The Revolution.

Social-Change Nexus: Some Old Theories and New Hypotheses

Author(s): Ted Robert Gurr
Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, Special Issue on Revolution and Social Change (Apr.,
1973), pp. 359-392
Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/421270
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T h e Re volution-
Social-Ch ange
N e x us
Some Old T h e orie s and N e w
Hypoth e s e s
T e d Robe rt Gurr
T h e
analys is
of th e ne x us be twe e nre volutionand s ocial
ch ange may
be
approach e d
in th re e
ways .
One is th e
que s tion-be gging
de finitionof
re volutionas a
type
of s ocial
ch ange -abrupt ch ange
in fundame ntal
patte rns
of be lie f and action. T h is "de finitional"
approach
is
que s tion
be gging
ins ofar as it fails to de al with s uch
as pe cts
as th e conditions
unde r wh ich s ocial
ch ange
be come s
"re volutionary"
rath e r th an "non-
re volutionary,"
and h ow it doe s s o. T h e s e cond and th ird
approach e s
as s ume s ome caus al conne ctionbe twe e nre volutionand
ch ange .
One of
th e s e
s pe cifie s
kinds or
s e que nce s
of
ch ange
th at le ad to viole nce and
re volution;
we
may
call it th e
"e tiology" approach .
T h e
oth e r,
"ins tru-
me ntal"
approach
cons ide rs th e
cons e que nce s
of
re volution,
and le s s e r
forms of
viole nce , for s ocial
ch ange .
T h e s e
approach e s ,
as de s cribe d
h e re ,
are
polar type s
and not ne ce s -
s arily
accurate ch aracte rizations of
particular
th e orie s . Se ve ral
ge ne ral
ch aracte ris tics of th e
type s
be ar
me ntioning,
h owe ve r. T h e de finitional
approach
is a manife s tationof traditional
s ch olars h ip,
in wh ich
pro-
ce dure s of
de finition, s pe cification
of
type s ,
and th e
continge nt cate gori-
zationof h is torical cas e s of "re volution" are e nds in th e ms e lve s .
Among
th e ir more abs urd
cons e que nce s
are s ch olas ticde bate s about wh e th e r a
give n
s e t of e ve nts was
"re ally"
a re volutionor not. T h is
approach
is
none mpirical,
for its
ge ne ralizations
are not inte nde d for
ve rification;
and it will not be furth e r cons ide re d in th is article .
T h e
"e tiological" approach
h as its roots in s uch s tudie s as Crane
Brinton's clas s ic T h e
Anatomy of Re volution
1
th at
atte mpt
to s ort out th e
caus e s or
proce s s e s ,
or
both ,
of h is toricre volutions .
Conte mporary
e tio-
logical
th e orie s are
principally
conce rne d with
ide ntifyingtype s
of
ch ange
or s e ts of
pre conditions
th at are
various ly
s aid to be
ne ce s s ary,
s ufficie nt,
or
probabilis tically pre dis pos ing
conditions of
political
viole nce
'N e w
York, 1938.
359
Comparative
Politics
April
1973
ge ne rally,
or re volution
s pe cifically.
T h e s e th e orie s are
ordinarily s ubje ct
to
e mpirical
validation; s ome of th e m h ave be e n
s pe cifically
formulate d
with th is
obje ct
in mind. A late nt
purpos e
of
many e tiological
th e orie s
s e e ms to be th e control of viole nce and re volution. T h e ir auth ors ofte n
-th ough
not
ne ce s s arily-proce e d
from th e
as s umption
th at re volution
is
unde s irable ,
and
may
be fore s talle d if
s cie ntifically
unde rs ood. T h e s e
as s umptions
do not make s uch th e orie s
inh e re ntly
cons e rvative or re -
pre s s ive ;
s ome h ave
s trong
"re formis t"
as s umptions
and
implications .
We
migh t
als o note th at Karl Marx 's
th e ory
of re volution is
e tiological, and
s e lf-e vide ntly prore volutionary.2
T h e "ins trume ntal"
approach
to re volution is all but an
e mpty
cate -
gory.
T h e
ins trume ntality
of various forms of viole nce is ofte n
alle ge d
by
re volutionarie s and
re volutionary
th e oris ts . Marx fore cas ts a
progre s -
s ion of
re volutionary s truggle s culminating
in clas s le s s
utopias .
T h e re
are als o s ome
ide ograph ic
s tudie s of th e e ffe cts of viole nce and re volu-
tion on
particular
s ocie tie s . But it is s till
large ly true ,
as
Harry
Ecks te in
wrote
ne arly
a de cade
ago,
th at "almos t
noth ing
care ful and
s ys te matic
h as be e n writte n about th e
long-run
s ocial e ffe cts of inte rnal
wars ," not
e ve n on s uch bas ic
que s tions
as "h ow
political le gitimacy
and s ocial h ar-
mony may
be re s tore d afte r viole nt
dis ruption, wh at make s inte rnal wars
acute or ch ronic, and wh at th e
comparative
cos ts (and
probabilitie s ) are
of
re volutionary
and
e volutionary
trans formations ." 3
T h e firs t obje ct of th is article is to e x amine wh at s ome conte mporary
e tiological th e orie s s ay about s ocial ch ange as a caus e of viole nce ge n-
e rally, and re volution s pe cifically. Its s e cond obje ct is to cons ide r th e
limite d implications of th e s e e tiological th e orie s for ans we ringth e ins tru-
me ntal que s tion. Finally, I propos e s ome ge ne ral de te rminants of th e
"s ucce s s " of various kinds of viole nt
conflict,
as a furth e r s te p toward
de alingwith th e kinds of que s tions Ecks te in h as rais e d.
I. Some Conce pts
A fe w
pre liminary, de finitional points mus t be made . By viole nce I me an
de libe rate us e s of force to injure or de s troy ph ys ically, not s ome more
ge ne ral cate gory of coe rcive actions or
policie s ,
and not ins titutional
arrange me nts th at de me an or frus trate th e ir me mbe rs . T h is de finition is
inde pe nde nt of age nts , obje cts , or conte x ts of viole nce . T h e caus e s of th e
e x te nt of viole nce pe r s e may be of intrins icinte re s t, and inde e d th e y are
2
On th e une x amine d ide ological pre mis e s and implications of conflict th e orie s ,
s e e T e rry N ardin, Viole nce and th e State : A Critique of Empirical Political T h e ory
(Be ve rly Hills , 1971).
'
Harry Ecks te in, "On th e Etiology of Inte rnal Wars ," His tory and T h e ory, IV
(2/1965),
136.
360
T e d Robe rt Gurr
for s ome of th e
e tiological
th e oris ts cons ide re d be low. A more common
conce rn of
e tiological
th e orie s is
wh y particular
viole nt e ve nts occur:
"viole nce " is us e d
th e ore tically
as a s h ort-h and te rm
for,
or
de fining
prope rty of,
e ve nts
various ly
labe le d
riots , re be llions , inte rnal
wars ,
tur-
moil, re volutions ,
and s o on. A re late d
e tiological approach
is to focus
ons ome s e t of
fre que ntly-but-not-ne ce s s arily-viole nt
inte ractions be twe e n
groups , e .g.,
"conflict be h avior" or "clas s conflict"; de finitions and e x -
planations
of "viole nce " are
s ubs idiary
to th e
e x planation
of conflict
ge ne rally.
In
e valuating
th e s e
th e orie s ,
and
advancingmy
own
h ypoth -
e s e s ,
I will us e "viole nce " in th e abs tract s e ns e
s pe cifie d
above . Wh e n
dis cus s ing
e ve nts or inte ractions
involving
th e us e of
viole nce ,
I will
us e th e
ph ras e
"viole nt conflict."
As to "re volution," it is de fine d in diffe re nt
ways
from diffe re nt th e o-
re tical
pe rs pe ctive s .
I h ave me ntione d its de finitionas a
s pe cie s
of
abrupt
ch ange . Etiological
th e orie s
various ly
us e th e te rm to re fe r to
(a) a
motive or
obje ctive
of a
group
of
pe ople ; (b)
a
s tyle
or form of
action;
(c)
an outcome of action;
and (d) ch ange s continge nt upon
action. Le t
us cons ide r th e s e
brie fly.
a.
Individuals , groups ,
and
organizations
are s aid to be "re vo-
lutionary"
if
th e y
are
(th ough t
to be )
committe d to
accomplis h -
ings we e ping,
fundame ntal ch ange s . Socie tie s in wh ich s uch groups
are wide s pre ad may be s aid to be in a "re volutionary s ituation,"
wh e th e r or not ove rt conflict or viole nce h as occurre d.
b. Conce rte d action aime d at trans forminga s ocial s ys te m or
ove rth rowinga re gime is s ome time s calle d "re volution," with out
re fe re nce to its impact or outcome . T h us , re volutionary activis ts
may proclaim at th e ons e t of viole nce th at "th e re volution h as
be gun." Similarly, s ch olars may cate gorize a continuing viole nt
conflict as a "re volution"; in th is way, we s pe ak of th e "Vie t-
name s e re volution" wh ile h os tilitie s are s till in progre s s . Once
outcome s are known, s uch conflicts may be de note d "s ucce s s ful"
or "uns ucce s s ful" (or "atte mpte d") re volutions . All th e s e us age s
pre s ume th e e x is te nce of re volutionary motive s (above ), adding
to th e m th e occurre nce of ove rt action aime d at th e ir attainme nt.
c. T h e imme diate outcome of viole nt conflict is s ome time s
th e crite rion for "re volution." If th e "outs " s ucce e d in dis placing
th e "ins ," a re volution h as occurre d; oth e rwis e , th e actions of th e
would-be re volutionarie s are de s cribe d as a"re be llion," "upris ing,"
"puts ch ," or s ome s uch te rm. One anomaly of th is us age is th at
"re volution" may h appe n with out re volutionary inte nt or action.
T h e re are a numbe r of ins tance s -for e x ample , El Salvador in
361
Comparative
Politics
April
1973
1944 and th e Sudanin 1964-wh e re ge ne ral s trike s and riots ove r
imme diate
grie vance s
induce d rule rs to
re s ign,
th us
giving
dis s i-
de nts
une x pe cte d
victorie s th at we re late r h aile d as "re volutions ."
d. Se izure of
powe r may
be
dis tinguis h e d
from th e
s ubs e que nt
atte mpt
to ach ie ve
re volutionary goals ;
"re volution" is
re garde d
as
th e
s truggle
toward or th e attainme nt of th os e
goals . Brinton,
amongoth e rs ,
de s cribe s th e e ve nts
s ubs e que nt
to th e s e izure of
powe r
as th e
"proce s s
of re volution."
Conte mporary
re volution-
arie s
ge ne rally re cognize
th e s e izure of
powe r
as
only
th e firs t
s te p
in "re volution,"
and re fe r to th e ir s ocioe conomicand
political
ch ange s
in te rms
analogous
to th e Cuban's la re volucione n
march a.
Finally-and
h e re we come full circle in th e de finitional
cycle -s ome
advocate s of "re volution" me an
by
th at te rm th e
attainme nt of s ubs tantial s ocial
ch ange
with out th e us e of s ubs tan-
tial viole nce or aconve ntional s e izure of
powe r.
All of th e s e
us age s
s e e m to me to h ave s ome
validity,
or at le as t
s ufficie nt
curre ncy
th at it is foolis h to
s ay
th at one of th e s e
th ings
is
"re volution" and anoth e r is not. In
s ubs e que nt
dis cus s ionI avoid th e un-
qualifie d
te rm
"re volution,"
and us e ins te ad one of th e
followingph ras e s ,
wh ich
corre s pond rough ly
to th e above
us age s : (a) re volutionary
move -
me nts ; (b) re volutionary conflicts ; (c) political re volution;
and
(d)
re v-
olutionary ch ange .
In th e final s e ctionof th is article I s h all
dis tinguis h
re volutionary move me nts from move me nts ch aracte rize d by oth e r kinds
of motive s .
A fe w words ne e d to be s aid als oabout "s ocial ch ange " as aconce pt.
Abs tractly, I re gard it as any colle ctive ch ange in th e me ans or e nds of
h umanaction. More s pe cifically, followingT alcott Pars ons and Edward
Sh ils , and N e il Sme ls e r,4 we canth ink of h umanactionas be ingde te r-
mine d by (a) pe ople 's value s ,
i.e ., th e ir value d goods and conditions of
life ; (b) pe ople 's norms about h ow th os e value s are appropriate ly pur-
s ue d; (c) th e patte rne d forms of action-ins titutions -by wh ich pe ople
organize or are organize d for action; and (d) pe ople 's s ituations , th e
circums tance s -e nvironme nt, re s ource s , te ch nology-th at facilitate or
h inde r th e ir purs uit of particular value s . Any ch ange in any of th e s e de -
te rminants of actionis "s ocial ch ange ." So de fine d, it is aportmante au
conce pt, and I s o inte nd it. For any me aningful analys is one mus t dis -
tinguis h a numbe r of as pe cts and dime ns ions of ch ange . Amongth e
more obvious one s are :
4T alcott Pars ons and Edward A. Sh ils , T oward a Ge ne ral T h e ory of Action
(Cambridge [Mas s .], 1951); N e il J. Sme ls e r, T h e ory of Colle ctive Be h avior (N e w
York, 1963).
362
T e d Robe rt Gurr
a.
T ype of ch ange .
Wh ich variable s
among
wh ich of th e above
de te rminants of action
ch ange ?
b. Ex te nt
of ch ange .
How
many ch ange s
in th e above variable s
occur and are
th e y ch ange s
in
de gre e
or
s te p (th re s h old) ch ange s ?
c.
Scope of ch ange . Wh ich
groups
in a
s ocie ty
are affe cte d
by
wh ich
ch ange s ,
and to wh at e x te nt?
d. Patte rn
of ch ange .
Is
ch ange nonrandom, and,
if
s o, wh at
kind of tre nd or
cycle
doe s it
re pre s e nt?
e . Rate of ch ange .
How s low or
rapid
is e ach
s pe cifiable
ch ange ?
Atte mpts
to formulate
compre h e ns ive th e ory
about th e caus e -and-
e ffe ct
re lations h ips
be twe e nviole nce and s ocial
ch ange
would s e e m to
re quire
an e normous amount of
prior conce ptual
and th e ore tical mate -
rials . T h e s e would include
e tiological
th e orie s of viole nce ,
conce ptualiza-
tion and th e orie s of conflict
proce s s e s ,
analytic
s ch e me s for
de s cribing
ch ange ,
and th e orie s
s pe cifying
inte rre lations
among
dime ns ions of
ch ange .
Partial and
compe ting
th e orie s of th e s e
type s
e x is t
s e parate ly,
but th us far
th e y
afford ano more
inte grate d pe rs pe ctive
onth e viole nce -
ch ange
ne x us th andid th e
re ports
of th e
apocryph al
blind me nabout th e
true nature of th e
e le ph ant-and
for an ide ntical re as on: all h ad dif-
fe re nt points of de parture .
