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Hekman
Review by: Susan Mendus
Feminist Review, No. 58, International Voices (Spring, 1998), pp. 114-115
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1395686 .
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I
Both the above books mark a view from a
privileged
class centreto the
*
periphery
- and should be read as such.
a.
LA Parita Mukta
o
z
;
Moral
Voices,
Moral Selves: Carol
Gilligan
and
Feminist Moral
Theory
Susan J. Hekman
Polity
Press:
Oxford,
1995
I SBN0 7456 1502 3 ?11.95 Pbk I SBN0 7456 1421 3 ?39.50 Hbk
Thecentral thesisof Susan Hekman'sbook is that we should
'stop trying
to
get
it
right'
in moral
theory.
She takes this to be the most
important
insight
of Carol
Gilligan's
work and shealsotakesit to bethe
insight
which
containsmost
promise
forthefuture
development
of feminist moral
theory
in
general. Thus, despite
their
deep disagreements,
both liberalsand com-
munitarians,
universalistsand
relativists,
justice
theoristsand care theo-
rists are
all,
in the
end,
obsessed
by
the desireto
get
it
right
and this
obsession
serves,
in Hekman's
view,
to obscurethe most
promising
lines
of
development
availableto moral
theory
in the late twentieth
century.
Hekman
begins
with a
summary
and
interpretation
of the work of Carol
Gilligan.Distancing
herself from those who construe
Gilligan
as
merely
advocating
the
superiority
of careover
justice('there
is
virtually
no textual
evidenceforthisclaim in
Gilligan's
book'
p. 3),
she
arguesthat,
in
fact,
Gilli-
gan's
work
suggests
a radical
re-conceptualization
of what moral
theory
is
or could become: 'her
theory
createsits own data and
generates
evidence
that is relativeto
it;
no
theory-independent proof
or
disproof
is
possible'
(p. 19). So,
farfrom
denying
the truth of
Kohlberg's
research and
insisting
on thetruth of herown
conclusions, Gilligan is,
in
fact, offering
a Kuhnian
interpretation
of herown
findings.
Even thedebatebetween
justice
and care
sparked by Gilligan's
own
early
work is now revealed as sterileand mis-
guided,
sinceit
supposes(unhelpfully)
that thereis a
way
of
'getting
it
right'.
I ndeed,
Hekman
goes
further
and, anticipating
that the
charge
of relativism
will be levied
against
this radical
interpretation,
she
argues
that the
universalist-relativist debateis itself a
symptom
of the dominant modeof
moral
theory,
a modewhich
Gilligan's
work can
help
to discredit: 'in Gilli-
gan'swork, questions
of relativism do not arisebecauseit restson an under-
standing
of
subjectivity
that rendersthose
questions
irrelevant'
(p. 40).
What,then,
is thissenseof
subjectivity,
and howcan it serveto renderrela-
4 tivism irrelevant? Here Hekman is
eclectic,
and takes her cue from
I
Both the above books mark a view from a
privileged
class centreto the
*
periphery
- and should be read as such.
a.
LA Parita Mukta
o
z
;
Moral
Voices,
Moral Selves: Carol
Gilligan
and
Feminist Moral
Theory
Susan J. Hekman
Polity
Press:
Oxford,
1995
I SBN0 7456 1502 3 ?11.95 Pbk I SBN0 7456 1421 3 ?39.50 Hbk
Thecentral thesisof Susan Hekman'sbook is that we should
'stop trying
to
get
it
right'
in moral
theory.
She takes this to be the most
important
insight
of Carol
Gilligan's
work and shealsotakesit to bethe
insight
which
containsmost
promise
forthefuture
development
of feminist moral
theory
in
general. Thus, despite
their
deep disagreements,
both liberalsand com-
munitarians,
universalistsand
relativists,
justice
theoristsand care theo-
rists are
all,
in the
end,
obsessed
by
the desireto
get
it
right
and this
obsession
serves,
in Hekman's
view,
to obscurethe most
promising
lines
of
development
availableto moral
theory
in the late twentieth
century.
