Ricardo Cheng vs. Ramon B. Genato, Ernesto R. Da Jose and Socorro B.

Da Jose
G.R. No. 129760 [December 29, 1998] Martines, J.
Facts:
Respondent Ramon B. Genato is the owner of two parcels of land located at Paradise
Farms, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan with an aggregate area of 35,821square meters. He entered
into an agreement with respondent-spouses Ernesto R. Da Jose and Socorro B. Da Jose over the
stated two parcels of land. The agreement concluded in the execution of a contract to sell for
which the purchase price was P80.00 per square meter. The contract was in a public instrument
and was duly annotated at the back of the two certificates of title on the same day.
Da Jose spouses, not having finished verifying the titles asked for and was granted by
respondent Genato an extension of another 30 days. However, according to Genato, the
extension was granted on condition that a new set of documents is made seven days from
October 4, 1989. This was denied by the Da Jose spouses.
Pending the effectivity of the extension period, and without due notice to the Da Jose
spouses, Genato executed an Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell. Likewise, no annotation of
the said affidavit at the back of his titles was made right away.
Petitioner Ricardo Cheng went to Genato's residence and expressed interest in buying the
subject properties. On that occasion, Genato showed to Ricardo Cheng copies of his transfer
certificates of title and the annotations at the back thereof of his contract to sell with the Da Jose
spouses. Genato also showed him the Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell which has not been
annotated at the back of the titles. Regardless of the same, Cheng went ahead and issued a check
for P50,000.00 upon the assurance by Genato that the previous contract with the Da Jose spouses
will be annulled for which Genato issued a handwritten receipt.
Genato deposited Cheng's check. On the same day, Cheng called up Genato reminding
him to register the affidavit to annul the contract to sell. The following day Genato caused the
registration of the Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell in the Registry of Deeds, Meycauayan,
Bulacan.
Da Jose spouses they met Genato by coincidence at the Office of the Registry of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Da Jose spouses discovered about the affidavit to annul their contract.
The latter were shocked at the disclosure and protested against the rescission of their contract.
They were willing and able to pay the balance of the agreed down payment, later on in the day,
Genato decided to continue the Contract he had with them. The agreement to continue with their
contract was formalized in a conforme letter.
Thereafter, Ramon Genato advised Ricardo Cheng of his decision to continue his contract
with the Da Jose spouses and the return of Cheng's P50,000.00 check. Consequently, Cheng's
lawyer sent a letter to Genato demanding compliance with their agreement and threatening legal
action.
Genato sent a letter

to Cheng enclosing a BPI Cashier's Check for P50,000.00 and
expressed regret for his inability to "consummate his transaction" with him. After having
received the letter, Cheng returned the said check to the former via RCPI telegram reiterating
that "our contract to sell your property had already been perfected." Cheng executed an affidavit
of adverse claim and had it annotated on the subject TCT's.
Cheng filed a complaint for specific performance to compel Genato to execute a deed of
sale to him of the subject properties plus damages and prayer for preliminary attachment. In his
complaint, Cheng averred that the P50,000.00 check he gave was a partial payment to the total
agreed purchase price of the subject properties and considered as an earnest money for which
Genato acceded. Thus, their contract was already perfected.
The lower court ruled that the receipt issued by Genato to Cheng unerringly meant a sale
and not just a priority or an option to buy.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it reversed the said judgment and ruled that the prior
contract to sell in favor of the Da Jose spouses was not validly rescinded. The subsequent
contract to sell between Genato and Cheng, embodied in the handwritten receipt, was without
force and effect due to the failure to rescind the prior contract and that Cheng should pay
damages to the respondents being found to be in bad faith.
Issue:
Whether or not the Da Jose spouses' Contract to Sell has been validly rescinded or
resolved
Whether or not Ricardo Cheng's own contract with Genato was not just a contract to sell
but one of conditional contract of sale which gave him better rights, thus precluding the
application of the rule on double sales under Article 1544, Civil Code
Held:
The petition must be denied for no reversible error can be ascribed to the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that there was no valid and effective rescission or resolution of the Da Jose
spouses Contract to Sell, contrary to petitioner's contentions and the trial court's erroneous ruling.
1. Article 1191 of the New Civil Code cannot be made to apply to the situation in the
instant case because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose spouses since the 30-day extension
period has not yet expired. The Da Jose spouses' contention that no further condition was agreed
when they were granted the 30-days extension period from October 7, 1989 in connection with
clause 3 of their contract to sell dated September 6, 1989 should be upheld. Genato could have
sent at least a notice of the affidavit to annul the contract to sell, there being no stipulation
authorizing him for automatic rescission, so as to finally clear the encumbrance on his titles and
make it available to other would be buyers.
2. The records of this case are replete with admissions that Cheng believed it to be one of
a Contract to Sell and not one of Conditional Contract of Sale. But even if we are to assume that
the receipt is to be treated as a conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force
since it was subject to suspensive condition that the earlier contract to sell between Genato and
the Da Jose spouses should first be cancelled or rescinded a condition never met, as Genato,
to his credit, upon realizing his error, redeemed himself by respecting and maintaining his earlier
contract with the Da Jose spouses.
Danao Coal Mining Syndicate, Ltd. vs. Cenon Laurente
G.R. No. L-20075 [November 27, 1968] Reyes, J.
Facts:
Transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 7567) covered a parcel of land situated in Camansi,
Danao, Cebu. The same was issued in 1928 by the Register of Deeds of Cebu in favor of H. M.
H. Nemazee, the proprietor of the original applicant, Danao Coal Mining Syndicate, Ltd.
In a quitclaim deed, the heirs of Nemazee transferred and quitclaimed in favor of
Southwestern University their rights, title, interest and participation in, including their mining
and leasehold rights over, subject land.
Southwestern University petitioned the lower court to order:
(1) the cancellation of the annotation of encumbrances on the ground that the condition
and agreement constituting the same were cancelled and rendered inoperative by the
outbreak of World War II as well as by the death of all the listed beneficiaries thereof;
(2) the registration of the quitclaim deed; and
(3) the cancellation of TCT No. 7567 itself, and issuance of a new certificate of title in its
name.
The petition was immediately granted and a new certificate of title (TCT No. RT-2164)
was thereafter issued in favor of Southwestern University.
Cenon Laurente moved for reconsideration of the order of cancellation, specifically of the
second portion of the annotation of encumbrances in question. He alleged that Southwestern
University had filed an ejectment suit before another branch of the same court against him and
several other occupants of the land covered by TCT No. 7567, over which land, he claimed, he
might possibly have an interest as a purchaser of a certain parcel of land situated also in
Camansi, Danao, Cebu, from Filomeno del Mar, one of the persons in whose favor "the use of
occupancy of the surface of the ... land" covered by said TCT No. 7567 was reserved. Laurente
thus argued that the cancellation of the annotation of the incumbrance in favor of Filomeno del
Mar and others should not have been ordered without giving notice, at least through publication,
to the parties who, like him, being a successor-in-interest of said Filomeno del Mar, might
thereby be adversely affected. Laurente's alleged interest was, however, never registered.
The motion for reconsideration was denied reasoning that inasmuch as the law
specifically provides notice to parties in interest, such notice if any, should be limited to the
parties listed or annotated on the certificate of title. Hence, if such parties are already dead, as
had been alleged and substantiated by petitioner Southwestern University, then notice to said
parties would be superfluous or notice would not be necessary. The Court acting within its
limited jurisdiction as a Court of Land Registration, can only act on what appears on the face of
the certificate of title, and cannot go beyond what appears therein as movant Cenon Laurente
would now want this Court to believe. Notice by Publication is not necessary in connection with
the petition which has been duly filed in accordance with Section 112 of Act 496.
Granting that the use and occupancy which was annotated in the certificate of title is a real right
which could be transferred or disposed of by the person named in the certificate of title to a third
person (Cenon Laurente), the latter should have taken the precaution of having his right
annotated on said (certificate of title). His failure to do so is therefore fatal, in the sense that this
Court cannot consider him as a party in interest who is entitled to notice before the petition for
cancellation of encumbrance could be acted upon.
