteD RA 8+,7 which ma1es criminal actions in!ol!ing
members of the P5P come Bwithin the eclusi!e 2urisdiction
of the reg%#ar co%rts.
Fsed Bregular courtsC ? Bci!il courtsC interchangeably
&ourt martial 3 not courts within the Philippine #udicial
%ystemH they pertain to the eecuti!e department and simply
instrumentalities of the eecuti!e power$
Regular courts 3 those within the 2udicial department of the
go!ernment namely the %& and lower courts which includes
the Sandiganbayan.
@eldD &ourts considered the purpose of the law which is to
remo!e from the court martial, the 2urisdiction o!er criminal
cases in!ol!ing members of the P5P and to !est it in the
courts within the 2udicial system$
Mo#ina v. "afferty
IssueD Ghether BAgricultural productsC includes
domesticated animals and fish grown in ponds$
%tatuteD Phrase used in ta statute which eempts such
products from payment of taes, purpose is to encourage the
de!elopment of such resources$
@eldD phrase not only includes !egetable substances but also
domestic and domesticated animals, animal products, and
fish or bangus grown in ponds$ &ourt ga!e epansi!e
meaning to promote ob2ect of law$
M%no' 3 Co. v. !ord
IssueD B&onsumptionC limited or broad meaning
%tatuteD word is used in statute which pro!ides that Becept
as herein specifically eempted, there shall be paid by each
merchant and manufacturer a ta at the rate of *=- of *N on
gross !alue of money in all goods, wares and merchandise
sold, bartered, or echanged for domestic consumption$
@eldD &onsidering the purpose of the law, which is to ta all
merchants ecept those epressly eempted, it is reasonable
and fair to conclude that legislature used in commercial use
and not in limited sense of total destruction of thing sold$
Mottom%# v. de #a Pa'
IssueD Ghether the word BcourtC refers to the &ourt of
Appeals or the trial courtR
%tatuteD RA 7-9- Effect of Appea#A Appeal shall not stay the
award, order, ruling, decision or 2udgment unless the officer
or body rendering the same or t*e co%rt, on motion, after
hearing ? on such terms as it may deem 2ust should pro!ide
otherwise$
@eldD It refers to the 4RIAL &OFR4$ If the ad!erse party
intends to appeal from a decision of the %E& and pending
appeal desires to stay the eecution of the decision, then the
motion must be filed with and be heard by the %E& before
the ad!erse party perfects its appeal to the &ourt of Appeals$
Purpose of the lawD the need for immediacy of eecution of
decisions arri!ed at by said bodies was imperati!e$
)eaning of term dictated by contet
4he contet in which the word or term is employed may
dictate a different sense
2erba accipienda s%nt sec%nd%m materiamA a word is to be
understood in the contet in which it is used$
Peop#e v. C*ave'
%tatuteD /amily home etra2udicially formed shall be eempt
from eecution, forced sale or attachment, ecept for Bnon
payment of debtsC
Gord BdebtsC 0 means obligations in general$
0rivenko v. "egister of Deeds
%tatuteD lands were classified into timber, mineral and
agricultural
Gord BagriculturalC 0 used in broad sense to include all
lands that are neither timber, nor mineral, such being the
contet in which the term is used$
Sant%#an v. E)ec%tive. Secretary.
%tatuteD A riparian owner of the property ad2oining foreshore
lands, marshy lands or lands co!ered with water bordering
upon shores of ban1s of na!igable la1es shall ha!e
preference to apply for such lands ad2oining his property$
/actD Riparian 3 one who owns land situated on the ban1s of
ri!er$
@eldD Fsed in a more broader sense referring to a property
ha!ing a water frontage, when it mentioned Bforeshore
lands,C Bmarshy lands,C or Blands co!ered with water$C
Peo. v. Ferrer
Bcase ;*ere conte)t may #imit t*e meaningC
GordD BO!erthrowC
%tatuteD Anti3%ub!ersion Act B1nowingly ? willfully and by
o!ert acts$C
Re2ects the metaphorical BpeacefulC sense ? limits its
meaning to Bo!erthrowC by force or !iolence$
Peo. v. +a'ario
%tatuteD )unicipal ta ordinance pro!ides Bany owner or
manager of fishpondsC shall pay an annual ta of a fied
amount per hectare and it appears that the owner of the
fishponds is the go!ernment which leased them to a pri!ate
person who operates them
GordD BOwnerC 0 does not include go!ernment as the
ancient principle that go!ernment is immune from taes$
Ghere the law does not distinguish
1bi #e) non disting%it. nec nos disting%ere debem%s A where
the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish$
&orollary principleD Keneral words or phrases in a statute
should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general
significance
Keneral term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and
one part distinguished from the other to 2ustify its eclusion
from operation$
&orollary principleD where the law does not ma1e any
eception, courts may not ecept something therefrom,
unless there a compelling reason to 2ustify it$
ApplicationD when legislature laid down a rule for one class,
no difference to other class$
PresumptionD that the legislature made no .ualification in the
general use of a term$
"ob#es v. 5amba#es C*romite Co.
%tatuteD grants a person against whom the possession of Bany
landC is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for
unlawful detainer$
@eldD any land not eclusi!e to pri!ate or not eclusi!ely to
publicH hence, includes all 1inds of land$
Director of Lands v. ,on'a#es
%tatuteD authoriAes the director of lands to file petitions for
cancellation of patents co!ering public lands on the ground
therein pro!ided$
@eldD not distinguished whether lands belong to national or
local go!ernment
SSS v. City of aco#od
IssueD eempts the payment of realty taes to Bproperties
owned by RPC
@eldD no distinction between properties held in so!ereign,
go!ernmental, or political capacity and those possessed in
proprietary or patrimonial character$
2e#asco v. Lope'
%tatuteD certain BformalitiesC be followed in order that act
may be considered !alid$
@eldD no distinction between essential or non3essential
formalities
Co#gateAPa#mo#ive P*i#s v. ,imene'
%tatuteD does not distinguish between BstabiliAer and fla!orsC
used in the preparation of food and those used in the
manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream
O#iva v. Lamadrid
%tatuteD allows the redemption or repurchase of a homestead
property w=in 7 years from its con!eyance
@eldD Bcon!eyanceC not distinguished 3 !oluntary or
in!oluntary$
Escos%ra v. San Mig%e# re;ery /nc.
%tatuteD grants employee Blea!es of absence with payC
@eldD Bwith payC refers to full pay and not to half or less than
full payH to all lea!es of absence and not merely to sic1 or
!acation lea!es$
O#fato v. COMELEC
%tatuteD ma1es &O)ELE& the sole 2udge of Ball pre3
proclamation contro!ersiesC
@eld D BallC 0 co!ers national, pro!incial, city or municipal
P*i#. ritis* Ass%rance Co. v. /ntermediate Ape##ate Co%rt
%tatuteD A counterbond is to secure the payment of Bany
2udgment,C when eecution is returned unsatisfied
@eldD Bany 2udgmentC includes not only final and eecutory
but also 2udgment pending appeal whose eecution ordered
is returned unsatisfied$
"amire' v. CA
%tatuteD BAct to Prohibit ? PenaliAe Gire 4apping and Other
related >iolations of Pri!ate &ommunications and Other
PurposesC
BIt shall be unlawful, not being authoriAed by all the parties
to any pri!ate communication or spo1en word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other de!ice or
arrangementLC
IssueD Ghether !iolation thereof refers to the taping of a
communication ot*er t*an a participant to the
communication or e!en to the taping by a participant who
did not secure the consent of the party to the con!ersations$
@eldD Law did not distinguish whether the party sought to be
penaliAed ought to be party other than or different from those
in!ol!ed in the pri!ate communication$ 4he intent is to
penaliAe all persons unauthoriAed to ma1e any such
recording, underscored by BanyC
Ligget 3 Myers Tobacco Co. v. C/"
%tatuteD imposes a Bspecific taC on cigarettes containing
>irginia tobacco L$ Pro!ided that of the length eceeds ,*
millimeters or the weight per thousand eceeds *W 1ilos, the
ta shall be increased by *66N$
IssueD whether measuring length or weight of cigars, filters
should be ecluded therefrom, so that ta would come under
the general pro!ision and not under the pro!isoR
@eldD 5ot ha!ing distinguished between filter and non3filter
cigars, court should not distinguish$
Ti% San v. "ep%b#ic
IssueD whether the con!iction of an applicant for
naturaliAation for !iolation of a municipal ordinance would
dis.ualify him from ta1ing his oath as a citiAen$
%tatuteD An applicant may be allowed to ta1e his oath as a
citiAen after : years from the promulgation of the decision
granting his petition for naturaliAation if he can show that
during the inter!ening period Bhe has not been con!icted of
any offense or !iolation of go!ernment rulesC
@eldD law did not ma1e any distinction between ma#a in se
and ma#a pro*ibita. &on!iction of the applicant from
!iolation of municipal ordinance is comprehended within the
statute and precludes applicant from ta1ing his oath$
Pera#ta v. CSC
IssueD whether pro!ision of RA :8:7, that go!ernment
employees are entitled to *7 days !acation lea!es of absence
with full pay and *7 days sic1 lea!es with full pay,
eclusi!es of %aturday, %undays or holidays in both cases,
applies only to those who ha!e lea!e credits and not to those
who ha!e none$
@eldD Law spea1s of granting of a right and does not
distinguish between those who ha!e accumulated and those
who ha!e none$
Pi#ar v. COMELEC
%tatuteD RA ,*88 pro!ides that BE!ery candidate shall,
within -6 days after the day of the election file true and
itemiAed statement of all contributions and ependitures in
connection with the election$
@eldD Law did not distinguish between a candidate who
pushed through and one who withdrew it$
BE!ery candidateC refers to one who pursued and e!en to
those who withdrew his candidacy$
Sanciagco v. "ono
B;*ere t*e distinction appears from t*e stat%te. t*e co%rts
s*o%#d make t*e distinctionC
%tatuteD %ec *- of 'P 'lg$ 8+, which pro!ides thatD 9Any
person holding public appointi!e or position shall ipso facto
cease in office or position as of the time he filed his
certificate of candidacyC
Ko!ernors, mayors, members of !arious sangg%nians or
barangay officia#s shall upon the filing of candidacy, be
considered on forced lea!e of absence from office
/actsD an electi!e 'arangay$ &aptain was elected President of
Association of 'arangay &ouncils and pursuant thereto
appointed by the President as member of the Sangg%nian
Pan#%ngsod. @e ran for &ongress but lost$
IssueD @e then wants to resume his duties as member of
sangg%iniang pan#%ngsod. @e was merely forced on lea!e
when he ran for &ongress$
@eldD the %ecretary of Local Ko!ernment denied his re.uestH
being an appointi!e sangg%nian member, he was deemed
automatically resigned when he filed his certificate of
candidacy$
,arvida v. Sa#es. 6r.
IssueD whether petitioner who was o!er :* but below :: was
.ualified to be an electi!e %Q member
%tatuteD %ec$9:9 of the LK& pro!ides that a member of the
0atip%nan ng 0abataan must not be :* yrs old$
%ec$ 9:; as additional re.uirement pro!ides that electi!e
official of Sangg%niang 0abataan must not be more than :*
yrs$ Bon the day of electionC
@eldD the distinction is apparentD the member may be more
than :* years of age on election day or on the day he
registers as member of 0atip%nan ng 0abataan. 'ut the
electi!e official, must not be more than :* years of age on
the day of election$
Dis2uncti!e and con2uncti!e words
Gord BorC is a dis2uncti!e term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from each other$
Peo v. Martin
%tatuteD %ec$ 96 of &ommonwealth Act 8*, punishes Bany
indi!idual who shall bring into or land in the Philippines or
conceals or harbors any alien not duly admitted by any
immigration officerL
does not 2ustify gi!ing the word a dis2uncti!e meaning , since
the words Bbring intoC BlandC, BconcealsC and BharborsC
being four separate acts each possessing its distincti!e,
different and disparate meaning$
C/" v. Mani#a 6ockey C#%b
%tatuteD imposes amusement taes on gross receipts of
Bproprietor, lessee, or operator of amusement placeC
@eldD BorC implies that ta should be paid by either
proprietor, lessee, or operator, as the case may be, single ?
not by all at the same time$
Fse of BorC between : phrases connotes that either phrase
ser!es as .ualifying phrase$
BorC means BandC, G@E5 4@E %PIRI4 OR &O54EE4 O/
4@E LAG %O GARRA54%
Trinidad v. erm%de' (e$g$ of BorC to mean BandC"
%tatuteD %ec$ :, Rule **: of Rules of &ourt authoriAing
municipal 2udges to conduct Bpreliminary eamination or
in!estigationC
BorC e.ui!alent of Bthat is to sayC
SMC v. M%nicipa#ity of Manda%e (e$g$ of BorC e.ui!alent of Bthat is to
sayC"
OrdinanceD imposes graduated .uarterly fied ta
Bbased on the gross !alue in money or actual mar1et !alueC
of articlesH phrase Bor actual mar1et !alueC intended to
eplain Bgross !alue in money$C
BorC means successi!ely
%tatuteD Art$ -99 of the Re!ised Penal &ode 3 Bthe offenses
of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasci!iousness, shall
not be prosecuted ecept upon a complaint by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents or guardianL$C
Although these persons are mentioned dis2uncti!ely,
pro!ision must be construed as meaning that the right to
institute a criminal proceeding is eclusi!ely and
successi!ely reposed in said persons in the order mentioned,
no one shall proceed if there is any person pre!iously
mentioned therein with legal capacity to institute the action$
BAndC is a con2unction pertinently defined as meaning
Btogether with,C B2oined with,C Balong with,C Badded to or
lin1ed toC
o 5e!er to mean BorC
o Fsed to denote 2oinder or union
Band=orC 3 means that effect should be gi!e to both
con2uncti!e and dis2uncti!e term
o term used to a!oid construction which by use of
dis2uncti!e BorC alone will eclude the
combination of se!eral of the alternati!es or by the
use of con2uncti!e BandC will eclude the efficacy
of any one of the alternati!es standing alone$
ASSOCIATED WORDS
5oscitur a sociis
where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or
e.ually susceptible of !arious meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering
the company of words in which it is found or with which it is
associated$
to remo!e doubt refer to the meaning of associated or
companion words
%enaseda v. F#avier
%tatuteD %ec$ *-(-", Art EI of the &onstitution grants
Ombudsman power to BDirect the officer concerned to ta1e
appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his remo!al, suspension, demotion,
fine censure or prosecution$
BsuspensionC 0 is a penalty or puniti!e measure not
pre!enti!e
Magta-as v. Pryce Properties Corp.
%tatD %ec$ 97; of LK& authoriAed local go!ernment units to
pre!ent or suppress BKambling ? other prohibited games of
chance$C
BKamblingC 0 refers only to illegal gambling, li1e other
prohibited games of chance, must be pre!ented or suppressed
? not to gambling authoriAed by specific statutes$
Carandang v. Santiago
IssueD Ghether an offended party can file a separate and
independent ci!il action for damages arising from physical
in2uries during pendency of criminal action for frustrated
homicide$
%tatuteD Art$ -- of &i!il &ode Bin case of defamation, fraud,
? physical in2uriesLC
@eldD &ourt ruled that Bphysical in2uriesC not as one defined
in RP&, but to mean bodily harm or in2ury such as physical
in2uries, frustrate homicide, or e!en death$
Co 0im C*an v. 2a#de' Tan 0e*
IssueD Ghether proceedings in ci!il cases pending in court
under the so called Republic of the Philippines established
during the #apanese military occupation are affected by the
proclamation of Ken$ )cArthur issued on October :-, *+99
that Ball laws, regulations and processes of any other
go!ernment in the Philippines than that of the said
&ommonwealth are null and !oid and without legal effect$C
BProcessesC does not refer to 2udicial processes but to the
eecuti!e orders of the &hairman of the Philippine
Eecuti!e &ommittee, ordinances promulgated by the
President of so3called RP, and others that are of the same
class as the laws and regulations with which the word
BprocessesC is associated$
Commissioner of C%stoms v. P*i#. Acety#ene Co.
%tatuteD %ec$ 8 of RA *-+9 pro!ides that Bta pro!ided for
in %ec$ * of this Act shall not be imposed against the
importation into the Philippines of machinery or raw
materials to be used by new and necessary industry H
machinery e.uipment, spare parts, for use of industriesLC
IssueD Is the word BindustriesC used in ordinary, generic
sense, which means enterprises employing relati!ely large
amounts of capital and=or laborR
@eldD %ince BindustriesC used in the law for the :
nd
time Bis
classified togetherC with the terms miners, mining
industries, planters and farmers, ob!ious legislati!e intent is
to confine the meaning of the term to acti!ities that tend to
produce or create or manufacture such as those miners,
mining enterprises, planters and farmers$
If used in ordinary sense, it becomes inconsistent and
illogical
Peo. v. Santiago
IssueD Ghether defamatory statements through the medium
of an amplifier system constitutes slander or libelR
LibelD committed by means of Bwriting, printing,
lithography, engra!ing, radio, cinematographic ehibiton$C
It is argued that BamplifierC similar to radio
@eldD 5o$ Radio should be considered as same terms with
writing and printing whose common characteristic is the
Bpermanent means of publication$C
San Mig%e# Corp. v. +L"C
IssueD Ghether claim of an employee against his employer
for cash reward or submitting process to eliminate defects
in .uality ? taste of %an )iguel product falls within
2urisdiction of the labor arbiter of 5LR&R
@eldD 5o$ Outside of 2urisdiction$ 5ot necessary that entire
uni!erse of money claims under 2urisdiction of labor arbiter
but only those to *$" unfair labor practices, :$" claims
concerning terms ? conditions of employment 9$" claims
relating to household ser!ices 7$" acti!ities prohibited to
employers ? employees$
%tatuteD B2urisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the 5LR&, as
last amended by 'P 'lg$ ::, including paragraph - Ball
money claims of wor1ers, including hose based on
nonpayment or underpayment of wages, o!ertime
compensation, separation pay, and other benefits pro!ided
by law or appropriate agreement, ecept claims for
employees compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits$C
Ebar#e v. S%ca#dito
%tatuteD EO :87 outlines the procedure which complainants
charging go!ernment officials and employees with
commission of irregularities should be guided, applies to
criminal actions or complaints$
EO :87 0 Bcomplaints against public officials and employees
shall be promptly acted upon and disposed of by the officials
or authorities concerned in accordance with pertinent laws
and regulations so that the erring officials and employees can
be soonest remo!ed or otherwise disciplines and the
innocent, eonerated or !indicated in li1e manner, and to the
end also that other remedies, including court action, may be
pursued forthwith by the interested parties, after
administrati!e remedies shall ha!e been ehaustedC
@eldD eecuti!e order does not apply to criminal actions$
4he term is closely o!ershadowed by the .ualification 3
9After administrative remedies s*a## *ave been e)*a%sted.:
which suggest ci!il suits sub2ect to pre!ious administrati!e
actions$
Mottom%# v. de#a Pa'
IssueD Ghether the word Tcourt( in %ec 7, Art 79-9D Appeal
shall not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or 2udgment
unless the officer or body rendering the same or the court,
on motion after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem
2ust should pro!ide otherwise$ 4he propriety of a stay
granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order,
ruling, decision or 2udgment may be raised only by motion
in the main case,C refers to the &A or to the &ourt of
Agrarian RelationsR
@eldD &orrect construction made clear with reference to
%ec$ * of RA 79-9, where the court, officers or bodies
whose decision, award are appealable to the &ourt of
Appeals, enumerated as followsD &ourt of Agrarian
Relations, %ec$ of Labor, %ocial %ecurity &ommission
etcLH /rom grouping, the enumeration in %ec$ 7 means
&ourt of Agrarian Relations not &A$
E2usdem generis (or the same 1ind or species"
Keneral ruleD where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same
class or where the latter follow the former, the general word
or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to,
persons, things or cases a1in to, resembling, or of the same
1ind or class as those specifically mentioned$
PurposeD gi!e effect to both particular or general words, by
treating the particular words as indicating the class and the
general words as indicating all that is embraced in said
class, although not specifically named by the particular
words$
PrincipleD based on proposition that had the legislature
intended the general words to be used in their generic and
unrestricted sense, it would ha!e not enumerated the
specific words$
PresumptionD legislators addressed specifically to the
particulariAation
Illustration
M%t%c v. COMELEC
%tatuteD Act ma1es unlawful the distribution of electoral
propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic
goods, materials and t*e #ike:
@eldD and the li1e, does not embrace taped 2ingles for
campaign purposes
M%rp*y. Morris 3 Co. v. Co##ector of C%stoms
%tatuteD Dynamos, generators, eciters, and other machinery
for the generation of electricity for lighting or for powerH
@eldD phrase Bother machineryC would not include steam
turbines, pumps, condensers, because not same 1ind of
machinery with dynamos, generators and eciters$
2era v. C%evas
%tatuteD all condensed s1immed mil1 and all mil1 in
whate!er form shall be clearly and legibly mar1ed on its
immediate containers with wordsD B4his mil1 is not suitable
for nourishment for infants less than * year of ageC
@eldD restricts the phrase Ball mil1 in whate!er form,C
ecluded filled mil1$
,rap*i#on v. M%nicipa# Co%rt of Cigara
%tatuteD the !ice3mayor shall be entitled to assume the office
of the mayor during the absence, suspension or other
temporary disability
@eldD anything which disables the mayor from eercising the
power and prerogati!es of his office, since Btheir temporary
disabilityC follows the words BabsenceC and BsuspensionC
Peo. v. Maga##anes
Ghere a law grants a court eclusi!e 2urisdiction to hear and
decide Boffenses or felonies committed by public officials
and employees in relation to their office,C the phrase BI5
RELA4IO5 4O 4@EIR O//I&EC .ualifies or restricts the
offense to one which cannot eist without the office, or the
office is a constituent element of the crime defined in the
statute or one perpetuated in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of his official functions
C% 1n-ieng Sons. /nc. v. ord of Ta) Appea#s
IssueD whether losses due to the war were to be deductible
from gross income of *+97 when they were sustained, or in
*+76 when Philippine Gar Damage &ommission ad!ised
that no payment would be made for said lossesR
%tatuteD BIn the case of a corporation, all losses actually
sustained and not charged off within the taable year and not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise$C
&ontentionD the assurances of responsible public officials
before the end of *+97 that property owners would be
compensated for their losses as a result of the war sufficed to
place the losses within the phrase Bcompensated
otherwiseC than by insurance
@eldD Re2ectedS BOtherwiseC in the clause 9compensated for
by ins%rance or ot*er;ise: refers to compensation due under
a title analogous or similar to insurance$ Inasmuch as the
latter is a contract establishing a legal obligation, it follows
that in order to be deemed Bcompensated for Totherwise,(
the losses sustained by a tapayer must be co!ered by a
2udicially enforceable right, springing from any of the
2uridical sources of obligations, namely, law, contract, .uasi3
contract, torts, or crimes,C and not mere pronouncement of
public officials
Ceb% /nstit%te of Tec*no#ogy v. Op#e
IssueD Ghether teachers hired on contract basis are entitled to
ser!ice incenti!e lea!e benefits as against the claim that they
are not soR
%tatuteD Rule > of IRR of Labor &odeD B4his rule (on ser!ice
incenti!e lea!es" shall apply to all employees, ecept Bfiled
personnel and other employees whose performance is
unsuper!ised by the employer including those who are
engaged on tas1 or contract basis$C
@eldD Bthose who were employed on tas1 or contract basisC
should be related with Bfield personnel,C apply the principle,
clearly teachers are not field personnel and therefore entitled
to ser!ice incenti!e lea!e benefits$
Cagayan 2a##ey Enterprises v. CA
IssueD whether the phrase Bother lawful be!eragesC which
gi!es protection to manufacturer with the Phil$ Patent Office
its duly stamped or mar1ed bottles used for Bsoda water,
mineral or aerated waters, cider, mil1, cream or other lawful
be!erages,C includes hard li.uorR
%tatute titleD BAn Act to regulate the use of stamped or
mar1ed bottles, boes, cas1s, 1egs, barrels, ? other similar
containers$C
@eldD 4he title clearly shows intent to gi!e protection to all
mar1ed bottles of all lawful be!erages regardless of nature of
contents$
+ationa# Po;er Corp. v. Angas
IssueD whether the term 2udgment, refers to any 2udgment
directing the payment of legal interest$
%tatuteD &entral 'an1 &ircular I 9*8 0 Bby !irtue of the
authority granted to it under %ec$ * of Act 5umber :877, as
amended, otherwise 1nown as Fsury Law, the )onetary
'oard in a resolution prescribed that the rate of interest for
loan or forbearance of any money, good or credit ? the rate
allowed in 2udgment in the absence of epress contract shall
be *:N per annum$
@eldD #udgments should mean only 2udgments in!ol!ing
loans or forbearance money, goods or credit, these later
specific terms ha!ing restricted the meaning B2udgmentsC to
those same class or the same nature as those specifically
enumerated$
"ep%b#ic v. Migrino
/actsD retired military officer was in!estigated by the P&KK
for !iolation of Anti3Kraft Act in relation to EO I * ? :
authoriAing the P&KK to reco!er ill3gotten wealth from the
former President(s Bsubordinates and close associatesC
IssueD Does P&KK ha!e 2urisdiction to in!estigate such
military officer for being in ser!ice during the administration
of the former PresidentR
@eldD B%ubordinatesC refers only to one who en2oys close
association or relation to the former President and his wifeH
term Bclose associatesC restricted the meaning of
BsubordinatesC
Limitations of e2usdem generis
Re.uisitesD
o %tatute contains an enumeration of particular ?
specific words, followed by general word or phrase
o Particular and specific words constitute a class or
are the same 1ind
o Enumeration of the particular ? specific words is
not ehausti!e or is not merely by eamples
o 4here is no indication of legislati!e intent to gi!e
the general words or phrases a broader meaning
Rule of e-%sdem generis. is not of uni!ersal applicationH it
should use to carry out, not defeat the intent of the law$
1S v. Santo +ino
%tatuteD It shall be unlawful to for any person to carry
concealed about his person any bowie, 1nife, dagger, 1ris or
other deadly weapon$ Provided prohibition shall not apply to
firearms who ha!e secured a license or who are entitled to
carry the same under the pro!isions of this Act$C
IssueD does Bthe deadly weaponC include an unlicensed
re!ol!erR
@eldD MesS &arrying such would be in !iolation of statute$
'y the pro!iso, it manifested its intention to include in the
prohibition weapons other than armas blancas therein
specified$
Cagayan 2a##ey Enterprises. /nc. v. CA & previo%s page. sa 1abilang
column
"oman Cat*o#ic Arc*bis*op of Mani#a v. Socia# Sec%rity Commission
IssueD a religious institution in!o1ing e-%sdem generi
whether TemployerC be limited to underta1ing an acti!ity
which has an element of profit or gainR
%tatuteD Bany person, natural or 2uridical, domestic or
foreign, who carried in the Philippines any trade, business,
industryL$ and uses the ser!ices of another person, who
under his orders as regard the employment, ecept the
Ko!ernment, and any of its political subdi!isions branches or
instrumentalities and KO&&sC$
@eldD 5o$ the rule of e-%sdem generis applies only when
there is uncertainty$ 4he definition is sufficiently
comprehensi!e to include charitable institutions and charities
not for profitH it contained eceptions which said institutions
and entities are not included$
Epressio unius est eclusion alterius
4he epress mention of one person, thing or conse.uence
implies the eclusion of all others$
Rule may be epressed in a number of waysD
o E)press%m facit cessare tacit%m A what is
epressed puts an end to that which is implied
where a statute, by its terms, is epressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be etended to other matters$
o E)ceptio firmat reg%#am in casib%s non e)ceptis 3
A thing not being ecepted must be regarded as
coming within the pur!iew of the general rule
o E)pressio %ni%s est e)c#%sion a#teri%s 3 4he
epression of one or more things of a class implies
the eclusion of all not epressed, e!en though all
would ha!e been implied had none been epressedH
opposite the doctrine of necessary implication
5egati!e3opposite doctrine
Arg%ment%m a contrarioA what is epressed puts an end to
what is implied$
C*%ng Fook v. @*ite
%tatuteD case eempts the wife of a naturaliAed American
from detention, for treatment in a hospital, who is afflicted
with a contagious disease$
@eldD &ourt denied petition for writ of habeas corpus (filed
by the nati!e3born American citiAen on behalf of wife
detained in hospital", court resorted to negati!e3opposite
doctrine, stating that statute plainly relates to wife of a
naturaliAed citiAen ? cannot interpolate Bnati!e3bornC
citiAen$
AnalysisD court(s application results to in2ustice (as should
not discriminate against nati!e3born citiAens", which is not
intent of law, should ha!e used doctrine of necessary
implication$
Application of e)pression %ni%s rule
Kenerally used in construction of statutes granting powers,
creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights,
imposing rights ? forfeitures, as well as statutes strictly
construed$
Acosta v. F#or
%tatuteD specifically designates the persons who may bring
actions for $%o ;arranto. ecludes others from bringing such
actions$
Escribano v. Avi#a
%tatuteD for libel, Bpreliminary in!estigations of criminal
actions for written defamation shall be conducted by the
city fiscal of pro!ince or city or by municipal court of city or
capital of the pro!ince where such actions may be instituted
precludes all other municipal courts from conducting such
preliminary in!estigations
Peo. v. Lantin
%tatuteD crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio namely
adultery, concubinage, seduction, rape or acts of
lasci!iousnessH crimes such as slander can be prosecuted de
oficio.