Hekman
begins
with a
summary
and
interpretation
of the work of Carol
Gilligan.Distancing
herself from those who construe
Gilligan
as
merely
advocating
the
superiority
of careover
justice('there
is
virtually
no textual
evidenceforthisclaim in
Gilligan's
book'
p. 3),
she
arguesthat,
in
fact,
Gilli-
gan's
work
suggests
a radical
re-conceptualization
of what moral
theory
is
or could become: 'her
theory
createsits own data and
generates
evidence
that is relativeto
it;
no
theory-independent proof
or
disproof
is
possible'
(p. 19). So,
farfrom
denying
the truth of
Kohlberg's
research and
insisting
on thetruth of herown
conclusions, Gilligan is,
in
fact, offering
a Kuhnian
interpretation
of herown
findings.
Even thedebatebetween
justice
and care
sparked by Gilligan's
own
early
work is now revealed as sterileand mis-
guided,
sinceit
supposes(unhelpfully)
that thereis a
way
of
'getting
it
right'.
I ndeed,
Hekman
goes
further
and, anticipating
that the
charge
of relativism
will be levied
against
this radical
interpretation,
she
argues
that the
universalist-relativist debateis itself a
symptom
of the dominant modeof
moral
theory,
a modewhich
Gilligan's
work can
help
to discredit: 'in Gilli-
gan'swork, questions
of relativism do not arisebecauseit restson an under-
standing
of
subjectivity
that rendersthose
questions
irrelevant'
(p. 40).
What,then,
is thissenseof
subjectivity,
and howcan it serveto renderrela-
4 tivism irrelevant? Here Hekman is
eclectic,
and takes her cue from 11 11
This content downloaded from 143.117.157.129 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 05:40:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
postmodernism,
from feminist
theory
and from theoristsof raceand eth-
'
nicity. By drawing
on theirdifferent
insights
she
hopes
to construct and
defend a 'discrusive
subject'
which is 'neither
relational, feminist, post-
modern,
nora
product
of theoriesof raceand
ethnicity, yet
which borrows
from each of thesediscourses'
(p. 109). This, however,
is a
dangerous
strat-
egy for,
asHekman
acknowledges,
it
might
be
thought
that a concreteiden-
tity
is
necessary
in orderto
ground identitypolitics
and
that,
without such
an
identity,
we run the risk of
philosophical
nihilism and
political
im-
potence. Ultimately, however,
she deniesthat this is
so, urging
ratherthat
the
acknowledgement
of different voices and different sourcesof
oppres-
sion can be
politically empowering.
I t can makeus awareof the need to
distinguish
between different sourcesof
oppression
and it can also enable
us to resist the
homogenizing
tendenciesof
identity politics.
Hekman'sbook is a tourde
force
of feminist
theory. Although
itstitle
sug-
gests
that this will be
simply
another book about
Gilligan
and the
justice-caredebate,
it
is,
in
fact,very
much morethan that.
Gilligan's
work
is
given
a
sophisticated reading
which then servesas a
jumping-off point
for a discussion which
rangeswidely
(and
deeply)
acrossthe intellectual
background
of modern moral
theory,
the liberal-communitarian
debate,
postmodernism,
theoriesof raceand
ethnicity,
and much morebesides. I n
all these areas Hekman
displays
extensive
knowledge
and
deep philo-
sophical insight. My only (ratherironic) complaint
is
that,
in-the
end,
Hekman
gets
it
wrong. Despite
the
repeated protestations
that
Gilligan's
framework renders
objections
to relativism
redundant,
it was neverclear
to me
exactly
howit does this. To
put
the
point
at its most
brutal,
femin-
ism in
general
and feminist
political theory
in
particularbegin
from the
contention that women havebeen and continueto be
oppressed.
I t asserts
that thereis an
important
sensein which the
great
dead moral
philoso-
phers
of the western tradition
'got
it
wrong'
and are
continuing
to
get
it
wrong.
Of
course,
thefact that it is
possible
to
get
it
wrong
doesnot entail
that thereis a
singleway
of
getting
it
right,
but it does
suggest
that if the
multiplicity
of different voices is not to
disintegrate
into a mere
cacoph-
ony
of dissonant
noises, somethingother,
and
more,
than the merecel-
ebration of differencewill be
necessary.
Hekman
clearly
thinksthat shehas
provided this,
but
despitemy sympathy
with her
project,
and
my
admira-
tion for its
execution,
I remain
unpersuaded.
I still
yearn
to
get
it
right,
and see this as an
indispensable
concomitant of Hekman'sexcellent cri-
tique
of thosein the dominant tradition who haveso
demonstrably got
it
wrong.
Susan Mendus
115
This content downloaded from 143.117.157.129 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 05:40:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions