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Anti-Americanism is growing in Latin America extending an olive
branch to Cuba is necessary to re-establish our regional soft power
Perez JD Yale Law School 2010 David America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department Harvard Latino Law Review lexis
Anti-Americanism has become the political chant de jour for leaders seeking long-
term as well as short-term gains in Latin American elections. In Venezuela, the
anti-American rhetoric spewed by Hugo Chavez masks his otherwise autocratic
tendencies, while countries like Bolivia and Ecuador tilt further away from
Washington, both rhetorically and substantively. The former expelled the U.S. Ambassador in October 2008, and the latter
has refused to renew Washington's lease on an airbase traditionally used for counter-narcotics missions. The systemic
neglect for eight years during the Bush Administration meant that political capital
was never seriously spent dealing with issues affecting the region. Because of this, President
Bush was unable to get much headway with his proposal to reform immigration, and his free trade agreement with Colombia
encountered significant opposition in Congress. Recent examples of U.S. unilateralism, disregard for
international law and norms, and a growing financial crisis, have all been seized
by a new generation of populist Latin American leaders who stoke anti-American
The region, however, is absolutely critical to our national interest and security. Over
thirty percent of our oil comes from Latin America - more than the U.S. imports
from the Middle East. Additionally, over half of the foreign-born population in the United States is Latin American,
meaning that a significant portion of American society is intrinsically tied to the region. n1 These immigrants, as well as their sons
and daughters, have already begun to take their place amongst America's social, cultural, and political elite.
Just south of America's borders, a deepening polarization is spreading throughout
the entire region. In the last few years ideological allies in Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela have written and approved new constitutions that have consolidated the
power of the executive, while extending - or in Venezuela's case eliminating -
presidential term limits. In Venezuela the polarization has been drawn along economic lines, whereby Chavez's base
of support continues to be poor Venezuelans. In Bolivia the polarization has been drawn along racial lines: the preamble to the new
Bolivian constitution, approved in January 2009, makes reference to the "disastrous colonial times," a moment in history that
Bolivians of Andean-descent particularly lament. Those regions in Bolivia with the most people of European or mixed descent have
consistently voted for increased provincial autonomy and against the constitutional changes proposed by President Morales.
Perhaps due to its sweeping changes, the new Constitution was rejected by four of Bolivia's nine provinces. n2 Like Bolivia, Latin
America is still searching for its identity.
[*191] Traditionally the U.S. has projected its influence by using varying
combinations of hard and soft power. It has been a long time since the United States
last sponsored or supported military action in Latin America, and although highly context-
dependent, it is very likely that Latin American citizens and their governments would view any
overt display of American hard power in the region negatively. n3 One can only imagine the
fodder an American military excursion into Latin America would provide for a leader like Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales
of Bolivia. Soft power, on the other hand, can win over people and governments without
resorting to coercion, but is limited by other factors.
The key to soft power is not simply a strong military, though having one helps, but rather an
enduring sense of legitimacy that can then be projected across the globe to
advance particular policies. The key to this legitimacy is a good image and a
reputation as a responsible actor on the global and regional stage. A good
reputation and image can go a long way toward generating goodwill, which
ultimately will help the U.S. when it tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in
the region. n4
In order to effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its
image by going on a diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's
leaders, but also the Latin American people, of the important relationship between
the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the problems facing Latin America today
cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation. Working
with other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up
legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on
Cuba, every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen
its existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look to us
for "ideas and solutions, not lectures." n5
When analyzing ecosystems, environmental scientists seek out "keystone species." These are organisms that, despite their small size,
function as lynchpins for, or barometers of, the entire system's stability. Cuba, despite its size and isolation, is a keystone
nation in Latin America, having disproportionately dominated Washington's
policy toward the region for decades. n6 As a result of its continuing tensions with
Havana, America's reputation [*192] in the region has suffered, as has its ability to
deal with other countries. n7 For fifty years, Latin American governments that hoped to
endear themselves to the U.S. had to pass the Cuba "litmus test." But now the
tables have turned, and the Obama Administration, if it wants to repair America's
image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba litmus test of its own. n8 In short, America
must once again be admired if we are going to expect other countries to follow our
example. To that end, warming relations with Cuba would have a reverberating effect
throughout Latin America, and would go a long way toward creating goodwill.
US influence in Latin America is key to prevent Chinese crowd in
the impact is cyber war
Perez JD Yale Law School 2010 David America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department Harvard Latino Law Review lexis
The absence of a strong American presence over the last eight years has also given
China the opportunity to step in as a major player, both economically and politically, in regions all
around the world, but particularly in Latin America. The Chinese government has invested
a tremendous amount of soft power in Latin America, where it is now the continent's third largest
trading partner, with an annual trade growth of 30% since 2001. n115 American disinterest in Latin America
has convinced many countries to adopt a "Pacific view," whereby China steps in to
fill the gap left by America's absence. n116
After signing a free trade agreement with Chile, China quickly displaced the United States as that country's largest export market.
China also [*224] recently displaced the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trading partner. n117 In 2000, trade between China and Latin
America hovered around $ 13 billion, but in 2007, that number had increased to $ 102 billion, and by 2008 total trade was valued at
$ 140 billion. n118 Even despite the current financial crisis, trade between China and Latin America is likely to grow during the next
five years.
China's interest in Latin America is also based on its increasingly assertive global
political agenda. In 2007, Costa Rica dropped its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, a move heavily courted by Chinese
officials. In 2008, President Hu rewarded Costa Rica's new policy by visiting San Jose and signing a free trade agreement in 2010.
China also timed the release of a new policy paper on Sino-Latin American relations to coincide with
President Hu's most recent trip to the region. It charts China's growing relationship with Latin
America and promises increased cooperation in scientific and technological
research, cross-cultural educational exchanges, as well as political and economic
exchanges. n120 As China's role in Latin America increases, American clout
correspondingly decreases in terms of relative power. To be sure, the U.S. will remain the major
powerbroker in the Americas for decades to come, but will increasingly have to make room for a new player. Given this
diminishing economic position, Washington will have to rely more heavily on
diplomatic initiatives that shore up credibility rather than simply economic
incentives and disincentives, such as bilateral trade agreements.
(7B) China's Strategic Interest in Cuba
China's presence in Cuba is rather significant: after Venezuela, China is Cuba's second-largest trading
partner with $ 2.3 billion worth of goods exchanged. n121 In fact, China purchases over 400,000 tons of Cuban sugar, as well as half
its annual output of nickel, which is Cuba's top export. n122 In 2008, on a visit to Cuba, Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to not
only defer for ten years some of Cuba's debt payments, but also to invest $ 80 million in the island's health industry. n123 Moreover,
as long as Taiwan is a [*225] thorny issue for U.S.-Sino relations, China will have a stake in Cuba. China is neurotic about the
functional American presence in Taiwan and has made its intentions for the island known to everyone; the only thing standing
between Beijing's re-appropriation of Taipei is Washington. An increased Chinese presence in Cuba
might be a strategic move by Beijing to later leverage their presence on the island
for a change in America's Taiwan policy.
In the unlikely event of hostile engagement with the United States, China has an incentive to develop
technological capabilities in Cuba, which can be used in tandem with cyber and
communications warfare against Washington. Development of such capabilities
may already be happening. China has a huge presence at Lourdes, a former Soviet espionage base just outside of
Havana, where in 2004 Hu Jintao visited and confirmed that most of the technology housed there, including almost all of the
computers, came from China. n124 Another former Soviet base in Bejucal may now also house both Cuban and Chinese intelligence
analysts. n125 But China's leadership is pragmatic, not ideological, which begs the question: what is China getting in return for all
this assistance? If China is cooperating with Cuban intelligence to spy on the United
States, a greater American presence on the island would be needed to fully
understand the scope of this rather disturbing operation.
Cyber-attack would destroys the US economy
Vatis, 2000 (Michael, FBI, Congressional Testimony to the Subcommittee on Crime in the
House and the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, Federal News Service, 2/29,
And this is not just a criminal problem; it is also a national security problem. This is because our nation's critical
infrastructures -- and by that I mean those services that are vital to our economy and to our
national security, such as electrical power, telecommunications, transportation and government operations -- are
now all dependent on computer technology for their very operations. And that
dependence makes them vulnerable to an attack which, if successful, could deny service
on a very broad scale. The same basic types of cyber attacks that therefore have
become attractive to criminals are also attractive to foreign intelligence services,
who seek new ways to obtain sensitive government or proprietary information, and also to terrorists and hostile
foreign nations, who are bent on attacking U.S. interests.
Economic decline causes global war
Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction U.S. Department of Defense,
Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, Economics of
War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external
conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the
security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national
levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996)
work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the
rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-
eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a
redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances,
increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain
redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising
power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles
combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he
suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on
a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a
significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour
of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic
view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult
to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be
inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the
trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by
interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and
external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong
correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during
periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are
strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the
presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and
external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline
has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, &
Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce
the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing
unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased
incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag'
effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic
decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest
that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than
autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of
domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic
performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an
increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration
with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic
decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied
connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and
deserves more attention.
The plan leads to broader cooperation and influence in the region and
Perez JD Yale Law School 2010 David America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department Harvard Latino Law Review lexis
[*195] Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril. Latin
America's importance to the United States is growing by the day, and cannot be
overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is obviously of smaller import
than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy, climate change,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), addressing it would also involve correspondingly less
effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a disproportionately high
return by making regional cooperation more likely. n20 In order to confront any of
the major world issues facing the United States, Washington must find a way to
cooperate with its neighbors, who generally view U.S. policy toward Cuba as the
most glaring symbol of its historic inability to constructively engage the region.
These three reasons combine for a perfect storm: to the extent that a healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship
would mean a healthier U.S.-Latin America relationship, the former should be
pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has been absent for the last fifty
Aside from the strategic importance of this issue, addressing these concerns might also prevent more
serious problems in the future. Although the chances of a post-Castro Cuba becoming a failed state are slim, the
threat is nevertheless real. If the state were to collapse, the island could plunge into civil war,
face a humanitarian crisis, become a major drug trafficking center, experience a
massive migration to Florida, or endure a combination of each. However, a new
and comprehensive policy toward Cuba can help prevent these nightmare
scenarios from materializing.
There is no doubt that America's diminished image in Latin America means that it
will face additional difficulty when trying to accomplish its regional goals. n21 To
address the issues confronting the United States vis-a-vis Latin America (i.e., drugs,
the environment, trade, labor and human rights), Washington must restore its
heavily damaged image and regain its place as the region's trendsetter and leader.
Resolving America's "Cuba problem" is a low-cost/high-reward strategy that would inject new
energy and credibility into America's image. The Eight Recommendations found in this proposal are
suggestions that the Obama Administration should consider as it moves to reengage Latin America. Part of America's greatness is its
ability to inspire practical solutions in people. Any new U.S.-Cuban policy should embrace not only America's uncanny ability to
reinvent itself, but also the pragmatism that has made America so great to begin with.
This cooperation and influence is key to solve existential crisis
Inter-American Dialogue Policy Report, 2012 (IAD is a think tank hosting 100
leaders and experts from the US and Latin America, Remaking the Relationship: The United
States and Latin America, April, Online:
Many of the issues on the hemispheric agenda carry critical global dimensions. Because of
this, the United States should seek greater cooperation and consultation with Brazil, Mexico, and other
countries of the region in world forums addressing shared interests. Brazil has the broadest
international presence and influence of any Latin American nation. In recent years it has become far more active on global issues of concern to the United States. The United States and Brazil have clashed over
such issues as Irans nuclear program, non-proliferation, and the Middle East uprisings, but they have cooperated when their interests converged, such as in the World Trade Organization and the G-20
(Mexico, Argentina, and Canada also participate in the G-20), and in efforts to rebuild and provide security for Haiti. Washington has worked with Brazil and other Latin American countries to raise the profile
of emerging economies in various international financial agencies, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In addition to economic and
financial matters, Brazil and other Latin American nations are assuming
enhanced roles on an array of global political, environmental, and security issues.
Several for which US and Latin American cooperation could become increasingly
important include: As the worlds lone nuclear-weapons-free region, Latin America has the opportunity to participate more actively in non-
proliferation efforts. Although US and Latin American interests do not always converge on non-proliferation
questions, they align on some related goals. For example, the main proliferation challenges today are found
in developing and unstable parts of the world, as well as in the leakageor
transfer of nuclear materialsto terrorists. In that context, south-south
connections are crucial. Brazil could play a pivotal role. Many countries in the region give priority to climate change challenges.
This may position them as a voice in international debates on this topic. The importance of the Amazon basin to worldwide
climate concerns gives Brazil and five other South American nations a special role to play. Mexico
already has assumed a prominent position on climate change and is active in global policy debates. Brazil organized the first-ever global environmental meeting in 1992 and, this year, will host Rio+20. Mexico
hosted the second international meeting on climate change in Cancn in 2010. The United States is handicapped by its inability to
devise a climate change policy. Still, it should support coordination on the
presumption of shared interests on a critical policy challenge. Latin Americans are taking more active leadership
on drug policy in the hemisphere and could become increasingly influential in global discussions of drug strategies. Although the United States
and Latin America are often at odds on drug policy, they have mutual interests
and goals that should allow consultation and collaboration on a new, more
effective approach to the problem. Even as Latin America expands its global reach and presence, it is important that the United States and the region
increase their attention to reshaping regional institutions to better align them with current realities and challenges and to make them more effective. The hemispheres
institutional architecture is in great flux, and there is growing need for decisions
about priorities and objectives.
Lifting the embargo is essential to US-Cuba oil cooperation key to
solve independence from Middle East oil
Benjamin-Alvadaro 10 Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro, Report for the Cuban Research
Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of
Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence
Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, 2010, Brookings
Institution book, Cubas Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation
Conclusion and Recommendations
Undoubtedly, after fifty years of enmity, there is a significant lack of trust and confidence between the United States and Cuba. This is plain from the
almost quaint maintenance of a sanctions regime that seeks to isolate Cuba economically and politically but hardly reflects the dramatic changes that
have occurred on the island since 1991, not to mention since 2008,when Fidel Castro officially stepped aside as Cubas president. Now, the opportunity
to advance relations in the energy arena appears to be ripe. Since 2004, representatives from American companies, trade organizations, universities,
and think tanks have had the opportunity to meet with Cuban energy officials. The scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes have
been disseminated, dissected, and discussed across a number of settings where the interested parties are now familiar with and well versed in the
agendas and opportunities that exist in this arena. In public discussions, Cuban energy authorities have made it
clear that their preferred energy development scenario includes working closely
with the U.S. oil and gas industry and using state-of-the- art U.S. oil technologies. The assessment from
U.S. energy experts on the technical acumen and capability of Cuban energy
officials has been overwhelmingly positive.9 Should the U.S. government and the Obama
administration see fit to shift its policy so as to allow broader participation of American academics and practitioners in the energy field to
attend conferences and meet with Cuban energy officials, it may pave the way to establishing much-needed
familiarity and confidence across these communities. The United States and Cuba will
have a unique opportunity to employ a highly educated and competent cadre of Cuban engineers and technicians to work in
critical areas of the energy sector. This will deploy an underused segment of the Cuban workforce, and allow U.S. oil, construction,
and engineering firms to subcontract work to an emerging class of Cuban firms specializing in these areas. The Cubans have accumulated experience
and training from past energy cooperation projects and exchanges in Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, and other countries in the region. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that these contacts and exchanges have been wildly successful because of the Cubans high level of competence and strong work ethic. The
Cubans have gained invaluable knowledge and experience through the operation and construction of energy facilities in collaboration with their joint-
venture partners on the island. The United States possesses few options when it comes to
balancing the various risks to U.S. energy security and satisfying energy demand,
because U.S. energy independence is not attainable, the policy tools available to
deal with energy supply disruptions are increasingly inadequate, and the United
States needs to articulate a new vision of how best to manage international energy
interdependence. In particular, even if the United States were to choose to exploit all of its domestic energy resources, it would remain
dependent on oil imports to meet its existing and future demand. The critical need to improve the integrity of
the U.S. energy supply requires a much broader, more flexible view on the quest
for resourcesa view that does not shun a source from a potential strategic
partner for purely political reasons. U.S. decisionmakers must look
dispassionately at potential energy partners in terms of the role they might play in
meeting political, economic, and geostrategic objectives of U.S. energy security. The
Obama administration has signaled that it wants to reinvigorate inter-American cooperation
and integration; a movement toward energy cooperation and development with Cuba is
consistent with, and may be central to, that objective . The energy-security environment for the United States is at a critical
juncture. The productive capacity of two of the United States largest oil suppliers, Mexico and Venezuela, has declined, and the supporting energy
infrastructure in both countries is in need of significant revitalization. The vagaries of the politics in the region, the variability of weather patterns, and
the overall dismal state of the global economy create a setting of instability and uncertainty that requires close attention to the national security
interests of the United States vis--vis energy. Cubas energy infrastructure, too, is in need of significant repair and modernization (its many energy
projects notwithstanding); the price tag is estimated to be in the billions of dollars. Delaying work on many of these projects increases costs, because
deterioration of the infrastructure continues and eventually pushes up the cost of renovation and replacement. It also stands to reason that the lions
share of the financial burden of upgrading Cubas energy infrastructure will fall to the United States, directly and indirectly. Changes in
U.S. policy to allow investment and assistance in Cubas energy sector are a
precondition for international entities to make significant investments , yet this change
implies a large American footprint. Trade and investment in the energy sector in Cuba have been severely
constrained by the conditions of the embargo placed on the Cuban regime. These constraints also affect foreign firms seeking
to do business in Cuba because of the threat of penalties if any of these firms use technology containing more than 10 percent of proscribed U.S.
technologies needed for oil and gas exploration and production. American private investment and U.S. government assistance will constitute a large
portion of the needed investment capital to undertake this colossal effort. The longer that work is delayed, the
higher the cost to all the investors, which will then potentially cut into the returns
from such undertakings. U.S. cooperation with Cuba in energy just may create an opportunity for the United States to improve its
relations with Venezuela, if it can demonstrate that it can serve as a partner (or at a minimum, a supporter) of the Petrocaribe energy consortium.
The United States could provide much-needed additional investment capital in the development of
upstream, downstream, and logistical resources in Cuba that simultaneously addresses Petrocaribe objectives,
diversifies regional refining capacity, and adds storage and transit capabilities while enhancing
regional cooperation and integration modalities. This does not mean that the United States has to dismantle the nearly fifty-
year-old embargo against Cuba, but the United States will have to make special provisions that create commercial and trade openings for energy
development that serve its broad geostrategic and national security goals, as it has in the case of food and medicine sales to Cuba. This discussion is
intended to help distill understanding of U.S. strategic energy policy under a set of shifting political and economic environmental conditions in Cuba
and its implications for U.S. foreign policy for the near and long term. Because the policies can be considered works-in-progress, an understanding of
possible outcomes is important to those crafting future policy and making changes in the policymaking milieu.
Oil independence strengthens U.S. leadership
LeVine 11 Steve LeVine is a writer for Foreign Policy, November 1, 2011, Is this group think,
or is the U.S. about to be energy-independent?,
What could undermine the prognoses is if the result is relatively low oil prices, and a resumption of America's gluttonous gasoline appetite, which would erode millions of barrels of oil a day. Still, Crooks finds
solace in the volumes further afield, but still in the Western Hemisphere: "Even if the most optimistic hopes are not fulfilled," he
writes, "one can imagine a future in which the U.S. imports oil only from Canada, Mexico and a handful of
other friendly countries such as Brazil." But what does this mean in the big picture? First, America's trade balance
would improve considerably -- currently, crude oil imports account for 44 percent of the U.S. trade deficit, Crooks writes. But according to Citigroup oil economist
Edward Morse (quoted by Crooks), it also means a new day for the U.S. as a global superpower: The notion that the
U.S. was a superpower in the 20th century but won't be in the 21st doesn't hold up so well now. Compare it to a country such as China, which is going to be overwhelmingly dependent on energy imports. The U.S.
is in a much stronger position. I was left puzzled by that formulation of how the world works -- since oil is fungible and can be bought freely by anyone with the money, we have seen a parade of relatively
resource-poor nations carve out significant global economic and geopolitical places for themselves over the decades. Japan for example imports 98 percent of its oil; China imports much of its oil and natural gas,
not to mention metals. So why would relative American power abruptly reverse course compared
with China's simply because one has and the other lacks oil? I emailed Morse to find out. His reply:
Superpower status really does depend over time on lots of abilities to deliver
public goods for a wide variety of others; energy dependence is a severe handicap
for being able to do that. To be sure one can do it for a long period of time, perhaps, but not readily forever. China might or might not
have access to cheap energy feedstocks and to virtual self-sufficiency. The U.S.
stands an excellent chance of access to both; it's hard to write off an economy that
has these two pillars of long-term strength.
US global leadership is vital to protecting the globe from wars
Khalilzad 11 Zalmay Khalilzad, the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and
the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning
at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992, February 8, 2011, The Economy and National
Security; If we dont get our economic house in order, we risk a new era of multi-polarity,
We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India,
and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter
the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers
continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap
between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical
competition among major powers , increase incentives for local powers to play major
powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to
international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern
history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S.
leadership . By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics
resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international
systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences.
Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats.
Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation,
or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict . Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker
powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way,
hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival
powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition.
Beijings economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth
aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. Chinas strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around
China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, Chinas expansive territorial claims and provocative statements and actions
following crises in Korea and incidents at sea have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the
United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.

Soft Power General Impacts
Soft Power is key to solving competitiveness, terrorism, war,
proliferation, disease, human trafficking, and drug trafficking.
Joshua Kurlantzick, visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowments China Program, Dec
2005, The Decline of American Soft Power, Current History, Vol. 104, Iss. 686; pg. 419,
proquest, accessed 07/10/07
A broad decline in soft power has many practical implications. These include the drain in foreign
talent coming to the United States, the potential backlash against American companies, the
growing attractiveness of China and Europe, and the possibility that anti-US sentiment will
make it easier for terrorist groups to recruit. In addition, with a decline in soft power,
Washington is simply less able to persuade others. In the run-up to the Iraq War, the Bush administration could
not convince Turkey, a longtime US ally, to play a major staging role, in part because America's image in Turkey was so poor. During
the war itself, the United States has failed to obtain significant participation from all but a handful of major nations, again in part
because of America's negative image in countries ranging from India to Germany In attempts to persuade North Korea to abandon
its nuclear weapons, Washington has had to allow China to play a central role, partly because few Asian states view the United States
as a neutral, legitimate broker in the talks. Instead, Washington must increasingly resort to the other option Nye discusses-force, or
the threat of force. With foreign governments and publics suspicious of American policy, the White
House has been unable to lead a multinational effort to halt Iran's nuclear program, and instead
has had to resort to threatening sanctions at the United Nations or even the possibility of strikes against Iran. With
America's image declining in nations like Thailand and Pakistan, it is harder for leaders in these countries to openly embrace
counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, so Washington resorts to quiet arm-twisting and blandishments to obtain
counterterror concessions. Force is not a long-term solution. Newer, nontraditional security threats such as
disease, human trafficking, and drug trafficking can only be managed through forms of
multilateral cooperation that depend on America's ability to persuade other nations. Terrorism
itself cannot be defeated by force alone, a fact that even the White House recognizes. The 2002 National security
Strategy emphasizes that winning the war on terror requires the United States to lead a battle of ideas against the ideological roots of
terrorism, in addition to rooting out and destroying individual militant cells.
US leadership is key to solving the economy, disease, and WMD
Blinken 03 (Antony J, senior fellow at CSIS, Winning the War of Ideas, The Battle for
Hearts and Minds: edited by Alexander T. J. Lennon, pg. 284)
Why should the United States care that some criticize its policies and others resent its power? Following U.S. military success in
Afghani- stan, concluding that unilateral might makes right, silencing critics and creating a bandwagon effect among friends, is
tempting. As Charles Krauthammer wrote, "We made it plain that even if no one followed us, we would go it alone. Surprise: others
followed. ... Not because they love us. Not because we have embraced multilateralism. But because we have demonstrated
astonishing military power and the will to de- fend vital American interests, unilaterally if necessary."2 Military power remains the
foundation of U.S. security; successfully applied, it magni- fies U.S. influence. More than ever before, however, the
transnational nature of the problems the United States faces defies unilateral solutions. Global-
ization is erasing borders that once protected the United States, while empowering its enemies.
Thus, trouble on the far side of the planet, such as economic disaster, outbreak of disease, or
theft of a weapon of mass destruction, can quickly become a plague on the United States'
house. Rogue states, outlaw actors, and religious fanatics use the nation's very strengths-its
openness, advanced technology, and freedom of movement-against it, as demonstrated on
September 11. U.S. lead, ership is essential to meet these threats successfully; now more than
ever, however, so is followership. Whatever response the United States chooses-engagement,
containment, or elimination-requires the help of others.

