Sei sulla pagina 1di 395

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310


CS ( Pe e r s I nqui r y) 1 4 March 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY
SUBJECT: Le t t e r of Tr a ns mi t t a l
.1. Pur s uant t o your d i r e c t i v e of 26 November 1969, I have
compl et ed t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of f a c t s and ci r cumst ances
sur r oundi ng t h e o r i g i n a l Army i n v e s t i g a t i o n of i n c i d e n t s
which occur r ed dur i ng t h e pe r i c d 16-19 March 1968 i n Son
My Vi l l a g e , Quang Ngai Pr ovi nce, Republ i c of Vietnam.
2. Forwarded her ewi t h i s t h e f i n a l r e p o r t of i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
/cA W. R. PEERS
1 I n c l
a s Li e ut e na nt Gener al , USA
Volume I of the Report of the Department of the Army
Review of the Prel i mi nary Investigations into the My Lai
Incident has been declassified and released by the Secret ary
of the Army. This volume contains the body of the report.
It has not been altered in any way except to delete footnotes
which refer in large part to mat eri al in Volumes I1 and IV
which will not be released.
Volume 111of the report has also been declassified and
released by the Secretary of the Army. Due to i t s volume
(seven books), however, i t will not be reproduced. A
complete set of Volume I11 i s available for examination in
the reference section of the Army Library, Room 1A 526
in the Pentagon.
ForsalebytheSuperintendentof Documents,U.S.Government PrintingOffice
Washington, D.C.,20402-Price$6.20
StockNumber0800-00210
1 4 March 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY
SUBJECT: Fi na l Report of I nve s t i ga t i on
I would l i k e t o r ecor d my concurrence i n t he ba s i c f i nd-
i ngs of t he r e p o r t and my s a t i s f a c t i o n wi t h t he manner i n
which t he I nqui r y has been conduct ed by LTG Peer s. I am s a t i s -
f i e d t h a t ever y r easonabl e e f f o r t has been made t o det er mi ne
t he f u l l f a c t s sur r oundi ng t he o r i g i n a l Army i nve s t i ga t i on of
t he i nc i de nt s and t h a t t he r e por t f a i r l y r ecor ds what was found.
Si nce j oi ni ng t h e I nqui r y on Oecember 5 , 1969, M r . Jerome
K. Walsh, Jr. , and I , a s c i v i l i a n l e g a l counsel , have ser ved
a s i n t e g r a l members of t he I nqui r y team. Our advi ce has been
cont i nual l y s o l i c i t e d i n t he cour se of t he I nqui r y and our
suggest i ons a s t o i s s u e s t o be examined and i nf or mat i on t o be
sought have been cons ci ent i ous l y pursued. We f u l l y pa r t i c i p-
a t e d - i n t h e i nt e r r oga t i on of wi t nes s es , t he revi ew of t he evi -
dence and t he pr epar at i on of t he r e por t . While t h e r e have been
many as pect s e s s e n t i a l t o t he I nqui r y and t o a compl et e r e por t
which go beyond a layman' s spher e of knowledge, ever y at t empt
was made by LTG Peer s and members of h i s team t o pr ovi de us
wi t h t he background i nf or mat i on r equi r ed t o enl ar ge our pa r t i c -
i pat i on.
I t became c l e a r t o me i n t h e cour se of t h e I nqui r y t h a t
t he r es our ces and t e c hni c a l competence of t h e Army i t s e l f were
e s s e n t i a l t o a sound, t horough and e f f e c t i v e exami nat i on of
t h i s mat t er . I am convi nced t h a t it was de s i r a bl e from t he
poi nt of view of t h e publ i c and of a l l concerned t h a t t h i s
mat t er i n t he fi rst i ns t ance be f u l l y examined by t he Army.
I be l i e ve it has been we l l done.
AOBERT M~C&TE
Speci al Counsel
CONTENTS
Page
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose of t he I nqui r y ................
B. Scope of t he I nqui r y..................
C. Or gani zat i on and General Conduct of
t h e I nqui r y; ........................
I ncl os ur e 1. J o i n t Memorandum from Secr e-
t a r y of t h e Army and Chi ef
of S t a f f , US Army, t o Gen-
e r a l Peer s , 26 Nov 69. . . . .
I ncl os ur e 2 . Le t t e r from Mr . Ronald L.
Ridenhour t o Secr et ar y of
Defense, 29 Mar 69. . . . . . . .
I ncl os ur e 3. Memorandum from Gener al
Peer s t o Secr et ar y of t h e
Army and Chi ef of S t a f f ,
US Army, 30 Nov 69. . . . . . . .
I ncl os ur e 4 . Memorandum from General
Peer s t o Secr et ar y of t h e
Army and Chief of S t a f f ,
US Army, 30 Nov 69. . . . . . . .
I ncl os ur e 5. DA Out Message 933773,
9 Dec 69. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I ncl os ur e 6. Memorandum from General
Peer s t o Secr et ar y of t he
Army and Chi ef of S t a f f ,
US Army, 21 J an 70 ( 4
I n c l w/d) .................
I ncl os ur e 7. J o i n t Memorandum from Sec-
r e t a r y of t h e Army and
Chief of S t a f f , US Army,
t o General Peer s , 2 Feb
70........................
CHAPTER 2. SUMMARY REPORT
A. The Son MY Vi l l age I nci dent . . . . .......
B. Report s of the I nci dent . . .............
C. I nve s t i ga t i on of t h e I nci dent and
Re v i e w. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......
D. Suppr essi on and Wi t hhol di ng of I n-
f or mat i on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. Summary of Fi ndi ngs. . .................
P a g e
CHAPTER 3. BACKGROUND
A. Ene my Si t ua t i on i n Ma r c h 1 9 6 8 ..:......
B . Son My V i l l a g e ........................
C. T h e People of Qu a n g N g a i P r o v i n c e .....
D. En e my T a c t i c s and T e c h n i q u e s i n Sout h
V i e t n a m.............................
E . Free World M i l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e Forces
O b j e c t i v e s f or 1 9 6 8 .................
F . St a t u s of P a c i f i c a t i o n ................
G. US Psychol ogi cal O p e r a t i o n s ...........
H. Fr i endl y Si t ua t i on....................
CHAPTER 4 . ORGANIZATION. OPERATIONS AND TRAI NI NG
OF THE US UNI TS
A . A m e r i c a 1 ( 2 3 d ) D i v i s i o n ...............
B . T h e 11t h I nf a nt r y B r i g a d e .............
C . T a s k Force B a r k e r .....................
D. Co mp a n y C, 1st B a t t a l i o n , 2 0 t h I n-
f a n tr y ..............................
E . Co mp a n y B, 4 t h B a t t a l i o n , 3d I n-
f a nt r y ..............................
F . Previous T a s k Force B a r k e r O p e r a t i o n s
i n t h e Son My A r e a ..................
CHAPTER 5. THE SON MY OPERATION. 1 6 - 1 9 MARCH 1 9 6 8
A . C o n c e p t of O p e r a t i o n ..................
B. Issuance of O r d e r s and I ns t r uc t i ons ...
C . I nt e l l i ge nc e B r i e f i n g .................
D. O p e r a t i o n a l O r d e r s and I ns t r uc t i ons ...
E . Issues C o n c e r n i n g LTC B a r k e r ' s
B r i e f i n g ............................
F. Subsequent B r i e f i n g s By Co mp a n y
Co mma n d e r s
..........................
G. Su mma r y of O p e r a t i o n s on 1 6 Ma r c h .....
H. Su mma r y of O p e r a t i o n s on 1 7 Ma r c h .....
I . S u mma r y of O p e r a t i o n s on 18 Ma r c h .....
J . Su mma r y of O p e r a t i o n s on 1 9 Ma r c h .....
K. Subsequent O p e r a t i o n s by T F B a r k e r ....
CHAPTER 6 . COMPANY C. 1 S T BATTALION. 20TH INFANTRY:
ACTIONS ON 1 6 AND 1 7 MARCH 1 9 6 8
A. O p e r a t i o n s on 1 6 Ma r c h ................
B . O p e r a t i o n s on 1 7 Ma r c h ................
CHAPTER 7 . COMPANY B. 4TH BATTALION. 3D INFANTRY:
ACTIONS ON 1 6 - 1 9 MARCH 1 9 6 8
A. I nt r oduct i on ..........................
B . O p e r a t i o n s 1 6 Ma r c h ...................
C. O p e r a t i o n s 17 Ma r c h ................-.
D. O p e r a t i o n s 18 Ma r c h ...................
E . O p e r a t i o n s 1 9 Ma r c h ...................
<" P a g e
~ H A P T E R 8.
SI GNI FI CANT FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED
TO THE SON MY TRAGEDY
A . G e n e r a l ...............................
B. P l a n s and O r d e r s ......................
C . A t t i t u d e s T o wa r d t he V i e t n a m e s e .......
D. C a s u a l t i e s F r o m Mi n e s and B o o b y t r a p s ..
E . P r i o r Fa i l ur e t o C l o s e w i t h t he
Ene my ...............................
F. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l P r o b l e m s ...............
G. L a c k of Command R a p p o r t w i t h i n T F
B a r k e r ..............................
H. A t t i t u d e of G o v e r n me n t of V i e t n a m
O f f i c i a l s ...........................
I . N a t u r e of t he Ene my ...................
J . L e a d e r s h i p ............................
K. P e r m i s s i v e A t t i t u d e ...................
L . L a c k of A f f i r m a t i v e Command and Con-
t r o l ................................
M. L a c k of E mp h a s i s i n T r a i n i n g ..........
N . P s y c h o l o g i c a l B u i l d u p .................
0; Su mma r y ...............................
' CHAPTER 9. POLI CY AND DI RECTI VES AS TO RULES OF EN-
/'
GAGEMENT AND TREATMENT OF NONCOMBATANTS
A. US O b l i g a t i o n s U n d e r t he La w of War ...
B . U n i t e d States D i r e c t i v e s ..............
C . G o v e r n me n t of V i e t n a m P o l i c y / D i r e c -
t i ves as t o Son My ..................
CHAPTER 1 0 . REPORTS. I NVESTI GATI ONS. AND REVIEWS
A. T h e I mme d i a t e R e p o r t s . I nvest i gat i ons.
and R e v i e w s . Ma r c h - e a r l y ~ p r i l 1 9 6 8.
B . T h e Subsequent R e p o r t s ( t h e A b s e n c e
of F u r t h e r I nves t i gat i on or Re -
v i e w ) Ap r i l - Ma y 1 9 68................
C . G o v e r n me n t of V i e t n a m.................
I ncl os ur e 1. Kn o wl e d g e of I nci dent s ......