II. Social Ch ange as a Caus e of Viole nce and Re volution
All th e e tiological th e orie s with wh ich I am familiar attribute viole nt con-
flicts and re volutionary move me nts to s ome s pe cifie d kinds of s ocial
ch ange . T h e ge ne ral re lations h ip is s o clos e to tautological th at it ne ve r
s e e ms que s tione d: viole nt conflicts and re volutionary move me nts occur
in time s of ch ange , not s tas is . Some th ing
ch ange s ,
e ve nif it is only an
old e lite loos ingits grip on th e ins trume ntalitie s of force . An e x ample
is provide d by th e paradigm of re volutionary caus ationh e ld by mos t
Ame ricans ch olars in th e firs t h alf of th is ce ntury. Value ch ange s of
s ubs tantial e x te nt and s cope occur, at apace toorapid for comme ns urate
ch ange inins titutions . Pe ople cannolonge r ach ie ve many of th e ir goals ;
th e re s ult is 'wide s pre ad s tre s s , various ly calle d "balke d dis pos itions ,"
"re pre s s ion," or "cramp." A pe riod of "milling" and "agitation" s e ts
in,
le adingtoward cons e ns us on grie vance s and th e de ve lopme nt of anti-
e lite norms ; and "s olidifie d publicopinion" de ve lops . Gove rnme nts prove
too incompe te nt or re calcitrant to re me dy th e s ituation. Wh e ne ve r fur-
th e r ins titutional or s ituational ch ange we ake ns th e ability of th e ruling
363
Comparative
Politics
April
1973
e lite to
re s is t,
s ome
pre cipitant
will
s park re volutionary
conflict.5 In
brie f,
a s ucce s s ion of s ocial
ch ange s
is s aid to "caus e " viole nce .
Pre vale nt th e orie s te nd to be more
s pe cific
about th e kinds of
ch ange
th at
dis pos e
to viole nt conflict. In
fact,
it is
pos s ible
to
clas s ify
th e m ac-
cording
to th e ir me tath e ore tical
approach
to th e
ch ange -viole nce
ne x us .
Some are conce rne d with th e s ocial s ource s of
ps ych ological ch ange s
th at
dis pos e
to
viole nce ;
th e s e are th e
s ocial-ps ych ological
th e orie s . A
s e cond
cate gory
cons is ts of
e x planations
th at
e mph as ize
s ocial-s tructural
ch ange ,
s ome wh at in th e tradition of th e e arlie r th e orie s me ntione d
above . T h e th ird
type
cons ide re d h e re is
group
conflict
th e ory:
viole nce
is s aid to flow from th e e fforts of s ocial or functional clas s e s to maintain
or
improve
th e ir
pos itions
re lative to oth e rs . One comme nt be fore e x -
amining
s ome of th e s e th e orie s : e ach de als with th e
viole nce -inducing
e ffe cts of s ome
particular
kinds of s ocial
ch ange ,
wh ich are
argue d
on
various inductive and a
priori grounds
to caus e viole nt conflict. With th e
e x ce ption
of
Sme ls e r,6 none of th e m
be gins
with a
ge ne ral analys is
of
s ocial
ch ange ,
from wh ich
migh t
be de rive d a
compre h e ns ive
s e t of s tate -
me nts about th e caus al
s e que nce
from
ch ange
to viole nce .
Social-ps ych ological
th e orie s Some th e oris ts
be gin
with th e
s e e mingly
s e lf-e vide nt
pre mis e
th at dis conte nt is th e root caus e of viole nt conflict.
Principal e x pone nts
of th is
vie w,
in addition to
mys e lf,
are Jame s C.
Davie s and Ivo and Ros alind Fe ie rabe nd.7
My
ve rs ion of th e
pre mis e
is
th at th e pote ntial for colle ctive viole nce in a nation or s malle r com-
munity varie s with th e inte ns ity and s cope of s ocially induce d dis con-
te nt among its me mbe rs . T h e pre mis e is e s s e ntially a ge ne ralization of
XT h e ph ras e s in quotations are th os e us e d re s pe ctive ly by Lyford P. Edwards ,
T h e N atural His tory of Re volutions (Ch icago, 1927); Pitirim A. Sorokin, T h e
Sociology of Re volution (Ph ilade lph ia, 1925); Ge orge Pe tte e , T h e Proce s s of
Re volution (N e w York, 1938); Re x D.
Hoppe r,
"T h e Re volutionary Proce s s : A
Frame of Re fe re nce for th e Study of Re volutionary Move me nts ," Social
Force s ,
XXVIII (March 1950), 270-79; and Louis Gotts ch alk, "Caus e s of Re volution,"
Ame rican Journal of Sociology, I (July 1944), 1-8.
0
Sme ls e r, T h e ory of Colle ctive Be h avior.
7
T h e principal th e ore tical s tate me nts by th e s e auth ors are T e d Robe rt
Gurr,
Wh y Me n Re be l (Prince ton, 1970); Jame s C.
Davie s ,
"T oward a T h e ory of Re vo-
lution," Ame ricanSociological Re vie w, XXVII (Fe bruary
1962), 5-19; Jame s C.
Davie s , "T h e J-Curve of Ris ingand De clining Satis factions as a Caus e of Some
Gre at Re volutions and a Containe d Re be llion," in Hugh Davis Grah am and T e d
Robe rt Gurr, e ds . Viole nce in Ame rica: His torical and Comparative Pe rs pe ctive s
(N e w York, 1969), ch ap. 19; Ivo K. Fe ie rabe nd and Ros alind L. Fe ie rabe nd,
"Aggre s s ive Be h aviors with in Politie s , 1948-1962: A Cros s N ational Study,"
Journal of Conflict Re s olution, X (Se pte mbe r 1966), 249-71; and Ivo K. Fe ie ra-
be nd, Ros alind L. Fe ie rabe nd, and Be tty A. N e s vold, "Social Ch ange and Political
Viole nce : Cros s -N ationalComparis ons ," in Grah am and Gurr, e ds ., ch ap. 18.
364
T e d Robe rt Gurr
th e
frus tration-ange r-aggre s s ionprinciple
from th e individual to th e s o-
cial le ve l. All th e s e
e mpirical
th e orie s e laborate on
e s s e ntially
th e s ame
bas ic
pre mis e by s pe cifying
wh at kinds of s ocial conditions and
proce s s e s
of
ch ange
incre as e s ocial dis conte nt to th e th re s h old of viole nt conflict.
Davie s attribute s
re volutionary
conflict to one
s pe cific patte rn
of
ch ange
th at h e calls th e "J-curve ": "re volution is mos t
like ly
to take
place
wh e n a
prolonge d pe riod
of
ris ing e x pe ctations
and
ris inggratifi-
cations is followe d
by
a s h ort
pe riod
of
s h arp re ve rs al, during
wh ich th e
gap
be twe e n
e x pe ctations
and
gratifications quickly
wide ns and be come s
intole rable . T h e frus tration th at
de ve lops
. . . s e e ks outle ts in viole nt
action. Wh e n th e frus tration be come s focus e d on th e
gove rnme nt,
th e
viole nce be come s coh e re nt and dire ctional. If th e frus tration is s uf-
ficie ntly wide s pre ad, inte ns e ,
and focus e d on
gove rnme nt,
th e viole nce
will be come are volution. ..." 8 I
pos it
two additional
patte rns
of
ch ange
th at cre ate a
pote ntial
for viole nt
conflict, th ough
not
ne ce s s arily
re volu-
tionary
conflict. One is th e s o-calle d "re volutionof
ris inge x pe ctations ,"
wh e re by
me n be come
ange re d
be caus e
th e y acquire
ne w or inte ns ifie d
e x pe ctations
wh ich cannot be s atis fie d
by
me ans at th e ir
dis pos al;
th e
pe rce ive d gap be twe e n e x pe ctations and capability is "re lative de priva-
tion," wh ich ge ne rate s dis conte nt. T h e s e cond migh t be calle d a "capa-
bility de cay" patte rn; th e s ource of pe ople 's dis conte nt is th e ir de clining
capacity to s atis fy s table e x pe ctations .9 T h e Fe ie rabe nds and Be tty N e s -
voId add to th e s e bas ic mode ls , dis tinguis h ing, for e x ample , s e ve ral J-
curve type patte rns of ch ange , rapid and minimal ch ange patte rns , and a
fluctuation ch ange patte rn.10
T h e s e kinds of th e orie s quickly e ngage us in two additional que s tions :
Wh at ch ange s according to th e s e patte rns ,
and wh y? T h e re is approx i-
mate cons e ns us among th e s e th e oris ts about wh at ch ange s . On th e one
h and, wh at pe ople e x pe ct out of life ch ange s (Davie s : "e x pe cte d ne e d
s atis faction"; Gurr: "value e x pe ctations "; Fe ie rabe nds and N e s vold:
"s ocial e x pe ctations ," "pre s e nt e x pe ctations of future gratifications ").
On th e oth e r h and, wh at pe ople do ge t or th ink th e y can ge t out of life
ch ange s (Davie s : "actual ne e d s atis faction"; Gurr: "value capabilitie s ";
Fe ie rabe nds and N e s vold: "s ocial ach ie ve me nt"). All th e oris ts re cognize
th at me n s e e k many diffe re nt type s of value s . I us e a clas s ification of
value s wh os e th re e ge ne ric type s are we lfare ,
powe r,
and inte rpe rs onal
(be longingne s s , re s pe ct, s tatus ) value s . Davie s propos e d a fourfold
clas s ification compris ing ph ys ical ne e ds , s ocial-affe ctional ne e ds , e qual
e s te e m or dignity ne e ds ,
and,
finally, s e lf-actualization. More ove r, h e
8
Davie s , "T h e J-Curve ," 547.
9
Gurr, ch ap. 2.
10Fe ie rabe nd, Fe ie rabe nd, and N e s vold.
365
Comparative
Politics
April
1973
as s e rts th at th e s e h ave aunive rs al
h ie rarch y
of
importance :
once
ph ys i-
cal ne e ds are
s atis fie d,
s ocial-affe ctional ne e ds be come
dominant; wh e n
th e y
are s atis fie d th e ne e d for
dignity pre dominate s ;
and s o forth . T h is
h ypoth e s is
h as a
ps ych ological
bas is . If it is manife s t in colle ctive
affairs ,
it is of
gre at importance
for
any analys is
of th e conne ctions be twe e n
ch ange
and viole nce . Cons ide r th e
fre que nt
obs e rvationth at
incre as ing
mate rial
we ll-be ing
s e e ms s o ofte n as s ociate d with th e
ge ne ration
of
re volutionary
de mands . T h os e de mands
may
we ll re fle ct
e me rging
ne e ds .
At
pre s e nt,
th e
h ypoth e s is
is
s upporte d only by
afe w
plaus ible ,
but far
from de finitive ,
cas e s tudie s .
Wh y e x pe ctations
and ach ie ve me nt
ch ange
ove r time is a
th orny
que s tion,
one wh os e ans we rs involve a
re gre s s ionup
an
e ve rwide ning
"funne l of
caus ality."
One of Davie s ' ans we rs was
jus t
outline d: ne w
ne e ds
e me rge .
T h e Fe ie rabe nds ' and N e s vold's ans we r is
s pe cific
to th e
conte mporary
world:
th e y
take th e s ocioe conomicmode rnization
proce s s
as a
give n,
and
s ugge s t
th at it is
s imultane ous ly
th e s ource of
incre as ing
e x pe ctations among"mode rnizing" groups
and a th re at to th e ach ie ve -
me nts of "traditional"
groups . More ove r,
th e attainme nt of mode rn
goals
is
like ly
to be th warte d
by
th e
traditionals ,
and vice ve rs a. "T h e farth e r
th e
proce s s
of trans ition
progre s s e s ,
th e more
like ly
and th e more inte ns e
th e conflicts be twe e nmode rnand e s tablis h e d
patte rns .
T h e s ituation
[is ]
a mas s ive
conflict,
re fle cte d in
myriad
individual
ps ych e s
of diffe re nt
s trata.. . and infe ctingdiffe re nt domains of th e s ocial proce s s ." 11 In an
ope rational te s t of th is th e ory, time -lagge d comparis onof many conte m-
porary nations s h ows ge ne rally th at th e h igh e r th e le ve ls of s ocial and
mate rial mode rnity, th e le s s th e political ins tability and viole nt conflict,
but th at th e gre ate r th e rate of ch ange toward th os e conditions , th e
gre ate r th e dis ruption. In oth e r words , th e trans itional nations -re la-
tive ly unmode rnize d but rapidly ch anging-are th e mos t s ubje ct to
viole nt conflict. T h e e vide nce is s ugge s tive , not de finitive . An e qually im-
portant kind of s tudy re mains to be done : th e corre lationof indice s of
s pe cifickinds of ch ange with th e incide nce of viole nt conflict ove r time
in particular countrie s . T h is type of longitudinal s tudy is woe fully lack-
ing in s tudie s of conflict and viole nce . T h e one e x ce ptionth at be ars
me ntioningis Pitirim Sorokin's e x traordinary analys is of ch ange , s ocial
dis turbance s , and war acros s twe nty-five ce nturie s of Europe anh is tory.
He finds e vide nce th e re infor along-te rm, cyclical s h ift from mate rialis tic
to ide ological culture s and back again, e ach pe riod of trans itionbe ing
accompanie d by inte ns ifie d viole nce . From th is point of vie w, th e con-
te mporary "drive to mode rnity" is only a ph as e of a large r wave of
ch ange . T h e th e ory h as powe rful implications for our topic. It doe s not
"Ibid., 507.
366
T e d Robe rt Gurr
s e e m to h ave be e n th e
s ubje ct
of
any
furth e r
conce ptual
or
e mpirical
work.l2
I h ave take n a more inductive and
microanalyticapproach
to th e
que s tion
of
s pe cifying
s ource s of
ch ange
in colle ctive
e x pe ctations and
capabilitie s .
A numbe r of
re lative ly s pe cific
conditions th at are ide nti-
fiable e ith e r incre as e
e x pe ctations
or de cre as e
capabilitie s
in
ways
th at
ge ne rate
incre as e d
pote ntial
for viole nt conflict. For
e x ample ,
e ach
group's pas t
rate of
ch ange
in abs olute
pos ition, up
or
down,
and its de -
cline re lative to oth e r
groups
are
s trongpos itive
de te rminants of its
po-
te ntial for viole nce . So is lack of a
value , like
powe r,
th at
prove s
ne ce s -
s ary
to
prote ct
value s
alre ady attaine d,
s uch as
we ll-be ing
and s tatus .
Conve rs e ly,
th e
gre ate r
th e
range
of alte rnative s
ope n
to a
group's
me m-
be rs and th e
gre ate r
th e
availability
of re s ource s in th e
s ocie ty,
th e le s s
is th e
pote ntial
for viole nt
conflict.l3
All of th e s e variable s are
s ubje ct
to
ch ange
ove r
time ; th e y
could be
analyze d
as
s pe cific
ins tance s of s ome of
th e dime ns ions of s ocial
ch ange
cite d e arlie r. T h e fact th at
th e y
are not
h igh ligh ts
th e ir ad h occh aracte r, and
points up again
th e
de s irability
of
working
toward be tte r
inte grate d
th e orie s of s ocial
ch ange
and viole nt
conflict.