AT: Heg Bad Hard Power Inevitable
Decline makes all their turns worse- US will be more violent and
desperate post-decline
Dupont June 2012 (Alan, professor of international security and director of the Institute
for International Security and Development at the University of New South Wales in Sydney,
Australia, An Asian Security Standoff, The National Interest, lexis)
What of the argument that America should accept the inevitable and share power
with China as an equal? Paralleling the G-2 would be an Asia-2, allowing Beijing and Washington to divide the region into
spheres of influence in much the same way as the United States and the Soviet Union managed a politically bifurcated Europe during
the early part of the Cold War. While superficially appealing because it holds out the prospect of a peaceful
transition to a new international order, power sharing between the United States and China is unlikely to work for
two reasons. First, no U.S. administration, regardless of its political complexion, would
voluntarily relinquish power to China, just as China wouldnt if the roles were reversed. Second, Chinas new
great-power status is hardly untrammeled. Nor is it guaranteed to last, for the country faces formidable environmental, resource,
economic and demographic challenges, not to mention a rival United States that shows no sign of
lapsing into terminal decline despite its current economic travails. Sooner than it
thinks, Beijing may have to confront the prospect of a resurgent Washington
determined to reassert its strategic interests.
Even Layne agrees- the US wont just give up
Layne June 2012 (Chris, professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M Universitys
George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, The Global Power Shift from West to East, The National Interest,
THE CONSTELLATION of world power is changing, and U.S. grand strategy will have to change with it. American elites must come
to grips with the fact that the West does not enjoy a predestined supremacy in international politics that is locked into the future for
an indeterminate period of time. The Euro-Atlantic world had a long run of global dominance, but it is coming to an end. The future
is more likely to be shaped by the East. At the same time, Pax Americana also is winding down. The United States can
manage this relative decline effectively over the next couple of decades only if it
first acknowledges the fundamental reality of decline. The problem is that many
Americans, particularly among the elites, have embraced the notion of American
exceptionalism with such fervor that they cant discern the world transformation
occurring before their eyes.
All their turns are inevitable - Zero Chances of willful US restraint
well inevitably be engaged globally the only question is
Shalmon and Horowitz 09 (Dan, Graduate Student in the PhD Program in Political
Science - International Relations at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Mike, Assistant
Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania- Philadelphia, Orbis, Spring)
It is important to recognize at the outset two key points about United States strategy
and the potential costs and benefits for the United States in a changing security
environment. First, the United States is very likely to remain fully engaged in
global affairs. Advocates of restraint or global withdrawal, while popular in some
segments of academia, remain on the margins of policy debates in Washington
D.C. This could always change, of course. However, at present, it is a given that the United States will
define its interests globally and pursue a strategy that requires capable military
forces able to project power around the world. Because indirect counter-strategies are the rational
choice for actors facing a strong states power projection, irregular/asymmetric threats are inevitable given Americas role in the
global order.24
AT: Heg Bad - Transition War
Transition from US dominance causes conflict- perception of
weakness spurs war- history proves
Friedberg 2011 (July/August, Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at
Princeton University, Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics, The National Interest, lexis)
THE UNITED States and the Peoples Republic of China are locked in a quiet but
increasingly intense struggle for power and influence, not only in Asia, but around
the world. And in spite of what many earnest and well-intentioned commentators seem to believe, the nascent Sino-
American rivalry is not merely the result of misperceptions or mistaken policies; it
is driven instead by forces that are deeply rooted in the shifting structure of the
international system and in the very different domestic political regimes of the two Pacific powers. Throughout history,
relations between dominant and rising states have been uneasyand often violent. Established powers tend to regard themselves as
the defenders of an international order that they helped to create and from which they continue to benefit; rising powers feel
constrained, even cheated, by the status quo and struggle against it to take what they think is rightfully theirs. Indeed, this story line,
with its Shakespearean overtones of youth and age, vigor and decline, is among the oldest in recorded history. As far back as the fifth
century BC the great Greek historian Thucydides began his study of the Peloponnesian War with the deceptively simple observation
that the wars deepest, truest cause was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta. The fact that the
U.S.-China relationship is competitive, then, is simply no surprise. But these countries are not just any two great powers: Since
the end of the Cold War the United States has been the richest and most powerful
nation in the world; China is, by contrast, the state whose capabilities have been
growing most rapidly. America is still number one, but China is fast gaining
ground. The stakes are about as high as they can get, and the potential for conflict
particularly fraught. At least insofar as the dominant powers are concerned, rising states tend to be troublemakers. As a
nations capabilities grow, its leaders generally define their interests more expansively and seek a greater degree of influence over
what is going on around them. This means that those in ascendance typically attempt not only to secure their borders but also to
reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far
from home; to defend their foreign friends and allies; to promulgate their religious or ideological beliefs; and, in general, to have
what they consider to be their rightful say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world. As they begin to assert
themselves, ascendant states typically feel impelled to challenge territorial
boundaries, international institutions and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when they
were still relatively weak. Like Japan in the late nineteenth century, or Germany at the turn
of the twentieth, rising powers want their place in the sun. This, of course, is what
brings them into conflict with the established great powersthe so-called status quo stateswho
are the architects, principal beneficiaries and main defenders of any existing international system. The resulting clash
of interests between the two sides has seldom been resolved peacefully. Recognizing the
growing threat to their position, dominant powers (or a coalition of status quo states) have occasionally tried to attack and destroy a
competitor before it can grow strong enough to become a threat. Othershoping to avoid warhave taken
the opposite approach: attempting to appease potential challengers, they look for ways to
satisfy their demands and ambitions and seek to incorporate them peacefully into the existing
international order. But however sincere, these efforts have almost always ended in
failure. Sometimes the reason clearly lies in the demands of the rising state. As was true of Adolf Hitlers Germany, an aggressor
may have ambitions that are so extensive as to be impossible for the status quo powers to satisfy without effectively consigning
themselves to servitude or committing national suicide. Even when the demands being made of them are less onerous, the dominant
states are often either reluctant to make concessions, thereby fueling the frustrations and resentments of the rising power, or too
eager to do so, feeding its ambitions and triggering a spiral of escalating demands. Successful policies of appeasement are
conceivable in theory but in practice have proven devilishly difficult to implement. This is why periods of transition,
when a new, ascending power begins to overtake the previously dominant state,
have so often been marked by war.
AT: Heg Bad - Heg Solves War
Collapse of US hegemony causes a global power vacuum resulting in
nuclear war
Ferguson 04 professor of history at New York University's Stern School of Business and
senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University (Niall, A World without Power,
Foreign Policy )
Could an apolar world today produce an era reminiscent of the age of Alfred? It could, though with some important and troubling
differences. Certainly, one can imagine the world's established powersthe United
States, Europe, and Chinaretreating into their own regional spheres of influence.
But what of the growing pretensions to autonomy of the supranational bodies created under U.S. leadership after the Second World
War? The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (formerly the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) each considers itself in some way representative of the international community. Surely
their aspirations to global governance are fundamentally different from the spirit of the Dark Ages? Yet universal claims were also an
integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other
civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was not a global Christendom, nor an all-embracing Empire of
Heaven. The reality was political fragmentation. And that is also true today. The
defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational
institutions, but downward. With the end of states' monopoly on the means of
violence and the collapse of their control over channels of communication,
humanity has entered an era characterized as much by disintegration as
integration. If free flows of information and of means of production empower
multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations (as well as
evangelistic religious cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive
technology empowers both criminal organizations and terrorist cells. These groups can
operate, it seems, wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global at
all. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few Page 5 strategic cities such as Kabul and Pristina. In short, it is the nonstate actors
who truly wield global powerincluding both the monks and the Vikings of our time. So what is left? Waning
empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified
cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower
might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age
would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth
century. For the world is much more populousroughly 20 times moreso
friction between the world's disparate tribes is bound to be more frequent.
Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely
on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to
be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just
to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalizationthe
integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capitalhas raised living
standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off
from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization
which a new Dark Age would producewould certainly lead to economic
stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11
devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work,
visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become
irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would
plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western
investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst
effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers.
The wealthiest ports of the global economyfrom New York to Rotterdam to
Shanghaiwould become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease,
terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft
carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure.
Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the
Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle
East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders.
In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work.
The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their
privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal
more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global
hegemony its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontierits critics at home and abroad must not
pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful
what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It
would be apolaritya global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces
than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder

Lack of hegemony extinction
Khalilzad, Rand Corporation 1995 (Zalmay Khalilzad, Spring 1995. RAND Corporation.
Losing the Moment? The Washington Quarterly 18.2, Lexis.)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to
multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end
in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the
global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a
world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear
proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would
help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid
another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership
would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
AT: Heg Bad - Heg Solves Democracy
Heg promotes democracy
Thayer 6 (Bradley A., Prof of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Missouri State University, In
Defense of Primacy., National Interest; Nov/Dec2006 Issue 86, p32-37)
Throughout history, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--
Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the
anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international
order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--
is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current
amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling
things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded
the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will
end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is
important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy
within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world.
During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France
and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between
Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia.
This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously
threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great
power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of
its ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen
noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the
American worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed
democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not
have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to
resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for
advancing the interests of the United States.
Democracy solves extinction
Diamond 95 (Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December,
Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global
ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated
with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular
sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly
democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or
glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much
less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons
of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading
partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible
because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.

AT: Heg Bad Heg Solves Deterrence
Heg collapse emboldens rogues it signals weakness
Thayer, 06 Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies,
Missouri State University (Bradley A., In Defense of Primacy, National Interest,
November/December, Lexis)
In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these
fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the
United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is
because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in
international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are
terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the
United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making
unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that
others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies
weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal
kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The
same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to
the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United
States is what protects the country from
Causes global wars that escalate perception is key
Victor Davis Hanson (Senior Fellow in Residence in Classics and Military History @ Hoover
Institution, Stanford University) December 2009 Change, Weakness, Disaster, Obama:
Answers from Victor Davis Hanson,
Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a
kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy
rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as
regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape whether China,
Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. are just waiting to see whos
going to be the first to try Obama and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as
they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess,
the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then Venezuela,
Russia, Iran, etc. do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect,
in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably
cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are
liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously
pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. Theres
an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th
parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. Indias borders with
both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows
whom it will bite or when. BC: Can Obama get any more mileage from his perpetually played Im not George W. Bush card or is
that card past its expiration date? Dr. Hanson: Two considerations: 1) Its hard (in addition to being shameless), after a year, for any
president to keep scapegoating a prior administration. 2) I think he will drop the reset/Bush did it throat-clearing soon, as his polls
continue to stay below 50 percent. In other words, it seems to be a losing trope, poll-wise. Americans hate whining and blame-
gaming. So the apologies and bows dont go over well here at home; one more will be
really toxic, politically speaking. Most are starting to see that our relations with Britain, Italy, Germany, or
France are no better under Obama and probably worse than during the Bush administration.

AT: Heg Bad - Its Sustainable
Heg is sustainable- challengers cant make up the power differential,
and trends point toward continued unipolarity
Beckley 2012 (Michael, PhD candidate at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Columbia, The Unipolar Era: Why
American Power Persists and Chinas Rise Is Limited, Dissertation found on google scholar)
More important, the gap in defense spending likely understates the true military gap
because U.S. economic superiority literally gives the United States more bang for
the buck each dollar it spends on the military produces more force than each
dollar China spends. In a separate study, I found that developing countries systematically fail at warfare, regardless of
the size of their defense budgets, because they lack the economic capacity to maintain, modernize, and integrate individual
technologies into cohesive military systems.206 Multivariate regressions suggest that military effectiveness is
determined by a countrys level of economic development, as measured by per
capita income, even after controlling for numerous material, social, and political
factors. As noted earlier, Chinas per capita income has declined relative to that of the
United States. Chinas defense industry has also fallen further behind: in 2008, the U.S.
share of the world conventional arms market surged to 68 percent while Chinas share dropped below 1.5 percent. If history is any
guide, this growing economic gap is also a growing military gap. The PLA may look increasingly respectable on paper, but its
performance in battle against the United States would not necessarily be much better than that of, say, Iraq circa 1991. Indeed, an
independent task force of more than thirty experts recently found no evidence to
support the notion that China will become a peer military competitor of the United
States.The military balance today and for the foreseeable future strongly favors
the United States and its allies.207 Figure 3.20: Share of World Arms Transfer Agreements, 1993-- 2008 Source:
Congressional Research Service, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-- 2008, p. 71; Ibid., Conventional
Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-- 2000, p. 73. None of this should be cause for chest-- thumping. China can pose
problems without catching up, compensating for its technological and organizational inferiority by utilizing asymmetric strategies,
local knowledge, and a greater willingness to bear costs.208 In particular, some experts believe Chinas anti-area-- denial
capabilities are outpacing U.S. efforts to counter them.209 There are reasons to doubt this claim the Pentagon is developing
sophisticated countermeasures and Chinese writings may purposefully exaggerate PLA capabilities.210 There is also reason to doubt
the strategic importance of Chinas capabilities because the United States may be able to launch effective attacks from positions
beyond the reach of Chinese missiles and submarines.211 It is certainly true, however, that the U.S. military has vulnerabilities,
especially in littorals and low-- altitudes close to enemy territory. But this has always been the case. From 1961 to 1968 North
Vietnamese and Vietcong units brought down 1,700 U.S. helicopters and aircraft with simple antiaircraft artillery and no early
warning radar.212 Sixty years ago, China projected a huge army into Korea and killed tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers. Yes,
weak adversaries can impose significant costs, but evidence of American
vulnerability is not the same as evidence of American decline. Conclusion Change is inevitable,
but it is often incremental and nonlinear. In the coming decades, China may surge out of its
unimpressive condition and close the gap with the United States. Or China might
continue to rise in place steadily improving its capabilities in absolute terms
while stagnating, or even declining, relative to the United States. The best that can be done is
to make plans for the future on the basis of present trends. And what the trends suggest is that Americas
economic, technological, and military lead over China will be an enduring feature
of international relations , not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded
material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future .

AT: Heg Bad No Counter Balancing
No counterbalancing- bandwagoning is more likely- maintaining the
power gap key to prevent challengers
Fiammenghi 2011 (Davide, postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Politics, Institutions, History at the University
of Bologna, The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics; A Neorealist Synthesis, International Security, Spring,
In principle, the absolute security threshold should not pose the same problem because of the logical limits in determining it.
Ideally, the absolute threshold should represent 50 percent of the capabilities in the system, because at this level the sum of all the
forces opposing the aspiring hegemon is insufficient to successfully balance it. Still, it is useful to consider William Wohlforth's
admonition: "If balancing were the frictionless, costless activity assumed in some balance-of-power theories, then the unipolar
power would need more than 50 percent of the capabilities in the great power system to stave off a counterpoise. . . . But such
expectations miss the fact that alliance politics always impose costs." 59 It is therefore reasonable to assume that the absolute
security threshold is around 45 percent of the military capabilities in the system. This is the figure William Thompson suggests in
describing a near-unipolar system. 60 In this light, the absence of balancing against the United States
today appears less puzzling. The United States has already moved beyond the
absolute threshold, making balancing futile. 61 Levy and Thompson raise the important question of why
other states failed to balance against the United States when it was a rising power but not yet a hegemon. 62 Part of the answer lies
in the United States' unusual path to primacy. For decades, the Soviet Union maintained a rough balance with the United States. 63
U.S. primacy resulted from the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union. It may be an exaggeration to suggest that the United States
became a hegemon by accident, but the outcome was not planned. 64 The extraordinarily wide gap in
capabilities created by the fall of the Soviet Union left other states with little choice
but to acquiesce. Countries such as China, Iran, Russia, and Syria, or even Brazil
and Pakistan, may not like U.S. primacy, but they lack the capabilities to challenge
it. 65 Meanwhile, other countries benefiting from U.S. primacy appear not to be worried
about it. The next section considers hegemonic strategies that can soften opposition.

No balancing US lead is insurmountable and is growing
Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University
of Toronto) 2010 Americas Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation
p. 19
As illustrated in table 2.1, the United States is by far the largest military spender and has actually
increased its share of world military spending in the last twenty years. Moreover, the United States lead over its
nearest competitor is actually stronger in the security arena than it was in 1988. The
Soviet Union was the closest rival in 1988, accounting for 18 percent of the world total, whereas China, the country with the second
largest share today, only accounts for 5 percent of the world total. Counting coalitions as potential
balancers, the euro area still accounts for a lower share today than did the Soviet
Union in 1988. The European Union, on the other hand, accounts for a larger share than did the Soviet Union in 1988.
But the European Unions share does not amount to even half of the United States
share of the world total. Without even throwing the technological sophistication of
American weaponry (or the collective action problems that many states confront when deciding to act in the national
interest) into the balance, it is clear that the United States is peerless in the security
sphere and has strengthened its lead in the last two decades. Because of the
superiority of American military power, and other states dependence on it for
effective action, the United States faces very few constraints in the security arena.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq is a case in point but there are plenty of other examples. As I will also show in chapter 6, there are also
economic advantages associated with this privileged position in the security field. Although some question the utility of armed force,
few will contest that the United States is in a league of its own when it comes to
security affairs. But what about the economic realm? The real test is whether the United States still towers over other
countries economically, and is able to reap economic benefits as a result of its hegemonic position. This is the claim that is likely to
be the most carefully scrutinized.

AT: Heg Bad Link Turn
Low US soft power leads to an increase in unilateralism.
Kurlantzick 07 (Joshua, fellow at the USC School of Public Diplomacy and the Pacific
Council on International Policy and previous foreign editor at The New Republic, Charm
Offensive, pg. 194)
This unpopularity matters. Even without China on the scene, America's declining popularity
decreases Washington's soft power, and potentially makes the United States more likely to
resort to force rather than persuasion to meet American objectives. One recent bipartisan report on
American diplomacy concluded as much, warning that if the "downward spiral [in diplomacy] is not reversed, the prospect of relying
on military force to protect US national interests will increase."34

AT: Not Enough Oil
US-Cuban joint oil production is the critical key to US oil self-
sufficiency---there are massive amounts of offshore oil waiting to be
Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida
International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at
Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at
UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, The Current Status and Future
Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,
Why is it important to clarify the current status of Cuban energy in the face of a
continuing opposition by the United States to anything resembling what can be construed as good news
for the Castro regime? Obviously, because up until this point it hasnt cost the United States
much if anything. The current policy continues to clearly place at the forefront the sanctity and utility of a
comprehensive economic and political embargo in the hopes that it helps to foment a change in regime and a peaceful transition to a
democratic system of governance and a complimentary market economy. As energy security concerns
continue to percolate up to an increasingly important status in the realm of
national security objectives we may begin to see the erosion of the hard position
against the Cuban regime regardless of its leadership. The overview of the Cuban
energy developments clearly and unambiguously reveals that the Castro regime
has every intention of continuing to promote, design and implement energy development
policies that will benefit Cuba for generations to come. Cuba is sparing no effort by instituting bottom-up
and top-down policy initiatives to meet this challenge. It has significantly increased its
international cooperation in the energy sector and continues to enhance its efforts
to ensure energy security in these most uncertain of times. But it stands to reason that no matter how
successful these efforts are, they will come up short. Two factors may alter this
present situation. First, Cuba may indeed realize a bonanza from the offshore
tracts that will allow it to possibly address its many energy challenges, from
increasing oil production and refining capacity, to improving the nations energy
infrastructure, ensuring a stable energy future. Second, and no less significant, is
the possibility of normalization of trade relations with the United States. This is
important not only because it will allow direct foreign investment, technology
transfer and information sharing between these neighboring states but it possibly
enhances the energy security of both states, and hence, the region, realized
through a division of labor and dispersion of resources that serve as a hedge
against natural disaster and market disruptions. Moreover, all states could derive benefit from the
public information campaigns to promote energy efficiency and conservation presently being promoted in Cuba in the face of
diminishing energy stocks and uncertain global markets. Ultimately, and only after normalization, the task still falls
to the Cuban government, but the cost will necessarily be spread through a
number of sources that are predominately American because of strategic interests,
proximity and affinity. It suffices to say that the requisite investment and assistance will
have a distinct American tinge to it, inasmuch as American corporations, U.S.
government agencies, and international financial institutions, of which the U.S. is
a major contributor, will play important roles in the funding of the effort to
revitalize the Cuban energy sector. Cuban officials are not averse and perhaps would
prefer that the U.S. be its major partner in this effort owing to the fact that most if not all of
the cutting-edge technology in energy, oil and gas comes from the United States. It is
remarkable that the Cuban energy sector is as vibrant as it presently is, absent the type
of infrastructural investment that is available to most developing states, in large part because of
the American economic embargo. Finally, the cost is significant and it stands to reason that
the longer one waits to address the challenge at hand the higher the cost of modernizing the
energy sector . For this reason alone, the American role in assisting Cuba in this effort will be
significant and every day that the task is put off, it increases the long-term cost of the
effort. This should serve as an obvious point of entry into cooperation with the
Cuban government and perhaps can serve as a catalyst for promoting confidence,
trust and cooperation in this critical issue area across the region.

AT: Environment Turn
Cuba wont spill---theyll be safe and U.S. involvement isnt key
Richard Sadowski 11, J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, Fall 2011, IN THIS ISSUE:
Sustainable Development Law & Policy, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y 37, p. lexis
Fears that Cuban offshore drilling poses serious environmental threats because of
the proximity to the United States and the prohibition on U.S. technology transfer are
overblown. Cuba has at least as much incentive to ensure safe-drilling practices as
does the United States, and reports indicate that Cuba is taking safety seriously. n64 Lee
Hunt, President of the Houston-based International Association of Drilling Contractors, said,
"[t]he Cuban oil industry has put a lot of research, study and thought into what will
be required to safely drill," and that "they are very knowledgeable of international
industry practices and have incorporated many of these principles into their safety
and regulatory planning and requirements." n65 Thus, while the economic embargo of
Cuba restricts American technology from being utilized, foreign sources have
provided supplemental alternatives. n66

Companies investing in Cuba have extensive offshore experience---no
risk of spills
Nerurkar & Sullivan 10 Neelesh Nerurkar, Specialist in Energy Policy at the
Congressional Research Service, and Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs at
the Congressional Research Service, November 29, 2010, Cubas Offshore Oil Development:
Background and U.S. Policy Considerations, online:
It is difficult to assess the likelihood of a spill. According to Saipem, Scarabeo-9 is built to
Norwegian standards, including extra equipment to shut off blown-out wells
beyond what is required in the United States.30 Repsol has significant offshore
experience, including projects in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. It has had issues with oil spills, which is not abnormal for an oil company.31
Among other Cuban lease holders, Petrobras and Statoil have extensive offshore experience,
including projects in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, and are generally seen as accomplished offshore operators.
Petronas, ONGC, and PetroVietnam also have offshore experience. PdVSA does not, but its offshore project appears the furthest from seeing
drilling activity among existing licenses.

Oceans are resilient
Kennedy 2 - Environmental science prof, Maryland. Former Director,
Cooperative Oxford Laboratory. PhD. (Victor, Coastal and Marine Ecosystems and Global Climate
There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems are resilient to environmental change. Steele
(1991) hypothesized that the biological components of marine systems are tightly
coupled to physical factors, allowing them to respond quickly to rapid
environmental change and thus rendering them ecologically adaptable .
Some species also have wide genetic variability throughout their range, which
may allow for adaptation to climate change.
Marine life is resilient
Dulvy 3 Professor of Marine Science and Technology, Newcastle
(Nicholas, Extinction vulnerability in marine populations, Fish and Fisheries 4.1)
Marine fish populations are more variable and resilient than terrestrial populations Great natural
variability in population size is sometimes invoked to argue that IUCN Red List criteria, as one example, are too conservative
for marine fishes (Hudson and Mace1996; Matsuda et al.1997; Musick 1999; Powles et al. 2000; Hutchings 2001a). For the
(1996) IUCN list, a decline of 20% within 10 years or three generations (whichever is longer) triggered a classification of
'vulnerable', while declines of 50 and 80% led to classifications of 'endangered' and 'critically endangered', respectively.
These criteria were designed to be applied to all animal and plant taxa, but many marine resource biologists feel that for
marine fishes 'one size does not fit all' (see Hutchings 2001a). They argue that percent decline criteria are
too conservative compared to the high natural variability of fish populations.
Powles et al. (2000) cite the six-fold variation of the Pacific sardine population (Sardinopssagax, Clupeidae) and a nine-fold
variation in northern anchovy (Engraulis mordax, Clupeidae) over the past two millennia to suggest
that rapid declines and increases of up to 10-fold are relatively common in
exploited fish stocks. It should, however, be borne in mind that the variation of exploited populations must be
higher than unexploited populations because recruitment fluctuations increasingly drive population fluctuations when there
are few adults (Pauly et al. 2002).