Issue:
Whether or not court erred in denying the motion for reconsideration filed by a third
person whose interest, purportedly, might have been prejudiced by the cancellation
Held:
No. Cancellation of registered interests that have terminated and ceased may be ordered
by the land registration court under the Land Registration Act. The new owner, Southwestern
University, of the land herein involved took the right step by petitioning the court under said
section to have the registered interests the deceased persons' rights of use and occupancy of
the surface of said land ordered cancelled on the ground that the same had terminated and
ceased. Notice was no longer necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the petition
insofar as the second portion of the annotation of encumbrances was concerned. With the death
of all the registered adverse claimants thereof, there were no more parties in interest to be
notified.
Appellant Laurente was not and cannot now be considered a party in interest entitled to
notice. He was a stranger representing no adverse claim as to render the petition for cancellation
controversial and, thereby, divest the lower court of its jurisdiction. The cancellation of the right
of the persons recorded as entitled to use and occupancy of the surface of the land is too vague
and unsubstantial to give him standing to claim right to notice or to contest the order of
cancellation.
Before a claimant can be considered as possessing a genuine adverse interest that would
deprive the Registration Court of jurisdiction to proceed in the absence of notice to him, there
must be a showing of the prima facie truth and validity of such adverse interest. Laurente has
failed to make such a showing. His motion merely speaks of a possibility of being prejudiced.

Apolinio Egao and Beatriz Egao vs. Court of Appeals, Severo Dignos and Severo Bontilao
G.R. No. L-79787 [June 29, 1989] Padilla, J.
Facts:
Private respondents filed an action Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Possession and
Ownership before the RTC of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, against petitioners Apolonio and
Beatriz Egao. They alleged that they are the legitimate owners and possessors of two parcels of
land situated at Lonocan, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, per deed of absolute sale. Upon purchase of
the lot from Roberto Marfori, improvements were introduced and taxes paid by private
respondents. Sometime in June 1983, petitioners allegedly occupied illegally portions of the
land.
In their answer, petitioner claims that Apolonio Egao is the registered owner of the parcel
of land evidenced by OCT No. P-3559 issued by the Register of Deeds of Bukidnon pursuant to
Free Patent No. 298112 dated 12 August 1965. He also claim that the land has never been sold
by reason of the prohibition against alienation under Commonwealth Act No. 141
The Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered respondent Severo Bontilao
to immediately deliver to the Egaos the owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title
No. P-3559.
Private respondents went to the Court of Appeals and the same set aside the RTC
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents has a right over the disputed land, they being the
transferees of Marfori
Held:
No. It clearly appears that all deeds were executed within the prohibited period of five
years. Respondents who are not innocent purchasers for value have no standing to question
petitioners' right to the land and to file an action for quieting of title.
An "innocent purchaser for value" is deemed, under the Torrens system, to include an
innocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrancer for value. Where a purchaser neglects to make
the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his
guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, and relying on the
belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases the property without making
any further investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith for value.
The rule of pari delicto non oritur actio (where two persons are equally at fault neither
party may be entitled to relief under the law), admits of exceptions and does not apply to an
inexistent contract, such as, a sale void ab initio under the Public Land Act, when its
enforcement or application runs counter to the public policy of preserving the grantee's right to
the land under the homestead law.

Pacifico Garcia vs. Benjamin Gozon, et al.
G.R. Nos. L-48971 & 49011 [January 22, 1980] Aquino, J.
Facts:
A deed of sale for two parcels of land of the Hacienda Maysilo, located in Malabon, Rizal
and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 983, was executed in favor of Ismael Lapus
a bona fide occupant thereof. The deed was executed pursuant to an order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 391, Negao vs. Vidal, a partition proceeding involving the
said hacienda.
The deed of sale was presented for registration and was recorded as Primary Entry No.
7710. However, the deed of sale was not annotated on OCT No. 983 and that title was apparently
not cancelled.
As a result of the registration of that deed of sale, Transfer Certificate of 'Title No. 4910
was issued to Lapus for the two parcels of land and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4911 was
issued for the remaining five lots covered by OCT No. 983.
Lapus on different occasions mortgaged the two parcels of land to secure his obligations
to the PNB, the Government and the Philippine Trust Company. He died in 1951. The two
parcels of land were inherited by his daughter, Carolina Lapuz-Gozon. She became the registered
owner of the two lots. She subdivided them into 55 lots. She sold some of the subdivision lots to
her co-respondents-appellees herein. Lapus and his successors-in-interest have been in
possession of the two parcels even before 1910.
In 1962, the alleged heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal filed a motion in Land
Registration alleging that they were deprived of their participation in the Hacienda Maysilo
covered by OCT No. 983 and for other titles and that, since only OCT No. 983 was supposedly
unencumbered, all the land covered by that title should be adjudicated to them. The court granted
the motion notwithstanding the fact that OCT No. 983 appears to have remained uncancelled
although the sale to Lapus of two parcels covered by it and the fact that it had been replaced by
TCT Nos. 4910 and 4911.
On June 7, 1963, OCT No. 983 was definitely cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 112236 was issued to the Riveras. Later, Lots 5 and 7 of the said title
were assigned by Bartolome Rivera to Sergio Cruz and Pacifico Garcia and TCT Nos. 112743
and 112742 were issued to Cruz and Garcia, respectively. Thus, two sets of transfer certificates
of title for Lots E and G or 5 and 7, originally covered by OCT No. 983, were issued, one to the
heir of Ismael Lapus and another set to the successors-in-interest of the Riveras.
On October 22, 1964, Garcia subdivided Lot 7 (G) into Lots A and B. As a consequence
of the assignment, TCT No. 112742 was cancelled and TCT No. 134957 was issued to Muoz.
In 1965, he mortgaged Lot B to the Associated Banking Corporation to secure a loan of
P200,000.
On July 17, 1964 Cruz sold to Santiago Go Lot 5 (E). Go mortgaged Lot 6 to PNB to
secure a loan of P50,000 which was later increased to P60,000.
Muoz and Go did not pay their mortgage debts. The two banks foreclosed the
mortgages. The PNB bought the mortgaged lot at the auction sale. The sheriff issued to it a
certificate of sale but at that time there was already a notice of lis pendens annotated on the title
of the mortgaged lot. TCT Nos. 212163 and 236881 for the mortgaged lots were issued to the
Associated Banking Corporation and PNB, respectively.
Gozon later learned that the Riveras had acquired the land. Her lawyer and a surveyor
informed her that parcels E and G, which she inherited from her father, were identical to Lots 5
and 7 which were conveyed to Cruz and Garcia. She registered adverse claims on the titles
covering Lots 5 and 7. On December 27, 1965 she and the persons to whom she had transferred
portions of parcels E and G filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Caloocan City
against the Riveras, Cruz, Muoz, Garcia, Associated Banking Corporation, PNB and others an
action to quiet title and for damages.
The trial court in its decision declared valid TCT Nos. 141802 to 141855 and 143512
issued to Mrs. Gozon and her co-plaintiffs. It voided TCT No. 112235 issued to the Riveras and
all titles and transactions emanating therefrom insofar as those titles covered the lots embraced in
plaintiffs' titles.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the 1920 title issued to Lapus and the titles derived therefrom should
prevail over the 1963 title issued to the Riveras and the subsequent titles derived from it
Held:
Yes. The title of Lapus and the titles derived therefrom should be given effect. The title of
the Riveras and the titles springing from it are void. Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value.
He validly transmitted to his successors-in-interest his indefeasible title or ownership over the
disputed lots. That title could not be nullified by the issuance 43 years later to other persons of
another title over the same lots due to the failure of the register of deeds to cancel the title
preceding the title issued to Lapuz. This must be so considering that Lapus and his interest
remained in possession of the disputed successors in lots and the rival claimants never possessed
the same.
It is settled that is this jurisdiction the maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is
first in time is preferred in right) is followed in land registration matters.

People of the Philippines vs. Mizpah Reyes
G. R. No. 74226-27 [July 27, 1989] Cortes, J.
Facts:
The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land located in Lipa City
registered in their names under TCT No. T-7471. They were survived by the following children:
the accused Mizpah R. Reyes and the complainants Cristina R. Masikat, Julieta R. Vergara and
Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.
In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the Register of
Deeds of Lipa City that the said property had already been transferred in the name of Mizpah
Reyes under TCT No. T-9885 effected through a notarized deed of sale executed and signed on
by their parents Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo. The deed of sale was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Lipa City on May 26, 1961.
Upon examination of the document, they found that the signatures of their parents were
falsified and that accused also made an untruthful statement that she was single although she was
married. The document was referred by the complainants to the N.B.I. for examination of the
signatures of their parents and a report was returned with the finding that the signature of Julio
Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia Pampo was forged. Upon complaint, the fiscal filed with
the RTC of Batangas, 2 Informations both for falsification of public document, the first for
allegedly making it appear in the notarized deed of sale that Patricia Pampo, the mother of the
accused, participated in the sale of a parcel of land by falsifying Pampo's signature, and the
second for allegedly making an untruthful statement of fact in the deed of sale by stating that
accused was single.
Accused filed a motion to quash both informations on grounds that the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished by prescription of the crime and the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the offense charged and the person of accused because of non-compliance with the pre-
conciliation requirement of P.D. No. 1508. The trial court granted the motion.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the discovery of the crime may be deemed to have taken place from the
time the document was registered with the Register of Deeds, consistent with the rule on
constructive notice
Held:
No. Registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is
constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains.
The Court does not subscribe to the conclusion that the presumptions and rules of
interpretation used in the law on prescription of civil suits, including the rule on constructive
notice, cannot be applied in criminal actions.
The application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91 of the
Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to the accused since the prescriptive
period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed
of sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant case, the notarized deed of sale was
registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a public document
having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten years from May 26, 1961, the
crime for which the accused was charged has prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore,
committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's order quashing the two informations
on the ground of prescription.

Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-40824 [February 23, 1989] Regalado, J.
Facts:
Private respondents, spouses Isabelo R. Racho, together with the spouses Flaviano
Lagasca, executed a deed of mortgage in favor of GSISand subsequently, another deed of
mortgage in connection with two loans granted by the latter in the sums of P 11,500.00 and P
3,000.00, respectively. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 38989 of the
Register of Deed of Quezon City, co-owned by said mortgagor spouses, was given as security
under the aforesaid two deeds.
On July 11, 1961, the Lagasca spouses executed an "Assumption of Mortgage" where
they obligated themselves to assume the aforesaid obligation to the GSIS and to secure the
release of the mortgage covering that portion of the land belonging to herein private respondents
and which was mortgaged to the GSIS.

This undertaking was not fulfilled.
Upon failure of the mortgagors to comply, GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage
and caused the mortgaged property to be sold at public auction.
More than two years thereafter, herein private respondents filed a complaint against the
petitioner and the Lagasca spouses in the former Court of First Instance of Quezon City, praying
that the extrajudicial foreclosure be declared null and void. It was further prayed that they be
allowed to recover said property, and/or the GSIS be ordered to pay them the value thereof,
and/or they be allowed to repurchase the land.
Private respondents alleged that they signed the mortgage contracts not as sureties or
guarantors for the Lagasca spouses but they merely gave their common property to the said co-
owners who were solely benefited by the loans from the GSIS.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for failure to establish a cause
of action. However, such decision was reversed by the respondent Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents are liable under the mortgage contract
Held:
Yes. Contrary to the holding of the respondent court, it cannot be said that private
respondents are without liability under the aforesaid mortgage contracts.
So long as valid consent was given, the fact that the loans were solely for the benefit of
the Lagasca spouses would not invalidate the mortgage with respect to private respondents' share
in the property. In consenting thereto, their share in the property shall nevertheless secure and
respond for the performance of the principal obligation. The parties to the mortgage could not
have intended that the same would apply only to the aliquot portion of the Lagasca spouses in the
property, otherwise the consent of the private respondents would not have been required.