T h e re are oth e r ps ych ological approach e s to th e analys is of viole nt
conflict. A re ce nt s ympos ium by ps ych iatris ts analyze s individual and
colle ctive viole nce as forms of adaptive or copingbe h avior, and argue s
th at th is
inte rpre tationis cons is te nt with avarie ty of narrowe r ps ych o-
logical
and
ps ych iatricth e orie s about th e caus e s of viole nce .'4 Victor
Wolfe ns te inh as
atte mpte d aps ych odynamicinte rpre tationof th e
origins
of re volutionary le ade rs h ip.'5 Political alie nationis th e s ubje ct of e x te n-
s ive
th e ore tical and e mpirical work by David Sch wartz, wh o is con-
ce rne d with both its ps ych os ocial de te rminants and with th e ps ych ologi-
cal variable s th at de te rmine wh e th e r it is dire cte d intopas s ive or re be l-
lious be h avior.'6 In none of th e s e ins tance s , h owe ve r, h as much atte n-
tion be e n
give nto th e patte rns of s ocial ch ange th at h ave wide s pre ad
ps ych ological e ffe cts of th e kinds cons ide re d. T h e s e are s pe cifically
l
Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics , Vol. l11: Fluctuations of
Social
Re lations h ips ,
War and Re volutions (N e w York, 1937). A re analys is of
Sorokin's
data,
th us far unpublis h e d, h as be e n made by Profe s s or Paul Smoke r
of th e
Unive rs ity
of Britis h Columbiaand Unive rs ity of Lancas te r (England).
13Gurr, ch aps .
4 and 5.
+David
N . Danie ls e t
al., Viole nce and th e Struggle for Ex is te nce (Bos ton,
1970).
15
E. Victor
Wolfe ns te in,
T h e
Re volutionary Pe rs onality: Le nin, T rots ky, Gandh i
(Prince ton, 1967).
1l David C.
Sch wartz,
Political Alie nation and Political Be h avior (Ch icago,
forth coming).
367
Comparative
Politics April
1973
ps ych ological th e orie s ,
in contras t with th e th re e
s ocial-ps ych ological
th e orie s dis cus s e d above .
Social-s tructural th e orie s T h e s ocial-s tructural th e orie s of viole nt con-
flict diffe r in
e mph as is
rath e r th an kind from th e
s ocial-ps ych ological
th e orie s . T h e ir common
pre mis e
is th at s ome fundame ntal s ocial dis -
location, various ly
calle d "s train" or
"dys function,"
is th e
ne ce s s ary
pre condition
for
re volutionary
conflict. Wh e re as th e
s ocial-ps ych ological
th e oris ts of viole nce
be gin
with
aggre gate ps ych ological s tate s , th e n work
both "backward" to th e ir s ocial de te rminants and "forward" to th e ir
cons e que nce s ,
th e s ocial-s tructural th e oris ts link
s pe cifie d
kinds of s ocial
ch ange dire ctly
to th e ir
colle ctive ly
viole nt outcome s with out s ubs tantial
re fe re nce to
any inte rve ning ps ych ological
variable s . A
s imilarity
be -
twe e n th e two
type s
of
th e ory
is th e ir
analogous conce ptualization
of
conditions th at inte rve ne be twe e n th e
ps ych ological
or s ocial
pre condi-
tions and th e actual occurre nce of viole nt conflict. All of th e m
s pe cify
s ome
as pe cts
of
gove rnme nt
or ins titutional
arrange me nts ge ne rally
th at
facilitate or de fle ct th e
unde rlyingimpe tus
to viole nce . I will s ummarize
two of th e s e s ocial-s tructural th e orie s and me ntion s e ve ral oth e rs .
Sme ls e r's T h e ory of Colle ctive Be h avior
incorporate s
a
ge ne ral
con-
ce ptual analys is
of s ocial
ch ange .
It is
principally conce rne d with s h ow-
ingh ow various kinds of s tructural s train produce "colle ctive be h avior,"
wh ich is de fine d as "mobilizationon th e bas is of abe lie f wh ich re de fine s
s ocial action." 17 More concre te ly, "colle ctive be h avior" include s panics ,
craze s , h os tile outburs ts (includingriots ), and norm- and value -orie nte d
move me nts . Hos tile outburs ts and value -orie nte d move me nts compris e
mos t viole nt conflicts -th ough note th at Sme ls e r is conce rne d with ac-
counting for th e ir non- or antis ys te m compone nt, not with e x plaining
conflict more ge ne rally. Sme ls e r ide ntifie s s ix s e ts of s ocial de te rminants
wh os e various de gre e s , type s , and concurre nce produce diffe re nt kinds of
colle ctive be h aviors :
1. s tructural conducive ne s s
-
s tructural ch aracte ris tics th at pe rmit
or e ncourage colle ctive be h avior, wh ich are e ffe ctive only in com-
bination with
2. s tructural s train - "ambiguitie s , de privations , conflicts , and dis -
cre pancie s ," s uch as "re al or anticipate d e conomic de privation";
3. growth and s pre ad of ge ne ralize d be lie f
- wh ich provide s pote n-
tial actors with an inte rpre tationof th e s ituation and s pe cifie s ap-
propriate re s pons e s ;
17 Sme ls e r, 8.
368
T e d Robe rt Gurr
4.
pre cipitatingfactor
- a
s pe cific
e ve nt th at
trigge rs group action;
5. mobilization of participants for
action -
us ually by
ale ade r; and
6.
ope ration of
s ocial control - "th os e counte r-de te rminants wh ich
pre ve nt, inte rrupt, de fle ct,
or inh ibit th e accumulation of th e
[above ] de te rminants ," including
th os e wh ich minimize condu-
cive ne s s and
s train,
and th os e mobilize d afte r a colle ctive
e pis ode
be gins .18
Structural s train is th e mos t
important
of
th e s e ,
as is e vide nt in th is
h ypoth e s is :
"Some form of s train mus t be
pre s e nt
if an
e pis ode
of col-
le ctive be h avior is to occur. T h e more s e ve re th e
s train, more ove r, th e
more
like ly
is s uch an
e pis ode
to
appe ar."
19 All th e s ix
de te rminingcon-
ditions are
s ubje ct
to
ch ange ; (3)
and
(5)
de note
particular
kinds of
ch ange .
T h e mos t
s ignificant
s ocial
ch ange s , h owe ve r,
are
pre s umably
th os e th at caus e s e ve re s tructural s train. Sme ls e r offe rs s e ts of
cate gorie s
for
typologizing
s train. One s e t of th e s e
cate gorie s
is h is
compone nts of
s ocial action,
wh ich I me ntione d above :
th e y
re fe r to
pe ople 's value s ,
norms , organization,
and "s ituational facilitie s ." A
cros s -cutting
s e t of
cate gorie s
re fe rs to th e le ve ls of
s pe cificity
of e ach
compone nt
of action.
T o us e norms as an e x ample , a particular bus ine s s 's code of ope rations
is more s pe cific th an th e bus ine s s community's norms about
bus ine s s
h one s ty and de ce ncy, and it is more s pe cific th an le gal code s
about
contracts and prope rty. Se ve n le ve ls of s pe cificity are ide ntifie d for
e ach
compone nt
of s ocial action, ge ne rating twe nty-e igh t cate gorie s
accord-
ing
to wh ich various kinds of s ocial ch ange s may be pige onh ole d.
Sme ls e r doe s not provide any dynamic analys is of ch ange pe r s e .
His
dis cus s ion of de te rminants of value -orie nte d move me nts , for e x ample ,
me re ly
lis ts kinds of s trainlike "inade quacy of knowle dge of te ch nique s
to
grapple
with ne w s ituations ," "s e ve re ph ys ical de privation," and
"th e
normative dis organization th at war occas ions ." 20 T h e dynamic
com-
pone nt
to th e th e ore tical frame work conce rns th e linkage s be twe e n
type s
of s train and th e nature of s ubs e que nt colle ctive be h avior. Brie fly,
s train
of a
give n le ve l and type s timulate s th e cre ation of ge ne ralize d be lie fs
at
a
h igh e r le ve l, wh ich re de fine s ocial action in s uch a way th at th e s train
is modifie d. Sme ls e r s pe cifie s proce s s e s by wh ich th is occurs and
s ug-
ge s ts wh ich type s of s train le ad to, s ay, "h ys te rical be lie fs ," "h os tile
be lie fs ,"
and s o forth . Sme ls e r's th e ory th us offe rs a ge ne ral approach to
analyzing conne ctions be twe e n s ocial ch ange and viole nt conflict;
its
cate gorie s
of ch ange , at le as t, are s ys te maticrath e r th an ad h oc. But
it
doe s not advance cle arly formulate d, dynamic
h ypoth e s e s ,
much
le s s
"Ibid.,
15-18.
"9
Ibid.,
48.
I Ibid.,
338-40.
369
Comparative
Politics
April
1973
s ugge s t
h ow
th e y migh t
be
ope rationally
te s te d. Such
h ypoth e s e s
could
be de rive d from th e
th e ory;
as
writte n, th ough ,
it is
principally
a
typology
wh ich is more s uitable for
de s cribing
and
inte rpre tings pe cific
e ve nts th an
for
s timulating
furth e r th e ore tical
de ve lopme nt
and as s e s s me nt.
Wh e re as Sme ls e r is conce rne d with colle ctive be h avior
ge ne rally,
Ch alme rs Joh ns on h as
propos e d
a
th e ory
to account
s pe cifically
for re v-
olutionary
conflict.21 T h e
th e ory
can be s ummarize d rath e r
brie fly.
It
take s account of four
de te rmining
variable s . T h e firs t
ne ce s s ary
caus e
of
re volutionary
conflict is a
dis e quilibrate d
s ocial
s ys te m,
one in wh ich
e ith e r
s ys te ms
of value s and
"s ymbolicinte rpre tations
of s ocial
action,"
or th e
s ocie ty's patte rn
of
adaptation
to th e e nvironme nt, ch ange
s uffi-
cie ntly
th at
s ocie ty's
functional
re quire me nts
can no
longe r
be fulfille d.
Elite s face d with th is s ituation
may
or
may
not
atte mpt
to re dre s s th e
dis e quilibrium.
If
th e y prove intrans ige nt
or unable to do
s o, th e y
los e
le gitimacy-th e
s e cond
ne ce s s ary
caus e of re volution.
T h e y may
s till
continue in
powe r
for s ome time
by re lying
on coe rcion. T h e
final, s uf-
ficie nt caus e of re volution-Joh ns on calls it an "acce le rator"-is th e
e lite 's los s of control ove r th e ins trume nts of coe rcion. T h e
military may
be de fe ate d in
war,
or be come
incre as ingly
ambitious or dis affe cte d from
th e rule rs ,
or be
ch alle nge d
to
re volutionary combat, but,
h owe ve r it
h appe ns ,
th e acce le rator
pre cipitate s re volutionary
conflict.
(T h e true
de gre e
of
military loyalty
and e ffe ctive ne s s is th e
major
de te rminant of
th e outcome of th at conflict.)
All four variable s are e vide ntly s ubje ct to ch ange . Value s and adapta-
tion patte rns may ch ange ; s ubs tantial s h ifts in e ith e r or both caus e dys -
functions . Joh ns on ide ntifie s four kinds of dys functions , de rive d from
Pars ons ' s pe cification of s ocial s ys te ms ' functional ne e ds . T h e dys func-
tions are incoh e re nt s ocialization, inappropriate e ns e mble of role s , dis -
s e ns us on goals , and-tautologically-failure to re s olve conflicts pe ace -
fully. T h is typology is analogous to Sme ls e r's much more de taile d typol-
ogy of kinds of ch ange . Joh ns on goe s one s te p furth e r back, to s ugge s t
as imple typology of s ource s of ch ange , with e x ample s . T h e s e are : (1) e x -
oge nous conditions caus ing value ch ange s , e .g., inte rnational "de mon-
s tration e ffe cts "; (2) e ndoge nous value -ch anging conditions , e .g., th e
ris e of ne w re ligious move me nts ; (3) e x oge nous s ource s of e nvironme ntal
ch ange , e .g., fore ign trade , te ch nology,
and conque s t; and (4) e n-
doge nous s ource s of e nvironme ntal ch ange , e .g., te ch nological innova-
tions .22 Joh ns on, like Sme ls e r, doe s not formulate h ypoth e s e s about
pos s ible s ys te maticconne ctions amongtype s or ch aracte ris tics of ch ange
2l
Ch alme rs Joh ns on, Re volution and th e Social Sys te m (Stanford, 1964);
Ch alme rs Joh ns on, Re volutionary Ch ange (Bos ton, 1966).
22Joh ns on, Re volutionary Ch ange , pp. 64-70.
370
T e d Robe rt Gurr
and
type s
or e x te nt of
dys function;
th is
part
of Joh ns on's
th e ory
is e s -
s e ntially
an e x e rcis e in
typology.
T h e
th e ory's dynamic
e le me nts conce rn
th e
cons e que nce s
of
dys function
for
re volutionary
conflict. T h e e lite 's
re s pons e
can
vary
from "cons e rvative
ch ange "
to
"intrans ige nce ";
its
le gitimacy de pe nds
on wh ich
re s pons e
it take s . Joh ns on fails to
s pe cify
or
e ve n to
s ugge s t
th e de te rminants of th e s e
re s pons e s
or h ow
th e y migh t
ch ange
ove r time . T h e
intrans ige nt
e lite 's
s ubs e que nt
re liance on force
s e ts th e
s tage
for th e
ope ration
of th e "acce le rators ,"
a clas s of
particu-
lar
type s
of
ch ange s .
Joh ns on
dis tinguis h e s
th re e kinds : conditions wh ich
re duce th e e ffe ctive ne s s of th e arme d force s
dire ctly;
conce rte d be lie fs
of
oppos itional groups
th at
th e y
can
win;
and
s trate gically
calculate d
viole nt
cons piracie s .
He
goe s
on to
s ugge s t
h ow th e forms and
proce s s e s
of re volution and its outcome s
de pe nd
on various combinations of th e
s pe cifie d conditions , plus
additional variable s introduce d on an ad h oc
bas is .23 T h e re is no
s ys te matic atte mpt
to re late th is dis cus s ion to fore -
goingcate gorie s
of s ocial
ch ange
or
dys function, th ough ,
as with
Sme ls e r,
anumbe r of
h ypoth e s e s
of th is s ort could be de rive d from th e dis cus s ion.
