Amuay renery disaster: The aftermaths and challenges ahead

Kirti Bhushan Mishra

a,
, Klaus-Dieter Wehrstedt
a
, Holger Krebs
b
a
Division 2.2 Reactive Substances and Systems, BAM Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing, Unter den Eichen 87, 12205 Berlin, Germany
b
Division 2.3 Explosives, BAM Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing, Unter den Eichen 87, 12205 Berlin, Germany
a b s t r a c t a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 8 May 2013
Received in revised form 24 September 2013
Accepted 29 October 2013
Available online 4 December 2013
Keywords:
Renery disaster
Vapor Cloud Explosion
Fire
Safety distance
Overpressure
Radiation
Amuay renery disaster (2012) is another recent example of Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) and re acci-
dents preceded by Bunceeld (2005), Puerto-Rico (2009) and Jaipur (2009), respectively [9]. The incident
has left many safety issues behind which must be repeatedly addressed. Unfortunately, the lessons taught
by previous similar events are just not understood carefully. It reveals that the proper safety measures for
such facilities were either underestimated or were not accounted seriously. Consequently, the resulting
overpressures from explosion and the subsequent thermal radiation from tank res have once again proved
to be disastrous to both mankind and infrastructure. This article highlights the aftermaths of Amuay incident and
addresses the challenges put forwardby it. Furthermore, a comparative study is performedbetweensuchincidents
to analyze the similarities and how they could have been avoided.
2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
On the 25th of August 2012 about 1.11 AM(GMT) an explosion took
place at Punto Fijo renery (also known as Amuay renery) situated in
the northwest of Venezuela and run by an state-owned company
Petrleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) [1-6] (Fig. 1(a) and (b)). It is the
world's second largest renery after Jamnagar in India. The major prod-
ucts the renery handles are crude oil, Liqueed Petroleum Gas (LPG)
and Liqueed Natural Gas (LNG). The severity of shock waves generated
by the explosion shook the nearby residential areas and the residents.
According to the eyewitnesses it felt like an occurring earthquake. The
incident cost signicant damage, more than 50 lives (some also report-
ed up to 100), over 100 seriously injured and several suffered with light
injuries. Apart frommore than 1600 houses that were completely dam-
aged, more than 200 houses were evacuated and people were trans-
ferred to safer places [2,3]. The total capital loss assessed was more
than $1 billion. The reasons behind the incident are still unclear. Some
sources claimthat there was a lack of maintenance while others consid-
er poor safety practices as important reasons [13]. Whatsoever the rea-
sons were at the end of the day it caused a huge destruction and setback
and led the safety community to reviewthe existing plant safety norms
and procedures.
2. The incident
Fig. 1(c) is depicting the regions where the dispersion, explo-
sion and re events probably took place and the path that the
vapor cloud have followed can be seen in marked arrows in
Fig. 1(d).
Like most of the others Amuay incident also began with a leak of
a ammable material. This time it was alkenes although some have
also reported Liqueed Natural Gas (LNG) or liquid propane (or bu-
tane) [24]. They are all high vapor pressure fuels tending to form
ammable dense-than-air (1.5 times) vapor clouds once released
in the atmosphere [7]. Depending on the atmospheric stability and
wind conditions this vapors either can be carried away or can be
gradually settled down on the ground and form a thick cloud. Usual-
ly, in a facility like Amuay (onshore) fuel vapors resulting from a
minor leak are assumed to be taken away by the strong wind.
When that is not the case the chances of accumulation of the dis-
persed vapor are greater and therefore the scenario can be extreme-
ly hazardous when this cloud contacts an ignition source. A running
vehicle, a cigarette or pumps and motors installed nearby are suf-
cient to ignite this cloud. When a dense ammable cloud is ignited
the ame front travels at a speed more than the speed of sound
pushing the unburned mixture ahead of it and leading to detonation.
The scenario gets worse when these shock waves nd obstacles (build-
ings, trees, congestion) on their way which help to enhance pressure.
These high pressure (blast) waves and also those felt in similar in-
cidents before as well ~200 kPa are sufcient to destroy a car, con-
crete walls, dwellings, warehouses and nearby facilities [810]. The
intensity of disaster worsens when the surrounding tanks are also af-
fected and join the catastrophe.
Fuel Processing Technology 119 (2014) 198203
Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 30 81044453; fax: +49 30 81041227.
E-mail address: kirti-bhushan.mishra@bam.de (K.B. Mishra).
0378-3820/$ see front matter 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fuproc.2013.10.025
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Fuel Processing Technology
j our nal homepage: www. el sevi er . com/ l ocat e/ f upr oc
According to the media sources the plant management had laid-
back attitude towards the regular maintenance and updation [25].
Some also reasoned their negligence and ignorance even after
knowing the fact days before the incident that something was
leaking and smelling [2]. Many of them quote it as an incident that
was just waiting to happen. However, the disaster happened and
the government has set-up a high level committee to investigate it
[1].
Inthis article the incident has beentechnically analyzed and probable
causes of the incident are looked in. Care must be exercised while
treating certain specications taken from the internet pages which may
not be fully correct.
2.1. Failure of equipments
The story of hazard most often begins when an installed compo-
nent fails to function. Such failures can be in the valves, pumps and
pipings. The reasons for these failures could be the lack of mainte-
nance, corrosion, and poor safety know-hows and can be even inten-
tional. The investigation reports published on previous incidents
that took place in Bunceeld (UK) and Sitapura (India) [8,9] revealed
that the failure of a valve led the gasoline tank to overow for many
hours. However, in Amuay the leak of a liqueed gaseous fuel (based
on the tellings of eyewitnesses) was reported [24]. Improper func-
tioning of pump, piping and valve connected to the olen tanks
was also published on some sites [2,3]. On the basis of these factors
it was believed that in Amuay incident the failure was somewhere
in the valve and pipings.
2.2. Dispersion of fuel
As a result of the failure of a valve the accumulating high vapor
pressure fuel (olens) started to disperse in the atmosphere. The
vapors of olens are about 50% denser than air [4]. This dense-
than-air cloud has a tendency to stick to the ground and form
white irregular pattern like fog under stable wind conditions. It
does not smell as such unless it contains some additives like hydro-
gen sulde [2]. The reported smell in the surroundings may be be-
cause of the same [2]. The fuel continued to disperse but was not
harmful as long as strong winds ew it off. Soon the wind speed
slowed down and the accumulation of dispersed fuel began. It al-
most spread out to a radius of 0.6 km (see Fig. 2). Based on the vi-
sual observation of witnesses, employees of lube oil plant and the
devastated cars (road adjacent to guard's residence) support the
extent of this dispersion radius.
2.3. Vapor Cloud Explosion
The spread of the dense-than-air cloud continued to get wider
until 1.11 AM of 25th when it came into contact of a potential source
of ignition and exploded. There were no evidences of second and
subsequent explosions. The damages inside and outside the plant
favor the idea that the ignition source was probably not inside the pre-
mises as what was also felt and told by the residents. The vehicles pass-
ing by are the most likely source of ignition [3]. Also the self-ignition of
such clouds could be possible under certain conditions [8]. The Amuay
renery and surroundings cannot be considered fully unconned to
prove the deagration to detonation transitions. In the past in the
Fig. 1. Locations of: a) Amuay renery; b) the renery region; c) sources of explosion and multiple tank/pool res; d) the origin and path of dispersion [5,6].
199 K.B. Mishra et al. / Fuel Processing Technology 119 (2014) 198203
sites of similar nature the partial connements were always considered
to be present. The overpressures generated due to the explosion waves
are of such high magnitude that they crushed vehicles, bent concrete
and steel fences, blown away the roofs and demolished structure
(Fig. 6(a), (b), (c) and (d)). For such destruction previous analyses
have shown that overpressures in such explosions can be in the range
of a minimum of 150 kPa (1.5 bar) to a maximum of even up to
2000 kPa (20 bar) (Fig. 3). In Fig. 3 the overpressure values vs. scaled
distance (TNT method [11]) and effects thereof are shown [9]. The
widely used overpressure calculation methods [814] are discussed as
follows:
2.3.1. Baker and Strehlow method
This method is based on the Mach number M
W
(ame veloci-
ty), reactivity of fuel and level of congestion and connement
[11,12]. Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) for maximum overpressure P
max
,
dimensionless average side on pressure P
S
and the scaled distance
R are
P
max
2:4
M
2
W
1 M
W

1
P
S

P
max
P
a
2
R R
P
a
E
1

1=3
: 3
When a medium reactivity, a Mach number M
W
of 0.55, a total
available energy E
1
(J) and a high level of congestion are assumed
an overpressure of 50 kPa results. The P
S
is plotted against R in
Fig. 4.
2.3.2. TNO (multi energy method)
In multi-energy method the following equation describes the maxi-
mum overpressure caused by a VCE:
P
max
0:84 VBR
L
f
D

2:75
S
2:7
L
D
0:7
=84: 4
Where P
max
: Maximum overpressure in kPa; VBR: Volume blockage
ratio (%); L
f
: Flame path length (m); D: Average obstacle diameter (m);
S
L
: Laminar burning velocity of ammable mixture (m/s).
The dependence of dimensionless overpressure Eq. (2) on distance
Eq. (3) is shown in Fig. 5. When this method is applied with VBR of
4%, L
f
= 60 m, D = 0.3 mand S
L
= 0.52 m/s for butane [9] it estimates
the overpressure to be N2000 kPa [9].
Considering the damaged vehicle at the source and the destructed
house (Fig. 6) at about 0.2 km from the source a conservative estima-
tion of overpressure predicted by BakerStrehlowTang and Game cor-
relation (TNO method) [11,12] can be in the range of 120300 kPa (1.2
to 3 bar). This estimation considered the ame path length of more
than 30 m which is likely that the ame traveled from road towards
the tank which is at about 200 m and volume blockage ratio of 4% Fig. 3. Explosion overpressure versus scaled distance.
Fig. 2. Extent of the possible dispersion radius and location of potential source of ignition.
200 K.B. Mishra et al. / Fuel Processing Technology 119 (2014) 198203
although considering the vegetation (trees) and buildings it can be up
to 6% [10]. Also medium connement and reactivity of the fuel are con-
sidered. Moreover, the vapor cloud must have been ignited at the pe-
riphery (at the road) which made the overpressure signicantly lower
thanthose recordedin Bunceeld[8]. The destructions seenin the near-
by region, e.g., in the entire residential area of national guards which is
about 0.4 km in radius from the probable source of explosion (Fig. 2)
are clearly from within the unsafe region considering the presented
range of overpressures [11]. However, comparing the previous inci-
dents with Amuay can be only worthy when a detailed investigation re-
port has been performed.
2.4. Multiple tank res
The heavier and medium vapor pressure hydrocarbon (naptha)
tanks that were installed just across the olen tanks also got ignited
after the explosion occurred. Three of the four tanks shown in Figs. 1(c)
and 7(d) were observed to be ring (Fig. 7). Very large and thick res
with a great amount of smoke obscured the sky. Sometimes the res
were also seen to be highly inuenced by the crosswind (Fig. 7(b) and
(c)) and approaching other tanks. Fortunately, none of the gas tanks
were further exploded although the scenario could not have been
impossible.
There are various models available to estimate the thermal radiation
emitted by the single or multiple res. Here only two methods are con-
sidered and are discussed as follows:
2.4.1. Solid ame model
Solid ame model basically considers the ame as a solid body (3Dcy-
lindrical or 2D rectangular) and if the average radiation from the surface
of such an assumed body is dened one can estimate the safety distance
by using the equation for view factor
F,R
as written below [9,12,13].

F;R

E
SEP
5

F;R

1
2
b

b
2
y
2
q tan
1
H

b
2
y
2
q
H

H
2
y
2
q tan
1
b

H
2
y
2
q
0
B
@
1
C
A
6
WhereEis irradiance (kW/m
2
); SEP: average surface emissive power
(kW/m
2
); : Transmissivity (); b: average ame width(m); andH: av-
erage ame length (m).
The measured irradiance and relative safety distance for large
scale pool/tank re experiments are shown in Fig. 8. The largest
size of the pool used was 25 m. Nonetheless, it forms a basis for fur-
ther approximations.
In Amuay one tank was of size of about 64 m and considering a
multi-re scenario with 3 tanks a safety distance for thermal radiation
exposure (a limiting value 1.5 kW/m
2
) of about 0.5 kmfromthe bound-
ary of tank farms can be established [9]. Fortunately, the tanks were not
seen to be engulfed to form a large single pool reducing the chance of
more catastrophic consequences.
2.4.2. CFD (Computational Fluid Dynamics) model
Computer based simulation can also be used to assess the reliable
safety distances from large pool/tank res. The detailed methodologies
are described in [9,1517]. The time averaged ame surface tempera-
tures can be obtained by solving reactive NavierStokes equations.
This average ame surface temperature can be further utilized to ob-
tain a Surface Emissive Power SEP with appropriate emissivity. After
obtaining the SEP the discussed solid ame model above can be used to
predict the average irradiance and relative safety distances (y/d). Such
a predictiontogether withexperimental data [17] for large hydrocarbon
fuel (diesel, gasoline, JP-4) pool res is shown in Fig. 8. Considering the
large diameter d of res at Amuay site the safety distances y~ 3d (EN
1413: 1.5 kW/m
2
[9,16]) can be established.
3. Challenges ahead
Avoiding future renery disaster requires a number of reviews of safe-
ty guidelines/regulations that were targeted and nally achieved. In cases
where the favorable conditions for such catastrophes are majorly con-
trolled by the surrounding weather e.g. onshore facilities like in Amuay
it is expected to be more cautious while performing routine maintenance
or transferring the fuels for transportation purposes. Above all, special
care must be given to high vapor pressure fuels like LNG which have en-
tirely different dispersion behavior. The storage tanks of LNG and fuels
alike should be separated by a reasonable distance from medium vapor
Fig. 4. Scaled overpressure versus scaled distance (BakerStrehlowTang).
Fig. 5. Scaled overpressure versus scaled distance (multi-energy method).
201 K.B. Mishra et al. / Fuel Processing Technology 119 (2014) 198203
pressure fuels e.g. crude oil as there could be an engulfment scenario of
other fuel tanks leading to more devastation.
Minor leakages should not be ignored prior to routine maintenance
schedule. It should be reported to higher authorities and causes of leak
should be tried to identify. The semi-skilled workers performing such
maintenance should be trained to not ignore such leakages even when
they have done the same and did not face ugly consequences in the
past. Sometimes, it is neglected by the higher ofcials of the safety
unit as they believe that the small/minor leakage can be carried away
by the strong wind (onshore facilities). If that is not the case the vapor
cloud will spread and accumulate depending on the extremities of the
bund. When a small maintenance activity like welding work is started
Fig. 6. Aftermaths of the incident: a) crushed car; b) bent column and destructed boundary wall; c) collapsed steel frames; d) severe cracks on the walls [5].
Fig. 7. a) Tank re and other approximate tanks. b) Crosswind pushes the re to the other tanks/facilities. c) Thermal radiation from re inuencing the olen tanks. d) Site after the
incident.
202 K.B. Mishra et al. / Fuel Processing Technology 119 (2014) 198203
within the lower ammability limits of the mixture vapor cloud will ig-
nite and explode with overpressure values leading to severe conse-
quence like those faced in Amuay. Additionally, the congestion in the
form of residential buildings and vegetation in the blast and radiation
radius should be avoided as much as possible. Obstacle free path will
lower the probability of DDT (deagration to detonation transitions).
Top management responsible for the safety of the plant should
keep on reviewing and inspecting safety measures on regular basis
close to the places where probably a leak might begin. Such places
are ttings, joints, valves and pipings. The properties of materials
for these equipment's should also be checked with great care to
avoid any material failure due to corrosion.
To deal with post incident scenario proper mitigation plan has to be
made beforehand. Obviously, such mitigation measures will rely largely
on the reliable estimation of major hazards else it would be too conser-
vative and may overestimate the consequences and put unnecessary -
nancial burden on the plant. Therefore, a proper coordination between
plant safety personnel and management is also necessary to assure
the economical safety measures.
On top of the abovementioned suggestions the safety experts of the
plant should rather motivate and aware the subordinates to followsafe-
ty practices at the maximum possible limits.
The following points summarize the challenges ahead.
1. Appropriate estimation of the overpressures and learning from
Bunceeld, Sitapura and Perto Rico incidents.
2. Appropriate estimation of thermal radiation hazards from multiple
re tanks.
3. Reducing the poor management policies towards maintenance and
motivating employee awareness towards safety.
4. Strict procedures/rules for negligence and ignorance on minor
leakages.
5. Minimizing the congestion in the safety region (blast radius).
4. Conclusions
Amuay incident has added one more question mark in process safety
know-hows and serious implementations thereof. The residents and
daily lives should be in no way affected by the incidents. Similar inci-
dents in the past have occurred more or less due to similar reasons.
The predictions of safetydistances fromthe blast overpressure andther-
mal radiation from multi-tank res were carried out in the present
study. These conservative estimations are symbolic in nature however
detailed investigation by the safety community and government should
perhaps indicate the causes and remedies to avoid such disastrous
events worldwide in the future.
References
[1] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19393467.
[2] http://globalbarrel.com/2012/08/30/amuay-renery-disaster-syrian-naphtha-chavez-
petroleum-revolution-in-ames/.
[3] http://www.petroleumworld.com/storyt12090501.htm.
[4] http://www.slideshare.net/RiskMgmtGroup/amuay-ucve-14177498.
[5] http://www.google.com/images?q=amuay+re+images&oe=utf-8&rls=org.
debian%3Aen-GB%3Aunofcial&client=iceweasel-a&gs_l=heirloom-serp.34742.
8829.0.8989.9.9.0.0.0.0.38.193.9.9.00.01c.VqmLOsfvOQQ&hl=de&sa=X&oi=
image_result_group&ei=Rso5UZXuIdHFswadooHICQ&ved=0CBsQsAQ.
[6] http://wikimapia.org/#lat=11.7408755&lon=-70.2092887&z=14&l=0&m=
b&search=amuay%20renery.
[7] R.P. Koopman, D.L. Ermak, Lessons learned from LNG safety research, Journal of
Hazardous Materials 140 (2007) 412428.
[8] The Bunceeld Incident, The nal report of the Major Incident Investigation Board
Volume 1 and 2, Health and Safety Executive, UK, 11 December 2005. ISBN 978 0
7176 6270 8.
[9] K.B. Mishra, K.D. Wehrstedt, H. Krebs, Lessons learned from recent fuel storage res,
Journal of Fuel Processing Technology 107 (2013) 166172.
[10] J. Taveau, The Bunceeld explosion: were the resulting overpressures really unfore-
seeable? Process Safety Progress 31 (1) (2012) 5571.
[11] Q.A. Baker, E.A. Tang, E.A. Scheier, G.J. Silva, Vapor cloud explosion analysis, Process
Safety Progress 15 (2) (1996) 106109.
[12] A.C. Van den Berg, The multi-energy method: a framework for vapor cloud explo-
sion blast prediction, Journal of Hazardous Materials 12 (1989) 110.
[13] http://www2.gexcon.com/calculators/new/TNTMethod.php.
[14] O.R. Hansen, P. Hinze, D. Engel, S. Davis, Using computational uid dynamics (CFD)
for blast wave predictions, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23
(2010) 885906.
[15] P.K. Raj, A review of the criteria for people exposure to radiant heat ux from res,
Journal of Hazardous Materials 159 (2008) 6171.
[16] K.B. Mishra, Experimental investigation and CFD simulation of organic peroxide
pool res (TBPB and TBPEH), BAM-Dissertation Series 63, Berlin, Germany, 2010,
ISBN 978-3-9813550-6-2.
[17] I. Vela, CFD Prediction of Thermal Radiation of Large, Sooty, Hydrocarbon Pool Fires,
PhD Thesis University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, 2009.
Fig. 8. Average irradiance versus non-dimensional distance from pool rim.
203 K.B. Mishra et al. / Fuel Processing Technology 119 (2014) 198203