Panofsky, Iconography, and Semiotics

Author(s): Christine Hasenmueller

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 36, No. 3, Critical Interpretation
(Spring, 1978), pp. 289-301
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/430439 .
Accessed: 29/09/2013 19:21
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Wiley and The American Society for Aesthetics are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 19:21:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CHRISTINE HASENMUELLER
Panofsky, Iconography,
and Semiotics
THERE HAS BEEN little active
experimenta-
tion with
extend ing
the method s and con-
cepts
of structuralism and
semiology
to the
subject
matter of art
history.
Reluctance has
'stemmed from several factors:
implicit
ac-
ceptance
of
history
as a mod e of
explana-
tion,
the
tend ency among
art historians to
d istinguish investigations
of form from in-
terpretations
of content or
meaning,
and
the fact that art
history-
almost
by
d efini-
tion
-
accord s a
special place
in civilization
to
art,
especially
to Western art of the classi-
cal trad ition. The classical bias built into
the
terminology
and method s of the d isci-
pline
is
d iametrically opposed
to the struc-
turalist
assumption
of the essential
equiva-
lence of
"primitive"
and "civilized " think-
ing. Finally,
art
history
in the United States
has been characterized
by
a
strong
value on
concrete d ata and conclusions and a corre-
spond ing suspicion
of
attempts
to d ed uce
intangibles.1
Nevertheless,
in recent
years,
there have
been some
interesting attempts
to d iscern
parallels
between structuralism and art his-
tory.2
The work of Erwin
Panofsky, espe-
cially,
has been consid ered "semiotic" in
character.
Argan recently
found it so
clearly
so that he labelled
Panofsky
the "Saussure"
of art
history.3
Two works have attracted
most of the
inquiry
into
Panofsky's
work as
an
incipient
"semiotic": Gothic Architecture
and Scholasticism and
"Iconography
and
Iconology:
An Introd uction to the
Stud y
of Renaissance Art."
4
The latter
essay
is
a d etailed
attempt
to d iscern strata of mean-
CIRISTINE HASENMUELLER is associate
professor
in the
d epartment of fine
arts at Vand erbilt
University.
ing,
elucid ate
interpretive processes
that
constitute various levels of
und erstand ing,
and
present
a
taxonomy
to
specify
relation-
ships
between
meaning
in art and a
"history
of
meaning."
For a
generation
it has stood
as the
primary
statement of the
"iconologi-
cal method " in art
history,
and as the stand -
ard d efinition of the
concepts iconography
and
iconology.
Within art
history,
Panof-
sky's
work has been
appreciated chiefly
at
face value as an authoritative d efinition of
concepts
and method s. There has been little
systematic attempt
to assess the
implications
of his contributions to
implicit
notions of
"meaning,"
and to
"history"
as a mod e of
ord ering
information about art.
Most
attempts
to
analyze Panofsky's
work
from the
perspective
of semiotics
proceed
from a wish to establish a found ation in
extant art historical stud ies of
meaning
for
a semiotic of art.5
They inevitably empha-
size the
correspond ences
between
Panofsky's
thinking
and the
conceptual vocabulary
of
semiology,
and minimize
-
or
ignore
-
the
fact that his
concepts
are
highly integrated
with the art historical
theory
of which
they
are a
part.
Panofsky's concepts iconography
and ico-
nology certainly
subsume brilliant d efini-
tions that
clarify practice,
and bear
striking
resemblances to some id eas
typical
of semi-
ology.
But to assess whether
Panofsky's sys-
tem
is, as
Argan suggested ,
a "semiotic of
art" we must
begin
with an examination of
the
logic
of the
essay
itself and of its
place
in a
largely implicit
and still obscure
bod y
of art historical
theory. Comparison
of the
resulting
red efinitions with recent
explica-
tions of the notions of
"sign"
and
"symbol"
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 19:21:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HASENMUELLER
will reveal fund amental d istinctions be-
tween
Panofsky's
method and
semiology.
The
comparison
has broad
implications
for
both field s. The
very proposal
of a "semi-
otic of art" has a "cathartic" effect- to use
Barthes's term
-
for
historians,
forcing
re-
assessment of the role of
history
in
explain-
ing
art.6
Conversely,
the test of
ad apting
semiological concepts
and method s to
paint-
ing
und erlines some limitations on semiol-
ogy d eriving
from
long
association of its
conceptual language
with
linguistic
and lit-
erary
material. It
poses,
from another
angle,
Sperber's question
as to whether the notion
of
sign
is
ad equate
to all forms of
meaning.7
Panofsky d istinguished
three levels of
meaning
in Renaissance art.8 He
presented
them
through
an
analogy
with three
phrases
of the
interpretation
of an instance of com-
municative behavior
-
a man
tipping
his
hat.
Primary
or natural
meaning,
the first
phase,
he subd ivid ed into
recognition
of
factual meaning,
and
empathetic appre-
hension of
expressional meaning.
Id entifi-
cation of visual d ata with
objects
known
from
experience
was
factual,
while sensitiv-
ity
to
psychological
nuances of these facts
consisted in
und erstand ing
of
expressional
meaning.
Recognition
of the act as a
greeting pre-
supposed
a shared cultural
context,
and a
second
phase
of
interpretation
that Panof-
sky
labelled
second ary
or conventional.
While he consid ered both these strata of
meaning
to be
phenomenal,
he
recognized
a d ifference between the two at the level
of
interpretive processes.
Where
primary
meaning
was
sensible,
Panofsky
d efined sec-
ond ary meaning
as
intelligible.9 Clearly
the
intelligent interpretation
of conventional
meaning
based on shared knowled ge of the
systematic
association of the
gesture
with its
message implies
a notion of
meaning
that is
in a
general way
"semiotic."
Although
Pa-
nofsky
d id not use the
concept "sign,"
he
set
up,
at this
point
in his
argument,
a
thoroughly parallel
association of a
"signify-
ing" gesture
and a
"signified " message
of
greeting.
The third level,
which
Panofsky
called
intrinsic
meaning,
is somewhat d ifferent,
and its
relationship
to semiotic notions of
meaning
are nowhere near so obvious.
Panofsky
set it
apart
from the first two
levels of
meaning, by stating
that intrinsic
meaning
was "essential" where natural and
conventional
meaning
were
"phenomenal."
A social act like
tipping
a hat
conveyed ,
in
Panofsky's
view,
fragments
of informa-
tion about the character and
philosophical
orientation of the actor.
Though
these atti-
tud es were not reconstructable on this evi-
d ence,
they
were nevertheless ind icated
"symptomatically."
Three
analogous
levels of
meaning
in
art become the
objects
of
pre-iconographic,
iconographic,
and
iconological interpreta-
tion.
Pre-iconograpiLic d escription
was the
recognition
of
"pure
forms." In the hat ex-
ample, primary meaning
meant d irect asso-
ciation of a new visual
experience
with
memory;
with art there was an ad d itional
step
in
recognition
of the
motif
in art as a
representation
of the world of
experience.10
In
effect, then,
pre-iconographic d escription
consisted in
acceptance
of form in art as a
carrier of
primary
or natural
meaning.
Iconography
was the intellectual inter-
pretation
of
second ary
or conventional sub-
ject
matter
analogous
to the second level of
interpretation
of social acts.
Recognition
that form
may
refer to "themes and con-
cepts"
as well as visual
experiences presup-
posed
both a correct
pre-iconographic
d e-
scription
and
knowled ge
of the
literary
sources.
Panofsky's
d efinition of
image
as
a conventional association of
motif
and
literary
content is
easily
seen as
parallel
to
the
concept "sign."
An
image
was d efined
by
its
explicit d uality:
it constituted the
point
of intersection between reference in
art to nature and reference to literature. It
is
very
d ifficult to d ecid e what kind of lin-
guistic signa
are most
closely paralleled by
this
relationship.
Not
only
are there
many
alternative taxonomies for the
linguistic
phenomena,
but even within one taxon-
omy,
the fit of
categories
to the
"signifier/
signified " relationship Panofsky
d escribed is
ambiguous.
Ed mund Leach,
for
instance,
labels as
signs
those
signa
in which
signifier/
signified
are related as the
part
to the
whole."
Certainly
to the extent that natu-
ralistic
representations
for
Panofsky
"mean"
290
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 19:21:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Panofsky, Iconography,
and Semiotics
by becoming
an extension
-
part
- of the
naturalistic
phenomena represented , they
approximate
this
d esignation.
However, as-
sociation of
signifier/signified by planned
resemblance,
as in a
map
or
portrait,
Leach
assigned
to
icons,
which in turn are a va-
riety
of
symbol
-
and as
such,
contrasted to
signs. Panofsky's concepts
d o not ad mit
of a consistent and
unambiguous
"transla-
tion" into Leach's or other
specific
semiotic
terminology.
Significantly, Panofsky
includ ed
only
cer-
tain
aspects
of the
capacity
of elements in
art to refer to external id eas in his d efini-
tion of
image.
It follows that
only
certain
operations
of the
interpretation
of these
references consist in
iconography. Interpre-
tation of
images
is concerned with conscious
shaping
of references to "themes and con-
cepts"-
further d efined as "stories and alle-
gories." Iconography
is, then,
the
analysis
of
systematic
associations of motif and liter-
ary
content.
Panofsky
d efined the third
phase,
iconol-
ogy,
as:
"ascertaining
those
und erlying prin-
ciples
which reveal the basic attitud e of a
nation,
a
period ,
a
class,
a
religious
or
philo-
sophical persuasion- unconsciously quali-
fied
by
one
personality
and cond ensed in
one work."
12
It involved a level of mean-
ing analogous
to the "essential"
meaning
of
social acts. These
"und erlying principles"
cannot be reconstructed on the basis of
their
partial
manifestation in a
single
work,
but nevertheless are
presumably analyzable.
The
principles
that are the ultimate ob-
ject
of
iconology played
a role in
every step
of the creative
process
-
even such factors as
choice of med ia.
They presumably
affected
representation
of nature and influenced ico-
nography.
The d ata are thus not d iscrete.
Panofsky
d rew fund amental
d istinctions,
however,
between the method s of
iconology
and the method s
appropriate
to more con-
crete levels of
meaning.
He viewed
iconog-
raphy
and
pre-iconographic interpretation
as
d escriptive processes,
and
iconology, by
contrast,
as a matter of
synthesis.
There is
a certain d efensiveness d etectable at this
point
in his
argument: Panofsky
was
d eeply
aware of the contrast between the
"d escrip-
tive and
classificatory"
character he ascribed
291
to the first two levels of his
analysis,
and the
inherently interpretive
and
subjective
char-
acter of
analysis
that went
beyond
this. He
allud ed to the
"d anger"
that
iconology
would behave like
astrology,
i.e., become
hopelessly
unscientific, and
apologetically
remarked that the
faculty
need ed for icono-
logical insight might
best be d escribed
by
"the rather d iscred ited term
'synthetic
in-
tuition.' "13 He well knew the d ifficulties
of
verifying
the conclusions of
investigation
that transcend ed
empirical
d ata, and of d e-
fend ing
them in an
age
when humanistic
stud ies felt
increasingly compelled
to mod el
themselves on the sciences.
The
terminology Panofsky
used in d is-
tinguishing iconology
from
iconography
in-
d irectly supports
the
analogy
between ico-
nography
and
general
characteristics of
signs.
In
stating
that
iconology
was inter-
pretation
that went
beyond
the articulate
he
implied
that the
subject
of
iconography
was articulate.14
Panofsky
was
quite explicit
about the unconscious character of intrinsic
meaning: by
contrast,
the
object
of
iconog-
raphy
was
consciously
used conventional
cod es.
Finally, Panofsky
id entified the ob-
ject
of
iconology
with what Cassirer called
"symbolical
values."
15
He
contrasted , then,
meaning
which was
articulate, conscious,
and d ecod able
through literary keys
to
meaning
that was
essential, unconscious,
and
accessible
only
to
subjective und erstand ing.
The
systematic,
conventional
meaning
ar-
ticulated in
images
behaves much like the
messages conveyed through
the conscious
use of
language
as a cod e. And the notion
image
has
many
characteristics of
typical
d efinitions of the
concept "sign."
The
prob-
lem
lies, however,
not in
assimilating
ico-
nography
to the
comparatively
concrete
levels of
semiological investigation,
but in
assessing
the
relationship
between
iconology
and extensions of the
linguistic
mod el to a
more abstract
interpretation
of
"d eep"
meaning.
The
d evelopment
of
semiological
method s in the literatures has led to wid e
agreement
that there is a
high d egree
of con-
tinuity
of the d ata and method s
applicable
between
relatively
concrete levels of
sign
function and what
might
be
called ,
to bor-
row
Panofsky's
term, "essential"
meaning.
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 19:21:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HASENMUELLER
Panofsky
himself,
as we have
seen,
d rew sev-
eral kind s of d istinctions between these
levels of
analysis.
The
question
must
be,
then, whether his d istinctions are substan-
tive.
First,
can the notion of
"sign" usefully
be extend ed from
iconography
to
Panofsky's
levels 1 and
3; second ,
d id
Panofsky
intend
such a
continuity?
The first
question
con-
cerns the limits of a "semiotic of art." The
second concerns the
relationship
between
Panofsky's conceptual vocabulary
and that
of semiotics.
Panofsky
ind eed tried to estab-
lish a
continuity
of his own
among
his three
levels. The
epistemological problems
he
encountered are
significant
not
only
for the
interpretation
of his
work,
but for
any
at-
tempt
to
forge
a "semiotic of art." Exami-
nation of the
object
and method s of each
phase
of the
investigation
will
provid e
a
basis for
d ecid ing
whether it consists in a
sequence
of d iscrete
proced ures
or
parts
of
a unified
-
and
essentially semiological-
inquiry.
The notion of
pre-iconographic meaning
presupposed
a substratum of naturalism in
painting. Panofsky
restricted his consid era-
tion to Renaissance
art,
where
represen-
tation of nature is the normal
mod ality
of artistic communication. Correct
pre-
iconographical d escription
was the found a-
tion of
und erstand ing:
the work of art be-
comes "sensible" as an ind irect
part
of the
nature that it
represents.
Where the artist and the
interpreter
are
not
part
of the same
cultural/historical
group, representational
conventions are not
part
of a shared tacit
knowled ge:
it is neces-
sary
for the
interpreter
to und erstand and
bracket characteristics of
representation
typical
of the time and
place
a work of art
was mad e in ord er for this
"id entity"
be-
tween the
representation
and nature to oc-
cur.16
Panofsky
stated that
pre-iconographic
d escription
must be
guid ed by
the "correc-
tive
principle"
of the
history
of
style.
This
cautionary proced ure
ind icates two
signifi-
cant
assumptions
that und erlie the
argu-
ment. At this
level, motifs
"mean" nature.
And ,
meaning
is "d ecod ed "
by recognizing
the
systematic relationship
between motifs
and nature so that the latter
may
be in-
clud ed in our
interpretation
of the former.
"Style"
was
seen,
by implication,
as a
changing
set of
representational
conven-
tions that med iate the
relationship
between
motif
and nature. To be
sure,
Panofsky
broad ly
allowed at a later
point
in his
argu-
ment,
that
iconological meaning may
infuse
all
aspects
of a work of
art,
includ ing style.
But
style
remained
primarily
a factor that
cond itions
interpretation
rather than a locus
of
meaning.
"Iconographic meaning"
was
systematic
and
arbitrary.
Its
interpretation
involved
the
"d ecod ing"
of
images
-
units much like
signs; iconography
is,
in
effect,
the
analysis
of a
particular "sign-function"
within the
spectrum
of artistic
meaning.
It is con-
cerned with the
meaning
of conventional
vocabularies of
images
d efined
by
their refer-
ence to
literary
sources. The effect is to
sup-
port
a
concept
of the
"meaning"
of art that
may
be
satisfactorily
stated
by establishing
the source of the artistic
image
in literature.
As was the case with
pre-iconographic
mean-
ing,
form in art was seen to
signify through
reference to a
range
of
phenomena
outsid e
the work of art.
Just
as form was "sensible"
as the ind irect reflection of visual d ata of the
lived
world ,
it is
"intelligible"
as a reformu-
lation of
literary
content.
The
"meaning"
and "referents" of art are
closely
related , but not
necessarily
id entical.
If
they
are
equated ,
as often
happens
in
practice
-
and there is little in
Panofsky's
d efinitions to
d iscourage
this inference
-
then art becomes,
willy-nilly,
a fund amen-
tally
lexical
phenomenon.
Motifs and
images might
seem
"sign-like"
in terms of
their
relationships
to external units of
meaning.
But the
"sign system"
thus d efined
is
second ary
and
incomplete.
It is a "lexi-
con" without its own
"syntax."
Either its
"systematic"
character is a mere reflection
of the
patterns
formed
by
its referents, or its
capacity
to
generate ind epend ent
state-
ments is outsid e the
interpretive power
of
Panofsky's analysis.
To return to the basic
analogy: iconog-
raphy
was
compared
to our
recognition
of
the
tipping
of a man's hat as a
greeting.
In
the same
way, Panofsky suggested ,
we
recog-
nize that a
picture
of thirteen men seated
around a table
represents
the Last
Supper.17
292
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 19:21:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Panofsky, Iconography,
and
Semiotics
The two
interpretive
acts are
certainly par-
allel in that a
greater d egree
of
culturally
shared
knowled ge
is
necessary
to conclud e
that the
tipped
hat
conveys greeting,
and
that the
picture
refers to a
particular supper
than to
recognize
the visual d ata as result-
ing
from,
respectively,
a man's
gesture
and a
representation
of thirteen men
eating.
The
kind of
knowled ge
that allows our
recogni-
tion of the Last
Supper
d iffers, however,
from that which allows
interpretation
of
the
greeting
in three
important ways.
First,
acts and situations are
d istinguish-
alle from
representations
of acts and situa-
tions
by
the fact of
representation
alone.
Interpretation
of the latter must consid er
not
only
the
parallels
between
representa-
tion and
represented ,
but also the d iffer-
ences of structure and function.
Panofsky's
essay
d id not
emphasize
this,
but an exten-
sion of his
example
makes the
point
clear.
Our
interpretation
of a
representation
of
gestures
of
greeting
- such as the
gestures
of the men with their hats in Courbet's The
Encounter
-
is d oubtless
parallel
to our in-
terpretation
of the observed acts them-
selves.18 That
is,
our
recognition
that the
picture shows men
making gestures of greet-
ing
is based on our
ability
to
recognize
ac-
tual
gestures
as
greetings.
The
representa-
tion, however,
is not a
greeting
-and d oes
not function like or "mean" the same
thing
as the
greetings d epicted .19
Even where
art
d irectly represents
communicative
acts,
then, the
meaning
effects of
representation
and
represented
are related but not
congru-
ent. The conclusion that the
representation
"means" what is
represented -
or means the
same
thing
as what is
represented
-
is mani-
festly
unsatisfactory.
Ironically
it is the
meaning expressed by
representing-per-
haps
the d imension of
meaning
most intrin-
sic to art -that is
minimized or exclud ed
if
Panofsky's analogy
is taken too
literally.
Second , where the
meaning
of the con-
ventional
gesture
is
generic,
the
meaning
of
the
majority
of
conventional themes in
painting d epend s
on their
specific
associa-
tion with
literary
events. A d istinction
d rawn in Leach's
taxonomy
of communica-
tion events is
helpful.
The
relationship
be-
tween the
gesture
of
tipping
a hat and its
293
meaning
is that of a
sign:
the
message
bear-
ing entity
has a fixed , conventional, d enota-
tive association with its
message.20
The rela-
tionship
between a
representation
of the
Last
Supper
and its referent is
specific-
singular.
The
relationship
of
message
bear-
ing entity
and
message approximates
the
"separately
d efined d enotation" that char-
acterizes Leach's d efinition of a
symbol.
He
follows Muld er and
Hervey
in
d efining
symbols
as
"signa d epend ent
on a
separate
(occasional)
d efinition for their correct
interpretation."
21
Both
signs
and
symbols
in Leach's termi-
nology,
are
signa
-
that is,
they
are variants
of a
general type
of "communication
d yad "
composed
of a
message-bearing entity (com-
pare: "signifier")
and a
message (compare:
"signified ")
associated
by arbitrary
human
choice. Both
sign
and
symbol
share the
gen-
eral characteristics often associated with the
term
"sign"
when that term is used in its
more
general
sense. There is no barrier,
then, to
consid ering
Leach's
signs
and
sym-
bols as
proper objects
of semiotics
broad ly
d efined as the "science of
signs."
Leach's
very
d efinition of
symbol
d oes
not, as
Sperber's
d oes,
pose
the
question
of the
valid ity
of semiotic
investigation
of the
symbolic.22 However, the d istinctions Leach
d raws between the two kind s of
signa
d o
suggest
some limitations on semiotic
analy-
sis of
symbols.
He
emphasizes
that
"sign
relationships
are
mainly metonymic,
while
symbol relationships
are
arbitrary
assertions
of
similarity
and therefore
mainly
meta-
phoric...."
23
Signs
are
always part
of sets
and
convey
information
only
when com-
bined with others of this set or context. The
meaningfulness
of
signs,
therefore, is a func-
tion of their
patterned contiguity
to other
signs
of the same set. The
metonymic (or
syntagmatic,
to use the
parallel
term
pre-
ferred
by
Levi-Strauss and d e
Saussure)
rela-
tionships
of
sequences
of
signs
both
id entify
the set and actualize the
meaning potential
of ind ivid ual
signs. Symbols, by
contrast,
relate two elements
(message-bearing entity
and
message)
d rawn from
d iffering
realms,
and associated
uniquely.24
Meaning
is not
d epend ent
on
patterned
relationships
to
other
symbols
of the same kind .
Symbolic
re-
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 19:21:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HASENMUELLER
lationships
thus are
mainly metaphoric (or
in d e Saussure's
parallel
term,
parad igmatic).
Leach makes it clear that the same entities
may
be d efined as
signs
or as
symbols d epend -
ing
on context or
function,
and that
signs
and
symbols normally
occur in combina-
tion.
Still,
the d istinction is
significant
for
the method of
interpretation applied .
The
uniqueness
of
symbols
means that
they
can-
not be "d ecod ed "
simply by id entifying
the
"cod e"
(set
of
signs)
and
bringing
to bear
knowled ge
of the lexicon and
syntactic
structure
ad equate
to "read " the statement
in
question. Symbols typically
occur in con-
trastive
relationships,
but d o not
require
the context of a
patterned metonymy (e.g.,
a
syntax)
in ord er to
convey meaning. Sym-
bolic
meaning d epend s
on
metaphoric
asser-
tion of
id entity
between
signifier
and
signi-
fied :
interpretation d epend s
on
specification
of this
id entity.
Leach's
enterprise
bears
comparison
to
Panofsky's.
He
ad apted
some structuralist
assumptions (e.g.,
that behavior
may
be
und erstood as
fund amentally
communica-
tive),
and a
terminology
from semiotics to
the
d escription
and
analysis
of behavior.
Panofsky
viewed art as
fund amentally
com-
municative,
and
attempted
to
forge
a
method for the
analysis
of levels of
meaning
conveyed by
artistic form. He arrived at a
set of
concepts
that
approximate,
in limited
ways,
the
conceptual vocabulary
of semi-
otics. In both cases,
the ultimate
object
of
und erstand ing
is non-verbal,
and the mod el
for
und erstand ing
it rests at
key points
on
method s for
analysis
of verbal materials.
Both face,
in
very
d ifferent
ways,
the
prob-
lem of
co-ord inating
verbal and non-verbal
mod es of
expressing meaning.
Second ary
or conventional
meaning
-
the
object
of
iconography
-
has much in com-
mon with Leach's notion of the
symbol.
The
linkage
between
motif
and convention-
ally recognized
referent in the
image
is
essentially
that of
meaning-bearing entity
and
message
in Leach's
symbol.
This is
most clear in the method
by
which
images
are to be und erstood . The
image
associates
a
motif,
which is an element from the "con-
text" of
representation
of
nature,
with a
theme or
story
d rawn from the "context" of
literature. The result is a unit of a "meta-
phoric"
character.
Significantly,
it is to be
d eciphered
not
by looking
at its
place
in the
patterned relationships
of similar units in
the work of
art,
but
by d iscovering
the
par-
ticular basis of the association of the two
elements.
A third d istinction between
iconography
and
interpretation
of a
gesture
of
greeting
lies in the fact that
Panofsky specifically
id entified
iconography
as the
d escription
of
"themes and
concepts
transmitted
through
literary
sources."
25
In
d istinguishing
ico-
nography
from
iconology,
he
obliquely
ad -
mitted the
epistemological ad vantages
of
this "literariness." There was to
be,
lamen-
tably,
no "text" for
iconology.26
Without
such concrete evid ence,
the
investigator
was
thrown back
upon "synthetic
intuition." In
practice,
the
explication
of
"meaning"
in
art is often
equated
to the correct id entifica-
tion of the "texts" of
images. Iconography
thus concerned id entification of
parad ig-
matic
relationships
between art and litera-
ture. Patterned
relationships among images
-metonymy-
were not
systematically
con-
sid ered .
The conviction that
iconographical
mean-
ing
is
fund amentally literary
is
parad oxical
with
regard
to the
question
of the
"proto-
semiotic" character of
Panofsky's investiga-
tion. On one hand ,
support
of
id entity
be-
tween art and literature
may
be read as
license to extend
semiological investigations
of literature to art. One
might hope
to
arrive at a "semiotic of art"
by
the d evice
of
annexing
art to literature. On the other
hand ,
such an extreme extension of the
principle
of "ut
pictura poesis"
would ob-
viate a
specific
"semiotic of art." The extent
of efforts to
explain away
some
problemati-
cal d ifferences between art and literature,
however,
tend s to
suggest
that a fund amen-
tal
id entity
between art and literature is
wid ely
assumed .
Painting presents
its com-
ponents simultaneously
rather than
sequen-
tially.
This is awkward for mod els
ad apted
to
d escription
of narrative
-
semiological
and otherwise! There
is, however,
a con-
sid erable literature that tend s to minimize
this characteristic of
painting
and rational-
ize mod es of
analysis
that are based on time
294
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 19:21:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Panofsky, Iconography,
and Semiotics
sequence.
The fact that motifs in
painting
refer to
episod es
in literature itself invites
consid eration of
painting
as a
partial
or
second ary
reflection of a
temporal
art.
Much Western
painting
of the later Mid d le
Ages
and Renaissance
clearly attempts
to
suggest
the
episod ic sequence
of literature
through
inclusion of references to more
than one
phase
in an action or
by juxta-
position
of
separate representations
of se-
quential episod es.
Another
wid espread
view
attempts
to infuse
sequentiality
into
paint-
ing by specifying
the ord er in which formal
arrangement
d ictates that the
eye
shall ex-
perience images.
It is
wid ely supposed
that
the formal ord er of
painting
often,
presum-
ably by
the artist's
d esign,
d irects the move-
ment of the
eye
to create a
sequence
of im-
pressions.
Id eas like these have eased the
approach
from
semiology
of narrative to
semiology
of the
literary aspects of
art. The
result has been concentration on these as-
pects
of art and
correspond ent
slowness to
d efine a
semiology
of
purely
visual elements.
Ad d itional factors have reinforced this
iconographic
focus on the
literary aspects
of
art. The
attempt
to d iscover
literary
sources
is
d ocument-oriented ,
and therefore con-
forms to
preference
for
quasi-empirical
problems
and method s.
And ,
where the
question
of the
particular meaning
of a
given
work of art is a
fund amentally syn-
chronic
issue,
the
meaning
of isolated ele-
ments is
ad aptable
to d iachronic answers.
Panofsky
noted that
images
in art have
their own
history,
often
d igressing
from the
history
of the
literary imagery upon
which
they
are
ultimately
based .27 This
history
of
images
or
"types"
consid ered in isolation is
parallel
to
etymology.
It is a limited form
of d iachronic
investigation
that elaborates a
lexicon without
encountering
the
problems
of
interpreting
the function of those ele-
ments in relation to each other. Such a
"history"
has the
ad vantage
of
avoid ing
d e-
pend ence
on
highly subjective interpreta-
tions,
but its conclusions are
strictly
limited
in scale. Much
iconography,
in
practice,
poses questions
that are
"etymological"
rather than
interpretive
of
meaning.
The
apparent simplicity
of
"metonymic"
(syntagmatic)
structures formed
by images
295
ally
them with the units Leach called
sym-
bols.28 The reasons for
Panofsky's
d e-
emphasis
of these relations, however, are
best
sought
in the
implicit theory
of art
history. Relationships among
forms in art
are
trad itionally
conceived as an element of
style,
constrained
by
the
exigencies
of
repre-
sentation where this is relevant. The tend -
ency
not to
assign
the
relationships among
images
a
major
role in the
expression
of
meaning may
reflect the
assumption
that
these
relationships
are controlled
by
factors
external to
problems
of
iconographic
mean-
ing,
and
are,
to that
d egree, "meaning
neutral."
If illusionistic
painting
is a
representa-
tion of the
appearance
of nature in accord -
ance with certain
stylistic
conventions,
then
most of the
configuration
of motifs is "d ic-
tated "
by
the ord er of
nature,
the
optical
cond itions of its
apprehension,
and the
technical conventions of its
representation.
Often it is
just
those formal
relationships
that seem to contrad ict what
might
be ex-
pected
from a "naturalistic"
representation
that are
recognized
as
significant. Typically
it is d etails that seem anomalous that elicit
explanation
in terms of the artist's
symbolic
intent
-
or his technical limitations.
Iconography,
then,
has a
generally
"semi-
otic"
character,
but there are two
problems
with
consid ering iconography
a "semiotic
of art."
First,
the semiotic functions as-
cribed to the units in
question
are
very
limited .
Images
are
parallel
to the
signa
Leach called
symbols. They
are
uniquely
d efined ,
and
patterned relationship
with
like units is of
relatively
small
importance
in
interpretation.
Mod els from semiotics
which
emphasize patterned metonymy may
not be
applicable.
Second ,
iconography
is
concerned with
only
a narrow d imension
of the
meaning
of art. Much of its
appeal
as a method is based on the
epistemological
ad vantages
of this limitation to
literary
content.
As a stratum of the
meaning
of
art,
ico-
nology
is a
parad ox. Panofsky
mad e it
d epend ent upon
and continuous with the
first two
levels,
yet
contrasted the nature of
the
meaning
at stake and the method
need ed to d iscover it with the
objects
and
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 19:21:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HASENMUELLER
method s of the
previous phases
of
analysis.
It is both
correspond ent
to the other two
categories
and a
way
of
begging
the
ques-
tion of
categories.
The d istinction between
iconography
and
iconology
is
largely method ological.
Panof-
sky
consid ered
iconography,
like
ethnogra-
phy
and other stud ies characterized
by
the
suffix,
to be
fund amentally d escriptive.29
The method
proposed respond s
to a value
on
objectivity,
and the
concept
"icono-
graphic meaning" may
even be seen as sec-
ond ary
to the method and the criteria that
d efine it.
Iconology, by
contrast,
is Panof-
sky's
name for
analysis
of
meaning
that
transcend s the limits of this kind of inves-
tigation.
It is
iconography stripped
of the
"restrictions" he found
especially
evid ent
in
America,
and taken out of the narrow
isolation
imposed by
these
method ological
criteria.30
The cautions
Panofsky
set forth for ico-
nology
reveal his awareness of the criticism
to which it would be
subject.
He stated the
d anger
that it
might
become like
astrology
rather than like scientific
pursuits d esigned
by
the
"ology"
suffix
d enoting analysis
rather than mere
d escription.
He
pro-
found ly recognized
that not all of that
which humanists wish to und erstand is in-
vestigatable
in accord ance with the "scien-
tific" criteria of
investigation
and verifiabil-
ity
that tend to be
read ily accepted
in our
intellectual climate. Where
iconography
is
restricted to that which is "knowable"
given
certain criteria of
method ,
iconology
is d e-
fined
by
the intuitive
capacity
of the mind
to
pose
and
attempt
to solve
problems
that
d efy
these limits.
"Synthetic
intuition," ind eed ,
is not so
much a method as a human
capacity:
it is
not an
investigative process
but a d imen-
sion of mind . The
object
of this
thinking
is,
correspond ingly,
not a d elimited kind
of d ata but
"principles
which und erlie the
choice and
presentation
of
motifs
as well
as the
prod uction
and
interpretation
of
images,
stories,
and
allegories,
and which
give meaning
even to formal
arrangements
and technical
proced ures employed ."
31
Though
it is
possible
to assess the relation-
ship
between
iconography
and semiotics
by
comparison
of
explicitly
d efined
terms,
it is
not
easy
to
specify precisely
what is d one in
iconology,
much less the
relationship
of this
to
semiology.
The
parallels
between
iconology
and
semiology
concern not method and
concepts
but
assumptions. Panofsky
assumed that
"symbolical
values" infuse cultural
prod ucts
includ ing
art and literature. The
suggestion
that
iconology
utilize the "corrective
prin-
ciple"
of
comparing
results to the conclu-
sions of similar
analyses
of literature
pre-
supposes
their ultimate
homogeneity.32
The
assumption
of such an
und erlying
unity
allies
Panofsky
with the structuralists
and
semio!ogists,
but even more
d irectly,
with
Geistesgeschichte,
the school of art his-
torical
thinking
out of which his id eas d e-
veloped .
This
unity
of the arts was
formerly
explained
as the result of a
d etermining
force.
Panofsky sought
to transcend the d iffi-
culties of
speculative,
essentialist
attempts
to d erive historical ord er from a
single
cau-
sality.
His insistence on the
d epend ence
of
each
phase
of
interpretation
on the last
mitigates
the d ed uctive character of the
analysis,
as d oes his
d e-emphasis
of causal-
ity.
It is
by
no means
easy
to
replace
the
causal
"spirits" Popper
called on us to re-
ject
with
something
more
logically
d efen-
sible.33 One
response
has been retreat into
small-scale
enterprises
that are
relatively
easy
to co-ord inate with more or less em-
pirical
criteria of
investigation. Panofsky's
great strength
is shown in his refusal to
retreat into narrow
d ocumentary
stud ies
-
to avoid the sins of historicism
by
the d is-
appointing exped ient
of
avoid ing
the
prob-
lems that led to its d iscred ited conclusions.
The
general assumption
that there is
meaning beyond iconography parallels
semiotics. It d oes not follow from this
alone, however,
that
Panofsky's approach
is
a semiotic
-
even an unfinished one. Panof-
sky's
reasons for
d efining iconology
as he
d id stem less from
hypotheses
about the
nature of this level of
meaning
than from
his
d eep
and
ultimately
classical humanism.
He
profound ly
und erstood the
power
of a
generally empirical epistemology
to influ-
ence humanistic research. The fact that he
thought
the humanistic character of art his-
296
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 19:21:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Panofsky, Iconography,
and Semiotics
tory
need ed to be stated ind icates that he felt
it had been
questioned
and
perhaps
com-
promised .34
He
certainly appreciated
the
necessity
to attach art historical research
firmly
to concrete d ocuments and observa-
tions,
and few scholars have contributed so
much to this. But he also envisioned the
tragic
result that would follow
attempts
to
subord inate a humalnistic concern for mean-
ing
to
implicit
and often naive notions of
the criteria for "scientific"
valid ity.
An un-
d efined ,
uncritical
popularity
of the id eal
of "scientific" truth could
-
and d id
-
lead
to avoid ance of
problems
that were inher-
ently
inimical to concrete mod es of investi-
gation.
Such
curtailing
of the
scope
of hu-
manistic
inquiry
in ord er to accommod ate
it to these
unspoken
values could not make
art
history
a
science,
but it could well
sap
its
vitality
as a humanistic
d iscipline.
Panofsky
shared with semiotics both a
concern for
"d eep" meaning
in cultural
prod ucts,
and a conviction that it is acces-
sible to
analysis.
Are we to conclud e from
this that
Panofsky's approach
is a nascent
semiotic which possesses the essentials
though
it
perhaps
lacks some refinements?
Further consid eration of three factors
-
the
nature of the ultimate
subject
of the
analy-
sis,
the role of
historicity
in the
explanatory
structure
offered ,
and the
consistency
of the
notion of
sign
will
support
the conclusion
that the "semiotic" character of
Panofsky's
approach
is
ephemeral.
Panofsky
summarized the
method ,
object,
and
necessary capacities
or cond itions of
iconology
in a chart.35 Here the
question
of
whether
Weltanschauung
or mind was the
ultimate
subject
was most
clearly
ad d ressed .
Though
the
ways
in which the "essential
tend encies of the human mind "
express
themselves
change
und er
varying
historical
cond itions,
there was no
implication
that
mind itself was conceived as mutable. More-
over,
the essential tend encies of mind and
the
patterns
of
expression
were not the ob-
jects
of
knowled ge
in
Panofsky's
table but
the
prerequisites
of
iconological
research.
The
familiarity
with these essential ten-
d encies that is the basis of
synthetic
intui-
tion was not arrived at
through
research,
but
"given":
it was a
capacity
rather than
297
a method or a conclusion. The intuitive
notion of mind involved is revealed
by
the
absence of
any
formulation of its structure
or
functioning
assumed to be reflected in the
nature of intrinsic
meaning.
The lack of a
mod el
linking
these
things clearly
d ifferen-
tiates
Panofsky's approach
from most semio-
logical inquiry.
The issue of the
historicity
of
Panofsky's
method
provid es
another avenue to its d is-
tinction from semiotics. Both
iconographv
and
iconology
are
integral parts
of a form
of
history. Iconography
is a
"philology"
of
images;
the
d escriptive,
factual
aspect
of the
process
of
und erstand ing
the
past.
Relative
closeness to d ocuments and concrete obser-
vations meant that
iconography
was more
easily
d efend ed in an
empirical
intellectual
climate.
Iconology sought
to state the
und erlying
principles
that
shape
the
expression
of an
age.
As such it is a variant of the
"history
of id eas." Certain
ambiguities,
however,
support questioning
as to whether it is
necessarily
a historical
concept.
This has
vast
implications
for the
congruence
of
Panofsky's concepts
with
semiology.
In
Panofsky's
table,
three kind s of historical
knowled ge
are
given
as cond itions of cor-
rect
analysis
at each level -not as
goals.
This
may engend er questions
as to whether
Panofsky's approach
is
"history"
at all-
that
is,
whether he
might
not be closer to
an
essentially synchronic,
semiotic
approach
to art than hitherto
suspected .
If
"history"
in
Panofsky's
chart is
effectively
a
support
to the
investigation
of
meaning
rather than
a
form of explanation,
then the whole
sys-
tem becomes much easier to co-ord inate with
semiological
and structuralist
approaches.
The table
is, however,
somewhat mislead -
ing.
Each level is a
cycle
rather than a
sequence,
as
Panofsky
stated at another
point
in the
argument.36
He
recognized
that
a
"history
of
style"
could
only
be built
up
through analysis
of the
styles
of ind ivid ual
works,
and that it sound ed like a vicious
circle to use a
history
thus d erived to
classify
and
explain
the
style
of
subsequent
works.
However, he
d istinguished
ind ivid ual ob-
servations of new d ata from the "sense"
mad e
by analysis
of
ranges
of d ata. This
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 19:21:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HASENMUELLER
"circulus method icus" characterized the re-
lationships
between a
"history
of
images"
and ind ivid ual
iconographical problems,
and between
history
of "cultural
symptoms"
and the "essential
meaning"
of
specific
works. Since the
object
and the
starting
as-
sumptions
of each level are
interd epend ent,
the
object
of each level is not
necessarily
the
goal
of the
investigation.
The histories
(of
style, types,
and cultural
symptoms, respec-
tively)
with which one
ostensibly begins
analysis
at each level
(pre-iconographic,
ico-
nographic,
and
iconological)
are in turn the
prod ucts
of historical
analyses
of works of
art.
At all three levels,
analysis
is focussed on
the characteristics which enable
integration
of each new
object
of
analysis
into a histori-
cal "sense." Diachronic
ord ering
is not inci-
d ental,
it is essential.
There is another
large
scale d istinction
between
Panofsky's approach
and a "semi-
otic of art":
consistency
of the mod el. Semi-
ology
is characterized
by
the
assumption
that communication is more
homogeneous
than
previously suspected . "Meaning"
is
approached
as a continuum whose levels are
transformations of each
other,
and
by
ex-
tension,
amenable to
analogous analytical
method s and
d escriptive
mod els.
Panofsky's
typology
of
meaning
is
quite
d ifferent. He
mad e a
sharp
d istinction between levels of
meaning, precisely
in the matter of the
method s to which
they
were accessible.
It
might perhaps
be
argued
that
Panofsky
d id
pursue
the id eal of a
homogeneous
in-
vestigation
of
meaning,
but
stopped
short
of solution of certain
logical problems. By
basing iconology
on correct
iconography
and
suggesting
certain
controls,
he
certainly
hoped
to
mitigate
the
epistemological prob-
lems of
iconology.
It d oes not follow that
he
implied
the essential
homogeneity
of all
three levels of
meaning.
There is no con-
tinuity
of
method , mod el,
or the
key
notion
of
"sign."
The
"linguistic"
character of
Panofsky's
whole
system
is
very
limited . The
sporad ic appearance
of
"sign-like"
units
d oes not
support attempts
to extend that
notion to other
parts
of the
analysis.
There is little in
Panofsky's
d efinition of
intrinsic
meaning
to
suggest application
of
linguistic
mod els. The essential tend encies
of
the human mind that are the basis of
synthetic
intuition constitute a
conceptual
mod ality
rather than a cod e.
Interpretation
d oes not involve correct association of
sig-
nifier and
signified .
The
object
of
iconology
is close ind eed to
Sperber's
notion of the
symbolic,
which he
expressly
contrasted
with the semiotic. In
entirely
d ifferent
language, Panofsky d istinguished
between
meaning expressed
in cod es and
meaning
arising
from
conceptual ord ering-
the cen-
tral issue of
Sperber's critique
of Levi-
Strauss. At root it is a
question
of whether
all
meaning
can
lbe
red uced to
linguistic
mod els.
It is inevitalle that
attempts
to extend
semiotics to
non-linguistic phenomena
shall
present
new
problems
and severe tests.
And ,
as Paul Bouissac has
pointed
out,
one im-
portant way
to d efine and work
through
the
external resistance and internal
questioning
that face a
fled gling d iscipline
is to confront
the new
program
with
previous
d ebates of
a similar nature.37 These texts are
impor-
tant not
only
as a source of the
"genealogy"
of the new
d iscipline,
but also for the
very
epistemological,
theoretical,
and method o-
logical problems
that led them to formulate
the
problems d ifferently
than in the new
program
of semiotics.
Many linguists,
he
remarks,
seem unaware of the trad ition
-
a humanistic trad ition
-
which has
per-
mitted the d efinition of the
problems they
are
trying
to solve.
They
tend to
proceed
ind epend ently,
or to view id eas
parallel
to
their own in earlier
generations
as
"proto-
semiotic." The central
point
of his review
is that semiotics cannot afford to overlook
previous
d ebates on the issues the
d iscipline
has claimed either
by ignorance,
or
by
chau-
vinistically regard ing
them as "naive" or
"incipient"
forms of
response
to issues for-
mulated
meaningfully only
in semiotics.
From this
perspective,
the
question
here
is whether
Panofsky's
"semiotic of art" was
as
yet
naive,
or whether the
d iscrepancies
between his id eas and those of
contemporary
semiotics arise at least in
part
from the
failure of semiotics
fully
to encounter or
resolve the
problems
that
shaped
his en-
quiry.
The
application
of the tools of semi-
298
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 19:21:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Panofsky, Iconography,
and Semiotics
otic
analysis
of
linguistic phenomena
to
complex
humanistic d imensions of
meaning
is
subject
to the same
generalized ,
often un-
d efined values of our intellectual milieu
that so
profound ly
structured
Panofsky's
approach.
A consistent
vocabulary
and
method based
squarely
on the most concrete
d imensions of
language
cod es
conveys
a
sense of
greater homogeneity
than Panof-
sky
achieved . But the
question
is still
open
as to whether
aspects
of semiotics that tran-
scend the
analysis
of cod es and venture into
what
Sperber
called the
"symbolic"
have
really
transcend ed the
epistemological
sta-
tus of
"synthetic
intuition."
1I have d iscussed the
concept
of
"style"
in con-
temporary
American art
history
as an ind ex of these
values in: Christine Hasenmueller
McCorkel, "Sense
and
Sensibility:
An
Epistemological Approach
to A
Philosophy
of Art
History,"
Journal of
Aesthetics and
Art
Criticism, XXXIV, No. 1
(Fall, 1975),
35-50.
2
See, for
example:
Sheld on
Nod elman, "Structural
Analysis
in Art and
Anthropology,"
in
Jacques
Ehr-
mann, ed ., Structuralism
(Gard en City,
New
York,
1970), pp.
79-93;
originally published
as a volume of
Yale French Stud ies, 1966. For a consid eration of
Panofsky's concepts
see: Hubert
Damisch, "Semiotics
and
Iconography,"
Times
Literary Supplement (Octo-
ber
12,
1973),
1221ff.
Meyer Schapiro's
Word s and
Pictures,
Approaches
to
Semiotics, 11, Thomas A.
Sebeok,
ed .
(The Hague, 1973),
is
virtually
alone in
the
attempt
to
d evelop
elements of a semiotic of
visual form.
3Giulio Carlo
Argan, "Id eology
and
Iconology,"
trans. Rebecca
West, Critical
Inquiry,
2:2
(Winter,
1975),
299 and 303.
Originally published
in Italian
in Storia d ell'arte.
4
Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism is most re-
cently published by
Merid ian Books
(Cleveland ,
1957). "Iconography
and
Iconology,"
first
appeared
as the Introd uction to his Stud ies in
Iconology:
Humanistic Themes in the Art
of
the Renaissance
(New York, 1939);
a
slight
revision titled
"Iconog-
raphy
and
Iconology:
An Introd uction to the
Stud y
of Renaissance Art"
appears
in his
Meaning
in the
Visual Arts
(Gard en City,
New
York,
1955).
5
Paul Bouissac has sLated the
point succinctly
in
a recent review of Alain
Bey,
Theories d u
signe
et d u
sens titled : "The Gold en
Legend
of
Semiotics,"
Semiotica, 17:4, 371-84. He observed that new d isci-
plines
tend to seek a
"genealogy"
in
prior
statements
of
key principles,
and that: "The result is
generally
a
gratifying fallacy
in as much as the texts which are
recovered or unearthed for this
purpose
receive their
relevancy precisely
from the
point
of view which
they
are assumed to have
generated ,
and not the re-
verse"
(p. 371).
299
8 Roland Barthes, "Les sciences humaines et
l'oeuvre d e Levi-Strauss," Annales: economies -so-
cietes-civilisations,
XIX
(November-December 1964),
1085-86;
quoted
in H. Stuart
Hughes,
The Ob-
structed
Path,
Torchbook ed ition
(New
York,
1969),
p.
285.
7
Dan
Sperber, Rethinking Symbolism, Cambrid ge
Stud ies in Social
Anthropology,
trans. Alice L. Mor-
ton
(Cambrid ge, 1975),
a revised version of the
French text
published by
Hermann
(Paris, 1974).
8
It is
important
that his
essays
were
presented
as
an
approach
to Renaissance art, and
accord ingly
sub-
titled .
Panofsky's
further work in
iconography
and
iconology
concerns
mostly
Renaissance material. The
approach
is
conceived , then,
as a tool for
analysis
of
an art that balances naturalism and id ealism in
largely
narra ive
representation
of
pred ominantly
literary subjects.
The
question
of how art can "mean"
when it d oes not fit this mod el d oes not arise. It is
also
important
that much
iconographical
work on
Panofsky's pattern
involves the
painting
of the
Netherland s in the fifteenth
century.
Northern art
is, in
Worringer's
classic characterization,
"literary":
it is more focussed than even
contemporary
Italian
art on
meaning conveyed by
motifs that refer
d irectly
to literature.
9
Of course, from
many points
of view,
notably
that
of Gestalt
psychology,
it could be
argued
that the
processes Panofsky d istinguished
are
actually
con-
tinuous. The immed iate concern here, however, is
not the
valid ity
of these
d istinctions, but their role
in
Panofsky's theory,
and their
implications
for a
rapprochement
with semiotics.
10 There is an
important
d istinction between
repre-
sentation as an
image
of the world of
experience
and
as an
image
of a
perceptual/mental interpretation
of
the d ata of
experience.
The
metaphor Panofsky
uses
tend s to
d epict
art as
equivalent
to the actualities
which are the basis of
experience.
It is not clear
whether this
d iscrepancy
has been
simply
missed ,
d ismissed as not
pertinent,
or resulted from the
character of the
metaphor
and is hence extraneous
to inferences about
Panofsky's
notion of the
psycho-
logical
mechanism in
question.
1 Culture and Communication: The
Logic by
Which
Symbols
are
Connected ,
Themes in the Social
Sciences
(Cambrid ge, 1976), p.
12ff.
12
"Iconography
and
Iconology," p.
30.
13
Ibid .,
p.
38. It is also
interesting
that his remark
on the "limitations
placed
on
iconography especially
in this
country," (p. 32)
d id not
appear
in the earlier
version of the text. See
Panofsky,
Stud ies in Iconol-
ogy,
Torchbook ed ition
(New York,
1962).
It
seems,
then, a
response
to the intensification of
empirical
bias in the American intellectual environment
by
the
mid 1950s.
' Ibid .,
p.
31.
15
Ibid .
16
The
relationship
between the world as seen
by
the
investigator
and the world seen
by
the
investiga-
tor
ind irectly through
the work of art is not as
simple
as
Panofsky's analogy
makes it
appear.
See foot-
note 10.
17
"Iconography
and
Iconology," pp.
35ff.
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 19:21:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HASENMUE L ER
's
The
Encounter, 1854, Musee Fabre,
Montpellier.
Only
this d etail of the
meaning
of Courbet's
picture
is ad d uced here.
19 Ernst Gombrich has elaborated this
point
in
his well-known
essay
"Med itations on a
Hobbyhorse
or the Roots of Artistic Form,"
reprinted
in Med ita-
tions on a
Hobby
Horse and Other
Essays
on the
Theory of Art,
2nd ed .
(New
York,
1971).
He used
the
metaphor
of the
relationship
between a
hobby-
horse and the horse it
represents
to elaborate the
id ea that
representations
d o not
simply
imitate what
they represent,
but constitute a substitute that is
significantly
d ifferent in function.
Representation
and
represented
must be linked
by
sufficient evid ence
of "likeness" in form and function to be
placed
in
the same class. In the case of the
hobbyhorse,
both
the
toy
and the horse are "horses" and are "rid able."
But the
relationship
is also characterized
by
d iffer-
ences: almost
every aspect
of the real horse is screened
out
except
for the minimal visual d etails to establish
"id entity"
and the accommod atability
of both to
d ifferent
specifications
of the
concept "rid ing."
Simi-
larly,
motifs in
painting
are id entified with their sub-
jects by
the conventions of illusionism,
but also lis-
tinct from them in function.
Interpretation
of mean-
ing,
it
follows,
should consid er both the
id entity
of
representation
and
subject,
and the d istinction.
Panofsky's system
d escribes the
psychological
mecha-
nism for
recognition
of the first,
but not the second .
In
effect, then,
Panofsky's concepts
red uce the mean-
ing
of art to the
metaphoric (or parad igmatic)
asso-
ciation between
representation
and
represented .
His
analytical system
d oes not
explicitly
includ e
recogni-
tion of the
change
in context
implied
in the act of
representation,
nor d oes it
provid e
for
analysis
of the
function of motifs in this context.
20
For a
summary
sta:ement
of Leach's
taxonomy,
see Culture and Communication,
pp.
12ff. Based on
the
system
of Muld er and
Hervey,
and
ultimately
Jakobson,
the vocabulary ad apts linguistic concepts
of the nature and
systematic
functioning
of com-
munication events to the
analysis
of
non-linguistic
communicative
behavior. Since it
applies
semiotic
concepts
to behavior, it is a
particularly
valuable
formulation of these
concepts
for
any
consid eration
of their
applicability
to works of art.
Panofsky's
con-
cepts
would stand in somewhat d ifferent
relationship
to other uses of the same terms. These d ifferences
are technical,
however. Leach's formulation has been
chosen because it d etaches these terms from
linguistic
and narrative material.
21
J.
W. F. Muld er and S. G.
J. Hervey, Theory of
the
Linguistic Sign, Janua Linguarum:
Series Minor
136
(The Hague, 1972), pp.
13-17,
quoted
in Leach,
Culture and Communication,
p.
13.
Sperber,
Rethinking Symbolism,
see
pp.
12ff. for
statement of
problem.
He
argues
that there is a
cog-
nitive level of
meaning
-
which he calls "the
sym-
bolic"- that is not
analyzable
in terms of
sign
func-
tions,
and hence inaccessible to semiotics.
23
Leach,
Culture and Communication, p.
15. The
concept
is elaborated on
p.
12,
and
pp.
14-16.
24
The d istinction between
sign
and
symbol
is
quite
clear so far as it concerns the
relationship
between
signifier
and
signified
that characterizes each. And ,
it
emerges
in the course of the d iscussion that the
relationships among signs
are
highly
structured and
essential to the actualization of the
meaning poten-
tial of ind ivid ual
signs. Relationships among symbols
are not characterized
by
such
highly d eveloped sys-
tems. Since
signs
are used in combination with
signs
from the same context,
the kind of
signifier/signified
relationship
is constant and
insignificant
once the
system
has been
recognized
and its conventions
"bracketed ." The same is not true of
symbols,
whose
signifier/signified
association is
uniquely
d efined . In
the case of
signs, recognition
of the "context" from
which
they
are d rawn
(i.e., recognition
of the
system
which
they express) implies bracketing
of the
pat-
terned
signifier/signified
relationship,
and interpre-
tation of the
meaning
of
signs
in such a
sequence
assumes
application
of
knowled ge
of the
systematic
relationships
that characterize that "context" or
sys-
tem. There is a connection between the
signifier/
signified relationship
within the structure of
signa
and the
patterned relationships among signa
that
characterize the
subtypes sign
and
symbol.
Much of
this connection is not
explicitly expressed
in Leach,
and where
specific aspects
of
signs
or
symbols
are
isolated for d iscussion,
it is not
always entirely
clear
whether the
metaphoric
or
metonymic qualities
ana-
lyzed
are characteristic of the internal structure or
the external
relationships
of the
signa
in
question.
25
"Iconography
and
Iconology," p.
36.
26
Ibid ., p.
38.
27"Iconography
and
Iconology," pp.
36-38. In
Panofsky's
own
iconographical
work,
investigation
typically
treats each
image
as a
separate problem
with
comparatively
little d iscussion of the
implications
of
their interrelations. His
approach gives
us no method
or
vocabulary
for the
d escription
or
analysis
of these
"metonymic" patterns
within the work of art. This
omission need not, however,
lead to the conclusion
that
Panofsky
exclud ed such observations
absolutely
from his
approach.
Certain kind s of structured rela-
tions
among images,
such as narrative
sequence,
axial
sequence,
and
spatial
d evices for
juxtapositions
that
transcend illusionistic
verity
have
certainly
been
wid ely
observed and
incorporated
into conclusions.
It
may
be
simply
that the
significance
of
relationships
that tie
together,
for
example,
the voussoir reliefs
that frame
Rogier's Mary Altarpiece,
or the
images
d istributed
along
the center axis of
Jan
van
Eyck's
Arnolfini Wed d ing
have seemed so obvious to Panof-
sky
and others that no "method " has seemed
necessary
to their correct
interpretation.
In
examples
like these,
the
relationship among images
is
certainly
both sim-
ple
and
prominent.
There remain, however,
two
problems:
correct
inierpretation
of more subtle struc-
ture,
and the
logical importance
of the kind and
extent of structures
images may
form to evaluation
of
image
as a semiotic
concept.
2s
Though
not,
of course,
with what
Sperber
called
"the
symbolic."
29
"Iconography
and
Iconology," p.
31.
30
Ibid .,
p.
32.
31Ibid ., p. 38.
32
Ibid ., p. 39.
300
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 19:21:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Panofsky, Iconography,
and Semiotics
33 Ernst
Gombrich,
"The
Logic
of
Vanity
Fair:
Alternatives to Historicism in the
Stud y
of
Fashions,
Style,
and
Taste,"
in The
Philosophy of
Karl
Popper,
ed . Paul Arthur
Schilpp, Library
of
Living
Philoso-
phers,
Vol. XIV
(La
Salle, Ill.,
1974), 11:925-957,
p.
926.
-' See his "Art
History
as a Humanistic
Discipline,"
in his
Meaning
in the Visual Arts
(Gard en City,
N.
Y.,
1955).
As a humanist of the classical trad ition
-
whose notion of the
"symbolic"
came from the
Neo-Kantian
approach
of Cassirer rather than from
anthropological
or
linguistic
formulations
-
Panofsky
301
is a d escend ant of an intellectual trad ition hard to
correlate with Levi-Strauss. He is a
likely cand id ate,
in
fact, for that
group
Levi-Strauss d enounced as
retreating
into
"history
as the last
refuge
of transcen-
d ental humanism."
(Savage
Mind
[Chicago, 1966],
p. 262), quoted
in H. Stuart
Hughes,
The Obstructed
Path,
p.
284.
3
"Iconography
and
Iconology," pp.
40-44.
3
Stud ies in
Iconology,
"Introd uction,"
p.
11,
note 3.
3 "The Gold en
Legend
of
Semiotics,"
pp.
371-373.
This content downloaded from 146.95.253.17 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 19:21:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions