Leopoldo Nuti

The Role Model? Italy and US Armed Forces, 1945-1963

*
(in U.S. Forces in Europe: the early years, ed. S Duke and W. Krieger, Boulder, Colorado, 1!)
In November 1957, at the end of an inspection of U militar! installations in "urope, U
#ssistant ecretar! of $efense %ran& Nash noted that 'the usual irritations associated (ith the
presence of U forces on forei)n countries have been conspicuousl! absent in Ital!', to the point
that 'the methods of achievin) this success in Ital! ma! (ell be studied for adaptation (herever
possible in other areas'*(
*
) # repetition of this success, ho(ever, (as hi)hl! improbable, as the
stor! of the deplo!ment of U forces in Ital! sho(s an almost unparalleled inte)ration bet(een
the strate)ic needs of the United tates and the Italian (illin)ness to )o a lon) (a! to
accomodate them* In order to e+plain ho( this came about, this essa! anal!,es three phases of
U militar! presence in Ital!- 1) the shrin&in) presence of the occupation troops, .a! 19/5 0
$ecember 19/7* 1his (as the time (hen the conceptual basis of the relationship (ere developed*
2) # transitional phase, (hich can be defined as the search for cooperation, 19/3 0195/* $urin)
these !ears a militar! relationship bet(een Ital! and the United tates (as formali,ed b! the
comin) into e+istence of the #tlantic #lliance, and some attempts (ere made to establish a
plannin) cooperation (ith the #llied occupation troops stationed in #ustria and in the stillborn
%ree 1erritor! of 1rieste* 1his phase (as also characterised b! the si)nature of a number of
a)reements related to the use of Italian militar! facilities b! the U armed forces* 4) 1he nuclear
* * I (ish to e+press m! than&s to 5olf)an) chl6r for his comments on an earl! version of this paper, and to
.ichael 7affe for both his (illin)ness to discuss (ith me the database of the Nuclear 8istor! 9ro)ram and some
useful information about the timin) of the deplo!ment of U nuclear (arheads in "urope*
* * United tates :verseas .ilitar! ;ases, <eport to the 9resident b! %ranc& =* Nash* =ountr! tudies- Ital!,
November 1957, in $eclassified $ocuments <eference !stem ($$<), 199> ? 223/*
comebac&, 1955019@4, (hen U units eAuipped (ith nuclear deliver! means (ere stationed in
the Northeastern part of the countr!*
(
) 1he article dedicates particular attention to this episode as
it is hi)hl! e+plicative of the importance attached b! the Italian )overnment and the Italian
militar! even to a s!mbolic presence of U troops on Italian soil*
1) # conceptual bac&)round*
8istories of contemporar! Ital! )enerall! be)in their narration since the si)nature of the
armistice bet(een Ital! and the #llied po(ers on eptember 4, 19/4, as that date is assumed as a
conceptual (atershed of fundamental importance to an! understandin) of post(ar Italian
policies* #mon) its man! conseAuences, in fact, the armistice also sanctioned the final demise of
the attempt to assert Ital!Bs presence in the international arena b! the use of force* 1he ma)nitude
of the disaster in 19/4 seemin)l! persuaded the ne+t )eneration of Italian polic!ma&ers that
never a)ain should Ital! tr! to emphasi,e militar! force as a &e! element of its forei)n polic!*
1he impact of the t(o !ears of 'cobelli)erence' (hich follo(ed the armisitice (as also a
deep and lastin) one* 1he collapse of Italian institutions after the armistice (as announced on
eptember 3 did not spare the countr!Bs militar! structure* In spite of the man! brave attempts to
or)ani,e centers of resistance a)ainst the Cerman reaction, most militar! units either disbanded
or (ere captured and transferred to 9:5 camps in Cerman!* 5hat (as left of the Italian armed
forces stru))led to rebuild a to&en force in order both to continue the (ar alon)side the #llies,
and create a core around (hich a post(ar reconstruction could be or)anised* Italian militar!
leaders, ho(ever, Auic&l! reali,ed that at least in the short term forei)n help (as crucial to this
(19@4 is here assumed as a possible endline of convenience mainl! because of a si)nificant reduction in the number
of U troops deplo!ed in Italian territor!, but should not be interpreted as havin) an! other particular meanin)* ee
infra, section 4*
endeavour, and pleaded for #llied militar! assistance* 1his (as eventuall! )ranted in 19//, and
allo(ed the Italian )overnment in the part of the countr! under #llied occupation to or)ani,e a
small #rm! and an #ir %orce, eAuipped and supplied mostl! (ith #llied material*
(
)
1he armistice and the cobelli)erence had therefore a t(ofold conseAuence on Italian
militar! thin&in), as the! revealed both Ital!Bs po(erlessness and a possible solution to the
countr!Bs predicament* %irst, the Italian militar! leadership (as persuaded b! this turn of events
that the post(ar reconstruction of the armed forces (as possible onl! if the United tates and
Creat ;ritain (ould continue to provide the necessar! eAuipment*
(
) "Auall! important (as the
second conclusion, namel! that in the future Ital! could not resist an! maDor a))ression (ithout
the help of po(erful allies* Until the =old (ar split "urope in t(o opposin) camps, Italian
Ceneral taff documents referred, some(hat va)uel!, to the United Nations as to the
or)ani,ation (hich (ould ultimatel! )uarantee the countr!Bs securit! in a maDor militar!
confrontation* It (as clear, ho(ever, that it (as the ;ritish, and even more the #merican, help
that the Italian militar! (ere loo&in) for*
(
)
#t the same time, #llied militar! leaders in Ital! Auic&l! )rasped the importance of
helpin) Ital! to rebuild her armed forces and of retainin) #llied forces in the peninsula until the
Italian )overnment could stand on its o(n feet* upreme #llied =ommander in the
(%or the relationship (ith the #llies see Norman Eo)an, Ital! and the #llies (=ambrid)e- =ambrid)e Universit!
9ress, 195@)F $avid "ll(ood, Ital! 19/4019/5 (Leicester- Leicester Universit! 9ress, 1935)F Games "* .iller 1he
United tates and Ital!, 19/>0195>* 1he 9olitics and $iplomac! of tabili,ation (=hapel 8ill- Universit! of North
=arolina, 193@)* %or the ori)ins of militar! cooperation see mine LBesercito italiano nel secondo dopo)uerra, 19/50
195>* La sua ricostru,ione e lBassisten,a militare alleata (<ome- Ufficio torico tato .a))iore "sercito, 1939),
chapter 1*
(#ccordin) to Italian militar! thin&in) in 19/50/@, Ital! could and should endo( itself (ith limited armed forces,
(hich (ould enable her to cope (ith small0scale militar! threats- the necessar! eAuipment for these forces, ho(ever,
could come onl! from #llied militar! assistance, since the (ar0torn Italian econom! had to concentrate on the more
ur)ent priorit! of rebuildin) the nationBs &e! activities*
(%or a more detailed anal!sis of post(ar Italian militar! thin&in), see Nuti, LBesercito italiano, cit*, pp* /7053*
.editerranean %ield .arshal 8arold #le+ander and =hief #llied =ommissioner <ear #dmiral
"ller! 5* tone repeatedl! stressed the necessit! of maintainin) a lar)e number of #llied
occupation troops until a viable, stable democratic )overnment could be established* In the
turbulent political atmosphere of the earl! post(ar months, (ith 7u)oslavia threatenin) to ta&e
over 1rieste and the attitude of the former =ommunist partisans an un&no(n variable, #llied
troops could pla! a crucial role in steerin) Ital! in the desired direction (hen she mi)ht be at the
crossroads bet(een 'democrac! and a ne( totalitarianism'*
(
) Nevertheless this call for
maintainin) a stron) militar! posture and ma&in) Ital!
'
a bul(ar& of democrac!' in the
.editerranean contrasted sharpl! (ith pre0established demobili,ation plans* 1hus the
su))estions of the #llied authorities in Ital! (ere lar)el! unheeded, and the number of #llied
occupation troops (as drasticall! reduced bet(een .a! 19/5 and the ummer of 19/7* #lread!
b! late 19/5 onl! the 5@th ;ritish division and the U 33th infantr! division (ere left in Ital!,
(ith the 9olish =orps soon to be redeplo!ed in Creat ;ritain*
(
)
1he importance of the remainin) #llied occupation troops, ho(ever, became evident to
all parties concerned in the ummer of 19/@* #s the 9aris 9eace conference dra))ed on (ithout
bein) able to produce a solution for the contested area of 1rieste, the tension around the cit! rose
Auic&l!* 5hen t(o #merican planes (ere shot do(n b! some tri))er0happ! Gu)oslav soldiers, a
militar! sho(do(n in the area seemed imminent* 1he upreme #llied =ommander in the
.editerranean, .aDor Ceneral ir 5illiam $* .or)an, had alread! be)un plannin) #llied
(%uture 9olic! to(ard Ital!, memorandum b! =hief =ommissioner "ller! tone, Gune 24, 19/5, in %orei)n <elations
of the United tates (%<U), =onference of ;erlin (9otsdam) 19/5, vol*I, pp*@330@9/*
(1he 9olish =orps, based on t(o divisions and an armoured bri)ade, caused some embarassment to the #llies as
most of its trooos refused to return to an increasin)l! =ommunist 9oland* %or more information about #llied
demobili,ation plans, see the e+chan)e of letters bet(een =hurchill and %. #le+ander, on Gune 17 19/5, in 9ublic
<ecord :ffice (9<:), 5ar :ffice, 194H23>*
reactions for such a contin)enc!, and there is little doubt that the presence of the #llied troops
(as crucial in preventin) a further deterioration of the situation*
(
) In spite of the fact that #llied
stren)th (as hardl! sufficient to deter maDor a))ression (as the earl! #merican (ar plans
confirm) the Italian #rm! taff Auic&l! concluded that their presence on Italian soil made limited
a))ressions unli&el! because it mi)ht tri))er a maDor confrontation (hich (ould also involve the
#llies*
(
)
#s for the reconstruction of the Italian armed forces, Ital! suffered some militar!
restrictions that (ere imposed on her b! the peace treat! si)ned on %ebruar! 1>, 19/7*
Nevertheless, durin) the period bet(een 19/5 and 19/7 the Italian services survived mainl!