I ncl osur e 2 . VC P r o p a g a n d a B r o a d c a s t ......
\ CHAPTER 11.
SUPPRESSI ON AND WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION
I nt r oduct i on ..........................
C Co mp a n y . 1st B a t t a l i o n . 3d I n-
f a nt r y ..............................
B Co mp a n y . 4 t h B a t t a l i o n . 2 0 t h I n-
f a nt r y ..............................
T a s k Force B a r k e r and 11t h B r i g a d e ....
COL H e n d e r s o n ' s R e p o r t s ...............
Co mp a n y B. 1 2 3 d A v i a t i o n B a t t a l i o n ....
H e a d q u a r t e r s . 1 2 3 d A v i a t i o n B a t t a l i o n .
H e a d q u a r t e r s . A m e r i c a 1 D i v i s i o n .......
A c t i o n s by Personnel O u t s i d e t he
A m e r i c a 1 D i v i s i o n ...................
Su mma r y ...............................
Page
CHAPTER12. FINDINGSANDRECOMMENDATIONS
I. Findings
A. ConcerningEventsSurrounding
theSonMyOperationsof16-
19March1968.................
B. ConcerningtheAdequacyofRe-
ports.Investigations.and
Reviews.......................
C. ConcerningAttemptstoSup-
pressInformation.............
D. WithRespecttoIndividuals.....
E. ConcerningtheAdequacyof
CertainPolicies.Directives.
andTraining..................
F. PeripheralIssues...............
I1. Recommendations.......................
Inclosure1. OmissionsandCommissions...
ANNEXA. PEERSINQUIRYORGANIZATIONANDPROCEDURES
1. ExecutiveDirection.................
2. SpecialCivilianCounsel............
3. OrganizationandRulesofPro-
cedure............................
4. Personnel...........................
5. AdministrationandLogistics........
6. ProductionofTestimonialEvidence..
7. ProductionofPhysicalEvidence.....
8. SupportbyOtherOfficesand
Agencies..........................
9. SaigonOffice.......................
10. VietnamTrip........................
11. PreparationofReport...............
Inclosure1. OrganizationalChart,Peers
Inquiry....................
Inclosure2. PeersInquiryPersonnel......
Inclosure3. PhotographofLTGPeers,Mr.
West,Mr.MacCrate,and
Mr.Walsh..................
Inclosure4. GroupPhotographofPeers
Inquiry....................
ANNEXB . PERIPHERALISSUES
1. RecordsManagementandDisposition..
2. AviationRecords....................
3. UseofPersonalCamerasbyA m y
Photographers.....................
4. UseofSmokeGrenades...............
5. SelectionandTrainingofLiaison
Officers..........................
6. PersonnelTurbulance................
7. UtilizationofFirstSergeants......
viii
C- 1
m
Page
ANNEX C. GLOSSARY..................................
Chapt er I
INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE OF THE I NQUI RY
On 26 November 1969, t h e Secr et ar y of t h e Army and t h e
Chief of S t a f f , US Army, i s s ued a j o i n t memorandum di r e c t i ng
Li eut enant General Wi l l i am R. Peer s t o expl or e t h e nat ur e and
scope of t h e o r i g i n a l Army i nve s t i qa t i ons of what occurred on
16 March 1968 i n Son My Vi l l age, Quang Ngai Provi nce, Republic
of Vietnam, and t o det ermi ne:
1. The adequacy of such i nve s t i ga t i ons o r i n q u i r i e s and
subsequent revi ews and r e por t s wi t hi n t h e chai n of command;
and
2 . Whether any suppr essi on o r wi t hhol di nq of i nf or mat i on
by persons i nvol ved i n t h e i nc i de nt had t aken pl ace ( I ncl o-
s u r e 1).
The same memorandum s pe c i f i e d t h a t t h e I nqui r y would be con-
cerned wi t h t h e t i me per i od beqi nni ng March 1968 and cont i nui nq
u n t i l r e c e i pt by t h e Secr et ar y of Defense and ot her s of informa-
t i o n concerni ng t h e i nc i de nt i n a l e t t e r dat ed 29 March 1969
( I ncl osur e 2 ) . It was f ur t he r provi ded t h a t t h e Inqui ry would
ne i t he r i ncl ude nor i n t e r f e r e wi t h cr i mi nal i nve s t i ga t i ons i n
pr ogr ess. M r . Bland W e s t , As s i s t a nt General Counsel of t h e Army,
was named as General Peer s ' deputy f o r purposes of t h e I nqui r y.
B. SCOPE OF THE I NQUI RY
The primary focus of t h e I nqui r y has been on t h e subsequent
r e por t s and i nve s t i ga t i ons of t h e Son My i nci dent r a t h e r t han on
t h e i nci dent i t s e l f ; however, it became apparent a t an e a r l y
s t a ge t h a t t h e adequacy of t hos e r epor t s and i nve s t i ga t i ons coul d
not be eval uat ed i n t e l l i g e n t l y wi t hout a thorough underst andi ng
of what a c t ua l l y t ook pl ace dur i nq Task Force (TF) Bar ker ' s
e
oper at i ons i n t h e Son My a r e a on 16-19 March 1968.* Addi t i on-
a l l y , knowledge of t he oper at i onal f a c t s , i ncl udi ng t hose r e l a t -
i ng t o t he commission of a t r o c i t i e s , was e s s e n t i a l t o a det ermi -
nat i on a s t o whet her t he r e had been any subsequent suppr essi on
or wi t hhol di ng of i nf or mat i on by persons havi ng a dut y t o r e por t .
or t hes e r easons, t he scope of t h e I nqui r y i ncl uded a com-
p l e t e exami nat i on i n t o t he oper at i onal s i t u a t i o n t hroughout . TF
~ a r k e r ' sa r e a of oper at i ons (AO) dur i ng t h e per i od 16-19 March
1968, t oget her wi t h an expl or at i on o f , t h e f a c t s r e l a t i n g t o
a t r o c i t i e s committed i n t he cour se of such oper at i ons. The
l a t t e r aspect was pursued i n s u f f i c i e n t dept h t o det ermi ne t h e
s ubs t ant i ve f a c t s concerni ng such a t r o c i t i e s , but no d i r e c t
e f f o r t was' made t o e s t a b l i s h t he cr i mi nal l i a b i l i t y of pa r t i c -
ul a r i ndi vi dual s f o r pos s i bl e vi ol a t i ons of cr i mi nal s t a t u t e s
or t h e law of war. The Of f i ce of t h e Provost Marshal General
of t he Army assumed r e s pons i bi l i t y f o r i nve s t i ga t i on of t he s e
pos s i bl e vi ol a t i ons i n J ul y 1969, and c e r t a i n t est i mony and
ot her evi dence devel oped i n t he cour se of t h a t i nve s t i ga t i on
have been made a va i l a bl e and i ncor por at ed i n t h e r ecor d of
t h i s I nqui r y.
C. ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL CONDUCT OF THE I NQUI RY
General Peer s informed t h e Chief of St a f f and Secr et ar y of
t he Army on 30 November 1969 t h a t he i nt ended t o proceed by:
1. Reviewing t he f a c t s t hen a va i l a bl e f o r background i nf or -
mation;
2. Col l ect i ng pe r t i ne nt o f f i c i a l r ecor ds of u n i t s i n V i e t -
nam;
3 . Locat i ng and i nt e r r oga t i ng a l l wi t nesses known o r det er -
mined t o have i nf or mat i on bear i ng on t he i nc i de nt ; and
4. Pr epar i ng a r e por t on t h e r e s u l t s of t he i nve s t i ga t i on,
i ncl udi ng appr opr i at e f i ndi ngs and recommendations ( I ncl os ur e 3 ) .
*By memorandum t o t h e Secr et ar y of t he Army and t h e Chief of
St a f f , US Army, dat ed 2 1 January 1970 ( I ncl os ur e 6) , General
Peers poi nt ed out t h a t t h e name "My Lai ( 4 ) I' used on some US
maps was a misnomer i n t he sense t h a t it i s not commonly used by
t h e Vietnamese and t h a t t h e oper at i ons of TF Barker under i nves-
t i g a t i o n took pl ace i n s e ve r a l of t h e haml et s and subhaml et s of
Son My Vi l l age. On 2 February 1970, t h e Secr et ar y of t h e Army
and t he Chief of St a f f , US Army, confirmed t o General Peers t h a t
expl or at i on of mat t er s t hroughout a l l of Son My Vi l l age was con-
s i der ed t o be wi t hi n t he scope of t h e o r i g i n a l d i r e c t i v e f o r i n-
ve s t i ga t i on ( I ncl os ur e 7) .
On t h a t same da t e , General Peer s a l s o recommended t h a t a
di s t i ngui s hed lawyer be made a va i l a bl e t o t he i nve s t i ga t i ve team
i n or der t o promote publ i c r ecogni t i on and accept ance of t h e ob-
j e c t i v i t y of t h e I nqui r y and t o enhance i t s e f f e c t i ve ne s s ( I ncl o-
s ur e 4 ) . I n response t o t h i s r eques t , t h e Secr et ar y of t he Army
obt ai ned t he s e r vi c e s of Robert MacCrate, Esq., a pa r t ne r i n t h e
Ne w York law f i r m of Sul l i van & Cromwell and a Vice Pr es i dent -of
bot h t he New York St a t e Bar Associ at i on and t h e Associ at i on of
t he Bar of t h e Ci t y of New York, who agreed t o s er ve a s s pe c i a l -
counsel . Jerome K. Wa-lsh, Jr. , Esq. , of t he New York law f i r m
of Walsh f Fr i s ch, was appoi nt ed a s s oc i a t e s p e c i a l counsel .
An i nve s t i ga t i ng team of Department of t he Army per sonnel ,
i ncl udi ng f i e l d grade o f f i c e r s havi ng ext ensi ve exper i ence i n
ba t t a l i on- s i z e combat oper at i ons i n Vietnam and admi ni s t r at i ve
and suppor t per sonnel , was assembled t o a s s i s t General Peer s.
Addi t i onal per sonnel were added t o t h e team a s requi rement s be-
came more c l e a r l y def i ned. Fur t her d e t a i l s r es pect i ng t he organ-
i z a t i o n , procedures, and methods employed i n t h e cour se of t he
I nqui r y a r e set f o r t h i n I ncl osur e 3.
On 9 December 1969, t he I nqui r y was o f f i c i a l l y desi gnat ed a s
"The Department of t he Army Review of t h e Pr el i mi nar y I nvest i ga-
t i o n s i n t o t he My Lai I nci dent " ( I ncl os ur e 5) and was gi ven t h e
s hor t t i t l e of "The Peer s I nqui r y. "
The f i r s t phase of t he I nqui r y began a t t h e Pentagon on 2
December 1969 wi t h t h e t a ki ng of t est i mony from wi t nesses and t h e
/
c ol l e c t i on and revi ew of documentary evi dence. I nt e r r oga t i on of
wi t nesses proceeded on a 6-day pe r week ba s i s , and by 24 Decem-
be r , 39 wi t nesses had gi ven t est i mony, some of them on more t han
one occasi on. Si mul t aneousl y, t he i nve s t i ga t i ve team was assem-
b l i n g and st udyi ng numerous di r e c t i ve s , or der s , l ogs, r e por t s ,
maps, phot ographs, and ot he r evi dent i ar y mat er i al s bear i ng upon
t h e mat t er s under review. On 13 December, two o f f i c e r s depar t ed
f o r Vietnam t o provi de t h e team wi t h c-ontinuing i n-count ry r epr e-
s e nt a t i on and t o complete arrangements f o r t he Vietnam phase of
t h e I nqui r y.
On 26 December, General Peer s, t he c i v i l i a n s p e c i a l counsel ,
and ot he r members of t h e i nve s t i ga t i ng team depar t ed f o r Vietnam.
Ot her members of t h e team, under di r e c t i on of t h e deput y, M r .
W e s t , cont i nued t o examine a ddi t i ona l wi t nesses a t t he Pentagon
6.uring t h e per i od General Peers was i n Vietnam.
The Vietnam phase of t he I nqui r y, which cont i nued from 28 De-
cember 1969 u n t i l 8 January 1970, i nvol ved t he t aki ng of
1-3
t est i mony from o r i nt er vi ews wi t h key per sonnel t hroughout t h e
US mi l i t a r y chai n of command, US c i v i l i a n per sonnel , o f f i c i a l s
of t h e Government of Vietnam, Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)
of f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d per sonnel , and Vietnamese c i v i l i a n s r es i d-
i ng i n t he Son My Vi l l age ar ea. Documents consi der ed r e l e va nt
t o t he I nqui r y were obt ai ned from var i ous headquar t er s, i ncl ud-
i ng US Mi l i t a r y Assi st ance Command, Vietnam (USMACV) ; US Army,
Vietnam (USARV) ; I11 Marine Amphibious Force (I11MAF) ; America1
~ i v i s i o n ; and t h e 11t h I nf ant r y Bri gade. Fur t her documentation
was made a va i l a bl e t o t he team by var i ous Republic of Vietnam
(RVN) o f f i c i a l s and ARVN headquar t er s. General Peer s, t h e c i v i l -
i a n s pe c i a l counsel , and ot he r members of t h e i nve s t i ga t i ve team
made an on- s i t e i ns pect i on of c e r t a i n s i g n i f i c a n t ar eas wi t hi n
Son My Vi l l age, and ot he r such a r e a s were c l os e l y i nspect ed by
General Peers a t very low a l t i t u d e u t i l i z i n g an OH-6, a smal l ,
observat i on-t ype he l i c opt e r . Two members of t h e i nve s t i ga t i ng
team remained i n Vietnam t o cont i nue t he assembl i ng of documents
and t o obt a i n f u r t h e r i nf or mat i on from i n-count ry wi t nesses a s
developments i ndi cat ed t h e need.
The t h i r d phase of t he I nqui r y began wi t h t h e r e t ur n of
General Peers and pa r t y t o Washington on 8 January 1970. During
h i s absence, t he por t i on of t he team working under M r . West i n
Washington had i nt e r r oga t e d 4 1 a ddi t i ona l wi t nesses. I n or der
t o enabl e t h e i nve s t i ga t i ve team t o i nt e r r oga t e every person who
might reasonabl y be expect ed t o have usefu!. i nf or mat i on wi t hout
unduly del ayi ng compl et i on of t he I nqui r y, General Peer s est ab-
l i s hed t hr e e i nt e r r oga t i on teams t o t ake t est i mony concur r ent l y.
A f our t h team w a s added l a t e r f o r a l i mi t e d purpose. * Thi s pro-
cedure made it pos s i bl e f o r t he I nqui r y t o i nt e r r oga t e a t o t a l
of 399 wi t nesses, some of them on s e ve r a l d i f f e r e n t occasi ons,
and never t hel es s complete t he t aki ng of t est i mony by 7 March
1970.
Edi t i ng, revi ewi ng, and summarizing of t h e t r a n s c r i p t s of
t est i mony, pr epar at i on of e xhi bi t s , a na l ys i s of t h e i s s ue s and
evi dence, and d r a f t i n g of por t i ons of t he r e por t were c a r r i e d
forward by ot he r members of t he i nve s t i ga t i ve team concur r ent l y
wi t h t he t aki ng of t est i mony. Consequently, upon t he completion
*During t he oper at i on of TF Barker on 16-19 March 1968, two
r i f l e companies were employed on of f ens i ve oper at i ons i n t he Son
My Vi l l age ar ea. The t h i r d r i f l e company, A/ 3-L I n f , was em-
ployed e s s e n t i a l l y i n a bl ocki ng pos i t i on nor t h of Son My. The
f our t h i nt e r r oga t i on team was e s t a bl i s he d t o check out a l ead of
pos s i bl e misconduct by A Company. No r e l i a b l e evi dence of mis-
conduct was developed and, t he r e f or e , t he a c t i v i t i e s of A
Company a r e not gi ven de t a i l e d t r eat ment i n t h e r e por t
of hear i ngs i n e a r l y March and de s pi t e t h e va s t volume of as-
sembled evi dence, General Peers was i n a pos i t i on t o complete
h i s review and a na l ys i s of t h e evi dence and t o pr epar e t h i s r e-
p o r t wi t hi n a minimum of t i me.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
26 November 1969
i
MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM R. PEERS
! 218-34-7471
I SUBJECT: Directive for Investigation
Confirming or al instructions given you on 24 November 1969, you
a r e di rect ed to explore the nat ure and the scope of the original U. S.
Army investigation(s) of the alleged My Lai (4) incident which occurred
16 March 1968 i n Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam. Your
investigation will include a determination of the adequacy of the investiga-
t i o n ( ~ ) or inquiries on this subject, t hei r subsequent r e ~ e w s and report s
within the chain of command, and possible suppressi on or withholding of
information by persons involved i n the incident.
Your investigation will be concerned with the t i me period beginning
March 1968 until Mr . Ronald L. Ridenhour sent hi s l et t er, dated
29 March 1969, to the Secr et ar y of Defense ,and ot hers. The scope of
your investigation does not include, nor will i t i nt erfere with, ongoing
cri mi nal investigations i n progress.
The procedures contained i n AR 15-6 a r e authorized for such use
a s may be required.
You a r e authorized to sel ect and us e on a full- t i me basi s officer
and civilian member s of the Army whom you deem necessar y for the
conduct of the investigation. Your deputy i s designated a s Mr. Bland
West, Assi st ant General Counsel, Department of the ~ r m y . Should
you requi re other assi st ance, please l et us know.
You will i nform us a t an ear l y dat e of the expected completion date
of your report .
t I c r " 1 ~ .
Stanle R. Resor
General, U. S. Army Secr et ar y of the Army
Chief of 'Staff
Inclosure I
M r . Ron Ri d e n h o u r
1 4 1 6 E a s t Thomas Road /I104
P h o e n i x , Ar i z o n a
Mar ch 2 9 , 1 9 6 9
Ge n t l e me n :
I t was l a t e i n A p r i l , 1 9 6 8 t h a t I f i r s t h e a r d o f
" P i n k v i l l e " a nd wh a t a l l e g e d l y h a p p e n e d t h e r e . I r e c e i v e d
t h a t f i r s t r e p o r t w i t h some s k e p t i c i s m, b u t i n t h e f o l l o wi n g
mont hs I was t o h e a r s i m i l a r s t o r i e s f r o m s u c h a wi d e v a r i e t y
o f p e o p l e t h a t i t became i mp o s s i b l e f o r m e t o d i s b e l i e v e t h a t
s o me t h i n g r a t h e r d a r k a n d b1ood. y d i d i n d e e d o c c u r s ome t i me
i n Ma r c h, 1 9 6 8 i n a v i l l a g e c a l l e d " P i n k v i l l e " i n t h. e Re p u b l i c
o f Vi e t N a m.
The c i r c u ms t a n c e s t h a t l e d t o my h a v i n g a c c e s s t o t h e
r e p o r t s I ' m a b o u t t o r e l a t e n e e d e x p l a n a t i o n . I was i n d u c t e d
i n Mar ch, 1 9 6 7 i n t o t h e U. S. Army. A f t e r r e c e i v i n g v a r i o u s
t r a i n i n g I was a s s i g n e d t o t h e 7 0 t h I n f a n t r y De t a c h me n t ( LRP) ,
l l t h L i g h t I n f a n t r y Br i g a d e a t S c h o f i e l d Ba r r a c k s , Ha wa i i ,
i n e a r l y Oc t o b e r , 1 9 6 7 . Th a t u n i t , t h e 7 0 t h I n f a n t r y De t a c h -
me nt ( LRP) , was d i s b a n d e d a week b e f o r e t h e l l t h Br i g a d e
s h i p p e d o u t f o r V i e t Na m on t h e 5 t h o f December , 1 9 6 7 . A l l
o f t h e men f r o m whom I l a t . e r h e a r d r e p o r t s o f t h e " P i n k v i l l e "
i n c i d e n t we r e r e a s s i g n e d t o " C" Company, 1st B a t t a l i o n , 2 0 t h
I n f a n t r y , l l t h L i g h t I n f a n t r y Br i g a d e . I w a s r e a s s i g p e d t o
t h e a v i a t i o n s e c t i o n o f He a d q u a r t e r s He a d q u a r t e r s Company l l t h
LI B. A f t e r we h a d b e e n i n Vi e t Nam f o r 3 t o 4 mo n t h s many o f
t h e men f r o m t h e 7 0 t h I n f . De t . (LRP) b e g a n t o t r a n s f e r i n t o
t h e same u n i t , "E" Company, 5 1 s t I n f a n t r y ( LRP) .
I n l a t e A p r i l , 1 9 6 8 I was a wa i t i n g o r d e r s f o r a t r a n s -
f e r f r o m HHC, l l t h Br i g a d e t o Company "E, " 5 1 s t I n f . ( LRP) ,
when I h a p p e n e d t o r u n i n t o P f c " ~ u t c h " Gr u v e r , whom I h a d
known i n Ha wa i i . Gr u v e r t o l d m e h e h a d b e e n a s s i g n e d t o " C"
Company 1st o f t h e 2 0 t h u n t i l A p r i l 1s t when h e t r a n s f e r r e d t o
t h e u n i t t h a t I was h e a d e d f o r . Du r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f o u r con-
v e r s a t i o n h e t o l d me t h e f i r s t of many r e p o r t s I was t o h e a r
o f " P i n k v i l l e . "
Inclosure 2
" Ch a r l i e " Company 1 / 2 0 h a d b e e n a s s i g n e d t o Ta s k F o r c e
Ba r k e r i n l a t e F e b r u a r y , 1 9 6 8 t o h e l p c o n d u c t " s e a r c h a nd
d e s t r o y " o p e r a t i o n s on t h e Ba t a n g a n P e n i n s u l a , Ba r k e r ' s
a r e a o f o p e r a t i o n . The t a s k f o r c e was o p e r a t i n g o u t o f
L. F. D o t t i e , l o c a t e d f i v e o r s i x mi l e s n o r t h o f Quang Nh a i
c i t y on V i e t Namese Na t i o n a l Hi ghway 1. Gr u v e r s a i d t h a t
C h a r l i e Company h a d s u s t a i n e d c a s u a l t i e s ; p r i ma r i l y f r om
mi n e s a n d booby t r a p s , a l mo s t e v e r y d a y f r o m t h e f i r s t d a y
t h e y a r r i v e d on t h e p e n i n s u l a . One v i l l a g e a r e a was p a r t i -
c u l a r l y t r o u b l e s o me a n d s eemed t o b e i n f e s t e d w i t h booby
t r a p s a nd enemy s o l d i e r s . I t was l o c a t e d a b o u t s i x mi l e s
n o r t h e a s t o f Quang Nh a i c i t y a t a p p r o x i ma t e c o o r d i n a t e s
B. S . 728795. I t was a n o t o r i o u s a r e a a n d t h e men o f Ta s k
F o r c e Ba r k e r h a d a s p e c i a l name f o r i t : t h e y c a l l e d i t
" P i n k v i l l e . " One mo r n i n g i n t h e l a t t e r p a r t o f Ma r c h,
Ta s k F o r c e Ba r k e r moved o u t f r o m i t s f i r e b a s e h e a d e d f o r
" P i n k v i l l e . " I t s mi s s i o n : d e s t r o y t h e t r o u b l e s p o t a n d
a l l o f i t s i n h a b i t a n t s .
When " But c h" t o l d me t h i s I d i d n ' t q u i t e b e l i e v e t h a t
what h e was t e l l i n g me was t r u e , b u t he a s s u r e d m e t h a t i t
was a nd we n t on t o d e s c r i b e wh a t h a d h a p p e n e d . The o t h e r
t wo c o mp a n i e s t h a t made up t h e t a s k f o r c e c o r d o n e d o f f
t h e v i l l a g e s o t h a t " Ch a r l i e " Company c o u l d move t h r o u g h
t o d e s t r o y t h e s t r u c t u r e s a nd k i l l t h e f n h a b i t a n t s . Any
v i l l a g e r s who r a n f r om C h a r l i e Company we r e s t o p p e d b y t h e
e n c i r c l i n g c o mp a n i e s . I aske-d " But ch" s e v e r a l t i me s i f
a l l t h e p e o p l e we r e k i l l e d . He s a i d t h a t h e t h o u g h t t h e y
we r e , men, women a n d c h i l d r e n . He r e c a l l e d s e e i n g a s ma l l
b o y , a b o u t t h r e e o r f o u r y e a r s o l d , s t a n d i n g by t h e t r a i l
wi t h a g u n s h o t wound i n o n e ar m. The boy wa s c l u t c h i n g
h i s wounded ar m wi t h h i s o t h e r h a n d , wh i l e b l o o d t r i c k l e d
b e t we e n h i s f i n g e r s . He was s t a r i n g a r o u n d h i ms e l f i n
s h o c k a nd d i s b e l i e f a t wh a t h e saw. "He j u s t s t o o d t h e r e
wi t h b i g e y e s s t a r i n g a r o u n d l i k e h e d i d n ' t u n d e r s t a n d ; )
h e d i d n ' t b e l i e v e wh a t w a s h a p p e n i n g . Th e n t h e c a p t a i n ' s
RTO Cr a d i o o p e r a t o r ) p u t a b u r s t o f 1 6 CM-16 r i f l e ) f i r e
i n t o hi m. " I t wa s s o b a d , Gr u v e r s a i d , t h a t o n e o f t h e
men i n h i s s q u a d s h o t h i ms e l f i n t h e f o o t i n o r d e r t o b e
medi vac- ed o u t o f t h e a r e a s o t h a t h e wo u l d n o t h a v e t o
~ a r t i c i ~ a t e t h e Al t h o u g h h e h a d n o t s e e n i t , i n s l a u g h t e r .
Gr u v e r h a d b e e n t o l d by p e o p l e h e c o n s i d e r e d t r u s t w o r t h y
t h a t o n e o f t h e company' s o f f i c e r s , 2nd L i e u t e n a n t Ka l l y
( t h i s s p e l l i n g may b e i n c o r r e c t ) h a d r o u n d e d up s e v e r a l
g r o u p s o f v i l l a g e r s ( e a c h g r o u p c o n s i s t i n g o f a minimum o f
2Q p e r s o n s of b o t h s e x e s a nd a l l a g e s ) . Ac c o r d i n g t o t h e
a t o r y , Ka l l y t h e n ma c hi ne - gunne d e a c h g r o u p , Gr u v e r
e s t i ma t e d t h a t t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e v i l l a g e h a d b e e n 300
t o 400 p e o p l e a n d t h a t v e r y f e w, i f a n y , e s c a p e d .
Af t e r h e a r i n g t hi s a c c o u n t I c o u l d n ' t q u i t e a c c e p t i t .
Somehow I j u s t c o u l d n ' t b e l i e v e t h a t n o t o n l y ha d s o many
young Amer i can men p a r t i c i p a t e d i n s u c h an a c t of b a r b a r i s m,
b u t t h a t t h e i r o f f i c e r s ha d o r d e r e d i t . The r e we r e o t h e r
men i n t h e u n i t I was s oon t o b e a s s i g n e d t o , " En Company,
5 1 s t I n f a n t r y ( LRP) , who had be e n i n Ch a r l i e Company a t t h e
t i m e t h a t Gr uve r a l l e g e d t h e i n c i d e n t a t " P i n k v i l l e " ha d
o c c u r r e d . I became d e t e r mi n e d t o a s k them a b o u t " P i n k v i l l e "
s o t h a t I mi ght compar e t h e i r a c c o u n t s wi t h P f c Gr u v e r ' s .
When I a r r i v e d a t "Echo" company, 5 1 s t I n f a n t r y (LRP)
t h e f i r s t men 1 l ooke d f o r wer e P f c ' s Mi c ha e l Terry, a nd
Wi l l i a m Dohe r t y. Bot h were v e t e r a n s of " Ch a r l i e " Company,
1 / 2 0 and " P i n k v i l l e . I' I n s t e a d of c o n t r a d i c t i n g "But ch"
Gr u v e r ' s s t o r y t h e y c o r r o b o r a t e d i t , a ddi ng some t a s t y t i d -
b i t s of i n f o r ma t i o n of t h e i r own. Te r r y and Dohe r t y ha d
be e n i n t h e same s qua d a nd t hei r p l a t o o n was t h e t h i r d
p l a t o o n of "C" Company t o p a s s t h r o u g h t h e v i l l a g e . Most
o f t h e p e o p l e t h e y came t o were a l r e a d y de a d. Thos e t h a t
we r e n ' t we r e sough- t o u t a nd s h o t . The p l a t o o n l e f t n o t h i n g
a l i v e , n e i t h e r l i v e s t o c k n o r p e o p l e . Around noon t h e two
s o l d i e r s ' s qua d s t o p p e d t o e a t . i ill^ and I s t a r t e d t o
g e t o u t o u r chow, " Te r r y s a i d , " but c l o s e t o u s was a
bunch- of Vi e t na me s e i n a h e a p , and some of t hem were moan-
i n g . Ka l l y (2nd L t . Ka l l y ) ha d be e n t h r o u g h b e f o r e u s and
a l l of t hem ha d be e n s h o t , b u t many we r e n ' t de a d. I f was
o b v i o u s t h- at t h e y we r e n t t g o i n g t o g e t any me d i c a l a t t e n -
t i o n s o B i l l y a nd I g o t up and went o v e r t o wher e t h e y
we r e . I g u e s s we s o r t of f i n i s h e d them o f f . " Te r r y
we nt on t o s a y t h a t h e and Dohe r t y t h e n r e t u r n e d t o wher e
t h e i r p a c k s we r e a nd a t e l u n c h . He e s t i ma t e d t he s i z e of
t h e v i l l a g e t o b e 200 t o 300 p e o p l e . Dohe r t y t h o u g h t t h a t -
t h e p o p u l a t i o n of " P i n k v i l l e " ha d be e n 400 p e o p l e .
I f Te r r y , Do h e r t y and Gr uve r c o u l d b e b e l i e v e d , t h e n
n o t o n l y h-ad " Ch a r l i e " Company r e c e i v e d o r d e r s t o s l a u g h t e r
a l l t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of the v i l l a g e , b.ut t h o s e o r d e r s had
come f r om t h e commanding o f f i c e r of Ta s k Fo r c e Ba r k e r , o r
p o s s i b l y e ve n h i g h e r i n t h e c h a i n of command, P f c Te r r y
s t a t e d t h a t when Ca p t a f n Medi na ( Ch a r l i e Company' s commanding
o f f i c e r Ca p t a i n E r n e s t Medi na) i s s u e d , t h e o r d e r f o r t h e
d e s t r u c t i o n of " P i n k v i l l e " he ha d be e n h e s i t a n t , a s i f i t
we r e s ome t hi ng h e d f d n p t want t o do b u t ha d t o . Ot h e r s I
s p o k e t o c o n c u r r e d w i t h Te r r y on t h f s .
I t w a s J u n e b e f o r e I s p o k e t o a n y o n e who h a d some-
t h i n g o f s i g n i f i c a n c e t o add t o wh a t I h a d a l r e a d y b e e n t o l d
of t h e " P i n k v i l l e " i n c i d e n t . I t was t h e e n d o f J u n e , 1 9 6 8
when I r a n i n t o S a r g e n t L a r r y La Cr o i x a t t h e US0 i n Chu L a i .
La Cr o i x h a d b e e n i n 2nd L t . K a l l y ' s p l a t o o n on t h e da y
Tas k F o r c e Ba r k e r s we p t t h r o u g h " P i n k v i l l e . " What h e t o l d
me v e r i f i e d t h e s t o r i e s o f t h e o t h e r s , b u t h e a l s o h a d some-
t h i n g new t o a dd. He h a d b e e n a w i t n z s s t o K a l l y t s g u n n i n g
down o f a t l e a s t t h r e e s e p a r a t e g r o u p s o f v i l l a g e r s . "I t was
t e r r i b l e . They we r e s l a u g h t e r i n g t h e v i l l a g e r s l i k e s o
many s h e e p . " K a l l y ' s men we r e d r a g g i n g p e o p l e o u t o f b u n k e r s
and h o o t c h e s a nd p u t t i n g t he m t o g e t h e r i n a g r o u p . The
p e o p l e i n t h e g r o u p we r e men, women a n d c h i l d r e n o f a l l a g e s .
A s s o o n a s h e f e l t t h a t t h e g r o u p w a s b i g e n o u g h , Ka l l y
o r d e r e d a n M-60 ( machi ne- gun) s e t u p a nd t h e p e o p l e k i l l e d .
La Cr o i x s a i d t h a t h e b o r e w i t n e s s t o t h i s p r o c e d u r e a t l e a s t
t h r e e t i m e s . The t h r e e g r o u p s we r e o f d i f f e r e n t s i z e s , o n e
of a b o u t t we n t y p e o p l e , o n e o f a b o u t t h i r t y p e o p l e , a n d o n e o f
a b o u t f o r t y p e o p l e . When t h e f i r s t g r o u p w a s p u t t o g e t h e r
Ka l l y o r d e r e d P f c T o r r e s t o man t h e . machi ne- gun a n d o p e n
f i r e on t h e v i l l a g e r s t h a t h a d b e e n g r o u p e d t o g e t h e r . T h i s
T o r r e s d i d , b u t b e f o r e e v e r y o n e i n t h e g r o u p was down h e c e a s e d
f i r e a nd r e f u s e d t o f i r e a g a i n , A f t e r o r d e r i n g T o r r e s t o
r ecommence f i r i n g s e v e r a l t i m e s , Ka l l y t o o k o v e r ~ ~ e u t e n a n t
t h e M-60 a n d f i n i s h e d s h o o t i n g t h e r e ma i n i n g v i l l a g e r s i n t h a t
f i r s t g r o u p h i ms e l f . S a r g e n t La Cr o i x t o l d me t h a t Ka l l y d i d n ' t
b o t h e r t o o r d e r a n y o n e t o t a k e t h e machi ne- gun- when t h e o t h e r
t wo g r o u p s o f v i l l a g e r s we r e f o r me d . He s i mp l y manned i t hi m-
s e l f a nd s h o t down a l l v i l l a g e r s i n b o t h g r o u p s .
T h i s a c c o u n t o f S a r g e n t La C r o i x ' s c o n f i r me d t h e r umor s
t h a t Gr u v e r , T e r r y a n d Do h e r t y h a d p r e v i o u s l y t o l d me a b o u t
L i e u t e n a n t Ka l l y . It a l s o c o n v i n c e d me t h a t t h e r e w a s a
v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l amount o f t r u t h t o t h e s t o r i e s - t h a t a l l o f
t h e s e men h a d t o l d . I f I n e e d e d mor e c o n v i n c i n g , I was t o
r e c e i v e i t .
I t was i n t h e mi d d l e o f November , 1 9 6 8 j u s t a f ew
weeks b e f o r e I was t o r e t u r n t o t h e Un i t e d S t a t e s f o r s e p a -
r a t i o n f r o m t h e army t h a t I t a l k e d t o P f c Mi c h a e l Be r n h a r d t .
Be r n h a r d t h a d s e r v e d h i s e n t i r e y e a r i n V i e t Nam i n " Ch a r l i e "
Company 1 / 2 0 a nd h e t o o w a s a b o u t t o go home. "Be r n i e ' '
s u b s t a n t i a t e d t h e t a l e s t o l d by t h e o t h e r men I h a d t a l k e d
t o i n v i v i d , b l o o d y d e t a i l and a d d e d t h i s . " Be r n i e " h a d
a b s o l u t e l y r e f u s e d t o t a k e p a r t i n t h e ma s s a c r e o f t h e v i l l a g e r s
o f " P i n k v i l l e " t h a t mor ni ng and h e t h o u g h t t h a t i t was
r a t h e r s t r a n g e t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s of t h e company ha d n o t
made a n i s s u e of i t . But t h a t e ve ni ng "Medi na ( Ca p t a i n
E r n e s t Medi na) came up t o m e ( " Ber ni e" ) and t o l d me n o t
t o do a n y t h i n g s t u p i d l i k e w r i t e my congr es s man" a b o u t what
h.ad happened t h a t da y. Be r n h a r d t a s s u r e d Ca p t a i n Medi na
t h a t h e ha d no s u c h t h i n g i n mi nd. H e ha d n i n e mont hs l e f t
i n V i e t Nam and f e l t t h a t i t was da nge r ous enough j u s t
f i g h t i n g t h e acknowl edged enemy6
Ex a c t l y wha t d i d , i n f a c t , o c c u r i n t h e v i l l a g e of "Pi nk-
v i l l e " i n March., 1968 I d? n o t know f o r c e r t a i n , b u t I am
c onvi nc e d t h a t i t was s ome t hi ng v e r y b l a c k i n d e e d . I r e ma i n
i r r e v o c a b l y p e r s u a d e d t h a t i f ydu and I do t r u l y b e l i e v e i n
t h e p r i n c i p l e s , of j u s t i c e and t h e e q u a l i t y of e v e r y man,
however humbl e, b e f o r e t h e l a w, t h a t f or m t h e v e r y backbone
t h a t t hi s c o u n t r y i s f ounde d on, t h e n we mus t p r e s s f o r wa r d
a wi d e s p r e a d and p u b l i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h i s ma t t e r wi t h
a l l - o u r combi ned e f f o r t s . I t h i n k t h a t i t was Wi ns t on
Chur chbi l l . who once s a i d "A c o u n t r y wi t h o u t a c o n s c i e n c e
i s a c o u n t r y wi t h o u t a s o u l , a nd a c o u n t r y wi t h o u t a s o u l
i s a c o u n t r y t h a t c a n n o t s u r v i v e . " I f e e l t h a t I mus t t a k e
some p o s i t i v e a c t f o n on t h l s ma t t e r . I hope t h a t you w i l l
l a u n c h an i n v e s t i g a t f o n i mmed2at el y and keep me i nf or me dL
o f y o u r p r o g r e s s . I f you c a n n o t , t h e n I don' t know
wha t o t h e r c o u r s e of a c t i o n t o t a k e .
I have c o n s i d e r e d s e n d i n g t h i s t o ne ws pa pe r s , maga-
z i n e s , and b r o a d c a s t i n g c ompa ni e s , b u t I somehow f e e l
t h a t f n v e s t i g a t i o n and a c t i s n by t h e Congr e s s of t h e Un i t e d
S t a t e s i s th-e a p p r o p r i a t e p r o c e d u r e , and a s a c o n s c i e n t i o u s
c i t i z e n I h a v e no d e s i r e t o f u r t h e r be s mi r c h t h e i mage of
th.e Amer i can s e r v i c e ma n i n t h e e y e s of t h e wo r l d . I f e e l
t h a t t h i s a c t i o n , w h i l e p r o b a b l y i t woul d pr omot e a t t e n t i o n ,
woul d n o t b r i n g a b o u t t h e c o n s t r u c t i v e a c t i o n s t h a t t h e d i r e c t
a c t i o n s of t h e Congr e s s of t h e Un i t e d S t a t e s woul d.
S i n c e r e l y ,
/ s / Ron Ri.de.nh.our
A TRUE COPY
MAJ, $C
30 November 1969
MEFIO,'L~NDU:~FOR: SECRETARY OF THE AmlY
CHIEF 09 STAFF, UNITED STA'XES
SUBJECT: I r ~ v e s t i g a t i o n of t he Adequacy of t he Pr el i mi nar y I n q u i r i e s
i n t o t h e Ply La i (4) Case
REFERENCE : bfemorandurn, Sec/Army and CofS, s ubj e c t : Di r e c t i ve f o r
I n v e s t i g a t i o n , 26 November 1969
1. Th i s r esponds t o your r eques t i n Re f e r r a l S l i p No. 58313, 26 November
,1969, f o r a memorandum o u t l i n i n g the concept oft he s ubj e c t i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,
t he o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i v e team, and a n e s t i ma t e d c on~pl e t i on
da t e of t h e r e p o r t of i nve s t i ga t i on.
2 -
Concept of I n v ~ s t i g a t i o n .
-
Theabove r e f e r e n c e a s s i gns me t h e mi ssi on of det er mi ni ng t he adequacy
oftheo r i g i n a l i n q u i r i e s i n t o t he liy Lzii (4) i nc i de nt of 16 Narch 1968,
t he p r o p r i e t y of t h e cozzt:and a c t i o n s based t her eon, and whet her t he r e was,
any i mpr oper s uppr e s s i on of i n f o r r ~~a t i o n i n t he c ha i n of by per sons comnand
o r ot he r wi s e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r r e por t i ng t he i nc i de nt t o s upe r i or a u t h o r i t y .
I have or gani zed a team of i nve s t i ga t i ve a s s i s t a n t s and pr opose t o
accor;cplish t h e r ~t i s s i on by revi.exring t he f a c t s a v a i l a b l e t o d a t e f o r
background pur pos es , c o l l e c t i rl g pe r t i ne nt o f f i c i a l recorcls of t he u n i t s
5n Vi et nam i nvol ved i n t he a s s a u l t on Ely L a i ( L ; ) , l o c a t i n g and i n t e r r o -
g a t i n g a l l wi t ne s s e s known t o have i n f or &t i on be a r i ng on t he mi s s i on,
and by pr e pa r i ng a r e p o r t on t he r e s u l t s of such i nvcs t i g a t i o n , i nc l udi ng
a ppr opr i a t e f i n d i n g s and recomncndat i ons.
Iw i l l be a s s i s t e d i n t he i nve s t i ga t i on by t h e f ol l owi ng per s onnel :
Mr . Bland TJest , OGC (Deputy)
Col onel W. V. Wilson, OTIG
Col onel Robert E. Mi l l e r , OTJ AG
Piajor E. F. Zychor ~ski , OPKG
Mr. James S. St okes I V , OGC
Naj or Clyde Lynn, Recor der
Four Court I t epor t er s n o t named
Li eut enant Col onel J. H. Ereen, Execut i ve
Two ormore c l e r k/ s t e nos
Inclosure 3
SUBJECT: I nves t i gat i on of t he Adequacy of t he Prel i mi nary I nqui r i es
i n t o t he Ply Lai (4) Case
Poi nt s of cont act have been es t abl i s hed wi t h OCINFO, OCACSI, TAG
and Headquar ~er s USNC. Ot hers w i l l be arranged a s r equi r ed.
4 . Tent at i ve Schedule of Ac t i vi t i e s .
It i s plarzned t ha t the or gani zat i on and admi ni s t r at i on w i l l be
f i n a l i z e d on 1Dec 69 a t which time personnel i mpedi at el y as s oci at ed
wi t h t he i nvezt i gat i on w i l l be sworn i n. The i nt er r ogat i on of wi t nesses
w i l l begi n on 2 Dec 69; There being t h i r t y t o f o r t y wi t nesses, t he.
i nt er r ogat i ons w i l l probabl y go on f o r a t l e a s t two weeks, Ther eaf t er ,
a v i s i t w i l l be made t o Vietnam t o review r ecor ds, r epor t s , f i l e s and
. ot her per t i nent documents. Upon r et ur n t o t he St a t e s a ddi t i ona l
testimony w i l l be t aken a s r equi r ed and the r epor t dr af t ed and
f i na l i z e d. The es t i mat ed dat e of completion i s 10 Jan 70,
a. The i nve s t i ga t i on be gi ven an o f f i c i a l t i t l e t o e s t a b l i s h i t s
s epar at e i d e n t i t y and t o f a c i l i t a t e communications.
b. Informat i on a s t o i t s t i t l e and purpose be d i s s e mi n ~t e d t o
appr opr i at e mi l i t a r y commands wi t h i ns t r uct i ons t o provi de r e q u i s i t e
as s i s t ance. -
-w.R. PEEKS
Li eut enant General , USA
30' November 1969
MEP~ORANDUPIFOR: SECRETARY OF TI E APXY
CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AREn
SUBJECT: Appointment of Legal douns el
REFERENCE: Memorandum, Sec/Army ' and CofS, s u b j e c t : Di r e c t i v e f o r
I n v e s t i g a t i o n , 26 November 1969
1. As you a r e awar e, i n t e n s e i n t e r e s t has been expr es s ed i n Congres-
s i o n a l q u a r t e r s and by t he publ i c a s t o whet her t he pr e l i mi na r y i n q u i r i e s
i n t o t h e Ply La i (4) i n c i d e n t i nvol ved a "cover-up by t h e Amy. " I
i nt e nd t o conduct t he i n v e s t i g a t i o n a s d i r e c t e d by t he above r e f e r e n c e
i n a compl et el y i mp a r t i a l manner. IIovever, I b e l i e v e t h a t p u b l i c
r e c o g n i t i o n and accept ance of t he o b j e c t i v i t y of t he i n q u i r y and i t s
e f f e c t i v e n e s s would be prornoied i f I had a v a i l a b l e t o me a d i s t i n g u i s h e d
j u r i s t of i mpeccabl e i n t e g r i t y , It i s v i s u a l i z e d t h a t he would obser ve
and a p p r a i s e t he i n v e s t i g a t i o n a s pr ogr es s es and pr ovi de a s s i s t a n c e
and gui dance a s t o t h e pr oceedi ngs and any l e g a l ma t t e r s r e l a t e d t h e r e t o .
2. Accor di ngl y, I recommend t h a t you s o l i c i t t he s e r v i c e s of s uch an
i n d i v i d u a l and d e s i g n a t e hin! t o s e r ve a s my l e g a l couns el .
W. ' R. PEERS
Li eut enant Gener al , USA
Inclosure 4
JOINT MESSAGEFORW
EEEB
I
m AIC 7401 a
Invest i gat i on of Reporting of Xy Lai (4) Inci dent
IsmJ:
I1. m e Secret ary of the A m and I have appointed Li e ut e nqt Conoral
( W i l l i a m R. Peer., 218-34-9471, t o explore t he nat ure and scope of tb.
I or i gi nal U.S. Army i nvest i gat i on(r) of t he i dci dent which a11egad1y
Ioccurred on 16 March 1968a t nyLai (4) i n Quang Ngai Province,
I Republic of Vi e t nu. Mr. Bland Vest D I ( U- b 1 - ~ 3 6 ~ Offi ce of the
IArmyConera1Counsel, has bean appointed a s LTC Peers' Deputy.
I
Sel ect ed Depart wnt of t he Army personnel w i l l a r s i a t LTCPearr.
1 2. Ll'C.Peertst investigationw i l l be referred t o a8 "The Lkpgr r ml
Iof t he Army Review of t he Preliminary Investigations i nt o tho My
I La i Inci dent " (Short t lt l e : "Peerr'Inquiry").
6
5 3. Request you pr wi de assi st ance t o IXG Peers and mubar s of h i s
9
3
team a s requi red.
E
l
ADDED DISTR:
DCSOPS, DCSPIZR, TJAC,
COA, CLL, OCofSA, LTG
1-15
Inclosure 5
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTOf% D.C. 20310
CS ( Peer s I nqui r y) 2 1 Januar y 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF !CHE ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF US ARMY
SUBJECT: Scope of I nve s t i ga t i on
1. Ref er ence, Secr et ar y of t h e Army/Chief of St a f f US Army
memorandum, Subj ect : D5r ect i ve f o r I nve s t i ga t i on, dat ed
26 Nov 69 (Tab A) .
2. The above- r ef er enced d i r e c t i v e appoi nt s t h e under si gned
a s t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r t o e xpl or e . t he na t ur e and scope
of t h e o r i g i n a l US Army i n v e s t i g a t i o n ( s ) of t h e Bl l eged My
Lai ( 4 ) i n c i d e n t which occur r ed 16 March 1968 i n QuangNgai
Pr ovi nce, Republ i c of Vietnam. Our r e c e nt v i s i t t o Sout h
Vietnam a s w e l l a s t h e t est i mony t aken- t o d a t e i n d i c a t e :
a. The name My Lai ( 4 ) as i ndi c a t e d on some US maps- i s
a misnomer i n t h e s ens e t h a t i t i s n o t commonly used by The
Vietnamese. That p a r t s o des i gnat ed a s My Lai ( 4 ) i s r e f -
e r r e d t o a s Thuan Yen Sub-hamlet _ofTu Cung Hamlet.
b. Ac t i v i t i e s which t ook pl a c e i n Tu Cung Hamlet on
- - 36 March 1968 i nvol ved a t l e a s t p a r t s of t h r e e o t h e r sub--
haml et s, namely Binh Tay, Binh Dong and Trung Hoa.
c. There i s evi dence t o show t h a t o t h e r a t r o c i t i e s and/.
- o r v i o l a t i ~ n s of mi l i t . s r y r egul at i ons w e r e committedi n t he-
o t h e r t h r e e haml et s of Son My Vi l l age, namely; Co Luy, My..Lai
and My Khe.
3. A c h a r t showing t h e Vietnamese names f o r t he- haml et s and
sub-hamlets i n Son My Vi l l age a s compared t o t hos e shown on
US maps i s at t ached a t Tab B. A gr aphi c p o r t r a y a l of t h i s
i nf or mat i on i s a t Tab C.
4 . I n l i g h t of t h e above, iti s recommended t h a t t h e geog-
r aphi c scope of t h e f i n a l r e por t be ext ended t o i ncl ude t h e ,
e n t i r e Son My Vi l l age. Thi s would be more r e a l i s t i c i n terms
of t h e a r e a and a c t i v i t i e s i nvol ved and would per mi t b e t t e r
1-16
Inclosure 6
DEPARTMENT OFTHE ARMY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310
CS ( Peer s I nqui r y) 21January 1970 J
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF !CHE ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF US ARMY
SUBJECT: Scope of I nve s t i ga t i on
1. Ref er ence, Secr et ar y of ' t he Army/Chief of St a f f US Army
memorandum, Subj ect : D5r ect i ve f o r I nve s t i ga t i on, dat ed
26 Nov 69 (Tab A) .
2. The above- r ef er enced d i r e c t i v e appoi nt s t h e under si gned
a s t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r t o e x p l o r e , t h e na t ur e and scope
of t h e o r i g i n a l US Army i n v e s t i g a t i o n ( s ) of t h e Bl l eged My
Lai ( 4 ) i n c i d e n t which occur r ed 16 March 1968 i n QuangNgai
Provi nce, Republ i c of Vietnam. Our r e c e nt v i s i t t o South
Vietnam a s w e l l a s t h e t est i mony t aken- t o d a t e i n d i c a t e :
a. The name My Lai ( 4 ) as i ndi c a t e d on some US maps-i s
.a misnomer i n t h e s ens e t h a t iti s n o t commonly used by t h e
Vietnamese. That p a r t s o des i gnat ed as My Lai ( 4 ) i s r e f -
e r r e d t o a s Thuan Yen Sub-hamlet _of Tu Cung Hamlet.
b. Ac t i v i t i e s which t ook pl a c e i n Tu Cung Hamlet on
- - 16March 1968 i nvol ved a t l e a s t p a r t s of t h r e e o t h e r sub--
haml et s, namely Binh Tay, Binh Dong and Trung Hoa.
C. There i s evi dence t o show t h a t o t h e r a t r o c i t i e s and/.
- o r v i o l a t i o n s of mi l i t . ar y r egul at i ons w e r e committedi n the-
o t h e r t h r e e haml et s of Son My Vi l l age, namely; Co Luy, My-Zai
and My Khe.
3. A c h a r t showing t h e Vietnamese names f o r t he- haml et s and
sub-hamlets i n Son My Vi l l age as compared t o t hos e shown on
US maps is at t nched a t Tab B. A gr aphi s p o r t r a y a l of t h i s
i nf or mat i on i s a t Tab C.
4 . I n l i g h t of t h e above, iti s recommended t h a t t h e geog-
r aphi c seope of t h e f i n a l r e por t be ext ended t o i ncl ude t h e
e n t i r e Son My Vi l l age. Thi s would be more r e a l i s t i c i n terms
of t h e a r e a and a c t i v i t i e s i nvol ved and would per mi t b e t t e r
1-16
Inclosure 6
CS'(Peers I nqui r y) 21 Januar y 1970
SUBJECT: Scope of I nve s t i ga t i on
d e f i n i t i o n wi t hi n t h e r e p o r t of t h e a c t i ons which t ook pl ace
i n some of t h e sub- haml et s,
5. Recommend t h e memorandum a t Tab D be approved and si gned.
4 I n c l W. R. PEERS
a s - Li eut enant Gener al , USA
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310
2 FEB i970
MEMORANDUM FOR LTGWILLIAM R. PEERS
SUBJECT: SonMy Investigation
The recommendationcontainedinyour memorandumof
21January 1970, tothe effectthatyour inquiryi nfinal report
should cover allof SonMy Village, Quang Ngai Province,
Republic of Vietnam, i s approved. The explorationof mat t ers
withinSon My Village i s consideredtobe within the scopeof your
original directiveforinvestigation, dated 26 November 1969.