UQ Foreign Influence High
Cuba has experienced an increasing foreign influence- most notably
Venezuela & China
Erikson, Senior Advisor for Western Hemisphere Affairs @ the U.S.
Department of State, 05
rikson.pdf, 6/23/13 , PD)
Cubas international relations have undergone significant shifts in recent years,
with old alliances unraveling and new partnerships emerging. In particular, the
Cuban government of Fidel Castro has embarked on a path of deeper engagement
and cooperation with Venezuela and China that has transformed those two
countries into the most important international allies of Cuba today. Since 2001,
the rising influence of Venezuela and China constitute the most significant
realignment of Cubas foreign relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early
1990s. This is all the more striking because it has occurred against the backdrop of
modest U.S. efforts to tighten existing sanctions and hasten change in Cuba.
Without question, the emergence of Venezuelas Hugo Chavez has provoked the most
dramatic change in Cubas international relations in this hemisphere. Elected to the
helm of the most significant oil-producing country in Latin America in the late 1990s, Chavez
has steadily proceeded down a path of closer political and economic ties with Cuba. After his
temporary removal by force in April 2002, Chavez has become increasingly reliant on the advice
and counsel of Fidel Castro to help maintain his power in Venezuela. At the same time, Chavez
has offered hundreds of thousands of barrels of discounted oil to the Cuban government, which
has helped the island to keep its rickety economy afloat despite tougher U.S. measures. The
scope and nature of the Venezuela-Cuba relationship has also sparked concerns
that the two governments may seek to advance proposals that run counter to the
strengthening of market-oriented democracy in the region. A second major shift in
Cubas international profile is its deepening ties with the Peoples Republic of
China, a country of 1.3 billion people that has achieved sustained growth through introducing
market reform into its communist political system. China has prioritized Cuba as a key
partner in Latin America, and quickly surged to become the islands third largest
trading partner after Venezuela and Spain. Chinas interest in Cuba has led to
frequent high-level meetings, a series of economic cooperation agreements, and
growing exchanges in the areas of science, technology, and defense. China plans to invest
millions in Cuba to help secure needed commodities such as nickel and agricultural products,
and it has been a strong supporter of Cuban positions in international forums such as the United
Nations. The emergence of China as an economic power has strongly benefited the
Cuban economy and become a crucial component of the islands economic
planning. Cubas strong ties with Venezuela and China contrast sharply with its
deteriorating relations with other partners. While the European Union remains an
important economic player, Cubas dissident crackdown in 2003 and subsequent hostile rhetoric
have cooled relations considerably, despite moves by Spain to help improve ties. In Latin
America, Cuba has experienced a partial renaissance as a large swathe of South American
countries have elected center-left leaders, including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
While most countries have been hesitant to deepen ties with Cuba, almost all have at least
established normal diplomatic relations and several have stepped up their trade and investment
with the island. Meanwhile, Cubas once staunch alliance with Mexico has verged on total
breakdown during the administration of President Vicente Fox, mainly because the Mexican
government has backed successive UN resolutions condemning the human rights situation in
Cuba. Of all the worlds major capitals, only in Beijing and Caracas are Cubas
claims as a defender of the interests of the third world so attentively received, and
only China and Venezuela are attempting to harness Cuba as a vehicle for pursuing
their own national interests and international objectives. Recent evidence suggests
that any contemplation of Cubas present or future must extend to include the
scope and implications of the islands deepening links with Venezuela and China.

Foreign involvement in Cuba by Venezuela & China is edging out the
Erikson, Senior Advisor for Western Hemisphere Affairs @ the U.S.
Department of State, 05
rikson.pdf, 6/23/13 , PD)
U.S. officials have expressed concern that the two countries have entered into a
strategic alliance to thwart U.S. objectives in the region. During his time as the U.S.
special envoy to the Western Hemisphere, Otto Reich argued that we certainly see a
Venezuela-Cuba axis which is broadening and deepening and which is not
conducive to the promotion of democracy and human rights.5 Indeed, some U.S.
officials have expressed deep concerns that the mix of Castros smarts and
Venezuelas cash could evolve into a hotbed of anti-American sentiment, lead to
the rise of new leftist movements, and even pose a security threat to the United
States and its allies in the region. The collapse of the Bolivian government of Gonzalo
Sanchez de Lozada in 2003, followed by the resignation of his successor Carlos Mesa in 2005,
and the rise of indigenous leader Evo Morales, have generated rumors regarding this type of
involvement. Outgoing Assistant Secretary of State Roger Noriega has described
Fidel Castro as nostalgic for destabilizing elected governments and increasingly
provocative.6 It is true that many indigenous leaders express admiration for Castro and
Chavez at such left-wing gatherings as the Bolivarian Congress of the People, convened in
Caracas in November 2003. At the same time, Bolivias deep poverty, social tensions, and
history of racial exclusion hold considerable explanatory power regarding the countrys recent
UQ Russia
Russia is establishing military relations with Cuba
Meyer & Anatoly, Research Fellow at the School of Social and Political
Sciences, the University of Sydney, 12
(Henry, Temkin, Bloomberg Business Week, July 2012, Russia Seeks
Naval Bases in Cold War Allies Cuba, Vietnam,
supply-bases-in-cold-war-allies-cuba-vietnam, PD)
Russia is in talks to set up naval bases in former Cold War allies Cuba and Vietnam
as President Vladimir Putin undertakes the countrys biggest military overhaul
since the Soviet era. We are working on establishing navy bases outside Russia,
Vice-Admiral Viktor Chirkov, the navys commander-in- chief since May, said in an
interview with the state-run RIA Novosti news service and confirmed by the navy. We aim
to set up resupply bases in Cuba, the Seychelles and Vietnam. Russias intentions
for overseas military expansion threaten to further strain relations with the U.S.
when the former superpower rivals are at loggerheads over American missile-
shield plans and how to respond to the fighting in Syria. Putins government plans to
spend 23 trillion rubles ($712 billion) this decade on defense spending, including 4.4 trillion
rubles next year, an increase of 19 percent. Theres a lot of tension between Washington
and Moscow right now as Syria is creating a lot of bad feeling between them, said Pavel
Felgenhauer, an independent defense analyst in Moscow. This will be seen by some in
the U.S. as the Russian bear growling in its lair. Pentagon spokesman George Little said Russia
has a right to enter into military agreements and relationships with other nations, just as the
U.S. does. He didnt raise concern about Russia seeking military access to Cuba, which lies near
the mouth of the Gulf of Mexico and is 145 kilometers (90 miles) south of the Florida Keys. Red
Line U.S. Air Force General Norton Schwartz in 2008 warned Russia not to cross a
red line by stationing bombers in Cuba, where the deployment of Soviet missiles
brought Moscow and Washington close to nuclear conflict in 1962. Schwartz
commented after the newspaper Izvestia said Russia planned to build a refueling
base for strategic aircraft in the Communist island state in response to U.S. plans
to deploy elements of a missile- defense system in Europe. The Russian Defense
Ministry later denied the report. Under the deal that ended the 1962 Cuban crisis, the Soviet
Union withdrew its missiles and pledged not to station offensive weapons on the island. Russian
military cooperation with Cuba ended in 2002 after Russia closed its radar base at Lourdes,
Russias only intelligence-gathering center in the Western hemisphere, which had been
operating since the 1960s.

Russia is establishing military relations with Cuba
The Wall Street Journal, 5/18
(The Wall Street Journal, 5/18/13, Cuba Parliament Leader: Ties
With Russia Under Full Expansion,
20130518-700836.html, PD)
HAVANA (Xinhua)--Relations between Cuba and Russia are under full expansion,
Esteban Lazo, president of Cuban parliament, said Friday. Lazo made the remarks
after signing an agreement with the visiting leader of Russia's senate, Valentina
Matviyenko, to boost the parliamentary cooperation between the two countries. The delegation
of the Russian Senate arrived Thursday in Havana, headed by Ms. Matviyenko. Mr. Lazo said
the visit would boost the "excellent" historical ties between both the governments
and the peoples. He also called on Russia to increase the investments to the island country. Mr.
Lazo stressed the importance of the current Russian investments in Cuba's oil sector and
expressed the interest of the Cuban government in extending the cooperation to other areas,
such as nickel production, tourism and agriculture. Cuba isn't just a strategic partner for
Russia, but also a friend for whom Russia feels special affection, due to historical
connections, Ms. Matviyenko said. Havana and Moscow were close allies during the Cold
War era, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the relations cooled. Since 2005,
the bilateral relations have began to improve with the resumption of mutual high-
level visits. Currently, Russia is Cuba's ninth largest trade partner, with a trade volume of
$224 million in 2011, according to official figures.

Russia is using Cuba as a launch pad for extending its influence in
Latin America
Luxner, news editor of The Washington Diplomat, 9
(Larry, April 2009, Using Old Friend Cuba as Its Base, Russia
Reasserts Its Latin American Influence,
latin-influence-&catid=976:april-2009&Itemid=257, accessed
6/26/13, IC)
But lately, the Kremlin is reaching out to its old friend and making its presence felt
close to American shores. In fact, while international attention remains riveted on Moscows growing influence in its
backyard, namely in Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine, the former Soviet sphere isnt the only place where Russia is trying to
reassert its authority. Just as Russia announced plans to modernize its armed forces, boost
its nuclear weapons, and build military bases in the Georgian breakaway territories of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, halfway across the world, its also been staging a resurgence of sorts in Latin America
using Cuba as its base of operations. Last October, top-ranked Russian Lt. Gen. Alexander
Maslov visited Cuba and signed key treaties in information technology and
communications with his Cuban counterpart. Later that month, a massive Russian Orthodox
cathedral was inaugurated in Old Havana even though virtually no Cubans belong
to the Russian Orthodox Church. Then in November, President Dmitry Medvedev visited Havana,
marking the first such visit of a Russian leader to the Cuban capital since 2000. On
Dec. 19, a Russian anti-submarine destroyer and two logistical warships docked in
Havana Bay in what AP correspondent Will Weissert called a thumb-your-nose port call aimed at Washington in waters
just 90 miles from Florida. Russian sailors in white-and-tan dress uniforms stood at attention on the deck of the Admiral
Chabanenko destroyer, which chugged into Havana Bay amid a cloud of gray smoke. Russian officials said the visit was non-
military, an extension of a tour that included a stopover in Venezuela, where Russia staged a series of joint war games that included
a large flotilla of Russian warships. But outsiders say the idea was to flex some muscle in
Americas backyard after the Bush administration supported the former Soviet republic of Georgia in its brief war with
Russia. More recently in mid-March, a top Russian military official confirmed that the Kremlin
was considering using bases in Cuba or Venezuela as logistics stops for its long-distance
bomber patrols. If the two chiefs of state display such a political will, we are ready to fly there, said Maj. Gen. Anatoly
Zhikharev, head of Russias strategic aviation forces, also noting that there are four or five airfields in Cuba
with 4,000-meter-long runways, which absolutely suit us. The Pentagon though quickly mocked
the announcement. That would be quite a long way for those old planes to fly, Geoff Morrell, Pentagon press secretary, told the
Associated Foreign Press. No decision has been made on the Cuban or Venezuelan stopovers, but outsiders predict the move is as
much about giving Moscow added leverage in talks with Washington as it is about building up a military presence within range of the
United States. It could also be good old-fashioned payback. After all, its no secret that the Kremlin is still annoyed by what it sees as
U.S. encroachment on its neighborhood, including Washingtons efforts to build a missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech
Republic as well as American support for Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO. Part of what motivated them was irritation at what
they perceived as the Bush administrations interference on their periphery, said noted Cuba-watcher Phil Peters, vice president of
the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Va. The missile defense system and the U.S. relationship with Georgia clearly irritated them,
and I think their building up a relationship with Cuba and Venezuela is their way of responding. But Peters doesnt think Russias
increased presence in Cuba is cause for concern. I dont think the Cubans would put their own security at risk, he said, alluding to
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which nearly pushed the world to the brink of nuclear war. The Cubans are more cautious than
anyone in that regard. Smith agrees. A few months ago, the Russians were really pissed off at us because of the missile shield
program in Europe; they indicated that their strategic bombers could fly out of Cuban airfields. But this was not an official
statement. Then they sent a military mission to Cuba, and it was expected that theyd sign some sort of agreement, Smith explained.
But the mission came back with nothing. A Cuban military spokesman said his country had no interest in a closer military
relationship with Russia, because theyd been down that road before. To that end, Cuba seems to be pursuing a policy of practical
engagement with its old benefactor. What Cuba and Russia are doing today is using each other for mutual convenience, says
Daniel Erikson, director of Cuba programs at the Washington-based Inter-American Dialogue. For Cuba, this is part of a broader
strategy of diversifying foreign relations and trying to secure new sources of credit which Russia has promised, Erikson told The
Washington Diplomat. In addition to that, there was so much bad blood between Fidel Castro and the Russian leadership following
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now that Ral [Castro] is president of Cuba and Medvedev is president of Russia, thats enough of a
leadership transition for both sides to let bygones be bygones. On Jan. 28, Ral arrived in Moscow for a weeklong state visit his
first since 1984 that culminated with a strategic partnership between the two leaders. A total of 34 agreements were signed
covering everything from the creation of joint ventures to cooperation in biotechnology to the establishment of a joint electronic
scientific research center. Cubas objectives in renewing and expanding its relations with
Russia are obvious, said Jaime Suchlicki, director of the University of Miamis Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American
Studies. Russia is a major power with a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. Cuba
desperately needs all the foreign aid and credits it can get. Russia has been a traditional
supplier of weapons and spare parts to Cuba, and Castro is interested in
modernizing his armed forces. Theres also the petroleum issue, Suchlicki added, noting that Venezuela
currently provides 92,000 barrels of oil a day on credit that Cuba will never be able to repay. Russia can be an alternate source for
oil if Venezuela were to fall apart or [Hugo] Chvez is kicked out, although I dont think this is going to happen, Suchlicki said. The
other side of the coin is Moscows motivation. The financially strapped Russians would also like to recover a part of Cubas billion
debt, most of which dates from the Soviet era. The economics of necessity is also why Smith doesnt seem overly concerned with
Moscows latest overtures to both Cuba and Venezuela, including a recent offer of billion in credits to Venezuelan President Chvez
to buy weapons and Russian nuclear technology. This doesnt mean that Russia and Cuba are going back to their former
relationship, but given the economic distress in Cuba, having more economic ties with Russia just makes sense, Smith said. At a
time when U.S. standing in Latin America has never been so low thanks to Bush
Russia is simply taking advantage of that. Theyre trying to reach out and
strengthen their relations with Latin America. However, its not only Venezuela thats benefiting from
military ties with Moscow. Although Venezuela is the largest purchaser of armaments, Argentina has bought helicopters, radars and
air traffic control systems. Peru has also acquired Russian weaponry, while Brazil, Mexico and Colombia all pursue cordial military
relations, according to Odeen Ishmael, Guyanas former ambassador to the United States and an expert on regional politics.
Russias trade with Brazil surpassed billion in 2008, an amount likely to reach billion by 2010, said Ishmael, noting that Medvedev
recently spent three days in Brazil, discussing the development of bilateral ties in oil and gas production, nuclear power, agriculture
and space exploration. Evidently, the expanded military relations between Russia and Venezuela, as well as with other countries in
the region, are worrying to the United States, which has traditionally dominated the arms market in Latin America, said Ishmael.
Thus, Russias military investment can easily undermine U.S. influence and some
military analysts feel that this may whip up an arms race in the region. As such, Suchlicki
sees a more sinister side to Russias new fascination with Cuba. The Russians are interested in rebuilding
the Lourdes eavesdropping facility [which was dismantled in 2002 at the insistence of the U.S. government]. I think
theyre going to do it under the guise of creating a satellite tracking station [in Cuba]. The objective, he charged, would
be to provide the Russians an important nearby listening post to spy on U.S.
military, civilian and industrial communications.

China's expanding now--US influence is key
Malln, Reporter for the International Business Times, 7/28
(Patricia, IBT, Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For The
1317981, 7,28,2013, EB)

As if to confirm the declining hegemony of the United States as the ruling global
superpower, China is gaining influence in its hemispheric "backyard," Secretary of
State John Kerry's unintentionally insulting designation for Latin America. China has had its
sights on Latin America for the past decade and is now positioning itself as a
competitive trade partner in the region. The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation
covets oil, soybeans and gold, of which Latin America has plenty, and has been slowly but
steadily increasing its presence and its trade with several countries there. The U.S., whose
history of blocking outside political influence in Latin America going back to the
Monroe Doctrine, has been directing its attention elsewhere, as Michael Cerna of the
China Research Center observed. [The U.S.'] attention of late has been focused on Iraq and
Afghanistan, and Latin America fell lower and lower on Americas list of priorities.
China has been all too willing to fill any void, Cerna said. Between 2000 and 2009,
China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13 billion at the
beginning of the 21st century to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports
to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. Chinas share of the
regions trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12
percent. As impressive as that growth is, the numbers still pale in comparison to the U.S.' stats
in its commercial relationship with Latin America. The U.S. still holds more than half of the total
trade, adding up to $560 billion in 2008. Notably, though, Americas trade participation in Latin
America has remained static, while China is closing the gap more and more each year -- having
already surpassed the U.S. in some countries, including powerhouse Brazil.
Concomitant with this burgeoning interest from the Far East, Latin America is undergoing an
economic rebirth. After decades of devastating economic crises, the region is experiencing
unprecedented growth: On average, annual GDP growth for Latin American countries will be 3.7
percent this year, according to United Nations estimates, almost double the average for the rest
of the world. That has prompted several countries to form quasi-governmental entities to
further promote the progress of the region. One such entity is the recently formed Pacific
Alliance. Born with the specific goal of increasing relations with Asia, its members include
Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Peru, which together represent half of the regions total exports
and 35 percent of its GDP. In a meeting in Colombian capital Bogot last month, the Pacific
Alliance signed an agreement to open its member countries' economies to Asian
markets; the U.S., despite an invitation, did not attend. Though a recent trip to the
region by Vice President Joe Biden seems to run counter to the Pacific Alliance snub, Chinas
President Xi Jinping has also visited recently, and likewise met with Latin American leaders,
illustrating how the two global powers are going after the same prize. Biden traveled to
Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil in May, with the last leg of his trip coinciding with
the beginning of Xis in Trinidad, before jumping to Costa Rica and Mexico. Both leaders met
with several Latin American presidents and discussed trade and cooperation. The outcomes of
their trips were very different, however, Trinidad and Tobagos main newspaper, Newsday,
called the visit a historic occasion and a visit from China to a good friend. Prime Minister
Kamla Persad-Bissessar said she was committed to boosting relations with China and accepted
an invitation to Beijing for November of this year. In Costa Rica, Xi signed a $400 million loan
to build a cross-country road and reaffirmed relations with its main ally in the region. Costa Rica
is the only country in Latin America that sides with China in the mainland-Taiwanese dispute
and does not recognize the island as a nation. Even more significant was Xis visit to Mexico.
President Enrique Pea Nieto welcomed his Chinese counterpart, whom he had visited in
Beijing in April, and made his intentions clear: Mexico wants closer trade relations with
China, with whom it has a gap of $45 billion in export and import -- an important
development considering that Mexico is, for now, America's biggest trade partner
in the world. Bidens visit was not as successful. His meeting in Trinidad and Tobago was
called brutal and tense by Persad-Bissessar, and Colombian journalist Andrs Oppenheimer
deemed the trip a sympathy visit after Secretary John Kerry called Latin America Washingtons
backyard in a much-berated slip last April. While Biden had pleasant meetings in Rio and
Bogot, no agreements were signed during his trip. Perhaps the biggest development in Chinas
investment in the area is the recent decision by the Nicaraguan congress to allow a Chinese
company to build a canal through the country. Although still in the proposal stages, the project
would bring profound change to the geopolitics of the region -- and even the world. If built, the
canal could significantly affect commerce through the Panama Canal, which, though it is now
part of Panama's domain, was built by the U.S. and remains a symbol of the nation's historical
dominance in the region. That dominance is in decline, some Latin American leaders
have started making decidedly anti-American policies. The most notable was the late
Venezuelan Comandante Hugo Chvez, who was very vocal about his disdain for the U.S., but he
is far from the only one. Bolivia's President Evo Morales, for instance, kicked out USAID after
Kerry's verbal slip, and has gone so far as to ban Coca-Cola from the country. But now it's
Ecuador bumping heads with its northern neighbor, mostly in regard to Ecuador granting entry
to NSA-secrets leaker Edward Snowden. President Rafael Correa openly said that they would
welcome the whistle-blower because he was a "free man," no matter what the U.S. said.
Disagreements between the governments have led to the cancellation of a special trade
agreement, which Ecuador has called "an instrument of blackmail. Beyond the lack of
understanding with its former main trade partner, why is Latin America so smitten with China?
Kevin Gallagher, a professor of international relations at Boston University, says China speaks
to the regions newfound confidence. China is offering attractive deals to Latin
American economies while the United States continues to lecture and dictate,
Gallagher wrote for The Globalist. For too long, the United States has relied on a rather
imperial mechanism, just telling Latin America what it needs, he added. Compare
that to Chinas approach: It offers Latin America what it wants. Gallagher argued
that the U.S. biggest offer to Latin America is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which
offers access to the U.S. market on three conditions: deregulate financial markets,
adopt intellectual property provisions that give preferences to U.S. firms, and
allow U.S. firms to sue governments for violating any of its conditions. China, on the
other hand, has been providing more financing to Latin America than the World Bank, the
Inter-American Development Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank combined since 2003,
with no previous conditions and very few strings attached. Latin America is very sensitive
to any notions of conditionality due to painful past experiences with the IMF and
the World Bank, Gallagher said. China makes sure that its policy is not based on
conditionalities. Gallagher said the U.S. should awake from its past slumber and stop taking
Latin America for granted. Shlomo Ben-Ami, vice president of the Toledo International Center
for Peace and former Israeli foreign minister, takes a different stance. He argues that China's
advancement in the region does not automatically equate with American loss of preeminence.
U.S. exports to Latin America continue to rise (by 94 percent over the past six years), as do
imports (87 percent in the same period), and America continues to be the biggest foreign
investor in the area. Perhaps even more crucial are America's cultural and historical ties to the
region, Ben-Ami said. Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos influence in the U.S., it is
almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China, he said.
Still, Gallagher and Ben-Ami agree that the U.S. needs to step up, both economically and
diplomatically, to compete with new influences in a part of the world that was until recently
widely considered Americas domain. Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics
of subversion could secure U.S. influence -- in Latin America or anywhere else, Ben-Ami said.
It is high time for the U.S. government to undertake a true rethink of its economic
policy toward Latin America, Gallagher observed. Very soon, it might be too late.