)ore short eamples on p$ ::7
Mani#a Lodge +o. =>? v. CA
Santos v. CA
Ler%m v. Cr%'
Centra# arrio v. City Treas%rer of Davao
2era v. Fernande'
%tatuteD All claims for money against the decedent, arising
from contracts, epress or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral epenses and
epenses for the last sic1ness of the decedent, and 2udgment
for money against decedent, must be filled within the time
limit of the notice, otherwise barred fore!er$
@eldD 4he taes due to the go!ernment, not being mentioned
in the rule are ecluded from the operation of the rule$
Mendeni##a v. Omandia
%tatuteD changed the form of go!ernment of a municipality
into a city pro!ides that the incumbent mayor, !ice3mayor
and members of the municipal board shall continue in office
until the epiration of their terms$
@eldD all other municipal offices are abolished$
%tte v. Man%e# 1y 3 Sons. /nc.
%tatuteD Legislature deliberately selected a particular method
of gi!ing notice, as when a co3owner is gi!en the right of
legal redemption within -6 days from notice in writing by
the !endor in case the other co3owner sells his share is the
co3owned property,
@eldD the method of gi!ing notice must be deemed ecusi!e
? a notice sent by !endee is ineffecti!e$
2i##an%eva v. City of /#oi#o
%tatuteD Local Autonomy Act, local go!ernments are gi!en
broad powers to ta e!erything, ecept those which are
specifically mentioned therein$ If a sub2ect matter does not
come within the eceptions, an ordinance imposing a ta on
such sub2ect matter is deemed to come within the broad
taing power, e)ception firmat reg%#am in casib%s non
e)ceptis.
Samson v. Co%rt of Appea#s
Ghere the law pro!ides that positions in the go!ernment
belong to the competiti!e ser!ice, ecept those declared by
law to be in the noncompetiti!e ser!ice and those which are
policy3determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical in nature and enumerates those in the
noncompetiti!e as including %E&RE4ARIE% O/
KO>ER5OR% A5D )AMOR%, the clear intent is that
assistant secretaries of go!ernors and mayors fall under the
competiti!e ser!ice, for by ma1ing an enumeration, the
legislature is presumed to ha!e intended to eclude those not
enumerated, for otherwise it would ha!e included them in
the enumeration
Firman ,enera# /ns%rance Corp. v. CA
4he insurance company disclaimed liability since death
resulting from murder was impliedly ecluded in the
insurance policy as the cause of death is not accidental but
rather a deliberate and intentional act, ecluded by the !ery
nature of a personal accident insurance$
@eldD the principle Bepresssio unius est eclusio 3 the
mention of one thing implies the eclusion of the other thing
3 not ha!ing been epressly included in the enumeration of
circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance
policy cannot be considered by implication to discharge the
petitioner insurance company to include death resulting from
murder or assault among the prohibited ris1s lead ine!itably
to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or eempt
itself from liability for such death
Insurance company still liable for the in2ury, disability and
loss suffered by the insured$ (sobra Tto, I swearS )inurder na
nga, ayaw pang bayaranS %obraS @indi daw accidentalL eh
di mas lalo ng 1ailangang bayaran dahil murderS %usS %usS"
Centeno v. 2i##a#onAPorni##os
IssueD whether the solicitation for religious purposes, i$e$,
reno!ation of church without securing permit fro Department
of %ocial %er!ices, is a !iolation of PD *789, ma1ing it a
criminal offense for a person to solicit or recei!e
contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes$
@eldD 5o$ &haritable and religious specifically enumerated
only goes to show that the framers of the law in .uestion
ne!er intended to include solicitations for religious purposes
within its co!erage$
Limitations of the rule
*$ It is not a rule of law, but merely a tool in statutory
construction
2. E)pressio %ni%s est e)c#%sion a#teri%s. no more than
auiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where other
circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended
to be eclusi!e$
-$ Does not apply where enumeration is by way of eample or
to remo!e doubts only$
,ome' v. 2ent%ra
IssueD whether the prescription by a physician of opium for a
patient whose physical condition did not re.uire the use of
such drug constitutes Bunprofessional conductC as to 2ustify
re!ocation of physician(s license to practice
@eldD %till liableS Rule of e)pressio %ni%s not applicable
&ourt said, I cannot be seriously contended that aside from
the fi!e eamples specified, there can be no other conduct of
a physician deemed Tunprofessional$( 5or can it be
con!incingly argued that the legislature intended to wipe out
all other forms of Tunprofessional( conduct therefore deemed
grounds for re!ocation of licenses
9$ Does not apply when in case a statute appears upon its face
to limit the operation of its pro!ision to particular persons or
things enumerating them, but no reason eists why other
persons or things not so enumerated should not ha!e been
included and manifest in2ustice will follow by not including
them$
7$ If it will result in incongruities or a !iolation of the e.ual
protection clause of the &onstitution$
8$ If adherence thereto would cause incon!enience, hardship
and in2ury to the public interest$
Doctrine of casus omissus
A person, ob2ect or thing omitted from an enumeration must
be held to ha!e been omitted intentionally$
4he maim operates only if and when the omission has been
clearly established, and in such a case what is omitted in the
enumeration may not, by construction, be included therein$
EceptionD where legislature did not intend to eclude the
person, thing or ob2ect from the enumeration$ If such
legislati!e intent is clearly indicated, the court may supply
the omission if to do so will carry out the clear intent of the
legislature and will not do !iolence to its language
Doctrine of last antecedent
Pualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated not those
which are distantly or remotely located$
Ad pro)im%m antecedens fiat re#atio nisi impediat%r
sententia & relati!e words refer to the nearest antecedents,
unless the contet otherwise re.uires
RuleD use of a comma to separate an antecedent from the rest
eerts a dominant influence in the application of the doctrine
of last antecedent$
Illustration of rule
Pangi#inan v. A#vendia
)embers of the family of the tenant includes the tenant(s
son, son3in3law, or grandson, e!en though they are not
dependent upon him for support and li!ing separately from
him 'E&AF%E the .ualifying phrase Bwho are dependent
upon him for supportC refers solely to its last antecedent,
namely, Bsuch other person or persons, whether related to the
tenant or notC
F#orentino v. P+
IssueD whether holders of bac1pay certificates can compel
go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said certificates in
payment of the holder(s obligations to the ban1$
%tatuteD Bobligations subsisting at the time of the appro!al of
this amendatory act for which the applicant may directly be
liable to the go!ernment or to any of its branches or
instrumentalities, or to corporations owned or controlled by
the go!ernment, or to any citiAens of the Philippines or to
any association or corporation organiAed under the laws of
the Philippines, who may be wiling to accept the same for
such settlementC
@eldD the court, in!o1ing the doctrine of last antecedent,
ruled that the phrase .ualify only to its last antecedent
namely Bany citiAen of the Philippines or association or
corporation organiAed under the laws of the PhilippinesC
4he court held that bac1pay certificate holders can compel
go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said certificates for
payment of their obligations with the ban1$
Pualifications of the doctrine$
*$ %ub2ect to the eception that where the intention of the law is
to apply the phrase to all antecedents embraced in the
pro!ision, the same should be made etensi!e to the whole$
:$ Doctrine does not apply where the intention is not to .ualify
the antecedent at all$
Reddendo singular singuilis
>ariation of the doctrine of last antecedent
Referring each to eachH
Referring each phrase or epression to its appropriate ob2ect,
or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the word should
be ta1en distributi!ely$
Peo. v Tamani
IssueD when to count the *73day period within which to
appeal a 2udgment of con!iction of criminal actionXdate of
promulgation of 2udgment or date of receipt of notice of
2udgment$
%tatuteD %ec$ 8, Rule *:: of the Rules of &ourt
@eldD %hould be from Tpromulgation( should be referring to
T2udgment,( while notice refer to order$
0ing v. !ernande'
IssueD Ghether a &hinese holding a noncontrol position in a
retail establishment, comes within the prohibition against
aliens inter!ening Bin the management, operation,
administration or controlC followed by the phrase Bwhether
as an officer, employee or laborerL
@eldD /ollowing the principle, the entire scope of personnel
acti!ity, including that of laborers, is co!ered by the
prohibition against the employment of aliens$
Amadora v. CA
IssueD whether Art :*;6 of &i!il &ode, which states that
Blastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trade
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices so long as they remain in their
custodyC applies to all schools, academic as well as non3
academic
@eldD teachers pupils and studentsH heads of
establishments of arts and trades to apprentices
Keneral ruleD responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student
(where school is academic"
EceptionD responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the head, and only he, (who" shall be
held liable (in case of the establishments of arts and tradesH
technical or !ocational in nature"
PROVISOS, E,CEPTIONS AND CLAUSES
Pro!isos, generally
to limit the application of the enacting clause, section or
pro!ision of a statute, or ecept something, or to .ualify or
restrain its generality, or eclude some possible ground of
misinterpretation of it, as etending to cases not intended by
legislature to be brought within its pur!iew$
RuleD restrain or .ualify the generality of the enacting clause
or section which it refers$
PurposeD limit or restrict the general language or operation of
the statute, not to enlarge it$
LocationD commonly found at the end of a statute, or
pro!ision ? introduced, as a rule, by the word BPro!idedC$
Determined byD Ghat determines whether a clause is a
pro!iso is its substance rather than its form$ If it performs
any of the functions of a pro!iso, then it will be regarded as
such, irrespecti!e of what word or phrase is used to introduce
it$
Pro!iso may enlarge scope of law
It is still the duty of the courts to ascertain the legislati!e
intention and it pre!ails o!er pro!iso$
4hus it may enlarge, than restrict
1.S. v. Santo +ino
%tatuteD it shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed
about his person any bowie, 1nife, dagger, 1ris or any other
deadly weaponD Provided. that this pro!ision shall not apply
to firearms in the possession of persons who ha!e secured a
license therefore or who are entitled to same under
pro!isions of this Act$
@eldD through the Pro!iso it manifested the intention to
include in the prohibition weapons other than armas b#ancas
as specified$
Pro!iso as additional legislation
Epressed in the opening statement of a section of a statute
Gould mean eactly the re!erse of what is necessarily
implied when read in connection with the limitation
PurposeD
o 4o limit generalities
o Eclude from the scope of the statute that which
otherwise would be within its terms
Ghat pro!iso .ualifies
Keneral ruleD .ualifies or modifies only the phrase
immediately preceding itH or restrains or limits the
generality of the clause that it immediately follows$
EceptionD unless it clearly appears that the legislature
intended to ha!e a wider scope
C*inese F#o%r /mporters Assn v. Price Stabi#i'ation oard
%tatuteD %ec$ *7 RA 9:8 3 Any eisting law, eecuti!e order
or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, no go!ernment
agency ecept the Import &ontrol &ommission shall allocate
the import .uota among the !arious importers$ Provided.
4hat the Philippine Rehabilitation and 4rade Administration
shall ha!e eclusi!e power and authority to determine and
regulate the allocation of wheat flour among importers$C
IssueD whether or not the pro!iso ecluded wheat flour from
the scope of act itself$
@eldD 5OS Pro!iso refer to the clause immediately
preceding it and can ha!e no other meaning than that the
function of allocating the wheat flour instead of assigning to
Import &ontrol &ommission was assigned to PR4A$
If wheat flour is eempted from the pro!isions of the Act,
the pro!iso would ha!e been placed in the section containing
the repealing clause
Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e v. Ange#es
Ghen an earlier section of statute contains pro!iso, not
embodied in later section, the pro!iso, not embodied in a
later section thereof, in the absence of legislati!e intent, be
confined to .ualify only the section to which it has been
appended$
F#ores v. Miranda
IssueD Petitioner that appro!al of the Public %er!ice
&ommission of the sale of public ser!ice !ehicle was not
necessary because of pro!iso in %ec$ :6 of &ommonwealth
Act 5o$ *98
%tatuteD It shall be unlawful for any public ser!ice !ehicle or
for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the
pre!ious appro!al and authority of the &ommission
pre!iously had to sell, alienate its property,
franchiseH Provided. *o;ever. that nothing herein contained
shall be construed to pre!ent the transaction from being
negotiated or completed before its appro!al or to pre!ent the
sale, alienation, or lease by any public ser!ice of any of its
property in the ordinary course of businessC
@eldD
o the pro!iso means only that the sale without
the re.uired appro!al is still !alid and binding
between the partiesH also
o the phrase Bin the ordinary course of business
could not ha!e been intended to include sale of
!ehicle itself, but at most may refer only to such
property that may be concei!ably disposed of by
the carrier in the ordinary course of its business,
li1e 2un1ed e.uipment$
Mercado Sr. v. +L"C
@eldD the pro!iso in par : of Art :;6 relates only to casual
employeesH not to pro2ect employees$
Applying rule that pro!iso to be construed with reference to
immediately preceding part of the pro!ision which it is
attached and not to other sections thereof, unless legislati!e
intent was to restrict or .ualify$
Eception to the rule
Pro!iso construed to .ualify only the immediately preceding
part of the section to which it is attachedH if no contrary
legislati!e intent is indicated$
Ghere intent is to .ualify or restrict the phrase preceding it
or the earlier pro!isions of the statute or e!en the statute
itself as a whole, then the pro!iso will be construed in that
manner, in order that the intent of the law may be carried out
Repugnancy between pro!iso and main pro!ision
Ghere there is a conflict between the pro!iso and the main
pro!ision, that which is located in a later portion of the
statute pre!ails, unless there is legislati!e intent to the
contrary$
Latter pro!ision, whether pro!ision or not, is gi!en
preference for it is the latest epression of the intent of the
legislation$
Eceptions, generally
Eception consists of that which would otherwise be
included in the pro!ision from which it is ecepted$
It is a clause which eempts something from the operation of
a statute by epress words$
Becept,C Bunless otherwise,C and Bshall not applyC
)ay not be introduced by words mentioned abo!e, as long as
if such remo!es something from the operation of a pro!ision
of law$
/unctionD to confirm the general ruleH .ualify the words or
phrases constituting the general rule$
E)ceptio firmat reg%#am in casib%s e)ceptis A A thing not
being ecepted, must be regarded as coming within the
pur!iew of the general rule$
DoubtsD resol!ed in fa!or of general rule
Eception and Pro!iso distinguished
EceptionD
Eempts something absolutely from the operation of statute
4a1es out of the statute something that otherwise would be a
part of the sub2ect matter of it$
Part of the enactment itself, absolutely ecluding from its
operation some sub2ect or thing that would otherwise fall
within the scope$
Pro!isoD
Defeats its operation conditionally$
A!oids by way of defeasance or ecuse
If the enactment is modified by engrafting upon it a new
pro!ision, by way of amendment, pro!iding conditionally for
a new case3 this is the nature of pro!iso$
%imilarD in a way since one of the functions of pro!iso is to ecept
something from an enacting clause$
Illustration of eception

ME"ALCO v. P%b#ic 1ti#ities Emp#oyeesD Association
%tatuteD 5o person, firm, or corporation, business
establishment or place shall compel an employee or laborer
to wor1 on %undays? legal holidays, unless paid an
additional sum of at least :7N of his renumerationD
Provided. that this prohibition shall not apply to public
utilities performing public ser!ice, e$g$ supplying gas,
electricity, power, water etcL
IssueD Is )ERAL&O liable to pay the :7N for employees
who wor1 during holidays and %undaysR
@eldD 5egati!e$ :
nd
part is an eception although introduced
by BPro!ided$C As appellant is a public utility that supplies
electricity ? pro!ides means of transportation, it is e!ident
that appellant is eempt from .ualified prohibition
established in the enactment clause$
To#entino v. Secretary of Finance
%tatuteD 5o bill shall be passed by either @ouse shall become
a law unless it has passed - readings on separate days, ?
printed copies thereof in its final form ha!e been distributed
to its )embers - days before its passage, e)cept when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency$
@eldD it .ualifies only its nearest antecedent, which is the
distribution of the printed bill in its final form - days from its
final passage$? not the - readings on separate days$
Pendon v. Diasnes
IssueD whether a person con!icted of a crime against
property, who was granted absolute pardon by the President,
is entitled to !oteR
%tatuteD A person shall not be .ualified to !ote Bwho has
been sentenced by final 2udgment to suffer one year or more
from imprisonment, such disability not ha!ing been remo!ed
any plenary pardonC or Bwho has been declared by final
2udgment guilty of any crime against property$C
*
st
clause3 : ecpetions 0 (a" Person penaliAed by less than *
yr$H and (:" Person granted an absolute pardon
:
nd
clause 3 creates eception to *
st
but not to :
nd
that a person
con!icted of crime against property cannot !ote unless
there(s pardon$
@eldD absolute pardon for any crime for which one year of
imprisonment or more was meted out restores the prisoner to
his political rights$
If penalty less * yr, dis.ualification not apply, ecept when
against property3 needs pardon$
4he :
nd
clause creates the eception to the *
st

,orospe v. CA Be)ception need not be introd%ced by 9e)cept: or
9%n#ess:C
%tatuteD Rule :, of Rules of &ourt, Bser!ice by registered
mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addresseeH but if
fail to claim his mail from the post office within 7 days from
ate of first notice of the postmaster, ser!ice shall ta1e effect
at the epiration of such time$C
IssueD Ghether actual receipt the date of a registered mail
after 7 day period, is the date from which to count the
prescripti!e period to comply with certain re.uirements$
@eldD %er!ice is completed on the 7
th
day after the *
st
notice,
e!en if he actually recei!ed the mail months later$
:
nd
part is separated by semicolon, and begins with Tbut(
which indicates eception$
%a!ing clause
Pro!ision of law which operates to ecept from the effect of
the law what the clause pro!ides, or sa!e something which
would otherwise be lost$
Fsed to sa!e something from effect of repeal of statute
Legislature, in repealing a statute, may preser!e in the form
of a sa!ing clause, the right of the state to prosecute and
punish offenses committed in !iolation of the repealed law$
Ghere eisting procedure is altered or substituted by
another, usual to sa!e proceedings under the old law at the
time the new law ta1es effect, by means of sa!ing clause
&onstruedD in light of intent by legislature
Ki!en strict or liberal meaning depending on nature of
statute$
CHAPTER SI,: Statute Construe" as W$o'e an" !n Re'at!on to
ot$er Statutes
STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE
Kenerally
%tatute is passed as a whole
o It should ha!e one purpose and one intent
o &onstrue its parts and section in connection with
other parts
o GhyR 4o BproduceC a harmonious whole
5e!erD
o Di!ide by process of etymological dissertation
(whyR 'ecause there are instances when the
intention of the legislati!e body is different from
that of the definition in its original sense"
o %eparate the words (remember that the whole point
of this chapter is to construe it as a whole"
o %eparate contet
o 'ase definitions on leicographer (what is a
leicographerR A person who studies leicography$
Ghat is leicography thenR AnalyAes semantic
relationships between leicon and language 0 not
important$ 5e!er mind " 0 ang 1ulitS
4he whole point of this part is to construe the whole statute
and its part together (actually 1ahit ito nalang tandaan
hanggang matapos 1asi ito lang yung sinasabi ng boo1"
Intent ascertained from statute as whole
Legislati!e meaning and intent should be
etracted=ascertained from statutes as a whole (hence the
titleL"
o GhyR 'ecause the law is the best epositor of
itself
Optima Statuti Interpretatio est ipsum statutum 3 the best
interpreter of a statute is the statute itself
o Yremember t*is story to memori'e t*e ma)imD
Optima at %tatuti /rutti where interpreting as to
why when coc1roaches(IPI%" when added results
to %F) (ipsum" a stadium (statutum"Z 0 sorry
bloc1mates, weird si cherryS
Do not in.uire too much into the moti!es which influenced
the legislati!e body unless the moti!e is stated or disclosed
in the statute themsel!es$
Aisporna v. CA
pointed out that words, clauses, phrases should not be
studied as detached=isolated epressions
o &onsider e!ery part in understanding the meaning
of its part to produce a harmonious whole
o )eaning of the law is borne in mind and not to be
etracted from a single word
o )ost importantD E!ery part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the contet
Aboiti' S*ipping Corp v. City of Ceb%
Described that if the words or phrases of statute be ta1en
indi!idually it might con!ey a meaning different form the
one intended by the author$
Interpreting words or phrases separately may limit the etent
of the application of the pro!ision
,aanan v. /ntermediate Appe##ate Co%rt
&ase of wire tapping
4here is a pro!ision which states that B it shall be unlawful
for any person, not being authoriAed by all the parties to any
pri!ate communication or spo1en word to tap any wire or
cable or by using any other de!ice or arrangement, to
secretly o!erhear, intercept, or record such communication
or spo1en word by using such de!ice commonly 1nown as
dictagraphLC
IssueD whether the phrase de!ice or arrangement includes
party line and etension
%tatconD it should not be construed in isolation$ Rather it
should be interpreted in relation to the other words (tap, to
o!erhear" thus party line or telephone etension is not
included because the words in the pro!ision limit it to those
that ha!e a physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of de!ice to o!erhear$ (Remember the
maim noscitus a sociis because in here they applied an
association with other words in construing the intention or
limitation of the statute"
+ationa# Tobacco Administration v. COA
IssueD whether educational assistance gi!en to indi!iduals
prior to the enactment of RA 8,7; should be continued to be
recei!edR
@eldD Mes$ Proper interpretation of section*: RA 8,7;
depends on the combination of first and second paragraph
/irst sentence states that Bsuch other additional
compensation not otherwise specified as may be determined
by the D') shall be deemed included in the standardiAed
salary rates herein prescribed$C 4he second sentence states
Bsuch other additional compensation, whether in cash or in
1ind, being recei!ed by incumbents only as of #uly *, *+;+
not integrated into the standard shall continue to be
authoriAed$C (you can as1 cheery na lang to eplain it, ang
haba ng nasa boo1 "
statconD do not isolate or detach the parts$ &onstruing a
statute as a whole includes reconciling and harmoniAing
conflicting pro!isions
Purpose or contet as controlling guide
construe whole statute and ascertain the meaning of the
words or phrases base on its contet, the nature of the
sub2ect, and purpose or intention of the legislati!e body who
enacted the statute
gi!e it a reasonable construction
Leeway are accepted on grammatical construction, letters of
the statutes, rhetorical framewor1 if it can pro!ide a clear
and definite purpose of the whole statute ( as long as it can
produce a clear and definite statutes, it is sometimes affected
to be la on the construction of grammar"
@armoniAe the parts of each other and it should be consistent
with its scope and ob2ect
Ki!ing effect to statute as a whole
Ghy construe a statute as a wholeR 3 'ecause it implies that
one part is as important as the other
Ghat if the pro!ision=section is unclear by itselfR 3 One can
ma1e it clear by reading and construing it in relation to the
whole statute
@ow do you properly and intelligently construe a
pro!ision=statuteR 3 - waysD (*" Fnderstand its meaning and
scopeH (:" apply to an actual caseH (-" courts should consider
the whole act itself
Ghy should e!ery part of the statute be gi!en effectR 3
'ecause it is enacted as an integrated measure not a
hodgepodge of conflicting pro!isions
Gays on how the courts should construe a statute (according
to "ep%b#ic v. "eyes"D
o Interpret the thought con!eyed by the statute as
whole
o &onstrue constituent parts together
o Ascertain legislati!e intent form whole part
o &onsider each and e!ery pro!ision in light of the
general purpose
o )a1e e!ery part effecti!e, harmonious and
sensible (adopt a construction which would gi!e
effect to e!ery part of the of the statute"
Ft res magis !aleat .uam pereat 3 the
construction is to be sought which gi!es
effect to the whole of the statute 3 of its
e!ery word$
Apparently conflicting pro!isions reconciled
included in the rule of construing statute as a whole, is the
reconciling and harmoniAing conflicting pro!isions because
it is by this that the statute will be gi!en effect as a whole$
Ghy is it a must for courts to harmoniAe conflicting
pro!isionR 3 'ecause they are e.ually the handiwor1 of the
same legislature
"P v. CA
IssueD whether or not an appeal of cases in!ol!ing 2ust
compensation should be made first by DARA' before R4&
under %ec$ 7,
@eldD %& said that the contention of the Republic and the
Land 'an1 in the affirmati!e side has no merit because
although DARA' is granted a 2urisdiction o!er agrarian
reform matters, it does not ha!e 2urisdiction o!er criminal
cases$
Sa-onas v. CA
IssueD what period an ad!erse claim annotated at the bac1 of
a transfer certificate effecti!eR
@eldD In construing the law %ec$ ,6 of PD *7:+ (ad!erse
claim shall be effecti!e for a period of -6 days from the date
of the registrationL" care should be ta1en to ma1e e!ery part
effecti!e
%pecial and general pro!isions in same statute
special would o!errule the general
special must be operati!eH general affect only those it applies
ecept to general pro!ision
&onstruction as not to render pro!ision nugatory
another conse.uence of the ruleD pro!ision of a statute should
not be construed as to nullify or render another nugatory in
the same statute
Interpretatio fienda est et res magis !aleat .uam pereat 3 a
law should be interpreted with a !iew to upholding rather
than destroying
o Do not construe a statute wherein one portion will
destroy the other
o A!oid a construction which will render to
pro!ision inoperati!e
Reason for the rule
because of the presumption that the legislature has enacted a
statute whose pro!isions are in harmony and consistent with
each other and that conflicting intentions is the same statute
are ne!er supported or regarded
Pualification of rule
Ghat if the parts cannot be harmoniAed or reconciled without
nullifying the otherR 3 Rule is for the court to re2ect the one
which is least in accord with the general plan of the whole
statute
Ghat if there is no choiceR 3 the latter pro!ision must !acate
the formerH last in order is fre.uently held to pre!ail unless
intent is otherwise
Ghat if the conflict cannot be harmoniAed and made to stand
togetherR 3 one must in.uire into the circumstances of their
passage
&onstruction as to gi!e life to law
pro!ide sensible interpretation to promote the ends of which
they were enacted
construct them in a reasonable and practical way to gi!e life
to them
Interpretatio fienda es ut res magis !aleat .uam pereat 3
interpretation will gi!e the efficacy that is to be adopted$
&onstruction to a!oid surplusage
construe the statute to ma1e no part or pro!ision thereof as
surplasage
each and e!ery part should be gi!en due effect and meaning
do not construe a legal pro!ision to be a useless surplusage
and meaningless
eert all efforts to pro!ide the meaning$ GhyR 'ecause of
the presumption that the legislature used the word or phrase
for a purpose
Application of rule
Me-ia v.a#a#ong
IssueD how to constru Bnet general electionC in %ec$ ;; of
the &ity &harter of Dagupan &ityR
@eldD the phrase refers to the net general election after the
city came into being and not the one after its organiAation by
Presidential Proclamation$
+iere v. CF/ of +egros Occidenta#
IssueD does the city mayor ha!e the power to appoint a city
engineer pursuant to %ec$ * of the &ity &harter of La &arlote
@eldD no, the city mayor does not ha!e such power$ 4he
phrase Band other heads and other employees of such
departments as may be createdC whom the mayor can
appoint, refers to the heads of city departments that may be
created after the law too1 effect, and does not embrace the
city engineer$ 4o rule otherwise is to render the first
con2unction BandC before the words Bfire departmentC a
superfluity and without meaning at all
1ytengs% v "ep%b#ic
IssueD whether the re.uirement the re.uirement for
naturaliAation that the applicant Bwill reside continuously in
the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up
to the time of his admission to Philippine citiAenshipC refers
to actual residence or merely to legal residence or domicile
@eldD such re.uirement refers to actual or physical residence
because to construe it otherwise is to render the clause a
surplusage$
An applicant for naturaliAation must be actually residing in
the Philippines from the filing of the petition for
naturaliAation to its determination by the court
Mani#a Lodge +o. =>? v. CA
IssueD whether the reclaimed land is patrimonial or public
dominionR
@eldD to say that the land is patrimonial will render nugatory
and a surplusage the phrase of the law to the effect that the
&ity of )anila Bis hereby authoriAed to lease or sellC
A sale of public dominion needs a legislati!e authoriAation,
while a patrimonial land does not$
%tatute and its amendments construed together
rule applies to the construction and its amendments
Ghate!er changes the legislature made it should be gi!en
effect together with the other parts$
A#meda v. F#orentino
Law 0 Bthe municipal board shall ha!e a secretary who shall
be appointed by it to ser!e during the term of office of the
members thereofC
Amendment 0 Bthe !ice3mayor shall appoint all employees
of the board who may be suspended or remo!ed in
accordance with lawC
&onstruction of both Law and Amendment 0 the power of
the !ice3mayor to ma1e appointment pursuant to the
amendatory act is limited to the appointment of all
employees of the board other than the board secretary who is
to be appointed by the board itself
STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION
AND OTHER STATUTES
%tatute construed in harmony with the &onstitution
&onstitution3 the fundamental law to which all laws are
subser!ient
Keneral RuleD Do not interpret a statute independent from the
constitution
&onstrue the statute in harmony with the fundamental lawD
GhyR 'ecause it is always presumed that the legislature
adhered to the constitutional limitations when they enacted
the statute
It is also important to understand a statute in light of the
constitution and to a!oid interpreting the former in conflict
with the latter
Ghat if the statute is susceptible to two constructions, one is
constitutional and the other is unconstitutionalR AD 4he
construction that should be adopted should be the one that is
constitutional and the one that will render it in!alid should
be re2ected$
4he &ourt should fa!or the construction that gi!es a statute
of sur!i!ing the test of constitutionality
4he &ourt cannot in order to bring a statute within the
fundamental law, amend it by construction
TaEada v. T%vera
this is the case regarding Art$ : of the &i!il &ode especially
the phrase Bunless otherwise pro!idedC$
%tatconD one should understand that if the phrase refers to the
publication itself it would !iolate the constitution (since all
laws should be made public" Yif malabo, !ague, ehR huhR 0
cherry will eplain it na lang Z
%tatutes in Pari Materia
pari materia 3 refers to any the followingD
o same person or thing
o same purpose of ob2ect
o same specific sub2ect matter
Later statutes may refer to prior laws$
Ghat if the later law ha!e no reference to the prior law, does
that mean they are not in pari materiaR 3 5o$ It is sufficient
that they ha!e the same sub2ect matter$
Ghen is a statute not in pari materiaR 3 4he conditions abo!e
are the determinants of ascertaining if a statute is in pari
materia, thus e!en if two statutes are under the same broad
sub2ect as along as their specific sub2ects are not the same,
they are 5O4 in pari material
@ow statutes in Pari Materia construed
Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus
interpretandi modus 0 e!ery statute must be so construed and
harmoniAed with other statutes as to form a uniform system
of 2urisprudence (parang ganun din nung first part, construe
it as a whole$ 'ut also bear in mind that it should also be in
harmony with other eisting laws"
&onstrue statutes in pari materia together to attain the
purpose of an epress national policy
Ghy should they be construed togetherR 3 'ecause of the
assumption that when the legislature enacted the statutes they
were thin1ing of the prior statute$ Prior statutes relating to
the same sub2ect matter are to be compared with the new
pro!isions$
Again it is important to harmoniAe the statutes$ &ourts
should not render them in!alid without ta1ing the necessary
steps in reconciling them
2da de 1rbano v. ,S/S
there were no facts gi!en in the boo1 ecept that it was in
this case that in pari materia was eplained well$ 4he
eplanation are the same in the aforementioned
Other things to consider in constructing statutes which are in
pari materia
o @istory of the legislation on the sub2ect
o Ascertain the uniform purpose of the legislature
o Disco!er the policy related to the sub2ect matter
has been changed or modified
o &onsider acts passed at prior sessions e!en those
that ha!e been repealed
Distingue tempora et concordabis 2ura 0 distinguish times
and you will harmoniAe laws
In cases of two or more laws with the same sub2ect matterD
o Puestion is usually whether the later act impliedly
repealed the prior act$
o RuleD the only time a later act will be repealed or
amended is when the act itself states so (that it
supersedes all the prior acts" or when there is an
irreconcilable repugnancy between the two$
o In the case of BimpliedC the doubt will be resol!ed
against the repeal or amendment and in fa!or of
the harmoniAation of the laws on the sub2ect (later
will ser!e as a modification"
Reasons why laws on same sub2ect are reconciled
: main reasonsD
o 4he presumption that the legislature too1 into
account prior laws when they enacted the new one$
Borbiter dict%m ni c*erryF t*is c*apter keeps pointing o%t t*at t*e
#egis#at%re are kno;#edgeab#e on t*e #a;. b%t / ;onder *o; t*e actors
fitG /m not discriminating b%t *o; did Lito Lapid. Loi E-ercito. etc
kne; t*e prior #a;sG / *eard t*ey *ave researc*ers ;*o do it for t*em.