throu)h the provision of militar! surplus supplied b! the ;ritish and #merican occupation
troops* 1he upreme #llied =ommander in the .editerranean had feared (idespread
disturbances of public order at the end of the (ar, if not an all0out revolutionar! uprisin) of the
Cree& &ind, and in order to spare the #llied troops from havin) to enforce la( and order, he had
as&ed for the authori,ation to rearm the Italian arm!, so as to allo( it to cope (ith internal
turmoil* # == decision of late 19/5 authorised the upreme #llied =ommander in the
( 1he #=."$ Auic&l! realised the importance of militar! cooperation (ith the armed forces of Ital! if he had to
resist a Gu)oslav a))ression* In Gune 19/@, therefore, Ceneral .or)an formall! reAuested the == authorisation for
inte)rated plannin), (hich (as )ranted, (ith some dela!, later on durin) the !ear* #=."$ to == (N#% 11@>),
Use of Italian #rm! in the "vent of 8ostilities in North "ast Ital!, Gune 19, 19/@, in N#5, <ecord Croup 1@5, #;=
>91*711 Ital! (5 #pril 19//), ec*2*
(1he first post(ar #merican plan related to the Italian peninsula (as based on the strate)ic concept set forth in the
)eneral plan '9incher', and (as codenamed '=oc&spur'- see G59= /@/H1, '=oc&spur' (2> $ecember 19/@), in
teven 1* <oss and $avid #lan <osenber) (eds*), #mericaBs 9lans for 5ar #)ainst the oviet Union, 19/50195>,
vol*4, 9incher- =ampai)n 9lans, 9art 1 (London, Ne( 7or&- Carland 1939)* Its dire conclusions envisa)ed the
eventual evacuation of the (hole peninsula and the retention of icil! alone* %or an Italian militar! speculation of the
possibilit! of a Gu)oslav a))ression in 19/@, see the stud! b! the :peration $ivision of the Italian #rm! taff, =olpo
di mano Du)oslavo su 1rieste, in #U." (#rchivio Ufficio torico tato .a))iore "sercito), IH5 (=arte))io
=lassificato Ufficio :pera,ioni), 19/@*
.editerranean to dispose of #llied surplus material to help rebuildin) the Italian #rm!*
(
)
1hus the !ears 19/5019/7 shaped the attitude of the Italian militar! to(ards the #llies
(and viceversa)* #lthou)h a tan)ible evidence of the Italian defeat, the occupation troops
provided the onl! available )uarantee that Ital! (ould not be attac&ed b! Gu)oslavia in an attempt
to solve the issue of 1rieste b! force*
(
) 9erhaps even more important (as their role in preventin)
a possible =ommunist insurrection* In spite of the decision to rearm the Italian arm!, in fact, it
(as undoubtedl! the #llied militar! presence (hich ultimatel! deterred an! lar)e scale
disturbance of public order, let alone an insurrection*
1he 9eace 1reat! bet(een Ital! and the #llied po(ers (as eventuall! si)ned on %ebruar!
1>, 19/7, and ratified b! all parties concerned b! eptember 15* 1his entailed the (ithdra(al of
all the occupation troops (ithin 9> da!s, and the #llies actuall! planned to complete it b! earl!
$ecember*
(
) $urin) the interval bet(een the si)nature of the treat! and its ratification, ho(ever,
it seemed possible that some of the )overnments (ho had si)ned the treat!, and in particular the
Gu)oslav )overnment, mi)ht not ratif! it, and that there mi)ht occur an 'indefinite dela!' in the
(1he upreme #llied =ommander in the .editerranean to the =ombined =hiefs of taff, #u)ust 4 (N#% 1>51) and
#u)ust 22 (N#% 1>59) 19/5F == to #=."$ (%#N @21), eptember 4>, 19/5, in N#5, <C 1@5, #;= /2> Ital!
(4> :ct*19/4), ec 10;*
(:n 1rieste, see- $ie)o $e =astro, La Auestione di 1rieste- lBa,ione politica e diplomatica italiana dal 19/4 al 195/,
2 voll*, 1rieste, LIN1, 1931F #nton Ciulio deB <obertis, Le )randi poten,e e il confine )iuliano, 19/1019/9, ;ari,
Later,a, 1934F Gean0;aptiste $uroselle, Le =onflit de 1rieste, 19/40195/ ;russels, Institut de ociolo)ie de
lBUniversitI Libre de ;ru+elles, 19@@F ;o)dan Nova&, 1rieste 19/10195/*1he "thnic, 9olitical and Ideolo)ical
tru))le, =hica)o, Universit! of =hica)o 9ress, 197>F Ciampaolo Jaldevit, La Auestione di 1rieste 19/10195/-
9olitica interna,ionale e con testo loca le , .ilano, #n)eli 193@F <oberto C*<abel, ;et(een "ast and 5est* 1rieste,
the United tates, and the =old 5ar, 19/10195/, $urham, $u&e Universit! 9ress, 1933*
(;! mid019/7 U forces in Ital! proper (i*e*, not countin) those deplo!ed in 1rieste), amounted to one tan&
battalion (the 752nd) and one infantr! division (the 33th), (hile the ;ritish had si+ tactical units (unbri)aded infantr!
battalions) for a total of 5*>>> men, and suppl! and amministrative units for a total of 7*3>>, plus a militar! mission
of about 5>> men* %or the data about U troops, see 8ans Gur)en chraut ((ith Goan $* 8efferman, #le+ander .*
Earber, 9hillip #* Eerber and .ichael $* 7affe), 1he United tates #rm! in "urope, 19/501955 (Nuclear 8istor!
9ro)ram, 199>)*F for the data about the ;ritish troops, <eport b! the Goint Intelli)ence =ommittee to the G= on
"stimates of the ituation on Creece and Ital!, '"stimates of the situations in Creece and Ital!', in N#5, <C 1@5,
#*;*=* 47>*5 Creece Ital! (2> #u) /7) (ect 10#)*
conclusion of the peace settlement* #s tension (ith ;el)rade )re( a)ain in the middle of the
ummer, the ;ritish embass! in 5ashin)ton Auietl! informed the tate $epartment that for
financial and manpo(er reasons the ;ritish )overnment must immediatel! (ithdra( all of its
troops from Creece and Ital!* 1he ;ritish initiative aroused an outcr! of protest amon) the U
militar! in the field and at the tate $epartment, (hich noted that the presence of #llied troops
in Ital! had prevented a =ommunist uprisin) supported b! Gu)oslavia, and that 'the removal of
present forces in Ital! (ould facilitate Gu)oslav assistance to =ommunists in Ital! if the latter
should attempt a coup a)ainst the Italian )overnment'* ubseAuentl!, ho(ever, the U concluded
that 'the (ithdra(al (ould not affect the situation in Ital! and in Jene,ia Ciulia to a substantial
de)ree', but the! also estimated that it (ould 'place on the United tates the entire burden of
providin) a stabili,in) influence on the Italian and Cree& )overnments'*
(
) 1he ratification of the
peace treat! b! the Gu)oslav )overnment on #u)ust 15 eventuall! brou)ht the creepin) crisis to
an end, but not (ithout havin) made clear to the #merican )overnment the vacuum of po(er that
the (ithdra(al of the occupation troops (ould create* # =IC special evaluation concluded that
the
(ithdra(al (ould seriousl! affect U interests and securit! in Ital! b!- a)thro(in)
open to =ommunist pressure the important area of Northern Ital! (here the
pro+imit! of Gu)oslav =ommunists ma&es it possible for the U< to create a
situation on the border similar to that prevailin) in Northern CreeceF and b)
leavin) the entire countr! and the (ea& $e Casperi )overnment ill0prepared to
cope (ith the po(erful =ommunist part! in the national elections scheduled for
#pril 19/3*
(
)
(<eport b! the Goint Intelli)ence =ommittee to the G= on "stimates of the ituation on Creece and Ital!,
'"stimates of the situations in Creece and Ital!', in N#5, <C 1@5, #*;*=* 47>*5 Creece Ital! (2> #u) /7) (ect 10
#)*
(=onseAuences of #llied 1roop 5ithdra(als from Ital!, =entral Intelli)ence Croup pecial evaluation no* 4>, 1@
eptember 19/7, in $eclassified $ocuments <eference !stem, ($$<) 197@, 1@ $*
%or the Italian )overnment to openl! reAuest the continued presence of the occupation
troops '(ould amount to political suicide', the document continued, and the onl! realistic
alternatives (ere seen in the stren)thenin) of the Italian securit! forces and in the reachin) of an
a)reement (hich (ould allo( the U to use certain port and rail(a! facilities 'in order that
maintenance and suppl! troops ma! protect the lines of communication from the %ree 1erritor!
of 1rieste to the U ,one KinL #ustria'* It (as ar)ued b! the =IC that 'the presence of these
troops K****L (ould lend the moral support )reatl! needed b! the anti0=ommunist forces, and
(ould )reatl! stren)then the non0=ommunist Italian Covernment b! enablin) it to cope (ith the
critical period leadin) to the national elections'* #s a stop0)ap measure, the U )overnment
decided to e+amine the opportunit! of stren)thenin) the Italian armed forces (ith a pro)ram of
militar! assistance, and shortl! after the conclusion of the ratification process, an #merican
militar! mission under =olonel =harles <* ;athurst toured Ital! to find out ho( to bolster the
Italian )overnment and stren)then its militar! posture*
(
)
1he si)nificance of the (ithdra(al (as clear for the Italian )overnment as (ell* #s the
domestic political situation had been Auic&l! deterioratin) since the late sprin) of 19/7, the
Italian 9rime .inister, #lcide $e Casperi, (as becomin) more and more concerned about (hat
(ould happen after the #llied troops (ere )one* ;! earl! $ecember, therefore, he made a stron)
plea for the continuation of #llied militar! assistance in order to enable the Italian securit! forces
to cope (ith an! internal uprisin), and also as&ed the #llies to dela! the departure of the
occupation troops to the last possible moment*
(
) #t midni)ht of $ecember 1/, 19/7, (hen the
(U .ilitar! #ssistance to Ital!* <eport b! the U #rm! urve! Croup to Ital!, :ctober 14, 19/7, in N#5, <C
419, 9 and : >91 Ital! 1 (:ct 14, 19/7), ec* 1, =ase 1, 9art 1*
(Note of <ecord, $ela! in $eparture of U %orces from .1:, November 23, 19/7, in N#5, r) 419, 9 and : 43/
(ec* JII), =ases 91H1>4* 1he plea for militar! assistance to the Italian securit! forces in 1he #mbassador in <ome
(Dames $unn) to the tate $epartment, $ecember 7, 19/7, in %<U, 19/3, vol* III, pp*7430749*
final departure of the occupation troops eventuall! occurred, it (as sta)ed as a spectacular
demonstration meant to impress upon the Italian =ommunists the mi)ht and stren)th of the
#llies*
(
)
2) Inte)rated plannin) and bases a)reements*
#fter the departure of the occupation troops, the Italian militar! placed )reat importance
on coordinatin) their defensive plannin) (ith the #llied forces deplo!ed both in #ustria and the
%ree 1erritor! of 1rieste* 5ithout the ph!sical counterinsurance provided b! the presence of
;ritish and #merican soldiers on Italian soil, cooperation (ith 5estern forces stationed in
nearb! countries (as re)arded as necessar! not onl! because of the militar! support the! could
provide in case of an emer)enc!, but also because it seemed to )uarantee #llied assistance in a
broader sense*
(
) 1he limited si,e of the occupation troops, that never amounted to more than a
handful of units, seems to confirm that the Italians appreciated this cooperation for its political,
more than for its strictl! militar!, conseAuences*
(
) 1hese 'relativel! minor strate)ic advanta)es
'