Russian hegemony is growing in Latin Americaeconomic and
military ties, and even joint naval drills with Venezuela
Walle, research associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 12
(Walter, 5/8/12, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Russia Turns to the
South for Military and Economic Alliances,
economic-alliances/, accessed 6/26/13, IC)
Russian-Latin American relations are relatively warm these days, especially when it comes to a
number of seemingly left-leaning countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. Nonetheless, Washingtons
indifference to these countries may have pushed these governments further into
Moscows diplomatic embrace. The United States appears to have calculatedly severed any sort of close relations
with these left-leaning nations, and has been prone to criticize them with the same degree of careless indifference as it has of Russia
itself. In addition, these resident dynamics have provided the region with a growing autonomy; as Argentinean president Cristina
Fernndez de Kirchner aptly stated, the world has changed, Latin America is nobodys backyard.[1] This represents a full shift
from Cold War politics, when the U.S. supported authoritarian regimes throughout the region in order to act as a firewall to contain
Soviet influence within the hemisphere. In fact, much of the ever-growing presence of Russia in
Latin America is due to Moscows aspirations to return to global preeminence,
coinciding with Washingtons increasingly unsympathetic view toward a number of these left-leaning Latin American countries.
Notably, Russia has been able to exert its influence on an expanding agenda of mostly
military and energy issues through a series of existing ties, as well as through allying itself with
Central American nations to fight ever-changing drug trafficking trends. As the U.S. has curtailed military and economic assistance
to some emerging countries in Latin America, Russia emerged as a pivotal ally for some and a preferred alternative for others.
Colombia and Venezuela, a Proxy Conflict? With Russias new relationships with leftist Latin American governments and the U.S.
increasingly aimless presence in the region, one can discern a growing interaction among regional actors. In fact, this new direction
seems to be reminiscent of a slow return to a Cold War modus operandi. As Carcas modernizes its army with Russian
technology[2], Bogota is likewise being buttressed by the U.S., with its Plan Colombia (an international initiative to fight drug
trafficking), and other countries like Israel[3] and Spain[4]. While both Venezuela and Colombia claim that they have decided to arm
themselves for legitimate motives (Colombia as part of the U.S. Plan Colombia to combat drug trafficking and Venezuela for
defensive purposes against a purported U.S. threat), this growing tension should not be taken lightly. In 2008, the Vice-president of
Colombia, Francisco Santos Caldern, asked his Russian counterpart to halt arms sales to Venezuela in exchange for military and
economic cooperation.[5] Furthermore, Colombian and U.S. officials have charged Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez of arming the
Colombian guerrilla group, the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia),
an insurgent group that represents a persistent disruptive factor between several Latin American countries. However, in what
appeared to be part of an ongoing effort to restore relations between these two countries, in April of 2011 Colombian President Juan
Manuel Santos, stated that the FARC was no longer operating out of Venezuela[6] , which represented a very conciliatory posture on
Bogotas part. Russias Main Clients Aside from Venezuela and Colombia, other important
regional players in Russian-Latin American relations include Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador and Peru, among others. In November 2009, Ecuadorian President Rafael
Correa signed far-reaching pacts with Moscow regarding cooperation on security
and defense, even though Ecuadors constitution forbids taking on foreign debt for arm purchases,[7] In addition, with
the help of Moscow, the Andean nation hopes to develop nuclear technology to meet a
portion of its energy needs. Coupled with President Correa, in April 2010, Bolivian President Evo Morales asked
then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to promote a greater Russian presence in the Southern
Hemisphere.[8] Exemplary of this, Bolivia, like Venezuela and Ecuador, also has also invested in Russian technology; for
example, the Russian aerospace company Ilyushin plans to build a regional maintenance center for its Antonov An-148 model in
Bolivia.[9] Furthermore, Moscow approved a 100 million USD credit line for La Paz in order
to purchase a variety of military equipment, such as helicopters to combat drug
trafficking,[10] and a new presidential aircraft to replace the seriously-outdated American model from the 1970s that Morales
currently utilizes.[11] However, it seems that negotiations between La Paz and Moscow regarding the war against illicit drugs have
stalled: Without explanation, Bolivia signed deals with the U.S. and Brazil in March of 2012, and has demonstrated a willingness to
do the same with Colombia.[12] Nonetheless, at the upcoming G20 summit in June, Russia intends to propose a new strategy to
combat drug trafficking[13] in an apparent attempt to reassert its influence in Latin America. Similarly, Brazil has stated
its hope to modernize its armed forces with Russian technology. In 2008 the two
nations signed a contract whereby both countries will cooperate in building a fifth
generation jet fighter as well as new satellite launch vehicles.[14] However, some are skeptical
regarding the sought-after agreement, because Russia may limit the transfer of technology for the fighter jets, Peru too has
followed analogous steps as Bolivia and Brazil. The Inca nation bought Russian military technology as well;
such as Mi 35 helicopters to deploy against drug trafficking and to combat the insurgency.[15] In addition to military cooperation,
energy cooperation has been pursued by Russia and Latin America. For instance, much of Venezuelas credit, which enables it to flex
its military muscle, has come from Chvez welcoming Russian oil companies to drill in Venezuelan oil fields.[16] Moreover,
Argentina has expressed an interest in securing Russian cooperation for the
construction of two nuclear power stations, each costing around 4.5 billion USD. [17] Meanwhile Brazil
has signed cooperation agreements with Russia to aid in the development of nuclear energy capacity;[18] likewise there could be
assistance between the two countries to process Uranium and construct nuclear reactors. Finally, Russias longtime
ally, Cuba, is now looking to Moscow for help in pursuing oil exploration and
development prospects. Furthermore, under the terms of signed agreements between La
Habana and Moscow, cooperation will allow for mining, agriculture,
transportation, tourism, banking[19] Moscows Approach to the Drug War & Judicial Ties Additionally,
Moscow seeks opportunities to scout links with Central American nations to fight drug trafficking.[20] In contrast to American
planned initiatives, like Plan Colombia or the Mrida Initiative for Mexico, aimed at combating the trafficking of drugs through
military means, Russia has proposed the Rainbow-3, a plan to manage the drug trade through development and job creation.
Notably, Rainbow-3 would raise the drug issue to a new level of international involvement, through the UN Security Council. Viktor
Ivanov, director of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service, has criticized the U.S. approach for not focusing on the elimination of
the social causes of drug production, such as unemployment and poverty.[21] Furthermore, the Russian plan will provide special
training and custom-tailored courses for the police forces of Central American countries at no cost to their governments. In a
similar fashion, Russia wants to establish judicial cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries; such ties will focus on
the crackdown of narco-trafficking, organized crime, trafficking in arms, organs, and persons, corruption at the state and private
level, and against kidnapping of kids and airplanes and ships,[22] The fundamental premise will be to enhance justice through a
series of exchanges of methodologies and legislative acts linking the region and Russia. On the other hand, it is difficult to predict
how effective such cooperation will be achieved through uproar cooperation models when both Russia and a number of Latin
American and Caribbean nations are not particularly known for having the best transparency levels involving corruption practices.
A Pseudo-Cold War Policy Quite clearly, Russias interest in Latin America is escalating. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,
argued in his article, The New Stage of Development of Russian-Latin American Relations, that there is great attractiveness in
establishing bilateral relations, especially when three of the top twenty emerging economies -Mexico, Brazil and Argentina- are in
Latin America.[23] Lavrov has also stated that the Russian Federation has an interest in joining the Inter-American Development
Bank, perhaps a move to better accommodate Russian interests in the region, while at the same time neutralizing American
influence. Demonstrably, Russia has been developing cooperative relationships with
prominent organizational bodies of the region, such as the OAS (Organization of American
States), and has ratified visa-free travel agreements with countries like Colombia,
Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. In his article, Lavrov argues that Russias
intention behind quests for partnerships is the establishment of non-ideologized relationships with Latin American countries,
relationships that could be of mutual benefit to all parties involved. However, the Russian stance on Latin America ultimately may
be cause for apprehension. The establishment of bilateral, cordial relations between Russia and
Latin American countries could evolve to a proxy, neo-Cold War scenario. If the situation in
the regions worsens, some countries would be funded and supported by the U.S.,
while others, including several members of Latin Americas New Left, would become the major
beneficiaries of Moscow. An analogy of such practice is the Georgia Russia crisis that surfaced in August of 2008.
During this brief war, the U.S. sent military aid to Georgia[24] on warships to territory Russia considers its backyard (i.e. the
Caucasus and the Black Sea), infuriating Moscow. A month after the conflict erupted, ostensibly in retaliation, Russia sent
two Tu-160 bombers to conduct military exercises with Washingtons least favorite nation in Latin
America: Venezuela[25]. More importantly, in November of 2008 Moscow conducted war games with
Caracas, in which a small Russian fleet was sent to the Caribbean to participate in
joint naval maneuvers with the Venezuelan navy.[26] This was a powerful symbolic act: as it was
the first time that Russian warships had visited the Caribbean since the Cuban
Missile Crisis. In the wake of the post-Georgia conflict, such joint military maneuvers between
Russia and Venezuela were revitalized, and helped to build up the tensions
between Washington and Moscow, sending strong signals of a Cold War revival. Furthermore, in the aftermath
of the declarations of independence by the breakaway regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Venezuela[27] and
Nicaragua[28] were alone among Latin American countries in recognizing the independence of the new republics. Conclusion
Without a doubt, Russias alliances in Latin America are part of a greater geopolitical
game. Yet, it should not be forgotten why there is so much resentment within the region against the U.S. Perhaps, the displeasure
is the consequence of decades of U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs in order to maintain strategic interests. Russia
has been accused by numerous editorial writers of possessing too much leverage over Latin
American; it is understandable, if not forgivable, that Washington perceives Russian-Latin
American relations as incursions into the U.S. vicinity of interest, no matter how archaic
such thinking may be. Inarguably, Russia has bought the interest of Latin American governments that are not totally committed to
Washingtons policies; it has furnished the region with investments in energy infrastructure, strengthened military capabilities, and
provided means to combat drug trafficking.

Russian hegemony is increasing in Latin America CELAC was
directly created as a counter to the US OAS
Nechepurenko 13
(Ivan, 5/30/13, The Moscow Times, Russia Seeks to Restore
Influence in Latin America,
restore-influence-in-latin-america/480827.html, accessed 6/26/13,
Russia has demonstrated its increasing leverage in Latin America with Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov meeting representatives of the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States in Moscow on Wednesday. The foreign ministers of Cuba, Costa Rica and Haiti
and the deputy foreign minister of Chile discussed trade, political dialogue and a
visa-free regime with Lavrov, with everyone in agreement that Russia's relations with
the region are ripe enough to establish "a permanent mechanism for political
dialogue and cooperation in a Russia-CELAC format," a statement from Russia's Foreign Ministry
said. CELAC was founded in 2010 as a counterweight to the U.S.-led Organization of
American States. It consists of 33 states representing almost 600 million people and producing $7 trillion in annual GDP.
"This is a serious attempt by Latin American states to counter U.S. economic and political
influence in the region," said Mikhail Belyat, an independent Latin American expert and lecturer at the Russian State
University for the Humanities. In the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, the Soviet Union rapidly increased its economic and
military influence in Latin America only to see that influence subside with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Apart from Latin
America, Russia has recently reinvigorated its efforts to project its influence around the world, especially in other areas where its
influence has declined. To that end, Russia has been actively promoting the concept of a multi-polar world, playing an active role in
such organizations as the BRICS and the Eurasian Economic Space, which is planned to be transformed into a full-fledged Eurasian
Union in 2015. "Our friends have expressed their desire to make permanent contacts between the CELAC and BRICS. Particularly
on the sidelines of various meetings. We believe this is a very attractive suggestion and we will definitely discuss it with other states
that are members of this association," Lavrov said at the news conference that followed negotiations. BRICS consists of Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa, representing large, fast-growing economies with an increasing influence on global affairs.
Just like BRICS, CELAC countries have enjoyed strong economic growth of 4.5 percent
on average over the last three years, which in turn drives these states to look to distant markets. "Like
Russia, these countries want to diversify their economies and export markets so
that their goals complement each other," Belyat said. Trade between Russia and Latin
America reached $16 billion in 2012 alone. In order to complement the exchange of goods with the
exchange of people, the sides have agreed to put their efforts into establishing a visa-free
regime between CELAC countries and Russia. Although Russians already enjoy visa-free travel to most
countries of Latin America, including Brazil, Argentina and Chile, Costa Rica and Panama still require Russian citizens to apply for
entry clearance in advance. Russia has been negotiating visa-free entry for its citizens for some time now, with the most well-known
process taking place with the EU. Russia has noted that the EU already grants visa-free access to such countries as Brazil, Mexico
and Venezuela countries which enjoy a similar level of economic prosperity as Russia. As the bureaucratic process in the EU
drags out visa-free negotiations, Moscow is looking to other regions to expand its influence. "We
used to have hectares full of Lada cars along the Panama Canal, while our tractors were plowing Mexican lands," Belyat said. "So I
predict Russia will become more prominent in Latin America, and we will see more Latin
American goods in our stores."

Russias foreign policy is based on increasing influence to confront
US hegemony - even Putin says that Latin America is a significant part
Blank, Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 10
(Stephen J., 4/13/10, University of Miami Center for Hemispheric
Policy, Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences, p. 3-
mirussia_04-13-10.pdf, accessed 6/26/13, IC)
For these reasons, we cannot ignore Russias activities in Latin America. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said that Latin
America and Russia are natural partners, not because of Latin Americas
economic growth but because of the congruence between Latin governments
foreign policies and Russias attempt to bring them into its concept of a
multipolar world. Russias Policies and Objectives in Latin America 15 Similarly Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
has also said that Latin America is becoming a noticeable link in the chain of the
multipolar world that is forming we will pay more and more attention to this
vector of our economic and foreign policy.16 So while neither Russia nor Venezuela will challenge the
U.S. militarily, (e.g., by Russian bases in Cuba), their individual and collective goals entail the deliberate and substantial worsening
of East-West relations and of Latin Americas pre-existing acute problems.17 These statements show that while particular
emphasis is given to Venezuela and Cuba, Moscows purposes in engaging Latin
America economically and diplomatically have developed from the original concept stated by
Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov in 1997 when he visited Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica. Primakov justified the trip
by saying that Russia was and still is a great power. As a great power or one of the
main players in the international arena, Russia, naturally, should have
multilateral ties with all continents, with all regions of the world.18 Russian
interest in recovering or gaining positions in Latin America that it either had lost or thought that it could gain, or
regain in a changed world order at U.S. expense, preceded the more recent notion that it will show the United States
that if it intervenes in the former Soviet Union, Moscow can reciprocate in Latin
America. That latter idea and concept only became possible due to Russias recovery in 2000-08 and the corresponding and
coinciding decline of U.S. power and prestige due to the Bush Administrations disastrous policies such as the invasion of Iraq, the
treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo, the failure to deal effectively with either Iranian or Korean proliferation, and last, but
certainly not least the neglect of sound economic policy that has been a major cause of the current global economic crisis.19
Therefore any initiative for the employment of joint forces (with the United States or other states) must comply with the United
Nations. Integration initiatives must similarly be based on shared multilateral objectives, e.g., opposition to unilateral operations
involving the use of force. Meanwhile, the current economic crisis, plus the Obama administrations new policies, should lead to
less public emphasis on that particular rationale for Russian policy in Latin America. Instead, and this is implicit in Lavrovs
statement above and in Medvedevs rhetoric during his trip to Latin America, we may see greater Russian efforts to identify its
foreign policy with Latin American security elites clear preference for the following principles Latin America should be
impervious to outside efforts to violently challenge security and respect the principles of international law as established in the
charters of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN). 20 While these points accord with Russian
rhetoric, Latin American elites overwhelmingly prefer cooperation with the United States based on its acceptance and appreciation
of their needs interests and views. They refuse to be pawns once again in a new version of the Cold War.21 Indeed, Brazilian
President Inacio Lula da Silva openly expressed his hope that President Obama implements a preferential relationship with
Latin America.22 Unfortunately, Russian and Venezuelan foreign policies, albeit for different
reasons, aim to embroil the continent in a contest with the United States. Russia still
covets a global, or even superpower, status equal to that of the United States and therefore wants to
join every international club that exists, whether or not it has any real interests in
the area.23 Thus Russia expressed to Argentina its interest in becoming an observer at the
South American Defense Council that is part of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).
Russia also wants to participate as an observer in the Latin American Association
of Training Centers for Peace Operations (Alcopaz).24 This craving for status lies at the heart of Russian
foreign policy.25 Consequently Russian policy in Latin America is ultimately an American policy.
It aims to instrumentalize Latin America as a series of countries or even a weak, but still discernible,
political bloc to support Russian positions against U.S. policy and dominance in
world affairs. Therefore Russia argues that Latin American states that wish to
challenge America need to rely on Moscow. Thus President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua
pledged to Russia Nicaraguas opposition to a unipolar world and welcomed Russian
presence in Latin America as a sign of opposition to that unipolarity by saying extreme conditions are being
created in Latin America and all the governments are welcoming Russias presence.26 Chvezs recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia had similar objectives in mind.27 Russia welcomes the developing of democratization and increased attention to the task
of national development that we see in Latin America. We welcome Latin Americas role in the efforts to democratize
international relations in the context of the objectively growing multipolarity in the world. We believe that these processes are in the
interests of the whole [of] mankind. Russia is interested in the closest cooperation with our Latin American partners in reply to
the reciprocal interest they are showing. Moscows policy is part of its larger effort to realize this so-called multipolar world. Thus in
November 2008 Lavrov stated: 28 But other Latin American countries oppose being dragged into the Russo-American rivalry
and becoming a battleground like the former Soviet Union. Enhanced trade and relations with Russia are one thing; becoming
objects of a new quasi-Cold War struggle is another thing entirely. Countries other than Venezuela,
Nicaragua, Cuba and Bolivia clearly value not just the opportunity to enter into the
Russian market or buy arms, but also to gain a voice in their campaign to induce
the United States to return to a policy of more multilateralism and concern for their security
interests.29 But they oppose returning Latin America to being a front in a Cold War replay, especially as Russia clearly tries to
utilize leftist anti-American states like Venezuela for its own purposes.30 Instead, most states prefer that Latin America be
impervious to global threats.31 Multipolarity remains a policy aiming to enhance Russian standing as a global great power
through these diplomatic endeavors to counter the United States in a series of regions of interest to Russia.32 Moscow is still
pushing it in Latin America and now it appears that support for this concept, and in particular support for Rusian
policy in the Caucasus (i.e., recognition of the independence of South, Ossetia and
Abkhazia), is increasingly tied to Russian support of Latin American states
requests for loans and/or energy assistance and arms sales.33 Even if, as Lavrov,

Even Russian officials agree - Cuba is key to Russian foreign policy
Blank, Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 10
(Stephen J., 4/13/10, University of Miami Center for Hemispheric
Policy, Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences, p. 3-
mirussia_04-13-10.pdf, accessed 6/26/13, IC)
The dominance of geopolitics emerges quite strongly in Russian foreign policy towards its
main partners in Latin America, Venezuela and Cuba. Russias interests are
fundamentally geostrategic, not economic, and no Latin economy save perhaps Brazil can offer Russia much
tangible benefit. Therefore, geopolitical and strategic aims outweigh economic interaction with these states. For example, the BBC
reported that Patrushev told Ecuadors government that Russia wanted to collaborate with its intelligence agency, to expand
Moscows influence in Latin America. 59 Moscow also signed an agreement to sell Ecuador weapons.60 Most probably Russia
wants to link Ecuador and Venezuela with Russian weapons and intelligence support against Colombia. Since they are both
antagonistic to Colombia, they can then support the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), threaten a U.S. ally and
seek to pin Washington down in another dirty war.61 Chvezs open support of the FARC with Russian weapons strongly suggests
that Moscow knows all about his efforts and approves of them. The case of Viktor Bout, the notorious arms dealer who enjoys
protection from Russias government, reinforces this analysis. In 2008 Bout was arrested in Thailand for offering to deliver
weapons to the FARC as part of a sting organized by the United States. It may not be coincidental that Bouts offers coincide with
Russian support for Chvezs latest clash with Colombia.62 Once Bout was arrested and obliged to undergo an extradition hearing,
Moscow brought immense pressure to bear upon Bangkok so that he would not be extradited to the United States and forced to
name names, dates, places and people. 63 Undoubtedly, Moscow also fully recognizes Chvezs conversion of Venezuela into a
critical transshipment center for narcotics from both Latin America and West Africa, his support for insurgencies and terrorists
throughout Latin America and his expansionist and revolutionary dreams about Colombia, and seeks to exploit those factors for its
own anti-American purposes. Therefore one must treat reports of actual or forthcoming Russian agreements with Nicaragua and
Venezuela on counter-drug cooperation with great wariness, as they could be smokescreens for Moscows conscious support for
drug running into America, Europe and Latin America.65 Indeed, reports from 2003 point to Russian criminal penetration of
Mexicos narcotics gangs.66 More recently, in early 2009, a Russian and a Cuban citizen were both arrested for drug smuggling in
Yucatn.67 Simultaneously, Russia openly wants to increase cooperation among the BRIC members intelligence services and
Latin America in general. Clearly Moscow wants to establish permanent roots in Latin America and use those contacts as bases for
political influence to support those states and potential insurgent movements against the United States. 68 Chilean, Colombian
and especially Brazilian reports all raise the alarm about the $5.4 billion in Russian arms sales to Venezuela. These reports raise
the specter of Venezuela detonating a continental arms race, acquiring the largest Latin American fleet due to its purchase of
submarines, the comprehensive arming of Venezuelas army, fleet and air forces with huge arms purchases, and the acquisition of
hundreds of thousands of Kalashnikovs, and an ammunition factory. These reports also point out that since 2003, if not earlier,
these automatic rifles and ammunition have migrated from Venezuela to the FARC. This causes great fear that Russian arms will
underwrite armed insurgencies and drug running (submarines being excellently equipped for that purpose, as well as to defend
Venezuelas coastline from nonexistent threats). These are only some of the reasons why Moscows arms
sales to Venezuela, and projected sales to Cuba, are perhaps the only truly
dangerous aspects of its policies in Latin America. These sales aim to give Chvez much of what he
needs to foment his Bolivarian Revolution throughout Latin America, since Chvez is running or selling weapons to insurgents and
left-wing regimes all over the region, and second, because these weapons make no sense unless he is planning an arms race in
Latin America. 69 The sheer scale of ongoing Russian arms sales to Venezuela since 2004 justifies these alarms, as they make no
strategic sense given the absence of any U.S. or other military threat. Even Chvez knows this, for he claims that the air defense
missiles he ordered are meant to protect oil derricks!70 Therefore there are purposes beyond the legitimate defense of Venezuela
for these weapons. Moscow has sold Venezuela $5.4 billion in weapons since 2004. Those systems include 24 Su-30 fighters,
100,000 Kalashnikov AK-47 rifles, Ak-103 assault rifles, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles. Venezuela also bought 53 Mi-17V-s and
Mi-35M helicopters. In addition, Russia has helped develop factories in Venezuela that can make parts for the rifles, their
ammunition and the fighters, with an announced goal of producing 50,000 rifles a year. Venezuela plans to buy 12 Il-76 and Il-78
tankers and cargo aircraft, or possibly 96-300 military transport planes, Tor-M1 anti-air missiles, a fifth generation anti-air system
equally effective against planes, helicopters, UAVs, cruise missiles and high precision missiles, and Igla-S portable SAM systems.
In September 2009, Moscow advanced Caracas a $2 billion credit to buy more arms: 92 T-72 main battle tanks, Smerch rocket
artillery systems, and the Antey 2500 antiballistic missile system.71 Other Russian defense sources said that the tank deal could be
expanded to include three diesel-powered submarines Kilo class, combat helicopters Mi-28 and armored infantry vehicles BMP-
3.72 Venezuela also seeks Mi-28n Hunter high-attack helicopters and is discussing the possible purchase of submarines.73 There
were also earlier discussions about selling project 636 submarines (among the quietest subs in the world) to Venezuela during
2011-13, along with torpedo and missile ordnance for Venzuelas navy. The $2.2 billion loan in 2009 will go for 92 T-70 and T-72
tanks, BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Smerch anti-tank missiles, multiple rocket launchers, S-300, Buk M-2 and Pechora anti-
aircraft missiles, all systems usable against Colombia. In return, Russia got access to join Venezuelas national oil company,
Petrleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), in exploring oil fields in the Orinoco River basin.74 The signed agreements make it clear
that each of the three Russian companies has staked its own bloc in the Orinoco oil belt. Thus, LUKOIL has received permission to
explore the Junin-3 block. In effect, it has extended its three-year-long contract with PDSVA on the block's evaluation and
certification. The new two-year agreement provides for the bloc's joint exploration and development. Once accomplished, the two
companies plan to establish a joint venture to develop the deposit. This will require billions of dollars in investment. The oil from
this project could then be sent to an oil refinery in Italy. LUKOIL has just bought 49.9% of its shares. TNK-BP and PDSVA signed
an agreement on the joint study of the Ayacucho-2 block in the wake of a framework memo signed last October. As with the
LUKOIL agreement, it provides for a second phase -the sale of the produced oil abroad.75 Venezuelas arms purchases make no
sense unless they are intended for purposes of helping the FARC and other similar groups, fighting Colombia, projecting power
throughout Latin America, drug running with subs that are protected against air attacks, or providing a temporary base for
Russian naval and air forces where they can be sheltered from attacks but threaten North or South America.76 Since Putin has said
that permanent bases in Cuba and Venzuela are unnecessary, this leaves the door open to temporary bases, including submarine
bases as needed.77 Recently Bolivia, too, has offered its territory as a base in return for arms sales and economic help on energy
and other projects.78 Much of what Russia sells to Venezuela is compatible with that idea, as is Putins call for
restoring Russias position in Cuba and ongoing talks between Russian and Cuban
military officials (e.g., Sechins trips in 2008). 79 The following facts are also particularly noteworthy.
Chvez is not only arming the FARC; he is also training other Latin American states military forces (e.g., Bolivian forces). 80
Venezuela aided Iranian missile sales to Syria, Chvez told Iranian leaders about his desire to introduce nuclear elements into
Venezuela, (i.e., nuclear weapons) and Russia supports the allegedly peaceful Venezuelan development of nuclear energy and
explorations for finding uranium and an alternative nuclear fuel, thorium.81 Iran is now actively helping Venezuela explore for
uranium.82 75 Political Implications of Russian-Venezuelan Oil Agreements, RIA Novosti, These developments suggest the
possiblity of Venezuela functioning as a kind of swing man or pivot for a Russo-Venezuelan-Iranian alliance against the United
States. Certainly elements in the Iranian press and government believe that Tehran should further intensify its already extensive
efforts here to create the possibility of a second front in political or even in military terms against the United States. Hizbollah
already raises money and runs drugs in Latin America and many have noted the growing network of ties between Iran and Latin
American insurgents and terrorists facilitated by Chvez.83 Furthermore, Chvez has sought to engage Moscow not just in a
formal alliance, which it has so far resisted, but also in participation in the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the
Caribean (ALBA). Medvedev has indicated Russias willingness to discuss participation in this organization, since it accords with
Russias ideas about a multipolar world and international division of labor.84 Neither has Moscow forgotten about its military
partnership with Cuba. Russia has pledged to continue military-technological cooperation
(arms sales) with Cuba.85 Russian officials continue to say Cuba holds a key role in
Russian foreign policy and that Russia considers it a permanent partner in Latin
America.86 Neither has Moscow neglected its attempts to gain lasting positions of economic influence and ties of mutual, or
at least professed mutual advantage, in economics. Many of these discussions and agreements to date revolve
around either exploring for oil and/or gas in and around Cuba and Venezuela, or
constructing Chavezs idea of a Pan-American pipeline from Venezuela to Argentina. Russia and Venezuela are also discussing
participation in a gas cartel, another cherished Russian project. Russia will also mine bauxite and produce aluminum in Venezuela.
Both these states are also creating or discussing the creation of a binational bank and Venezuela and Cuba are also
discussing space projects with Russia.87

Russia is expanding military ties with Cuba
Xinhua News 13
(4/20/13, Global Times, Russia to pursue further military
cooperation with Cuba,,
accessed 6/26/13, IC)
Russia has good military cooperation with Cuba and will continue expanding their
military ties, Cuban official Prensa Latina news agency quoted a Russian general as saying
here Friday. The two countries have collaborated in various military fields such as
cadre training, operational combat training and technical cooperation, said
Russia's Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov, who arrived in Havana on Thursday for
a four-day working visit. He was welcomed by his Cuban counterpart General Alvaro Lopez
Miera on Friday and laid a wreath to Cuban pro-independence hero Antonio Maceo at the
Cacahual Mausoleum outside Havana. His agenda in Cuba covers touring important
tank units and other military units, schools and institutions. Russia and Cuba were
close economic and political allies during the Cold War. But their relations diminished after
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 till 2008, when Cuban leader Raul Castro
began a very active policy of restoring the old links with Moscow, including mutual
visits by the two countries' presidents.