@*y donDt ;e vote t*ose researc*ers insteadG 4%n #ang. / *ave been
reading t*e ;*o#e pres%mption t*at t*e #egis#at%re is kno;#edgeab#e.
Madaming namamatay sa aka#a. /s agpa#o sti## a#iveG*a*a*a "
o 'ecause enactments of the same legislature on the
same sub2ect are supposed to form part of one
uniform system (GhyR 'ecause later statutes are
supplementary to the earlier enactments"
If possible construe the two statutes
wherein the pro!isions of both are gi!en
effect
Ghere harmoniAation is impossible
Earlier law should gi!e way to the later law because it is the
BcurrentC or later epression of the legislati!e will
Illustration of the rule (in pari materia"
Lacson v. "o$%e
IssueD the phrase unless sooner remo!ed of a statute that
states Bthe mayor shall hold office for four years unless
sooner remo!edC
statconD the court held that the phrase should be construed in
relation to remo!al statutes$ 4hus the phrase meant that
although the mayor cannot be remo!ed during his term of
office, once he !iolates those that are stated in remo!al
statutes$
C*in O* Foo v. Concepcion
criminal case Article *:(*" eempting circumstance
(imbecile or insane"
%tatconD the phrase Bshall not be permitted to lea!e without
first obtaining permission of the same courtC should be
reconciled with another statute that states Bany patient
confined in a mental institution may be released by the
Director of @ealth once he is cured$ 4he Director shall
inform the 2udge that appro!ed the confinementC$ 4hese two
statutes refers to a person who was criminally charged but
was pro!en to be an imbecile or insane, thus they should be
construed together$ 4heir construction would mean that in
order for the patient to be release there should be an appro!al
of both the court and the Director of @ealth$
0ing v. !ernae'
%tatconD relation of RA **;6 (Retail 4rade 5ationaliAation
Act" to &ommonwealth Act *6; (Anti Dummy Law"
Dia#das v. Percides
/actsD a alien who operated a retail store in &ebu decided to
close his &ebu store and transfer it to Dumaguete$ R4L
(retail trade law" and 4a &ode %ec$ *++ were the statutes
ta1en into consideration in this case$ 4he former authoriAes
any alien who on )ay *7, *+79 is actually engaged in retail,
to continue to engage therein until his !oluntary retirement
from such business, but not to establish or open additional
stores for retail business$ 4he latter pro!ides that any
business for which the pri!ilege ta has been paid may be
remo!ed and continued in any other place without payment
of additional ta$
IssueD whether the transfer by the alien from &ebu to
Dumaguete can be considered as a !oluntary retirement from
business$
@eldD 5o$ Although the trial court affirmed the .uestion, the
%& ruled otherwise stating that R4& o!erloo1ed the clear
pro!ision of %ec$ *++$
C 3 C Commercia# Corp v. +ationa# @ater;orks and Se;erage
A%t*ority
/actsD R$A$ +*: (:" states that in construction or repair wor1
underta1en by the Ko!ernment, Philippine made materials
and products, whene!er a!ailable shall be used in
construction or repair wor1$
/lag Law (&ommonwealth Act *-;" gi!es nati!e products
preference in the purchase of articles by Ko!ernment,
including go!ernment owned or controlled corporations$
IssueD interpretation of two statutes re.uiring that preference
be made in the purchase and use of Phil$ )ade materials and
products
@eldD 4he %& relates the two statutes as in pari materia and
they should be construed to attain the same ob2ecti!e that is
to gi!e preference to locally produced materials$
Cabada v. A#%nan ///
IssueD whether or not an appeal lies from the decision of
regional appellate board (RA'" imposing disciplinary action
against a member of the P5P under %ec$ 97 of RA 8+,7
regarding finality of disciplinary action
4he court held that the BgapC in the law which is silent on
filing appeals from decisions of the RA' rendered within the
reglementary period should be construed and harmoniAed
with other statutes, i$e$ %ec :(*", Article IE3' of the *+;,
&onstitution because the P5P is part, as a bureau, of the
reorganiAed DILK, as to form a unified system of
2urisprudence
%tatconD if RA' fails to decide an appealed case within 86
days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed
decision is deemed final and eecutory, and the aggrie!ed
party may forthwith appeal therefrom to the %ecretary of
DILK$ Li1ewise, if the RA' has decided the appeal within
863day reglementary period, its decision may still be
appealed to the %ecretary of DILK
Mani#a 6ockey C#%b /nc. v. CA
IssueD who was entitled to brea1ages (*6N di!idend of
winning horse race tic1ets"
%tatconD 4here are two statutes that should be considered$
RA -6+ (amended by 88-* ?88-:" is silent on the matter but
the practice is to use brea1ages for anti boo1ie dri!e and
other sale promotions$ E$O$ ;; ? ;+ which allocated
brea1ages therein specified$ 4hese two should be construed
in pari materia, thus all brea1ages deri!ed from all races
should be distributed and allocated in accordance with
Eecuti!e Orders because no law should be !iewed in
isolation$ (supplementary"
Keneral and special statutes
Keneral statutes3 applies to all of the people of the state or to
a particular class of persons in the state with e.ual force$
o Fni!ersal in application
%pecial statutes3 relates to particular persons or things of a
class or to particular portion or section of the state only
&onsidered as statutes in pari materia thus they should be
read together and harmoniAed (and gi!en effect"
Ghat if there are two acts which contain one general and one
specialR
o If it produces conflict, the special shall pre!ail
since the legislati!e intent is more clear thus it
must be ta1en as intended to constitute an
eception$
o 4hin1 of it as one general law of the land while the
other applies only to a particular case
Ghat if the special law is passed before the general lawR It
doesn(t matter because the special law will still be
considered as an eception unless epressly repealed$
So#id !omes /nc. v. Paya;a#
/irst statute pro!ides that 5ational @ousing Authority shall
ha!e eclusi!e 2urisdiction to hear and decide cases
in!ol!ing unsound real estate (P$D$ 5o$ +7+"$
%econd statute grants R4& general 2urisdiction o!er such
cases$
IssueD Ghich one will pre!ailR
@eldD 4he first statute will pre!ail because it is a special law,
as compared to the latter which is general law, thus it is an
eception to the Bgeneral 2urisdictionC of the R4&
Magta-as v. Pryce Properties Corp
/actsD P$D$ 5o$ *;8+ authoriAed PAK&OR to centraliAe and
regulate all games of chance$
LK& of *++*, a later law, empowers all go!ernment units to
enact ordinances to pre!ent and suppress gambling and other
games of chance$
%taconD 4hese two should be harmoniAed rather than
annulling one and upholding the other$ &ourt said that the
solution to this problem is for the go!ernment units to
suppress and pre!ent all 1inds of gambling ecept those that
are allowed under the pre!ious law
Leveri'a v. /ntermediate Appe##ate Co%rt
RA ,,8 empowers the general manager of the &i!il
Aeronautics Administration to lease real property under its
administration$
Administrati!e &ode authoriAes the President to eecute a
lease contract relating to real property belonging to the
republic
@ow do you apply the ruleR 3 In this case, the prior (special"
law should pre!ail
Reason for the rule
the special law is considered an eception to the general law
(as long as same sub2ect"
Pualification of the rule
4he rule aforementioned is not absolute$
EceptionsD
o If the legislature clearly intended the general
enactment to co!er the whole sub2ect and to repeal
all prior laws inconsistent therewith
o Ghen the principle is that the special law merely
establishes a general rule while the general law
creates a specific and special rule
Reference statutes
a statute which refers to other statutes and ma1es them
applicable to the sub2ect of legislation
used to a!oid encumbering the statute boo1s of unnecessary
repetition
should be construed to harmoniAe and gi!e effect to the
adopted statute$
%upplemental statutes
Intended to supply deficiencies in eisting statutes
%upplemental statutes should be read with the original statute
and construed together
Reenacted statutes
statute which reenacts a pre!ious statute or pro!ision$
Reproducing an earlier statute with the same or substantially
the same words$
Monte#ibano v. Ferrer
IssueD application of %ec$ - fo the &ity &harter of )anila is
!alid in the criminal complaint directly file by an offended
party in the city court of 'acolodR
@eldD 4he court ruled that the criminal complaint filed
directly by the offended party is in!alid and it ordered the
city court to dismiss it$
4he pro!isions of the &ity &harter of )anila 'acolod on the
same sub2ect are identically worded, hence they should
recei!e the same construction$
RFLED two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and
terminology should each in its own field, ha!e a li1e
interpretation
Adoption of contemporaneous construction
in construing the reenacted statute, the court should ta1e into
account prior contemporaneous construction and gi!e due
weight and respect to it$
Pualification of the rule
rule that is aforementioned is applicable only when the
statute is capable of the construction gi!en to it and when
that construction has become a settled rule of conduct
Adopted statutes
a statute patterned after a statute of a foreign country$
&ourt should ta1e into consideration how the courts of other
country construe the law and its practices
CHAPTER SEVEN: Str!t or L!*era' Construt!on
IN GENERAL
Kenerally
Ghether a statute is to be gi!en a strict or liberal
construction will depend upon the followingD
4he nature of the statute
4he purpose to be subser!ed
4he mischief to be remedied
PurposeD to gi!e the statute the interpretation that will best
accomplish the end desired and effectuate legislati!e intent
%trict construction, generally
&onstruction according to the letter of the statute, which
recogniAes nothing that is not epressed, ta1es the language
used in its eact meaning, and admits no e.uitable
consideration
5ot to mean that statutes are construed in its narrowest
meaning
It simply means that the scope of the statute shall not be
etended or enlarged by implication, intendment, or
e.uitable consideration beyond the literal meaning of its
terms
It is a close and conser!ati!e adherence to the literal or
tetual interpretation
4he antithesis of liberal construction
Liberal construction, defined
E.uitable construction as will enlarge the letter of a statute to
accomplish its intended purpose, carry out its intent, or
promote 2ustice
5ot to mean enlargement of a pro!ision which is clear,
unambiguous and free from doubt
It simply means that the words should recei!e a fair and
reasonable interpretation, so as to attain the intent, spirit and
purpose of the law
Liberal construction applied, generally
Ghere a statute is ambiguous, the literal meaning of the
words used may be re2ected if the result of adopting said
meaning would be to defeat the purpose of the law
1t res magis va#eat $%am pereat & that construction is to be
sought which gi!es effect to the whole of the statute 0 its
e!ery word
Liberal &onstruction #udicial Interpretation
E.uitable construction as will
enlarge the letter of a statute to
accomplish its intended
purpose, carry out its intent, or
promote 2ustice
Act of the court in engrafting
upon a law something which it
belie!es ought to ha!e been
embraced therein
Legitimate eercise of 2udicial
power
/orbidden by the tripartite
di!ision of powers among the -
departments of go!ernment
A statute may not be liberally construed to read into it
something which its clear and plain language re2ects
&onstruction to promote social 2ustice
%ocial 2ustice must be ta1en into account in the interpretation
and application of laws
%ocial 2ustice mandate is addressed or meant for the three
departmentsD the legislati!e, eecuti!e, and the 2udicial
%ocial 2ustice (included in the &onstitution" was meant to be
a !ital, articulate, compelling principle of public policy
It should be obser!ed in the interpretation not only of future
legislations, but also of laws already eisting on 5o!ember
*7, *+-7$
It was intended to change the spirit of our laws, present and
future$
&onstruction ta1ing into consideration general welfare or growth
ci!iliAation
&onstrue to attain the general welfare
Sa#%s pop%#i est s%prema #e) & the !oice of the people is the
supreme law
Stat%ta pro p%b#ico commodo #ate interpretant%r & statutes
enacted for the public good are to be construed liberally
4he reason of the law is the life of the lawH the reason lies in
the soil of the common welfare
4he 2udge must go out in the open spaces of actuality and dig
down deep into his common soil, if not, he becomes
subser!ient to formalism
&onstrue in the light of the growth of ci!iliAation and
!arying conditions
o 4he interpretation that Bif the man is too long for
the bed, his head should be chopped off rather than
enlarge the old bed or purchase a new oneC should
5O4 be gi!en to statutes
STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED
Penal statutes, generally
Penal statutes are those that define crimes, treat of their
nature and pro!ide for their punishment
o Acts of legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their !iolation
4hose which impose punishment for an offense committed
against the state, and which the chief eecuti!e has the
power to pardon
A statute which decrees the forfeiture in fa!or of the state of
uneplained wealth ac.uired by a public official while in
office is criminal in nature
Penal statutes, strictly construed
Penal statutes are strictly construed against the %tate and
liberally construed in fa!or of the accused
o Penal statutes cannot be enlarged or etended by
intendment, implication, or any e.uitable
consideration
o 5o person should be brought within its terms if he
is not clearly made so by the statute
o 5o act should be pronounces criminal which is not
clearly made so
Peo v. Atop
%ec$ ** of RA ,87+, which amended Art$ --7 of the RP&,
pro!ides that the death penalty for rape may be imposed if
the Boffender is a parent, ascendant, step3parent, guardian,
relati!e by consanguinity or affinity within the -
rd
ci!il
degree, or the common3law spouse of the parent of the
!ictimC
Is the common3law husband of the girl(s grandmother
includedR
5oS &ourts must not bring cases within the pro!isions of the
law which are not clearly embraced by it$
o 5o act can be pronounced criminal which is not
clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought
within them$
o Any reasonable doubt must be resol!ed in fa!or of
the accused
%trict construction but not as to nullify or destroy the
ob!ious purpose of the legislature
o If penal statute is !ague, it must be construed with
such strictness as to carefully %A/EKFARD the
RIK@4% of the defendant and at the same time
preser!e the ob!ious intention of the legislature
o &ourts must endea!or to effect substantial 2ustice
Centeno v. 2i##a#onAPorni##os
PD *789, which punishes a person who solicits or recei!es
contribution for Bcharitable or public welfare purposesC
without any permit first secured from the Department of
%ocial %er!ices, DID 5O4 include Breligious purposesCC in
the acts punishable, the law &A55O4 be construed to
punish the solicitation of contributions for religious
purposes, such as repair or reno!ation of the church
Reason why penal statutes are strictly construedg
4he law is tender in fa!or of the rights of the indi!idualH
4he ob2ect is to establish a certain rule by conformity to
which man1ind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
limited
Purpose of strict construction is 5O4 to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through technicality but to
pro!ide a precise definition of forbidden acts
Acts ma#a in se and ma#a pro*ibita
Keneral ruleD to constitute a crime, e!il intent must combine
with an act
Act%s non facit re%m nisi mens sit rea & the act itself does not
ma1e a man guilty unless his intention were so
Act%s me invite fact%s non est me%s act%s & an act done by
me against my will is not my act
)ala in se )ala prohibita
&riminal intent, apart from the
act itself is re.uired
4he only in.uiry is, has the law
been !iolated
RP& %pecial penal laws
@owe!er, if special penal laws use such words as Bwillfully,
!oluntarily, and 1nowinglyC intent must be pro!edH thus
good faith or bad faith is essential before con!iction
Application of rule
Peo v. 4adao
A statute which penaliAes a Bperson assisting a claimantC in
connection with the latter(s claim for !eterans benefit, does
not penaliAe Bone who O//ER% to assistC
S%y v. Peop#e
Ghere a statute penaliAes a store owner who sells
commodities beyond the retail ceiling price fied by law, the
ambiguity in the EO classifying the same commodity into :
classes and fiing different ceiling prices for each class,
should be resol!ed in fa!or of the accused
Peo v. Terreda
%horter prescripti!e period is more fa!orable to the accused
Peo v. Manantan
4he rule that penal statutes are gi!en a strict construction is
not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws
Instead, the rule merely ser!es as an additional single factor
to be considered as an aid in detrmining the meaning of
penal laws
Peo v. P%risima
4he language of the a statute which penaliAes the mere
carrying outside of residence of bladed weapons, i$e$, a 1nife
or bolo, not in connection with one(s wor1 or occupation,
with a !ery hea!y penalty ranging from 73*6 years of
imprisonment, has been narrowed and strictly construed as to
include, as an additional element of the crime, the carrying of
the weapon in furtherance of rebellion, insurrection or
sub!ersion, such being the e!il sought to be remedied or
pre!ented by the statute as disclosed in its preamble
A'arcon v. Sandiganbayan
IssueD whether a pri!ate person can be considered a public
officer by reason if his being designated by the 'IR as a
depository of distrained property, so as to ma1e the
con!ersion thereof the crime of mal!ersation
@eldD 5OS the 'IR(s power authoriAing a pri!ate indi!idual
to act as a depository cannot include the power to appoint
him as public officer
A pri!ate indi!idual who has in his charge any of the public
funds or property enumerated in Art ::: RP& and commits
any of the acts defined in any of the pro!isions of &hapter 9,
4itle , of the RP&, should li1ewise be penaliAed with the
same penalty meted to erring public officers$ 5owhere in
this pro!ision is it epressed or implied that a pri!ate
indi!idual falling under said Art ::: is to be deemed a public
officer
Limitation of rule
Limitation I* 0 Ghere a penal statute is capable of :
interpretations, one which will operate to eempt an accused
from liability for !iolation thereof and another which will
gi!e effect to the manifest intent of the statute and promote
its ob2ect, the latter interpretation should be adopted
1S v. ,o C*ico
A law punishes the display of flags Bused duringC the
insurrection against the F% may not be so construed as to
eempt from criminal liability a person who displays a
replica of said flag because said replica is not the one BusedC
during the rebellion, for to so construe it is to nullify the
statute together
Ko &hico is liable though flags displayed were 2ust replica of
the flags Bused duringC insurrection against F%
Limitation I: 0 strict construction of penal laws applies only
where the law is ambiguous and there is doubt as to its
meaning
Peo v. ,atc*a#ian
A statute re.uires that an employer shall pay a minimum
wage of not less than a specified amount and punishes any
person who willfully !iolates any of its pro!isions
4he fact that the nonpayment of the minimum wage is not
specifically declared unlawful, does not mean that an
employer who pays his employees less than the prescribed
minimum wage is not criminally liable, for the nonpayment
of minimum wage is the !ery act sought to be en2oined by
the law
%tatutes in derogation of rights
Rights are not absolute, and the state, in the eercise of
police power, may enact legislations curtailing or restricting
their en2oyment
As these statutes are in derogation of common or general
rights, they are generally strictly construed and rigidly
confined to cases clearly within their scope and purpose
EamplesD
o %tatutes authoriAing the epropriation of pri!ate
land or property
o Allowing the ta1ing of deposition
o /iing the ceiling of the price of commodities
o Limiting the eercise of proprietary rights by
indi!idual citiAens
o %uspending the period of prescription of actions
Ghen : reasonably possible constructions, one which would
diminish or restrict fundamental right of the people and the
other if which would not do so, the latter construction must
be adopted so as to allow full en2oyment of such
fundamental right
%tatutes authoriAing epropriations
Power of eminent domain is essentially legislati!e in nature
)ay be delegated to the President, LKFs, or public utility
company
Epropriation plus 2ust compensation
A derogation of pri!ate rights, thus strict construction is
applied
%tatutes epropriating or authoriAing the epropriation of
property are strictly construed against the epropriating
authority and liberally in fa!or of property owners
%tatutes granting pri!ileges
%tatutes granting ad!antages to pri!ate persons or entities
ha!e in many instances created special pri!ileges or
monopolies for the grantees and ha!e thus been !iewed with
suspicion and strictly construed
Privi#egia recipient #argam interpretationem vo#%ntati
consonam concedentis & pri!ileges are to be interpreted in
accordance with the will of him who grants them
And he who fails to strictly comply with the will of the
grantor loses such pri!ileges
%t%an Sa;mi##. /nc. v. ayvie; T*eater. /nc
Ghere an entity is granted a legislati!e franchise to operate
electric light and power, on condition that it should start
operation within a specified period, its failure to start
operation within the period resulted in the forfeiture of the
franchise
Legislati!e grants to local go!ernment units
Krants of power to local go!ernment are to be construed
strictly, and doubts in the interpretation should be resol!ed in
fa!or of the national go!ernment and against the political
subdi!isions concerned
ReasonD there is in such a grant a gratuitous donation of
public money or property which results in an unfair
ad!antage to the grantee and for that reason, the grant should
be narrowly restricted in fa!or of the public
%tatutory grounds for remo!al of officials
%tatutes relating to suspension or remo!al of public officials
are strictly construed
ReasonD the remedy of remo!al is a drastic one and penal in
nature$ In2ustice and harm to the public interest would li1ely
emerge should such laws be not strictly interpreted against
the power of suspension or remo!al
Oc*ate v. De#ing
Krounds for remo!al 0 Bneglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other forms of maladministration in officeC
o Bin officeC 0 a .ualifier of all acts$
o )ust be in relation to the official as an officer and
not as a pri!ate person
!ebron v "eyes
Procedure for remo!al or suspension should be strictly
construed
%tatuteD local electi!e officials are to be remo!ed or
suspended, after in!estigation, by the pro!incial board,
sub2ect to appeal to the President
President has no authority on his own to conduct the
in!estigation and to suspend such electi!e official
5aturaliAation laws
5aturaliAation laws are strictly construed against the
applicant and rigidly followed and enforced
5aturaliAation is statutory than a natural right
%tatutes imposing taes and customs duties
4a statutes must be construed strictly against the
go!ernment and liberally in fa!or of the tapayer
Power to ta in!ol!es power to destroy
4aing act are not to be etended by implication
4a statutes should be clearly, epressly, and unambiguously
imposed
Reason for strict constructionD taation is a destructi!e power
which interferes with the personal property rights of the
people and ta1es from them a portion of their property for
the support of the go!ernment
%tatutes granting ta eemptions
Law frowns against eemption from taation because taes
are the lifeblood of the nation
Laws granting ta eemptions are thus construed strictissimi
-%ris against the tapayer and liberally in fa!or of the taing
authority
'urden of proof 0 on the tapayer claiming to be eempted
'asis for strict construction 0 to minimiAe the different
treatment and foster impartiality, fairness, and e.uality of
treatment among tapayers
4a eemptions are not fa!ored in law, nor are they
presumed$
C/" v. CA
IssueD whether containers and pac1aging materials can be
credited against the miller(s deficiency ta
'IR claimed that there should be no ta credit
@eldD pro!iso should be strictly construed to apply only to
raw materials and not to containers and pac1ing materials
which are not raw materialsH hence, the miller is entitled to
ta credit
Restriction in the pro!iso is limited only to sales, miller(s
ecise taes paid Ton raw materials used in the milling
process(
eng%et Corporation v. Cenrtra# oard of Assessment Appea#s
PD *+77 withdrew all ta eemptions, ecept those
embodied in the Real Property &ode, a law which grants
certain industries real estate ta eemptions under the Real
Estate &ode
&ourts cannot epand eemptiom
Esso Standard Eastern. /nc. v Acting Commissioner of C%stoms
Ghere a statute eempts from special import ta, e.uipment
Bfor use of industries,C the eemption does not etend to
those used in dispensing gasoline at retail in gasoline stations
C/" v. Mani#a 6ockey C#%b. /nc.