I me ntione d above th at both th e s ocial s tructural th e orie s and th os e
re vie we d in th e
pre vious
s e ction
ide ntify as pe cts
of
s ocie ty
wh ich facili-
tate or inh ibit th e
impe tus
to viole nt conflict. T h e kinds of conditions
cite d are re markably s imilar. Ide ological factors are ge ne rally re cog-
nize d, not only by Sme ls e r: Davie s s pe cifie s th at h os tility mus t be focus e d
on
gove rnme nt be fore re volutionary move me nts occur;
24
and I ide ntify
cultural and
political s ource s of be lie fs th at pe rform th is focus s ing
function.25 Sme ls e r's conce rn with "s tructural conducive ne s s " and "mo-
bilization of
participants
for action" is paralle le d by my h ypoth e s is in
Wh y Me n Re be l th at "th e magnitude of political viole nce varie s . . . with
th e ratio of dis s ide nt ins titutional s upport to re gime ins titutional s upport
to th e
point of e quality, and inve rs e ly be yond it."
26
I go on to s pe cify
s ome
ge ne ral de te rminants of ins titutional s upport and orie ntation. Joh n-
s on's inte re s t in e lite intrans ige nce and re volutionary organization are
as pe cts
of wh at Sme ls e r and I dis cus s in more ge ne ral te rms . Finally,
th e s e
th e orie s , with out e x ce ption, ide ntify coe rcion as an inte rve ning
variable . Sme ls e r and th e Fe ie rabe nds de al re s pe ctive ly with a s ys te m's
e x te nt of "s ocial control" and "coe rcive ne s s " as inh ibitors of viole nce .
Joh ns on and I are both conce rne d with th e re lative balance be twe e n
re volutionary and e lite capacitie s for e mployingforce .
T h e
principal
diffe re nce s be twe e n th e two groups of th e orie s re vie we d
23Ibid., ch ap. 7 and 8.
24
Davie s , "T h e J-Curve ."
25
Gurr, ch ap.
6 and 7.
20
Ibid., p.
276.
371
Comparative
Politics
April
1973
th us far are :
(1) dis agre e me nt
about wh e th e r and h ow th e
ps ych ological
le ve l of
analys is ough t
to be take n into
account; and
(2)
wh e th e r a
typological
or
propos itional approach
to
e x plaining
viole nt conflict
ough t
to be take n. T h e ne x t s e ction cons ide rs s ome conflict th e orie s of caus a-
tion th at h ave a
s ubs tantially
diffe re nt
approach .
Some oth e r s ocial-s tructural th e orie s
migh t
be me ntione d. Some
e arly
twe ntie th -ce ntury
th e orie s are
e s s e ntially
of th is s ort,
for
e x ample ,
th os e
of
Lyford
Edwards and
Ge orge
Pe tte e .27 More
re ce ntly
David Wille r
and
Ge orge
Zolls ch anattribute
re volutionary
move me nts to th e e x is te nce
of
e x ige ncy,
a
cons e que nce
of
dis cre pancy
be twe e n th e s tructural
pos ition
of individuals in
s ocie ty
and th e ir inte re s t
pos ition. Wide s pre ad e x ige ncie s
are trans forme d in
re volutionary
move me nts to th e e x te nt th at
e x ige ncie s
are
articulate d,
affe cte d
groups
are
organize d
to facilitate
action,
and
th e ir me mbe rs
pe rce ive
th e
re gime
as th e s ource of
pe rs is tinge x ige ncy.28
Group
conflict th e orie s All th e th e orie s cons ide re d s o far are con-
ce rne d
principally
with th e motive s of one
party
to viole nt conflicts : th e
"re be ls ,"
th e
"dis ruptors ,"
th os e wh o
ch alle nge
an
e x is ting
s tatus
quo
or
e quilibrium.
T h e re is a
compe ting paradigm
for
th e ory,
wh os e
origins
can be trace d at le as t back to Aris totle , th at as ks h ow and
wh y groups
in
s ocie tie s come into conflict. From th is
point
of vie w th e inte re s ts and
conflict be h avior of "e lite s " and
"re gime s "
are as
important
a
s ubje ct
for
inquiry
as th os e of
any
oth e r s ocial
group.
T h e bas ic
pre mis e
of
group conflict th e orie s is th at viole nt conflict and re volution aris e out of
group compe tition ove r value d conditions and pos itions . As Ch arle s
T illy puts it in a wide ly quote d s tate me nt, "Me n s e e king to
s e ize ,
h old,
or re align th e le ve rs of powe r h ave continually e ngage d in colle ctive
viole nce as part of th e ir s truggle s . T h e oppre s s e d h ave s truck in th e
name of jus tice , th e privile ge d in th e name of orde r, th os e in be twe e n
in th e name of fe ar."
29
Powe r is not th e only is s ue of conflict, of cours e ;
s o are we ll-be ing, s tatus , communal and ide ological purity, and s o forth .
A
corollary of th is pre mis e is th at viole nt conflict is are curre ntfe ature of
s ocie tie s . As th e compos ition, inte re s ts , and re lative pos itions of groups
ch ange , conflict occurs and s o doe s viole nce . T h e re are many s uch
th e orie s . T wo s ome wh at diffe re nt type s are re vie we d be low: th os e wh ich
e mph as ize conflictful e le me nts in group diffe re ntiation ge ne rally, and
27
Se e footnote 5.
28
David Wilie r and Ge orge K. Zolls ch an, "Prole gome nonto a T h e ory of Re vo-
lutions ," in Ge orge K. Zolls ch anand Walte r Hirs ch , e ds . Ex plorations in Social
Ch ange (Bos ton, 1964), pp. 125-51.
29
Ch arle s T illy,
"Colle ctive Viole nce in Europe anPe rs pe ctive ," in Grah am and
Gurr, ch ap.
1.
372
T e d Robe rt Gurr
th os e wh ich
e mph as ize
h orizontal or clas s
cle avage s .
T h e forme r are
more
ge ne ral th an,
but do not
ne ce s s arily s ubs ume ,
th e latte r.
Group
diffe re ntiationand conflict N ich olas T imas h e ff and Ralf Dah r-
e ndorf are
among
th e th e oris ts wh o attribute conflict to th e e x is te nce of
ge ne ral group diffe re ntiation. T imas h e ff take s th e more "traditional"
ap-
proach ,
writing
of
"ne ce s s ary
and s ufficie nt" conditions for viole nt con-
flict,
but h is
obje ct
is more
ge ne ral:
to account for th e occurre nce of
both re volution and war. He
pos tulate s
four s ufficie nt conditions : two
partie s
or
groups
h ave
h igh ly value d, incompatible goals ;
normative in-
h ibitions
agains t
viole nce are we ake ne d
among
one or both
partie s
to
th e
conflict;
one or both los e s
h ope
of
winning by
nonviole nt me ans of
conflict re s olution; and e ach th inks it h as s ome ch ance of
winning by
viole nt me ans . T imas h e ff
catalogs
rath e r th an
ge ne ralize s
about th e
nature and s ource s of
goal
conflicts in
pre re volutionary
s ituations . He
lis ts
dis pute s
ove r th e nature or
functioning
of
gove rnme nt, ch anging
clas s dis tributions of s ocial or e conomic
value s ,
and
ris inge x pe ctations .
Such conflicts mus t be
"s e rious ,
or
many,
or both " to caus e re volution.
He
s ugge s ts
th at th e failure of th e
coordinating
function of th e s tate
caus e s th e
groups
in conflict to
de s pair
of
pe ace ful s olutions ;
h e doe s
not
s pe culate s ys te matically wh y
th at
coordinating
function
migh t
fail.
As te ns ions grow, inh ibitions agains t viole nce te nd to de cre as e . T h e
final s tage s re s e mble Joh ns on's th e ory of re volutionary caus ation. T h e
gove rnme nt, wh ich is by de finition one of th e partie s to re volutionary
conflict,
s e e s its ch ance s of winning as re s ting with its control of th e
arme d force s . T h e re volutionarie s may th ink th at th e y can win be caus e
th e y s ubs cribe to an ide ology th at convince s th e m th e time is ripe , or
be caus e of tactical
calculations ,
or out of de s pair th e y may take action
agains t all odds .30
Dah re ndorf's th e ory of group conflict is more pre cis e and s oph is ticate d
th an T imas h e ff's . It s uffe rs cons ide rably from any atte mpt at brie f s um-
marization. One major th e s is of Dah re ndorf's work is th at group con-
flict is pe rvas ive in all s ocie tie s at all time s ; it cannot be
re s olve d,
only-
s ome time s -re gulate d. He is more conce rne d with wh at h e calls clas s
conflict th an T imas h e ff,
and h e cons ide rs clas s conflict a s pe cie s of group
conflict. Clas s conflict is de fine d as any conflict be twe e n th e s upe rordi-
nate and s ubordinate s trataof auth ority s tructure s . T h is is cons ide rably
diffe re ntfrom and broade r th an Marx 's de finitionof clas s e s by re fe re nce
to groups ' re lations h ip to th e me ans of production (s e e be low). For
s oFrom N ich olas S. T imas h e ff, War and Re volution (N e w York, 1965), ch aps . 4
and 7.
373
Comparative
Politics
April
1973
Dah re ndorf th e de te rminant of "clas s " is diffe re ntial allocation of au-
th ority,
wh ich ch aracte rize s a much wide r
varie ty
of ins titutions th an
jus t
th e s tate .
T wo
principal as pe cts
of conflict about wh ich Dah re ndorf
ge ne ralize s
are its
inte ns ity (th e e ne rgy e x pe nditure
and
de gre e
of involve me nt of
conflicting
partie s ) and its viole nce . T h e inte ns ity of clas s conflict is s aid
to de cre as e with th e e x te nt of clas s
organization;
with th e e x te nt to
wh ich various clas s and
group
conflicts are dis s ociate d rath e r th an coinci-
de nt;
and with "th e e x te nt th at th e dis tributionof
auth ority
and th e dis -
tributionof re wards and facilitie s in an as s ociation are dis as s ociate d...."
T o
clarify
th e las t
s tate me nt,
Dah re ndorf is
s aying
th at conflict is le s s
inte ns e if th e h olde rs of
powe r
in an as s ociation do not als o h old
h igh e s t
s tatus , mate rial
we ll-be ing,
and th e like . T h e viole nce of clas s conflict is
s aid to de cre as e with th e e x te nt of clas s
organization,
with th e de cline of
abs olute
de privation,
and
(tautologically?)
with th e e x te nt of e ffe ctive
conflict
re gulation.
All th e s e
de te rmining
conditions are
s ubje ct
to
ch ange ,
but th e s ource s of th os e
ch ange s
are not much de alt with in th e
th e ory.
Cons ide rable nonformalize d cons ide ration is
give n
to th e
e me rge nce
and
h is torical
de ve lopme nt
of clas s e s .
Dah re ndorf's
ce ntral
purpos e ,
h owe ve r,
is to s h ow h ow s tructural
ch ange s
in
s ocie ty
are de te rmine d
by group
conflict.
He is th us th e
only
one of th e viole nce and conflict th e oris ts
we h ave e x amine d wh o is s ignificantly conce rne d with ge ne ral s ocie tal
cons e que nce s of conflict: conflict is th e inde pe nde nt variable , not th e
de pe nde nt one , in th e th e ory.3' We will cons ide r th e s e caus al conne c-
tions
brie fly
in s e ction III of th is article .
T h e re are nume rous oth e r th e orie s conce rne d with th e origins , pro-
ce s s e s , and me lioration of group conflict, but fe w are s ubs tantially con-
ce rne d with viole nt, re volutionary conflict. Ins ofar as th e s e th e orie s ac-
count for conflict ge ne rally, th e y may be s aid to account for its viole nt
manife s tations as we ll; th e crucial que s tion for us is wh y conflict doe s or
doe s not take viole nt forms , and in re s pons e to wh at if any kinds of
ch angings ocial conditions . Some of th e conflict th e orie s I h ave in mind
are Ke nne th E. Boulding's Conflidt and De fe ns e : A Ge ne ral T h e ory,32
Anatol
Rapoport's Figh ts , Game s , and De bate s ,33 and T h omas C. Sch e ll-
ing's T h e Strate gy of Conflict.34 Oth e rs are re vie we d and s ynth e s ize d by
Raymond Mack and Rich ard Snyde r.35 T h e s e th e orie s various ly attribute
31
From Ralf Dah re ndorf, Clas s and Clas s Conflict in Indus trial Socie ty (Stan-
ford, 1959), ch aps . 5 and 6; quotationfrom p. 239.
32N e w York, 1962.
33Ann
Arbor, 1960.
3Cambridge [Mas s .], 1963.
88
Raymond W. Mack and Rich ard C. Snyde r, "T h e Analys is of Social Conflict:
374
T e d Robe rt Gurr
th e trans itionfrom nonviole nt to viole nt conflict to th e we akne s s of inte -
grating
or
re gulatory proce dure s ,
and to calculations of
participants
th at
viole nce is an e ffe ctive me ans to th e ir e nds .
T h e y
are
not, h owe ve r,
particularly
fruitful as s ource s of
s ys te matic ge ne ralizations
about con-
ne ctions be twe e n s ocial
ch ange
and viole nt
conflict, e x ce pt pe rh aps
at
a
ve ry
abs tract le ve l. Se e Mack and
Snyde r's
re mark th at "s ocial
ch ange
-its rate and dire ction-is an ultimate s ource of conflict
be caus e ,
as th e
factual s ocial orde r
unde rgoe s trans ition,
ne w
incompatibilitie s
and
antagonis tic
inte re s ts aris e ." 36
T h e orie s of clas s conflict T h e s e ve ral th e orie s of viole nt conflict con-
s ide re d h e re attribute viole nt
conflict,
at le as t in its
re volutionary form,
to
dis paritie s
in th e s h are s of value d
goods
h e ld
by
diffe re nt,
h orizontally
s tratifie d clas s e s . Aris totle
h e lpe d
e s tablis h th is tradition of
th e orizing
in
h is e fforts to
e x plain
th e circums tance s of
political
re volutions in th e
Gre e k
city-s tate s .
T h e
principal
caus e of
re volution, h e
propos e d,
is th e
common
pe ople 's as piration
for e conomic or
political e quality
wh e n
th e y
lack
it,
and th e
as piration
of
oligarch s
for
gre ate r ine quality
th an
th e y
h ave . Me n's de s ire s for one value d condition are corre late d with th e ir
attainme ntin
re s pe ct
to oth e rs .
T h us , if th e common
pe ople
are
e qual
in
powe r
and s tatus to th e ir
rule rs , th e y
will
like ly
s e e k
e quality
in mate rial
we ll-be ing. Me mbe rs of an oligarch y, if th e y h ave s upe rior mate rial we ll-
be ing, will, conve rs e ly, te nd to s e e k s upe rior powe r and s tatus as we ll.
T h e imme diate caus e s of re volution are th e s e as pirations afte r e quality
(or ine quality); th e principal or more re mote caus e s of re volution are
th e s ocial conditions wh ich produce s uch dis pos itions . Like many late r
th e oris ts , Aris totle catalogs nume rous conditions th at h ave th e s e e ffe cts
but doe s not ge ne ralize about th e m to th e de gre e th at h e ge ne ralize s
about re volutionary caus ation. Some are re lative ly s taticconditions , s uch
as th e conte mpt of a s ubordinate clas s for its mas te rs , and e th nic dive r-
s ity. Oth e r conditions are type s of ch ange , s uch as a dis proportionate in-
cre as e in th e re lative s ize of one clas s , or th e improvingcondition of one
clas s or group; th e latte r is s aid to ins pire re volution in two ways : by
fos te ring e nvy in oth e r clas s e s , and by cre ating as pirations for furth e r
ine quality in th e advancingclas s .37 T h e re is a re s e mblance h e re to th e
conte mporary "J-curve " and re lative de privation approach e s to e x plain-
ing viole nt conflict.
T oward an Ove rvie w and Synth e s is ," Journal of Conflict Re s olutions , I (June
1957), 212-48.
3
Ibid., 227.
37 From Aris totle , T h e Politics , Book V.
375
Comparative
Politics April
1973
We
may
ne x t s ke tch Marx 's
th e ory
of th e
origins
of
re volutionary
con-
flict, alth ough
it is s o we ll known th at it is
pe rh aps gratuitous
to do s o.
Marx finds re volution
e s s e ntially
a function of e conomic
ch ange , s pe -
cifically
th e
de ve lopme nt
of contradictions be twe e n
productive
force s of
s ocie ty
and th e re lations of clas s e s to
production.
T h e re are a s ucce s s ion
of
h is torically
ine vitable
s tage s
of e conomic
organization,
th e
pe nultimate
of wh ich , bourge ois capitalis m, give s way
to th e clas s le s s
s ocie ty
of th e
worke rs . Re volution marks th e trans itions
among s tage s .
T h is is Marx 's
own
s ummary:
In th e s ocial
production
of th e ir me ans of e x is te nce me n e nte r into
. . .
productive re lations h ips
wh ich
corre s pond
to a de finite
s tage
of
de ve lopme nt
of th e ir mate rial
productive
force s . T h e
aggre gate
of th e s e
productive re lations h ips
cons titute s th e e conomics tructure of
s ocie ty,
th e re al bas is on wh ich a
juridical
and
political s upe rs tructure
aris e s .
. . . T h e mode of
production
of th e mate rial me ans of e x is te nce con-
ditions th e wh ole
proce s s
of s ocial, political
and inte lle ctual life . ...
At a ce rtains tage
of th e ir
de ve lopme nt
th e mate rial
productive
force s
of
s ocie ty
come into contradictionwith th e
e x is tingproductive
re la-
tions h ips , or, wh at is but a
le gal e x pre s s ion
of th e s e , with th e
prope rty
re lations h ips
with in wh ich
th e y
h ad move d be fore . From forms of
de ve lopme nt
of th e
productive
force s th e s e
re lations h ips
are trans -
forme d into th e ir fe tte rs . T h e n an
e poch
of s ocial re volution
ope ns .
With th e ch ange in th e e conomicfoundationth e wh ole vas t s upe r-
s tructure is more or le s s rapidly trans forme d. ... A s ocial s ys te m ne ve r
pe ris h e s be fore all th e productive force s h ave de ve lope d for wh ich it
is wide e nough ; and ne w, h igh e r productive re lations h ips ne ve r come
into be ingbe fore th e mate rial conditions for th e ir e x is te nce h ave be e n
brough t to maturity with in th e womb of th e old s ocie ty its e lf. ... In
broad outline , th e As iatic, th e ancie nt, th e fe udal and th e mode rn
bourge ois mode s of productioncan be indicate d as progre s s ive e poch s
in th e e conomics ys te m of s ocie ty. Bourge ois productive re lations h ips
are th e las t antagonis ticform of th e s ocial proce s s of production.38
T h e s pe cificcontradictionth at brings about th e re volutionary re place -
me nt of th e capitalis t s ys te m of productionis th e progre s s ive immis e riza-
tion of th e working clas s . Capitalis m mus t ne ce s s arily and incre as ingly
e x ploit worke rs , Marx argue d, be caus e profit rate s te nd to de cline (for
as s e rte d e conomic re as ons not re vie we d h e re ). As th e y de cline , e m-
ploye rs pre s s worke rs toward and th e n be low th e s ubs is te nce le ve l. T h is
e conomic e x ploitation is accompanie d by incre as ingpolitical oppre s s ion,
a cons e que nce of capitalis m's ne e d for s table control ove r th e me ans of
38
Karl Marx , A Contribution to th e Critique of Political Economy, as quote d
in William Ebe ns te in, Mode rn Political T h ough t: T h e Gre at Is s ue s (N e w York,
1954), 367-68.
376
T e d Robe rt Gurr
production
and ove r th e worke rs th e ms e lve s .
Re volutionary
move me nts
be gin
wh e nworke rs be come cons cious th at th e ir colle ctive
mis e ry
can
be re lie ve d
only by
a total trans formationof th e e conomicand its de -
pe nde nt political s ys te m.
Marx at le as t cannot be accus e d of
"catalog-
ing"
s ocial
ch ange s
th at
dis pos e
to
re volutionary
conflict: h e
pre cis e ly
ide ntifie s th e
type s
and
s e que nce s
of
ch ange
th at caus e re volution. But
wh e th e r th is
e x planation
fits all manife s tations of
re volutionary
conflict
e qually
we ll is anoth e r matte r.
Marx ,
at
le as t,
would
argue
th at all con-
flict is e conomic-bas e d clas s conflict. In th is
conne ction,
we canme ntion
th at one of Mao
T s e -tung's major
contributions to Marx is t
th e ory
is h is
e mph as is
on th e conflictful and
re volutionary pote ntial
of
powe r
diffe r-
e nce s
amongclas s e s ; th e s ource s and
dynamics
of
political oppre s s ion
are
th us anadditional are afor
re volutionary th e orizing.39
Both Aris totle and th e Marx is t th e oris ts we re conce rne d
primarily
with
ide ntifying
th e clas s bas e s of
re volutionary
conflict. Joh an
Galtung
h as
propos e d
a"s tructural
th e ory
of
aggre s s ion"
th at
ge ne ralize s be yond
th e
narrow
conce ption
of "clas s " as a
party
to
conflict,
and th at als o
pro-
pos e s
to
iaccount
for a
range
of
aggre s s ive
be h aviors from viole nt crime
th rough riots and re volutionto war. Accordingto Galtung, it is th e
h ie rarch ical pos itionof th e individual or group re lative to oth e rs th at
de te rmine s aggre s s ive be h avior. His ce ntral h ypoth e s is is th at "Aggre s -
s ionis mos t
like ly to aris e in s ocial pos itions in rank-dis e quilibrium."
40
"Rank dis e quilibrium" is aconditionin wh ich an individual/group/na-
tionh as a
re lative ly h igh e r le ve l of attainme nt of s ome value d conditions
th anoth e rs . A group wh ich h as h igh we alth , me dium powe r, and low
s tatus , for e x ample , is "dis e quilibrate d" and will s e e k to attainh igh
powe r
and s tatus as we ll. Wh e th e r it doe s s o viole ntly or not will de pe nd
on wh e th e r oth e r me ans of e quilibrationh ave be e n trie d and found
wanting,
and wh e th e r "th e culture h as s ome practice in viole nt aggre s -
s ion." 41 A bas ic
s imilarity
be twe e nth is
argume nt and Aris totle 's s h ould
be e vide nt. But
Galtungs ays th at e quilibrium
is
ne ce s s arily s ough t,
wh e re as Aris totle
s ays
th at th e de s ire for cons is te nt e quality, or in-
e quality,
is afunctionof me n's
conce ption
of
jus tice . And Galtungap-
plie s
th e
principle to all dis e quilibriaamongall h igh ly value d conditions ,
wh e re as Aris totle
pos its re volutionary cons e que nce s only of dis e quilibria
be twe e nth e e conomicand
political pos itions of a clas s . We may als o
note afundame ntal contradictionbe twe e n
Galtung's argume nt and Dah r-
39 Se e Franz
Sch urmann, "OnRe volutionary Conflict," Journal of Inte rnational
Affairs ,
XXIII
(1/1969), 36-53.
"Joh an
Galtung,
"A StructuralT h e ory of Aggre s s ion," Journal of Pe ace Re -
s e arch , (2/1964), 95-119; quotationfrom 98.
"
Ibid.,
99.
377
Comparative
Politics
April
1973
e ndorf's
th e ory
of clas s conflict.
Galtung s ays dis e quilibrium
inte ns ifie s
aggre s s ion,
wh ile Dah re ndorf
h ypoth e s ize s
th at "th e lowe r th e corre la-
tion is be twe e n
auth ority pos itions
and oth e r
as pe cts
of s ocioe conomic
s tatus ,
th e le s s inte ns e are clas s conflicts
like ly
to
be ,"
42
or,
in oth e r
words , dis e quilibrium
be twe e n a
group's powe r pos ition
and its
pos ition
on oth e r dime ns ions s h ould minimize conflict
inte ns ity.
T h e
compe ting
h ypoth e s e s
s h ould be ame nable to
e mpirical
te s t.
Give n our conce rn with th e s ocial
ch ange -viole nce ne x us , Galtung's
th e ory s ugge s ts
th at we look for
s ys te matic
s ource s of
dis e quilibria.
He
make s a fe w
ge ne ral
re marks on th e
s ubje ct, s ugge s ting,
for
e x ample ,
th at s ocial
ch ange
is "s tructural" in th e s e ns e th at it te nds to introduce
ne w, us ually dis e quilibrate d, rankings .
"Or it
may
dis tribute ne w re -
s ource s more
e ve nly,
wh ich is anoth e r
way
of
s aying
th at s ome
comple te
or
ne arly-comple te unde rdogs
will ris e on one or more dime ns ion due
to mas s
e ducation, pros pe rity,
unive rs al
s uffrage .
. . . T h e re s ult is dis -
e quilibrium
with
cons e que nt aggre s s ion
until more
e quilibrate d
combi-
nations of rank-s e ts are ach ie ve d...." 43 He als o
s pe culate s
on th e con-
ditions for re volution. One formula, not an e x clus ive
one ,
is to
e x pand
h igh e r e ducation,
make fe w ne w e lite
pos itions available , ins titute mas s
e ducation,
but make no oth e r s ocial
ch ange s -all
of wh ich in combina-
tion cre ate
s h arp
and
wide s pre ad dis e quilibria.
T o th e s e conditions h e
adds ,
ad
h oc,
s e ve ral oth e rs
including
a
J-curve ,
boom-and-bus t e co-
nomic patte rn, plus ide ology and ch aris maticle ade rs h ip.44 For our pur-
pos e s Galtung's th e ory h as one dis tinct advantage ove r many oth e rs
cons ide re d h e re : it points dire ctly to rath e r s ys te matic, ope rational pro-
ce dure s for e x amining th e ch ange -viole nce re lations h ip. In any give n
s ocie ty, one migh t e x amine all s ocial ch ange s th at alte re d th e re lative
rankingof e ach ide ntifiable group on s ome s pe cifie d s e t of dime ns ions ,
th e n atte mpt to link th e s e to th e e x te nt and form of s ubs e que nt mani-
fe s tations of viole nce .
Some obs e rvations I h ope it is cle ar th at th e s e s ummarie s are only a
s ample of th e e tiological th e orie s of viole nce and conflict, alth ough mos t
of th e th e orie s I re gard as "important" are me ntione d. T h e dominant
impre s s ion th e y give may be one of confus ion, for a gre at many diffe re nt
kinds and as pe cts of s ocial ch ange are cite d as "caus e s ." Some propos e
cate gorie s in wh ich to clas s ify caus e s , s ome afford ros te rs of e x ample s ,
s ome focus on patte rns or dime ns ions of s ocial ch ange s uch as its rate
4Dah re ndorf, p. 218.
4' Galtung, 112.
4 Ibid., 108-9.
378
T e d Robe rt Gurr
and
s cope .
T h e
obje cts
of
e x planation,
th e
de pe nde nt variable s , are als o
dive rs e . Some th e orie s de al with e x te nt of
aggre s s ion
or
viole nce , s ome
with
conflict,
s ome with "re volution."
Se ve ral
approach e s
to
de aling
with th is
profus ion
of th e orie s canbe
s ugge s te d.
I as s ume th is
obje ctive :
to make
ge ne ral,
te s table s tate me nts
about th e e ffe cts of s ocial
ch ange
on viole nce and conflict. One bas ic
pre mis e
is th at th is can be s t be
atte mpte d by be ginning
with a
ge ne ral
conce ptual
s ch e me for
de s cribing
s ocial
ch ange ,
th e n
working
out its
various
patte rns
and
cons e que nce s ,
rath e r th an
taking
a
particular type
or
as pe ct
of viole nt conflict and
working
back out a caus al funne l to its
as s orte d caus e s . T h e latte r kind of
th e ory
is a
h igh ly
us e ful
input
for th e
large r e nte rpris e s ugge s te d
h e re , but,
as th e re vie w
jus t comple te d s ug-
ge s ts ,
it is not afruitful
way
to de al
ge ne rally
with s ocial
ch ange .
One
approach migh t
be calle d
"conce ptual
re duction." T h e th e orie s
re vie we d h e re
s tipulate many
caus al
as pe cts
of
ch ange
th at re s e mble one
anoth e r. T h e s e variable s and
re lations h ips
could be clas s ifie d
according
to an
analytics ch e me , compris ing,
for
e x ample ,
th e dime ns ions of s ocial
ch ange
lis te d in s e ction
I,
and th e n combine d and
ge ne ralize d
into a
"s ynth e tic" th e ory
of
ch ange -conflict-viole nce . Anoth e r,
more de ductive
approach
would
re quire
us to s tate
as s umptions
about th e nature and
ge ne ral e ffe cts of e ach dime ns ionof s ocial ch ange , th e n to de rive a
s e t of more s pe cifich ypoth e s e s , wh ich in turns h ould be s uite d (a) for
comparis onwith th e h ypoth e s e s of th e more ad h octh e orie s , and (b) for
e mpirical validation. It would be e s pe cially fruitful to e s tablis h de finitive
te s ts be twe e nh ypoth e s e s s o de rive d and th os e s tipulate d inth e
e tiological
th e orie s . T h is s ugge s ts ath ird, more inductive , approach to s ys te matizing
th e ch ange -viole nce re lation. Various pairs of contradictory h ypoth e s e s
can be found in, or de rive d from, e x tant th e orie s ; th e oppos itionof
Galtung's bas ich ypoth e s is to one of Dah re ndorf's propos itions was note d
above . De finitive e mpirical te s ts migh t be s e t up for s uch oppos ingh y-
poth e s e s , and as e mpirically s upporte d re lations h ips we re winnowe d out,
th e y could be s ubs ume d to a s ys te maticinve ntory of ve rifie d ch ange -
conflict re lations h ips -one wh ich would e ve ntually le ad
to,
or take on
th e proportions of, a compos ite th e ory.
Each of th e s e approach e s to th e ory cons tructionh as its advocate s , and
much more could be s aid about th e proble m of h ow to tidy up aninte l-
le ctual lands cape litte re d with partial th e orie s . Rath e r th an doings o
h e re , I propos e to cons ide r now th e oth e r s ide of th e ch ange -viole nce
ne x us : th e orie s about th e e ffe cts of viole nt conflict on s ocial ch ange .