UQ China
China is establishing a deep economic relationship with Cuba- one
that is filling the niche U.S. companies sought to occupy
Hearn, Research Fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences,
the University of Sydney, June 09
(Adrian H., Florida International University, June 2009, Cuba and
China: Lessons and Opportunities for the United States,
hearn.pdf, PD)
While some analysts identify state leadership in developing countries as an integral and valuable
component of alliance capitalism (Dunning 1997), critics argue that state-led industrial
models, such as those advocated by Cuba and China, threaten human rights and democratic
governance (CLATF 2006, Eisenman 2006, Lam 2004, Santoli et al. 2004). In his testimony
before the House Committee on International Relations in April 2005, U.S.
Congressman Dan Burton warned that, Beijings influence could easily unravel
the regions hard-won, U.S.-backed reforms to fight against corruption, human
rights abuses, increase government transparency and combat intellectual property
violations (Burton 2005:7). Similarly, Joshua Kurlantzick argues that poor
transparency has enabled China to develop partnerships with countries that are
hostile to the United States while maintaining privacy from international rights
and monitoring agencies (2008:199). Given the political climate in Washington, an
opportunity exists for the United States to engage with both sides of this debate, and to assert a
regional policy that enables more genuine forms of information sharing, responds to local needs,
and sustains geopolitical balance. As the Congressional Research Service has advised, the United
States should work harder to ensure that U.S. democratization and human rights values are not
seen by other countries as encumbrances and prohibitions placed in the way of, but instead as
things that ultimately will improve, their economic progress (CRS 2008:15). Given the political
climate in Havana, Cuba is a logical starting point for advancing this policy. Its successful
implementation, however, will require a more detailed awareness of the Cuban governments
approach to cooperation with foreign enterprises. Below I discuss two prominent aspects of
bilateral engagement that have underpinned Chinas industrial relations with Cuba. Chinese
Industry in Cuba: Incremental Growth and Coordinated Development The products on
display at the annual Havana trade fair demonstrate that U.S. companies seeking
to operate in Cuba will enter a market already occupied by foreign competitors. For
almost a decade, the fairs white goods pavilion has been dominated by Haier, Huawei, ZTE, and
other Chinese electronics firms, whose promotional literature proudly links them to the Chinese
government, for instance: China Putian Corporation was founded in 1980. It is an extra-large
sized state-owned enterprise directly under the management of [the] Chinese central
government...China Putian Corporation will regard Cuba as a platform so as to develop is
business in Latin America. Huawei is developing broadband internet services to Cuban
government specifications, and Chinese manufacturers have integrated
themselves neatly into Cubas energy revolution campaign, which seeks to
reduce electricity consumption through the mass distribution of energy-efficient
refrigerators, light bulbs, and domestic appliances. They have also participated in long-
term technology transfer schemes that aim to progress from initial sales of Chinese products to
their eventual manufacture in Cuba. An early example of this emerged two years into the Special
Period, when China shipped 500,000 bicycles to Cuba. To meet continuing demand, Mao
Xianglin, a former envoy of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, visited
Cuba in 1997 to study the domestic economy and set up a bicycle factory with Chinese capital
and technical expertise. The success of the initiative led to a similar export-to-production
scheme for electric fans. Mao described this as an incremental strategy that Chinese
businesses have since employed across a range of sectors in Cuba and Latin
America: I would hesitate to say that our Cuban manufacturing operations are entirely
commercial, because what were doing is broader than that. Were trying to help Cuba to
incrementally upgrade its technical ability. If our products prove popular and useful then we
assist by setting up factoriesIt is interesting that China learned from the United States how to
manage its economy, and now Latin America looks to China as a teacher of socialism. Today
we are a global village, but for the village to be harmonious there has to be mutual
understanding and respect. That is why we are helping Cuba to reach its
goalsUsing Chinese expertise Cuba could come to produce electronic goods for sale to Latin
America (interview, 14 December 2007). Chinese technical and financial assistance to Cuba
demonstrate the sincerity of these words. During a 2001 visit to Cuba, Chinese President Jiang
Zemin offered an interest-free credit line of $6.5 million, a loan of $200 million to modernize
local telecommunications with Chinese products, and a $150 million credit to buy Chinese
televisions (Erikson and Minson 2006:14). Following the successful sale of Chinese washing
machines, televisions, air conditioners, and refrigerators to Cuba, Hu Jintao signed sixteen
accords in 2004 pledging Chinese support for the domestic manufacture of these and other
goods, a promise that has materialized in a three-story production facility next to Havanas
Lenin Park. Visiting again in November 2008, Hu offered extensions on the repayment of
previous loans, a donation of $8 million for hurricane relief, and a credit of $70 million for
health infrastructure. A Chinese businessman accompanying the delegation noted that 37 new
investment projects offered by Hu will require Chinese technicians, investors, and their families
to take up residence in Cuba, and will attract additional Chinese professionals to the country
over time (interview, 21 November 2008). In return for Chinese technology transfer,
Ral Castro has provided a domestic market for Chinese exports and, as Cheng
Yinghong notes, has attempted to implement certain aspects of a revised Chinese
model of local economic reform (Cheng 2009:1). Beyond the distribution of Chinese
televisions and refrigerators through state channels, Rals April 2008 lifting of restrictions on
the domestic sale of VCRs, mobile phones, computers, and other electronic items was an
important building block of China-Cuba commercial relations. This reform also permits closer
regulation of trade in products that were already widely in circulation through informal
channels, reflecting William Ratliffs (2004:35) observation that Chinese-inspired economic
reforms in Cuba may require more rigorous anti-corruption measures. The interests of Chinese
electronics firms in Cuba, alongside those of Orascom from Egypt, and VimpelCom and
Rostelecom from Russia, make electrodomestics a likely area of manufacturing expansion.
Chinas incremental approach to market expansion in Cuba is one component of a
broader strategy of development that has proven successful across East Asia (Hira
2007:87-96). A related component of this strategy that has generated opportunities
for Chinese firms in Cuba is the linkage of distinct industrial sectors into an
integrated system, a process that analysts argue has given the Chinese government
an unusual degree of control over production chains in a number of countries (Ellis
2005:5, Kurlantzick 2008:200). As Kurlantzick puts it, The Chinese government wants
to control the entire process, from taking commodities out of the ground to
shipping them back to China, because it does not trust world markets to ensure
continuous supplies of key resources. It is purchasing stakes in important oil and gas
firms abroad, constructing the infrastructure necessary to get those 5 industries resources to
port, and building close relations with refiners and shippers (2008:200).

China is expanding military ties with Cuba
Xinhua News 12
(9/15/12, Peoples Daily Online, China, Cuba to further military
accessed 6/26/13, IC)
BEIJING, Sept. 14 (Xinhua) -- China and Cuba agreed to further deepen military
cooperation as a Cuban senior general visited Beijing on Friday. Joaquin Quintas, Vice
Minister of Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), said that the Cuban side is willing to
enhance exchanges with the Chinese military and strengthen bilateral cooperation
in personnel training and other areas. In Friday's talks with Quintas, Ma Xiaotian,
deputy chief of general staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), said that China-
Cuba relations have withstood the test of time and international vicissitudes since
the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1960, adding that the
willingness of their armed forces to strengthen bilateral ties is unwavering. The
PLA attaches great importance to developing relations with the FAR, according to Ma. Vice
Chairman of the Central Military Commission Guo Boxiong and Defense Minister Liang
Guanglie also met with Quintas. Developing bilateral military relations is in
accordance with the fundamental interests of the two countries and peoples, Guo
said, stressing that China is ready to work with Cuba to strengthen friendship and
enhance cooperation. Liang, also China's State Councilor, said the Chinese government
has always attached great importance to developing a friendship with Cuba, noting
that military cooperation is conducive to the two countries' national security and
development interests. The Cuban side is very pleased to see China's progress and
achievements, Quintas said, vowing that Cuba will always adhere to the one-China
policy and support China to safeguard national unity and territorial integrity.

China is turning towards Latin America and its up to the US to find a
new form of engagementproves why plan is key
Malln, writer on Latin America for International Business Times, 13
(Patricia Rey, 5/30/13, International Business Times, Latin Lovers:
China And U.S. Both Vying To Increase Influence And Trade In Latin
America, Caribbean,
1284839, accessed 6/26/13, IC)
The battle is on. The world's two largest economic superpowers, China and the United States, are making
moves on Latin America, hoping to gain more geopolitical influence in a booming region.
U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden arrived in Rio de Janeiro on Wednesday, while Chinese President Xi Jinping just landed in the
Caribbean island nation of Trinidad and Tobago and is following closely in Bidens steps. Bidens visit to Brazil marks the end of a
six-day swing through the region, which included stops in Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago. Xis trip to Trinidad, Costa Rica and
Mexico is the first since the formal transition of power ended in China in March. These parallel journeys from the worlds
top powers to Latin America emphasize how the regions vast natural resources
and steady economic growth are making it an increasingly attractive trading
partner. China's designs on Latin America have long been apparent, with imports to the Asian giant surging from $3.9 billion
in 2000 to $86 billion in 2011, as calculated by the Inter-American Development Bank. Now, China seeks to start buying massive
amounts of soy beans, copper and iron ore from Latin nations, reports the South China Morning Post. The U.S., on the other hand,
which has had deep involvement in many Latin American nations for the past two centuries, has nonetheless been less than
consistent in its recent trade policies, said Boston University economist Kevin Gallagher, who has written about China's incursions
in the region. The onus is on the U.S. to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer,
but thats not so easy because it doesnt have the deep pockets like it used to, he told
Bloomberg. During his visit to Colombia, Biden signed a two-year free trade agreement between
the countries, calling it just the beginning. The VP said, at the end of a particularly tense discussion about trade in
Trinidad on Tuesday, that the U.S. is deeply invested in the region, and wants to expand
that investment with more agreements. Our goal is not simply growth, but growth that reaches everyone,
he added. In Rio de Janeiro, Biden met with President Dilma Rousseff and invited her to a meeting in Washington to finalize a
strategic accord. Biden mentioned being particularly interested in oil and energy companies like state-owned Petroleo Brasilero,
better known as Petrobras (NYSE: PBR), reported Brazilian newspaper O Globo. Biden mentioned that trade with Brazil could be
increased by 400 percent from the current $100 billion, if trade between the two largest Western Hemisphere nations included
biofuels and aviation. Meanwhile, Chinas blossoming relationships with the region evince a
shift in its strategy; indeed, in the past Beijing deferred to U.S. economic interests in
Latin America, due to geographic proximity, even referring to the region as
Washingtons backyard. But now, in a globalized world, China seems to view the
entire planet as its own "backyard." You dont hear that anymore from Xis team, said Evan Ellis, professor
at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. In fact China has recently ousted the U.S. to
become the top trade partner for Brazil and Chile, reported Bloomberg News. Moreover, China is
seeking to advance its footprints in the region in gradual steps -- for example, Beijing plans to lend Costa
Rica $400 million to help expand a highway,reported local newspaper La Nacin. If the Chinese decide to unroll one of their little
packages in Trinidad [the biggest energy supplier in the region], they will win the entire Caribbean over, said Gallagher. Still, the
U.S. and China both deny they are competing in the vast region. Ultimately, the decision lies
with Latin American leaders, says Gallagher. If I was [a Latin American leader], Id be very happy because I now have more chips to
play with, he added.

Chinese influence in Cuba is up now- theyre cooperating in scientific and
agricultural areas
Embassy of the Republic of Cuba, 6/18/13
(6/18/13, Press release from the Cuban government, China and Cuba
to advance cooperation in agriculture, Online:
agriculture.htm FG)
China and Cuba expressed their interest in keeping advancing bilateral
cooperation in agriculture, innovation and scientific exchange, official sources
reported on Saturday. The issue was addressed by Cuban Agriculture minister
Gustavo Rodriguez during a meeting in Beijing with his Chinese counterpart Han
Changfu. The Chinese government official recalled a recent visit to Cuba in which he met with
the historic leaders of the Cuban Revolution and he stressed the importance of
implementing a cooperation program signed by the two Agriculture ministries
during the visit to China by President Raul Castro last year. The two parties agreed that
although some actions have been taken on the basis of the accord, there is mutual
interest in the advancement of that program. Minister Han Changfu also expressed
his willingness to further increase scientific and technical exchange and
innovation in the industrial and agriculture sectors. The two agriculture ministers
exchanged views on the measures being implemented by the Cuban government in the sector.
The Cuban official briefed his host about the transformations that are underway in the area as
part of the update of the islands economic sector.
China and Cuba are cooperating now, Chinese influence is only
Frank, journalist at the Financial Times, 2006
(Mark, 3/7/2006, Trade with China Primes Cubas Engine for
Trade, Online:
0000779e2340.html#axzz2XjxLfqSU FG)
Cuba is turning to Chinese companies rather than western ones to modernize its
crippled transportation system at a cost of more than $1 billion, continuing a trend of
favoring the fellow Communist country that has made Beijing Cubas second
trading partner after Venezuela. Buses plying Cubas highways increasingly come
from the Yutong Bus Company and railway locomotives from the 7th of February
works on Beijings outskirts. Cubas ports are being revamped with Chinese
equipment, in part, to handle millions of Chinese domestic appliances that began arriving last
year. Oil rigs along Cubas northwest heavy oil belt boast Chinese flags, and this is
only the beginning, says Fidel Castro, Cuban president. Enabled by friendly ties with a
government that is ready to resist US pressure, trade cover insuring low-cost
credit and what Mr. Castro says are competitive prices and fuel efficiency, more
buses, locomotives, train cars, trucks and cars are on the way. Cubas maximum
leader announced last month he was negotiating personally the purchase of 8,000 buses to be
partially assembled on the island. Mr. Castro estimated that the cost of the new vehicles and old
ones fitted with new motors would exceed $1bn (840m, 575m). In addition, was a deal for 500
Chinese railway cars and thousands of trucks and cars. China reported 2005 bilateral trade
between the two countries up to November was $777m, up 62.5 per cent year-on-year. The
increase was mainly due to $560m in Chinese exports to Cuba, up 91 per cent.
China has provided Cuba with about $500m in trade cover to develop
communications and electronics. But direct investment between the countries is only
about $100m. Plans jointly to produce nickel and cobalt have yet to materialise. But the budding
commercial relations are still far removed from past ties with the Soviet Union, says Cuban
economist Omar Everleny. You cant say our relations are like those with the Soviets. They are
strictly commercial, though with very low interest, and behind that political relations are
excellent, he said. The two countries were bitter foes during the Sino-Soviet dispute. And even
today China and Cuba appear to be heading in different directions, with the former adopting
market economics and the latter clinging to a command economy that frowns on
entrepreneurship and where more than 90 per cent of the economy is in state hands. Fifteen
years after the demise of the Soviet Union plunged Cuba into crisis, passenger transport
numbers stand at 30 per cent of the 1989 level in a country where few own cars. Internal freight
traffic is only now beginning to recover and the truck and heavy machinery stock consists mainly
of old petrol-guzzling vehicles from the Soviet era. Western companies such as Volvo,
Mercedes-Benz, Alstom, Toyota and Fiat, entered the Cuban market through
representative and subsidiary companies in the 1990s with an eye to supplying the
growing tourist industry and replacing Soviet equipment if Havana ever had the
cash. Now Mr. Castro does have it, but it is China that is benefiting, although Havana
still imports large volumes of agricultural goods and medical equipment from other countries, as
well as fuel from Venezuela. Cubas foreign exchange earnings increased by more than
30 per cent, or about $2.5bn, last year, according to senior central bank officials and the
country had a current account surplus for the second consecutive year. Most of the
new income came from a direct payment from Venezuela for medical services and indirectly
from other Caribbean and Latin America countries under preferentially financed oil agreements,
such as the 13-member PetroCaribe accord. Mr.Castro was micro- managing the budding trade
relationship with the Asian giant thousands of miles away, in part because it was related to his
campaign to save on subsidised energy and fuel through greater efficiency, government sources
said. The first 1,000 buses, plus spare parts, cost $100m, to be paid over four years at 5 per cent
interest, Mr Castro said at a ceremony where they were symbolically received. The deal, along
with others for locomotives, re-equipping ports and other transport projects, was guaranteed
by $400m in Chinese government trade cover, the sources said, overcoming
whatever fears Chinese companies might have about doing business with the
Caribbean island. The government has a firm position to develop trade co-
operation between our countries, the policy, the orientation, has been determined.
Whats left is the work to complete our plans Chinas ambassador to Cuba, Zhao
Rongxian, said at the ceremony.
China has close political ties with Cuba- military and civilian delegations are
often exchanged
Suchlicki, University of Miami history professor, 1999
(Jamie, 7/30/1999, Those Men in Havana are now Chinese, article
in the Wall Street Journal, Online:
men-in-havana-are-now-chinese FG)
In February, a top-level Chinese military delegation, led by Defense Minister Chi
Haotian, visited Cuba. It was the first time a Chinese minister of defense had been to the
island. But in terms of recent Cuba China relations, it was not a rare exchange. In
fact, after a prolonged period of tension, the two countries have been warming up to
each other in an unprecedented fashion. In 1993, President Jiang Zemin visited Cuba and
Fidel Castro reciprocated by visiting China in 1995. Within the past two years, Cuba and
China have exchanged high-level military and civilian delegations, including visits by
Raul Castro and Cubas top generals to China and a trip to Cuba by General Dong Liang Ju, head
of the Chinese Military Commission. China has become increasingly vocal in its
opposition to the USs Cuba policy, particularly the embargo, and Cuba
condemned last months accidental NATO attack on the Chinese embassy as an
act of aggression, a genocidal action by the US. As the US debates the value of the Cuba
embargo and as questions continue to arise in Congress about President Clintons dealing with
the Chinese, the China-Cuba nexus is of more than passing interest. The impoverished
island obviously can offer little attraction to China in economic terms. The logical conclusion
from the military visits and other clues is that China sees a presence in Cuba of
some strategic value, just as the Soviet Union did years ago when it first teamed up
with Fidel Castro to make Cuba a Soviet military base and intelligence gathering
center. A US administration official, who asked not to be identified, says that the
US is tracking very closely Chinese activities in Cuba. As closely as we can.

China has spy bases on Cuba- theyre used to get intel about the US
Westerman, Journalist at the Canada Free Press, 2012
(Toby, 1/10/2012, China, Cuba, and the espionage alliance against the
US, Online: FG)
Chinas intelligence operations are the core arena for achieving the superpower
status which the Communist elite in Beijing so passionately desires. Central to its
spy activities is the island of Cuba which is strategically located for the
interception of U.S. military and civilian satellite communications. Chinas spy
services also cooperates closely with Havanas own world-class intelligence
services. Inexplicably, the U.S. mass media are ignoring both the existence of the spy
base as well as the Cuban-Chinese alliance which is responsible for it. International News
Analysis Today is challenging that media silence in an exclusive interview with counterintelligence expert Chris Simmons, who
explains why China needs Cuba and details the dangers to the United States in Havanas espionage partnership with Beijing.
Simmons is a retired Counterintelligence Special Agent with 28 years service in the Army, Army Reserve, and the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and has testified on the subject of Cuban espionage before members of U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Simmons notes that China has the largest espionage network in the world with an
estimated two million career staff intelligence officers, making Beijings spy
services larger than the intelligence operations of all the other nations in the world
combined. While Americans are well aware of Chinas financial might, its
espionage activities get relatively little attention. We are too often distracted by Chinas economic
gains. For China, however, espionage and economics are tied hand in hand, and China has the largest appetite for U.S. secrets in the
world, Simmons told International News Analysis Today. The members of Chinas intelligence services, both its officers and those
recruited as agents by those officers, tend to be ethnic Chinese, Simmons observed. This ethnic orientation of Chinas espionage
services limits the available avenues of access to American security information. Chinas spy alliance with Cuba, however, assists
China in overcoming this potential handicap. Cuban penetration of U.S. society augments Chinese efforts and makes an extremely
valuable contribution to Beijings overall espionage effort. Cubas human intelligence operations give
needed perspective to information China receives both from its own operatives
and from electronic spy bases operating in Cuba. That is why China needs Cuba,
Simmons stated. The kind of restricted information gathered electronically in Cuba
covers military, economic, and political affairs, and ranges from how foreign
policy is determined to indications of troop and fleet movements to significant
details on important political figures. The value Beijing places upon the information acquired via Havana can
be seen in the October 2011 visit to the island by Gen Guo Boxiong, Vice Chairman of Chinas Central Military Commission. Guos
presence in Cuba underscored that China has a special military commitment in addition to a
sizable economic investment in Cuba. China is in the process of replacing Cubas
aging Soviet-era military equipment, purportedly supplying only non-lethal aid.
The U.S. prohibits lethal assistance to Cuba, and Beijing is risking U.S. sanctions if that prohibition is
known to be violated. The true volume and nature of Chinese military aid to Cuba is, of course, difficult to assess. General Guos trip
to Cuba follows a December 2010 military agreement, signed by top ranking PLA General Fu Quanyou, insuring needed military aid
to the Castro regime. Simmons pointed out that Chinas electronic intelligence activities on
Cuba are particularly interesting, because China claims they dont exist. Officially they
are not there, said Simmons, commenting upon Beijings denials that it has electronic spying capabilities in Cuba. The island
of Cuba has been used as an electronic spy base for decades. The island of Cuba has been used as
an electronic spy base for decades, going back to the Soviet construction and use of the facility
at Lourdes. The construction of the base at Lourdes was hard to miss as the concrete buildings and large antennas appeared
on the Cuban landscape. The Russians pulled out of Lourdes in 2001, much to the relief of many in Washington and the expressed
displeasure of Fidel Castro and his regime. Simmons stated that Moscow scored a propaganda victory in the U.S. media and among
the U.S. political establishment with its abandonment of Lourdes. The reality of the matter, however, was much different than
appearances seemed to indicate, Simmons told International News Analysis Today. When the Russians left Cuba,
they also left a well-trained Cuban electronic intelligence battalion functioning on
the island at the base in Bejucal, as well as an understanding with Havana to share
intelligence information important to Moscow. As a result, Russia saved millions of
dollars which had been spent on the Lourdes base, Moscow avoided Congressional
censure and obtained important economic cooperation from the United States, all
at the same time still receiving important intelligence information on the U.S.
from Cuba. It was a win-win situation for the Russians, Simmons stated. 50-100 Chinese
intelligence officers are at Bejucal gathering and interpreting information The base at Bejucal, however, is still operating. While the
Cubans technically run it, some 50-100 Chinese intelligence officers are at Bejucal gathering
and interpreting information, according to Simmons. In sharp contrast to Moscow, there is no political
cost to China. It took us years to find out they [the Communist Chinese] were operating there. We found out
through migrs, defectors, and travelers to Cuba, Simmons told INA Today. Unlike the Soviets,
China has not constructed a facility and only with the greatest of difficulty can the Chinese be connected with Cuban electronic spy
base activities. In this way, China can plausibly deny both the use of the base and the transference of information from its Havana
embassy to Beijing, Simmons informed INA Today. The Chinese even took pains to cover the expected increase in radio traffic from
the Chinese embassy in Havana to Beijing as the Bejucal base, and smaller bases across the island which are connected with it,
became more active. In anticipation of a greater volume of radio communication activity between Cuba and China, Beijing gradually
increased useless or dummy radio traffic with Havana. These dummy messages were later replaced, at least in part, with actual
intelligence information generated from the Bejucal facility and its sub-stations as they became an important Chinese information
source. As a result, the U.S. has difficulty determining the spikes of real intelligence information within the broadcasts of dummy
transmissions coming from the Chinese embassy in Havana, Simmons said. The eye of the Chinese dragon is
upon the United States. We do not know what information is coming from bases
that supposedly do not exist, but Simmons commented on Chinas military and
commercial investment in Communist Cuba and declared that, Whatever they
[the Chinese] are paying, they are getting a steal.