%tatuteD Bracing club holding these races shall be eempt
from the payment of any municipal or national taC
&annot be construed to eempt the racing club from paying
income ta on rentals paid to it for use of the race trac1s and
other paraphernalia, for what the law eempts refers only to
those to be paid in connection with said races
L#adoc v. C/"
%tatuteD eemption from taation charitable institutions,
churches, parsonages or co!enants appurtenant thereto,
mos.ues, and non3profit cemeteries, and all lands buildings,
and impro!ements actually, directly, and eclusi!ely used
for religious or charitable purposes
Eemption only refer to property taes and not from all
1inds of taes
La Car#ota S%gar Centra# v. 6imene'
%tatuteD ta pro!ided shall not be collected on foreign
echange used for the payment of BfertiliAers when imported
by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperati!esC
4he importation of fertiliAers by an entity which is neither a
planter nor a farmer nor a cooperati!e of planters or farmers
is not eempt from payment of the ta, e!en though said
entity merely acted as agent of planter or farmer as a sort of
accommodation without ma1ing any profit from the
transaction, for the law uses the word BdirectlyC which
means without anyone inter!ening in the importation and the
phrase Bthrough their cooperati!esC as the only eemption
C/" v. P*i#. Acety#ene Co.
%ee page -67
Power of taation if a high prerogati!e of so!ereignty, its
relin.uishment is ne!er presumed and any reduction or
diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate must
be strictly construed
P*i#. Te#egrap* and Te#ep*one Corp. v. COA
On Bmost fa!ored treatment clauseC
: franchisee are not competitors
4he first franchisee is will not en2oy a reduced rate of ta on
gross receipts
Pualification of rule
%trict construction does not apply in the case of ta
eemptions in fa!or of the go!ernment itself or its agencies
Pro!isions granting eemptions to go!ernment agencies may
be construed liberally in fa!or of non3ta liability of such
agencies
4he epress eemption should not be construed with the
same degree of strictness that applies to eemptions contrary
to policy of the state, since as to such property eemption is
the rule and the taation is the eemption
E$g$ ta eemption in fa!or of 5APO&OR 0 whether direct
or indirect taes, eempted
%tatutes concerning the so!ereign
Restricti!e statutes which impose burdens on the public
treasury or which diminish rights and interests are strictly
construed$
Fnless so specified, the go!ernment does not fall within the
terms of any legislation
A##iance of ,overnment @orkers v. Minister of Labor and Emp#oyment
PD ;7* 0 re.uires BemployersC to pay a *-
th
month pay to
their employees
BemployersC does not embrace the RP, the law not ha!ing
epressly included it within its scope
%tatutes authoriAing suits against the go!ernment
Art$ E>I, %ec$ -, *+;, &onstitution 0 B4he %tate may not be
sued without its consentC
o Keneral ruleD so!ereign is eempt from suit
o EceptionD in the form of statute, state may gi!e its
consent to be sued
%tatute is to be strictly construed and
wai!er from immunity from suit will not
be lightly inferred
+%##%m temp%s occ%rrit regi & there can be no legal right as
against the authority that ma1es the law on which the right
depends
Reason for non3suability 0 not to sub2ect the state to
incon!enience and loss of go!ernmental efficiency
Mobi# P*i#. E)p#oration. /nc. v. C%stoms Arrastre Services
4he law authoriAing the 'ureau of &ustoms to lease arrastre
operations, a proprietary function necessarily incident to its
go!ernmental function, may 5O4 be construed to mean that
the state has consented to be sued, when it underta1es to
conduct arrastre ser!ices itself, for damage to cargo
%tate3immunity may not be circum!ented by directing the
action against the officer of the state instead of the state itself
o 4he state(s immunity may be !alidly in!o1ed
against the action A% LO5K A% I4 &A5 'E
%@OG5 that the suit really affects the property,
rights, or interests of the state and not merely those
of the officer nominally made party defendant
E!en if the state consents, law should 5O4 be interpreted to
authoriAe garnishment of public funds to satisfy a 2udgment
against go!ernment property
o ReasonD
Public policy forbids it
Disbursement of public funds must be
co!ered by a corresponding
appropriation as re.uired by law
/unctions and ser!ice cannot be allowed
to be paralyAed or disrupted by the
di!ersion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific ob2ects, as
appropriated by law
%tatutes prescribing formalities of the will
%trictly construed, which means, wills must be eecuted in
accordance with the statutory re.uirements, otherwise, it is
entirely !oid
4he court is see1ing to ascertain and apply the intent of the
legislators and not that of the testator, and the latter(s
intention is fre.uently defeated by the non3obser!ance of
what the statute re.uires
Eceptions and pro!isos
%hould be strictly but reasonably construed
All doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of the general
pro!ision rather than the eceptions
o @owe!er, always loo1 at the intent of legislators if
it will accord reason and 2ustice not to apply the
rule that Ban epress eception ecludes all othersC
4he rule on eecution pending appeal must be strictly
construed being an eception to the general rule
%ituations which allows eceptions to the re.uirement of
warrant of arrest or search warrant must be strictly
construedH to do so would infringe upon personal liberty and
set bac1 a basic right
A preference is an eception to the general rule
A pro!iso should be interpreted strictly with the legislati!e
intent
o %hould be strictly construed
o Only those epressly eempted by the pro!iso
should be freed from the operation of the statute
STATUTES LI-ERALLY CONSTRUED
Keneral social legislation
Keneral welfare legislations
o 4o implement the social 2ustice and protection3to3
labor pro!isions of the &onstitution
o &onstrued liberally
o Resol!e any doubt in fa!or of the persons whom
the law intended to benefit
o Includes the following 0 labor laws, tenancy laws,
land reform laws, and social security laws
Tamayo v. Mani#a !ote#
Law grants employees the benefits of holiday pay ecept
those therein enumerated
%tatcon 0 all employees, whether monthly paid or not, who
are not among those ecepted are entitled to the holiday pay
Labor laws construed 0 the wor1ingman(s welfare should be
the primordial and paramount consideration
o Article 9 5ew Labor &ode 0 Ball doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the pro!isions
of the Labor &ode including its implementing rules
and regulations shall be resol!ed in fa!or of laborC
Liberal construction applies only if statute is !ague,
otherwise, apply the law as it is stated
Keneral welfare clause
: branches
o One branch attaches to the main trun1 of municipal
authority 0 relates to such ordinances and
regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred
upon local legislati!e bodies by law
o Other branch is much more independent of the
specific functions enumerated by law 0 authoriAes
such ordinances as shall seem necessary and
proper to pro!ide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, impro!e the morals, peace,
good order of the LKF and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of the property
therein
&onstrued in fa!or of the LKFs
4o gi!e more powers to local go!ernments in promoting the
economic condition, social welfare, and material progress of
the people in the community
&onstrued with proprietary aspects, otherwise would cripple
LKFs
)ust be elastic and responsi!e to !arious social conditions
)ust follow legal progress of a democratic way of life
Krant of power to local go!ernments
Old ruleD municipal corporations, being mere creatures of
law, ha!e only such powers as are epressly granted to them
and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the
eercise thereof
5ew ruleD RA ::89 BLocal Autonomy ActC
o %ec *: 0 Bimplied power of a pro!ince, a city, or a
municipality shall be liberally construed in its
fa!or$ Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
eistence of the power should be interpreted in
fa!or of the local go!ernment and it shall be
presumed to eistC
%tatutes granting taing power (on municipal corporations"
'efore *+,- &onstitution 0 inferences, implications, and
deductions ha!e no place in the interpretation of the taing
power of a municipal corporation
5ew &onstitution 0 Art$ E, %ec 7 *+;, &onstitution 0 Beach
local go!ernment unit shall ha!e the power to create its own
sources of re!enue and to le!y taes, fees, and charges
sub2ect to such guidelines and limitations as the &ongress
may pro!ide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomyC
o %tatutes prescribing limitations on the taing
power of LKFs must be strictly construed against
the national go!ernment and liberally in fa!or of
the LKFs, and any doubt as to the eistence of the
taing power will be resol!ed in fa!or of the local
go!ernment
%tatutes prescribing prescripti!e period to collect taes
'eneficial for both go!ernment and tapayer
o 4o the go!ernment 0 ta officers are obliged to act
promptly in the ma1ing of the assessments
o 4o the tapayer 0 would ha!e a feeling of security
against unscrupulous ta agents who will always
find an ecuse to inspect the boo1s of tapayers
Laws on prescription 0 remedial measure 0 interpreted
liberally affording protection to the tapayers
%tatutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of ta
liberally construed in fa!or of go!ernment and strictly
construed against the tapayer
intention to hasten ta payments or to punish e!asions or
neglect of duty in respect thereto
liberal construction would render penalties for delin.uents
nugatory
Election laws
Election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to
achie!e their purpose
Purpose 0 to effectuate and safeguard the will of the
electorate in the choice of their representati!es
- parts
o Pro!isions for the conduct of elections which
election officials are re.uired to follow
o Pro!isions which candidates for office are re.uired
to perform
o Procedural rules which are designed to ascertain,
in case of dispute, the actual winner in the
elections
Different rules and canons or statutory construction go!ern such
pro!isions of the election law
Part *D
o Rules and regulations for the conduct of elections
'efore election 0 mandatory (part *"
After election 0 directory (part -"
o Kenerally 0 the pro!isions of a statute as to the
manner of conducting the details of an election are
5O4 mandatoryH and irregularities in conducting
an election and counting the !otes, not preceding
from any wrongful intent and which depri!es no
legal !oter of his !otes, will not !itiate an election
or 2ustify the re2ection of the entire !otes of a
precinct
Against disenfranchisement
Remedy against election official who did
not do his duty 0 criminal action against
them
Part :D
o Pro!isions which candidates for office are re.uired
to perform are mandatory
o 5on3compliance is fatal
Part -D
o Procedural rules which are designed to ascertain,
in case of dispute, the actual winner in the
elections are liberally construed
o 4echnical and procedural barriers should not be
allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle in
the choice of their electi!e officials
/or where a candidate has recei!ed popular mandate,
o!erwhelmingly and clearly epressed, all possible doubts
should be resol!ed in fa!or of the candidates eligibility, for
to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the electorate
Amnesty proclamations
Amnesty proclamations should be liberally construed as to
carry out their purpose
Purpose 0 to encourage to return to the fold of the law of
those who ha!e !eered from the law
E$g$ in case of doubt as to whether certain persons come
within the amnesty proclamation, the doubt should be
resol!ed in their fa!or and against the state
%ame rule applies to pardon since pardon and amnesty is
synonymous
%tatutes prescribing prescriptions of crimes
Liberally construed in fa!or of the accused
Reason 0 time wears off proof and innocence
%ame as amnesty and pardon
Peo v. "eyes
Art$ +* RP& 0 Bperiod of prescription shall commence to run
from the day the crime is disco!ered by the offended,
authorities, C
Ghen does the period of prescription start 0 day of disco!ery
or registration in the Register of DeedsR
@eldD /rom the time of registration
5otice need not be actual for prescription to runH
constructi!e notice is enough
)ore fa!orable to the accused if prescripti!e period is
counted from the time of registration
Adoption statutes
Adoption statutes are liberally construed in fa!or of the child
to be adopted
Paramount consideration 0 child and not the adopters
>eteran and pension laws
>eteran and pension laws are enacted to compensate a class
of men who suffered in the ser!ice for the hardships they
endured and the dangers they encountered in line of duty
o Epression of gratitude to and recognition of those
who rendered ser!ice to the country by etending
to them regular monetary benefit
>eteran and pension laws are liberally construed in fa!or of
grantee
De# Mar v. P*i#. 2eterans Admin
Ghere a statute grants pension benefits to war !eterans,
ecept those who are actually recei!ing a similar pension
from other go!ernment funds
%tatcon 0 Bgo!ernment fundsC refer to funds of the same
go!ernment and does not preclude war !eterans recei!ing
similar pensions from the F% Ko!ernment from en2oying the
benefits therein pro!ided
oard of Administrators 2eterans Admin v. a%tista
>eteran pension law is silent as to the effecti!ity of pension
awards, it shall be construed to ta1e effect from the date it
becomes due and 5O4 from the date the application for
pension is appro!ed, so as to grant the pensioner more
benefits and to discourage inaction on the part of the officials
who administer the laws
C*ave' v. Mat*ay
Ghile !eteran or pension laws are to be construed liberally,
they should be so construed as to pre!ent a person from
recei!ing double pension or compensation, unless the law
pro!ides otherwise
Santiago v. COA
Eplained liberal construction or retirement laws
Intention is to pro!ide for sustenance, and hopefully e!en
comfort when he no longer has the stamina to continue
earning his li!elihood
@e deser!es the appreciation of a grateful go!ernment at best
concretely epressed in a generous retirement gratuity
commensurate with the !alue and length of his ser!ice
Orti' v. COMELEC
IssueD whether a commissioner of &O)ELE& is deemed to
ha!e completed his term and entitled to full retirement
benefits under the law which grants him 73year lump3sum
gratuity and thereafter lifetime pension, who Bretires from
the ser!ice after ha!ing completed his term of office,C when
his courtesy resignation submitted in response to the call of
the President following ED%A Re!olution is accepted
@eldD MesS Entitled to gratuity
Liberal construction
&ourtesy resignation 0 not his own will but a mere
manifestation of submission to the will of the political
authority and appointing power
/n "e App#ication for ,rat%ity enefits of Associate 6%stice Efren /
P#ana
IssueD whether #ustice Plana is entitled to gratuity and
retirement pay when, at the time of his courtesy resignation
was accepted following ED%A Re!olution and establishment
of a re!olutionary go!ernment under the /reedom
&onstitution, he lac1ed a few months to meet the age
re.uirement for retirement under the law but had
accumulated a number of lea!e of credits which, if added to
his age at the time, would eceed the age re.uirement
@eldD yes, entitled to gratuityS Liberal construction applied
/n "e Pineda
Eplained doctrine laid down in the pre!ious case
4he crediting of accumulated lea!es to ma1e up for lac1 of
re.uired age or length of ser!ice is not done discriminately
only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was mar1ed
by competence, integrity, and dedication to the public ser!ice
/n "e Martin
IssueD whether a 2ustice of the %&, who a!ailed of the
disability retirement benefits pursuant to the pro!ision that
Bif the reason for the retirement be any permanent disability
contracted during his incumbency in office and prior to the
date of retirement he shall recei!e only a gratuity e.ui!alent
to *6 years salary and allowances aforementioned with no
further annuity payable monthly during the rest of the
retiree(s natural lifeC is entitled to a monthly lifetime pension
after the *63year period
@eldD MesS *63year lump sum payment is intended to assist
the stric1en retiree meeting his hospital and doctor(s bills
and epenses for his support
4he retirement law aims to assist the retiree in his old age,
not to punish him for ha!ing sur!i!ed
Cena v. CSC
IssueD whether or not a go!ernment employee who has
reached the compulsory retirement age of 87 years, but who
has rendered less than *7 years of go!ernment ser!ice, may
be allowed to continue in the ser!ice to complete the *73year
ser!ice re.uirement to enable him to retire with benefits of
an old3age pension under %ec **(b" PD **98
@owe!er, &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o :, pro!ides that
Bany re.uest for etension of compulsory retirees to
complete the *73years ser!ice re.uirement for retirement
shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career
ser!ice who are regular members of the K%I% and shall be
granted for a period not eceeding * year
@eldD &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o :, unconstitutionalS It
is an administrati!e regulation which should be in harmony
with the lawH liberal construction of retirement benefits
Rules of &ourt
R& are procedural 0 to be construed liberally
Purpose of R& 0 the proper and 2ust determination of a
litigation
Procedural laws are no other than technicalities, they are
adopted not as ends in themsel!es but as means conduci!e to
the realiAation of the administration of law and 2ustice
R& should not be interpreted to sacrifice substantial rights at
the epense of technicalities
Case v. 6%go
Lapses in the literal obser!ance of a rule of procedure will
be o!erloo1ed when they do not in!ol!e public policyH when
they arose from an honest mista1e or unforeseen accidentH
when they ha!e not pre2udiced the ad!erse party and ha!e
not depri!ed the court of its authority
Literal stricture ha!e been relaed in fa!or of liberal
construction
o Ghere a rigid application will result in manifest
failure or miscarriage of 2ustice
o Ghere the interest of substantial 2ustice will be
ser!ed
o Ghere the resolution of the emotion is addressed
solely to the sound and 2udicious discretion of the
court
o Ghere the in2ustice to the ad!erse party is not
commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure
Liberal construction of R& does not mean they may be
ignoredH they are re.uired to be followed ecept only for the
most persuasi!e reasons
Other statutes
&urati!e statutes 0 to cure defects in prior law or to !alidate
legal proceedings which would otherwise be !oid for want of
conformity with certain legal re.uirementsH retroacti!e
Redemption laws 0 remedial in nature 0 construed liberally
to carry out purpose, which is to enable the debtor to ha!e
his property applied to pay as many debtor(s liability as
possible
%tatutes pro!iding eemptions from eecution are interpreted
liberally in order to gi!e effect to their beneficial and
humane purpose
Laws on attachment 0 liberally construed to promote their
ob2ects and assist the parties obtaining speedy 2ustice
Garehouse receipts 0 instrument of credit 0 liberally
construed in fa!or of a bona fide holders of such receipts
Probation laws 0 liberally construed
o PurposeD to gi!e first3hand offenders a second
chance to maintain his place in society through the
process of reformation
%tatute granting powers to an agency created by the
&onstitution should be liberally construed for the
ad!ancement of the purposes and ob2ecti!es for which it was
created
CHAPTER EIGHT: Man"ator) an" D!retor) Statutes
IN GENERAL
Kenerally
)andatory and directory classification of statutes 0
importanceD what effect should be gi!en to the mandate of a
statute
)andatory and directory statutes, generally
)andatory statute 0 commands either positi!ely that
something be done in a particular way, or negati!ely that
something be not doneH it re.uires O'EDIE5&E, otherwise
!oid
Directory statute 0 permissi!e or discretionary in nature and
merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no
in2ury can result from ignoring it or that its purpose can be
accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and
substantially the same result obtainedH confer direction upon
a personH non3performance of what it prescribes will not
!itiate the proceedings therein ta1en
Ghen statute is mandatory or directory
5o absolute test to determine whether a statute is directory or
mandatory
/inal arbiter 0 legislati!e intent
Legislati!e intent does not depend on the form of the statuteH
must be gi!en to the entire statute, its ob2ect, purpose,
legislati!e history, and to other related statutes
)andatory in form but directory in nature 0 possible
Ghether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on
whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the
thing re.uired, or is a mere matter of form, what is a matter
of essence can often be determined only by 2udicial
construction
o &onsidered directory 0 compliance is a matter of
con!enienceH where the directions of a statute are
gi!en merely with a !iew to the proper, orderly
and prompt conduct of businessH no substantial
rights depend on it
o &onsidered mandatory 0 a pro!ision relating to the
essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters
of substanceH interpretation shows that the
legislature intended a compliance with such
pro!ision to be essential to the !alidity of the act or
proceeding, or when some antecedent and
prere.uisite conditions must eist prior to the
eercise of the power, or must be performed before
certain other powers can be eercised
4est to determine nature of statute
4est is to ascertain the conse.uences that will follow in case
what the statute re.uires is not done or what it forbids is
performed
Does the law gi!e a person no alternati!e choiceR 0 if yes,
then it is mandatory
Depends on the effects of compliance
o If substantial rights depend on it and in2ury can
result from ignoring itH intended for the protection
of the citiAens and by a disregard of which their
rights are in2uriously affected 0 mandatory
o Purpose is accomplished in a manner other than
that prescribed and substantially the same results
obtained 3 directory
%tatutes couched in mandatory form but compliance is
merely directory in nature
o If strict compliance will cause hardship or in2ustice
on the part of the public who is not at fault
o If it will lead to absurd, impossible, or mischie!ous
conse.uences
If an officer is re.uired to do a positi!e
act but fails because such actions will
lead to the aforementioned, he will only
be sub2ect to administrati!e sanction for
his failure to do what the law re.uires
Language used
Kenerally mandatory 0 command words
o %hall or %hall not
o )ust or )ust not
o Ought or Ought not
o %hould or %hould not
o &an or &annot
Kenerally directory 0 permissi!e words
o )ay or )ay not
Fse of BshallC or BmustC
Kenerally, BshallC and BmustC is mandatory in nature
If a different interpretation is sought, it must rest upon
something in the character of the legislation or in the contet
which will 2ustify a different meaning
4he import of the word ultimately depends upon a
consideration of the entire pro!ision, its nature, ob2ect and
the conse.uences that would follow from construing it one
way or the other
Loyo#a ,rand 2i##a !omeo;ners BSo%t*C Assn.. /nc. v. CA
BmustC construed as directory
&orporation &ode %ec 98 reads B e!ery corporation formed
under this &ode )F%4 within one month after receipt of
official notice of the issuance of its certification of
incorporation with the %E&, adopt a code of by3laws for its
go!ernment not inconsistent with this &odeC
PD +6:3A which is in pari materia# with the &orporation
&ode states that the non3filing of the by3laws does not imply
the BdemiseC of the corporationH that there should be a notice
and hearing before the certificate of registration may be
cancelled by the failure to file the by3laws
One test whether mandatory or directory compliance must be
made 0 whether non3compliance with what is re.uired will
result in the nullity of the actH if it results in the nullity, it is
mandatory
Director of Land v. CA
Law re.uires in petitions for land registration that Bupon
receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial
hearing to be published in the OK and once in a newspaper
of general circulation in the PhilippinesC
Law epressly re.uires that the initial hearing be published
in the OK A5D in the newspaper of general circulation 0
reasonD OK is not as widely read of the newspaper of general
circulation
BshallC is imperati!e= mandatory
Githout initial hearing being published in a newspaper of
general circulation is a nullity
Fse of BmayC
An auiliary !erb showing opportunity or possibility
Kenerally, directory in nature
Fsed in procedural or ad2ecti!e lawsH liberally construed
EampleD %ec 8- of the corporation &ode 0 Bshares of stoc1
so issued are personal property and )AM be transferred by
deli!ery of the certificate or certificated endorsed by the
owner
o BmayC is merely directory and that the transfer of
the shares may be effected in a manner different
from that pro!ided for in law
Ghen BshallC is construed as BmayC and !ice !ersa
RuleD BmayC should be read BshallC
o where such construction is necessary to gi!e effect
to the apparent intention of the legislature
o where a statute pro!ides for the doing os some act
which is re.uired by 2ustice r public duty
o where it !ests a public body or officer with power
and authority to ta1e such action which concerns
for the public interest or rights of indi!iduals
RuleD BshallC should be read BmayC
o Ghen so re.uired by the contet or by the
intention of the legislature
o Ghen no public benefit or pri!ate right re.uires
that it be gi!en an imperati!e meaning
Diokno v. "e*abi#itiation Finance Corp
%ec$ : RA -69 reads Bban1s or other financial institutions
owned or controlled by the Ko!ernment %@ALL, sub2ect to
a!ailability of funds accept at a discount at not more
than :6N for *6 years of such bac1pay certificateC
B%hallC implies discretion because of the phrase Bsub2ect to
a!ailability of fundsC
,overmnent v. E# !ogar Fi#ipino
&orporation &odes reads B%@ALL, upon such !iolation
being pro!ed, be dissol!ed by $%o ;arranto proceedingsC
B%hallC construed as BmayC
erces. Sr. v. ,%ingona
%ec$ 8; Ra ,*86 (LK&" pro!ides that an appeal from an
ad!erse decision against a local electi!e official to the
President B%@ALL not pre!ent a decision from becoming
final and eecutorC
B%hallC is not mandatory because there is room to construe
said pro!ision as gi!ing discretion to the re!iewing officials
to stay the eecution of the appealed decision
Fse of negati!e, prohibitory or eclusi!e terms
A negati!e statute is mandatoryH epressed in negati!e words
or in a form of an affirmati!e proposition .ualified by the
word BonlyC
BonlyC eclusionary negation
Prohibiti!e or negati!e words can rarely, if e!er, be
discretionary
MANDATORY STATUTES
%tatutes conferring power
Kenerally regarded as mandatory although couched in a
permissi!e form
%hould construe as imposing absolute and positi!e duty
rather than conferring pri!ileges
Power is gi!en for the benefit of third persons, not for the
public official
Kranted to meet the demands of rights, and to pre!ent a
failure of 2ustice
Ki!en as a remedy to those entitled to in!o1e its aid
%tatutes granting benefits
&onsidered mandatory
/ailure of the person to ta1e the re.uired steps or to meet the
conditions will ordinarily preclude him from a!ailing of the
statutory benefits
2igi#antib%s et non dormientib%s -%ra s%bveni%nt & the laws
aid the !igilant, not those who slumber on their rights
Potior est in tempoe. potior est in -%re 0 he who is first in
time is preferred in right
%tatutes prescribing 2urisdictional re.uirements
&onsidered mandatory
Eamples
o Re.uirement of publication
o Pro!ision in the 4a &ode to the effect that before
an action for refund of ta is filed in court, a
written claim therefore shall be presented with the
&IR within the prescribed period is mandatory and
failure to comply with such re.uirement is fatal to
the action
%tatutes prescribing time to ta1e action or to appeal
Kenerally mandatory
@eld as absolutely indispensable to the pre!ention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge or
business, and are necessary incident to the proper, efficient,
and orderly discharge of 2udicial functions
%trict not substantial compliance
5ot wai!able, nor can they be the sub2ect of agreements or
stipulation of litigants
"eyes v. COA
%ec$ *;, RA ,*86 0 process of appeal of dissatisfied
tapayer on the legality of ta ordinance
o Appeal to the %ec of #ustice within -6 days of
effecti!ity of the ta ordinance
o If %ec of #ustice decides the appeal, a period of -6
days is allowed for an aggrie!ed party to go to
court
o If the %ec of #ustice does not act thereon, after the
lapse of 86 days, a party could already proceed to
see1 relief in court
Purpose of mandatory complianceD to pre!ent delays and
enhance the speedy and orderly discharge of 2udicial
functions
Fnless the re.uirements of law are complied with, the
decision of the lower court will become final and preclude
the appellate court from ac.uiring 2urisdiction to re!iew it
/nterest reipiciae %t sit finis #iti%m & public interest re.uires
that by the !ery nature of things there must be an end to a
legal contro!ersy
,ac*on v. Devera. 6r
IssueD whether %ec 8 of the Rule on %ummary Procedure,
which reads B should the defendant fail to answer the
complaint within the period abo!e pro!ided, the &ourt, mot%
proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, %@ALL render
2udgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein,C is
mandatory or directory, such that an answer filed out of time
may be accepted
@eldD mandatory
o )ust file the answer within the reglementary
period
o Reglementary period shall be Tnon3etendible(
o Otherwise, it would defeat the ob2ecti!e of
epediting the ad2udication of suits
%tatutes prescribing procedural re.uirements
&onstrued mandatory
Procedure relating to 2urisdictional, or of the essence of the
proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or benefit of
the party affected
Ghere failure to comply with certain procedural
re.uirements will ha!e the effect of rendering the act done in
connection therewith !oid, the statute prescribing such
re.uirements is regarded as mandatory e!en though the
language is used therein is permissi!e in nature
De Mesa v. Mencias
%ec *,, Rule - R& 0 Bafter a party dies and the claim is not
thereby etinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representati!e of the deceased to appear and
to be substituted $ If legal representati!e fails to appear
, the court )AM order the opposing party to produce the
appointment of a legal representati!e C
Although )AM was used, pro!ision is mandatory
Procedural re.uirement goes to the !ery 2urisdiction of the
court, for Bunless and until a legal representati!e is for him is
duly named and within the 2urisdiction of the trial court, no
ad2udication in the cause could ha!e been accorded any
!alidity or the binding effect upon any party, in
representation of the deceased, without trenching upon the
fundamental right to a day in court which is the !ery essence
of the constitutionally enshrined guarantee of due process
Election laws on conduct of election
&onstrued as mandatory
'efore election 0 mandatory
After election 0 directory, in support of the result unless of a
character to affect an obstruction to the free and intelligent
casting of the !otes, or to the ascertainment of the result, or
unless it is epressly declared by the statute that the
particular act is essential to the !alidity of an election, or that
its omission shall render it !oid (whew, and habaS"
Ghen the !oters ha!e honestly cast their ballots, the same
should not be nullified simply because the officers appointed
under the law to direct the elections and guard the purity of
the ballot ha!e not done their duty
/or where a candidate has recei!ed popular mandate,
o!erwhelmingly and clearly epressed, all possible doubts
should be resol!ed in fa!or of the candidates eligibility, for
to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the electorate
De#os "eyes v. "odrig%e'
4he circumstance that the coupon bearing the number of the
ballot is not detached at the time the ballot is !oted, as
re.uired by law, does not 2ustify the court in re2ecting the
ballot
Election laws on .ualification and dis.ualification
4he rule of Bbefore3mandatory and after3directoryC in
election laws only applies to procedural statutesH
5ot applicable to pro!isions of the election laws prescribing
the time limit to file certificate of candidacy and the
.ualifications and dis.ualifications of electi!e office 0
considered mandatory e!en after election
%tatutes prescribing .ualifications for office
Eligibility to a public office is of a continuing nature and
must eist at the commencement of the term and during the
occupancy of the office
%tatutes prescribing the eligibility or .ualifications of
persons to a public office are regarded as mandatory
Eample in the boo1 0 lawyer32udgeH 2udge3disbarment as
lawyer
%tatutes relating to assessment of taes
Intended for the security of the citiAens, or to insure the
e.uality of taation, or for certainty as to the nature and
amount of each other(s ta 0 )A5DA4ORM
o E$g$ %tatutes re.uiring the assessor to notify the
tapayer of the assessment of his property within a
prescribed period
4hose designed merely for the information or direction of
officers or to secure methodical and systematic modes of
proceedings 3 DIRE&4ORM
%tatutes concerning public auction sale
&onstrued mandatory
Procedural steps must be strictly followed
Otherwise, !oid
DIRECTORY STATUTES
%tatutes prescribing guidance for officers
Regulation designed to secure order, system, and dispatch in
proceedings, and by a disregard of which the rights of parties
interested may not be in2uriously affected 0 directory
o Eception 0 unless accompanied by negati!e
words importing that the acts re.uired shall not be
done in any other manner or time than that
designated
%tatutes prescribing manner of 2udicial action
&onstrued directory
Procedure is secondary in importance to substanti!e right
Kenerally, non3compliance therewith is not necessary to the
!alidity of the proceedings
%tatutes re.uiring rendition of decision within prescribed period
%ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+;, &onstitution 0 the maimum
period within which a case or matter shall be decided or