(Lovett to <o!al, November 23, 19/7, in %<U, 19/3, vol* III, p*729* :n that ver! da! the U =on)ress passed a
bill providin) Interim #id for %rance and Ital! as a stop0)ap measure before the .arshall 9lan be)un to be
implemented- .iller, 1he United tates and Ital!, cit*, p*24@*
(:ffice of the .ilitar! #ttache, #merican "mbass! in <ome, to $irector of Intelli)ence, CU#, $ept* of the
#rm!- Italian Ceneral taff tudies, %unction of Ital! in the #n)lo0#merican trate)ic 9lan %or the .editerranean,
23 #pril 19/3, in N#5, <C 419, 9 and : >91 Ital! 1, ;o+ 17 0 1ab 21 0 1#1* ($ocument released throu)h the
%:I#)* ee also .inistero della difesa* ."* Uff* :p*, se,* 2M* .emoria operativa n*/* La difesa del nostro
territorio verso oriente* %ebruar! 19/3, in #U.", 80@, racc* n* 27* %or a more e+tensive discussion of Italian
plannin) in 19/3, see Leopoldo Nuti, '1he Italian .ilitar! and the #tlantic 9act', in "nnio $I N:L%:, ed*, 1he
i)nature of the #tlantic 9act %ort! 7ears #fter(ards- # 8istorical <eappraisal, 9roceedin)s of the International
=onference 8eld In %lorence, #pril 405, 1939, (;erlin- 5alter de Cru!ter, forthcomin))*
(%rom 19/9 to 195/, for instance, U forces in #ustria amounted to 1 Infantr! <e)iment, 1 <econ ;attalion, and 1
%ield #rtiller! ;attalionF in 1rieste there (as the 451st Infantr! <e)iment* 8ans Gur)en chraut ((ith Goan $*
8efferman, #le+ander .* Earber, 9hillip #* Eerber and .ichael $* 7affe), 1he United tates #rm! in "urope,
19/501955 (Nuclear 8istor! 9ro)ram, 199>)*
(ere also appreciated b! the Goint =hiefs of taff, (ho re)arded the presence of #llioed troops in
1rieste as 'at least in some de)ree a stabili,in) influence on Ital! and %rance and a deterrent to
=ommunist penetration into Ital! and to =ommunist covert operations'*
(
)
In the second half of 19/3 the issue of inte)rated plannin) became strictl! related to the
broader problem of the relationship bet(een Ital! and a 5estern defensive pact* In $ecember
19/3 the =hief of taff of the Italian #rm!, Ceneral "fisio .arras, met at the 9enta)on (ith
some #merican militar! representatives in order to discuss the possibilities offered b! a formal
securit! lin&a)e bet(een Ital! and a future 5estern alliance* 1he #merican militar! made clear
that the safest (a! to ensure the cooperation desired b! the Italians (as for Ital! to become a part
either of the ;russels 9act or of the future #tlantic pact*
(
) 1he inclusion of Ital! in the #tlantic
9act, ho(ever, (as b! no means a fore)one conclusion, and it caused a protracted discussion
ended onl! b! 9resident 1rumanBs favorable decision in earl! .arch of 19/9*
1he debate about (hether Ital! should be included in the #tlantic pact centered about the
strate)ic value of the Italian peninsula* "ventuall! it (as probabl! the %rench insistence on
Italian membership, partiall! bac&ed up b! the #merican militar!, that made possible for Ital! to
(1he G= also believed that 'from the strate)ic vie(point, the #llied part of the %11 is suitabl! located for #n)lo0
#merican intelli)ence activities, and for covert ps!cholo)ical (arfare and special operations in outhern "urope'*
Goint =hiefs of taff 0 $ecision on G= 1434H/7, '# <eport b! the G= on 9:lic! on tatus of 1roops in the %ree
1erritor! of 1rieste', 22 eptember 19/9, in <ecords of the Goint =hiefs of taff, 9art 2, 19/@01954, section $,
"urope and N#1:, <eel 4, ? >54/*
(=hief of #rm! taff Ceneral .arras first broached the issue of coordination (ith U =ommander in =hief,
"uropean theater, Ceneral Lucius 9* =la!, at the same time (hen Nav! =hief of taff #dmiral .au)eri discussed it
(ith the %rench Ceneral <evers* .arras then discussed the subDect more in detail durin) his crucial conversations
(ith &e! 9enta)on representatives in $ecember* %or the .arras0=la! meetin), see =la! to ;radle!, :ctober 5th,
19/3, and =la! to .arshall, :ctober 15th, 19/3, in 1he 9apers of Ceneral Lucius $* =la!, edited b! Gean "d(ard
mith, (LondonH;loomin)ton- Indiana Universit! 9ress, 197/), pp*3910392 and 9>@09>7 respectivel!F for the
.au)eri0<evers tal&s, see Nuaroni a Ooppi, :ctober /th, 19/3, in #.#", #mbasciata di 9ari)i, 19/3, b*/>5, f*1*
ee also %ranco .au)eri, <icordi di un marinaio (.ilano- .ursia, 193>), pp*2390294* %or .arrasB 9enta)on
meetin)s, see m! 'La missione .arras,2022 dicembre 19/3', in toria delle <ela,ioni Interna,ionali, 1937, n*2*
be one of the foundin) countries of the #lliance*
(
) #fter the si)nature of the North #tlantic
1reat!, ho(ever, there (as no immediate effort to coordinate defence plans for the troops
deplo!ed alon) Ital!Bs borders for almost a !ear* %ormall!, #llied troops in #ustria and 1rieste
(ere not assi)ned to the #tlantic 9act- the! remained under the direct command of the =ombined
=hiefs of taff, and initiall! had no relationship (ith the 9actBs 9lannin) Croups*
(
) 1he
=ommanders of the occupation troops, moreover, envisa)ed man! different courses of action in
case of oviet a))ression, includin) a Auic& (ithdra(al to re)roup and fi)ht in the central
"uropean front, and (ere therefore reluctant to disclose these options to the Italians*
(
)
1he outbrea& of the Eorean (ar in Gune 195> suddenl! made preparations for a )eneral
(ar much more realistic, and persuaded the #llied militar! of the necessit! to inte)rate the plans
for the occupation troops (ith Italian militar! authorities* hortl! after the outbrea& of the (ar,
the Italian Ceneral taff (as for the first time officiall! notified of the e+istence of the #llied
plans for a coordinated (ithdra(al of the 5estern troops of occupation from #ustria and 1rieste
into Ital!, (ith the purpose of redeplo!in) them alon) Italian forces*
(
)
In the follo(in) !ears 5estern plannin) for an inte)rated defense of the re)ion borderin)
(ith the North"astern border of Ital! (as, at best, little more than tentative*
(
) erious differences
("lisabeth $* her(ood, #llies in =risis* .eetin) Clobal =hallen)es to 5estern ecurit!* (Ne( 8aven- 7ale
Universit! 9ress, 199>), p*17* %or the inclusion of Ital! in the #tlantic 9act, see also 1imoth! "* mith, '1he %ear of
ubversion- the U and the Inclusion of Ital! in the North #tlantic 1reat!', in $iplomatic 8istor!, JII, n*2 (1934)
pp*1490155F
(:nl! later, (hen the militar! structure of the #lliance (as completed, it (as made clear that in case of (ar the!
(ould be placed at the orders of #="U<*
(Inte)ration of #llied 9lannin) for "vacuation of 1rieste in an "mer)enc! (ith 9lannin) b! the Italian 8i)h
("+tract of meetin) of 9rincipal taff :fficers of the "..: <e)ion on 14th Gul!, 9<:, $"%" 11H24*
(ee L* Nuti, Ital! and the $efence of N#1:Bs outhern %lan&, in Norbert 5i))ershaus (ed*), $ie Nordatlantische
;undnis, 19/90195@ (%reibur)- .ilitPr)eschitliches %orschun)samt, 1991)
e+isted bet(een the occup!in) #llied po(ers as to (hether it (ould be feasible, in case of oviet
a))ression, to tr! to defend the (hole of #ustrian territor!, or (hether the troops should be
(ithdra(n into Ital! and defend the Italo0#ustrian passes* %urthermore, the option of
(ithdra(in) them from this theater of operations and redeplo!in) them else(here (as never
entirel! eliminated, and reappeared time and a)ain*
1he tas& to develop coordinated plannin) for the re)ion (as )iven to #%:U18, the ne(
8eadAuarter set up b! N#1: in Gune 1951, and its first commander in =hief, #dmiral =arne!,
tried to foster a common defense effort*
(
) ;! the end of 1952, ho(ever, the idea of a for(ard
strate)! in #ustria (as eventuall! dismissed and definitivel! replaced (ith the plan for the
defense of the #lpine passes* In late 1954 the ;ritish and the %rench reduced their occupation
troops to such an e+tent as to ma&e it impossible for them to pla! an! meanin)ful militar! role,
and the strate)ic tas& of defendin) the #lpine passes (as practicall! left to the U troops in
#ustria, (hich in case of (ar (ould be reinforced for this purpose b! the other U forces
stationed in 1rieste*
(
) 1his remained their mission until their final (ithdra(al*
1he documentation available from the Italian militar! archives does not shed much li)ht
on ho( the Italian Dud)ed this cooperation* 1he! mi)ht have had some doubts about its militar!
efficac!, but obviousl! the! re)arded it as crucial from the political point of vie(* 1he strate)ic
counterinsurance provided b! these troops, moreover, (as stren)htened b! the fact that in those
same !ears the U and Ital! entered a number of le)al a)reements (hich created a net(or& of
(Cenerale di bri)ata Cuido ;ertoni KItalian liaison officer at 8#9"L al =apo di . $ifesa, Cen* .arras, 13
$ecember 1952, in #U.", I05, 1952*

(.emorandum for the ecretar! of $efense, ubDect- United Ein)dom and %rench forces in #ustria, 11 eptember
1954, enclosure to G= 1@35H57, Note b! the ecretaries to the G= on UE and %rench %orces in #ustria, 15
eptember 1954, in <ecords of the Goint =hiefs of taff, 9art 2, 19/@01954, section $, "urope and N#1:, <eel 1, ?
414*
militar! relations bet(een the t(o states*
(
) In Gune 1951 both )overnments si)ned in London the
N#1: tatus of %orces a)reement, (hich re)ulated the status of N#1: troops deplo!ed in the
territor! of other member countries* hortl! after(ards, bilateral ne)otiations (ith the U be)an
to define the use b! U troops of a number of facilities in Italian territor!* In particular, it (as
a)reed that the ne( N#1: =ommand for the N#1: outhern <e)ion (ould have its
8eadAuarters in Naples, and the t(o )overnments also discussed the use b! U forces of the port
of Le)horn and the creation of a lar)e depot near the cit!, (hich (ould be used to resuppl! the
occupation troops in #ustria*
(
) In Gune, ho(ever, rumours about the ne)otiations (ere used b!
the =ommunist opposition to sta)e an attac& a)ainst the Covernment in the Italian enate*
(
) 1he
vehement reaction of the left made the Italian )overnment ver! cautios, and (hen the first U
ship doc&ed at Le)horn (ith the material needed to build the ne( U suppl! base 'there (ere si+
truc&loads of Italian riot police (aitin) nearb!' read! to char)e a)ainst an! =ommunist
demonstrators*
(
) # first )eneral a)reement bet(een the t(o )overnments (as not si)ned until
Ganuar! 7, 1952, and it too& the form of an e+chan)e of notes in order to avoid parliamentar!
scrutin!* Its te+t, moreover, (as couched in ver! va)ue terms in order to ma&e it as incospicuous
as possible* 1he a)reement simpl! binds the Italian )overnment to 'fulfill the militar! obli)ations
(hich it has assumed under multilateral or bilateral a)reements or treaties to (hich the United
(%or the sa&e of brevit!, this part of the article omits an! reference to the issues related to the .utual ecurit!