Booster Zero Sum
Chinas ideological differences makes it zero sum with U.S. Heg
Xia, Professor of Political Science at the Graduate Center and the
College of Staten Island, NDG
(Ming Xia, New York Times, No Date Given, "China Threat" or a
"Peaceful Rise of China"?,
china-politics-007.html, 6/27/2013, PD)
"China's rise" can be seen as a quintessentially political processthrough which the
ruling Communist Party has sought to shore up its legitimacy after the Cultural Revolution
irreversibly changed the nation and caused three crises of ideological belief, faith in the CPC,
and confidence in the future. As the Party realized that the performance-based
legitimacy was the only hope for prolonging its rule, economic development
became the highest politics. Consequentially, the success of economic
development would have to cause political implicationsthe external ones are carefully
monitored and evaluated by China's neighbors and the only superpower of the worldthe
United States. Will China become a threat to the United States, Japan, and
surrounding countries? The reason for American concern mainly arises from its
hegemonic status in the world politics and the ideological incompatibility of China
with the Western value system. China's stunning economic growth has convinced
the West that it is just a matter of time until China becomes a world superpower.
But its ideological orientation makes China a revolutionary power that is
threatening both to the United States' status and global structure. Three different
logics have been constructed to substantiate the "China threat" thesis. First, ideological and
cultural factors make China a threat. For neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration,
the mere factor that China still sticks to communism makes view it adversely.
Samuel Huntington has added a cultural factor: in the clash of civilizations, the
"unholy alliance between Islamic and Confucian civilizations" is the most
fundamental threat to the West. For people using this logic, the sensible response from the
U.S. is, in the short run, a containment policy, and confrontation is possible if needed; in the
long run, the promotion of a peaceful transformation within China. Second, geopolitical and
geoeconomic factors. For many realists, even China has shed off its ideological
straitjacket, as a great power in size (territory, population, and economy), China has to
pursue its own interest and respect. Nationalism may still drive China into a course of
clash with the United States, if the latter refuses to accommodate or share the leadership
with China as a rising power. Some scholars fear that democracy can unleash strong
nationalism and popular nationalism can make China even more aggressive
toward the United States. Third, the collapse of China. Opposed to the previous two
perspectives, some people are concerned that if China suffers a Soviet-style sudden-
death syndrome and spins out of control, it can create an even worse scenario. The
sheer size of the population makes refuge problem, the failed state and the followed crises
(warlordism, civil war, crime, proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc) impossible for the world to
deal with. Due to these three different considerations, the United States often oscillates from
demonization to romaticization of China, from containment to engagement. The U.S.-China
relationship has shifted from conflict, to confrontation, to competition and back to
conflict, but so rarely features with cooperation. One American China specialist
characterizes the bilateral relationship as "the sweet-and-sour Sino-American relationship."

China threatens US hegemony ---- influence is zero-sum
Ramakrishnan, Competitive Industries Practice at The World Bank, 08
(Karuna, March 25, 2008, Helium, Is the rise of China as a global power a threat to American
a-threat-to-american-hegemony/side_by_side?page=2, ACCESSED Jun 30, 2013, RJ)
The rise of China since 1990 has been superlative: the world has witnessed its galloping growth in almost every sphere. In political
and cultural diplomacy, military capability, and economic strength, China is rising some say it has already risen - as a world super
power. Three decades since the bamboo curtain lifted, there has been a power shift', as China resumes its place as Asia's star; a shift
that will be showcased as Beijing prepares to host a glitzy Olympics later this year. As its export juggernaut rolls on, China is
catching up with developed nations, with a 10% rate of economic growth, a swelling trade surplus and a newly-
opened economy. But, Prime Minister Hu Jintao's assertions of a "peaceful rise" find no
takers in American diplomatic circles, where China is perceived as a coercive
power - its ballooning military budget, combined with its capabilities shrouded in
secrecy, make its military policies at odds with its stated peaceful means. China's
restrictive trade policies, its insatiable hunger for oil and other natural resources
reveal tell-tale signs of a power-grabbing giant, with the capability to back its will.
Will the rise of China be a threat to the United States in the international system? The post-Cold War world, on
which America stamped its supremacy, was largely uni-polar, with capitalist
ideology winning decisively over communist principles. The consolidation and growth of the
European Union was in tandem with the shift of the balance of power to the western hemisphere, and posed no military threat to
America. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an international defense alliance formed between the US and
European super-powers in 1949 is effective even today. The US and the EU have strong links, both diplomatic and
economic, and they largely agree on all strategic military concerns. While America, the world's richest democracy retains its place as
a regional hegemon, there is a definite shift in the balance of power towards Asia in
general, and China in particular. I would assess China's rise as a definite threat to
American power, a threat, which has the potential to create conditions for conflict -
in a backdrop of anarchy (i.e. lacking a global policeman) the ultimate goal of every nation is to
maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. Power,
therefore is a "zero-sum" game if one states gains power, another state has to lose
it, and that defines the conflict between nation-states. By this line of thought, an
increase in China's power must mean a decrease in America's. The present day scenario in
which a resurgent China, with varied weaponry a surging economy, nuclear
capability, and a swelling middle class, poses a very real threat to American
hegemony. Even though military conflict with the US will hurt China's economy
(since its principle trading partner is America), it would be naive to put it past China to start a war to
upset the balance of power. It would also not be paranoid to presume that China is
likely to mirror in Asia, America's strategy of domination - as China tries to rise
above its neighbors, Japan, Russia and India, it will seek to ensure that no state in
Asia can threaten it. China may not conquer other large Asian countries, but will increasingly outline the way forward in
neighborly behavior (whether it's the border issue with India in Siachin, or energy-sharing with Russia). The idea that America keeps
world order by providing public goods' like nuclear non-proliferation, fighting terrorism, building and democratizing states ignores
its intentions of cornering critical resources for its excessive, consumerist ways. And the concept of a single authority which enforces
rules and order, by definition, erodes its legitimacy. Therefore, China as a counter-point to American
hegemony is attractive not only for those bullied by America (Iran, Venezuela, Syria, Pakistan),
but also for nearly-developed nations (India, Brazil, South Africa) who can play one super-
power against another in cornering political and economic mileage. President Bush's vision
of a foreign policy which steers the world towards a "distinctly American Internationalism", may not find many takers in this era of
multi-polarity, with China matching the US step for step in its no-holds-barred exploitative capitalism, its addiction to oil and an
affluent middle-class. Despite its diplomatic over-drive to smoke-screen this very fact, the crouching dragon has
bared its claws, and prudent policy is imperative for America to retain its post-
Cold War status.

Christensen, William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War
Co-Director, China and the World Program (CWP), Faculty Chair, M.P.P. Program, 06
(Thomas J., Summer 2006, Project MUSE, Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise
of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia,
repository/public/christensen-1.pdf, ACCESSED June 30, 2013, RJ)
In Central Asia, China was the founding member of the SCO, which includes various Central and South
Asian actors as members or observers, but does not include the United States.53 At that organizations meeting in July 2005,
members called for a timeline for the withdrawal of foreign military forces in
member states that were deployed initially to fight the global war on terror in
Afghanistan. This thinly veiled reference to the withdrawal of U.S. bases in
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan is exactly what zero-sum analysts fear from
multilateral organizations that include both of the potential U.S. great power
rivals, China and Russia, and wavering U.S. security partners such as Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan, but do not include the United States.54 Joshua Kurlantzick
emphasizes the dangers of Chinas newfound diplomatic soft power for the
United States. He sees China vying with the United States for hegemony not just
regionally, but globally. Pointing to how Chinese soft power appears to be
spreading quickly to such disparate places as Latin America and Australia, he writes, China
may become the first nation since the fall of the Soviet Union that could seriously
challenge the United States for control of the international system.55 In the fall of 2005, the
U.S. commentator Charles Krauthammer adopted a similar zero-sum perspective
by viewing even the prospect of Chinas diplomatic success in promoting North
Korean denuclearization as potentially bad for the United States. The perceived danger is that
China would gain signicant prestige in tackling a knotty problem that the United States could not solve and, therefore, Beijing
would gain in relative power terms vis--vis the United States.56 Some observers have also
expressed concern that by asserting its inuence in the inaugural meeting of the East Asia
Summit (EAS) in December 2005, China has attempted to maximize its power at the expense
of the United States and U.S. allies.57 Chinas ofcial government position is that it does not favor the exclusion
of the United States or other actors from the EAS or from the region more generally.58 But during the early discussions of the EASs
composition, various signs suggested that China was at least comfortable with, if not fully supportive of, Malaysias position that
actors from outside East Asia should be excluded.59 ASEAN eventually decided to extend EAS membership to any outside power
that has signicant regional interests and is willing to sign the associations Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, thus opening the door
for Australia, India, and New Zealand. Japan apparently had pushed hard for such an open summit and initially seemed to have
won the day. According to knowledgeable Chinese and Japanese experts, however, in the period leading up to the December
meeting, China successfully lobbied to place ASEAN plus Three at the core of the process that will eventually create an East Asian
Community (EAC), relegating the more diffuse East Asia Summit to a secondary role. In fact, such a two-tiered arrangement for EAC
creation was one of the few clear conclusions reached at the inaugural EAS.60 Chinas apparent strategy before
and during the summit suggests to some inside and outside of China that Beijing
prefers a relatively closed process for creation of the EAC, a process in which
China can maximize its own inuence and minimize the role of states more
friendly to the United States.
Booster Now Key
Relations are on the brink --- new reforms are critical before China
takes over
Mallen, reporter for the International Business Times on Latin America, 6/28
(Patricia Rey, June 28, 2013, International Business Times, Latin America Increases Relations
With China: What Does That Mean For The US?,
ACCESSED June 30, 2013, RJ)
As if to confirm the declining hegemony of the United States as the ruling global
superpower, China is gaining influence in its hemispheric "backyard," Secretary of State
John Kerry's unintentionally insulting designation for Latin America. China has had its sights on Latin
America for the past decade and is now positioning itself as a competitive trade
partner in the region. The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation covets oil, soybeans and gold, of which Latin
America has plenty, and has been slowly but steadily increasing its presence and its trade with several countries there. The
U.S., whose history of blocking outside political influence in Latin America going
back to the Monroe Doctrine, has been directing its attention elsewhere, as Michael
Cerna of the China Research Center observed. [The U.S.'] attention of late has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and Latin
America fell lower and lower on Americas list of priorities. China has been all too willing to fill
any void, Cerna said.Between 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13
billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached $41.3
billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. Chinas share of the regions trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009,
the number had jumped to 12 percent. As impressive as that growth is, the numbers still pale in comparison to the U.S.' stats in its
commercial relationship with Latin America. The U.S. still holds more than half of the total trade, adding up to $560 billion in 2008.
Notably, though, Americas trade participation in Latin America has remained static,
while China is closing the gap more and more each year -- having already
surpassed the U.S. in some countries, including powerhouse Brazil. Concomitant with this
burgeoning interest from the Far East, Latin America is undergoing an economic rebirth. After
decades of devastating economic crises, the region is experiencing unprecedented growth: On average, annual GDP growth for Latin
American countries will be 3.7 percent this year, according to United Nations estimates, almost double the average for the rest of the
world. That has prompted several countries to form quasi-governmental entities to further promote the progress of the region. One
such entity is the recently formed Pacific Alliance. Born with the specific goal of increasing relations with Asia, its members include
Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Peru, which together represent half of the regions total exports and 35 percent of its GDP. In a meeting
in Colombian capital Bogot last month, the Pacific Alliance signed an agreement to open its member countries' economies to Asian
markets; the U.S., despite an invitation, did not attend. Though a recent trip to the region by Vice
President Joe Biden seems to run counter to the Pacific Alliance snub, Chinas
President Xi Jinping has also visited recently, and likewise met with Latin
American leaders, illustrating how the two global powers are going after the same
prize. Biden traveled to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil in May, with the last leg of his trip coinciding with the
beginning of Xis in Trinidad, before jumping to Costa Rica and Mexico. Both leaders met with several Latin American presidents
and discussed trade and cooperation. The outcomes of their trips were very different, however. Xis trip
was the first visit from a Chinese official to the region in almost a decade. Trinidad and Tobagos main
newspaper, Newsday, called the visit a historic occasion and a visit from China to a
good friend. Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said she was committed to
boosting relations with China and accepted an invitation to Beijing for November
of this year. In Costa Rica, Xi signed a $400 million loan to build a cross-country road and reaffirmed relations with its main
ally in the region. Costa Rica is the only country in Latin America that sides with China in the mainland-Taiwanese dispute and does
not recognize the island as a nation. Even more significant was Xis visit to Mexico. President
Enrique Pea Nieto welcomed his Chinese counterpart, whom he had visited in
Beijing in April, and made his intentions clear: Mexico wants closer trade relations
with China, with whom it has a gap of $45 billion in export and import -- an
important development considering that Mexico is, for now, America's biggest
trade partner in the world. Bidens visit was not as successful. His meeting in
Trinidad and Tobago was called brutal and tense by Persad-Bissessar, and Colombian journalist
Andrs Oppenheimer deemed the trip a sympathy visit after Secretary John Kerry called Latin America Washingtons backyard in
a much-berated slip last April. While Biden had pleasant meetings in Rio and Bogot, no
agreements were signed during his trip. Perhaps the biggest development in
Chinas investment in the area is the recent decision by the Nicaraguan congress to
allow a Chinese company to build a canal through the country. Although still in the proposal
stages, the project would bring profound change to the geopolitics of the region -- and even the world. If built, the canal
could significantly affect commerce through the Panama Canal, which, though it is
now part of Panama's domain, was built by the U.S. and remains a symbol of the
nation's historical dominance in the region. That dominance is in decline. After
decades of uncontested U.S. influence in the region, some Latin American leaders
have started making decidedly anti-American policies. The most notable was the
late Venezuelan Comandante Hugo Chvez, who was very vocal about his disdain
for the U.S., but he is far from the only one. Bolivia's President Evo Morales, for
instance, kicked out USAID after Kerry's verbal slip, and has gone so far as to ban
Coca-Cola from the country. But now it's Ecuador bumping heads with its northern neighbor, mostly in regard to
Ecuador granting entry to NSA-secrets leaker Edward Snowden. President Rafael Correa openly said that
they would welcome the whistle-blower because he was a "free man," no matter
what the U.S. said. Disagreements between the governments have led to the cancellation of a special trade agreement,
which Ecuador has called "an instrument of blackmail. Beyond the lack of understanding with its former main trade partner, why is
Latin America so smitten with China? Kevin Gallagher, a professor of international relations at Boston University, says China speaks
to the regions newfound confidence. China is offering attractive deals to Latin American
economies while the United States continues to lecture and dictate, Gallagher wrote for The
Globalist. For too long, the United States has relied on a rather imperial mechanism,
just telling Latin America what it needs, he added. Compare that to Chinas approach:
It offers Latin America what it wants. Gallagher argued that the U.S. biggest offer to Latin America is the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, which offers access to the U.S. market on three conditions: deregulate financial markets, adopt
intellectual property provisions that give preferences to U.S. firms, and allow U.S. firms to sue governments for violating any of its
conditions. China, on the other hand, has been providing more financing to Latin America
than the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank combined since 2003,
with no previous conditions and very few strings attached. Latin America is very sensitive to any notions of conditionality due to
painful past experiences with the IMF and the World Bank, Gallagher said. China makes sure that its policy is
not based on conditionalities. Gallagher said the U.S. should awake from its past slumber and stop taking Latin
America for granted. Shlomo Ben-Ami, vice president of the Toledo International Center for Peace and former Israeli foreign
minister, takes a different stance. He argues that China's advancement in the region does not automatically equate with American
loss of preeminence. U.S. exports to Latin America continue to rise (by 94 percent over the past six years), as do imports (87 percent
in the same period), and America continues to be the biggest foreign investor in the area. Perhaps even more crucial are America's
cultural and historical ties to the region, Ben-Ami said. Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos influence in the U.S., it is almost
inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China, he said. Still, Gallagher and Ben-Ami agree that the
U.S. needs to step up, both economically and diplomatically, to compete with new
influences in a part of the world that was until recently widely considered
Americas domain. Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of
subversion could secure U.S. influence -- in Latin America or anywhere else, Ben-Ami
said. It is high time for the U.S. government to undertake a true rethink of its
economic policy toward Latin America, Gallagher observed. Very soon, it might be too
Now is key --- our relations and credibility are on the decline and they
need to be fixed to solve for every impact in the round.
IAD, 12
(Inter-American Dialogue, April 12, Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin
ACCESSED June 30, 2013, RJ)
Impressive economic, political, and social progress at home has, in turn, given Brazil, Mexico,
Chile, Colombia, Peru, and many other countries greater access to worldwide opportunities .
Indeed, the regions most salient transformation may be its increasingly global
connections and widening international relationships . Brazils dramatic rise on the
world stage most visibly exemplifies the shift . But other countries, too, are participating actively
in global affairs and developing extensive networks of commercial and political ties . China is
an increasingly prominent economic actor, but India and other Asian countries
are intensifying their ties to the region as well . The United States has also changed
markedly, in ways that many find worrisome . The 2008 financial crisis revealed serious
misalignments in and poor management of the US economywhich, four years later, is still
struggling to recover . Inequality has significantly widened in the United States, while much-
needed improvements in education and infrastructure are ignored . The most ominous
change in the United States has taken place in the political realm . Politics have
become less collaborative . It is increasingly difficult to find common ground on which to
build solutions to the critical problems on the policy agenda . Compromise, the hallmark of
democratic governance, has become an ebbing art, replaced by gridlock and inaction on
challenges that would advance US national interests and well-being . In part as a result of
these shifts, US-Latin American relations have grown more distant . The quality
and intensity of ties have diminished . Most countries of the region view the United
States as less and less relevant to their needsand with declining capacity to propose
and carry out strategies to deal with the issues that most concern them . In the main,
hemispheric relations are amicable . Open conflict is rare and, happily, the sharp antagonisms
that marred relations in the past have subsided . But the US-Latin America relationship
would profit from more vitality and direction . Shared interests are not pursued as
vigorously as they should be, and opportunities for more fruitful engagement are
being missed . Well developed ideas for reversing these disappointing trends are
scarce. Some enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership and effective
cooperation . The inability of Washington to reform its broken immigration system
is a constant source of friction between the United States and nearly every other
country in the Americas . Yet US officials rarely refer to immigration as a foreign policy issue
. Domestic policy debates on this issue disregard the United States hemispheric
agenda as well as the interests of other nations . Another chronic irritant is US
drug policy, which most Latin Americans now believe makes their drug and crime
problems worse . Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, while visiting Mexico, acknowledged that
US anti-drug programs have not worked . Yet, despite growing calls and pressure from the
region, the United States has shown little interest in exploring alternative
approaches . Similarly, Washingtons more than half-century embargo on Cuba, as
well as other elements of United States Cuba policy, is strongly opposed by all
other countries in the hemisphere . Indeed, the US position on these troublesome
issuesimmigration, drug policy, and Cubahas set Washington against the
consensus view of the hemispheres other 34 governments . These issues stand as
obstacles to further cooperation in the Americas . The United States and the
nations of Latin America and the Caribbean need to resolve them in order to build
more productive partnerships . There are compelling reasons for the United States and
Latin America to pursue more robust ties . Every country in the Americas would benefit
from strengthened and expanded economic relations, with improved access to
each others markets, investment capital, and energy resources . Even with its current
economic problems, the United States $16-trillion economy is a vital market and source of
capital (including remittances) and technology for Latin America, and it could contribute more
to the regions economic performance . For its part, Latin Americas rising economies will
inevitably become more and more crucial to the United States economic future .
The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean would
also gain a great deal by more cooperation on such global matters as climate
change, nuclear non-proliferation, and democracy and human rights . With a rapidly
expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 million, the cultural and demographic
integration of the United States and Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating
pace, setting a firmer basis for hemispheric partnership. Despite the multiple
opportunities and potential benefits, relations between the United States and Latin
America remain disappointing . If new opportunities are not seized, relations will
likely continue to drift apart . The longer the current situation persists, the harder
it will be to reverse course and rebuild vigorous cooperation . Hemispheric affairs
require urgent attentionboth from the United States and from Latin America and the
The embargo undermines US credibility and thats key to solving
multiple impacts energy security, democracy, and climate change.
IAD, 12
(Inter-American Dialogue, April 12, Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin
ACCESSED June 30, 2013, RJ)
Relations between the United States and Latin America are at a curious juncture .
In the past decade, most Latin American countries have made enormous progress in managing their economies and reducing
inequality and, especially, poverty, within a democratic framework . These critical changes have brought greater autonomy,
expanded global links, and growing self-confidence . It is now the United States that is in a sour mood,
struggling with a still weak economic recovery, diminished international stature
and influence, and fractured politics at home . These recent changes have
profoundly affected Inter-American relations . While relations are today cordial and largely free of the
antagonisms of the past, they also seem without vigor and purpose . Effective cooperation in the Americas, whether to deal with
urgent problems or to take advantage of new opportunities, has been disappointing . The Inter-American Dialogues report is a call
to all nations of the hemisphere to take stock, to rebuild cooperation, and to reshape relations in a new direction . All
governments in the hemisphere should be more attentive to emerging
opportunities for fruitful collaboration on global and regional issues ranging
across economic integration, energy security, protection of democracy, and
climate change . The United States must regain its credibility in the region by
dealing seriously with an unfinished agenda of problemsincluding immigration,
drugs, and Cubathat stands in the way of a real partnership . To do so, it needs the help of
Latin America and the Caribbean

UQ Embargo - > Expansion
Lifting the Cuban Embargo Resolves All Alt Causes
Lee, Stanford Ph.D. and President of Global Advisory Services, 8
(Rens, 8/26/8, ISN, In Havana, waiting for Obama or for Putin?,
Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=90543, 6/26/13, AL)
Indeed, no president could unilaterally lift the US embargo - the main sticking point in US-Cuban relations -
because US law (the 1996 Helms-Burton Act) mandates preconditions for this, such as
legalization of all political activity and departure of the Castro brothers from the political scene, that Cuba finds unacceptable. But a new president who
is open to dialogue with America's enemies could prevail on a solidly democratic Congress to amend or abrogate the law and thus un-freeze the US-
Cuban relationship. The embargo bans most US trade with and all investment in Cuba.
While damaging the country's economy, it has obviously failed in its intended purpose of
getting rid of the Castro regime. Cuba remains a police state in which the population is subject to a repressive control and,
excepting favored few, lives at or close to the subsistence level. (Interestingly, the police are among the best paid professionals in Cuba, earning almost
twice the miserly average wage of US$17 per month). Cuba-watchers debate whether lifting the embargo and flooding the country with US tourists and
businesspersons would erode the legitimacy of the current regime or breathe new life into it. Yet there are very good strategic
reasons why America should not continue its policy of isolating Cuba, even in the
absence of positive signs of democratization on the island. One reason is that the
current US policy makes Cuba a target of opportunity for a resurgent and
increasingly hostile Russia. Vladimir Putin talks openly about "restoring our position in
Cuba," and hints are surfacing in Moscow that Russia might reestablish a military and
intelligence presence on the island in response to the planned missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. Other
energy-dependent countries (such as China and India) already are negotiating
exploration rights, but because Cuba is a sanctioned country, US companies are
forced to stand idly by. Opening Cuba to commerce and interchange with the
United States could, as many argue, plant the seeds of democracy and capitalism there and
give Americans some leverage to moderate the regime's police-state
Impact China Environment
Chinese investment leads to destruction of the Latin American
exports and less environmental regulation
Gallagher, Professor International relations Boston University, 4/30
(Kevin, The Guardian, Latin America playing a risky game by
welcoming in the Chinese dragon,
dragon, 4/30/2013, EB)

The Chinese president, Xi Jinping, travels to the US and Latin America this week, for the first
time since he took office in March. What a difference a decade makes. Ten years ago, there
would hardly have been any fanfare about a Chinese visit to the region. Now, for Brazil, Chile
and others, China is the most important trade and investment partner. China-Latin America
trade surpassed $250bn (165bn) last year. Although China's impact in Africa receives the most
attention, China trades just as much in Latin America as in Africa, and has more investments in
the region. Chinese finance in Latin America chiefly from the China Development Bank and
the Export-Import Bank of China is staggeringly large and growing. In a recently updated
report, colleagues and I estimate that, since 2005, China has provided loan commitments of
more than $86bn to Latin American countries. That is more than the World Bank or the Inter-
American Development Bank have provided to the region during the same period. China's
presence is a great opportunity for Latin America, but it brings new risks. If the
region can seize the new opportunities that come with Chinese finance, countries could come
closer to their development goals, and pose a real challenge to the way western-backed
development banks do business. However, if Latin American nations don't channel this
new trade and investment toward long-term growth and sustainability, the risks
may take away many of the rewards. First, the positive side. Chinese trade and investment
is partly a blessing for Latin America because it diversifies the sources of finance finance that
for too long has relied on the west. The US and European economies have been anaemic since
2008, and trade with China has tugged Latin American growth rates to impressive levels. Every
1% increase in Chinese growth is correlated with a 1.2% increase in Latin American growth.
Chinese finance is more in tune with what Latin American nations want, rather
than with what western development experts say they "need". Whereas the US and
international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and IMF tend to finance in
line with the latest development fads such as trade liberalisation and micro-anti-poverty
programmes, Chinese loans tend to go into energy and infrastructure projects in a region that
has an annual infrastructure gap of $260bn. Neither do Chinese loans come with the harsh
strings attached to IFI finance. The IFIs are notorious for their "conditionalities" that make
borrowers sign up to austerity and structural adjustment programmes that have had
questionable outcomes on growth and equality in the region. But there are risks. While the
Chinese do not attach policy conditions to their loans, they have required that borrowers
contract Chinese firms, buy Chinese equipment, and sometimes sign oil sale agreements that
require nations to send oil to China in exchange for the loans instead of local currency. Chinese
investment accentuates the deindustrialisation of Latin America. Large scale,
capital intensive commodities production is not very employment-intensive, nor
does it link well with other sectors of an economy. Dependence on commodities
can cause a "resource curse" where the exchange rate appreciates such that
exporters of manufacturing and services industries can't compete in world
markets and thus contribute to deindustrialisation and economic vulnerability.
Producing natural resource-based commodities also brings major environmental risk. Many of
China's iron, soy and copper projects are found in Latin America's most environmentally
sensitive areas. In areas such as the Amazon and the Andean highlands, conflict over natural
resources, property rights and sustainable livelihoods have been rife for decades. In our report,
we find that Chinese banks actually operate under a set of environmental guidelines
that surpass those of their western counterparts when at China's stage of
development. Nevertheless, those guidelines are not on par with 21st century
standards for development banking. Stronger standards should be in place at a
time when environmental concerns are at an all-time high. With every opportunity
comes a challenge. Latin Americans have access to a new source of finance that gives them more
leeway to meet their own development goals. If Latin America doesn't channel some of
the finance to support macroeconomic stability, economic diversification, equality
and environmental protection, this new source of finance could bring great risk.