resol!ed from the date of its submission shall be
o :9 months 0 %&
o *: months 0 lower collegiate courts
o - months 0 all other lower courts
%ec , Art$ IE3A, *+;, &onstitution 0
o 86 days from the date of its submission for
resolution 0 for all &onstitutional &ommissions
'efore the &onstitution too1 effect 3 %tatutes re.uiring
rendition of decision within prescribed period 0 Directory
o Ecept
intention to the contrary is manifest
time is of the essence of the thing to be
done
language of the statute contains negati!e
words
designation of the time was intended as a
limitation of power, authority or right
always loo1 at intent to ascertain whether to gi!e the statute
a mandatory or directory construction
o basisD EEPEDIE5&M 0 less in2ury results to the
general public by disregarding than enforcing the
little of the law and that 2udges would otherwise
abstain from rendering decisions after the period to
render them had lapsed because they lac1ed
2urisdiction tot do so
H%er%bin v. CA
%tatuteD appeals in election cases Bshall be decided within -
months after the filing of the case in the office of the cler1 of
courtC
IssueD whether or not &A has 2urisdiction in deciding the
election case although the re.uired period to resol!e it has
epired
@eldD yes, otherwise is to defeat the administration of 2ustice
upon factors beyond the control of the partiesH would defeat
the purpose of due processH dismissal will constitute
miscarriage of 2usticeH speedy trial would be turned into
denial of 2ustice
o /ailure of 2udge to ta1e action within the said
period merely depri!es him of their right to collect
their salaries or to apply for lea!es, but does not
depri!e them of the 2urisdiction to act on the cases
pending before them
&onstitutional time pro!ision directory
Marce#ino v. Cr%'
%ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+;, &onstitution 0 the maimum
period within which a case or matter shall be decided or
resol!ed from the date of its submission shall be
o :9 months 0 %&
o *: months 0 lower collegiate courts
o - months 0 all other lower courts
%ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+;, &onstitution 0 directory
ReasonsD
o %tatutory pro!isions which may be thus departed
from with impunity, without affecting the !alidity
of statutory proceedings, are usually those which
relate to the mode or time of doing that which is
essential to effect the aim and purpose of the
legislature or some incident of the essential act 0
thus directory
o Liberal construction 0 departure from strict
compliance would result in less in2ury to the
general public than would its strict application
o &ourts are not di!ested of their 2urisdiction for
failure to decide a case within the +63day period
o Only for the guidance of the 2udges manning our
courts
o /ailure to obser!e said rule constitutes a ground
for administrati!e sanction against the defaulting
2udge
A certification to this effect is re.uired
before 2udges are allowed to draw their
salaries
CHAPTER NINE: Pros#et!.e an" Retroat!.e Statutes
IN GENERAL
Prospecti!e and retroacti!e statutes, defined
Prospecti!e 0
o operates upon facts or transactions that occur after
the statute ta1es effect
o loo1s and applies to the future$
Retroacti!e 0
o Law which creates a new obligation, imposes a
new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to
a transaction already past$
o A statute is not made retroacti!e because it draws
on antecedent facts for its operation, or part of the
re.uirements for its action and application is drawn
from a time antedating its passage$
1ma#i vs. Estanis#ao
A law may be made operati!e partly on facts that occurred
prior to the effecti!ity of such law without being retroacti!e$
%tatuteD RA ,*8,3 granting increased personal eemptions
from income ta to be a!ailable thenceforth, that is, after said
Act became effecti!e and on or before the deadline for filing
income ta returns, with respect to compensation income
earned or recei!ed during the calendar year prior to the date
the law too1 effect$
Castro v. Saga#es
A retroacti!e law (in a legal sense"
o one which ta1es away or impairs !ested rights
ac.uired under eisting laws
o creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty
o attaches a new disability in respect of transactions
or considerations already past
Laws operate prospecti!ely, generally
It is a settled rule in statutory construction that statutes are to
be construed as ha!ing only prospecti!e operation, unless the
intendment of the legislature is to gi!e them a retroacti!e
effect, epressly declare or necessarily implied from the
language used$
5o court will hold a statute to be retroacti!e when the
legislature has not said so$
Art$ 9 of the &i!il &ode which pro!ides that BLaws shall
ha!e no retroacti!e effect, unless the contrary is pro!ided$C
Le) prospicit. non respicit & the law loo1s forward, not
bac1ward
Le) de f%t%re. -%de) de praeterito & the law pro!ides for the
future, the 2udge for the past$
If the law is silent as to the date of its application and that it
is couched in the past tense does not necessarily imply that it
should ha!e retroacti!e effect$
,rego v. Come#ec
A statute despite the generality of its language, must not be
so construed as to o!erreach acts, e!ents, or matters which
transpired before its passage
%tatuteD %ec$96 of the LK& dis.ualifying those remo!ed
from office as a result of an administrati!e case from running
for local electi!e positions cannot be applied retroacti!ely$
@eldD It cannot dis.ualify a person who was administrati!ely
remo!ed from his position prior to the effecti!ity of said
&ode from running for an electi!e position$
RationaleD a law is a rule established to guide actions with no
binding effect until it is enacted$
+ova constit%tion f%t%ris formam imponere debet non
praeteretis & A new statute should affect the future, not the
past$
Prospecti!ity applies toD
o %tatutes
o Administrati!e rulings and circulars
o #udicial decisions
4he principle of prospecti!ity of statutes, original or
amendatory, has been applied in many cases$ 4hese includeD
%yco v. P+
%tatuteD RA *7,8 which di!ested the P5' of authority to
accept bac1 pay certificates in payment of loans
@eldD does not apply to an offer of payment made before
effecti!ity of the act$
Lagardo v. Masaganda
@eldD RA :8*-, as amended by RA -6+6 O5 #une *++*,
granting inferior courts 2urisdiction o!er guardianship cases,
could not be gi!en retroacti!e effect in the absence of a
sa!ing clause$
Larga v. "anada 6r.
@eldD %ec$ + ? *6 of E$O$ +6 amending %ec 9 of P$D$ *,7:
could ha!e no retroacti!e application$
Peo v. H%e Po Lay
@eldD a person cannot be con!icted of !iolating &ircular :6
of the &entral 'an1, when the alleged !iolation occurred
before publication of the &ircular on the Official KaAette$
a#ta'ar v. CA
@eldD It denied retroacti!e application to PD :, decreeing
the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, ?
PD -*8, prohibiting e2ectment of tenants from rice ? corn
farmholdings pending promulgation of rules ? regulations
implementing PD :,
+i#o v CA
@eldD remo!ed Tpersonal culti!ation( as the ground for
e2ectment of a tenant can(t be gi!en retroacti!e effect in
absence of statutory statement for retroacti!ity$
Applied to administrati!e rulings ? circularsD
ASAC+ roadcasting v. CTA
@eldD a circular or ruling of the &IR cannot be gi!en
retroacti!e effect ad!ersely to a tapayer$
Sanc*e' v. COMELEC
@eldD the holding of recall proceedings had no retroacti!e
application
"om%a#de' v. CSC
@eldD &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o$ :+ cannot be gi!en
retrospecti!e effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment
an employee whose temporary appointment had epired
before the &ircular was issued$
Applied to 2udicial decisions for e!en though not laws, are
e!idence of what the laws mean and is the basis of Art$; of
the &i!il &ode wherein laws of the &onstitution shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines$
Presumption against retroacti!ity
Presumption is that all laws operate prospecti!ely, unless the
contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and
une.ui!ocally epressed or necessarily implied$
In case of doubtD resol!ed against the retroacti!e operation of
laws
If statute is susceptible of construction other than that of
retroacti!ity or will render it unconstitutional3 the statute will
be gi!en prospecti!e effect and operation$
Presumption is strong against substanti!e laws affecting
pending actions or proceedings$ 5o substanti!e statute shall
be so construed retroacti!ely as to affect pending litigations$
Gords or phrases indicating prospecti!ity
Indicating prospecti!e operationD
o A statute is to apply BhereafterC or BthereafterC
o Bfrom and after the passing of this ActC
o Bshall ha!e been madeC
o Bfrom and afterC a designated date
B%hallC implies that the law ma1es intend the enactment to
be effecti!e only in f%t%re.
%tatutes ha!e no retroacti!e but prospecti!e effectD
o BIt shall ta1e effect upon its appro!alC
o %hall ta1e effect on the date the President shall
ha!e issued a proclamation or E$O$, as pro!ided in
the statute
Retroacti!e statutes, generally
4he &onstitution does not prohibit the enactment of
retroacti!e statutes which do not impair the obligation of
contract, depri!e persons of property without due process of
law, or di!est rights which ha!e become !ested, or which are
not in the nature of e) post facto laws$
%tatutes by nature which are retroacti!eD
o Remedial or curati!e statutes
o %tatutes which create new rights
o %tatute epressly pro!ides that it shall apply
retroacti!ely
o Ghere it uses words which clearly indicate its
intent
Problem in construction is when it is applied retroacti!ely, to
a!oid frontal clash with the &onstitution and sa!e the law
from being declared unconstitutional$
STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT
Penal statutes, generally
Penal laws operate prospecti!ely$
Art$ :* of the RP& pro!ides that Bno felony shall be
punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission$
Pro!ision is recognition to the uni!ersally accepted principle
that no penal law can ha!e a retroacti!e effect, no act or
omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author punished,
ecept by !irtue of a law in force at the time the act was
committed$
+%##%m crimen sine poena. n%##a poena sine #egis & there is
no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law$
E) post facto law
&onstitution pro!ides that no e) post facto law shall be
enacted$ It also prohibits the retroacti!e application of penal
laws which are in the nature of e) post facto laws$
E) post facto laws are any of the followingD
o Law ma1es criminal an act done before the passage
of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such act
o Law which aggra!ates a crime, ma1es it greater
than it was, when committed
o Law which changes the punishment ? inflicts a
greater punishment than that anneed to the crime
when committed
o Law which alters the legal rules of e!idence,
authoriAes con!iction upon less or different
testimony than the law re.uired at the time of the
commission of the offense
o Law which assumes to regulate ci!il rights and
remedies only, but in effect imposes penalty or
depri!ation of a right for something which when
done was lawful
o Law which depri!es a person accused of a crime of
some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as protection of a former con!iction
or ac.uittal, or proclamation of amnesty$
4est if e) post facto clause is !iolatedD Does the law sought
to be applied retroacti!ely ta1e from an accused any right
!ital for protection of life and libertyR
%copeD applies only to criminal or penal matters
It does 5O4 apply to laws concerning ci!il proceedings
generally, or which affect or regulate ci!il or pri!ate rights or
political pri!ilege
A#via v. Sandiganbayan
LawD as of the date of the effecti!ity of this decree, any case
cogniAable by the Sandiganbayan is not an e) post facto law
because it is not a penal statute nor dilutes the right of appeal
of the accused$
'ill of attainder
&onstitution pro!ides that no bill of attainder shall be
enacted$
'ill of attainder 0 legislati!e act which inflicts punishment
without 2udicial trial
EssenceD substitution of a legislati!e for a 2udicial
determination of guilt
%er!es to implement the principle of separation of powers by
confining the legislature to rule3ma1ing ? thereby
forestalling legislati!e usurpation of 2udicial functions$
@istoryD 'ill of Attainder was employed to suppress
unpopular causes ? political minorities, and this is the e!il
sought to be suppressed by the &onstitution$
@ow to spot a 'ill of AttainderD
o %ingling out of a definite minority
o Imposition of a burden on it
o A legislati!e intent
o retroacti!e application to past conduct suffice to
stigmatiAe
'ill of Attainder is ob2ectionable because of its e) post facto
features$
Accordingly, if a statute is a 'ill of Attainder, it is also an e)
post facto law$
Ghen penal laws applied retroacti!ely
Penal laws cannot be gi!en retroacti!e effect, ecept when
they are fa!orable to the accused$
Art$:: of RP& Bpenal laws shall ha!e a retroacti!e effect
insofar as they fa!or the person guilty of a felony, who is not
a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 7 Art 8:
of the &ode , although at the time of the application of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the con!ict is
ser!ing the same$
4his is not an e) post facto law$
Eception to the general rule that all laws operate
prospecti!ely$
Rule is founded on the principle thatD the right of the state to
punish and impose penalty is based on the principles of
2ustice$
Favorabi#ia s%nt amp#ianda. adiiosa restrigenda &
&onscience and good law 2ustify this eception$
Eception was inspired by sentiments of humanity and
accepted by science$
: laws affecting the liability of accusedD
o In force at the time of the commission of the crime
0 during the pendency of the criminal action, a
statute is passed
reducing the degree of penalty
eliminating the offense itself
remo!ing subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insol!ency to pay the ci!il
liability
prescription of the offense
such statute will be applied
retroacti!ely and the trial court
before the finality of 2udgment
or the appellate court on appeal
from such 2udgment should
ta1e such statute in
consideration$
o Enacted during or after the trial of the criminal
action
Director v. Director of Prisons
Ghen there is already a final 2udgment ? accused is ser!ing
sentence, remedy is to file petition of *abeas corp%s.
alleging that his continued imprisonment is illegal pursuant
to said statute ? praying that he be forthwith released$
Eceptions to the ruleD
o Ghen accused is habitual delin.uent
o Ghen statute pro!ides that it shall not apply to
eisting actions or pending cases
o Ghere accused disregards the later law ? in!o1es
the prior statute under which he was prosecuted$
Keneral ruleD An amendatory statute rendering an illegal act
prior to its enactment no longer illegal is gi!en retroacti!e
effect does not apply when amendatory act specifically
pro!ides that it shall only apply prospecti!ely$
%tatutes substanti!e in nature
%ubstanti!e law
o creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life,
liberty or property, or the powers of agencies or
instrumentalities for administration of public
affairs$
o that part of law which creates, defines ? regulates
rights, or which regulates rights or duties which
gi!e rise to a cause of action
o that part of law which courts are established to
administer
o when applied to criminal lawD that which declares
which acts are crimes and prescribe the
punishment for committing them
o &annot be construed retroacti!ely as it might affect
pre!ious or past rights or obligations
%ubstanti!e rights
o One which includes those rights which one en2oys
under the legal system prior to the disturbance of
normal relations$
&ases with substanti!e statutesD
To#entino v. A'a#te
In the absence of a contrary intent, statutes which lays down
certain re.uirements to be complied with be fore a case can
be brought to court$
Espirit% v. Cipriano
/reeAes the amount of monthly rentals for residential houses
during a fied period
Spo%ses Tirona v. A#e-o
LawD &omprehensi!e Land Reform Law granting
complainants tenancy rights to fishponds and pursuant to
which they filed actions to assert rights which subse.uently
amended to eempt fishponds from co!erage of statute
@eldD Amendatory law is substanti!e in nature as it eempts
fishponds from its co!erage$
4est for procedural lawsD
o if rule really regulates procedure, the 2udicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recogniAed
by substanti!e law ? for 2ustly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of
them
o If it operates as a means of implementing an
eisting right
4est for substanti!e lawsD
o If it ta1es away a !ested right
o If rule creates a right such as right to appeal
Fabian v. Desierto
Ghere to prosecute an appeal or transferring the !enue of
appeal is procedural
EampleD
o Decreeing that appeals from decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrati!e actions be made to
the &ourt of Appeals
o Re.uiring that appeals from decisions of the
5LR& be filed with the &ourt of Appeals
Kenerally, procedural rules are retroacti!e and are applicable
to actions pending and undermined at the time of the passage
of the procedural law, while substanti!e laws are prospecti!e
Effects on pending actions
%tatutes affecting substanti!e rights may not be gi!en
retroacti!e operation so as to go!ern pending proceedings$
/b%ran v. Labes
Ghere court originally obtains and eercises 2urisdiction, a
later statute restricting such 2urisdiction or transferring it to
another tribunal will not affect pending action, unless statute
pro!ides ? unless prohibitory words are used$
Lagardo v. Masagana
Ghere court has no 2urisdiction o!er a certain case but
ne!ertheless decides it, from which appeal is ta1en, a statute
enacted during the pendency of the appeal !esting
2urisdiction upon such trial court o!er the sub2ect matter or
such case may not be gi!en retroacti!e effect so as to
!alidate the 2udgment of the court a $%o, in the absence of a
sa!ing clause$
"ep%b#ic v. Prieto
Ghere a complaint pending in court is defecti!e because it
did not allege sufficient action, it may not be !alidated by a
subse.uent law which affects substanti!e rights and not
merely procedural matters$
Rule against the retroacti!e operation of statutes in general
applies more strongly with respect to substanti!e laws that
affect pending actions or proceedings$
Pualification of rule
A substanti!e law will be construed as applicable to pending
actions if such is the clear intent of the law$
4o promote social 2ustice or in the eercise of police power,
is intended to apply to pending actions
As a rule, a case must be decided in the light of the law as it
eists at the time of the decision of the appellate court, where
the statute changing the law is intended to be retroacti!e and
to apply to pending litigations or is retroacti!e in effect
4his rule is true though it may result in the re!ersal of a
2udgment which as correct at the time it was rendered by the
trial court$ 4he rule is sub2ect to the limitation concerning
constitutional restrictions against impairment of !ested rights
%tatutes affecting !ested rights
A !ested right or interest may be said to mean some right or
interest in property that has become fied or established and
is no longer open to doubt or contro!ersy
Rights are !ested when the right to en2oyment, present or
prospecti!e, has become the property of some particular
person or persons, as a present interest
4he right must be absolute, complete and unconditional,
independent of a contingency
A mere epectancy of future benefit or a contingent interest
in property founded on anticipated continuance of eisting
laws does not constitute a !ested right
Inchoate rights which ha!e not been acted on are not !ested
A statute may not be construed and applied retroacti!ely
under the following circumstancesD
o if it impairs substanti!e right that has become
!estedH
o as disturbing or destroying eisting right embodied
in a 2udgmentH
o creating new substanti!e right to fundamental
cause of action where none eisted before and
ma1ing such right retroacti!eH
o by arbitrarily creating a new right or liability
already etinguished by operation of law
Law creating a new right in fa!or of a class of persons may
not be so applied if the new right collides with or impairs
any !ested right ac.uired before the establishment of the new
right nor, by the terms of which is retroacti!e, be so applied
ifD
o it ad!ersely affects !ested rights
o unsettles matter already done as re.uired by
eisting law
o wor1s in2ustice to those affected thereby
eng%et Conso#idated Mining Co v. Pineda
Ghile a person has no !ested right in any rule of law
entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his
benefit, nor has he a !ested right in the continued eistence
of a statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any
omission to legislate on a particular matter, a subse.uent
statute cannot be so applied retroacti!ely as to impair his
right that accrued under the old law$
%tatutes must be so construed as to sustain its
constitutionality, and prospecti!e operation will be presumed
where a retroacti!e application will produce in!alidity$
Peo v. Pata#in
4he abolition of the death penalty and its subse.uent re3
imposition$ 4hose accused of crimes prior to the re3
imposition of the death penalty ha!e ac.uired !ested rights
under the law abolishing it$
&ourts ha!e thus gi!en statutes strict constriction to pre!ent
their retroacti!e operation in order that the statutes would not
impair or interfere with !ested or eisting rights$ Accused3
appellant Ts rights to be benefited by the abolition of the
death penalty accrued or attached by !irtue of Article :: of
the Re!ised Penal &ode$ 4his benefit cannot be ta1en away
from them$
%tatutes affecting obligations of contract
Any contract entered into must be in accordance with, and
not repugnant to, the applicable law at the time of eecution$
%uch law forms part of, and is read into, the contract e!en
without the parties epressly saying so$
Laws eisting at the time of the eecution of contracts are
the ones applicable to such transactions and not later statutes,
unless the latter pro!ide that they shall ha!e retroacti!e
effect$
Later statutes will not, howe!er, be gi!en retroacti!e effect if
to do so will impair the obligation of contracts, for the
&onstitution prohibits the enactment of a law impairing the
obligations of contracts$
Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes
the intention of the parties necessarily impairs the contract
itself
A statute which authoriAes any de!iation from the terms of
the contract by postponing or accelerating the period of
performance which it prescribes, imposing conditions not
epressed in the contract, or dispensing with those which are
howe!er minute or apparently immaterial in their effect upon
the contract, impairs the obligation, and such statute should
not therefore be applied retroacti!ely$
As between two feasible interpretations of a statute, the court
should adopt that which will a!oid the impairment of the
contract$
If the contract is legal at it inception, it cannot be rendered
illegal by a subse.uent legislation$
A law by the terms of which a transaction or agreement
would be illegal cannot be gi!en retroacti!e effect so as to
nullify such transactions or agreement eecuted before said
law too1 effect$
1.S. Tobacco Corp. v. Lina
4he importation of certain goods without import license
which was legal under the law eisting at the time of
shipment is not rendered illegal by the fact that when the
goods arri!ed there was already another law prohibiting
importation without import license$ 4o rule otherwise in any
of these instances is to impair the obligations of contract$
Illustration of rule
Peop#e v. 5eta
Eisting lawD authoriAing a lawyer to charge not more than
7N of the amount in!ol!ed as attorney(s fees in the
prosecution of certain !eteran(s claim$
/actsD A lawyer entered into a contract for professional
ser!ices on contingent basis and actually rendered ser!ice to
its successful conclusion$ 'efore the claim was collected, a
statute was enacted$
5ew statuteD Prohibiting the collection of attorney(s fees for
ser!ices rendered in prosecuting !eteran(s claims$
IssueD /or collecting his fees pursuant to the contract for
professional ser!ices, the lawyer was prosecuted for
!iolation of the statute$
@eldD In eonerating the lawyer, the court saidD the statute
prohibiting the collection of attorney(s fees cannot be applied
retroacti!ely so as to ad!ersely affect the contract for
professional ser!ices and the fees themsel!es$
4he 7N fee was contingent and did not become absolute and
unconditional until the !eteran(s claim had been collected by
the claimant when the statute was already in force did no
alter the situation$
/or the Bdistinction between !ested and absolute rights is not
helpful and a better !iew to handle the problem is to declare
those statutes attempting to affect rights which the courts
find to be unalterable, in!alid as arbitrary and unreasonable,
thus lac1ing in due process$C
4he 7N fee allowed by the old law is Bnot unreasonable$
%er!ices were rendered thereunder to claimant(s benefits$
4he right to fees accrued upon such rendition$ Only the
payment of the fee was contingent upon the appro!al of the
claimH therefore, the right was contingent$ /or a right to
accrue is one thingH enforcement thereof by actual payment
is another$ 4he subse.uent law enacted after the rendition of
the ser!ices should not as a matter of simple 2ustice affect the
agreement, which was entered into !oluntarily by the parties
as epressly directed in the pre!ious law$ 4o apply the new
law to the case of defendant3appellant s as to depri!e him of
the agreed fee would be arbitrary and unreasonable as
destructi!e of the in!iolability of contracts, and therefore
in!alid as lac1ing in due processH to penaliAe him for
collecting such fees, repugnant to our sense of 2ustice$C
Repealing and amendatory acts
%tatutes which repeal earlier or prior laws operate
prospecti!ely, unless the legislati!e intent to gi!e them
retroacti!e effect clearly appears$
Although a repealing state is intended to be retroacti!e, it
will not be so construed if it will impair !ested rights or the
obligations of contracts, or unsettle matters that had been
legally done under the old law$
Repealing statutes which are penal in nature are generally
applied retroacti!ely if fa!orable to the accused, unless the
contrary appears or the accused is otherwise not entitled to
the benefits of the repealing act$
Ghile an amendment is generally construed as becoming a
part of the original act as if it had always been contained
therein , it may not be gi!en a retroacti!e effect unless it is
so pro!ided epressly or by necessary implication and no
!ested right or obligations of contract are thereby impaired$
4he general rule on the prospecti!e operation of statutes also
applies to amendatory acts
San 6ose v. "e*abi#itation Finance Corp
RA 96* which condoned the interest on pre3war debts from
#anuary *, *+9: to December -*, *+97 amended by RA 8,*
on #une *8, *+7* by !irtually reenacting the old law and
pro!iding that 9if t*e debtor. *o;ever. makes vo#%ntary
payment of t*e entire preA;ar %npaid principa# ob#igation on
or before December I?. ?JKL. t*e interest on s%c* principa#
ob#igation corresponding from 6an%ary ?. ?JM> to day of
payment are #ike;ise condonedC
@eldD a debtor who paid his pre3war obligation together with
the interests on )arch *9, *+7* or before the amendment
was appro!ed into law, is not entitled to a refund of the
interest paid from #anuary *, *+98 to )arch *9, *+7* the
date the debtor paid the obligation$
ReasonD
o Bma1es !oluntary paymentC 0 denotes a present or
future actH thereby not retroacti!ely
o Bunpaid principal obligationC and BcondoneC 0
imply that amendment does not co!er refund of
interests paid after its appro!al$
C/" v. La Tondena
%tatuteD imposes ta on certain business acti!ities is amended
by eliminating the clause pro!iding a ta on some of such
acti!ities, and the amended act is further amended, after the
lapse of length of time, by restoring the clause pre!iously
eliminated, which re.uires that the last amendment should
not be gi!en retroacti!e effect so as to co!er the whole
period$
/mperia# v. C/"
An amendment which imposes a ta on a certain business
which the statute prior to its amendment does not ta, may
not be applied retroacti!ely so as to re.uire payment of the
ta on such business for the period prior to the amendment
%yco v. P*i#ippine +ationa# ank
IssueD can 'uyco compel the P5' to accept his bac1pay
certificate in payment of his indebtedness to the ban1
April :9, *+783 RA ;+, ga!e 'uyco the right to ha!e said
certificate applied in payment of is obligation thus at that
time he offered to pay with his bac1pay certificate$
#une *8, *+78, RA *7,8 was enacted amending the charter
of the P5' and pro!ided that the ban1 shall ha!e no
authority to accept bac1pay certificate in payment of
indebtedness to the ban1$
@eldD 4he &ourt fa!ored 'uyco$ All statutes are construed as
ha!ing prospecti!e operation, unless the purpose of the
legislature is to gi!e them retroacti!e effect$
4his principle also applies to amendments$ RA *7,8 does
not contain any pro!ision regarding its retroacti!e effect$ It
simply states its effecti!ity upon appro!al$ 4he amendment
therefore, has no retroacti!e effect, and the present case
should be go!erned by the law at the time the offer in
.uestion was made
4he rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original
act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had
accrued prior to such amendment$
/ns%#ar ,overnment v. Frank
Ghere a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of
the law then pre!ailing, the amendment of said law will not
affect the terms of said contract$
4he rule applies e!en if one of the contracting parties is the
go!ernment

STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
Procedural laws
4he general law is that the law has no retroacti!e effect$
EceptionsD
o procedural laws
o curati!e laws, which are gi!en retroacti!e
operation
Procedural laws
o ad2ecti!e laws which prescribe rules and forms of
procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress
for their in!asion
o they refer to rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all 1inds can properly administer
in2ustice
o they include rules of pleadings, practice and
e!idence
o Applied to criminal law, they pro!ide or regulate
the steps by which one who commits a crime is to
be punished$
o Remedial statutes or statutes relating to modes of
procedure3 which do not create new or ta1e away
!ested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of the rights already
eisting, do not come within the legal conception
of a retroacti!e law, or the general rule against the
retroacti!e operation of statutes$
o A new statute which deals with procedure only is
presumpti!ely applicable to all actions 0 those
which ha!e accrued or are pending$
o %tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts will
be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage$
4he retroacti!e application of procedural laws is notD
o !iolati!e of any right of a person who may feel that
he is ad!ersely affectedH
o nor constitutionally ob2ectionable$
"ationa#eF no !ested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws$
A person has no !ested right in any particular remedy, and a
litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his
case, whether ci!il or criminal, of any other than the eisting
rules of procedure
A#day v. Cami##on
Pro!isionD 'P *:+3 Bnor record or appeal shall be re.uired to
ta1e an appeal$C (procedural in nature and should be applied
retroacti!ely"
IssueD Ghether an appeal from an ad!erse 2udgment should
be dismissed for failure of appellant to file a record on
appeal within -6 days as re.uired under the old rules$
%uch .uestion is pending resolution at the time the 'P 'lg
too1 effect, became academic upon effecti!ity of said law
because the law no longer re.uires the filing a of a record on
appeal and its retroacti!e application remo!ed the legal
obstacle to gi!ing due course to the appeal$
Castro v. Saga#es
A statute which transfers the 2urisdiction to try certain cases
from a court to a .uasi32udicial tribunal is a remedial statute
that is applicable to claims that accrued before its enactment
but formulated and filed after it too1 effect$
@eldD 4he court that has 2urisdiction o!er a claim at the time
it accrued cannot !alidly try to claim where at the time the
claim is formulated and filed, the 2urisdiction to try it has
been transferred by law to a .uasi32udicial tribunal$
"ationa#eF for e!en actions pending in one court may be
!alidly be ta1en away and transferred to another and no
litigant can ac.uire a !ested right to be heard by one
particular court$
An administrati!e rule D which is interpretati!e of a pre3
eisting statue and not declarati!e of certain rights with
obligations thereunder is gi!en retroacti!e effect as of the
date of the effecti!ity of the statute$
At#as Conso#idated Mining 3 Deve#opment Corp. v. CA
IssueD whether a trial court has been di!ested of 2urisdiction
to hear and decide a pending case in!ol!ing a mining
contro!ersy upon the promulgation of PD *:;* which !ests
upon the 'ureau of )ines Original and eclusi!e 2urisdiction
to hear and decide mining contro!ersies$
@eldD Mes$ PD *:;* is a remedial statute$
It does not create new rights nor ta1e away rights that are
already !ested$ It only operates in furtherance of a remedy or
confirmation of rights already in eistence$
It does not come within the legal pur!iew of a prospecti!e
law$ As such, it can be gi!en retrospecti!e application of
statutes$
'eing procedural in nature, it shall apply to all actions
pending at the time of its enactment ecept only with respect
to those cases which had already attained h character of a
final and eecutor 2udgment$
Gere it not so, the purpose of the Decree, which is to
facilitate the immediate resolution of mining contro!ersies
by granting 2urisdiction to a body or agency more adept to
the technical compleities of mining operations, would be
thwarted and rendered meaningless$
Litigants in a mining contro!ersy cannot be permitted to
choose a forum of con!enience$
#urisdiction is imposed by law and not by any of the parties
to such proceedings$
/urthermore, PD *:;* is a special law and under a well3
accepted principle in stat con, the special law will pre!ail
o!er a stature or law of general application$
S%bido. 6r. v. Sandiganbayan
&ourt ruled that RA ,+,7, in further amending PD *868 as
regards the %andiganbayan(s 2urisdiction, mode of appeal,
and other procedural matters, is clearly a procedural law, i.e.