T h e re th e lands cape is much diffe re nt, th e s ubje ct of cons ide rable con-
je cture and wis h ful as s umption, but not much s ys te maticth e ory.
379
Comparative
Politics
April
1973
III. Viole nce and Re volution as Source s of Social
Ch ange
I
s ugge s te d
th at s ocial
ch ange
can be
analyze d according
to th e
e x te nt,
s cope ,
patte rn,
and rate of
ch ange
in th e four
type s
of de te rminants of
s ocial action: value s , norms ,
ins titutions ,
and facilitie s
(s e ction I).
A
ge ne ral approach
to th e "ins trume ntal"
linkage
be twe e n viole nce and
ch ange
is to
h ypoth e s ize
and de s cribe h ow diffe re nt kinds and inte ns itie s
of viole nt conflict affe ct th e de te rminants of action,
and h ow
wide ly,
s wiftly,
and s o forth
th e y
do s o.
Marx and Dah re ndorf are th e
only
th e oris ts dis cus s e d th us far wh o do
anyth ings ys te matic
of th is s ort. Marx
quite concre te ly
s tate s th at clas s
re volution is a function of value
ch ange s -clas s
cons cious ne s s -wh ich
le ads to
s pe cifie d
ins titutional
re arrange me nts .
T h os e
re arrange me nts
in-
clude a ne w s e t of
productive re lations h ips ,
a
continge nt
s e t of ne w
political
and s ocial
re lations h ips , and,
at th e
final,
pos tcapitalis t
s tage ,
a
with e ring away
of th e s tate . Marx th us attribute s
s pe cific
e ffe cts to a
ve ry s pe cific
kind of conflict.
Dah re ndorf, by contras t,
argue s
mos t ab-
s tractly
th at clas s conflict
produce s
s tructural
ch ange s
in th e as s ociations
in wh ich it occurs . He attribute s ch aracte ris tics of th e s e s tructural
ch ange s
to s e ve ral conflict variable s . T h e radicalne s s of s tructural
ch ange (i.e .,
its
cons e que nce s )
is s aid to be a function of conflict
inte ns ity;
th e s udde n-
ne s s of s tructural
ch ange
is a function of th e e x te nt of viole nce in clas s
conflict.45
Some of th e oth e r th e oris ts s urve ye d h e re cons ide r s ome more limite d
cons e que nce s of viole nt
conflict,
in particular its fe e dback e ffe cts on th e
variable s s aid to caus e viole nce . One bas ic fe e dback re lations h ip on
wh ich a numbe r of th e oris ts agre e is th at viole nt conflict te nds to be come
e nde mic, to fe e d on its e lf.46 I h ave s ugge s te d in s ome de tail wh y th is
s h ould be th e cas e ,
and unde r wh at circums tance s . An imme diate e ffe ct
is th at th e us e of viole nce by one party to a conflict s trongly dis pos e s
th e oth e r party to re taliate in kind; viole nce and counte rviole nce te nd
to e s calate until one or both partie s ' capacity for viole nce is e x h aus te d.
I bas e th is propos ition on th e pre mis e th at pe ople h ave an inh e re nt dis -
pos ition, irre s pe ctive of cultural diffe re nce s , to re s pond viole ntly to vio-
le nt attacks .47 A more indire ct way in wh ich viole nt conflict affe cts
future viole nce is by cre atingor re inforcinggroup jus tifications for future
viole nce . I dis tinguis h be twe e n normative jus tifications , i.e ., th e be lie f
th at viole nce is an approve d mode of action; and utilitarianjus tifications ,
th e be lie f th at viole nce is a us e ful me ans for th e attainme nt of group
value s . N ormative s upport for viole nt conflict is propos e d to vary with
45Dah re ndorf, pp. 231-35.
4' Se e Ecks te in, 150-51.
4Gurr, ch ap. 8.
380
T e d Robe rt Gurr
th e
magnitude
of
pas t viole nce ; utilitarian
s upport
varie s with th e
pas t
s ucce s s of viole nce . Some conflict th e oris ts concur th at "viole nce bre e ds
viole nce ,"
but account for th e re lation s ome wh at
diffe re ntly, arguing
th at
th e occurre nce of viole nce in conflict s ituations te nds to unde rmine
th e e ffe ctive ne s s of
conflict-re gulatingproce dure s
s uch as
ne gotiation
and me diation. A re late d
propos ition
is th at
inte rgroup
viole nce incre as e s
intragroup
coh e s ive ne s s and h e nce
s h arpe ns
line s of divis ion be twe e n
conflicting groups .48
Various th e oris ts attribute s ome more
pos itive
kinds of s ocial
ch ange
to conflict. Conflict
among groups
is
propos e d
to
s tre ngth e ngroup
co-
h e s ive ne s s and
s e parate ne s s ,
as note d
be fore ;
to re duce te ns ion and
de viation with in th e
group;
to
clarify group obje ctive s ;
and to
h e lp
e s tablis h
group
norms .49 T h e s e more or le s s be ne ficial
ch ange s
are
attribute d to conflict
ge ne rally, th ough
not
s pe cifically,
nor
ne ce s s arily
to viole nt conflict.
Els e wh e re ,
I h ave
propos e d
th at
political
viole nce
(viole nt
conflict
involving political groups )
te nds to re s olve its e lf if th e
dis s ide nt
group th e re by
obtains re s ource s and
opportunitie s by
wh ich it
can re s olve its dis conte nts .50 T h e
propos ition
is not th at
"winning
e nds
viole nce ," wh e n "winning" me ans th at one group dis place s anoth e r
downward; th is me re ly make s it like ly th at th e dis place d group rath e r
th an th e winningone will initiate th e ne x t round of conflict. T h e propo-
s ition re s ts rath e r on th e pre mis e th at mos t s ocie tie s h ave unus e d or
unde rutilize d s tocks of re s ource s and te ch nique s , wh ich in th e h ands of
dis conte nte d groups can be us e d to improve th e ir abs olute if not re lative
pos ition in th e dis tributionof value d goods and conditions .
Finally, I mus t me ntion th e utopian and mille nnial e x pe ctations th at
s ome re volutionary th e oris ts and ph ilos oph e rs h ave h ad about th e e ffe cts
of re volutionary conflict. I h ave in mind s uch me n as th e more radical
Fre nch ph ilos oph e s , T h omas Paine , Karl Marx , Pie rre -Jos e ph Proudh on,
Ge orge s Sore l, Louis Augus te Blanqui, Le on T rots ky, Mao T s e -tung,
Frantz Fanon, Erne s to Gue vara, Re gis De bray-th e lis t could e as ily
be e x te nde d. T h e s e me n various ly cons ide re d and advocate d re volu-
tionary conflict as a ne ce s s ary condition for s ocial ch ange . Almos t
with out e x ce ption th e y h ope d for a more e galitarian, jus t, and unop-
pre s s ive s ocial orde r, and mos t s aw in re volutionary conflict a ne ce s s ary
condition to th at e nd. T h e re is cons ide rable plaus ibility in th e conte n-
tion th at viole nt, re volutionary conflict is a ne ce s s ary condition to th e
48
T h is is mos t fully de ve lope d by Le wis Cos e r, T h e Functions of Social Conflict
(N e w York, 1956).
49
Se e Mack and Snyde r, 228; Cos e r, pas s im; and Be rnard J. Sie ge l, "De fe ns ive
Cultural Adaptation," in Grah am and Gurr, ch ap. 22.
s oGurr, pp. 348-57.
381
Comparative
Politics
April
1973
utopian
s ocial
obje ctive s
th e s e me n h ave
s ough t;
fe w
"top dogs "
will-
ingly re linquis h powe r
or
acce pt le ve lling.
But th e s e th e oris ts are
h ope -
le s s ly
unre alis ticto th e e x te nt th at
th e y re gard re volutionary
conflict as
a
s ufficie nt
condition for s ocial trans formation. Marx 's doctrine of h is -
torical
ine vitability
was in h is
applications
amos t
s oph is ticate d
mille nnial
argume nt.
For
Blanqui
and s ome of th e
anarch is ts ,
th e
utopian
outcome
of
re volutionary
conflict was a little -e x amine d
pre mis e ,
almos t an act of
faith . T h e le as t
utopian,
and mos t re alis ticof
re volutionary
advocate s are
th os e like
T rots ky, Le nin,
and Mao
T s e -tung,
wh o
pe rs onally
face d th e
h ars h re alitie s of
atte mpting
to
carry
out
re volutionary ch ange .
By
virtue of th e ir
as s umptions
about
re volutionary be ne fice nce ,
th e
ph ilos oph e rs
of th e
pre ce dingparagraph
are no more fruitful s ource s of
ge ne ralizations
about h ow
re volutionary
conflict
ch ange s s ocie ty
th an
are th e more
"obje ctive " conte mporary
th e oris ts wh o confine th e ms e lve s
principally
to
re volutionary
caus ation. With th e
e x ce ption
of s ome
prom-
is ing be ginnings
in th e work of Dah re ndorf and Le wis Cos e r,
we are
pre tty
much with out th e ore tical
guide line s .
One
partial
th e ore tical con-
tribution of th is s ort is offe re d in th e ne x t s e ction.
IV. Some De te rminants of th e Succe s s of Viole nt Conflict
I am conce rne d h e re with one
particular que s tion
about th e viole nce -
ch ange
ne x us : Unde r wh at conditions is viole nt conflict
like ly
to be s uc-
ce s s ful? T h e
que s tion
make s
s e ns e ,
of
cours e , only
if as ke d from th e
vie wpoint of th os e e ngage d
in viole nce . It is a
"political"
kind of
que s -
tion to as k and atte mpt
to
ans we r,
at le as t more
obvious ly political
th an
a compre h e ns ive atte mpt
to s h ow th e e ffe cts of all kinds of viole nce
on all as pe cts
of s ocial ch ange . My
rationale for
atte mpting
it is th at it
doe s offe r apurch as e
on th e
large r que s tion;
th at it is
important
to s ome
s e rious conte mporary is s ue s ; and, frankly,
th at it is e as ie r th an th e
large r
e ffort.
Motive s for viole nce in s ocial move me nts T o e valuate th e "s ucce s s "
or "failure " of particular
viole nt acts
re quire s
s ome
cate gorization
of
type s of motive s for th os e acts , and, e mpirically,
e vide nce on th e motive s
manife s t in occurre nce s of viole nt conflicts . T h e
cate gorie s
s h ould s ub-
s ume all us e s of
viole nce ,
at le as t all colle ctive
one s ,
and not be re -
s tricte d to th e motive s of one or anoth e r
group; s pe cifically, th e y
s h ould
be applicable
to viole nce us e d
by private groups
in conflict with
oth e rs ,
and by public groups
in conflict with one anoth e r and with
private
groups . Four ge ne ral cate gorie s
of motive s are dis cus s e d be low: s e lf-
382
T e d Robe rt Gurr
as s e rtion,
de fe ns ive , re formis t,
and
re volutionary.
It is
my
e x te ns ion of
a
typology
us e d
by T illy.51
Subordinate
cate gorie s
could be de vis e d for
e ach , but th is will not be done h e re .
Se lf-as s e rtion T h e re is an e le me nt of s e lf-as s e rtion in almos t all acts
of viole nce : a de s ire to
s atis fy ange r,
obtain
re ve nge ,
as s e rt
pride ,
cre ate
fe ar in oth e rs . T h e motive is
appare nt
in actions both of rule rs and of
rule d.
Frus tration-aggre s s ion
th e oris ts
argue
th at
aggre s s ion (of
wh ich
viole nce is one
form)
is an
inh e re ntly s atis fying re s pons e
to
ange r.52
Fanon
s ays
th at
oppre s s e d pe ople s
re dre s s th e ir
infe riority th rough
vio-
le nce . "At th e le ve l of th e individuals ,
viole nce is a
cle ans ing
force . It
fre e s th e native from h is
infe riority comple x
and from h is
de s pair
and in-
action;
it make s h im fe arle s s and re s tore s h is
s e lf-re s pe ct."
T h e e ffe cts of
viole nce are s aid to h ave
e qually pos itive
colle ctive e ffe cts : "for th e
colonis e d
pe ople
th is
viole nce ,
be caus e it cons titute s th e ir
only work,
inve s ts th e ir ch aracte rs with
pos itive
and cre ative
qualitie s .
T h e
practice
of viole nce binds th e m
toge th e r
as awh ole ...." 53 Fanon's own
ps ych ia-
tric cas e s tudie s cas t doubt on th e
accuracy
of th e s e
ge ne ralizations , by
portraying
th e
grie vous ps ych ic
cos ts of viole nce on its
practitione rs ,54
but th e
pre cis e accuracy
of h is claims is not at is s ue h e re . T h e
point
is
th at
many angry
and
oppre s s e d me n, in Fanon's
Alge ria
and
e ls e wh e re ,
h ave acte d viole ntly to s atis fy s trongps ych ic ne e ds (not me re ly be caus e
Fanon s aid th e y s h ould).
Similar e le me nts of s e lf-as s e rtion may be s e e n on th e part of rule rs .
Slave owne rs s ome time s us e d e x traordinary viole nce on s lave s for
triflingoffe ns e s ,
a primary motive s e e mingly be ing to de mons trate th e ir
abs olute mas te ry. Abs olutis t rule rs in many s ocie tie s h ave us e d s um-
mary e x e cutions for s ligh t offe ns e s and e ve n with out offe ns e as an as s e r-
tion of mas te ry. T h e h is torical ch ronicle s of Europe an abs olutis m offe r
individual ins tance s . Some incre dible e x ample s of ch ronic butch e ry of
th is s ort in me die val African kingdoms are pre s e nte d and analyze d by
E. V. Walte r.55
De fe ns ive viole nce Pe ople wh o us e viole nce almos t always h ave more
th an imme diate motive s of s e lf-as s e rtion. Wh e n viole nce is us e d as part
51
T illy.
52
Re vie we d in Gurr, ch ap. 2.
5 Frantz Fanon, T h e Wre tch e d of th e Earth (N e w York, 1966), p. 73.
54 Ibid., pp. 201-51.
6
E. V. Walte r, T e rror and Re s is tance : A Study of Political Viole nce (London
and N e w York, 1969).
383
Comparative
Politics
April
1973
of an e ffort to maintain a
group's
pos ition,
to
pre s e rve
th e s tatus
quo,
I
call it de fe ns ive . Mos t viole nce us e d
by gove rnme nts
is de fe ns ive in th is
s e ns e . Almos t all
policie s
of all
gove rnme nts
are
unpopular
with s ome
citize ns ,
and
ph ys ical
force -viole nce -is
us ually re garde d
as th e las t
re s ort of rule rs face d with
noncompliance . Counte rins urge ncy
is a fa-
miliar
type
of de fe ns ive viole nce
by gove rnme nts ,
us e d to
s uppre s s
re v-
olutionary
and s e ce s s ionis t move me nts .