ImpactChina War
Escalates to extinction
Takai, Military Science Researcher, 9
(Mitsuo, retired colonel and former researcher in the military science faculty of the Staff College for Japans Ground Self Defense Force,U.S.-
China nuclear strikes would spell doomsday,
china_nuclear_strikes_would_spell_doomsday/7213/, 6-31-13)

Tokyo, Japan Those who advocate nuclear armaments, and are now raising their voices in Japan and elsewhere,
should take a look at an objective analysis by U.S. scientists who have disclosed the
results of several studies on strategic nuclear missile strikes. What would happen
if China launched its 20 Dongfeng-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with a 5-megaton warhead, at 20 major U.S.
cities? Prevailing opinion in Washington D.C. until not so long ago was that the raids
would cause over 40 million casualties, annihilating much of the United States. In
order to avoid such a doomsday scenario, consensus was that the United States would
have to eliminate this potential threat at its source with preemptive strikes on
China. But cool heads at institutions such as the Federation of American Scientists and the National
Resource Defense Council examined the facts and produced their own analyses in 2006, which differed from the hard-line
views of their contemporaries. The FAS and NRDC developed several scenarios involving nuclear strikes
over ICBM sites deep in the Luoning Mountains in Chinas western province of Henan, and analyzed
their implications. One of the scenarios involved direct strikes on 60 locations including 20 main missile silos and decoy silos hitting each
with one W76-class, 100-kiloton multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle carried on a submarine-launched ballistic missile. In
order to destroy the hardened silos, the strikes would aim for maximum impact by
causing ground bursts near the silos' entrances. Using air bursts similar to the bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki would not be as effective, as the blasts and the heat would dissipate extensively. In this scenario, the 6 megatons of
ground burst caused by the 60 attacks would create enormous mushroom clouds
over 12 kilometers high, composed of radioactive dirt and debris. Within 24 hours
following the explosions, deadly fallout would spread from the mushroom clouds,
driven by westerly winds toward Nanjing and Shanghai. They would contaminate
the cities' residents, water, foodstuff and crops, causing irreversible damage. The
impact of a 6-megaton nuclear explosion would be 360 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, killing not less than 4
million people. Such massive casualties among non-combatants would far exceed the military purpose of destroying the enemy's
military power. This would cause political harm and damage the United States ability to achieve its war aims, as it would lose international
support. On the other hand, China could retaliate against U.S. troops in East Asia, employing
intermediate-range ballistic missiles including its DF-3, DF-4 and DF-21 missiles, based in Liaoning and Shandong
provinces, which would still be intact. If the United States wanted to destroy China's entire nuclear
retaliatory capability, U.S. forces would have to employ almost all their nuclear
weapons, causing catastrophic environmental hazards that could lead to the
annihilation of mankind. Accordingly, the FAS and NRDC conclusively advised U.S.
leaders to get out of the vicious cycle of nuclear competition, which costs
staggering sums, and to promote nuclear disarmament talks with China. Such
advice is worth heeding by nuclear hard-liners.

ImpactChina WarExt.

Yes warChinese policy is driven by resource access
Kaplan, Atlantic Monthly Correspondent, 10
(Robert D. National Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, May/Jun2010, Vol. 89,
Issue 3, The Geography of Chinese Power, EBSCO Host, AM)

China's internal dynamism creates external ambitions. Empires rarely come about by design; they grow
organically. As states become stronger, they cultivate new needs and--this may seem counterintuitive--
apprehensions that force them to expand in various forms. Even under the stewardship of some of the most
forgettable presidents--Rutherford Hayes, James Garfield, Chester Arthur, Benjamin Harrison--the United
States? economy grew steadily and quietly in the late nineteenth century. As the country traded more
with the outside world, it developed complex economic and strategic interests in far-flung places. Sometimes, as in
South America and the Pacific region, for example, these interests justified military action. The United States was
also able to start focusing outward during that period because it had consolidated the interior of the continent; the
last major battle of the Indian Wars was fought in 1890. China today is consolidating its land borders and
beginning to turn outward. China's foreign policy ambitions are as aggressive as those of the United
States a century ago, but for completely different reasons. China does not take a missionary approach to
world affairs, seeking to spread an ideology or a system of government. Moral progress in international affairs
is an American goal, not a Chinese one; China's actions abroad are propelled by its need to secure
energy, metals, and strategic minerals in order to support the rising living standards of its immense population,
which amounts to about one-fifth of the world's total.

Hegemony solves global nuclear war
Barnett, US Naval War College Prof, 11
(Thomas, Professor, Warfare Analysis and Research Dept U.S. Naval War College, The New Rules:
Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,
globalization-at-crossroads, 6-31-13)

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing
evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking
change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know
who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains
to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts
and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -in effect, a
man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably
the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most
amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider
when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent
larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically
imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American
"empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our
stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the
guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever
known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the
mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no
identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world
did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed
everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international
liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted
was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the
liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP
and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.

Solvency Plan Key
Status quo policies failthe plan is key for US hegemony in Cuba and
the Western Hemisphere
Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, 09
(Richard N., 3/6/09, The Daily beast, Forget About Fidel,
fidel.html, accessed 6/23/13, IC)

The American policy of isolating Cuba has failed. Officials boast that Havana now hosts
more diplomatic missions than any other country in the region save Brazil. Nor is the
economic embargo working. Or worse: it is working, but for countries like Canada, South Korea and dozens of others that are only
too happy to help supply Cuba with food, generators and building materials. Those in Congress who complain about the "offshoring"
of American jobs ought to consider that the embargo deprives thousands of American workers of
employment. The policy of trying to isolate Cuba also worksperversely enoughto bolster the
Cuban regime. The U.S. embargo provides Cuba's leaders a convenient excusethe country's
economic travails are due to U.S. sanctions, they can claim, not their own failed policies. The lack of American
visitors and investment also helps the government maintain political control. There is
one more reason to doubt the wisdom of continuing to isolate Cuba. However slowly, the country is changing. The
question is whether the United States will be in a position to influence the
direction and pace of this change. We do not want to see a Cuba that fails, in which the existing regime gives way
to a repressive regime of a different stripe or to disorder marked by drugs, criminality, terror or a humanitarian crisis that prompts
hundreds of thousands of Cubans to flee their country for the United States. Rather, Washington should work to
shape the behavior and policy of Cuba's leadership so that the country becomes more
open politically and economically. Fifty years of animosity cannot be set aside in a stroke, but now is the time for Washington to
act. Much of the initiative lies with the new president. President Obama, could, for example, make good on campaign promises to
allow Cuban-Americans to freely remit funds to relatives in Cuba and to visit them regularly, and could loosen travel restrictions for
others as well. (Some of these measures can be found in legislation currently working its way through Congress.) Obama could also
initiate technical contacts. Each country already maintains an "interests section," a small embassy by another name, in the other's
capital. They also share information about weather. But they could resume exchanges on such common challenges as migration and
drug interdiction, and initiate them on homeland security and counterterrorism. Going beyond this and dealing with the basics of
the embargoor removing Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorismwould likely require congressional approval. Current
law, though, makes it almost impossible to take such steps. It requires that Cuba effectively become a functioning democracy before
sanctions can be lifted. But it's precisely engagement that is far more likely to reform Cuba. Preconditions are an obstacle to effective
foreign policy. The Obama administration has a great opportunity to begin modifying U.S. policy before or during the Summit of
the Americas, to be held in April in Trinidad. A new U.S. policy would not only increase U.S.
influence in Cuba, but it probably would also be the single most powerful way in which
Obama could improve the U.S.'s standing throughout the Western Hemisphere. The
United States can engage with China and Russia, not to mention North Korea, Syria and even Iran. Surely it ought to be able to do so
with Cuba.
Solvency Credibility
The embargo undermines US credibility and international relations
Sadon, Washington Post Editor, 9/7
(Rachel, September 7, 2012, Latin American Advisor, U.S. Lacks Credibility on Cuba, Should
End Embargo: Carter,
ACCESSED June 24, 2013, RJ)
The United States should end its embargo against Cuba and seek constructive dialogue with the Caribbean nation, former U.S.
President Jimmy Carter said Thursday. "We should all continue to press the Cuban government
to respect individual rights and more political openness, but the embargo
undermines any credibility that [the United States] has in calling for
improvements in Cuba." Carter restored relations between the two nations after taking office in 1977, establishing
special interest sections in Havana and Washington, and has long championed an improved relationship with Cuba. But a "small
group of anti-Castro leaders in Florida, who have a major and exaggerated influence in the outcome of the elections" have dictated
U.S. policy, he said at the conference, which was sponsored by the CAF Development Bank of Latin America, the Inter-American
Dialogue and the Organization of American States. Carter also took the administration to task for keeping Cuba on the list of "State
Sponsors of Terrorism." The country was placed on the black list in 1982 for links to revolutionary "terrorist" groups and remains
there for ostensible ties to the FARC and Basque separatist party ETA (as well as fugitives wanted in U.S. courts and "deficiencies" in
fighting money laundering). But the Cuban offices of those groups created an opening to begin productive and valuable discussions,
said Carter. "The Colombian and Spanish ambassadors told me that this offered them an opportunity to dialogue, as evidenced by
Colombia's announcement of the new peace talks in Cuba." Referring to the recently revealed peace talks with the FARC, Carter
praised the administration of Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. He expressed hope for the future of the talks, which are set
to begin in Oslo on Oct. 8 and later relocate to Havana, and also commended Santos for restoring diplomatic with Ecuador and
Venezuela. "They don't agree on everything, but they can now work together on threats to security." The former
president also stressed the continued importance of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua
earlier this year threatened to pull out of the organization if it isn't reformed and
the OAS has agreed to draft a reform plan. Rights advocates fear that the commission, which has long been
considered a critical watchdog in the region, could be seriously weakened. "We must look for additional ways to strengthen the
commission on human rights and ensure its independence from political pressures... [it] may need some reforms to be more
efficient, but its autonomy must not be reduced," emphasized Carter. He also warned against governments
trampling on basic rights because of fears of insecurity or terrorism, alluding to
steps that the Obama administration has taken. "We must safeguard the hard won gains we have made
to prevent the abuse of power that inevitably results when the executive claims for itself unchecked power to detain and even kill
persons it considers a threat." Americans' fear of terrorism has led to indefinite detention in
Guantanamo and surveillance of American citizens without warrants, "which I hope we
will correct," he said.
The embargo is internationally unpopular and destroys US credibility
only the plan solves
Edmonds, Writer for the North American Congress on Latin America, 11/15
(Kevin, November 15, 2012, NACLA, Despite Global Opposition, United States Votes to
Continue Cuban Embargo,
united-states-votes-continue-cuban-embargo, Accessed June 24, 2013, RJ)
In a near unanimous vote at the United Nations General Assembly on Tuesday, the
vast majority of the world voted to put an end the U.S. economic embargo against
Cuba. Aside from the moral argument, the driving principles behind the vote to end the embargo were those regarding the
sovereign equality of states, non-intervention in internal affairs, and the freedom of international trade and navigation. In total, 188
countries voted in favor of the resolution [3], with the U.S., Israel, and Palau voting against it, and the Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia abstaining. It was the twenty first consecutive year that the
resolution passed by an overwhelming majority in the U.N. The last time the United States had
normal relations with Cuba, the Andy Griffith Show was the most popular show on TV, African Americans couldnt vote, McDonalds
only had 228 locations [4], and Barack Obama would not be born for another year. It was indeed a different world. "Photo Credit:
The Right Perspective" It was thought that President Obama knew this as well when he made headlines [5] in 2009 by stating that
he sought a new beginning with Cuba, as the outdated and damaging policy was more ideological than practical, Tuesdays vote
showed that when it came to the embargo, nothing has changed. The embargo began in 1960 when the United States sought to
punish revolutionary Cuba for nationalizing properties which previously belonged to U.S. corporations and citizens. To put things in
perspective, after Cuba gained formal independence in 1902, it was still governed largely by the neo-colonial Platt Amendment [6].
This imposition stipulated that the Cuban government could not make alliances or sign treaties with any foreign government without
the permission of the United States. Article III of the Amendment stated that [7] the government of Cuba must consent to the right
of the United States to intervene in Cuban affairs for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government
adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. Thus the Platt Amendment set the stage for repeated U.S.
intervention in Cuba in 1906, 1912, 1917, and 1920. While the Platt Amendment was scrapped in 1934 under President Roosevelt's
Good Neighbor policy, U.S. companies already dominated the Cuban economy, which owned 60% of rural properties [8], 90% of
Cuban mines [9] and mineral exports, and 80% of the utilities and railroads. The United States also backed business-friendly
strongmen which ensured that the neo-colonial status quo would continue. Students of American history would be right to recognize
that a similar pattern of foreign economic control sparked their very own revolution in 1776. In many ways, the ongoing Cuban
embargo is one of the most symbolic policies of U.S. imperial control in the Americas. That said, the impact is much more than
merely symbolic for the Cuban people, as according to [10] Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez, the embargo is an act of
aggression and a permanent danger to the stability of the nation. While the Cuban embargo was ultimately created to isolate Cuba
economically and politically, the routine imposition of harsher conditions has failed to bring down the Castro government. In 1992,
President George H. Bush signed the Cuban Democracy Act [11] (also known as the Torricelli Act) into law, which forbids
subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba, U.S. nationals from traveling to Cuba and remittances being sent to the
country. The Cuban Democracy Act [12] also attempts to limit the amount of interaction the international community has with Cuba
by imposing sanctions on any country that provides assistance to Cuba, including ending U.S. assistance for those countries and by
disqualifying them from benefiting from any programme of reduction or forgiveness of debt owed to the USA. It was widely
assumed that after the fall of the Soviet Union it would only be a matter of time before Castro fell as well. When that prediction
didnt materialize, President Bill Clinton signed the internationally condemned Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act in law
(more commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act) in March 1996. This act further deepened the sanctions against Cuba as it sought
to [11] strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government, and to plan for support of a transition government
leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act allowed for any non-U.S. company that dealt with
Cuba to be subjected to legal action and that the respective company's leadership could be barred from entry into the United States.
This essentially meant that many international businesses were blackmailed to choose between operating in Cuba or the United
Stateswhich financially speaking isnt much of a choice in regards to market size. Like any embargowhether in Iran, Gaza, or
Cubait is the regular people who suffer the most. While there is a wide disagreement on the exact amount of harm the embargo has
done to the Cuban economy, the estimates range between one [13] and three [14] trillion $US. In 2008, the Indian Delegation to the
United Nations stated that [15] The negative impact of the embargo is pervasive in the social, economic, and environmental
dimensions of human development in Cuba, severely affecting the most vulnerable socioeconomic groups of the Cuban population.
President Jimmy Carter highlighted the failure of the embargo in September, when he stated that [16] "We should all continue to
press the Cuban government to respect individual rights and more political openness, but the embargo undermines
any credibility that [the United States] has in calling for improvements in Cuba."
Cubas Foreign Minister went on to question the logic of the embargo, remarking that [17] Keeping this policy in
force is not in the national interest of the United States. Quite on the contrary, it harms the
interests of its citizens and companiesespecially in times of economic crisis and high unemploymentwhich, according to every
poll, are demanding a change of policy .... What's the point of encroaching on the constitutional and civil rights and the freedom of
travel of Americans by preventing them from visiting the Island when they can visit any other place in the planet, including those
where their country is waging wars? While the world has called on the United States to [3] act on the right side of history by
lifting the crushing and unnecessary economic embargo on Cuba, it must also remove Cuba from the U.S. State Departments list of
Sponsors of State Terrorism. This position is highly problematic, as the United States has actively engaged in over 50 years of
economic and covert destabilization in Cuba, going so far as blindly protecting wanted terrorists such as Luis Posada Carilles [18]
and Orlando Bosch [19], both former CIA agents accused of dozens of terrorist attacks in Cuba and the United States. The double
standard of dealing with noted human rights abusers such as China, Saudi Arabia and Colombia, while isolating Cuba, does not
make sense. Obamas re-election has meant that he is no longer captive to a potentially extreme anti-Cuba voting bloc in Florida. In
fact, calls for normalization [20] of relations with Cuba have been on the increase. Given that Obama has stated that [5] I am not
interested in talking for the sake of talking, but I do believe that we can move U.S.-Cuban relations in a new directionit is time for
meaningful, progressive engagement with Cuba to occur. Tuesdays vote showed how out of touch
America is on this issue. Given the other foreign relations nightmares Obama has both inherited and created,
normalizing relations with Cuba would be a realistically achievable and just goal for his second term.

Lifting the embargo solves US and Cuban economy, US relations with
Latin America, and global US perception
Hanson et al., economics researcher at the American Enterprise
Institute, 13
(Daniel, & Batten, Dayne, affiliated with the University of North
Carolina Department of Public Policy, & Ealey, Harrison, financial
analyst. 1/16/13, Forbes Its Time For The U.S. To End Its Senseless
Embargo Of Cuba,
s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/, accessed 6/23/13. IC)

While the embargo has been through several legal iterations in the intervening years, the general tenor of the U.S. position toward Cuba is a
hardline not-in-my-backyard approach to communism a la the Monroe Doctrine. The official position is outdated, hypocritical,
and counterproductive. The Cuban embargo was inaugurated by a Kennedy administration executive order in 1960 as a response to
the confiscation of American property in Cuba under the newly installed Castro regime. The current incarnation of the embargo codified primarily in
the Helms-Burton Act aims at producing free markets and representative democracy in
Cuba through economic sanctions, travel restrictions, and international legal penalties.
Since Fidel Castro abdicated power to his brother Raul in 2008, the government has
undertaken more than 300 economic reforms designed to encourage enterprise, and
restrictions have been lifted on property use, travel, farming, municipal governance, electronics access, and more. Cuba is
still a place of oppression and gross human rights abuse, but recent events would indicate the 11 million person nation is moving in the
right direction. Despite this progress, the U.S. spends massive amounts of money trying to keep illicit Cuban goods out of the United
States. At least 10 different agencies are responsible for enforcing different provisions of the embargo, and according to the Government
Accountability Office, the U.S. government devotes hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of
thousands of man hours to administering the embargo each year. At the Miami International Airport, visitors
arriving from a Cuban airport are seven times more likely to be stopped and subjected to further customs inspections than are visitors from other
countries. More than 70 percent of the Treasurys Office of Foreign Assets Control inspections each year are centered on rooting out smuggled Cuban
goods even though the agency administers more than 20 other trade bans. Government resources could be better
spent on the enforcement of other sanctions, such as illicit drug trade from Columbia, rather than the search for
contraband cigars and rum. At present, the U.S. is largely alone in restricting access to Cuba. The
embargo has long been a point of friction between the United States and allies in Europe, South
America, and Canada. Every year since 1992, the U.S. has been publically condemned in the
United Nations for maintaining counterproductive and worn out trade and migration restrictions
against Cuba despite the fact that nearly all 5,911 U.S. companies nationalized during
the Castro takeover have dropped their claims. Moreover, since Europeans, Japanese, and Canadians can travel and conduct
business in Cuba unimpeded, the sanctions are rather toothless. The State Department has argued that the cost of conducting business in Cuba is only
negligibly higher because of the embargo. For American multinational corporations wishing to undertake commerce in Cuba, foreign branches find it
easy to conduct exchanges. Yet, estimates of the sanctions annual cost to the U.S. economy range from
$1.2 to $3.6 billion, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Restrictions on trade disproportionately
affect U.S. small businesses who lack the transportation and financial
infrastructure to skirt the embargo. These restrictions translate into real reductions
in income and employment for Americans in states like Florida, where the unemployment rate currently stands at
8.1 percent. Whats worse, U.S. sanctions encourage Cuba to collaborate with regional players
that are less friendly to American interests. For instance, in 2011, the country inked a deal with Venezuela for the
construction of an underwater communications link, circumventing its need to connect with US-owned networks close to its shores. Repealing
the embargo would fit into an American precedent of lifting trade and travel
restrictions to countries who demonstrate progress towards democratic ideals. Romania,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were all offered normal trade relations in the 1970s after preliminary reforms even though they were still in clear
violation of several US resolutions condemning their human rights practices. China, a communist country and perennial human rights abuser, is the
U.S.s second largest trading partner, and in November, trade restrictions against Myanmar were lessened notwithstanding a fifty year history of
genocide and human trafficking propagated by its military government. Which, of course, begs the question: when will the U.S. see fit to lift the
embargo? If Cuba is trending towards democracy and free markets, what litmus test must be passed for the embargo to be rolled back? The cost
of the embargo to the United States is high in both dollar and moral terms, but it is higher for
the Cuban people, who are cut off from the supposed champion of liberty in their hemisphere because of an antiquated Cold War dispute. The
progress being made in Cuba could be accelerated with the help of American charitable relief,
business innovation, and tourism. A perpetual embargo on a developing nation that is moving towards reform makes little
sense, especially when Americas allies are openly hostile to the embargo. It keeps a broader discussion about
smart reform in Cuba from gaining life, and it makes no economic sense. It is time for the embargo to go.