one which prescribes rules and forms of procedure enforcing
rights or obtaining redress for their in!asion, or those which
refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of
all 1inds can properly administer 2ustice$
4he petitioners suggest that it is li1ewise curati!e or
remedial statute, which cures defects and adds to the means
of enforcing eisting obligations$
As a procedural and curati!e statute, RA ,+,7 may !alidly
be gi!en retroacti!e effect, there being no impairment of
contractual or !ested rights$
Martine' v. Peop#e
%tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undermined at
the time of their passage$
Ghere at the time the action was filed, the Rules of &ourtD Ba
petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be
entertained by the appellate courtC
4he subse.uent amendment thereto deleting the sentence
implies that the appellate court is no longer prohibited from
entertaining petitions to appear as pauper litigants, and may
grant the petition then pending action, so long as its
re.uirements are complied with$
Eceptions to the rule
4he rule does not apply whereD
o the statute itself epressly or by necessary
implication pro!ides that pending actions are
ecepted from it operation, or where to apply it to
pending proceedings would impair !ested rights
o &ourts may deny the retroacti!e application of
procedural laws in the e!ent that to do so would
not be feasible or would wor1 in2ustice$
o 5or may procedural laws be applied retroacti!ely
to pending actions if to do so would in!ol!e
intricate problems of due process or impair the
independence of the courts$
Tayag v. CA
IssueD whether an action for recognition filed by an
illegitimate minor after the death of his alleged parent when
Art :;7 of the &i!il &ode was still in effect and has
remained pending Art *,7 of the /amily &ode too1 effect
can still be prosecuted considering that Art *,7, which is
claimed to be procedural in nature and retroacti!e in
application, does not allow filing of the action after the death
of the alleged parent$
@eldD 4he rule that a statutory change in matters of
procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings,
unless the language of the act ecludes them from its
operation, is not so per!asi!e that it may be used to !alidate
or in!alidate proceedings ta1en before it goes into effect,
since procedure must be go!erned by the law regulating it at
the time the .uestion of procedure arises especially where
!ested rights maybe pre2udiced$
Accordingly, Art *,7 of the /amily &ode finds no proper
application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect
ad!ersely a right of pri!ate respondent and, conse.uentially,
of the minor child she represents, both of which ha!e been
!ested with the filing of the complaint in court$ 4he trial
court is, therefore, correct in applying the pro!isions of Art
:;7 of the &i!il &ode and in holding that pri!ate
respondent(s cause of action has not yet prescribed$C
&urati!e statutes
curati!e remedial statutes are healing acts
they are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means
of enforcing eisting obligations
the rule to curati!e statutes is that if the thing omitted or
failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to
be remo!ed or made harmless, is something which the
legislature might ha!e dispensed with by a pre!ious statute,
it may do so by a subse.uent one
curati!e statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in eisting laws, and curb certain e!ils$ 4hey
are designed and intended, but has failed of epected legal
conse.uence by reason of some statutory disability or
irregularity in their own action$ 4hey ma1e !alid that which,
before the enactment of the statute, was in!alid$
4heir purpose is to gi!e !alidity to acts done that would ha!e
been in!alid under eisting laws, as if eisting laws ha!e
been complied with
Friva#do v. COMELEC
(rested the definition of curati!e statutes"
4olentino
o those which underta1e to cure errors?
irregularities, thereby !alidating 2udicial 2udicial or
administrati!e proceedings, acts of public officers,
or pri!ate deeds or contracts which otherwise
would not produce their intended conse.uences by
reason of some statutory disability or failure to
comply with some technical re.uirement
Agpalo
o curati!e statutes are healing acts curing defects and
adding to the means of enforcing eisting
obligations
o and are intended to supply defects abridge
superfluities in eisting laws? curb certain e!ils
o by their !ery nature, curati!e statutes are
retroacti!e and reach bac1 to the past e!ents to
correct errors or irregularities ? to render !alid ?
effecti!e attempted acts which would be otherwise
ineffecti!e for the purpose the parties intended
&urati!e statutes are forms of retroacti!e legislations which
reach bac1 on past e!ents to correct errors or irregularities ?
to render !alid ? effecti!e attempted acts which would be
otherwise ineffecti!e for the purpose the parties intended$
Erectors. /nc. v. +L"C (hahhha for the petitioner"
%tatuteD EO ***, amended Art :*, of the Labor &ode to
widen the wor1ers, access to the go!ernment for redress of
grie!ances by gi!ing the Regional Directors ? the Labor
Arbiters concurrent 2urisdiction o!er cases in!ol!ing money
claims
IssueD Amendment created a situation where the 2urisdiction
of the RDs and LAs o!erlapped$
RemedyD RA 8,*7further amended Art :*, by delineating
their respecti!e 2urisdictions$ Fnder RA 8,*7, the RD has
eclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er cases in!ol!ing claims, pro!idedD
o the claim is presented by an employer or person
employed in domestic or household ser!ices or
household help under the &ode$
o the claimant no longer being employed does not
see1 reinstatement
o the aggregate money claim of the employee or
househelper doesn(t eceed P7,666$
All other cases are within the eclusi!e 2urisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter$
@eldD EO *** ? RA 8,*7 are therefore curati!e statutes$
A curati!e statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or
to !alidate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public
authorities which would otherwise be !oid for want of
conformity with certain eisting legal re.uirements
Adong v. C*eong Seng ,ee
%tatutes intended to !alidate what otherwise !oid or in!alid
marriages, being curati!e, will be gi!en retroacti!e effect$
Santos v. D%ata
%tatute which pro!ides that a contract shall presumed an
e.uitable mortgage in any of the cases therein enumerated,
and designed primarily to curtail e!ils brought about by
contracts of sale with right of repurchase, is remedial in
nature ? will be applied retroacti!ely to cases arising prior to
the effecti!ity of the statute$

Abad v. P*i# American ,enera# /nc.

Ghere at the time action is filed in court the latter has no
2urisdiction o!er the sub2ect matter but a subse.uent statute
clothes it with 2urisdiction before the matter is decided$
4he statute is in the nature of a curati!e law with retroacti!e
operation to pending proceedings and cures the defect of lac1
of 2urisdiction of the court at the commencement of the
action$
Legarda v. Masaganda
Ghere a curati!e statute is enacted after the court has
rendered 2udgment, which 2udgment is naturally !oid as the
court has at the time no 2urisdiction o!er the sub2ect of the
action, the enactment of the statute conferring 2urisdiction to
the court does not !alidate the !oid 2udgment for the
legislature has no power to ma1e a 2udgment rendered
without 2urisdiction of a !alid 2udgment$
Friva#do v. COMELEC
(an eample considered curati!e ? remedial as well as one
which creates new rights ? new remedies, generally held to
e retroacti!e in nature3 PD ,:7, which liberaliAes the
procedure of repatriation"
@eldD PD ,:7 ? the re3ac.uisition of the /ilipino citiAenship
by administrati!e repatriation pursuant to said decree is
retroacti!e$
De Castro v. Tan
@eldD what has been gi!en retroacti!e effect in Friva#do is
not only the law itself but also Phil$ &itiAenship re3ac.uired
pursuant to said law to the date of application for
repatriation, which meant that his lac1 of /ilipino citiAenship
at the time he registered as a !oter, one of the .ualification is
as a go!ernor, or at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy for go!ernorship, one of the .ualification is as a
go!ernor, was cured by the retroacti!e application of his
repatriation$
"ep%b#ic v. Atencio
&urati!e statuteD one which confirms, refines and !alidate the
sale or transfer of a public land awarded to a grantee, which
a prior law prohibits its sale within a certain period ?
otherwise in!alid transaction under the old law$
M%nicipa#ity of San +arciso. H%e'on v. Mende'
%tatuteD %ec$ 99:(d" of the Local Ko!ernment &ode of *++*,
pro!ides that municipal districts organiAed pursuant to
presidential issuances or eecuti!e orders ? which ha!e their
respecti!e sets of electi!e municipal officials holding at the
time of the effecti!ity of the code shall henceforth be
considered as a regular municipalities
4his is a curati!e statute as it !alidates the creation of
municipalities by EO which had been held to be an in!alid
usurpation of legislati!e power$
Tatad v. ,arcia 6r.
IssueD Ghere there is doubt as to whether go!ernment
agency under the then eisting law, has the authority to enter
intoa negotiated contract for the construction of a
go!ernment pro2ect under the build3lease3and transfer
scheme
@eldD 4he subse.uent enactment of a statute which
recogniAes direct negotiation of contracts under such
arrangement is a curati!e statute$
As all doubts and procedural lapses that might ha!e attended
the negotiated contract ha!e been cured by the subse.uent
statute
Limitations of rule
remedial statutes will not be gi!en retroacti!e effect if to do
so would impair the obligations of contract or disturb !ested
rights
only administrati!e or curati!e features of the statute as will
not ad!ersely affect eisting rights will be gi!en retroacti!e
operation
the eception to the foregoing limitations of the rule is a
remedial or curati!e statute which is enacted as a police
power measure
%tatutes of this type may be gi!en retroacti!e effect e!en
though they impair !ested rights or the obligations of
contract, if the legislati!e intent is to gi!e them retrospecti!e
operation
"ationa#eF 4he constitutional restriction against impairment
against obligations of contract or !ested rights does not
preclude the legislature from enacting statutes in the eercise
of its police power
Police power legislations
as a rule, statutes which are enacted in the eercise of police
power to regulate certain acti!ities, are applicable not only to
those acti!ities or transactions coming into being after their
passage, but also to those already in eistence
"ationa#eF the non3impairment of the obligations of contract
or of !ested rights must yield to the legitimate eercise of
power, by the legislature, to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people
Any right ac.uired under a statute or under a contract is
sub2ect to the condition that it may be impaired by the state
in the legitimate eercise of its police power, since the
reser!ation of the essential attributes of so!ereign power is
deemed read into e!ery statute or contract as a postulate of
the legal order
%tatutes relating to prescription
Keneral ruleD a statute relating to prescription of action,
being procedural in nature, applies to all actions filed after its
effecti!ity$ In other words, such a statute is bothD
o prospecti!e in the sense that it applies to causes
that accrued and will accrue after it too1 effect, and
o retroacti!e in the sense that it applies to causes that
accrued before its passage
@owe!er, a statute of limitations will not be gi!en
retroacti!e operation to causes of action that accrued prior to
its enactment if to do so will remo!e a bar of limitation
which has become complete or disturb eisting claims
without allowing a reasonable time to bring actions thereon
+agrampa v. +agrampa
%tatuteD Art$ ***8 of the &i!il &odeD Bprescription already
running before the effecti!ity of this &ode shall be go!erned
by laws pre!iously in forceH but if since the time this &ode
too1 effect the entire period herein re.uired for prescription
should elapse, the present &ode shall be applicable e!en
though by the former laws a longer period might be
re.uired$C
@eldD 4he pro!ision is retroacti!e since it applied to a cause
that accrued prior to its effecti!ity which when filed has
prescribed under the new &i!il &ode e!en though the period
of prescription prescribed under the old law has not ended at
the time the action is filed in court
4he fact that the legislature has indicated that the statute
relating to prescription should be gi!en retroacti!e effect will
not warrant gi!ing it if it will impair !ested rights
%tatute of limitations prescribing a longer period to file an
action than that specified under the law may not be construed
as ha!ing retroacti!e application if it will re!i!e the cause
that already prescribed under the old statute for it will impair
!ested rights against whom the cause is asserted$
%tatute which shorten the period of prescription ? re.uires
that causes which accrued prior to its effecti!ity be
prosecuted or filed not later than a specific date may not be
construed to apply to eisting causes which pursuant to the
old law under which they accrued, will not prescribe until a
much longer period than that specified in the later enactment
because the right to bring an action is founded on law which
has become !ested before the passage of the new statute of
limitations
Apparently conflicting decisions on prescription
i##ones v. C/"
IssueD whether %ec$ ,A of &ommon wealth Act *99,
amended by RA *++-, to the effect that Bany action to
enforce an cause (i.e. non payment of ;ages or overtime
compensationC under this Act shall be commenced within -
years after such cause of action accrued, otherwise it shall be
fore!er barred$ Provided. *o;ever. that actions already
commenced before the effecti!e day of this Act shall not be
affected by the period herein prescribed$
As statute shortened the period of prescription from 8 to -
yrs$ from the date the cause of action accrued, it was
contended that to gi!e retroacti!e effect would impair !ested
rights since it would operate to preclude the prosecution of
claims that accrued more than - but less than 8 yrs$
@eldD a statute of limitations is procedural in nature and no
!ested right can attach thereto or arise therefrom$
Ghen the legislature pro!ided that Bactions already
commenced before the effecti!ity of this Act shall not be
affected by the period herein prescribed,C it intended to apply
the statute to all eisting actions filed after the effecti!ity of
the law$
'ecause the statute shortened the period within which to
bring an action ? in order to !iolate the constitutional
mandate, claimants are in2uriously affected should ha!e a
reasonable period of * yr$ from time new statute too1 effect
within which to sue on such claims$
Cora#es v. Emp#oyeeDs Compensation Commission
%ame issue on 'illones but &ourt arri!ed at a different
conclusion$
IssueD Ghether a claim for wor1men(s compensation which
accrued under the old Gor1men(s &ompensation Act (G&A"
but filed under after )arch -*, *+,7 is barred by the
pro!ision of the 5ew Labor &ode which repealed the G&A$
G&A re.uires that Bwor1men(s compensation claims
accruing prior to the effecti!ity of this &ode shall be filed
with the appropriate regional offices of the Department of
Labor not later than )arch -*, *+,7, otherwise shall be
barred fore!er$C
@eldD Pro!ision doesn(t apply to wor1men(s compensation
that accrued before Labor &ode too1 effect, e!en if claims
were not filed not later than )arch -*, *+,7$
"ationa#eF prescripti!e period for claims which accrued
under G&A as amended *6 yrs$ which is Ba right found on
statuteC ? hence a !ested right, that cannot be impaired by
the retroacti!e application of the Labor &ode$
&omparison of 'illones and &orales
'illones
Ghile &ourt said that such right
to bring an action accrued under
the old law is not !ested right, it
did not say that the right is one
protected by the due process
clause of the &onstitution$
/or 'O4@ casesD In sol!ing how
to safeguard the right to bring
action whose prescripti!e period
to institute it has been shortened
by lawR
Ka!e the claimants whose rights
ha!e been affected, one year
from the date the law too1 effect
within which to sue their claims$
&orales
&ourt considered the right to
prosecute the action that accrued
under the old law as one founded
on law ? a !ested right$
&ourt construed the statute of
limitations as inapplicable to the
action that accrued before the
law too1 effect$
(It is generally held that the court
has no power to read into the law
something which the law itself
did not pro!ide epressly or
impliedly$ Cora#es case seems to
be on firmer grounds$
Prescription in criminal and ci!il cases
Keneral ruleD laws on prescription of actions apply as well to
crimes committed before the enactment as afterwards$ 4here
is, howe!er, a distinction between a statute of limitations in
criminal actions and that of limitations in ci!il suits, as
regards their construction$
In &I>IL %FI43 statute is enacted by the legislature as an
impartial arbiter, between two contending parties$ In the
construction of such statute, there is no intendment to be
made in fa!or of either party$ 5either grants right to the
otherH there is therefore no grantor against whom no ordinary
presumptions of construction are to be made$
&RI)I5AL &A%E%D the state is the grantor, surrendering by
act of grace its right to prosecute or declare that the offense
is no longer sub2ect of prosecution after the prescripti!e
period$ %uch statutes are not only liberally construed but are
applied retroacti!ely if fa!orable to the accused$
%tatutes relating to appeals
4he right to appeal from an ad!erse 2udgment, other than that
which the &onstitution grants, is statutory and may be
restricted or ta1en away
A statute relating to appeals is remedial or procedural in
nature and applies to pending actions in which no 2udgment
has yet been promulgated at the time the statute too1 effect$
%uch statute, li1e other statutes, may not howe!er be
construed retroacti!ely so as to impair !ested rights$ @ence,
a statute which eliminates the right to appeal and considers
the 2udgment rendered in a case final and unappealable,
destroys the right to appeal a decision rendered after the
statute went into effect, but 5O4 the right to prosecute an
appeal that has been perfected before the passage of the law,
for in the latter case, the right of the appellant to appeal has
become !ested under the old law and may not therefore be
impaired$
%tature shortening the period for ta1ing appeals is to be
gi!en prospecti!e effect and may not be applies to pending
proceedings in which 2udgment has already been rendered at
the time of its enactment ecept if there(s clear legislati!e
intent$
er#iner v. "oberts
Ghere a statute shortened the period for ta1ing appeals form
thirty days to fifteen days from notice of 2udgment, an appeal
ta1en within thirty days but beyond fifteen days from notice
of 2udgment promulgated before the statute too1 effect is
deemed seasonably perfected$
CHAPTER TEN: A&en"&ent, Re.!s!on, Co"!%!at!on an" Re#ea'
AMENDMENT
Power to Amend
4he legislature has the authority to amend, sub2ect to
constitutional re.uirements, any eisting law$
Authority to amend is part of the legislati!e power to enact,
alter and repeal laws$
4he %& in the eercise of its rule3ma1ing power or of its
power to interpret the law, has no authority to amend or
change the law, such authority being the eclusi!e to the
legislature$
@ow amendment effected
Amendment 0 the change or modification, by deletion,
alteration, of a statute which sur!i!es in its amended form$
4he amendment of a statute is effected by the enactment of
an amendatory act modifying or altering some pro!isions of
a statute either epressly or impliedly$
Epress amendment 0 done by pro!iding in the amendatory
act that specific sections or pro!isions of a statute be
amended as recited therein or as common indicated, Bto read
as follows$C
Amendment by implication
E!ery statute should be harmoniAed with other laws on the
same sub2ect, in the absence of a clear inconsistency$
Legislati!e intent to amend a prior law on the same sub2ect is
shown by a statement in the later act that any pro!ision of
law that is inconsistent therewith is modified accordingly$
Implied Amendment3 when a part of a prior statute
embracing the same sub2ect as the later may not be enforced
without nullifying the pertinent pro!ision of the latter in
which e!ent, the prior act is deemed amended or modified to
the etent of repugnancy$
H%impo v. Mendo'a
Ghere a statute which re.uires that the annual realty ta
on lands or buildings be paid on or before the specified
date, sub2ect to penalty of a percentage of the whole
amount of ta in case of delayed payment, is amended
by authoriAing payment of the ta in four e.ual
installments to become due on or before specified dates$
4he penalty pro!ision of the earlier statute is modified
by implication that the penalty for late payment of an
installment under the later law will be collected and
computed only on the installment that became due and
unpaid, and not on the whole amount of annual ta as
pro!ided in the old statute$
Legislati!e intent to change the basis is clear when the
later law allowed payment in four installments$
Peop#e v. Macatanda
A statute punishing an act which is also a crime under
the RP& pro!ides a penalty as prescribed in the said
&ode, such statute is not a special law but an
amendment by implication$
Ghen amendment ta1es effect
*7 days following its publication in the Official KaAette or
newspaper of general circulation, unless a date is specified
therein after such publication$
@ow amendment is construed, generally
%tatute and amendment 0 read as a whole
Amendment act is ordinarily construed as if the original
statute has been repealed and a new independent act in the
amended form had been adopted$
Amended act is regarded as if the statute has been originally
enacted in it amended form$
Read in a connection with other sections as if all had been
enacted in the same statute$
Ghere an amendment lea!es certain portions of an act
unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with the
same meaning and effect they ha!e before the amendment$
Ghere an amendatory act pro!ides that an eisting statute
shall be amended to read as recited in the amendatory act,
such portions of the eisting law as are retained either
literally or substantially
Estrada v. Caseda
Ghere a statute which pro!ides that it shall be in force
for a period of four years after its appro!al, the four
years is to be counted from the date the original statute
was appro!ed and not from the date the amendatory act
was amended$
)eaning of law changed by amendment
An amended act should be gi!en a construction different
from the law prior to its amendment, for its is presumed that
the legislature would not ha!e amended it had not it not
wanted to change its meaning$
Prior to the introduction of the amendment, the statute had a
different meaning which the amendment changed in all the
particulars touching which a material change in the language
of the later act eists$
Deliberate selection of language in the amendatory act
different from that of the original act indicates that the
legislature intended a change in the law or in its meaning$
2ictorias Mi##ing Co. v. SSS
A statutory definition of term containing a general rule
and an eception thereto is amended by eliminating the
eception, the legislati!e intent is clear that the term
should now include the eception within the scope of
the general rule$
Parras v. Land "egistration Commissions
%ection of a statute re.uiring the eact payment of
publication fees in land registration proceedings, ecept
in cases where the !alue of the land does not eceed
P76,666 is amended by deleting the ecepting clause, it
means that the statute as amended now re.uires
payment of the publication fees regardless of the !alue
of the land in!ol!ed
%uppression of the ecepting clause amount to the
withdrawal of the eemption allowed under the original
act$
Amendment Operates Prospecti!ely
An amendment will not be construed as ha!ing a retroacti!e
effect, unless the contrary is pro!ided or the legislati!e intent
to gi!e it a retroacti!e effect is necessarily implied from the
language used and only if no !ested right is impaired$
/mperia# v. Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e
A statute amending a ta law is silent as to whether it
operates retroacti!ely, the amendment will not be
gi!ing retroacti!e effect so as to sub2ect to ta past
transactions not sub2ect to ta under the original act$
Di% v. Co%rt of Appea#s
%tatutes relating to procedure in courts are applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage$
Effect of Amendment on >ested Rights
After a statute is amended, the original act continues to be in
force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to the
amendment or to obligations that were contracted under the
prior act and such rights and obligations will continue to be
go!erned by the law before its amendment$
5ot applied retroacti!ely so as to nullify such rights$
Effect of amendment on 2urisdiction
#urisdiction of a court to try cases is determined by the law
in force at the time the action is instituted$
#urisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally
decided therein$
"i##aro'a v. Arciaga
Absence of a clear legislati!e intent to the contrary, a
subse.uent statute amending a prior act with the effect
of di!esting the court of 2urisdiction may not be
construed to operate but to oust 2urisdiction that has
already attached under the prior law$
/b%raan v. Labes
Ghere a court originally obtains and eercises
2urisdiction pursuant to an eisting law, such
2urisdiction will not be o!erturned and impaired by the
subse.uent amendment of the law, unless epress
prohibitory words or words of similar import are used$
Applies to .uasi32udicial bodies
Erectors. /nc v. +L"C
PD *8+* and *-+* !ested Labor Arbiters with original
and eclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er all cases in!ol!ing
employer3employee relations, including money claims
arising out of any law or contract in!ol!ing /ilipino
wor1ers for o!erseas employment
/actsD An o!erseas wor1er filed a money claim against
his recruiter, and while the case is pending, EO ,+, was
enacted, which !ested POEA with original and
eclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er all cases, including money
claims, arising out of law or contract in!ol!ing /ilipino
wor1ers for o!erseas employment$
IssueD whether the decision of the labor arbiter in fa!or
of the o!erseas wor1er was in!alid
@eldD the court sustained the !alidity of the decision and
ruled that the labor arbiter still had the authority to
decide the cease because EO ,+,b did not di!est the
labor arbiter his authority to hear and decide the case
filed by the o!erseas wor1er prior to its effecti!ity$
#urisdiction o!er the sub2ect matter is determined by the
law in force at the time of the commencement of the
actionH laws should only be applied prospecti!ely unless
the legislati!e intent to gi!e them retroacti!e effect is
epressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used$
Effect of nullity of prior or amendatory act
Ghere a statute which has been amended is in!alid, nothing
in effect has been amended
4he amendatory act, complete by itself, will be considered as
an original or independent act$
,overnment v. Agonci##o
Ghere the amendatory act is declared unconstitutional,
it is as if the amendment did not eist, and the original
statute before the attempted amend remains unaffected
and in force$
REVISION AND CODIFICATION
Kenerally
PurposeD to restate the eisting laws into one statute and
simply complicated pro!isions, and ma1e the laws on the
sub2ect easily found$
&onstruction to harmoniAe different pro!isions
PresumptionD author has maintained a consisted philosophy
or position$
4he different pro!isions of a re!ised statute or code should
be read and construed together$
RuleD a code enacted as a single, comprehensi!e statute, and
is to be considered as such and not as a series of
disconnected articles or pro!isions$
Lic*a%co 3 Co. v. Aposto#
A irreconcilable conflict between parts of a re!ised
statute or a code, that which is best in accord with the
general plan or, in the absence of circumstances upon
which to base a choice, that which is later in physical
position, being the latest epression of legislati!e will,
will pre!ail$
Ghat is omitted is deemed repealed
all laws and pro!isions of the old laws that are omitted in the
re!ised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the
statute or code pro!ides otherwise
ReasonD re!ision or codification is, by its !ery nature and
purpose, intended to be a complete enactment on the sub2ect
and an epression of the whole law thereon, which thereby
indicates intent on the part of the legislature to abrogate
those pro!isions of the old laws that are not reproduced in
the re!ised statute or code$
Possible only if the re!ised statute or code was intended to
co!er the whole sub2ect to is a complete and perfect system
in itself$
RuleD a subse.uent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if
the former re!ises the whole sub2ect matter of the former
statute$
Ghen both intent and scope clearly e!ince the idea of a
repeal, then all parts and pro!ision of the prior act that are
omitted from the re!ised act are deemed repealed$
Mecano v. Commission on A%dit
&laim for reimbursement by a go!ernment official of
medical and hospitaliAation epenses pursuant to
%ection 8++ of the Re!ised Administration &ode of
*+*,, which authoriAes the head of office to case a
reimbursement of payment of medical and hospital
epenses of a go!ernment official in case of sic1ness or
in2ury caused by or connected directly with the
performance of his official duty$
&oA denied the claim on the ground that A& of *+;,
which re!ised the old A&, repealed %ec$ 8++ because it
was omitted the re!ised code$
%& ruled that the legislature did not intend, in enacting
the new &ode, to repeal %ec$ 8++ of the old code$
BAll laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this &ode are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly$C
5ew code did not epressly repeal the old as the new
&ode fails to identify or designate the act to be repealed$
4wo categories of repeal by implication
Pro!isions in the two acts on the same sub2ect matter
that are in irreconcilable conflict$
[ Later act to the etent of the conflict constitutes an
implied repeal of the earlier
If the later act co!ers the whole sub2ect of the earlier
one and is clearly intended as a statute, it will operate to
repeal the earlier law$
4here is no irreconcilable conflict between the two codes on
the matter of sic1ness benefits because the pro!ision has not
been restated in the 5ew &ode$
4he whereas clause is the intent to co!er only those aspects
of go!ernment that pertain to administration, organiAation
and procedure, and understandably because of the many
changes that transpired in the go!ernment structure since the
enactment of the old code$
&hange in phraseology
It is a well settled rule that in the re!ision or codification of
statutes, neither an alteration in phraseology nor the
admission or addition of words in the later statute shall be
held necessarily to alter the construction of the former acts$
Gords which do not materially affect the sense will be
omitted from the statute as incorporated in the re!ise statute
or code, or that some general idea will be epressed in brief
phrases$
If there has been a material change or omission, which
clearly indicates an intent to depart from the pre!ious
construction of the old laws, then such construction as will
effectuate such intent will be adopted$
&ontinuation of eisting laws$
A codification should be construed as the continuation of the
eisting statutes$
4he codifiers did not intend to change the law as it formerly
eisted$
4he rearrangement of sections or parts of a statute, or the
placing of portions of what formerly was a single section in
seprate sections, does not operate to change the operation,
effect of meaning of the statute, unless the changes are of
such nature as to manifest clearly and unmista1ably a
legislati!e intent to change the former laws$
REPEAL
Power to repeal
Power to repeal a law is as complete as the power to enact
one$
4he legislature cannot in and of itself enact irrepealable laws
or limit its future legislati!e acts$
Repeal, generally
RepealD total or partial, epress or implied
4otal repeal 0 re!o1ed completely
Partial repeal 0 lea!es the unaffected portions of the statute
in force$
A particular or specific law, identified by its number of title,
is repealed is an epress repeal$
All other repeals are implied repeals$
/ailure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the
intent was not to repeal any eisting law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy eist in the
terms of the new and old laws, latter situation falls under the
category of an implied repeal$
Repealed only by the enactment of subse.uent laws$
4he change in the condition and circumstances after the
passage of a law which is necessitated the enactment of a
statute to o!ercome the difficulties brought about by such
change does not operate to repeal the prior law, nor ma1e the
later statute so inconsistent with the prior act as to repeal it$
Repeal by implication
Ghere a statute of later date clearly re!eals an intention on
the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the
sub2ect, that intention must be gi!en effect$
4here must be a sufficient re!elation of the legislati!e intent
to repeal$
Intention to repeal must be clear and manifest
Keneral ruleD the latter act is to be construed as a
continuation not a substitute for the first act so far as the two
acts are the same, from the time of the first enactment$
4wo categories of repeals by implication
Ghere pro!isions in the two acts on the same sub2ect
matter are in an irreconcilable conflict and the later act
to the etent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal
of the earlier$
If the later act co!ers the whole sub2ect of the earlier
one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will
operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act$
Irreconcilable inconsistency
Implied repeal brought about by irreconcilable repugnancy
between two laws ta1es place when the two statutes co!er
the same sub2ect matterH they are so clearly inconsistent and
incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled
or harmoniAed and both cannot be gi!en effect, once cannot
be enforced without nullifying the other$
Implied repeal 0 earlier and later statutes should embrace the
same sub2ect and ha!e the same ob2ect$
In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute
must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the
eisting law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand
together$
It is necessary before such repeal is deemed to eist that is be
shown that the statutes or statutory pro!isions deal with the
same sub2ect matter and that the latter be inconsistent with
the former$
the fact that the terms of an earlier and later pro!isions of
law differ is not sufficient to create repugnance as to
constitute the later an implied repeal of the former$
Ag%-etas v. Co%rt of Appea#s
/act that %ec :; of RA ,*88 pertaining to can!assing
by boards of can!assers is silent as to how the board of
can!assers shall prepare the certificate of can!ass and as
to what will be its basis, w=c details are pro!ided in the
second paragraph of %ec:-* of the Omnibus Election
&ode, an earlier statute, Brespecti!e boards of
can!assers shall prepare a certificate of can!ass duly
signed and affied with the imprint of the thumb of the
right hand of each member, supported by a statement of
the !otes and recei!ed by each candidate in each polling
place and on the basis thereof shall proclaim as elected
the candidates who obtained the highest number of
!otes coast in the pro!inces, city, municipality or
barangay, and failure to comply with this re.uirement
shall constitute an election offenseC
Did not impliedly repeal the second paragraph of %ec
:-* of OE& and render the failure to comply with the
re.uirement no longer an election offense$
Irreconcilable inconsistency between to laws embracing the
same sub2ect may also eist when the later law nullifies the
reason or purpose of the earlier act, so that the latter law
loses all meaning and function$
Smit*. e## 3 Co. v. Estate of Maroni##a
A prior law is impliedly repealed by a later act where
the reason for the earlier act is beyond perad!enture
remo!ed$
Repeal by implication 0 based on the cardinal rule that in the
science of 2urisprudence, two inconsistent laws on the same
sub2ect cannot co3eist in one 2urisdiction$
4here cannot be two conflicting law on the same sub2ect$
Either reconciled or later repeals prior law$
Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant (a later law
repeals the prior law on the sub2ect which is repugnant
thereto"
Mecano v. Commission on A%dit
IssueD whether %ec$ 8++ of the Re!ised Administrati!e
&ode has been repealed by the *+;, Administrati!e
&ode$
*+;, Administration &ode pro!ides thatD BAll laws,
decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions
thereof, inconsistent with this code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly
&ourt ruled that the new &ode did not repeal %ec 8++D
[ Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency
ta1es place when two statutes co!er the same
sub2ect matter, they are so clearly inconsistent and
incompatible with each other that they cannot be
reconciled or harmoniAed, and both cannot be
gi!en effect, that one law cannot be enforced
without nullifying the other$
[ 4he new &ode does not co!er not attempt to the
co!er the entire sub2ect matter of the old &ode$
[ 4here are se!eral matters treated in the old &ode
that are not found in the new &ode$ (pro!isions on
notary publicH lea!e law, public bonding law,
military reser!ations, claims for sic1ness benefits
under section 8++ and others"
[ &oA failed to demonstrate that the pro!isions of
the two &odes on the matter of the sub2ect claim
are in an irreconcilable conflict$
[ 4here can no conflict because the pro!ision on
sic1ness benefits of the nature being claimed by
petitioner has not been restated in old &ode$
[ 4he contention is untenable$
[ 4he fact that a later enactment may relate to the
same sub2ect matter as that of an earlier statute is
not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of
the prior act new statute may merely be cumulati!e
or a continuation of the old one$
[ %econd &ategoryD possible only if the re!ised
statute or code was intended to co!er the whole
sub2ect to be a complete and perfect system in
itself$
RuleD a subse.uent is deemed to repeal a prior
law if the former re!ises the whole sub2ect
matter of the former statute$
[ Ghen both intent and scope clearly e!ince the idea
of a repeal, then all parts and pro!isions of the
prior act that are omitted from the re!ised act are
deemed repealed$
[ 'efore there can be an implied repeal under this
category, it must be the clear intent of the
legislature that later act be the substitute of the
prior act$
[ Opinion ,- s$*++* of the %ecretary of #usticeD what
appears clear is the intent to co!er only those
aspects of go!ernment that pertain to
administration, organiAation and procedure,
understandably because of the many changes that
transpired in the go!ernment structure since the
enactment of RA&$
[ Repeals of statutes by implication are not fa!ored$
Presumption is against the inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to 1now
the eisting laws on the sub2ect and not to ha!e
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes$
Ty v. Trampe
IssueD whether PD +:* on real estate taes has been
repealed impliedly by RA ,*86, otherwise 1now as the
Local Ko!ernment &ode of *++* on the same sub2ect$
@eldD that there has been no implied repeal
&ourtD it is clear that the two law are not coetensi!e
and mutually inclusi!e in their scope and purpose$
[ RA ,*86 co!ers almost all go!ernmental functions
delegated to local go!ernment units all o!er the
country$
[ PD +:* embraces only )etropolitan )anila Area
and is limited to the administration of financial
ser!ices therein$
[ %ec$+ PD+:* re.uires that the schedule of !alues
of real properties in the )etropolitan )anila Area
shall be prepared 2ointly by the city assessors states
that the schedules shall be prepared by the
pro!incial, city and municipal assessors of the
municipalities within )etropolitan )anila Area
for the different classes of real property situated in
their respecti!e local go!ernment units for
enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian
concerned$
!agad v. ,o'oADado#e
%ec$*+ RA 88,6, the Ombudsman Act grants
disciplinary authority to the Ombudsman to discipline
electi!e and appointi!e officials, ecept those
impeachable officers, has been repealed, RA ,*86, the
Local Ko!ernment &ode, insofar as local electi!e
officials in the !arious officials therein named$
@eldD both laws should be gi!en effect because there is
nothing in the Local Ko!ernment &ode to indicate that
it has repealed, whether epressly or impliedly$
[ 4he two statutes on the specific matter in .uestion
are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as
to compel us to uphold one and stri1e down the
other$
[ 4wo laws must be incompatible, and a clear
finding thereof must surface, before the inference
of implied repeal may be drawn$
[ /nterpretare et concordare #eges #egib%s. est
optim%s interpretandi mod%s. i. e (e!ery statute
must be so construed and harmoniAed with other
statutes as to form uniform system of
2urisprudence$
[ the legislature should be presumed to ha!e 1nown
the eisting laws on the sub2ect and not to ha!e
enacted conflicting statutes$
/nitia. 6r v. CoA
implied repeal will not be decreed unless there is an
irreconcilable inconsistency between two pro!isions or
laws is RA ,-79 in relation to PD *7+,$
[ RA ,-79 0 in part of the Postmaster Keneral,
sub2ect to the appro!al of the 'oard of Directors of
the Philippines Postal &orporation, shall ha!e the
power to Bdetermine the staffing pattern and the
number of personnel, define their duties and
responsibilities, and fi their salaries and
emoluments in accordance with the appro!ed
compensation structure of the &orporation$C
[ %ec$8 PD *7+, 0 B eemptions notwithstanding,
agencies shall report to the President, through the
'udget &ommission, on their position
classification and compensation plans, policies,
rates and other related details following such
specifications as may be prescribed by the
President$C
IssueD whether %ec8 of PD*7+,, the two laws being
reconcilable$
Ghile the Philippine Postal &orporation is allowed to
fi its own personnel compensation structure through its
board of directors, the latter is re.uired to follow certain
standards in formulating said compensation system, and
the role of D') is merely to ensure that the action
ta1en by the board of directors complies the
re.uirements of the law$
Ceb% /nstit%te of Tec*no#ogy v. Op#e
%ec$ -(a" PD 97* and %ec$ 9: of 'P :-: illustrates
repeal by implication$
[ %ec -(a" pro!idesD Bno increase in tuition or other
school fees or charges shall be appro!ed unless
86N of the proceed is allocated to increase in
salaries or wages of the member of the faculty$C
[ 'P :-:D Beach pri!ate school shall determine its
rate of tuition and other school fees or charges$
4he rates or charges adopted by schools pursuant
to this pro!ision shall be collectible, and their
application or use authoriAed, sub2ect to rules and
regulations promulgated by the )inistry of
Education, &ulture and %ports$C
IssueD whether %ec$ 9: of 'P :-: impliedly repealed
%ec$ -(a" of PD 97*
@eldD there was implied repeal because there are
irreconcilable differences between the two laws$
Implied repeal by re!ision or codification
Re!ised statute is in effect a legislati!e declaration that
whate!er is embraced in the new statute shall pre!ail and
whate!er is ecluded there from shall be discarded$
)ust be intended to co!er the whole sub2ect to be a complete
and perfect system in itself in order that the prior statutes or
part thereof which are not repeated in the new statute will be
deemed impliedly repealed$
Peop#e v. en%ya
Ghere a statute is re!ised or a series of legislati!e acts
on the same sub2ect are re!ised or consolidated into one,
co!ering the entire field of sub2ect matter, all parts and
pro!isions of the former act or acts
[ that are omitted from the re!ised act are deemed
repealed$
6oa$%in v. +avarro
Ghere a new statute is intended to furnish the eclusi!e
rule on a certain sub2ect, it repeals by implication the
old law on the same sub2ect,
Ghere a new statute co!ers the whole sub2ect matter of
an old law and adds new pro!isions and ma1es changes,
and where such law, whether it be in the form of an
amendment or otherwise, is e!idently intended to be a
re!ision of the old act, it repeals the old act by
implication$
Peop#e v. A#m%ete
Re!ision of the Agricultural 4enancy Act by the
Agricultural Land Reform &ode$
%ec -+ of A4& (RA **++" Bit shall be unlawful for
either the tenant or landlord without mutual consent, to
reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time pre!ious
to the date set, for its threshing$C
An action for !iolation of this penal pro!ision is
pending in court, the Agricultural Land Reform &ode
superseded the Agricultural 4enancy Act, abolished
share tenancy, was not reproduced in the Agricultural
Land Reform &ode$
4he effect of such non3reenactment is a repeal of
%ection -+$
It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that an act which
purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain,
operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was
contained in the old act and not included in the act as
re!ised$
A substitute statute, and e!idently intended as the
substitute for it, operates to repeal the former statute$
T%ng C*in !%i v. "odrig%e'
IssueD whether %ec$*; Rule 9* of the pre3*66, Rules of
&ourt, which pro!ided the appeal in habeas corpus
cases to be ta1en within 9; hours from notice of
2udgment, has been replaced by the *++, Rules of &i!il
Procedure, which pro!ides in %ec$ - Rule 9* thereof,
that appeal from 2udgment or final order shall be ta1en
within *7 days from receipt thereof, in !iew of the fact
that the %ec$ *; was repealed, in accordance with the
well3settled rule of statutory construction that
pro!isions of an old law that were not reproduced in
the re!ision thereof co!ering the same sub2ect are
deemed repealed and discarded
@eldD %& in this case to abrogate those pro!isions of the
old laws that are not reproduced in the re!ised statute or
&ode$
Repeal by reenactment
Ghere a statute is a reenactment of the whole sub2ect in
substitution of the pre!ious laws on the matter, the latter
disappears entirely and what is omitted in the reenacted law
is deemed repealed$
Parras v. Land "egistration Commission
Ghere a law amends a specific section of a prior act by
pro!iding that the same is amended so as to read as
follows, which then .uotes the amended pro!ision, what
is not included in the reenactment is deemed repealed$
4he new statute is a substitute for the original section
and all matters in the section that are omitted in the
amendment are considered repealed$
Other forms of implied repeal
4he most powerful implication of repeal is that which arises
when the later of two laws is epressed in the form of a
uni!ersal negati!e$
4here is a clear distinction between affirmati!e and negati!e
statutes in regard to their repealing effects upon prior
legislation$
Affirmati!e statute does not impliedly repeal the prior
law unless an intention to effect a repeal is manifest,
A negati!e statute repeals all conflicting pro!isions
unless the contrary intention is disclosed$
Legislati!e intent to repeal is also shown where it enacts
something in general term and afterwards it passes another
on the same sub2ect, which though epressed in affirmati!e
language introduces special conditions or restrictions
4he subse.uent statute will usually be considered as
repealing by implication the former regarding the matter
co!ered by the subse.uent act$
4he epress repeal of a pro!ision of law from which an
eecuti!e official deri!es his authority to enforce another
pro!ision of the same law operates to repeal by implication
the latter and to depri!e the official of the authority to
enforce it$
4he enactment of a statute on a sub2ect, whose purpose or
ob2ect is diametrically opposed to that of an earlier law on
the same sub2ect which thereby depri!es it of its reason for
being, operates to repeal by implication the prior law, e!en
though the pro!isions of both laws are not inconsistent$
BAll laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly,C construed$
5ature of repealing clause
5ot epress repealing clauses because it fails to identify
or designate the act or acts that are intended to be
repealed$
A clause, which predicates the intended repeal upon the
condition that a substantial conflict must be found on
eisting and prior acts of the same sub2ect matter$
4he presumption against implied repeal and the rule on
strict construction regarding implied repeal apply e
proprio !igore$
Legislature is presumed to 1now the eisting law so that
if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is
intended, the proper step is to so epress it$
2a#de' v. T%ason
Bsuch a clause repeals nothing that would not be e.ually
repealed without it$
Either with or without it, the real .uestion to be
determined is whether the new statute is in fundamental
and irreconcilable conflict with the prior statute on the
sub2ect$
%ignificance of the repealing clauseD the presence of such
general repealing clause in a later statute clearly indicates the
legislati!e intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the
sub2ect matter whether or not the prior law is a special law$
A later general law will ordinarily not repeal a prior
special law on the same sub2ect, as the latter is generally
regarded as an eception to the former$
Gith such clause contained in the subse.uent general
law, the prior special law will be deemed repealed, as
the clause is a clear legislati!e intent to bring about that
result$
Repeal by implication not fa!ored
Presumption is against inconsistency or repugnancy and,
accordingly, against implied repeal
Legislature is presumed to 1now the eisting laws on the
sub2ect and not to ha!e enacted inconsistent or conflicting
statutes$
A construction which in effect will repeal a statute altogether
should, if possible, be re2ected$
In case of doubt as to whether a later statute has impliedly
repealed a prior law on the same sub2ect, the doubt should be
resol!ed against implied repeal$
1S v. Pa#acio
Repeals by implication are not fa!ored, and will not be
decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so
intended$
As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation
and with full 1nowledge of all eisting ones on the
sub2ect
It is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute
it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any
former law relating to some matter
Fnless the repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable, but also clear and con!incing, and
flowing necessarily form the language used, the later act
fully embraces the sub2ect matter of the earlier, or
unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond
perad!enture remo!ed$
E!ery effort must be used to ma1e all acts stand and if,
by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled,
the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier$
+APOCO" v. Angas
Illustrates the application of the principle that repeal or
amendment by implication is not fa!ored$
IssueD whether &entral 'an1 &ircular 9*8 has impliedly
repealed or amended Art ::6+ of the &i!il &ode
@eldD in answering the issue in the negati!e, the court
ruled that repeals or e!en amendments by implication
are not fa!ored if two laws can be fairly reconciled$ 4he
statutes contemplate different situations and apply to
different transactions in!ol!ing loan or forbearance of
money, goods or credits, as well as 2udgments relating
to such load or forbearance of money, goods, or credits,
the &entral 'an1 &ircular applies$
In cases re.uiring the payment of indemnities as
damages, in connection with any delay in the
performance of an obligation other than those in!ol!ing
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, Art
::6+ of the && applies
&ourts are slow to hold that one statute has repealed another
by implication and they will not ma1e such ad2udication if
they can refrain from doing so, or if they can arri!e at
another result by any construction which is 2ust and
reasonable$
&ourts will not enlarge the meaning of one act in order to
decide that is repeals another by implication, nor will they
adopt an interpretation leading to an ad2udication of repeal
by implication unless it is ine!itable and a clear and eplicit
reason thereof can be adduced$
As between two laws, one passed later pre!ails
Leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant (later statute
repeals prior ones which are not repugnant thereto$"
Applies e!en if the later act is made to ta1e effect ahead
of the earlier law$
As between two acts, the one passed later and going into
effect earlier will pre!ail o!er one passed earlier and going
into effect later$
Mani#a Trading 3 S%pp#y Co. v. P*i#. Labor 1nion
an act passed April *8
th
and in force April :*
st
was held
to pre!ail o!er an act passed April +
th
and in effect #uly
9
th
of the same year$
And an act going into effect immediately has been held
to pre!ail o!er an act passed before but going into effect
later$
Ghene!er two statutes of different dates and of contrary
tenor are of e.ual theoretical application to a particular case,
the statute of later date must pre!ail, being a later epression
of legislati!e will$
P*i#ippine +ationa# ank v. Cr%'
As between the order of preference of credit set forth in
Articles ::9* to ::97 of the && and that of Article **6
of the Labor &ode, gi!ing first preference to unpaid
wages and other monetary claims of labor, the former
must yield to the latter, being the law of the later
enactment$
4he later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later
legislati!e will$
PresumptionD the lawma1ers 1new the older law and
intended to change it$
In enacting the older law, the legislators could not ha!e
1nown the newer one and could not ha!e intended to
change what they did not 1now$
&&D laws are repealed only by subse.uent ones, not the
other way around$
David v. COMELEC
%ec$ * of RA 88,+ pro!ides that the term of barangay
officials who were to be elected on the second )onday
of )ay *++9 is 7 years
4he later act RA ,*86 %ec 9- (c" states that the term of
office of barangay officials who were to be elected also
on the :
nd
)onday of )ay *++9 is - years$
4here being a clear inconsistency between the two laws,
the later law fiing the term barangay officials at -
years shall pre!ail$
Keneral law does not repeal special law, generally
A general law on a sub2ect does not operate to repeal a prior
special law on the same sub2ect, unless it clearly appears that
the legislature has intended by the later general act to modify
or repeal the earlier special law$
Presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of two
laws, one is special and the other general and this applies
e!en though the terms of the general act are broad enough to
include the matter co!ered by the special statute$
,enera#ia specia#ib%s non derogant & a general law does not
nullify a specific or special law
4he legislature considers and ma1es pro!ision for all the
circumstances of the particular case$
Reason why a special law pre!ails o!er a general lawD the
legislature considers and ma1es pro!ision for all the
circumstances of the particular case$
Keneral and special laws are read and construed together,
and that repugnancy between them is reconciled by
constituting the special law as an eception to the general
law$
Keneral law yields to the special law in the specific law in
the specific and particular sub2ect embraced in the latter$
Applies irrespecti!e of the date of passage of the special law$
Application of rule
Sto. Domingo v. De #os Ange#es
4he court in!ariably ruled that the special law is not
impliedly repealed and constitutes an eception to the
general law whene!er the legislature failed to indicate
in unmista1able terms its intent to repeal or modify the
prior special act$
+APOCO" v. Arca
IssueD whether %ec$ : of &om$ Act *:6 creating the
5APO&OR, a go!ernment3owned corporation, and
empowering it Bto sell electric power and to fi the rates
and pro!ide for the collection of the charges for any
ser!ices renderedD Pro!ided, the rates of charges shall
not be sub2ect to re!ision by the Public %er!ice Act has
been repealed by RA :8,, amending the Public %er!ice
Act and granting the Public %er!ice &ommission the
2urisdiction to fi the rate of charges of public utilities
owned or operated by the go!ernment or go!ernment3
owned corporations$
@eldD a special law, li1e &om$ Act *:6, pro!iding for a
particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a
subse.uent statute, general in its terms, li1e RA :8,,,
although the general statute are broad enough to include
the cases embraced in the special law, in the absence of
a clear intent to repeal$
4here appears no such legislati!e intent to repeal or
abrogate the pro!isions of the earlier law$
4he eplanatory note to @ouse 'ill 96-6 the later
became RA :8,,, it was eplicit that the 2urisdiction
conferred upon the Republic %er!ice &ommission o!er
the public utilities operated by go!ernment3owned or
controlled corporations is to be confined to the fiing of
rates of such public ser!ices
4he harnessing and then distribution and sale of electric
power to the consuming public, the contingency
intended to be met by the legal pro!ision under
consideration would not eist$
4he authority of the Public %er!ice &ommission under
RA :8,, o!er the fiing of rate of charges of public
utilities owned or operated by KO&&(s can only be
eercised where the charter of the go!ernment
corporation concerned does not contain any pro!ision to
the contrary$
P*i#ippine "ai#;ay Co. v. Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e
PR& was granted a legislati!e franchise to operate a
railway line pursuant to Act 5o$ *9+, %ec$ *- which
readD BIn consideration of the premises and of the
operation of this concession or franchise, there shall be
paid by the grantee to the Philippine Ko!ernment,
annually, an amount e.ual to one3half of one per
centum of the gross earnings of the grantee $C
%ec :7+ of Internal Re!enue &ode, as amended by RA
-+, pro!ides that Bthere shall be collected in respect to
all eisting and future franchises, upon the gross
earnings or receipts from the business co!ered by the
law granting a franchise ta of 7N of such taes,
charges, and percentages as are specified in the special
charters of the corporation upon whom suc franchises
are conferred, whiche!er is higher, unless the pro!isions
hereof preclude the imposition of a higher ta $
IssueD whether %ection :7+ of the 4a &ode has
repealed %ection *- of Act *9+,, stand upon a different
footing from general laws$
Once granted, a charter becomes a pri!ate contract and
cannot be altered nor amended ecept by consent of all
concerned, unless the right to alter or repeal is epressly
reser!ed$
ReasonD the legislature, in passing a special charter, has
its attention directed to the special facts and
circumstances in the particular case in granting a special
charter, for it will not be considered that the legislature,
by adopting a general law containing the pro!isions
repugnant to the pro!isions of the charter, and without
any mention of its intention to amend or modify the
charter, intended to amend, repeal or modify the special
act$
4he purpose of respecting the ta rates incorporated in
the charters, as shown by the clause$
LLDA v. CA
IssueD which agency of the go!ernment, LLDA or the
towns and municipalities compromising the region
should eercise 2urisdiction o!er the Laguna La1e and
its en!irons insofar as the issuance of permits for
fishery pri!ileges is concerned$
4he LLDA statute specifically pro!ides that the LLDA
shall ha!e eclusi!e 2urisdiction to issue permits for the
use of all surface water for any pro2ects in or affecting
the said region, including the operation of fish pens$
RA ,*86 the LK& of *++* grants the municipalities the
eclusi!e authority to grant fishery pri!ileges in
municipal waters$
@eldD two laws should be harmoniAed, and that the LLA
statute, being a special law, must be ta1en as an
eception to RA ,*86 a general law,
,arcia v. Pasc%a#
&ler1s of courts municipal courts shall be appointed by
the municipal 2udge at the epense of the municipality
and where a later law was enacted pro!iding that
employees whose salaries are paid out of the municipal
funds shall be appointed by the municipal mayor, the
later law cannot be said to ha!e repealed the prior law
as to !est in the municipal mayor the power to appoint
municipal clec1 of court, as the subse.uent law should
be construed to comprehend only subordinate officials
of the municipality and not those of the 2udiciary$
,ordon v. CA
A city charter gi!ing real estate owner a period of one
year within which to redeem a property sold by the city
for nonpayment of realty ta from the date of such
auction sale, being a special law, pre!ails o!er a general
law granting landowners a period of two years to ma1e
the redemption$
Sto. Domingo v. De#os Ange#es
4he &i!il %er!ice law on the procedure for the
suspension or remo!al of ci!il ser!ice employees does
not apply with respect to the suspension or remo!al of
members of the local police force$
Ghen special or general law repeals the other$
4here is always a partial repeal where the later act is a
special law$
2a#era v. T%ason
A subse.uent general law on a sub2ect has repealed or
amended a prior special act on the same sub2ect by
implication is a .uestion of legislati!e intent$
Intent to repeal may be shown in the act itself the
eplanatory note to the bill before its passage into law,
the discussions on the floor of the legislature,
Intent to repeal the earlier special law where the later general
act pro!ides that all laws or parts thereof which are
inconsistent therewith are repealed or modified accordingly
If the intention to repeal the special law is clear, then the rule
that the special law will be considered as an eception to the
general law does not applyH what applies is the rule that the
special law is deemed impliedly repealed$
A general law cannot be construed to ha!e repealed a special
law by mere implication admits of eception$
City ,overnment of San Pab#o v. "eyes
%ec$ * PD 77* pro!ides that any pro!ision of law or
local ordinance to the contrary, the franchise ta
payable by all grantees of franchise to generate,
distribute, and sell electric current for light, heat, and
power shall be :7 of their gross receipts$
%ec$ *-, of the LK& statesD 5otwithstanding any
eemption granted by any law or other special law, the
pro!ince may impose a ta on business en2oying a
franchise at a rate not eceeding 76N of *N of the gross
annul receipts$
@eldD the phrase is all3encompassing and clear that the
legislature intended to withdraw all ta eemptions
en2oyed by franchise holders and this intent is made
more manifest by %ec$ *+- of the &ode, when it
pro!ides that unless otherwise pro!ided in this code ta
eemptions or incenti!es granted to or presently
en2oyed by all persons, ecept local water districts,
cooperati!es, and non3stoc1 and non3profit hospitals
and educational institutions, are withdrawn upon the
effecti!ity of the &ode$
,aer#an v. Cat%big
IssueD whether %ec$ *: of RA *,6 as amended, the &ity
&harter of Dagupan &ity, which fied the minimum age
.ualification for members of the city council at :- years
has been repealed by %ec$8 of RA ::7+
@eldD there was an implied repeal of %ec$ *: of the
charter of Dagupan &ity because the legislati!e intent to
repeal the charter pro!ision is clear from the fact that
Dagupan &ity, unli1e some cities, is not one of those
cities epressly ecluded by the law from its operation
and from the circumstance that it pro!ides that all acts
or parts thereof which are inconsistent therewith are
repealed$
4he last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and
eplicit in its words so as to show that it was intended
to co!er the whole sub2ect and therefore to displace the
prior statute$
agatsing v. "amire'
A charter of a city, which is a special law, may be
impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute, and
where a statute is controlling, it must be read into the
charter, notwithstanding any of its particular pro!isions$
A subse.uent general law similarly applicable to all
cities pre!ails o!er any conflicting charter pro!ision, for
the reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with
the general laws and public policy of the state$
%tatute remains supreme in all matters not purely local$
A charter must yield to the constitution and general
laws of the state$
P*i#ippine /nternationa# Trading Corp v. CoA
&oA contended that the PI4& charter had been
impliedly repealed by the %ec$ *8 RA 8,7;
@eldD that there was implied repeal, the legislati!e
intent to do so being manifest$
PI4& should now be considered as co!ered by laws
prescribing a compensation and position classification
system in the go!ernment including RA 8,7;$
Effects of repeal, generally
Appeal of a statute renders it inoperati!e as of the date the
repealing act ta1es effect$
Repeal is by no means e.ui!alent to a declaration that the
repealed statute is in!alid from the date of its enactment$
4he repeal of a law does not undo the conse.uences of the
operation of the statute while in force, unless such result is
directed by epress language or by necessary implication,
ecept as it may affect rights which become !ested when the
repealed act was in force$
"amos v. M%nicipa#ity of Daet
'P --, 1nown as the LK& was repealed by RA ,*86
1nown as LK& of *++*, which too1 effect on #anuary *,
*++:$
%ec$ 7 (d" of the new code pro!ides that rights and
obligations eisting on the date of the effecti!ity of the
new code and arising out of contracts or any other
source of prestation in!ol!ing a local go!ernment unit
shall be go!erned by the original terms and conditions
of said contracts or the law in force at the time such
rights were !ested$
On 2urisdiction, generally
5either the repeal nor the eplanation of the law depri!es the
court or administrati!e tribunal of the authority to act on the
pending action and to finally decide it$
Keneral ruleD where a court or tribunal has already ac.uired
and is eercising 2urisdiction o!er a contro!ersy, its
2urisdiction to proceed to final determination of the cause is
not affected by the new legislation repealing the statute
which originally conferred 2urisidiction$
RuleD once the court ac.uires 2urisdiction o!er a contro!ersy,
it shall continue to eercise such 2urisdiction until the final
determination of the case and it is not affected by subse.uent
legislation !esting 2urisdiction o!er such proceedings in
another tribunal admits of eceptions$
Repeal or epiration of a statute under which a court or
tribunal originally ac.uired 2urisdiction to try and decide a
case, does not ma1e its decision subse.uently rendered
thereon null and !oid for want of authority, unless otherwise
pro!ided$
In the absence of a legislati!e intent to the contrary, the
epiration or repeal of a statute does not render legal what,
under the old law, is an illegal transaction, so as to depri!e
the court or tribunal the court or tribunal of the authority to
act on a case in!ol!ing such illegal transaction$
Ghere a law declares certain importations to be illegal,
sub2ect to forfeiture by the &ommissioner of &ustoms
pursuant to what the latter initiated forfeiture proceedings,
the epiration of the law during the pendency of the
proceedings does not di!est the &ommissioner of &ustoms of
the 2urisdiction to continue to resol!e the case, nor does it
ha!e the effect of ma1ing the illegal importation legal or of
setting aside the decision of the commissioner on the matter$
On 2urisdiction to try criminal case
Once a 2urisdiction to try a criminal case is ac.uired, that
2urisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally
determined$
A subse.uent statute amending or repealing a prior act under
which the court ac.uired 2urisdiction o!er the case with the
effect of remo!ing the courts( 2urisdiction may not operate to
oust 2urisdiction that has already attached$
On actions, pending or otherwise
RuleD repeal of a statute defeats all actions and proceedings,
including those, which are still pending, which arose out of
or are based on said statute$
4he court must conform its decision to the law then eisting
and may, therefore, re!erse a 2udgment which was correct
when pronounced in the subordinate tribunal, if it appears
that pending appeal a statute which was necessary to support
the 2udgment of the lower court has been withdrawn by an
absolute repeal$
On !ested rights
repeal of a statute does not destroy or impair rights that
accrued and became !ested under the statute before its
repeal$
4he statute should not be construed so as to affect the rights
which ha!e !ested under the old law then in force, or as
re.uiring the abatement of actions instituted for the
enforcement of such rights$
Rights accrued and !ested while a statute is in force
ordinarily sur!i!e its repeal$
4he constitution forbids the state from impairing, by
enactment or repeal of a law, !ested rights or the obligations
of contract, ecept in the legitimate eercise of police power$
%yco v. P+
Ghere a statute gi!es holders of bac1pay certificates the
right to use said certificates to pay their obligations to
go!ernment financial institutions, the repeal of the law
disallowing such payment will not depri!e holders
thereof whose rights become !ested under the old law
of the right to use the certificates to pay their
obligations to such financial institutions$
1n Pak Le%ng v. +igorra
A statute gi!es an appellant the right to appeal from an
ad!erse decision, the repeal of such statute after an
appellant has already perfected his appeal will not
destroy his right to prosecute the appeal not depri!e the
appellate court of the authority to decide the appealed
case$
"ep%b#ic v. Migrino
IssueD whether prosecution for uneplained wealth
under RA *-,+ has already prescribed$
@eldD Bin his pleadings, pri!ate respondent contends
that he may no longer be prosecuted because of the
prescription$
It must be pointed out that %ec$ : RA *-,+ should be
deemed amended or repealed by Art$ EI, %ec$ *7 of the
*+;, &onstitution$
On contracts
Ghere a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of
the law then obtaining, the repeal or amendment of said law
will not affect the terms of the contract nor impair the right
of the parties thereunder$
Effect of repeal of ta laws
Rule fa!oring a prospecti!e construction of statutes is
applicable to statutes which repeal ta laws$
%uch statute is not made retroacti!e, a ta assessed before the
repeal is collectible afterwards according to the law in force
when the assessment or le!y was made$
Effect of repeal and reenactment
%imultaneous repeal and reenactment of a statute does not
affect the rights and liabilities which ha!e accrued under the
original statute, since the reenactment neutraliAes the repeal
and continues the law in force without interruption$
4he repeal of a penal law, under which a person is charged
with !iolation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment
penaliAing the same act done by him under the old law, will
not preclude the accused(s prosecution, nor depri!e the court
of the 2urisdiction to try and con!ict him$
Peop#e v. A#m%ete
Ghere the reenactment of the repealed law is not
simultaneous such that the continuity of the obligation
and the sanction for its !iolation form the repealed law
to the reenacted law is bro1en, the repeal carries with it
the depri!ation of the court of its authority to try,
con!ict, and sentence the person charged with !iolation
of the old law to its repeal$
Effect of repeal of penal laws
Ghere the repeal is absolute, so that the crime no longer
eists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law
cannot be had and the action should be dismissed$
Ghere the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the
act which was penaliAed by a prior law ceases to be criminal
under the new law, the pre!ious offense is obliterated$
4hat a total repeal depri!es the courts of 2urisdiction to try,
con!ict, and sentence, persons, charged with !iolations of the
old law prior to the repeal$
Repeal of a statute which pro!ides an indispensable element
in the commission of a crime as defined in the RP& li1ewise
operates to depri!e the court of the authority to decide the
case, rule rests on the same principle as that concerning the
effect of a repeal of a penal law without .ualification$
ReasonD the repeal of a penal law without dis.ualification is
a legislati!e act of rendering legal what is pre!iously decreed
as illegal, so that the person who committed it is as if he
ne!er committed an offence
EceptionD
where the repealing act reenacts the statute and
penaliAes the same act pre!iously penaliAed under the
repealed law, the act committed before reenactment
continues to be a crime, and pending cases are not
thereby affected$
Ghere the repealing act contains a sa!ing clause
pro!iding that pending actions shall not be affected, the
latter will continue to be prosecuted in accordance with
the old law$
Distinction as to effect of repeal and epiration of law
In absolute repeal, the crime is obliterated and the stigma of
con!iction of an accused for !iolation of the penal law before
its repeal is erased$
Effect of repeal of municipal charter
4he repeal of a charter destroys all offices under it, and puts
an end to the functions of the incumbents$
4he con!ersation of a municipality into a city by the passage
of a charter or a statute to that effect has the effect of
abolishing all municipal offices then eisting under the old
municipality offices then the eisting under the old
municipality, sa!e those ecepted in the charter itself$
Repeal or nullity of repealing law, effect of
Ghen a law which epressly repeals a prior law is itself
repealed, the law first repealed shall not thereby re!i!ed
unless epressly so pro!ided
Ghere a repealing statute is declared unconstitutional, it will
ha!e no effect of repealing the former statute, the former or
old statute continues to remain in force$
CHAPTER ELEVEN: Const!tut!ona' Construt!on
&onstitution defined
fundamental law which sets up a form of go!ernment and
defines and delimits the powers thereof and those of its
officers, reser!ing to the people themsel!es plenary
so!ereignty
written charter enacted and adopted by the people by which a
go!ernment for them is established
permanent in nature thus it does not only apply to eisting
conditions but also to future needs
basically it is the fundamental laws for the go!ernance and
administration of a nation
absolute and unalterable ecept by amendments
all other laws are epected to conform to it
Origin and history of the Philippine &onstitutions
*+-7 &onstitution
Peop#e v. Linsangan 0 eplained as to how this &onstitution came
aboutD
4ydings3)cduffie Law3 allowed the /ilipinos to adopt a
constitutions but sub2ect to the conditions prescribed in the
Act$
o Re.uired - stepsD
drafting and appro!al of the constitution
must be authoriAed
it must be certified by the President of
the F%
it must be ratified by the people of the
Philippines at a plebiscite
*+,- &onstitution
o adopted in response to popular clamor to meat the
problems of the country
o )arch *8, *+8,D &ongress passed Resolution 5o$:,
which was amended by Resolution 5o$ 9, calling a
con!ention to propose amendments to the
&onstitution
*+;, &onstitution
o after ED%A Re!olution
o also 1nown as the *+;, &harter
Primary purpose of constitutional construction
primary tas1 of constitutional construction is to ascertain the
intent or purpose of the framers of the constitution as
epressed in its language
purpose of our &onstitutionD to protect and enhance the
people(s interests
&onstitution construed as enduring for ages
&onstitution is not merely for a few years but it also needs to
endure through a long lapse of ages
WHY/ 'ecause it go!erns the life of the people not only at
the time of its framing but far into the indefinite future
it must be adaptable to !arious crisis of human affairs but it
must also be solid permanent and substantial
Its stability protects the rights, liberty, and property of the
people (rich or poor"
It must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand
for a great length of time to be progressi!e and not static
Ghat it is 5O4D
o It should 5O4 change with emergencies or
conditions
o It should 5O4 be infleible
o It should 5O4 be interpreted narrowly
Gords employed should not be construed to yield fied and
rigid answers because its meaning is applied to meet new or
changed conditions as they arise
&ourts should construe the constitution so that it would be
consistent with reason, 2ustice and the public interest
@ow language of constitution construed
primary source in order to ascertain the constitution is the
LA5KFAKE itself
4he words that are used are broad because it aims to co!er
all contingencies
Gords must be understood in their common or ordinary
meaning ecept when technical terms are employee
o G@MR 'ecause the fundamental law if essentially
a document of the people
Do not construe the constitution in such a way that its
meaning would change
Ghat if the words used ha!e both general and restricted
meaningR
RuleD general pre!ails o!er the restricted unless the contrary
is indicated$
Ordi##o v. COMELEC
IssueD whether the sole pro!ince of Ifugao can be !alidly
constituted in the &ordillera Autonomous Region under
%ection *7, Article *6
@eldD 5o$ the 1eywords pro!inces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas connotes that a region consists of more
than one unit$ In its ordinary sense region means two or more
pro!inces, thus Ifugao cannot be constituted the &ordillera
Autonomous Region
Marcos v. C*ief of Staff
IssuesD
o the meaning or scope of the words any court in
%ection *, Article *, of the *+-7 &onstitution
o Gho are included under the terms inferior court in
section : Article ,
@eldD %ection *, of Article *, prohibits any members of the
&ongress from appearing as counsel in any criminal case
$ 4his is not limited to ci!il but also to a military court or
court martial since the latter is also a court of law and 2ustice
as is any ci!il tribunal$
Inferior courts are meant to be construed in its restricted
sense and accordingly do not include court martials or
military courts for they are agencies of eecuti!e character
and do not belong to the 2udicial branch unli1e the term
inferior court is$
Another RFLED words used in one part are to recei!e the
same interpretation when used in other parts unless the
contrary is applied=specified$
Lo'ada v COMELEC
the term B'atasang Pambansa,C which means the regular
national assembly, found in many sections of the *+,-
&onstitution refers to the regular, not to the interim 'atasang
Pambansa
words which ha!e ac.uired a technical meaning before they
are used in the constitution must be ta1en in that sense when
such words as thus used are construed
Aids to construction, generally
apart from its language courts may refer to the following in
construing the constitutionD
o history
o proceedings of the con!ention
o prior laws and 2udicial decisions
o contemporaneous constructions
o conse.uences of alternati!e interpret3tations
these aids are called etraneous aids because though their
effect is not in precise rules their influence describes the
essentials of the process (remember preambleR ganito lang
din yun"
Realities eisting at time of adoptionH ob2ect to be accomplished
@istory basically helps in ma1ing one understand as to how
and why certain laws were incorporated into the constitution$
In construing constitutional law, the history must be ta1en
into consideration because there are certain considerations
rooted in the historical bac1ground of the en!ironment at the
time of its adoption (Legaspi !$ )inister of /inance"
A$%ino v. COMELEC
IssueD what does the term Bincumbent president in sec$ - of
Article *, of the *+,- &onstitution refer toR
@eldD @istory shows that at that time the term of President
)arcos was to terminate on December -6, *+,-, the new
constitution was appro!ed on 5o!ember -6, *+,: still during
his incumbency and as being the only incumbent president at
the time of the appro!al it 2ust means that the term
incumbent president refers to )r$ )arcos
#ustice Antonio concurring opinion statesD the only rational
way to ascertain the meaning and intent is to read its
language in connection with the 1nown conditions of affairs
out of which the occasion for its adoption had arisen and
then construe it$
/n re erm%de'
incumbent president referred to in section 7 of Article *; of
the *+;, constitution refers to incumbent President A.uino
and >P Doy Laurel
Civi# Liberties 1nion v. E)ec%tive Secretary
issueD whether EO :;9, which authoriAes a cabinet member,
undersecretary and assistant secretary to hold not more than
two positions in the go!ernment and KO&&s and to recei!e
corresponding compensation therefore, !iolates %ec$ *-, Art$
, of the *+;, &onstitution
court eamined the history of the times, the conditions under
which the constitutional pro!isions was framed and its ob2ect
heldD before the adoption of the constitutional pro!ision,
Bthere was a proliferation of newly3created agencies,
instrumentalities and KO&&s created by PDs and other
modes of presidential issuances where &abinet members,
their deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as
members of the board with the corresponding salaries,
emoluments, per diems, allowances and other prere.uisites
of office
since the e!ident purpose of the framers of the *+;,
&onstitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, >ice President, members of the &abinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
go!ernment offices or employment in the Ko!ernment
during their tenure, the eception to this prohibition must be
read with e.ual se!erity
on its face, the language of %ec *- Art$ , is prohibitory so
that it must be understood as intended to be a positi!e and
une.ui!ocal negation of the pri!ilege of holding multiple
go!ernment offices or employment
Proceedings of the con!ention
RFLED If the language of the constitutional pro!ision is plain
it is not necessary to resort to etrinsic aids
EE&EP4IO5D when the intent of the framer doesn(t appear
in the tet or it has more than one construction$
Intent of a constitutional con!ention member doesn(t
necessarily mean it is also the people(s intent
4he proceedings of the con!ention are usually in.uired into
because it sheds light into what the framers of the
constitution had in mind at that time$ (refers to the debates,
interpretations and opinions concerning particular
pro!isions"
L%' Farms v. Secretary of DA"
Ghether the term BagricultureC as used in the &onstitution
embraces raising li!estoc1, poultry and swine
4ranscript of the deliberations of the &onstitutional
&ommission of *+;8 on the meaning of BagricultureC clearly
shows that it was ne!er the intention of the framers of the
&onstitution to include li!estoc1 and poultry industry in the
co!erage of the constitutionally3mandated agrarian reform
program of the Ko!ernment
Agricultural lands do not include commercial industrial, and
residential lands
@eldD it is e!ident in the foregoing discussion that %ec : of
RA 887, which includes Bpri!ate agricultural lands de!oted
to commercial li!estoc1, poultry and swine raisingC in the
definition of Bcommercial farmsC is I5>ALID, to the etent
of the aforecited agro3industrial acti!ities are made to be
co!ered by the agrarian reform program of the %tate
Monte-o v. COMELEC
Ghether the &O)ELE& has the power to transfer, by
resolution, one or more municipalities from one
congressional district to another district within a pro!ince,
pursuant to %ec : of the Ordinance appended to the *+;,
&onstitution
4he &ourt relied on the proceedings of the &onstitutional
&ommission on Bminor ad2ustmentsC which refers only to
the instance where a municipality which has been forgotten
(ano ba TtoL1inalimutan ang municipality" is included in the
enumeration of the composition of the congressional district
and not to the transfer of one municipality from one district
to another, which has been considered a substanti!e or ma2or
ad2ustment
&ontemporaneous construction and writings
may be used to resol!e but not to create ambiguities
In construing statutes, contemporaneous construction are
entitled to great weight howe!er when it comes to the
constitution it has no weight and will not be allowed to
change in any way its meaning$
Gritings of delegates 0 has persuasi!e force but it depends
on two thingsD
o if opinions are based on fact 1nown to them and
not established it is immaterial
o on legal hermeneutics, their conclusions may not
be a shade better in the eyes of the law$
Pre!ious laws and 2udicial rulings
framers of the constitution is presumed to be aware of
pre!ailing 2udicial doctrines concerning the sub2ect of
constitutional pro!isions$ 4@F% when courts adopt
principles different from prior decisions it is presumed that
they did so to o!errule said principle
&hanges in phraseology
'efore a constitution is ratified it undergoes a lot of re!isions
and changes in phraseology (e$ deletion of words" and these
changes may be in.uired into to ascertain the intent or
purpose of the pro!ision as appro!ed
@OGE>ER mere deletion, as negati!e guides, cannot
pre!ail o!er the positi!e pro!isions nor is it determinati!e of
any conclusion$
&ertain pro!isions in our constitution (from *+-7 to the
present" are mere reenactments of prior constitutions thus
these changes may indicate an intent to modify or change the
meaning of the old pro!isions$
,a#man v. Pamaran
the phraseC no person shall be compelled in a criminal
case be a witness against himselfC is changed in such a way
the words criminal cases had been deleted simply means that
it is not limited to criminal cases only$
&onse.uences of alternati!e constructions
conse.uences that may follow from alternati!e construction
of doubtful constitutional pro!isions constitute an important
factor to consider in construing them$
if a pro!ision has more than one interpretation, that
construction which would lead to absurd, impossible or
mischie!ous conse.uences must be re2ected$
e$g$ directory and mandatory interpretationD Art$ ; %ec *7(*"
re.uires 2udges to render decision within specific periods
from date of submission for decision of cases (construed as
directory because if otherwise it will cause greater in2ury to
the public"
&onstitution construed as a whole
pro!ision should not be construed separately from the rest it
should be interpreted as a whole and be harmoniAed with
conflicting pro!isions so as to gi!e them all force and effect$
sections in the constitution with a particular sub2ect should
be interpreted together to effectuate the whole purpose of the
&onstitution$
To#entino v. Secretary of Finance
>A4 Law, passage of bill
in!ol!ed are article 8 %ec$ :9 and RA ,,*8 (>A4 Law"
contention of the petitionerD RA ,,*8 did not originate
eclusi!ely from the @OR as re.uired by the &onstitution
because it is the result of the consolidation of two distinct
bills$
&ourtD re2ected such interpretation$ (guys alam niyo na
naman to, that it should originate from @OR but it could still
be modified by the %enate"
)andatory or directory
RFLED constitutional pro!isions are to be construed as
mandatory unless a different intention is manifested$
GhyR 'ecause in a constitution, the so!ereign itself spea1s
and is laying down rules which for the time being at least are
to control ali1e the go!ernment and the go!erned$
failure of the legislature to enact the necessary re.uired by
the constitution does not ma1e the legislature is illegal$
Prospecti!e or retroacti!e
RFLED constitution operates prospecti!ely only unless the
words employed are clear that it applies retroacti!ely
Magtoto v. Mang%era
%ec :6 of Article I> of the *+,- &onstitutionD Bno person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself$ Any
confession obtained in !iolation of this section shall be
inadmissible in e!idenceC
&ourt held that this specific portion of the mandate should be
gi!en a prospecti!e application
Co v. E#ectric Trib%na#
%ec$ *(-" Art$ 9 of the *+;, &onstitution states that those
born before #anuary *,, *+,- of /ilipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citiAenship upon reaching the age of ma2orityC are
citiAens of the Philippines has a retroacti!e effect as shown
to the clear intent of the framers through the language used
Applicability of rules of statutory construction
Doctrines used in Sarmiento v. Mison is a good eample in
which the %& applied a number of rules of statutory
construction$
IssueD whether or not the appointment of a &ommissioner of
&ustoms is sub2ect to confirmation by the &ommission on
appointments
Kenerally, constitutional pro!isions are self3eecuting
RFLED constitutional pro!isions are self eecuting ecept
when pro!isions themsel!es epressly re.uire legislations to
implement them$
%EL/ EEE&F4I5K PRO>I%IO5%3 pro!isions which are
complete by themsel!es and becomes operati!e without the
aid of supplementary legislation$
#ust because legislation may supplement and add or prescribe
a penalty does not render such pro!ision ineffecti!e in the
absence of such legislation$
In case of DoubtR &onstrue such pro!ision as self eecuting
rather than non3self eecuting$
Mani#a Prince !ote# v. ,S/S
IssueD w=n the sale at public bidding of the ma2ority
ownership of the )anila @otel a .ualified entity can match
the winning bid of a foreigner
@eldD resolution depends on whether the issue is self
eecuting or not$ 4he court ruled that the .ualified /ilipino
entity must be gi!en preference by granting it the option to
match the winning bid because the pro!ision is self
eecuting$
3 4he End 3
B4hat in all things, KOD may be glorifiedC