T h rough out
h uman
h is tory
th e mos t common kind of viole nt move -
me nt
by private groups
h as
probably
be e n de fe ns ive re s is tance to e x -
te rnally impos e d ch ange . Ex ample s
include re s is tance to
fore ign
con-
que s t,
to th e
e x pans ion
of ce ntral
gove rnme nt powe rs
at th e
e x pe ns e
of
local
autonomy
and
privile ge s ,
to th e
compe tition
and
pre s s ure s
of
ris ing
clas s e s ,
and to e conomic immis e rization
impos e d by e mploye rs .
In th is
country many private groups
s uch as
vigilante s
h ad de fe ns ive motive s
for viole nce . T h e
vigilante groups ,
wh ich we re e s tablis h e d to cre ate and
maintain
public orde r,
flouris h e d
th rough out
th e nine te e nth
ce ntury
in
almos t all
parts
of th e Unite d State s
e x ce pt
N e w
England. Many
frontie r
and farme rs ' re be llions -th e
Wh is ke y Re be llion, Sh ay's Re be llion,
th e
Gre e n Corn
Re be llion, among
oth e rs -we re de fe ns ive in nature . T h e
mos t notable
e x ample
in Ame rican
h is tory
is th e s e ce s s ion of th e South
in 1861 and th e
e ns uing
Civil War. T h e South in fact
fough t
to
de fe nd its traditions and
privile ge s agains t
th e e ncroach me nts of fe de ral
auth ority.56
Re formis t and re volutionary viole nce T h e re formis t motive for viole nce
is ade s ire for limite d ch ange , th e re volutionary motive a de s ire for wide -
s pre ad, th orough goingch ange . More pre cis e ly, th e re volutionary motive
is to ch ange fundame ntally th e patte rns of auth ority, th at is , to ch ange
th e bas ic ins titutions and proce dure s of s ocie ty. Its s atis faction us ually
re quire s a s ubs tantial ch ange in th e value s of s ocie ty, a ch ange in th e
ope ratingnorms of ins titutional life ,
and re place me nt of th e e lite s wh o
manage ins titutions . T h e re formis t motive is to ch ange wh at e x is ting in-
s titutions do, th at is , to ch ange th e ir ope ratingnorms and more s pe cif-
ically s ome of th e ir practice s and policie s . Both re formis t and re volu-
tionary motive s for viole nce are progre s s ive or "forward looking," as dis -
tinct from "backward-looking" de fe ns ive move me nts . T h os e wh o h old
s uch motive s and us e viole nce as a me ans for ach ie ving th e m want to
cre ate s ome th ingne w, not to re s tore s ome th ingold. An Ame rican com-
MFor a ge ne ral inte rpre tation of Ame rican political viole nce as de fe ns ive , s e e
Rich ard E. Rube ns te in, Re be ls in Ede n: Mas s Political Viole nce in th e Unite d
State s (Bos ton, 1970).
384
T e d Robe rt Gurr
paris on
s h ould make th is cle ar. T h e
Wh is ke y
Re be llion in
Pe nns ylvania
in th e 1790s was
de fe ns ive ,
a farme rs ' move me nt of re s is tance to an in-
flux of fe de ral officials and th e
impos ition
of ne w tax e s . Dorr's Re be llion
in Rh ode Is land in 1842 was
re formis t;
th e de mand was for e x te ns ion of
th e
s uffrage
for
worke rs ,
in th e face of e conomic
de pre s s ion.
Re formis t and
re volutionary
motive s are not
abs olute ly
dis tinct:
th e y
diffe r in th e
de gre e
of
ch ange s ough t,
and th us cons titute two
pole s
of a
continuum. T o ach ie ve re forms it is ofte n
ne ce s s ary
to make s ome funda-
me ntal ins titutional
ch ange s .
And th os e wh o want
re volutionary ch ange s
us ually
do s o be caus e
th e y
s e e k mas s ive
ch ange s
in th e
practice s
of e x is t-
ing ins titutions ,
not be caus e
th e y
value ins titutional
ch ange
as an e nd
in its e lf.
Social move me nts and motive s for viole nce I am
s pe cifically
conce rne d
with th e us e of viole nce on th e
part
of s ocial move me nts . I am
re fe rring
to th e coale s ce nce of a
large
numbe r of
pe ople
to take conce rte d e fforts
to s olve a s e t of common
proble ms .57
A s ocial clas s is not as ocial move -
me nt in th is
s e ns e , th ough
it can
give
ris e to one . N e ith e r is a
gove rn-
me nt, th ough
it
may originally
h ave aris e nfrom a s ocial move me nt
(e .g.,
th e N e w
England Puritans ),
and
may
fos te r s ocial move me nts
(e .g.,
"private "
re s is tance to
inte gration
in th e Ame rican South
during
th e
1950s and e arly 1960s , abe tte d by local gove rnme nts ). Mos t s ocial
move me nts draw th e ir me mbe rs h ip from particular functional or h ie r-
arch ic groups . T h e trade union, fe minis t, and black powe r move me nts
are familiar e x ample s . Oth e rs , like th e e cology and "law and orde r"
move me nts in th e conte mporary Unite d State s -if th e las t is inde e d a
move me nt-bring toge th e r me mbe rs of dis parate groups and clas s e s .
Social move me nts can be organize d around an infinity of
obje ctive s ,
and can purs ue th os e obje ctive s us ing a gre at varie ty of tactics . Fe w
move me nts will be h omoge ne ous
in
obje ctive s ; h e nce th rough th e ir
me mbe rs th e y may re pre s e nt motive s of s e ve ral or e ve n all four of th e
type s me ntione d above . At th e mos t ge ne ral le ve l of analys is , h owe ve r, it
s h ould be both pos s ible and us e ful to indicate wh e th e r aparticular move -
me nt is pre dominantly de fe ns ive , re formis t, or
re volutionary, and, failing
th is , to indicate wh at th e approx imate "mix " is . T h e curre nt wome n's
move me nt in th e Unite d State s , for e x ample , h as both re formis t and
re volutionary obje ctive s , and, as is fre que ntly th e cas e , th os e obje ctive s
are re pre s e nte d
in
s e parate organizations :
th e N ational
Organizationof
57
For a s imilar de finition, s e e Hans T och , T h e Social
Ps ych ology of Social
Move me nts (N e w York, 1965), p. 5.
385
Comparative
Politics
April
1973
Wome n is
pre dominantly re formis t,
wh ile th e
conge rie s
of
groups
calle d
Wome n's Libe ration are
pre dominantly re volutionary.
A move me nt
may s pe cify
viole nce as a
primary
or
s e condary tactic,
or
may e x plicitly
rule it out. A move me nt
may
als o be th e
obje ct
of
viole nt
oppos ition
from oth e r
groups
e ve n
th ough
its me mbe rs ne ve r
advocate nor take viole nt action th e ms e lve s . I
propos e , h owe ve r,
th at
th e
h ypoth e s e s
advance d be low
conce rning
th e de te rminants of th e s uc-
ce s s of move me nts are
applicable
to move me nts
involving
viole nce irre -
s pe ctive of th e circums tance s in wh ich viole nce occurs . Wh e th e r a move -
me nt initiate s viole nce ,
is victimize d
by it,
or be come s involve d in vio-
le nt conflict with anoth e r
group,
th e
ge ne ral h ypoth e s e s
about its s ucce s s
s h ould te nd to h old.
One las t
qualification
is ne e de d be fore
proce e ding
to th e
h ypoth e s e s .
I h ave no
ge ne ralizations
to offe r about th e "s ucce s s " of th e viole nce of
s e lf-as s e rtion. It is an imme diate motive ,
wh os e s atis faction is found in,
or
imme diate ly following,
th e act. If an individual or
group us ing
s e lf-
as s e rtive viole nce
"ge ts away
with it" with out dire imme diate cons e -
que nce s , th e y
s ucce e d. T h e more
inte re s ting
kinds of
que s tions
are th e
de te rminants of th e s ucce s s or failure of viole nce wh e n us e d in th e
pur-
s uit of
long-run obje ctive s -in
oth e r
words ,
viole nce us e d in th e
atte mpt
to ach ie ve s ubs tantial s ocial ch ange .
A
ge ne ral propos ition
T h e
gre ate r
th e viole nce us e d
agains t pe ople
wh o be lie ve th e y
are in th e
righ t,
th e
gre ate r
th e like lih ood
of
th e ir re -
s is tance , to th e e x te nt of
th e ir
capacitie s .
T h is
propos ition applie s
to all
s ituations in wh ich viole nce is us e d for s ocial
purpos e s ,
and it unde rlie s
th e h ypoth e s e s
to follow. T h e rationale is
s traigh tforward;
th e us e or
th re at of viole nce agains t pe ople
is an
attack,
a frus tration
and,
unle s s
it
is of an abs olute ly ove rwh e lming, life -e ndange ring
nature ,
it s timulate s
ange r and a de s ire to re taliate . Eve n wh e n fe ar
pre dominate s ,
wh ich it
may do at firs t attack,
th e
longe r
run e ffe ct is th at
ange r
incre as e s as
fe ar s ubs ide s . T h e
propos ition migh t
be calle d th e "backlas h "
principle .
It applie s to any
kind of
targe te d viole nce ,
wh ate ve r
group
or ins titution
initiate s it, and h as one
important
ramification th at be ars
me ntioning
h e re . Pe ople
are
s ymbol us e rs ,
and
re s pond
as much to
s ymbols
as to
dire ct action. T h us ,
th e ne ws th at viole nce h as be e n us e d
agains t "your
kind," agains t any group
or ins titution with wh ich
pe ople ide ntify,
te nds
to ange r all th os e wh o s o
ide ntify,
wh e th e r or not
th e y
are
dire ctly
affe cte d.
T h e s ucce s s of de fe ns ive viole nce Viole nce us e d in e fforts to maintain
orde r or oth e rwis e to de fe nd
a s tatus
quo
in th e allocation
of
value s is
386
T e d Robe rt Gurr
like ly
to h ave th e inte nde d e ffe cts to th e e x te nt th at th re e conditions h old:
(1)
th e
purpos e s for wh ich viole nce is us e d are
ge ne rally acce pte d;
(2)
viole nce is
ge ne rally acce pte d as a
le gitimate me ans ; and
(3)
th os e
agains t
wh om viole nce is us e d are too
fe w and
powe rle s s
to incre as e
th e ir re s is tance .
T h is
tripartite h ypoth e s is
s h ould
apply
to
any
colle ctive us e of viole nce
by
or
agains t
a s ocial move me nt. It attribute s th e s ucce s s of a viole nt
de fe ns ive move me nt le s s to its tactics th an to th e s ocial circums tance s in
wh ich it
ope rate s .
An
e x ample
of a
s ucce s s ful, nongove rnme ntal
de fe n-
s ive move me nt in Ame rica is
provide d by
th e Re cons truction South .
Be twe e n 1865 and 1878 South e rnwh ite s s ucce e de d in
re ve rs ing
almos t
all th e e ffe cts of th e 14th and 15th Ame ndme nts ; black South e rne rs we re
not
re e ns lave d,
but th e te rror and intimidationinflicte d on th e m and th e ir
h andful of wh ite
Re publican s upporte rs
in th e South was in
many ways
wors e th an
s lave ry
its e lf. T h e ch ronicle of mob action, vigilante -s tyle
be atings , s h ootings , burnings ,
and
ope n
re be llion
agains t
N orth e rn au-
th oritie s and black militia is too
long, dis mal,
and we ll docume nte d to
re pe at
h e re .58 T h e s ucce s s of counte rre cons tructionwas as s ure d
by
th e
fact th at all th re e of th e h ypoth e tical conditions we re me t.
1. Almos t all wh ite South e rne rs be lie ve d th at blacks h ad to be re -
s ubjugate d, oth e rwis e South e rncivilization was doome d.
2. Viole nce was ge ne rally acce pte d by South e rne rs as a le gitimate
me ans to th is e nd. T h e y h ad jus t fough t a much more viole nt war
for s imilar purpos e , wh ile ne ws pape r e ditorials and public s tate -
me nts by officials and politicians of th e e ra re pe ate dly condone d
s uch viole nce .
3. South e rn blacks and th e ir N orth e rn s ympath ize rs we re too we ak
to re s is t or re ve rs e th e e ffe cts of viole nce for any le ngth of time .
Re publican political s upporte rs , black and wh ite , we re a minority
almos t e ve rywh e re in th e South , and, e ve n wh e re th e y
we re
not,
th e y ofte n lacke d me ans to re s is t. T h e mainte nance of Fe de ral law
and orde r de pe nde d s ubs tantially on black militiaunits commande d
by wh ite office rs , at le as t until cons e rvative wh ite s tate gove rn-
me nts we re re e s tablis h e d. T h e s e units we re ne ith e r we ll traine d
nor we ll e quippe d; th e ir office rs we re s ome time s ope nly murde re d,
th e ir me n attacke d by arme d bands of wh ite s . Fe de ral policy was
ge ne rally not to s e nd troop re inforce me nts . T h e mos t te lling fac-
tor, pe rh aps , was th e lack of wh ite coope ration in e fforts to appre -
h e nd th e wh ite s wh o carrie d out campaigns of conce rte d te rror;
68
Of many s tudie s s e e , for e x ample , Joh n Hope Franklin, Re cons truction(Ch i-
cago, 1961).
387
Comparative
Politics April
1973
wh ite South e rne rs could us e viole nce with almos t
comple te
im-
punity agains t we akly
de fe nde d blacks .
T h e cas e is illus trative ,
not de finitive . A numbe r of additional cas e s
of both s ucce s s ful and uns ucce s s ful de fe ns ive move me nts would be re -
quire d
to de te rmine its
ge ne ral applicability.
T h e s ucce s s of re formis t viole nce I as s ume h e re th at mos t re formis t
move me nts h ave no more th an mode rate
powe r
to attainth e ir own
e nds ;
th e y
are
ordinarily
in th e
pos ition
of
trying
to
pe rs uade ,
or
force , powe r-
ful "oth e rs " to make
ch ange s
on th e ir be h alf. In th e s e
circums tance s ,
th e
followingh ypoth e s is s ugge s ts
th e conditions of th e ir s ucce s s . Viole nce
us e d in
e fforts
to
pe rs uade
or coe rce
"powe rful
oth e rs " to
ch ange is
like ly
to h ave th e inte nde d e ffe cts to th e e x te nt th at:
(1)
th e "oth e rs "
acce pt
or at le as t do not
re je ct outrigh t
th e de s ira-
bility of
th e
ch ange s ough t; (2)
th e "oth e rs " h ave th e
capacity
to make
th e
ch ange ;
and
(3)
th e re action
of
th e "oth e rs "
agains t
viole nce doe s
not ove rride th e ir
willingne s s
to
ch ange .
T h e fe minis t move me nt in
England
from th e 1890s to 1918
provide s
an
e x ample
of s ucce s s ful re form,
in wh ich all th re e conditions
appe ar
to
h ave be e n me t. It h ad as its s ole
obje ctive
th e
righ t
of wome n to vote and
oth e rwis e to
participate
in
politics .