9ro)ram*
(It mi)ht be (orth recallin) that in the =IC <eport of eptember 19/7 the deplo!ment of troops for lo)istical
purposes had been recommended to stren)then the (estern orientation of the Italian )overnment*
(#tti parlamentari, enato della <epubblica, Le)islatura I, 1951, pp*253@5025374*
(Ne( 7or& 1imes, #u)ust 12, 1951, 2>-/* In 1952, several bombin) attac&s (ere sta)ed a)ainst the cars of U
soldiers in the Le)horn area, (ithout an! casualt!*
tates is a part!'* :ther specific arran)ements (ere left to be defined at a later time*
(
) In 9aris, on
#u)ust 23, 1952, the U and the Italian )overnments si)ned a multilateral N#1: 9rotocol on
the tatus of the International 8eadAuarters of the #lliance*
(
) In November 1952 the lar)e depot
of =amp $arb!, near Le)horn, (as officiall! inau)urated as the Lo)istical =ommand (hich
(ould supervise the transshipment of supplies for the U occupation troops in #ustria*
(
) 1hus, in
spite of the fact that the details of the )eneral cooperation a)reement (ere !et to be defined, and
that the London convention had not !et been ratified b! the 9arliament, U command and
lo)istical structures (ere alread! bein) set up in Italian territor!*
(
)
1he ratification of these a)reements, ho(ever, (as a lon) and rather convoluted process,
and the same happened to the formali,ation of the arran)ements for the use of the facilities in
Naples and Le)horn* 1he bill for the ratification of the London convention (as introduced to the
%orei)n #ffairs =ommittee of the Italian =hamber of $eputies in :ctober 1951, (hich approved
it in Ganuar! of 1952* 1hat bein) a preelectoral !ear, the sensitive bill (as left dormant until after
the elections of Gune 1954* 1he results of the elections, ho(ever, )ave un ene+pected t(ist to the
ratification process as (ell as to the pace of the ne)otiations for formali,in) the facilites
arran)ements* In the ne(l! elected Italian 9arliament a sli)htl! more ri)ht(in) maDorit! sho(ed
a stron) inclination to use (hatever (eapons (ere available in order to reach a favorable solution
for the problem of the %ree 1erritor! of 1rieste* #fter the elections, therefore, the Italian
(1I#, #)reement effected b! the e+chan)e of notes si)ned at <ome, 7 Ganuar! 1952*
(1I# 2973, 9rotocol on the tatus of International .ilitar! 8eadAuarters set up pursuant to the North #tlantic
1reat!, #u)ust 23, 1952*
(Ne( 7or& 1imes, November 15, 1952, 27-5*
(It ma! be (orth notin) that a clause of article 1@ of the 9aris 9rotocol allo(ed 'the authorities of a receivin) state
and a upreme 8N ma! a)ree to )ive effect, b! administrative means in advance to ratification, to an! provision
'
of
the protocol, thereb! empo(erin) the )overnments to circumvent parliamentar! opposition*
)overnment too& a course of action (hich (as less supportive of N#1:, and conditioned its
return to a strai)htfor(ard #tlantic polic! to a settlement for 1rieste*
(
) In .a! 195/, (hen U
ecretar! of tate Gohn %oster $ulles as&ed the ne( Italian 9. .ario celba '(hen he thou)ht
he could si)n the facilities a)reement, (hich KhadL been in ne)otiation for 15 months', he (as
told that the reason for the dela! (as the need to be sure that the )overnment 'could si)n an
e+ecutive a)reement and not have to pass throu)h 9arlaiment'*
(
) ;efore and after his meetin)
(ith $ulles, ho(ever, celba made clear to U #mbassador =laire Luce that the deterioration of
the Italian international position, due to the prospect of a ne)ative solution of the 1rieste issue,
left 'no hope at all for an earl! si)nature of the militar! facilities a)reement'* 9iAued at the
Italian resistence, #mbassador Luce recommended to the tate $epartment that the ne)otiations
be bro&en off*
(
)
;oth )overnments &ne( that an a)reement (ould be eventuall! reached, as both re)arded
it in their mutual interest* celba, ho(ever, (as merel! fencin) in order to improve the Italian
bar)ainin) position before a final solution for 1rieste (as achieved, and U diplomats countered
b! threatenin) to brea& off the ne)otiations*
(
) 1his )ame of veiled threats and subtle feints,
(:n #pril 13, 195/, the Italian 9. celba e+plicitl! told #mbassador Luce that 'if the U (ishes Ital! to ma&e real
pro)ress a)ainst the =ommunist 9art! and on other U pro)rams (facilities, tatus of %orces) 1rieste (ill have to be
settled'* 1he U #mbassador (Luce) to the Under ecretar! of tate (;edell mith), #pril 13, 195/, in %<U,19520
195/, Jol* JI, 5estern "urope and =anada, pp*1@71075*
(1he #mbassador in Ital! (Luce) to the $epartment of tate, .a! /, 195/, in %<U, 19520195/, vol*JIII, "astern
"urope, pp*/190/22*
('$raft tatement of 9olic! proposed b! the 9lannin) ;oard of the N=', .arch 12, 195/, in %<U, 19520195/,
Jol* JI, 5estern "urope and =anada, pp* 1@5@01@@>F for #mbassador LuceBs su))estion, see Note 4, p*//4, in
("isenho(er, for instance, told Gohn %oster $ulles that 'oftentimes (e (ould )et better results b! seemin) to be less
demandin) and indicatin) that if the Italians did not (ant us there, (e (ould )ladl! adDust o!r plans accordin)l!'*
.emorandum of =onversation (ith the 9resident, Gul! 11, 195/, in Gohn %oster $ulles 9apers, 5hite 8ouse
=orrespondence and .emoranda eries, <eel 1, bo+ 1, >@@3*
therefore, lasted until a final settlement for 1rieste (as in si)ht* 5hen this condition (as met,
celba promised #mbassador Luce that he (ould deliver the a)reement in a matter of da!s, and
he &ept his (orld*
(
) ;! :ctober 2>, 195/, onl! a fe( (ee&s after the si)nature of the
.emorandum of Understandin) about 1rieste, the U and the Italian )overnment si)ned the
facilities a)reement*
(
) #)ain, it too& the form of an e+chan)e of notes that did not reAuire
parliamentar! approval* "mboldened b! the solution of the 1rieste problem, ho(ever, the
)overnment decided shortl! after(ards to accelerate the procedure for the approval of the bill
ratif!in) the London tatus of forces a)reement and the 9aris 9rotocol* #fter a tumultuous
parliamentar! debate (hich sa( sharp attac&s from the Left(in) opposition, the enate passed
the bill on %ebruar! /, 1955, and the =hamber of $eputies follo(ed suit in the follo(in)
November*
(
)
;! the time the London convention had been ratified, ho(ever, the Italian strate)ic
position had been seriousl! altered b! the si)nature of the #ustrian state treat!*
4) 1he nuclear comebac&*
1he Italian reaction at the prospect of the removal of the occupation troops in #ustria and
(.emorandum b! the ecretar! of tate to the 9resident, #u)ust 7, 195/, and 1he #mbassador in Ital! (Luce) to
the $epartment of tate, :ctober @, 195/, in %<U, 19520195/, vol*JIII, "astern "urope, p* /39 and pp* 5770573*
(In later documents, it (ill be referred to as '#)reement bet(een the United tates of #merica and the <epublic of
Ital! re)ardin) bilateral infrastructure'* 1he te+t of the a)reement remains secret to this da!, but from later
documents it can be established that it authorised the U to operate a)reed installations in accordance (ith its
provisions and, in a section denominated '$ocument II', listed all the installations to (hich the a)reement applied* It
also contemplated that it could be made applicable to additional installations b! subseAuent a)reements to add them
to the list* ee .emo to the #ctin) ecretar! of tate, 'Ne)otiations to brin) additional installations (ithin 195/
a)reement (ith Ital!', .arch 15, 195@, in National #rchives, 5ashin)ton (N#5), <C 59, 7@5*5H40155@ (bo+
4@19)* %urther details about the ne)otiations for the a)reement can be collected in the tate $epartment %ile
711*5@4@5, from 901@5/ to 1>02>5/, in N#5, <C 59*
(enato della <epubblica, #tti 9arlamentari, Le)islatura II01955, $iscussioni, pp* 932/099>9F =amera dei $eputati,
#tti 9arlamentari, Le)islatura II, $iscussioni, pp* 22>@/022>92*
the %ree 1erritor! of 1rieste provides a sort of a contrario demonstration of their importance for
Italian defense* In :ctober 195/ the si)nature of the London memorandum of understandin)
bet(een the Italian and the Gu)oslav )overnment settled the issue of 1rieste, and led to the
removal of ;ritish and #merican occupation troops from the cit!* 1he enthusiastic reaction of
the Italian population at the return of 1rieste to Italian soverei)nt! obscured the militar!
conseAuences of the (ithdra(al* 1he removal of the #llied troops, moreover, (as compensated
for b! the fact that the settlement seemed to open the prospect of a better relationship bet(een
Ital! and Gu)oslavia (hich, in due time, could be e+tended to militar! cooperation* 5hen in earl!
1955 the chance of an #ustrian treat! be)an to materiali,e, ho(ever, the Italian reaction (as ver!
different*
In earl! .a! 1955, (hen the #ustrian state treat! (as bein) debated in the North #tlantic
council, the Italian %orei)n .inister, Caetano .artino, made clear that the treat! (as for Ital! a
matter of serious concern* 1he Italian )overnment (as (orried about the e+act meanin) of
#ustrian neutralit!, .artino remar&ed, because it believed that #ustria must be allo(ed to be
part of the e+istin) international or)ani,ations, and to cooperate (ith other countries in social
and economic issues* In particular, .artino feared that, from the militar! point of vie(, #ustrian
neutralit! mi)ht have an impact for the defence of Ital!Bs "astern frontier, and affect the Italian
contribution to N#1:*
(
)
1he si)nature of the #ustrian tate 1reat! on .a! 15, 1955, pled)ed #ustria to a polic!
of neutralit!, forced the (ithdra(al of all the occupation troops from its territor!, and opened a
(1ele)ram from the United tates $ele)ation at the N#= .inisterial .eetin) to the $ept* of tate, .a! 1>, 1955,
in %<U, 199501957, vol* IJ, 5estern "uropean ecurit! and Inte)ration, pp*1>01/* It )oes (ithout sa!in) that
#ustrian neutralit! carried alon) not Dust the (ithdra(al of the occupation troops but also the li&el! removal of the
=amp $arb! lo)istical base in Le)horn, that (as the main suppl! depot for those troops*
)ap in the 5estern defense s!stem* %or Italian militar! planners, this meant that all ties to
N#1:Bs =entral "uropean sector, no matter ho( flims! and h!pothetical, (ere severed at once*
%or the first time since the end of the (ar, no #llied troops (ould be convenientl! deplo!ed near
the Italian territor!, read! to cooperate in the event of an a))ression*
(
) 1his chan)e posed some
serious problems and spurred the Italian $efence .inistr! to ta&e the initiative* $efense .inister
9aolo "milio 1aviani e+plained to $ulles that in vie( of these events, he thou)ht necessar! to
stren)then the defense of N#1:Bs southern flan&, (hich no( rested on Ital! aloneF advanced
militar! plannin) a)ainst a oviet attac& throu)h the ;al&ans and Northern Ital!, in particular,
(as essential* 1aviani revised (ith $ulles the stor! of the previous Italian attempts to see&
cooperation (ith Gu)oslavia for the purpose of Doint defence plannin), and of their thorou)h lac&
of success* 1hus, he concluded, it (as of crucial importance to build up )reater N#1: stren)th
in the area*
(
)
5hat the Italian $efense .inister had in mind became clear in a later conversation (ith
tate $epartment =ounselor $ou)las .ac#rthur, (hen 1aviani proposed to establish a ne(
N#1: command near Jenice* 1he ne( 8eadAuarter (as to be subordinate to N#1:Bs
=IN=:U18, (ith an #merican or ;ritish commander* 1his (as re)arded as necessar!, 1aviani
specified, in case operations had to be carried out in Gu)oslav territor!, 'in vie( of the attitudes
of the lovenes to(ard Ital!'* 1he ne( command (as to include at least three allied divisions
(# )ood retrospective anal!sis of the crisis of mid0summer of 1955 can be found in 9ro)ramma :ff0hore per
lBeserci,io 1955, :ctober 1955, in #U.", IH5, =arte))io =lassificato Ufficio :pera,ioni*
(1aviani told $ulles that the Italians had also sounded out the #ustrian )overnment for establishin) defense
cooperation, in particular in the matter of Doint plannin), and that this effort had apparentl! had more positive results*
1he author re)rets not bein) able to locate more specificall! the time of this and of the follo(in) discussion bet(een
1aviani and the U diplomats, but the onl! document mentionin) them that he has been able to found so far is a later
tate $epartment recollection of the events of mid01955, (hich does not provide an! specific timin)- 1he tate
$epartment to the "mbass! in <ome, #u)ust 15, 19@2, in G%E 9residential Librar!, N%, =ountries- Ital!, bo+ 12>,
folder Ital! Ceneral @H@H@20@H4>H@2*
stationed in North"ast Ital!, as (ell as a naval base at #ncona connected to the si+th %leet*
(
)
1he Italian plea (as based, as U #mbassador to <ome %rederic& <einhardt (rote a fe(
!ears later, 'on the militar!, political and ps!cholo)ical need for the presence of U forces in
Ital!Bs Northeast sector'*
(
) 1he #merican response came (ith the decision to redeplo! the
#merican troops of occupation in #ustria to Ital!* ;et(een .a! and Gul! 1955 8#9" studied
alternative deplo!ment scenarios for U forces in #ustria, and in earl! Gul! it reached the
conclusion that Ital! (ould offer the optimum location* :n Gul! 7, 1955, the Italian #mbassador
in 9aris 9ietro Nuaroni notified the =hief of $efense Ceneral taff, Ceneral .ancinelli, that after
listenin) to the favourable declarations of both the #merican and the Italian representatives, the
North #tlantic =ouncil had approved the proposals contained in 8#9"Bs stud! number 232055*
#ccordin) to the Italian ambassador, the stud! su))ested movin) to Ital! some of the U troops
deplo!ed in #ustria, but it also envisa)ed a further step be!ond the redeplo!ment of the
occupation troops, since it also recommended to stren)then the Italian #rm! (ith ')round0
launched atomic (eapons
'
*
(
)
1he available documentation does not allo( to ma&e clear (hether nuclear deliver!
means had been first deplo!ed in #ustria and then moved into Ital! to)ether (ith the occupation
forces, or (hether the redeplo!ment of the U troops from #ustria (as used as a plo! to Auietl!
smu))le into Ital! nuclear0capable roc&et artiller! at a later time* 5hat is clear, ho(ever, is that
b! the ummer of 1955 the U and Ital! had a)reed to station #merican units eAuipped (ith
(1he tate $epartment to the "mbass! in <ome, #u)ust 15, 19@2, in G%E 9residential Librar!, N%, =ountries-
Ital!, bo+ 12>, folder Ital! Ceneral @H@H@20@H4>H@2*
(1he #mbassador in Ital! (<einhardt) to the $epartment of tate, Dune 25, 19@2, in G%E 9residential Librar!, N%,
=ountries- Ital!, bo+ 12>, folder Ital! Ceneral @H@H@20@H4>H@2*
("ntr! of Gul! @, 1955, in #U.", $iario torico tato .a))iore $ifesa ($ .$) K8istorical $iar! of the
$efense Ceneral taffL
nuclear capable roc&etr! in Italian territor!*
hortl! after his meetin) (ith #mbassador Nuaroni, in fact, the =hief of $efense Ceneral
taff ordered to accelerate staff studies about the contribution that atomic (eapons could ma&e to
the defence of the North"astern frontier of Ital!* 1he possibilit! that #merican troops armed (ith
tactical nuclear (eapons mi)ht be deplo!ed in Italian territor! seemed to be confirmed in earl!
#u)ust, (hen the $efense Ceneral taff received from the U 'confidential' information about
both the 8onest Gohn and the =orporal, the t(o (eapons s!stems that the #merican units in Ital!
(ere e+pected to be eAuipped (ith*
(
)
1he deplo!ment in Ital! of an #merican contin)ent (as debated t(ice b! the Italian
=ouncil of .inisters in earl! #u)ust* $urin) the first meetin) %orei)n .inister .artino told the
=abinet that 'no concrete initiative' could be ta&en to(ards the ;al&an alliance of Gu)oslavia,
Creece and 1ur&e! because of the recent, more neutralist course of Gu)oslav forei)n polic!, and
obviousl! the impossibilit! of cooperatin) (ith the nei)hbourin) state made the Italian
)overnment all the more interested in alternative (a!s of stren)thenin) the defence of the
Northeastern frontier* $urin) the debates, ho(ever, 9rime .inister #ntonio e)ni added that
forei)n troops should not be stationed in sensitive areas such as ;ol,ano or 1rieste, and that it
(as important that the! be classified as a N#1: unit, thus do(npla!in) their national identit!
and stressin) their presence as a s!mbol of international cooperation* e)ni told his collea)ues
that he had mentioned these t(o points to the #merican ambassador, and that an a)reement had
been reached*
(
) 5hile there (as a )eneral consensus (ithin the =ouncil of .inisters, ho(ever,
("ntries of Gul! @ and #u)ust 1st, 1955, in #U.", $ .$*
(.eetin)s of #u)ust 2 and #u)ust @, 1955, in #rchivio =entrale dello tato (#=), Jerbali delle <iunioni del
=onsi)lio dei .inistri* 1he issue (as also probabl! debated b! the upreme $efense =ouncil, (hich met on #u)ust
2* 1he minutes of that meetin) are not open to research, but some information can be )athered in the #merican
#mbassador in <ome to the ecretar! of tate, .eetin) of the upreme $efense =ouncil, #u)ust /, 1955, in N#5,
the choice of the location for the deplo!ment of a lar)e forei)n contin)ent (as not accomplished
(ithout some difficulties* %ears of =ommunist demonstrations and of possible incidents (ith the
local population complicated the matter, and (hen an a)reement (as initiall! reached on the
to(n of ;assano del Crappa, a place strictl! connected (ith nostal)ic reminescences of the
Italian spirited resistance a)ainst the #ustrians in the %irst 5orld 5ar, it (as eventuall! reDected
b! the #rm! as li&el! to arouse nationalistic reactions* 1he militar!, ho(ever, (ere also
concerned that in case of prolon)ed difficulties the United tates mi)ht transfer 'the special
(eapons' to Cerman!, and not to Ital!, and that therefore it (as in Ital!Bs interest to come up
(ith a solution as Auic&l! as possible* It (as therefore decided to accept the #merican reAuest for
an area east of the cit! of Jerona, b! offerin) a ran)e of possibilities in the area included
bet(een the to(ns of 9almanova, Jicen,a and 1reviso*
(
) $efense .inister 1aviani has claimed
as his o(n the proposal of Jicen,a, a Auiet, conservative =hristian $emocratic stron)hold that
has proved to be an ideal place as it has never caused an! serious problems bet(een the
population and the U troops*
(
) ;! the end of #u)ust a )eneral a)reement (as reached, and
shortl! after(ards the first U troops be)an to cross the ;renner pass and redeplo! around
Jicen,a*
(
) :n :ctober 4, 1955, the final draft of the a)reement (as si)ned b! the commander of
the U unit, Ceneral #llen, and b! the vice0=hief of the Italian #rm! taff Ceneral %ornara*
#ccordin) to it, the "1#%, or outhern "uropean 1as& %orce, (as )ranted the ri)ht to use three
<C 59, 7@5*5H30/55 (bo+ 4@19)*
(9romemoria- $isloca,ione in Italia del contin)ente U# proveniente dallB#ustria, in #U.", I05, =arte))io
classificato Ufficio :pera,ioni, 1955*
(Intervie( (ith 1aviani*
lar)e barrac&s in the Jicen,a0Jerona area, to)ether (ith some trainin) facilities*
(
)
hortl! after the conclusion of the ne)otiations, the Italian cabinet decided to attach the
te+t of the pact to the )eneral N#1: tatus of %orces a)reement, (hich (as !et to be ratified b!
the Italian parliament* 1his (as eventuall! done on November 11, 1955, after a rather heated
debate durin) (hich the =ommunist opposition sharpl! criticised the a)reement because it
re)arded it as an infrin)ement upon Italian territorial soverei)nt!* cant attention, ho(ever, (as
paid to the deplo!ment of the ne( #merican unit, (hose special character mi)ht not have been
entirel! reali,ed b! most of those (ho too& part in the debate* %rom the point of vie( of the
chain of command, "1#% (as placed under the orders of =:.L#N$:U18, i*e* of the
Italian )eneral (ho, under =IN=:U18, (as in char)e of the land forces defendin) Ital!Bs
north0eastern frontier* 1his made "1#% ultimatel! dependent upon 8#9", but under
immediate command of an Italian militar! authorit!*
%rom the militar! point of vie(, ho(ever, "1#% did not acAuire a full nuclear capabilit!
until sometime later* Initiall! the 1as& %orce consisted of Dust a test unit, the 35th %ield #rtiller!
;attalion, armed (ith the 7@2mm roc&et 8onest Gohn* $urin) 195@, ho(ever, this unit (as
converted into the 51>th %ield #rtiller! ;attalion, (hich (as re)arded as effective since the 2>th
of #u)ust* In Gune 195@ the Italian $efense Ceneral taff also approved the #merican proposal
to include (ithin "1#% t(o battalions (comprisin) around 25> personnel each) of 5#=
=orporal missiles, thus brin)in) the unit to its full stren)th* 1he (arhead detachments necessar!
to arm the (eapons (ith their nuclear ordnance, ho(ever, do not seem to have been deplo!ed in
(ome technical details, relative to the definition of the use of trainin) facilities, (ere sli)htl! more difficult to be
resolved, the Italians blamin) the #mericans for tr!in) to escape too ri)id a definition of their ri)hts*
(9romemoria- $isloca,ione in Italia del contin)ente U# proveniente dallB#ustria, in #U.", I05, =arte))io
classificato Ufficio :pera,ioni, 1955*
Ital! until some time later*
(
)
1he arrival of the "1#% (as an obvious spur to a rapid completion of the reformulation
of both national strate)! and the #rm!Bs tactical doctrine* In 195@ the #rm!Bs summer
manoeuvres (ere entirel! dedicated to the verification of the main tenets of some ne( theories,
and the main e+ercises included simulated use of atomic (eapons* 1he #rm! =hief of taff,
Ceneral Liu,,i, remar&ed that the e+ercises had sho(n- first, the necessit! to prevent enem!
penetration of the 9o valle!, and therefore the need to stop him and defeat him on the #lps or in
the #lpine passesF second, the opportunit! to )ive the #rm! a dual structure, enablin) it to fi)ht
both a conventional and a nuclear (ar*
(
)
1he reformulation of the arm!Bs tactical doctrine (ent alon) (ith the redefinition of the
overall strate)! for the defence of the north0eastern frontier, replacin) the former plans of
cooperation (ith the #llied occupation units in #ustria* "1#% units could be used for both
close and distant interdiction of movements, at the ver! time (hen the oviet forces (ere bein)
)athered for an offensive on the other side of the #lps* Nuclear (eapons (ere to be used onl! in
the initial phase of the hostilities, because of their presumed limited availabilit!* 1he impact of
these (eapons (as e+pected to be ver! disruptin), thus providin) the necessar! breathin) spell
that the Italian armed forces needed in order to complete their mobili,ation* 1he potential use of
"1#%Bs missiles to obstacle enem! movements on the other side of the #lps e+plains (h! the
Italian $efence taff (as more interested in the 5#= =orporal, a rather cumbersome and not
ver! fle+ible (eapon, than in the more advanced 8onest Gohn- the =orporal, in fact, had a lon)er
(N89 $ata =ollection 0 Ital!F 1he United tates #rm! in "urope 0 (arhead detachments, pp*>>>345*
("sperimenti sullBa,ione difensiva con procedimenti conse)uenti allBimpie)o delle armi atomiche nel campo tattico*
=ommento allBesercita,ione .onte ;ianco 1* Gune 24, 195@, in #U.", I05, 195@*
ran)e and could hit tar)ets as far a(a! as the Ela)enfurt valle!*
(
) 5hen in 1957 the U proposed
to replace one battalion of =orporals (ith another one of 8onest Gohns, the Italian $efense
Ceneral taff e+pressed reservations, (hich eventuall! prevailed, thus ensurin) that "1#%
(ould continue to have =orporals at its disposal*
(
) #s a result, one more battalion of 8onest
Gohns (as added to "1#%, but no =orporals (ere (ithdra(n, at least for the time bein)*
In short, the Italian militar! adDusted rather smoothl! to the introduction of tactical
nuclear (eapons, (ithout Auestionin) too deepl! the feasibilit! of their use in case of (ar* 1he
importance of "1#%, ho(ever, must be )au)ed in a lar)er conte+t, and not Dust from a militar!
point of vie(, and the events follo(in) the initial deplo!ment provide further insi)ht into the
rationale behind Italian support for this unit* In late 1957 the G=, the $epartment of $efense and
the $epartment of tate debated (hether the U should propose to the Italian )overnment the
'indi)eni,ation' of "1#%, turnin) over to the Italian services the mannin) of the missiles and
retainin) onl! the custod! of the (arheads*
(
) 8o(ever, (hen in #u)ust 1953 the U minister
Gerne)an met (ith the ecretar! Ceneral of the Italian %orei)n :ffice, #lessandrini, to discuss
the reor)ani,ation of "1#%, he (as told that '9resident Cronchi, %anfani, e)ni and others on
hi)hest level ur)e and insist KthatL the U recondider the plan', that the )overnment of Ital!
'(ould )reatl! deplore an! reduction KinL U stren)th "1#% or else(here and KthatL it instead
(%or a description of the technical differences bet(een the t(o deliver! s!stems, see 9rince 8ubertus ,u Lo(enstein
and Jol&mar von Ouhlsdorff, N#1: and the $efense of the 5est* K5estport, =onnecticut- Creen(ood 9ress
9ublishers, 1975 (reprint of the ori)inal 1957 edition)L, pp*2790231*
($iario torico .$, #U.", November 11th, 1957 and $ecember /th, 1957F intervie( material (ith Ceneral
<ovi)hi*
(<eport b! the Goint trate)ic 9lans =ommittee to the G= on 9roposal to the Italian Covernment re)ardin)
indi)eni,ation of the outhern "uropean 1as& %orce (G= 13>3H/3), / :ctober 1957, in $$<, 1931, @/ =*
prefers U troop totals to be increased'*
(
) "ventuall! the U element in "1#% (as cut bac&
from @*>>> to /*>>>- U troops remained to operate the =orporals, (hile the 8onest Gohns (ere
handed over to the Italians, after the! (ere adeAuatel! trained on the ne( (eapons* In Gune 1959
the III Italian .issile bri)ade became an operational element of "1#%*
(
)
1hus in 1959 a part of "1#% (as turned over to the Italian arm!* %or the #mericans 'it
(as onl! natural that the Italian arm! assumed )raduall! certain of the responsibilities borne b!
the U arm!', since "1#%Bs mission (as to support the Italian armed forces* 1he Italians, in
turn, (ere as interested in the effectiveness of "1#%Bs nuclear (eaponr! as the! (ere in the
reassurin) presence of the #merican troops* 1hus, instead of (elcomin) the opportunit! to
bolster the presti)e of its armed forces (ith the acAuisition of the ne( (eapons, the Italian
)overnment pressured the "isenho(er administration not to (ithdra( all U forces from Ital!*
omethin) similar happened a)ain in 19@4, (hen the Italian )overnment (as appraised of
the U intention to further reduce the #merican component of "1#%* 1he 5#= =orporal had
b! then become a thorou)hl! obsolete (eapon, and the U #rm! had decided to replace it (ith
the more modern er)eant missile, (hich featured 'stri&in) improvements and advanta)es over
its predecessor'*
(
) 1he replacement of the (eapons seemed to offer an opportunit! to reduce U
(%or the Gerne)an0#lessandrini tal&s, see 1he #mbassador in <ome to the ecretar! of tate (? /93), #u)ust 9,
1953, in N#5, <C 59, 7@5*5@12H30953* ee also 1he #mbassador in <ome to the ecretar! of tate (? 475), Gul!
4>, 1953, in N#5, <C 53, 7@5*5@12H704>53 (bo+ 4@22)* It mi)ht be (orth pointin) out that in earl! 1957 $efense
.inister 1aviani had alread! sounded the U militar! attachI in <ome about as&in) formall! to the 9enta)on
(hether the U could deplo! more troops in Italian territor!, specificall! one division either in icil! or ardinia and
some air units in 1uscan!* 1he reAuest found #="U< interested onl! if it could be met (ithout sacrificin) an! of
the units alread! deplo!ed in Cerman!, and could not be satisfied* U N.< in 9aris (Ceneral chu!ler) to the
:ffice of the ecretar! of $efence, for I#, 1 %ebruar! 1957, in $$<, 1931, 1/5 ;*
('in Ganuar! 1959, // selected Italian artiller!men moved into "1#%Bs "derle =aserme at Jicen,a to be trained on
the 8onest Gohn <oc&et K****L hortl! after(ard, "1#%Bs t(o 8onest Gohn battalions (ere inactivated as t(o li&e
Italian units became operational, thus stren)thenin) Ital!Bs contribution to N#1: defenses* 1he United tates #rm!
in "urope, cit*, pp*>>>>49*
(1he U #rm! in "urope, cit*, p*>>>411*
involvement in "1#%, and possibl! turn it over completel! to the Italians* #t the same time as
the replacement (as bein) discussed, in fact, the U and the Italian )overnment (ere ne)otiatin)
a comple+ a)reement aimed at offsettin) an estimated Q 1>> million per !ear in U e+penditures
in Ital!* 1he ensuin) a)reement involved a reallocation of Italian e+penditures b! an increase in
Italian purchases of U0manifactured hard(areF furthermore, the U tate0$efense01reasur!
special )roup in char)e of the ne)otiations believed that the a)reement could also possibl!
include a possible phasedo(n of the U element of "1#% as (ell as other economies in all U
installations in Ital!*
(
) U #mbassador to <ome %rederic& <einhardt, ho(ever, (arned a)ainst a
dramatic reduction of U "1#% personnel-
KtheL proposal for "1#% phasedo(n entails political ps!cholo)ical factors of
possibl! vital importance to maintenance of #merican position in Ital!, and
perhaps even affectin) entire orientation of Italian forei)n polic!*
1he #mbassador remar&ed that both the Italian $efense .inister, Ciulio #ndreotti, and
the Italian )eneral commandin) L#N$:U18, ;ernabo, had recentl! inAuired about rumors of
"1#% phaseout* 1he! e+pressed their concern over this matter, and stated their hope that the
'rumors (ere not true and that no such Auestion (ould arise for man! !ears'*
(
) <einhardt did not
rule out completel! the possibilit! of a limited phasedo(n, especiall! if the Italians (ere )iven
the ne( er)eant missiles and not the obsolete =orporals, but he cautioned that the ne)otiations
(ere to be handled ver! carefull! in order not to )ive the impression that the U (as lessenin)
its militar! commitment in Ital!*
(
) "ventuall!, ho(ever, there (as no removal of the U
(1he #mbassador in <ome (<einhardt) to the ecretar! of tate (No* 44/2, section one of t(o), Gune 25, 19@2, in
G%E Librar!, N% =ountries- Ital!, bo+ 12>, folder Ital! Ceneral, @H@H@20@H4>H@2*
(1he #mbassador in <ome (<einhardt) to the ecretar! of tate (No* 44/4, section t(o of three), Gune 25, 19@2, in
G%E Librar!, N% =ountries- Ital!, bo+ 12>, folder Ital! Ceneral, @H@H@20@H4>H@2*
(Ibidem*
component of "1#%- in $ecember of 19@4 the t(o =orporal battalions (ere deactivated and
(ere replaced (ith one battalion eAuipped (ith the ne( er)eant missiles, 'a one0for0t(o trade
also practiced b! U forces in Cerman!'*
(
) Until the! (ere (ithdra(n in the mid07>s, the
er)eants continued to be manned b! U troops*
=onclusions
1he smoothness of the deplo!ment and the functionin) of "1#% did not escape the
attention of both the Italian and the #merican )overnments* :fficials on both sides lavished
praises on the inte)rated command and commended the )ood relationship bet(een "1#% and
the local populace* 1aviani (as e+tremel! pleased to host the ne( unit in Ital!, and in the
$ecember 195@ session of the North #tlantic council openl! declared that 'Ital! hopes there (ill
be more such units in central south sectors'*
(
) In late 1957, U #rm! ;ri)adier Ceneral Games
trumond and U <epresentative .aDor Ceneral Le<o! #nderson made an e+tended tour of U
installations in "urope, and in Ital! the! (ere 'impressed (ith the fine relations e+istin) bet(een
our armed forces and the Italian people'*
(
) # fe( !ears later, in 19@2, #mbassador <einhardt
noted that "1#% (as 'uniAue and entirel! harmonious' as an inte)rated command*
1he reasons for this success (ere described (ith remar&able insi)ht b! #ssistant
ecretar! of $efense %ran& Nash in 1957, after he concluded a tour of #merican militar! basis in
(1he ne( U arm! :rder of ;attle included therefore- U #rm! "1#% 8N, 1st U #rm! .issile =ommand
(.edium), 5th .issile battalion er)eant (4>th #rtiller! <e)iment)* N89 $atabase, >>>>9>*
(1ele)ram from the United tates $ele)ation at the North #tlantic =ouncil .inisterial .eetin) to the $epartment
of tate, $ecember 1/, 195@, in %<U, 195501957, vol* IJ, 5estern "uropean ecurit! and Inte)ration, p*151*
('#ctive dut! "uropean trip', report b! ;ri)* Ceneral Games trom 1hurmond, n*d* Kca* :ctober 1957L, in $$<,
193/, >>>371*
"urope* In his final report, Nash concluded that
Ital! is one of the most enthusiastic supporters of N#1: and is a stron) advocate
of collective securit!* "ven stron)er is the desire for cooperation (ith the United
tates as the most po(erful member of N#1: for leadership as (ell as material
support* 1he maDorit! of Italians, chastened b! their e+perience of the last 4>
!ears, believe that their o(n survival depends upon a close association (ith other
and stron)er nationsF the United tates is therefore an ideal all! if Ital! is to be
protected and assisted* 9s!cholo)icall!, ties (ith the United tates are stron)F
there is a lon) tradition of friendship (ith #merica and #mericans, and a sense of
)ratitude e+ists for the U part in the liberation of Ital! in 5orld 5ar II*
Nash observed that there (as al(a!s potential for trouble arisin) from the perennial
instabilit! of the Italian political scene and from the =ommunist opposition, but he added that the
)eneral outloo& remained favorable-
1he presence of #merican forces s!mboli,es securit! in the Italian mind
and there is considerable economic advanta)e connected there(ith* :ur economic
and militar! aid has and (ill continue to pla! an important part in enablin) a
stron) Ital! to (ithstand disruptin) pressures and pla! an important role in Ital!*
=ompared (ith the attitude in most countries to(ard the presence of U
forces, the reaction in Ital! is parado+ical* Instead of desirin) a reduction, the
Italians have )one on record as (antin) additional units* :fficiall!, the reason
)iven (as the increased instbilit! in the .iddle "ast, the dan)ers this holds for
N#1:, and Ital!Bs favorable strate)ic position from (hich to deplo! forces as
necessar!* "Auall! important factors behind this decision (ere, ho(ever, the
&no(led)e of the ver! important economic contribution b! the U forces, and the
feelin) that the )reater the number of U personnel stationed in Ital!, the )reater
the call Ital! (ould have on U 9rotection and assistance*
(
)
1he rationale behind the 'parado+ical' Italian behavior should be appraised b! ta&in) into
account the almost obsessive sense of insecurit! of (estern0oriented Italian politicians* 1he!
(United tates :verseas .ilitar! ;ases, <eport to the 9resident b! %ran& =* Nash* =ountr! tudies- Ital!,
November 1957, in $eclassified $ocuments <eference !stem ($$<), 199> ? 223/*
perceived the main threat to the 5estern orientation of the countr! as a comple+ mi+ture of
e+ternal and domestic menaces* $omesticall! there (as the chance of a perfectl! le)al electoral
victor! of the =ommunist part! and, e+ternall!, the possibilit! of oviet a))ression in a full0scale
armed confrontation across "urope* ome(here in bet(een the t(o e+tremes la!, at least until
the schism bet(een .osco( and ;el)rade, the possibilit! of an armed =ommunist uprisin)
supported b! Gu)oslavian forces* 5ith the passin) of time some of these possibilities diminished,
but the! never totall! disappeared* %or the time period under consideration, ho(ever, the! (ere
certainl! influential in shapin) Italian defense policies*
1he narro( parliamentar! maDorities enDo!ed b! the pro05estern parties e+plain the
sensitivit! of the Italian )overnment to this threat in all its facets, and therefore its (illin)ness to
host #merican troops in Italian territor!* U forces (ere re)arded as pla!in) a useful role a)ainst
each aspect of the comple+ threat to the pro0(estern orientation of the )overnment* 1he! had the
primar! purpose to deter an e+ternal invasion b! threatenin) U nuclear retaliation a)ainst the
a))ressor, and therefore the! fulfilled (hat (as primaril! a strictl! militar! role*
1he U militar! presence also meant that the Italian )overnment could allocate to the
defence bud)et a more limited portion of its finances than (ould have other(ise been the case*
1his left Ital! free to concentrate the bul& of its spendin) on economic )ro(th (hich, Italian
politicians tirelessl! repeated to their #merican counterparts, (as the best (a! to defeat
=ommunism* In certain areas, the presence of U troops also had some direct economic benefits,
related both to their influence on local commerce and to their emplo!ment of a certain amount of
Italian manpo(er* %inall!, and perhaps most important of all, the presence of U troops (as a
deep ps!cholo)ical reassurance that Ital! (as firml! tied to the 5est* 1he available
documentation does not sa! (hether it had ever been planned to use an! of the U troops in case
of a =ommunist uprisin), ((hich seems hi)hl! unli&el!, )iven their eAuipment, trainin) and
speciali,ation) but this is not the point- Italian politicians probabl! thou)ht that such an uprisin)
(as all the more unli&el! as lon) as an! #merican forces (ere stationed in Ital!, and the! also
e+pected that their presence (ould affect the electoral behavior of the Italian population b!
e+plicitl! representin) the #merican commitment to Italian securit!* 1he ecretar! Ceneral of
the %orei)n :ffice made this point Auite clear (hen he said to a U diplomat that
onl! Italians can full! appreciate KtheL political si)nificance in Ital! of KtheL
presence KofL U troops for a) internal stabilit!, b) ps!cholo)ical impression on
populace of U stren)th and protection*
(
)
1o sum up, #merican forces in Ital! (ere re)arded as a deterrent a)ainst e+ternal a))ression but,
to a certain e+tent, also a)ainst the de)eneration of domestic political stabilit!*
# final assessment of the relationship en)endered b! this arran)ement is rather
challen)in)* It is difficult to conceive ho( Ital! could have dedicated more of its limited
resources to defense e+penditures (ithout seriousl! compromisin) its 'economic miracle',
(hich, (ith all it limits, has mana)ed to complete the moderni,ation of a lar)e part of the
countr!* :n the other hand, it seems onl! fair to conclude that the inclination of the Italians to
rel! on the po(erful #merican all! for all defense purposes has sometime de)enerated in a lac&
of national responsibilit! for securit! problems, and in a sort of happ!0)o0luc&! attitude (hich
refuses to )ive the necessar! priorit! to securit! concerns* 1his problem ma! become more
serious if the present trend in international relations is confirmed, as in a post0=old (ar "urope
there mi)ht be an ur)ent need to rethin& most of the previous securit! arran)ements, and to
redefine defense policies alon) different lines*
( The Ambassador in Rome to the Secretary of State (# 498),August 9, 198, in !A", R# 9,
$%&%1'(8)98&
N;- the follo(in) acron!ms have been used throu)hout the te+t-
#=, #rchivio =entrale dello tato, <omeF
#.#", #rchivio torico del .inistero de)li #ffari "steri, <omeF
#U.", #rchivio Ufficio torico dello tato .a))iore "sercito, <omeF
$$<, $eclassified $ocuments <eference !stem, <esearch 9ublications, =onnecticutF
%<U, %orei)n <elations of the United tatesF
G%E Librar!, Gohn %it,)erald Eenned! 9residential Librar!, ;oston, .assachusettsF
N#5, National #rchives, 5ashin)ton $*=*F
N71, Ne( 7or& 1imesF
9<:, 9ublic <ecord :ffice, Ee(, Creat ;ritainF
1I#, 1reaties and other International #)reements of the United tates*
$r* 5olf)an) Erie)er
$r* imon $u&e
tiftun) 5issenschaft und 9oliti&
"benhausen, .unich %lorence, #u)ust 19, 1991
$ear 5olf)an), $ear $r* $u&e-
here is the edited cop! of the paper (ith all the corrections (in red, as reAuested) that I
(ould li&e to see included* I also attach a note on sources as (ell as a ne( printout of ho( the
paper should loo& li&e in its final version (althou)h even this ne( draft has a fe( last minute
hand0(ritten corrections in it)*
I hope ever!thin) is clear enou)h* 9lease let me &no( if there are an! problems* Loo&in)
for(ard to hearin) from !ou,
!ours sincerel!
Leopoldo Nuti
Note to the "ditors-
1) 1he pa)e numbers in !our comments do not match either the numbers of m! ori)inal draft or
those of the edited cop! 0 thus ma&in) it hard for me to find the e+act point the! refer to*
8o(ever, I hope I have made all the recommended corrections in red on !our edited cop!, and I
have added a fe( chan)es here and there* 5hen the chan)es (ere too complicated I added a
separate 'attached sheet', numbered, after the pa)e (here the chan)e must be included*
2) :n !our specific point ?1, in !our letter-
the contradiction is made e+plicit in the te+t, (hen I (rite that '**** nevertheless this call for
maintainin) a stron) militar! posture and ma&in) Ital!