The embargo is the crux of our negative IR perceptions the plan
solves for our international perception
Arzeno, Major and MBA from the University of Miami, 03
(Mario A., 2003, The U.S. Embargo on Cuba: A Time for Change?, pg 7, RJ)
This brings us to where we are today and the importance of researching this issue. The
situation in Cuba has continuously been debated in the United States since Castros
revolution and government take over in 1959. Incredibly, Fidel Castro has outlasted nine U.S.
presidents and working on his tenth. He has been a controversial object of fascination, hatred
and in many instances admiration by people all over the world. People all over the world
admire Castro because they see him as the defiant leader against the American
super power, which is resented and perceived by many countries as imperialistic and
intrusive following the Cold War. The U.S. fuels this perception by maintaining an
embargo that empowers Castro to first defy the U.S. and secondly to use as a
scapegoat for the failures of his socialist regime.
The embargo destroys US credibility makes us look imperialistic
Arzeno, Major and MBA from the University of Miami, 03
(Mario A., 2003, The U.S. Embargo on Cuba: A Time for Change?, pg 7, RJ)
The flaw with this idea and the Helms-Burton Act is that the United States has lost
international credibility, by passing a law criticized as imperialistic in nature by the
U.S. imposing its power, authority and influence over a sovereign nation, with unconditional
and inflexible terms for change before it will entertain the idea of lifting the
embargo. This is not the intent of an embargo. An embargo is not designed to mandate how a
country should run its internal affairs.
Solvency Soft Power

Lifting the embargo is key to soft power its necessary to achieving
hemispheric leadership
Gerz-Escandon, Independent scholar & former professor of political
science based in Atlanta, 8
(Jennifer, 10/8/08, MC Monitor, End the US-Cuba embargo: Its a
2-coop.html, 6/24/13, AL)
For its part, by ending the embargo, the US simultaneously gains security through stability in
Cuba. More important, by investing in the future prototype for emerging markets a
42,803-square-mile green energy and technology lab called Cuba America gains a dedicated partner in the
search for energy independence. Supporters of the embargo say it serves as an important
symbolic protest of Cuba's deplorable human rights record and its lack of political, civil,
and economic freedoms. Yet constructive engagement with the reform-ready regime of Mr. Castro utilizing a framework based on
mutual economic interests similar to US-China relations could give observers more cause for optimism.Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's willingness to
speak openly with Newsweek/CNN journalist Fareed Zakaria last month about democratization is evidence of progress.While phasing out the Cuban
embargo won't render a quick solution to fractured US-Cuba relations or end the evaporation of esteem the US is suffering throughout Latin America,
it would mark a significant achievement of hemispheric leadership on a divisive
issue. By ending the embargo, the US may learn that under the right circumstances, the soft power of diplomacy
proves more effective in reshaping America's perception in Latin America than the
hard power of economic isolation ever did.

Lifting the embargo is key to soft power its necessary to achieving
hemispheric leadership
Gerz-Escandon, Independent scholar & former professor of political
science based in Atlanta, 8
(Jennifer, 10/8/08, MC Monitor, End the US-Cuba embargo: Its a
2-coop.html, 6/24/13, AL)
For its part, by ending the embargo, the US simultaneously gains security through stability in
Cuba. More important, by investing in the future prototype for emerging markets a
42,803-square-mile green energy and technology lab called Cuba America gains a dedicated partner in the
search for energy independence. Supporters of the embargo say it serves as an important
symbolic protest of Cuba's deplorable human rights record and its lack of political, civil,
and economic freedoms. Yet constructive engagement with the reform-ready regime of Mr. Castro utilizing a framework based on
mutual economic interests similar to US-China relations could give observers more cause for optimism.Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's willingness to
speak openly with Newsweek/CNN journalist Fareed Zakaria last month about democratization is evidence of progress.While phasing out the Cuban
embargo won't render a quick solution to fractured US-Cuba relations or end the evaporation of esteem the US is suffering throughout Latin America,
it would mark a significant achievement of hemispheric leadership on a divisive
issue. By ending the embargo, the US may learn that under the right circumstances, the soft power of diplomacy
proves more effective in reshaping America's perception in Latin America than the
hard power of economic isolation ever did.
Solvency Soft Power K/ To Hard Power

Soft Power allows us to implement hard power and hegemony ore
Nye, Dean of Harvards Kennedy School of Government, Foreign
Affairs, 04)
(Joseph, speech to Carnegie council,
html?withOthers=1, 6/30/13, ND)

Ambassador Djerejian, who chaired a bipartisan panel on Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World, argued that the United States
spent $150 million on public diplomacy for the whole Islamic world last year, and that is about the equal of two hours of the defense
budget, an extraordinary imbalance. The United States spends 400 times more on its hard power
than on its soft power, if you take all the exchange programs and broadcasting programs and lump them together as a
measure of soft power. If we were to spend just 1 percent of the military budget on soft
power, it would mean quadrupling our public diplomacy programs. There is something
wrong with our approach. In short, the challenge that we face in dealing with this new threat of
terrorism, particularly the danger of their obtaining weapons of mass destruction, is a
challenge which is very new and real in American foreign policy. But beyond the United States, it
is a challenge for all of modern urban civilization. If this spreads, and we find that
people will no longer live in cities because of fear, we will live in a very different
and less favorable world. At the same time, our approach to the problem has relied much
too heavily on one dimension of a three-dimensional world, one instrument
between hard and soft power. The answer is not to pretend that hard power doesnt matter -- it does
and we will need to continue to use it -- but realise that to use hard power without combining it
with soft power, which has all too often been the practice in the last few years, is a serious mistake. The good
news is that in the past the United States has, as in the Cold War, combined hard and soft
power. The bad news is that we are not doing it yet. But since we have done it once, presumably we
can do it again. When we learn how to better combine hard and soft power, then we will
be what I call a smart power.

Soft power is key to keeping allies and preventing terror War on
Terror proves
Nye, Dean of Harvards Kennedy School of Government, Foreign
Affairs, 04
(Joseph, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, book
pg. 129-130, 6/30/13, ND)
It is not smart to discount soft power as just a question of image, public relations, and
ephemeral popularity. As we argued earlier, it is a form of powera means of obtaining desired
outcomes. When we discount the importance of our attractiveness to other countries, we
pay a price. Most important, if the United States is so unpopular in a country that being pro-
American is a kiss of death in that country's domestic politics, political leaders are unlikely to
make concessions to help us. Turkey, Mexico, and Chile were prime examples in
the run-up to the Iraq War in March 2003. When American policies lose their
legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of others, attitudes of distrust tend to fester and further reduce
our leverage. For example, after 9/11 there was an outpouring of sympathy from
Germans for the United States, and Germany joined a military campaign against
the Al Qaeda network. But as the United States geared up for the unpopular Iraq War,
Germans expressed widespread disbelief about the reasons the U.S. gave for going to
war such as the alleged connection of Iraq to 9/11 and the imminence of the threat of weapons of mass destruction. German
suspicions were reinforced by what they* saw as biased American media coverage during
the war, and by the failure to find weapons of mass destruction or prove the connection 109/11
in the aftermath of the war. The combination fostered a climate in which conspiracy theories
flourished. By July 2003, according to a Reuters poll, one-third of Germans under the age of 30 said that the)'
thought the American government might even have staged the original September 11
attacks." Absurd views feed upon each other, and paranoia can be contagious. American attitudes
toward foreigners harden, and we begin to believe that the rest of the world really
does hate us. Some Americans begin to hold grudges, to mistrust all Muslims, to boycott
French wines and rename French fries, to spread and believe false rumors." In turn,
foreigners see Americans as uninformed and in- sensitive to anyone's interests but their own. They see our media wrapped in the
American flag. Some Americans in turn succumb to residual strands of isolationism, and say that if
others choose to see us that way. "To hell with 'em." If foreigners are going to be like that, who cares whether we are
popular or not. But to the extent that Americans allow ourselves to become isolated, we
embolden our enemies such as Al Qaeda. Such reactions undercut our soft power
and are self-defeating in terms of the outcomes we want.

Improving relations allows us to make allies and lessens the chance of
confusion and conflict
Nye, Dean of Harvards Kennedy School of Government, Foreign
Affairs, 04
(Joseph, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, book
pg. 110-111, 6/30/13, ND)

Each of these three dimensions of public diplomacy plays an important role in helping to create an attractive
image of a country and this can improve its prospects for obtaining its desired
outcomes. But even the best advertising cannot sell an unpopular product, and, as we saw in chapter 2, policies that appear
narrowly self-serving or are arrogantly presented are likely to consume rather than produce soft power. At best, long-standing
friendly relationships may lead others to be slightly more tolerant in their
responses. Sometimes friends will give you the benefit of the doubt or forgive more willingly. A
communications strategy cannot work if it cuts against the grain of policy. Actions speak louder than words,
and public diplomacy that appears to be mere window dressing for the projection
of hard power is unlikely to succeed. Sir Michael Butler, a British diplomat who admires the United States,
explained, "If your government is perceived as self-interested, reactionary and unhelpful, it will
seriously hamper your ability to get your way-as the U.S. is finding at the moment."37 In 2003,
Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, attacked the State Department for failing to sell
America's Iraq policy.38 But selling requires paying attention to your markets, and on that dimension, the fault did not rest with
the State Department. Gingrich also complained about the removal of the United States from
the UN Human Rights Commission in 2001. But that was in retaliation for
America's failure to pay its UN dues (a policy that originated in Congress) and the unilateral
policies of the new Bush administration (which often originated in other executive departments, against the
warnings of the State Department). Senator Charles Hagel, a Nebraska Republican, noted that after 9/II
many people in Washington were suddenly talking about the need for a renewed public
diplomacy to "'get our message out.' ... But Madison Avenue-style packaging cannot market a
contradictory or confusing message. We need to reassess the fundamentals of our
diplomatic approach .... Policy and diplomacy must match, or marketing becomes a
confusing and transparent barrage of mixed messages."39

Solvency - Perception

Plan key to perception promotes LA cooperation and solves
democracy empirics
White, Former US Ambassador, 3/7
(Robert E., March 7 2013, The New York Times, After Chavez, a Chance to Rethink Relations
With Cuba,
neighbors-in-latin-america.html?pagewanted=all&pagewanted=print , 6/24/13. RJ)
FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a
partnership with Latin America. This legacy dates from the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the
Rio pact, the postwar treaty that pledged the United States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America. Yet for
a half-century, our policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between intervention
and neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chvez of
Venezuela who along with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the political
leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades offers an opportunity to restore bonds with
potential allies who share the American goal of prosperity. Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chvez used our embargo
as a wedge with which to antagonize the United States and alienate its supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and
his brother Ral, Cubas current president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever
did at all); President Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from Cuban-
American lawmakers in Congress. An end to the Cuba embargo would send a powerful signal to
all of Latin America that the United States wants a new, warmer relationship with democratic
forces seeking social change throughout the Americas. I joined the State Department as a Foreign Service officer in the 1950s and
chose to serve in Latin America in the 1960s. I was inspired by President John F. Kennedys creative response to the
revolutionary fervor then sweeping Latin America. The 1959 Cuban revolution, led by the charismatic Fidel Castro, had inspired
revolts against the cruel dictatorships and corrupt pseudodemocracies that had dominated the region since the end of Spanish and
Portuguese rule in the 19th century. Kennedy had a charisma of his own, and it captured the imaginations of leaders who wanted
democratic change, not violent revolution. Kennedy reacted to the threat of continental insurrection by creating the Alliance
for Progress, a kind of Marshall Plan for the hemisphere that was calculated to achieve the same kind of results that saved
Western Europe from Communism. He pledged billions of dollars to this effort. In hindsight, it may have been overly ambitious,
even nave, but Kennedys focus on Latin America rekindled the promise of the Good Neighbor Policy of
Franklin D. Roosevelt and transformed the whole concept of inter-American relations. Tragically, after Kennedys assassination in
1963, the ideal of the Alliance for Progress crumbled and la noche mas larga the longest night
began for the proponents of Latin American democracy. Military regimes flourished, democratic
governments withered, moderate political and civil leaders were labeled Communists, rights
of free speech and assembly were curtailed and human dignity crushed, largely because the United States
abandoned all standards save that of anti-Communism. During my Foreign Service career, I did
what I could to oppose policies that supported dictators and closed off democratic alternatives. In 1981, as the ambassador to El
Salvador, I refused a demand by the secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran
militarys responsibility for the murders of four American churchwomen. I was fired and forced out of the Foreign Service. The
Reagan administration, under the illusion that Cuba was the power driving the Salvadoran revolution, turned its policy over to the
Pentagon and C.I.A., with predictable results. During the 1980s the United States helped expand the Salvadoran military, which was
dominated by uniformed assassins. We armed them, trained them and covered up their crimes. After our counterrevolutionary
efforts failed to end the Salvadoran conflict, the Defense Department asked its research institute, the RAND Corporation, what had
gone wrong. RAND analysts found that United States policy makers had refused to accept the obvious truth that the insurgents were
rebelling against social injustice and state terror. As a result, we pursued a policy unsettling to ourselves, for ends humiliating to the
Salvadorans and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest. Over the subsequent quarter-
century, a series of profound political, social and economic changes have undermined the traditional power bases in Latin America
and, with them, longstanding regional institutions like the Organization of American States. The organization, which is
headquartered in Washington and which excluded Cuba in 1962, was seen as irrelevant by Mr. Chvez. He promoted the creation of
the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States which excludes the United States and Canada as an alternative. At a
regional meeting that included Cuba and excluded the United States, Mr. Chvez said that the most positive thing for the
independence of our continent is that we meet alone without the hegemony of empire. Mr. Chvez was masterful at manipulating
Americas antagonism toward Fidel Castro as a rhetorical stick with which to attack the United States as an imperialist aggressor, an
enemy of progressive change, interested mainly in treating Latin America as a vassal continent, a source of cheap commodities and
labor. Like its predecessors, the Obama administration has given few signs that it has grasped the magnitude of these changes or
cares about their consequences. After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin Americas leading statesman at the time, Luiz
Incio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr. Obama to normalize relations with Cuba. Lula, as he is universally
known, correctly identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been since the
very early years of the Castro regime. After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington set out to accomplish by stealth
and economic strangulation what it had failed to do by frontal attack. But the clumsy mix of covert action and porous boycott
succeeded primarily in bringing shame on the United States and turning Mr. Castro into a folk hero. And even now, despite the
relaxing of travel restrictions and Ral Castros announcement that he will retire in 2018, the implacable hatred of many within the
Cuban exile community continues. The fact that two of the three Cuban-American members of the Senate Marco Rubio of Florida
and Ted Cruz of Texas are rising stars in the Republican Party complicates further the potential for a recalibration of Cuban-
American relations. (The third member, Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, is the new chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, but his power has been weakened by a continuing ethics controversy.) Are there any other examples
in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a small, weak nation can prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest
merely by staying alive? The re-election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chvez, give
America a chance to reassess the irrational hold on our imaginations that Fidel Castro
has exerted for five decades. The president and his new secretary of state, John Kerry, should quietly
reach out to Latin American leaders like President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and Jos Miguel Insulza,
secretary general of the Organization of American States. The message should be simple: The president is
prepared to show some flexibility on Cuba and asks your help. Such a simple request could
transform the Cuban issue from a bilateral problem into a multilateral challenge. It would
then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy that would help Cuba achieve a
sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere
composed entirely of elected governments. If, however, our present policy paralysis
continues, we will soon see the emergence of two rival camps, the United States
versus Latin America. While Washington would continue to enjoy friendly relations with individual countries like
Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, the vision of Roosevelt and Kennedy of a hemisphere of partners
cooperating in matters of common concern would be reduced to a historical footnote.
Plan is key to sending a signal demographic shifts and international
Ballve, PhD in geography @ Berkeley, 08
(Teo, December 29, 2008, The Progressive, On the 50
Anniversary of the Cuban Revolution,
Obama should signal an end to the embargo, ,
ACCESSED June 24, 2013, RJ)
This week marks the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, an opportune time for President-elect Obama to signal an end to the
Cuban embargo. During the campaign, Obama promised to turn the page and begin to write a new chapter in U.S.-Cuba policy.
Contrary to the Bush administration's policies, Obama said he would give Cuban-Americans unrestricted rights to visit family and
send cash remittances to the island. But Obama stopped short of endorsing an end to the embargo. He said he planned to use it as
leverage over the Cuban government to induce democratic reforms. This strategy has repeatedly failed, leaving U.S.-Cuba relations
frozen in a Cold War iceberg since fatigue-clad rebels marched victoriously into Havana on New Year's Day, 1959. The
embargo is a policy that hasn't worked in nearly 50 years, Wayne Smith, the former head of
Washington's diplomatic mission in Havana under the Carter administration, recently told the AP. It's stupid, it's
counterproductive and there is no international support for it. For 17 straight years, the 192-
member U.N. General Assembly has overwhelmingly approved a non-binding resolution condemning the U.S. embargo. Only the
United States, Israel and Palau voted against the measure in October. In the United States, the political tide is also
turning against the embargo, which would require Congressional approval to lift.
Politicians have traditionally pandered to the Cuban exile community in Florida as
a key even decisive voting bloc, giving Cuban-American hardliners essentially a veto over changes in U.S. policy. But
these old guard, militant exiles, who generally left Cuba shortly after the Castro
brothers declared victory, have found their influence waning. A generational and
demographic shift is under way in south Florida that changes the calculus. A poll
conducted by Florida International University a month after the presidential election shows a sea change in Cuban-American
opinion. The poll revealed 55 percent of Cuban-American respondents favored ending
the embargo, while 65 percent said they wanted Washington to re-establish
diplomatic relations with Havana. Lifting the embargo would dramatically improve Washington's ties with the
rest of Latin America. On December 8, the heads of 15 Caribbean nations called on Obama to rescind the embargo: The Caribbean
community hopes that the transformational change which is under way in the United States will finally relegate that measure to
history, their statement said. Then on December 17 in Brazil, the leaders of 33 Latin American countries, including conservative
allies of Washington like Colombia and Mexico, convened for another gathering and unanimously called on Obama to drop the
unacceptable embargo. At that summit, Cuban President Ral Castro even offered to release political prisoners as a gesture to
pave the way for talks between Havana and Washington. If Obama moves to lift the embargo, it would
send a bold statement that his administration is serious about writing a truly new
chapter in U.S. relations with Cuba and the rest of Latin America. Finally, he will have
turned the page.
Releasing trade restrictions solves for international perception sets
different messages and opens up new possibilities
Zimmerman, Barnard College, 10
(Chelsea A., November 1, 2010, Rethinking the Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To
Mend a Broken Policy, , ACCESSED
June 24, 2013, RJ)
Relaxing U.S. trade restrictions will not result in an immediate thaw in relations
with Cuba. The Cuban governments response may be slow, as Raul Castro will
need to factor in the changes in U.S. policy into the larger equation of Cuban
recovery and economic reform. Moving from a policy of isolation to one of
investment and engagement will send a different message to Cuba and sets the
stage for fruitful trade possibilities and for normalizing relations between the
two countries. In addition, the United States will be sending a signal to other
Latin America about its willingness to view the world in cooperative terms. The
current U.S. policy toward Cuba has been driven by history, without taking into account political
and economic interests of both countries. A policy based on sanctions and regime change is out
of touch with the times, and is inconsistent and flawed in its intent and application. The trade
embargo imposed on Cuba reflects bad economics, bad business, bad national security strategy,
and bad global politics, and warrants a gradual revamping through revised regulations and,
ultimately, Congressional action.
Plan is key to LA cooperation and sends out a signal to the rest of
the hemisphere key to opening political space in Cuba
CDA et al. No Date
(Center for Democracy in the Americas, the Latin America Working Group, the
Lexington Institute, the New America Foundation, and Washington Office on
Latin America, No Date ***uses evidence from 2009***, , pg 4, RJ)
Allowing Americans to travel to Cuba will send an important signal to Latin
America as a whole. Currently every nation in the hemisphere - except the
U.S. - has full diplomatic relations with Havana. An end to the travel ban
would signal a shift in the U.S. approach to Cuba and demonstrate to our
democratic allies in the region that we are respecting their concerns while
continuing to adhere to our goals for opening political space in Cuba.
Most other governments have normal diplomatic relations with Cuba, engage
with Cuba in other multi-lateral bodies, address concerns about human rights in
the context of ongoing dialogue, and place no limitations on the right of their
citizens to travel to Cuba. At a December 2008 summit in Rio De Janeiro, the
leaders of every Latin American country called on the U.S. to end the embargo
against Cuba. An end to the ban on travel would be a modest step that
would respond to the calls of our friends in the hemisphere. In an
historic agreement at the General Assembly of the Organization of American
States (OAS) in San Pedro Sula, Honduras on June 2, 2009, foreign ministers
agreed by consensus to end Cubas suspension from the body, imposed in 1962
at the height of the Cold War. After rounds of tough negotiations, the U.S.
agreed to the language, showing flexibility and a willingness to listen to
regional partners. The final statement set no preconditions, but rather ended
the suspension on Cuba and proposed a mechanism for discussion with Cuba if
it requests re-admission.

Solvency Alliances

Latin American neoliberal reform is not due to U.S. intervention but
to the reality that free markets present the only viable economic
system. The status quo provides Cuba with a scapegoat, shielding
Cuba from any true reform. Engagement solves
Vasquez & Rodriguez, director and assistant director of the project on
human liberty @ The CATO Institute, NDG
(Ian, L. Jacobo, The CATO Institute, originally from the Journal of
Commerce, NDG, Trade Embargo In and Castro Out,
castro-out, 6/23/13, PD)
But the revolution in democratic capitalism that has swept the Western
Hemisphere has had little to do with Washingtons efforts to export democracy.
Rather, it has had to do with Latin Americas hard-earned realization that the free-
enterprise system is the only system capable of providing self-sustaining growth
and increasing prosperity. Even though Cubaunlike other communist countries, such
as China or Vietnam, with which the United States actively trades has not undertaken
meaningful market reforms, an open U.S. trade policy is more likely to subvert its
system than is an embargo. Proponents of the Cuban embargo vastly
underestimate the extent to which increased foreign trade and investment can
undermine Cuban communism even if that business is conducted with state
entities. Cuban officials appear to be well aware of the danger. For example, Cubas
opening of its tourism industry to foreign investment has been accompanied by
measures that restrict ordinary Cubans from visiting foreign hotels and tourist
facilities. As a result, Cubans have come to resent their government for what has
become known as tourism apartheid. In recent years, Cuban officials have also
issued increasing warnings against corruption, indicating the regimes fear that
unofficial business dealings, especially with foreigners, may weaken allegiance to
the government and even create vested interests that favor more extensive market
openings. Further undercutting the regimes authority is the widespread dollar
economy that has emerged as a consequence of the foreign presence and
remittances from abroad (those from the United States now banned by the Helms-
Burton bill). The dollarization of the Cuban economywhich the Cuban
government has been forced to legalize as a result of its inability to control ithas
essentially eliminated the regimes authority to dictate the countrys monetary
policy. Replacing the all-encompassing state with one that allows greater space for voluntary
interaction requires strengthening elements of civil society, that is, groups not dependent on the
state. That development is more likely to come about in an environment of increased interaction
with outside groups than in an environment of isolation and state control. Supporters of the
embargo casually assume that Castro wants an end to the embargo because he believes that step
would solve his economic problems. Despite his rhetoric, Castro more likely fears the lifting of
the U.S. sanctions. It is difficult to believe, for example, that he did not calculate a strong U.S.
response when he ordered the attack on two planes flown by Cuban-Americans in early 1996.
But as long as Castro can point to the United States as an external enemy, he will
be successful in barring dissent, justifying control over the economy, and stirring
up nationalist and anti-U.S. sentiments in Cuba. It is time for Washington to stop
playing into Castros hands and instead pull the rug out from under him by ending the embargo.

The embargo encourages Cuban relations with U.S. adversaries;
lifting sanctions key to pushing the neoliberal agenda
Pelvert, Writer for the Department of the Navy, 02
(Karl, Department of the Navy, 3/16/02, Cuban Economic Sanctions:
The Time Has Come to Lift Them and Move Forward,
6/23/13, PD)

The expected end state for the US is a democratic Cuba with or without Castro. The
means, the application of US economic power against Cuba must aim toward this goal. The
ways, the use of embargoes and trade sanctions have clearly failed to achieve this
desired end state. Any national security concerns certainly must be weighed carefully before
changing the policy. Normal relations with Cuba could serve as a tool to minimize the
growth of unchallenged influence of the PRC and Russia in Cuba. The existing
sanctions should be ended as they lack support from the international community and have not
altered the Cuban government's undesirable pattern of behavior. Bringing Cuba into the world
economy would encourage it to comply with the rules set down by organizations such as the
World Trade Organization and improve the standard of living for the Cubans as a whole. There
was a similar discussion regarding the PRC and they certainly pose a greater potential threat to
our national security than Cuba. Since the current policy is not achieving the desired
end state it is time and appropriate to change the approach even if there is some