T h e
principle
divis ion in th e move -
me nt was be twe e n th e
tactically
mode rate Wome n's Fre e dom
Le ague
and th e militant s uffrage tte s of th e Wome n's Social and Political Union.
T h e tactics of th e latte r include d an e igh t-ye ar s e que nce of incre as ingly
dis ruptive mas s de mons trations , confrontations with officials , and face -
s lapping brawls with police , de ve loping into a conce rte d te rroris t cam-
paign. At its h e igh t, be twe e n 1911 and 1914, th e s uffrage tte s carrie d out
gre at numbe rs of s tonings , fire bombings of public buildings , railway
s tations , and officials ' h ome s , window bre akingof th e type now calle d
"tras h ing," and s ome wh ippingand h atch e t attacks on officials . By 1918
all wome n ove r th irty we re e nfranch is e d and allowe d to s tand for Parlia-
me nt. T h e conditions of s ucce s s de ve lope d s e riatum:
1. T h e purs uit of woman's s uffrage be gan in th e 1860s , firs t agains t
th e
dis inte re s t,
th e n th e de ris ion, of politicians . Some fifty ye ars of
agitation on th e is s ue gradually incre as e d male s upport, as e vi-
de nce d in incre as ingly favorable Hous e of Commons vote s on
th e is s ue . T h ough no Gove rnme nt would de clare its e lf in favor of
woman's s uffrage until 1917, by th at ye ar public and political
opinion cle arly acce pte d th e principle .
2. T h e Englis h gove rnme nt unque s tionably h ad th e auth ority to grant
388
T e d Robe rt Gurr
woman's
s uffrage ;
Commons h ad in fact take n
away
th e
righ t
to
vote h e ld
by
a minis cule numbe r of wome n in 1832.
3. T h e
public
re action
agains t s uffrage tte
viole nce s e e ms
s ignificantly
to h ave
de laye d
th e
granting
of th e re form.
Alth ough
Commons
h ad vote d
favorably
on
s uffrage
in
1909,
th e Gove rnme nt allowe d
th e Hous e of Lords to kill it. T h e
s ubs e que nt
four
ye ars
of viole nt
prote s t
we re
accompanie d by
incre as e d re luctance of s ucce s s ive
gove rnme nts
to de al with th e is s ue . T h e outbre ak of World War I
provide d
a
re s pite ;
with in a month of its ons e t all militant actions
we re
s us pe nde d,
and
many
of th e
s uffrage tte s
took
up aux iliary
military
s e rvice . Give n th e lull in viole nt
prote s t,
and th e war
its e lf,
in 1917 th e
prime
minis te r de clare d h ims e lf for
s uffrage
and
an e le ctoral re form was
promptly pas s e d by
th e
ove rwh e lming
margin
of 364 to 23.59
T h e s e th re e conditions of re formis t s ucce s s can be us e d to e valuate
both
conte mporary
and h is torical
move me nts ,
as a
comparis on
of two
conte mporary
Ame rican move me nts de mons trate s : T h e civil
righ ts
for
black Ame ricans ,
and th e antiwar,
antimilitaris m move me nts . N e ith e r of
th e s e move me nts h as be e n pre dominantly viole nt, but e ach h as provide d
th e occas ion for cons ide rable viole nce of prote s t and re s is tance . T h e
que s tion is h ow th is viole nce affe cts th e ir s ucce s s .
1. De s irability of ch ange . Cons ide ringonly th e fe de ral le ve l of gov-
e rnme nt, a s ubs tantial diffe re nce s e e ms appare ntin th e de s irability
of th e two type s of ch ange . Fe de ral officials and th e majority of
congre s s me n h ave s ubs tantially acce pte d th e de s irability of e ffe c-
tive civil righ ts for blacks ; fe w fe de ral officials and only a minority
of congre s s me n h ave adopte d a s ubs tantially antimilitaris ticvie w.
As one cons e que nce , th e re h as be e n a gre at de al of rule making
and adminis trative activity on be h alf of civil righ ts , but only a
gradual and limite d s h ift in military policy.
2. Capacity to ch ange . On th is variable , th e balance is re ve rs e d. T h e
fe de ral gove rnme nt h as only limite d capacity to de al with th e
fundame ntal proble m of civil righ ts , wh ich is compris e d of th e in-
graine d racis t attitude s and practice s of awide s pe ctrum of Ame r-
ican ins titutions . T h e s lowne s s of e ffe ctive civil righ ts progre s s is
a function of wide s pre ad public re s is tance more th an of gove rn-
me ntal dis inte re s t. On th e antimilitaris m is s ue ,
h owe ve r,
th e fe de ral
gove rnme nt cle arly h as th e powe r to ch ange th e Unite d State s '
military policie s ove rs e as as we ll as to re tre nch ove rall military
69
T h is s ummary is drawnlarge ly from Roge r Fulford, Vote s for Wome n (Lon-
don, 1957).
389
Comparative
Politics April
1973
e x pe nditure s
and
activitie s ;
it is th e
de s irability
of
ch ange
th at h as
not be e n
wide ly acce pte d, e x ce pt
to s ome
de gre e
on Vie tnam.
3. Re action
agains t
viole nce . T h e re is
e ve ry
e vide nce th at
gh e tto
riots
in th e mid-1960s and th e dramatize d te rroris m and
re volutionary
pos turing
of s ome black militants h ad
s ubs tantially
unde rmine d
th e
partial public s upport gaine d by
th e civil
righ ts
move me nt in
th e late 1950s and
e arly
1960s . T h is backlas h e ffe ct was re fle cte d
in
opinion poll data,
in th e N ix on Adminis tration's
policie s
of
"be nign ne gle ct,"
in
wide s pre ad political oppos ition
to
programs
th ough t
to be ne fit blacks
primarily,
and in a
varie ty
of more
s pe -
cific and localize d
ways . Similarly,
th e us e of viole nce
by
th e
s uicidal le ft of th e antiwar move me nt re s ulte d in a
wide ly-fe lt
backlas h at
colle ge
s tude nts and
youth ge ne rally.
In
s ummary,
th e civil
righ ts
and antiwar move me nts h ave both be e n
no more th an
partly s ucce s s ful,
be caus e in e ach ins tance
th e y
h ave con-
fronte d a "mix " of favorable and unfavorable conditions for th e ir
s ucce s s .
T h e s ucce s s of
re volutionary
viole nce
Re volutionary obje ctive s
can
be
purs ue d
with out th e us e of
re volutionary
viole nce . In th e Unite d State s
today, many groups
h ave be e n
cons cious ly working
for
re volutionary
ch ange s by pe ace ful me ans , to a de gre e th at I th ink is with out h is torical
paralle l. India duringGandh i's s atyagrah acampaigns s e e ms to offe r th e
only approx imate analogy. T h e que s tion h e re , h owe ve r, is wh at th e re -
quire me nts are for s ucce s s ful re volutionary ch ange wh e n pros e cute d by
traditional, viole nt me th ods of re volutionary conflict.60 I s ugge s t th e
following conditions : Viole nce us e d to ach ie ve re volutionary ch ange is
like ly to le ad to th e de s ire d e ffe cts to th e e x te nt th at th re e conditions
h old: (1) th e re volutionarie s ove rcome th e re s is tance of th e ir
oppone nts ;
(2) th e re volutionarie s re main committe d to th e ir plans for ch ange afte r
gainingpowe r; and (3) th e re volutionarie s h ave th e re s ource s and s ocial
e ngine e ringcapacitie s to bringabout s ocial ch ange .
T h e firs t of th e s e conditions s tipulate s , in e ffe ct, th at th e re volution-
arie s h ave to "win"-i.e ., a political re volution mus t occur be fore th e y
can e ve n atte mpt to bringabout ch ange . Conditions for winningcan als o
be s tipulate d, de rive d from th e nume rous e tiological th e orie s re vie we d
above . T h e re volutionarie s re quire s ubs tantial popular, th ough not ne c-
e s s arily majoritarian, s upport. In addition, th e y mus t h ave a de gre e of
00
T h e e s s e ntial conditions of nonviole nt re volutionary s ucce s s are probably s imi-
lar to th os e s pe cifie d e arlie r for re formis t move me nts as s ociate d with viole nce .
390
T e d Robe rt Gurr
organizational s upport
from th e ir followe rs at le as t
e quivale nt
to th at of
th e ir
oppone nts . Finally,
and mos t
imme diate ly, th e y re quire military
me ans s ufficie nt to s tand off th e incumbe nts .
Re volutionary commitme nt, s trate gics kill,
favorable
te rrain, e x te rnal
s upport,
and
gue rrilla
or te rroris tictactics can
compe ns ate
to a cons id-
e rable
de gre e
for wh at th e re volutionarie s
may
lack in numbe rs and
e quipme nt.
Almos t
always , h owe ve r, re volutionary victory
re s ults not
from a
re gime 's
de fe at on th e battle fie ld
pe r s e ,
but from th e e ros ion of
th e
military's willingne s s
to continue to
s upport
th e
re gime .
T h e Com-
munis t Ch ine s e de fe at of th e N ationalis t
re gime
in 1949 is one of th e
rare
e x ce ptions
to th is
principle .
Fide l Cas tro's
victory
in Cubain 1959
was a
good
de al more
typical.
T h e Batis ta
re gime
los t much of its
popular s upport
be caus e of its
incre as ingly
te rroris tic and incons is te nt
practice
of viole nce
agains t
urban and rural
pe ople s .
T h e ins titutional
balance s h ifte d toward th e Cas tro
force s ,
not be caus e of
re lative ly
limite d
organizational de ve lopme nt
in th e rural are as
th e y controlle d,
but be -
caus e of th e dis affe ction of labor and middle -clas s
organizations
with
th e
re gime .
T h e
military
balance was turne d not
by any gre at
re be l vic-
tory-th e ir
numbe r unde r arms in De ce mbe r 1958 was no more th an
1,000-but by
th e
pre cipitous
de cline in
army
morale . Had Batis ta
not gone into e x ile on De ce mbe r
31,
le avingHavanaope n to Cas tro, h e
would h ave be e n ove rth rownve ry s h ortly by one of th e coup groups al-
re ady active in th e military.61
One oth e r point s h ould be made about "winning." T h e political
triumph of th e re volutionarie s is not ne ce s s arily th e e nd of re volutionary
conflict. Counte rre volutions are always apos s ibility. In Hungary in 1919,
a five -month -old Socialis t re volutionary re gime was ove rth rown in a
counte rre volutionth at h ad fore ign military s upport. Counte rre volutionin
Rus s ia, 1919-21, was uns ucce s s ful de s pite fore ign inte rve ntion, but it
de vas tate d th e country. T h e abs e nce of organize d, viole nt atte mpts to re -
ve rs e a re volution doe s not ne ce s s arily me an acquie s ce nce to th e re volu-
tionary caus e , e ith e r. Mas s ive e migration, noncoope ration, and clande s -
tine s abotage by th os e wh o s upporte d th e old e lite can be a de vas tating
burde n on "s ucce s s ful" re volutionarie s . One of th e Cuban re volution's
gre ate s t liabilitie s afte r 1959 was th e wh ole s ale de fe ction of pe ople
with
th e profe s s ional, te ch nical, and adminis trative s kills ne e de d for e conomic
and political trans formation.
Re volutionary
le ade rs may ch ange th e ir obje ctive s , too. T h e y may
prove
more inte re s te d in e x ploiting th e "re volution" for th e ir pe rs onal
be ne fit th an in pros e cutingch ange . Or th e y may e ngage th e ir re s ource s
01
Se e ,
for e x ample ,
Boris Golde nbe rg, T h e CubanRe volutionand LatinAme rica
(N e w York, 1965).
391
Comparative
Politics
April
1973
and
e ne rgie s
in
fore ign conflict, e ith e r out of
ne ce s s ity
or an e x ce s s of
re volutionary
ze al.
Some ,
like th e Cubanle ade rs in
1959,
and
pe rh aps
to
a le s s e r
de gre e
th e Ch ine s e le ade rs in
1949, may
ch oos e
re volutionary
policie s
th at alie nate
many
of th os e wh o
initially s upporte d
th e m. Re vo-
lutionary
le ade rs cannot
e ntire ly
avoid
bre aking
faith with th e ir
followe rs ,
s imply
be caus e of th e
dive rs ity
and mutual
incons is te ncy
of th e ir re volu-
tionary as pirations .
In
Cuba, h owe ve r,
th e
re volutionary "be trayal"
was
both s ubs tantial and
unus ual,
s ubs tantial be caus e it h urt mos t of th e
re volution's middle and s kille d
working-clas s s upporte rs ,
unus ual be caus e
th e le ade rs
s ough t
much
gre ate r ch ange
th an
originally propos e d,
rath e r
th an th e
re volutionary
norm of circums cribe d
ch ange .
Probably
th e mos t common s ource of failure
among
th os e wh o win
political
re volutions is th e ir limite d
capacity
to
manage ch ange .
At th e
point
of
victory
almos t
e ve ry re volutionary re gime
confronts e ith e r an
ine rt s ocial mas s of
be lie fs ,
practice s ,
and ins titutions th at
obdurate ly
re s is t
ch ange ,
or at be s t an inch oate s ocial
s ys te m
rive n
by
dis s e ns us and
paralyze d by
ins titutional
collaps e . (T h e
latte r is be tte r
be caus e , to e x -
te nd a familiar
re volutionary analogy,
it is e as ie r to make an ome le tte if
th e
e ggs
are
alre acid broke n.)
In ne ith e r circums tance are
re volutionary
le ade rs
like ly
to h ave te s te d me th ods for
bringing
about th e kinds of
s ocial
ch ange th e y
s e e k. T h e
h is tory
of
e ve ry atte mpt
at
manage d
re vo-
lutionary
trans formationwith wh ich I am familiar is
compris e d
of amix -
ture of imme diate gains , bootle s s e x pe rime ntation, and policy dis as te rs .
Only occas ionally is th e re a gradual, long-run re dire ction of s ocial, pro-
ductive , and political tre nds s ome wh at in th e original re volutionary
dire ction.62
T h e accuracy of th e s e fe w h ypoth e s e s about th e utility of viole nce as
ale ve r for s ocial ch ange can be e mpirically as s e s s e d. I s ugge s t th e m only
as a firs t cut at th e proble m. T h e y s h ould be s ubs tantially e laborate d
and made more pre cis e . Eve n at be s t, th e y can make only a s mall con-
tribution to th e large r proble m of tracingth e wh ole ne twork of conne c-
tions be twe e n viole nt conflict and s ubs e que nt s ocial ch ange .
62
Much th e s ame can be s aid of mos t large -s cale nonre volutionary e fforts at
s ocial e ngine e ring; vide th e re s ults of mos t of th e Joh ns onAdminis tration's "Gre at
Socie ty" programs . T h e proble m is not s o much th at th e re forme rs or re volu-
tionarie s lack ze al, or e ve n re s ource s ; lack of ope rationalknowle dge and re s is tance
by th os e wh o are to be e ngine e re d are us ually more vitiating.
392