W. C. Westmoreland Stanley R. Resor
General, U. S. Army Secretaryof theArmy
Chief of Staff
Inclosure 7
Chapter 2
SUMMARY
REPORT
A. THE SON MY VILLAGE I NCI DENT
During t h e per i od 16-19 March 1968, a t a c t i c a l oper at i on was
conducted i n t o Son My Vi l l age, Son Tinh Di s t r i c t , Quang Ngai Pro-
vi nce, Republic of Vietnam, by Task Force (TF) Barker, a ba t t a -
l i on- s i ze u n i t of t h e America1 Di vi si on.
TF Barker was an i nt e r i m or gani zat i on of t h e l l t h B r i -
gade, cr eat ed t o f i l l a t a c t i c a l voi d r e s u l t i n g from t h e wi t h-
drawal of a Republ i c of Korea Marine Bri gade from t he Quang Ngai , \
ar ea. The Task Force was composed of a r i f l e company from each
of t h e l l t h Br i gade' s t hr e e or gani c i nf a nt r y b a t t a l i o n s - A/3-1
7
I n f , B/4-3 I nf , C/1-20 I nf . The commander was LTC Frank A.
Barker (now deceased) .
The pl ans f o r t h e oper at i on were never reduced t o wr i t i ng
but it was r epor t edl y aimed a t des t r oyi ng t h e 48th VC Local Force
(LF) Ba t t a l i on, t hought t o be l ocat ed i n Son My Vi l l age, which
a l s o ser ved a s a VC s t a gi ng and l o g i s t i c a l suppor t base. On two
pr evi ous oper at i ons i n t h e ar ea, u n i t s of TF Barker had r ecei ved
c a s u a l t i e s from enemy f i r e , mines, and boobyt raps, and had not
been a bl e t o c l os e e f f e c t i v e l y wi t h t h e enemy.
On 15 March 1968, t h e new l l t h Bri gade commander, COL Oran
K. Henderson, v i s i t e d t h e TF Barker command post a t Landing Zone
(LZ) Dot t i e and t a l ke d t o t h e assembled s t a f f and commanders. He
urged them t o pr e s s forward aggr essi vel y and el i mi nat e t he 48th
LF Ba t t l i on. , Fol l owi ng t he s e remarks, LTC Barker and h i s s t a f f
gave an i nt e l l i ge nc e b r i e f i n g and i s s ued an oper at i ons or der .
The company commanders were t o l d t h a t most of t h e popul at i on of
Son My were "VC o r VC sympat hi zers" and were advi sed t h a t most
of t h e c i v i l i a n i nha bi t a nt s would be away from Son My and on
t h e i r way t o market by 0700 hours. The oper at i on was t o commence
a t 0725 hours on 16 March 1968 wi t h a s h o r t a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on,
fol l owi ng which C/1-20 I nf was t o combat a s s a ul t i n t o an LZ immedi-
a t e l y w e s t of My Lai ( 4 ) and t hen sweep e a s t t hrough t h e subhamlet.
Following C Company's l andi ng, B/4-3 I nf was t o r e i nf or c e C/1-20
I nf , or t o conduct a second combat a s s a ul t t o t he e a s t of My Lai
( 4) i nt o an LZ sout h of t he subhamlet of Ny Lai (1) o r " Pi nkvi l l e. "
A/3-1 I nf was t o move from i t s f i e l d l oc a t i on t o bl ocki ng posi -
t i ons nor t h of Son My.
During o r subsequent t o t he br i e f i ng, LTC Barker ordered
t he commanders of C/ 1- 20 I nf , and possi bl y B/4-3 I n f , t o -burn t he
houses, k i l l t h e l i ves t ock, des t r oy f oods t uf f s and perhaps t o
cl ose t he wel l s . No i ns t r uc t i ons w e r e i s s ued as t o t he safeguard-
i ng of noncombatants found t her e.
During a subsequent b r i e f i n g by CPT Medina t o h i s men, LTC
Bar ker ' s or der s were embel l i shed, a revenge element was added,
and t he men of C/ 1-20 I nf , were gi ven t o underst and t h a t only t h e
enemy would be pr es ent i n My Lai ( 4 ) on 16 March and t h a t t he
enemy was t o be dest r oyed. I n CPT Mi chl es' b r i e f i n g t o h i s
pl at oon l eader s , mention was a l s o appar ent l y made of t h e burni ng
of dwel l i ngs.
On t h e morning of 16 March 1968, t h e oper at i on began as
planned. A/3-1 Inf- was r epor t ed i n bl ocki ng pos i t i ons a t 0725
hours. A t about t h a t same t i me t h e a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on and
f i r e s of t h e suppor t i ng he l i c opt e r gunshi p were pl aced on t h e
C/1-20 Inf LZ and a p a r t of My Lai ( 4 ) . LTC Barker c ont r ol l e d
t he a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on and combat a s s a ul t from h i s he l i c opt e r .
COL Henderson and h i s command group a l s o a r r i ve d overhead a t
approxi mat el y t h i s t i me.
By 0750 hours a l l el ement s of C/1-20 I nf were on t he ground.
Before e nt e r i ng My Lai ( 4 ) , t hey k i l l e d s e ve r a l Vietnamese f l e e -
i ng t h e ar ea i n t h e r i c e paddi es around t h e subhamlet and al ong
Route 521 t o t h e sout h of t he subhamlet. No r e s i s t a nc e was
encount ered a t t h i s t i m e o r l a t e r i n t he day:
The i nf a nt r y a s s a ul t on My Lai ( 4 ) began a few mi nut es
bef or e 0800 hours. During t h e 1st Pl at oon' s movement through t he
sout hern h a l f of t h e subhaml et , i t s members were i nvol ved i n
widespread k i l l i n g of Vietnamese i nha bi t a nt s (comprised almost
excl usi vel y of ol d men, women, and c hi l dr e n) and a l s o i n pr oper t y
des t r uct i on. Most of t h e i nhabi t ant s who were not k i l l e d irnrnedi-
a t e l y w e r e rounded up i n t o two groups. The f i r s t group, cons i s t -
i ng of about 70-80 Vietnamese, was t aken t o a l a r ge di t c h e a s t of
My Lai ( 4 ) and l a t e r s hot . A second group, c ons i s t i ng of 20-50
Vietnamese, was t aken s out h of t h e hamlet and s hot t he r e on a
t r a i l . Si mi l ar k i l l i n g s of s mal l er groups t ook pl ace wi t hi n
t he subhamlet.
Members of t h e 2d Pl at oon k i l l e d a t l e a s t 60-70 Vietnamese
men, women, and chi l dr en, as t hey swept through t he nor t her n h a l f
of My Lai ( 4 ) and t hrough Binh Tay, a smal l subhamlet about 400
met ers nor t h of My Lai ( 4 ) . They a l s o committed s e ve r a l r apes.
The 3d Pl at oon, havi ng secur ed t he LZ, fol l owed behi nd t he
1st and 2d and burned and dest r oyed what remained of t h e houses
i n My Lai ( 4 ) and k i l l e d most of t h e remai ni ng l i ves t ock. ~ t s
members a l s o rounded up and k i l l e d a group of 7-12 women and
chi l dr en.
There was consi der abl e t est i mony t h a t or der s t o s t o p t he
k i l l i n g were i s s ued two o r t hr e e t i m e s dur i ng t h e morning. The
2d Pl at oon r ecei ved such an or der around 0920 hours and promptly
complied. The 1st Pl at oon cont i nued t he k i l l i n g s u n t i l perhaps
1030 hours, when t h e or der was r epeat ed. By t h i s t i m e t h ~ 1st
Pl at oon had completed i t s sweep through t he subhamlet.
By t h e t i m e C/1-20 I nf depar t ed My Lai ( 4 ) i n t he e a r l y
af t er noon, moving t o t h e nor t heas t f or l i nk-up wi t h B/4-3- I nf ,
i t s me mbe r s had k i l l e d a t l e a s t 175-200 ~ i e t n a me s e men, women,
and chi l dr en. " The evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t onl y 3 or 4 were
confirmed a s V i e t Cong, al t hough t he r e were undoubtedly s e ve r a l
unarmed VC (men, women, and c hi l dr e n) among them and many more
a c t i ve suppor t er s and sympat hi zers. One man from t he company was
r epor t ed a s wounded from t h e acci dent al di schar ge of h i s weapon.
Si nce C Company had encount ered no enemy opposi t i on, B/4-3
I nf was ai r - l anded i n i t s LZ between 0815 and 0830 hour s, fol l ow-
i ng a s hor t a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on. L i t t l e i f any r e s i s t a nc e was
encount ered, al t hough t h e 2d Pl at oon s uf f e r e d 1 KIA and 7 WIA
from mines and/or boobyt raps. The 1st Pl at oon moved east ward
s e pa r a t e l y from t h e r e s t of B Company t o c r os s and s ecur e a
br i dge over t h e Song My Khe (My Khe Ri ver ) . Af t er cr os s i ng t h e
br i dge and approachi ng t h e o u t s k i r t s of t he subhamlet of My Khe
( 4 ) , el ement s of t h e pl at oon opened f i r e on t he subhamlet wi t h
an M-60 machinegun and M-16 r i f l e s . The f i r e cont i nued f or ap-
proxi mat el y 5 mi nut es, dur i ng which t i me some i nha bi t a nt s of My
Khe ( 4 ) , most l y women and chi l dr en, were k i l l e d . The l ead e l e -
ments of t h e pl at oon t hen ent er ed t he subhaml et , f i r i n g i n t o t he
houses and t hrowi ng demol i t i ons i n t o s h e l t e r s . Many noncombat-
ant s appar ent l y w e r e k i l l e d i n t he process.
* Casual t y f i gur e s c i t e d f o r My Lai ( 4 ) were devel oped by
t h i s I nqui r y s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s of st at ement s and t est i mony of
US personnel . Separ at e es t i mat es by t he Cri mi nal I nves t i gat i on
Di vi si on ( CI D) agency t oget her wi t h ot he r evi dence, i ndi c a t e t he
number of Vietnamese k i l l e d i n t h e ove r a l l ar ea of Son My Vi l l age
may have exceeded 400.
