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For reasons of economy, this document is printed in a limited number. Delegates are
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INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION


IMO

E


SUB-COMMITTEE ON DANGEROUS
GOODS, SOLID CARGOES AND
CONTAINERS
11th session
Agenda item 6
DSC 11/6/6
7 July 2006
Original: FRENCH


CASUALTY AND INCIDENT REPORTS AND ANALYSIS

Total loss of the bulk carrier Adamandas

Submitted by France


SUMMARY

Executive summary:

Pursuant to the decision of MSC 76 and in accordance with document
DSC.1/Circ.36, the Sub-Committee is invited to consider the main
recommendations in the final report of the investigation into the total
loss of the bulk carrier Adamandas and, having done so, widen the
ongoing debate on the transport of direct reduced iron (DRI) to
include the various forms in which DRI may be carried

Action to be taken: Paragraphs 6 and 7

Related documents: MSC 76/23, paragraphs 13.12 to 13.16; DSC 10/17, paragraphs 4.25
to 4.29; DSC.1/Circ.36 and DSC 11/INF.3


1 Pursuant to the decision taken by MSC 76, the DSC Sub-Committee is authorized to
participate in the consideration of reports of investigations into incidents involving goods falling
within its sphere of competence. Hence the submission of the current document, which focuses
on the main recommendations in the final report of the investigation into the total loss of the bulk
carrier Adamandas on 22 September 2003 off Reunion Island, caused by re-oxidation of a cargo
of direct reduced iron. The full report is available in document DSC 11/INF.3.

2 The current document is also intended as a contribution to the ongoing debate concerning
conditions for the carriage of direct reduced iron (DRI). Discussion of this matter began during
DSC 10 following the accident to the m.v. Ythan (MSC 79/12/1) while it was carrying DRI fines;
Member Governments and the industry were invited to provide IMO with any useful information
concerning safe handling and transport of this product (DSC.1/Circ.36).

Circumstances of the incident

3 On 6 August 2003 the bulk carrier Adamandas, sailing under the Cypriot flag, left
Trinidad for Indonesia carrying 21,000 tonnes of DRI pellets. The entire cargo was blanketed
with nitrogen. During the voyage, just before arrival at Durban, the readings for oxygen and
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hydrogen content showed a significant increase in the concentrations of those two gases in
different holds. Natural ventilation of hold No.2 was carried out.

On 29 August, during the stopover at Durban, despite the ventilation the temperature in
hold No.2 reached 250C. It was decided to make several injections of nitrogen into hold No.2.

On 5 September, with the temperatures and levels of hydrogen and oxygen having been
stable for 24 hours, the ship sailed from Durban, although the South African maritime authorities
had advised that it should wait a few more days.

On 9 September, with the temperature in hold No.2 now at 380C, the cargo was sprayed
with fresh water. Although the temperature went down, hydrogen emission increased.

On 11 September 2003, while 65 miles south of Reunion Island, the Adamandas asked
to put in at Reunion Island and was given permission to come to the anchorage.

Over the next few days the situation on board worsened, with the temperature
reaching 619C. On 21 September the whole crew was evacuated and the Adamandas was
towed away from the coast to a point still within French-controlled territorial waters. In the late
evening, following a long meeting among all the interested parties, orders were given to destroy
and sink the ship, owing to the constantly increasing risk of an explosion caused by build-up of
hydrogen in the holds. The operation was carried out on the morning of 22 September.

Summary of the investigations conclusions

4 According to the report by the French Marine Accident Investigation Office (BEAmer), it
seems that the process which triggered the increase in hold temperature and the release of
hydrogen was probably started by the infiltration of seawater into the cargo during the voyage,
although the loading of a partially wet cargo cannot be ruled out. The report states that
deficiencies in the watertightness of the hatch covers and deck caused the infiltration and also
contributed to inerting loss.

The investigators also considered the way in which the incident was handled, beginning at
the time when the first signs of a temperature increase became apparent, and noted the following:

1. The initial measures taken were insufficient to stifle the reaction; consideration
should have been given to unloading the affected part of the cargo and flooding it
during the stopover at Durban;

.2 Spraying fresh water over the cargo once the reaction had started again could be
considered a contributory factor to the accident;

.3 This accident was not an isolated case, other ships carrying similar cargoes having
suffered explosions involving loss of life and total loss of the vessel. In this regard,
the following were mentioned:

- the explosion on 25 August 1999 in two holds of the bulk carrier Karteria,
a vessel of 34,900 dwt flying the Maltese flag and carrying a mixture of jigged
DRI particles and iron ore pellets, which led to the death of two seafarers and
badly damaged the ship;
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- the chain of explosions on board the mv Ythan, resulting in the death of the
master and in five crew members being reported as missing.

Recommendations of the investigation report affecting the DSC Sub-Committee

5 The main recommendations are as follows:

.1 Consultations should be carried out among DRI professionals with the aim of
decreasing the products reactivity and making it safer for carriage by sea; a DRI
contingency plan should be formulated to outline any special measures which
need to be taken;

.2 Special precautions should be taken during storage of DRI to ensure that the
condition of the product is continuously checked prior to transportation;

.3 Particular attention should be paid to the watertightness of holds and to ensuring
that ships carrying DRI are fitted with a nitrogen generator to top up the holds at
intervals during the voyage;

.4 Ships carrying DRI should be provided with a complete installation for reliably
measuring temperature and determining oxygen and hydrogen content, and their
deck and hold equipment should be fitted with systems providing adequate
protection against explosion;

.5 The cargo should be monitored at all times, with increased vigilance once the
temperature reaches 60C;

.6 A cargo in which a reaction has started should be unloaded as quickly as possible;
the vessel concerned should not be permitted to sail until the affected part of the
cargo has been unloaded;

.7 The BC Code should define more clearly:

- the different types of DRI, why they are dangerous and what precautions
should be taken in their handling and transportation;
- conditions to be avoided and products that trigger dangerous reactions;
- suitability criteria for vessels carrying this type of cargo;
- what action to take in the event of a reaction and what must be avoided. In this
connection, it is recommended that master and crew should be appropriately
informed about safe handling of this product and what safety measures must
be taken in the event of a reaction and of hydrogen emission;
`
.8 The inclusion of DRI particles or fines in homogeneous cargoes of briquettes or
pellets should be prohibited.

Proposals concerning the BC Code

6 Accordingly, and taking into account the recommendations mentioned in paragraph 5,
France proposes the following:
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.1 The ongoing discussions on the subject of formulating an entry on DRI fines for
inclusion in the BC Code should also embrace a revision of paragraphs A and B
on DRI as they currently appear in the Code.

.2 The provisions of existing paragraphs A and B should be revised in the light of the
ongoing discussions on DRI fines and the information contained in this document.
France has noted that the carriage of DRI in whatever form always involves the
presence of a more or less sizeable proportion of fines, and that the risks posed by
the fines are thus the same as those presented by the other types of DRI. France
would accordingly like to see the provisions relating to fines made applicable to
the other types of DRI.

.3 The provisions on inerting during transport should be made applicable to all forms
of DRI, as recommended in the investigation report. To this end, France proposes
that vessels which carry DRI and fines should be provided with a nitrogen
generator. France also proposes that the paragraphs under consideration should
stipulate topping-up of the nitrogen in holds during the voyage in order to
compensate for any leaks, as well as careful monitoring of the watertightness in
holds both prior to transportation and at regular intervals during the voyage.

.4 The provisions on contingency measures should be revised so that they clearly
state that consideration should be given to unloading as soon as possible the part
of the cargo in which a reaction has started, and that the relevant authorities
should not allow the vessel to sail until the affected part of the cargo has been
unloaded.

Action to be taken by the Sub-Committee

7 The Sub-Committee is invited to consider the proposals made in paragraph 6 and to take
the action it deems appropriate.


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