The supposed requirement of prior demand would not matter since the mortgage
contracts created obligations with specific terms for the compliance thereof. The facts further
show that the private respondents expressly bound themselves as solidary debtors in the
promissory note hereinbefore quoted.
On the extrajudicial foreclosure effected by GSIS, respondent court erred that lack of
notice to the private respondents of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale impairs the validity thereof.
There is no showing that the foregoing requirement on notice was not complied with in the
foreclosure sale complained of .
The respondent court erred in annulling the mortgage insofar as it affected the share of
private respondents or in directing reconveyance of their property or the payment of the value
thereof Indubitably, whether or not private respondents herein benefited from the loan, the
mortgage and the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were valid.

Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 102377 [July 5, 1996] Torres, Jr., J.
Facts:
Spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of residential land
located in Antipolo, Rizal to the petitioners on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to
Sell. The property was registered in the names of the Uychocde spouses. Sajonas couple caused
the annotation of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject
property, which was inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the
Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas
couple. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after.
Domingo Pilares (defendant-appellant) filed a case for collection of sum of money
against Ernesto Uychocde. A Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties in the said
case under which Ernesto Uychocde acknowledged his monetary obligation to Domingo Pilares.
When Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking, Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ
of execution to which the court granted. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued by the CFI
of Quezon City where the civil case was pending. Pursuant to the order of execution, a notice of
levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985 where defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of
Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina
and the same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.
When the deed of absolute sale was registered, TCT No. N-79073 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was issued in the name of the Sajonas couple. The notice of
levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title. Sajonas
couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon city, hence the auction sale of the
subject property did not push through as scheduled.
Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon
Pilares. Despite said demand, Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation. In view
thereof, petitioners filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal against Domingo
Pilares, the judgment creditor of the Uychocdes.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Sajonas couple, and ordered the
cancellation of the Notice of Levy from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.
On appeal, appellate court reversed the lower court's decision, and upheld the annotation
of the levy on execution on the certificate of title.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners has a better right over the property in question
Held:
Yes. The adverse claim provision in Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496)
does not provide for a period of effectivity of the annotation of an adverse claim. P.D. No. 1529,
however, now specifically provides for only 30 days. If the intention of the law was for the
adverse claim to remain effective until cancelled by petition of the interested party, then said
provision in P.D. No. 1529 stating the period of effectivity would not have been inserted in the
law.
Since the adverse claim was annotated on August 27, 1984, it was effective only until
September 26, 1984. Hence, when the defendant sheriff annotated the notice of levy on
execution on February 12, 1985, said adverse claim was already ineffective. It cannot be said that
actual or prior knowledge of the existence of the adverse claim on the Uychocdes' title is
equivalent to registration inasmuch as the adverse claim was already ineffective when the notice
of levy on execution was annotated. Thus, the act of defendant sheriff in annotating the notice of
levy on execution was proper and justified.
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without
qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the
remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure
designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of
such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now
P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing
with said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the
registered owner thereof.

Benita Salao, et al. vs. Juan Salao, et al.
G.R. No. L-26699 [March 16, 1976] Aquino, J.
Facts:
Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only
child. Valentin Salao. There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties formed part of
Manuel Salao's estate, if any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After her death, her estate was
administered by her daughter Ambrosia.
It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized on
May 22, 1919. The deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her three children,
Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in representation of his
deceased father.
The documentary evidence proves that prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two
children, Juan and Ambrosia, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pampanga, in their names for a 47 hectare fishpond. It is also known as Lot No. 540 of the
Hermosa cadastre because that part of Lubao later became a part of Bataan.
The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case.
Juan and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the fishpond business. Where they obtained
the capital is not shown in any documentary evidence. Plaintiffs' version is that Valentin Salao
and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the funds used were the earnings of
the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were used in the
acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no documentary evidence to support that theory.
On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted of lands
purchased by Juan and Ambrosia in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908.
After Juan and Ambrosia secured a Torrens title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911 they
exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao.
On December 1, 1911 Ambrosia Salao sold under pacto de retro for P800 the Calunuran
fishpond to Vicente Villongco. The period of redemption was one year. In the deed of sale
Ambrosia confirmed that she and her brother Juan were the dueos proindivisos of the
said pesqueria. On December 7, 1911 Villongco, the vendee a retro, conveyed the same fishpond
to Ambrosia by way of lease.
After the fishpond was redeemed from Villongco, Ambrosia and Juan sold it under pacto
de retro to Eligio Naval. The period of redemption was also one year. The fishpond was later
redeemed and Naval reconveyed it to the vendors a retro in a document.
The Calunuran fishpond has an area of 479,205 square meters and that it was claimed by
Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao, while the Pinanganacan fishpond (subsequently acquired by
Juan and Ambrosia) has an area of 975,952 square meters (Exh. 22).
Ambrosia Salao bought from the heirs of Engracio Santiago a parcel of swampland
planted to bacawan and nipa.
The record of Civil Case No. 136, General Land Registration Office Record No. 12144,
Court of First Instance of Pampanga shows that Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao filed an
application for the registration of that land in their names.
Judge Moir ordered the issuance of a decree for the said land. The decree was issued on
February 21, 1917. On March 12, 1917 Original Certificate of Title No. 472 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pampanga was issued in the names of Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao.
The Pinanganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the Hermosa
cadastre. It adjoins the Calunuran fishpond.
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his nephew, Valentin Salao, died. The intestate estate of Valentin
Salao was partitioned extrajudiciallybetween his two daughters, Benita Salao-Marcelo and
Victorina Salao-Alcuriza. His estate consisted of the two fishponds which he had inherited in
1918 from his grandmother, Valentina Ignacio.
Ambrosia Salao donated to her grandniece, plaintiff Benita Salao. As donee Benita Salao
signed the deed of donation.
On that occasion she could have asked Ambrosia Salao to deliver to her and to the
children of her sister, Victorina, the Calunuran fishpond if it were true that it was held in trust by
Ambrosia as the share of Benita's father in the alleged joint venture.
But she did not make any such demand. It was only after Ambrosia Salao's death that she
thought of filing an action for the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond which was allegedly
held in trust and which had become the sole property of Juan Salao y Santiago (Juani).
During the Japanese occupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao's death, she
donated her one-half proindiviso share in the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S.
Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time she was living with Juani's family. He was already the owner of the
the other half of the said fishponds, having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli)
The deed of denotion included other pieces of real property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved
for herself the usufruct over the said properties during her lifetime.
The said deed of donation was registered only on April 5, 1950.
The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter informed Juan
S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds and that when Juani took
possession thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita and Victorina's children their one-third
share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not have any
interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt
Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the
donee of Ambrosias one-half share.
Benita Salao and her nephews and niece asked for the annulment of the donation to Juan
S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salaos
supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y.
Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiffs action for reconveyance had already prescribed
Held:
Yes. Reconveyance had already prescribed. Plaintiffs action is clearly barred by
prescription or laches.
Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust
in this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten year.
The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its
reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the
lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their predecessor-
in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights if they had any rights at all. Vigilanti prospiciunt
jura or the law protects him who is watchful of his rights.
Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit in the
claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights most strongly when they are
threatened or invaded. Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to
enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances,
be destructive of the right itself.
Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of
the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer to Pass upon the validity of the donation made by
Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds The plaintiffs
have no right and personality to assail that donation.
Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional
rights to Ambrosias share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her
nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died,
would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao,
the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia
since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a
grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza.

Teodoro Almirol vs. Register of Deeds of Agusan
G.R. No. L-22486 [March 20, 1968] Castro, J.
Facts:
Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land covered by original
certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo."
Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan
City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title.
Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds that Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is considered conjugal property; the sale of a conjugal property
acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the
document; but since, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband
cannot dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a
petition for mandamus , to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue
to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a
ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that he has no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In its resolution, the lower court, declaring that mandamus does not lie because the
adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in
question
Held:
No. Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a
Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction.
The register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from
exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to
register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he
is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument
presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the
question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an
order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.
The court a quo correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus. Section 4 of Republic
Act 1151 provides that "where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds,
the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall
"enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which shall be
"conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be
resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.