'
a bul(ar& of democrac!' in the
.editerranean contrasted sharpl! (ith pre0established demobili,ation plans'* 1o ma&e the
contrast more visible I substituted 'earl!' (ith 'pre0established' in this ne( draft, and I added
somethin) to the follo(in) sentence*
4) pecific point ?2-
I ar)ue that it (as the (a! in (hich the departure (as sta)ed ((ith shipsB horns blo(in),
airplanes circlin) over maDor cities, and so forth0althou)h I did not include this in the te+t) that
(as meant to impress the =ommunists, and not the departure itself*
/) pecific point ?11-
1he onl! document I &no( (hich could e+plain 8#9"Bs decision is 8#9"Bs stud! 232055,
Auoted as such in the te+t* :bviousl! I do not have a cop! of it- I onl! &no( from the 8istorical
$iar! of the $efense Ceneral taff that it (as supposed to support the redeplo!ment of U
troops from #ustria to Ital!*
I (ish to e+press m! than&s to 5olf)an) chl6r for his comments on an earl! version of this
paper, and to .ichael 7affe for both his (illin)ness to discuss (ith me the database of the
Nuclear 8istor! 9ro)ram and some useful information about the timin) of the deplo!ment of U
nuclear (arheads in "urope*
8ans Gur)en chraut ((ith Goan $* 8efferman, #le+ander .* Earber, 9hillip #* Eerber and
.ichael $* 7affe), 1he United tates #rm! in "urope, 19/501955 (Nuclear 8istor! 9ro)ram,
199>)*
9lease add to footnote ? 22, after 'p*17'-
%or the inclusion of Ital! in the #tlantic 9act, see also 1imoth! "* mith, '1he %ear of
ubversion- the U and the Inclusion of Ital! in the North #tlantic 1reat!', in $iplomatic
8istor!, JII, n*2 (1934) pp*1490155F and the rich Italian biblio)raph- .ario 1oscano, '#ppunti
sui ne)o,iati per la partecipa,ione italiana al 9atto #tlantico', in Idem, 9a)ine di toria
$iplomatica =ontemporanea, vol* II, :ri)ini e vicende della seconda )uerra mondiale (.ilano-
CiuffrI, 19@4), pp*//50519F 9ietro 9astorelli, 'La politica europeistica di $e Casperi'
and 'LBadesione dellBItalia al 9atto #tlantico', in Idem, La politica estera italiana del dopo)uerra
(;olo)na- Il mulino, 1937), pp*1/502>3, and 2>90421F #ntonio Jarsori, 'La scelta occidentale
dellBItalia', in toria delle <ela,ioni Interna,ionali, I, n* 1 pp*950159, and n*2, pp*4>404@3
(1935)F #lfredo ;reccia, LBItalia e la difesa dellB"uropa* #lle ori)ini del '9iano 9leven' (<oma-
Istituto di tudi "uropei #* $e Casperi, 193/)F ;runello Ji)e,,i, '$e Casperi, for,a, la
diploma,ia italiana tra patto di ;ru+elles e patto atlantico (19/3019/9)', in toria
=ontemporanea, RJIII, n*1 (1937), pp*50/4* ee also m! 'La missione .arras', cit*, and '1he
Italian militar! and the #tlantic 9act', cit*
9lease add to footnote ?2@-
in N* 5i))ershaus (ed*), $ie Nordatalantische ;undnis, 19/90195@ (%reibur)-
.ilitPr)eschichtliches %orschun)samt, forthcomin))*
9lease modif! footnote ?/2 as follo(s-
In later documents, it (ill be referred to as '#)reement bet(een the United tates of #merica
and the <epublic of Ital! re)ardin) bilateral infrastructure'* 1he te+t of the a)reement remains
secret to this da!, but from later documents it can be established that it authorised the U to
operate a)reed installations in accordance (ith its provisions and, in a section denominated
'$ocument II', listed all the installations to (hich the a)reement applied* It also contemplated
that it could be made applicable to additional installations b! subseAuent a)reements to add them
to the list* ee .emo to the #ctin) ecretar! of tate, 'Ne)otiations to brin) additional
installations (ithin 195/ a)reement (ith Ital!', .arch 15, 195@, in National #rchives,
5ashin)ton (N#5), <C 59, 7@5*5H40155@ (bo+ 4@19)* %urther details about the ne)otiations for
the a)reement can be collected in the tate $epartment %ile 711*5@4@5, from 901@5/ to 1>02>5/,
in N#5, <C 59*
9lease add at the end of footnote ?51-
1he issue (as also probabl! debated b! the upreme $efense =ouncil, (hich met on #u)ust 2*
1he minutes of that meetin) are not open to research, but some information can be )athered in
the #merican #mbassador in <ome to the ecretar! of tate, .eetin) of the upreme $efense
=ouncil, #u)ust /, 1955, in N#5, <C 59, 7@5*5H30/55 (bo+ 4@19)*
9lease substitute from 'In 1953 the United tates proposed****' to 'an operational element of
"1#%' (ith the follo(in)-

In late 1957 the G=, the $epartment of $efense and the $epartment of tate debated (hether
the U should propose to the Italian )overnment the 'indi)eni,ation' of "1#%, turnin) over to
the Italian services the mannin) of the missiles and retainin) onl! the custod! of the (arheads*
(
)
8o(ever, (hen in #u)ust 1953 the U minister Gerne)an met (ith the ecretar! Ceneral of the
Italian %orei)n :ffice, #lessandrini, to discuss the reor)ani,ation of "1#%, he (as told that
'9resident Cronchi, %anfani, e)ni and others on hi)hest level ur)e and insist KthatL the U
recondider the plan', that the )overnment of Ital! '(ould )reatl! deplore an! reduction KinL U
stren)th "1#% or else(here and KthatL it instead prefers U troop totals to be increased'*
(
)
( Re*ort by the +oint Strategic,-ans .ommittee to the +.S on ,ro*osa- to the /ta-ian
#o0ernment regarding indigeni1ation of the Southern 2uro*ean Tas3 4orce (+.S 1858(48),4
6ctober 19$, in 77RS, 1981, %4 .&
( 4or the +ernegan)A-essandrinita-3s,see The Ambassador in Rome to the Secretary of
State (# 498),August 9, 198, in !A", R# 9, $%&%1'(8)98& See a-so The Ambassador in
Rome to the Secretary of State (# 8$),+u-y 85, 198, in !A", R# 8, $%&%1'($)858 (bo9
8%'')&/t might be :orth *ointing out that in ear-y 19$ 7efense ;inister Ta0ianihad
"ventuall! the U element in "1#% (as cut bac& from @*>>> to /*>>>- U troops remained to
operate the =orporals, (hile the 8onest Gohns (ere handed over to the Italians, after the! (ere
adeAuatel! trained on the ne( (eapons* In Gune 1959 the III Italian .issile bri)ade became an
operational element of "1#%*
(
)
9lease substitute footnote ?53 (ith the follo(in)-
%or a description of the technical differences bet(een the t(o deliver! s!stems, see 9rince
8ubertus ,u Lo(enstein and Jol&mar von Ouhlsdorff, N#1: and the $efense of the 5est*
K5estport, =onnecticut- Creen(ood 9ress 9ublishers, 1975 (reprint of the ori)inal 1957
edition)L, pp*2790231*
a-ready sounded the <S mi-itary attach= in Rome about as3ing forma--y to the ,entagon
:hether the <S cou-d de*-oy more troo*s in /ta-ian territory,s*ecifica--yone di0ision
either in Sici-yor Sardinia and some air units in Tuscany& The re>uest found SA.2<R
interested on-y if it cou-d be met :ithout sacrificingany of the units a-ready de*-oyed in
#ermany, and cou-d not be satisfied&<S !;R in ,aris (#enera- Schuy-er)to the 6ffice of
the Secretary of 7efence,for /SA, 1 4ebruary 19$, in 77RS, 1981, 14 ?&
( @in +anuary 199, 44 se-ected /ta-ian arti--erymen mo0ed into S2TA4As 2der-e .aserme at
Bicen1a to be trained on the Conest +ohn Roc3et D&&&&EShort-y after:ard,S2TA4As t:o Conest
+ohn batta-ions :ere inacti0ated as t:o -i3e /ta-ian units became o*erationa-,thus
strengthening /ta-yAscontribution to !AT6 defenses&/n +une 199 the ////ta-ian missi-e
?rigade became an o*erationa-e-ement of S2TA4@&!C, 7ata .o--ection ) /ta-yFThe <nited
States Army in 2uro*e ) :arhead detachments,**&555589&
9lease add at the end of footnore ?@>, after $$<, 1931, @/ =-
ee also 1he #mbassador in <ome to the ecretar! of tate (? 475), Gul! 4>, 1953, in N#5, <C
53, 7@5*5@12H704>53 (bo+ 4@22)*
9lease modif! the te+t before footnote ?@1 as follo(s-
'proposed instead that KUL forces be increased'- (hen the U minister Gerne)an met (ith the
ecretar! Ceneral of the Italian %orei)n :ffice, #lessandrini, to discuss the reor)ani,ation of
"1#%, he (as told that '9resident Cronchi, %anfani, e)ni and others on hi)hest level ur)e and
insist KthatL the U recondider the plan', that the )overnment of Ital! '(ould )reatl! deplore an!
reduction KinL U stren)th "1#% or else(here and KthatL it instead prefers U troop totals to be
increased'*(@1)
also add to footnote ?@1, at the end of the e+istin) footnote (i*e*, after $$<, 1931, 1/5 ;)-
%or the Gerne)an0#lessandrini tal&s, see 1he #mbassador in <ome to the ecretar! of tate (?
/93), #u)ust 9, 1953, in N#5, <C 59, 7@5*5@12H30953*
9lease add in the last pa)e, three lines from bottom, ri)ht after 'securit!'-
1he ecretar! Ceneral of the %orei)n :ffice made this point Auite clear (hen he said to a U
diplomat that
onl! Italians can full! appreciate KtheL political si)nificance in Ital! of KtheL
presence KofL U troops for a) internal stabilit!, b) ps!cholo)ical impression on
populace of U stren)th and protection*(71)
footnote ?71- 1he #mbassador in <ome to the ecretar! of tate (? /93), #u)ust 9, 1953, in
N#5, <C 59, 7@5*5@12H30953*
9lease note that the follo(in) para)raph is entirel! missin) from m! version of the edited cop!,
and that I thin& it is rather important to conclude the (hole article, (hich other(ise loo&s
truncated Auite abruptl!-
# final assessment of the relationship en)endered b! this arran)ement is rather
challen)in)* It is difficult to conceive ho( Ital! could have dedicated more of its limited
resources to defense e+penditures (ithout seriousl! compromisin) its 'economic miracle',
(hich, (ith all it limits, has mana)ed to complete the moderni,ation of a lar)e part of the
countr!* :n the other hand, it seems onl! fair to conclude that the inclination of the Italians to
rel! on the po(erful #merican all! for all defense purposes has sometime de)enerated in a lac&
of national responsibilit! for securit! problems, and in a sort of happ!0)o0luc&! attitude (hich
refuses to )ive the necessar! priorit! to securit! concerns* 1his problem ma! become more
serious if the present trend in international relations is confirmed, as in a post0=old (ar "urope
there mi)ht be an ur)ent need to rethin& most of the previous securit! arran)ements, and to
redefine defense policies alon) different lines*
# note on sources*
#s it happens (ith most of post(ar Italian militar! histor!, this article had to face the
problem of a limited availabilit! of sources* 1he main militar! source (as the #rchivio Ufficio
torico dello tato .a))iore "sercito (#rchives of the 8istorical :ffice of the #rm! taff),
(hich has some files open up to the mid0fifties and contains a fe( records from the files of the
$efense Ceneral taff as (ell* :ne document in particular, (9romemoria- $isloca,ione in Italia
del contin)ente U# proveniente dallB#ustria, in I05, =arte))io classificato Ufficio :pera,ioni,
1955) has been particularl! useful, as it sums up some of the technical aspects of the ne)otiations
for the deplo!ment of "1#%* 1he 8istorical $iar! of the $efense Ceneral taff (as also of
some help* #ccess to this files, ho(ever, is usuall! restricted to the :fficeBs o(n historians and
collaborators*
1he $efense .inistr! and the $efense Ceneral taff neither have their o(n archives open
to research nor do the! store their records at the #rchivio =entrale dello tato (tateBs =entral
#rchives), thus ma&in) an! reconstruction of Italian militar! polic! incomplete at best* 1he
.inistr! of %orei)n #ffairs is no( declassif!in) its o(n files for the 195>s, but at the time (hen
this article (as (ritten ver! little (as available* #s for the #=, it offers the minutes of the
=abinet meetin)s (hich, s&etch! as the! usuall! are, sometime provide some insi)ht in the
)overnmentBs activities* 1he published volumes of the #tti 9arlamentari (9arliamentar! $ebates)
allo( a rich and detailed reconstruction of parliamentar! activities*
1he situation is some(hat bri)hter from the U point of vie(* ;oth the .ilitar! and the
$iplomatic ;ranches of the National #rchives have plent! of material on U0Italian relations,
especiall! for the earl! post(ar !ears* 1he tate $epartment $ecimal %iles also contain relevant
records related to the ne)otiations for the facilities a)reements, and to the 1953 attempt to reduce
U role in "1#%* 1he facilities a)reement itself, ho(ever, remains classified to this da!*
%inall!, the G*%* Eenned! 9residential Librar! contains, in the National ecurit! %ilesH=ountr!
%iles of 9resident Eenned!Bs papers, some &e! documents to understand the 19@4 initiative to
reduce the U component of "1#%*
:ther sources must be briefl! mentioned as (ell* 1he $eclassified $ocuments <eference
!stem has provided scattered pieces of information (hich have proved ver! helpful in fillin)
certain )aps of the narrative* 1he same is true for the microfilmed collections of G*%* $ulles
papers and of the Goint =hiefs of taff* 1he %orei)n <elations of the United tates series does not
usuall! deal (ith militar! issues too much in detail, but the JIII volume of the 19520195/ series
offers a )ood understandin) of the connection bet(een the 1rieste problem nad the ne)otiations
about the facilities* 1he %orei)n :ffice and 5ar :ffice files at the ;ritish 9ublic <ecord :ffice
have helped to clarif! some of the issues*
Last but not least, the N89 database* #ltou)h in a still informal version, it has proved to
be of the utmost utilit! in corroboratin) m! o(n scattered data (ith a solid referential structure*