It i s bel i eved t h a t onl y t e n men i n ~ / 4 - 3 I nf d i r e c t l y
pa r t i c i pa t e d i n t h e k i l l i n g s and de s t r uc t i on i n My Khe ( 4 ) ; two
of t he s e a r e dead and t he remaining e i ght have e i t h e r r ef used
t o t e s t i f y o r cl ai m no r e c ol l e c t i on of t h e event . As a r e s u l t ,
it has not been pos s i bl e t o r econs t r uct t h e event s wi t h c e r t a i n-
t y. It appears, however, t h a t t h e number of noncombatants
k i l l e d by B/4-3 I nf on 16 March 1968 may have been as hi gh as
90. The company r epor t ed a t o t a l of 38 VC KI A on 16 March, but
it i s l i k e l y t h a t few i f any w e r e V i e t Cong.
On t h e eveni ng of 16 March 1968, a f t e r C/1-20 I nf and B/4-3
Inf had l i nked up i n a ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on, a Vi et Cong sus-
pect was appar ent l y t or t ur e d and maimed by a US o f f i c e r . He was
subsequent l y k i l l e d al ong wi t h some a ddi t i ona l s us pect s by Vi et -
namese Nat i onal Pol i ce i n t h e presence of US per sonnel .
During t h e per i od 17-19 March 1968 bot h C/1-20 Inf and B/4-3
Inf were i nvol ved i n a ddi t i ona l bur ni ng and de s t r uc t i on of dwel-
l i ngs , and i n t h e mi st reat ment of Vietnamese det ai nees.
B. REPORTS OF THE I NCI DENT
1. Report s of Ci vi l i a n Cas ual t i es
Commencing e a r l y i n t h e oper at i on, commanders began re-
cei vi ng r e por t s of c i v i l i a n c a s ua l t i e s i n My Lai ( 4 ) . A t about
0930 hour s, MG Kost er was advi sed by COL Henderson t h a t he had
observed 6 t o 8 such c a s ua l t i e s . The f i gur e was i ncr eased when
LTC Barker r epor t ed t o Henderson dur i ng t h e af t er noon t h a t t h e
t o t a l was 12 t o 1 4 , and was f ur t he r i ncr eased t o 20 i n a r e por t
Barker made t h a t evening. Thi s l a s t r e por t was r el ayed t o MG
Koster a t about 1900 hours. None of t he s e r e por t s was ent er ed
i n u n i t j our nal s o r r epor t ed out s i de t h e America1 Di vi si on.
2. Observat i ons and Complaints by Avi at i on Personnel
One el ement which provi ded combat suppor t t o TF Barker
on 16 March was an aero-scout team from Company B, 123d Avi at i on
Bat t al i on. . A p i l o t of t h i s team, W 0 1 (now 1LT) Hugh Thompson,
had been f l yi ng a t a low a l t i t u d e over My Lai ( 4 ) dur i ng t he
morning hours and had observed t h e act i ons of C/1-20 I nf . He
became g r e a t l y concerned over t h e "needl ess and unnece ssar y k i l -
l i ngs " he had wi t nessed. He l anded h i s he l i c opt e r s e ve r a l t i m e s
t o a i d t h e i nha bi t a nt s and i n an at t empt t o s t op t he k i l l i n g .
Shor t l y bef or e noon, W 0 1 Thompson r et ur ned t o LZ Dot t i e and
r epor t ed h i s obser vat i ons t o h i s company commander, MAJ Fr eder i c
Watke. The compl ai nt s of W 0 1 Thompson w e r e confirmed by ot he r
p i l o t s and crewmen who had a l s o been over My Lai ( 4 ) . The
compl ai nt s were expr essed i n most s e r i ous t erms; t hose who were
pr es ent heard t h e t erms " ki l l i ng" and "murder" used f r e e l y wi t h
es t i mat es of t h e dead i n My Lai ( 4 ) runni ng over 100. Upon r e -
c e i p t of t h i s r e por t , MAJ Watke went t o t he commander of TF Bar-
ke r and advi sed him of t h e a l l e ga t i ons . Watke s t a t e d t h a t Barker
t hen l e f t f o r h i s he l i c opt e r , presumably t o v i s i t C/1-20 I nf .
Watke consi der ed t h e mat t er was " i n t he hands of t h e man who
coul d do something about it" and t ook no f ur t he r a c t i on a t t h a t
t i me. Lat er t h a t day, he agai n encount ered Barker who advi sed
him t h a t he coul d f i nd not hi ng t o s ubs t a nt i a t e Thompson's a l l e -
gat i ons. While Watke t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was convinced a t t he
t i me t h a t LTC Barker was l yi ng, he t ook no f ur t he r a c t i on u n t i l
2200 hours t h a t ni ght when he r epor t ed t o h i s b a t t a l i o n command-
e r , LTC Holladay, and r e l a t e d f o r t he second t i me t he subst ance
of what i s h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s t he "Thompson Report . "
3 . The Order t o Ret urn t o My Lai ( 4 )
A t about 1530 hours on 16 March, a f t e r r ecei vi ng a
second r epor t of c i v i l i a n c a s ua l t i e s , COL Henderson s t a t e d he
became s us pi ci ous and di r e c t e d TF Barker t o send a company back
t hrough My Lai ( 4 ) t o a s c e r t a i n t h e exact number of c a s ua l t i e s
and t h e cause of deat h. As t h e or der was bei ng t r ans mi t t ed t o
C/1-20 Inf by TF Barker, it was monitored by MG Kost er, t h e com-
mander of t h e America1 Di vi si on, who i nqui r ed concerni ng t he
reasons. Af t e r a b r i e f expl anat i on by t he CO of C/1-20 I nf ,
dur i ng which t i m e MG Kost er was advi sed t h a t 20-28 noncombatants
had been k i l l e d , MG Kost er countermanded t h e or der and di r e c t e d
t h a t COL Henderson be not i f i e d. There were no f ur t he r e f f o r t s
t o make an on- s i t e det er mi nat i on of t h e cause o r e xt e nt of t he
c i v i l i a n c a s ua l t i e s .
4. The Thompson Report Reaches Di vi si on Headquart ers
Because of t h e l a t e hour a t which LTC Holladay r ecei ved
t he r e por t from MAJ Watke, t hey wai t ed u n t i l t h e f ol l owi ng morn-
i n g bef or e r e por t i ng t o BG Young, an As s i s t ant Di vi si on Commander.
Watke r epeat ed h i s s t or y, which bot h he and LTC Holladay agree
cont ai ned t h e a l l e ga t i ons t h a t t he r e had been " l o t s of unneces-
s a r y k i l l i n g . . . mostly women, chi l dr en and o l d men" and t h a t a
conf r ont at i on had t aken pl ace between personnel of a vi a t i on and
ground u n i t s ; however, t he r e i s c o n f l i c t as t o t h e number of cas-
u a l t i e s mentioned. LTC Holladay and MAJ Watke a l s o agr ee t h a t BG
Young was advi sed t h a t t h e compl ai nt s made by Thompson had been
confirmed by ot he r a vi a t i on u n i t personnel .
A t about noon on t h e 17t h, BG Young r epor t ed t o MG Koster
t he i nf or mat i on he had r ecei ved from MAJ Watke and LTC Holladay.
There i s s ubs t a nt i ve di sagreement i n t est i mony between what BG
Young t e s t i f i e d he r ecei ved from Watke and Holladay and what t he
l a t t e r two s t a t e t hey r epor t ed. BG Young s t a t e d he was not ap-
pr i s ed of any charge of i ndi s cr i mi nat e o r unnecessary k i l l i n g of
noncombatants. He f ur t he r s t a t e d t h a t it was h i s i mpressi on t he
mat t er of major concern wa-s t h a t t he r e had been a conf r ont at i on
between t h e ground f or ces and an a vi a t i on u n i t , r e s u l t i n g from
an i nci dent i n which noncombatants had been caught i n a c r os s
f i r e between US and enemy f or ces.
BG Young cont ends t h a t it was t h i s l e s s e r charge he brought
t o MG Kost er, who di r e c t e d BG Young t o i n s t r u c t COL, Henderson t o
conduct a thorough i nve s t i ga t i on of t h e i nci dent . MG Kost er has
confirmed p a r t s of BG Young' s account of t h i s conver sat i on but
i n a pr evi ous st at ement bef or e t h e Cri mi nal I nve s t i ga t i on Di vi -
si on ( C I D ) , MG Kost er s t a t e d t h a t he had been advi sed of some
i ndi s cr i mi nat e shoot i ng of c i v i l i a n s .
The I nqui r y has concluded t h a t t h e two gener al o f f i c e r s r e -
cei ved a muted ver si on of t h e Thompson Report from Watke and
Holladay, but one t h a t i ncl uded t he a l l e ga t i on t h a t noncombatants
had been i ndi s c r i mi na t e l y k i l l e d . Upon r e c e i pt of t he r e por t , it
seems most l i k e l y t h a t t hey r e l a t e d it t o t h e i nf or mat i on MG
Koster had r ecei ved from TF Barker t h e previ ous day, t h a t 20-28
noncombatants had been i nadver t ent l y k i l l e d . The i nf or mat i on
concerni ng noncombatant c a s ua l t i e s had not been forwa-rded out s i de
of t he Di vi si on, al.though FIACV and I I1 MAF r e gul a t i ons r equi r ed
such act i on, o r w e r e t he new a l l e ga t i ons r epor t ed t o hi gher
headquar t er s. Adopting a "cl ose hol d" a t t i t u d e concerni ng a l l
i nformat i on r e l a t i n g t o t h i s mat t er , MG Kost er di r e c t e d BG Young
t o have COL Henderson i nve s t i ga t e t he i nci dent .
0
C. INVESTIGATION OF THE I NCI DENT AND REVIEW
1. COL Henders-on' s " I nves t i gat i on"
BG Young made arrangements f o r a meeting which was hel d
on 18 Fllarch a t 0900 hours a t LZ Dot t i e. The meeting was at t ended
by f i v e o f f i c e r s : BG Young, COL Henderson, LTC Barker, LTC Hol-
l aday, and MAJ Watke. BG Young t o l d t h e group of t h e Di vi si on
Commander's i n s t r u c t i o n s concerni ng t he i nve s t i ga t i on and MAJ
Watke r epeat ed h i s account of t he compl ai nt s. When t he meeting
t ermi nat ed, COL Henderson commenced h i s " i nve s t i ga t i on" wi t h an
i nt er vi ew of W01 Thompson and two ot he r a vi a t i on u n i t personnel .
(While Henderson s t a t e s he t a l ke d onl y wi t h Thompson and f or onl y
a few mi nut es, t h e t est i mony of ot he r s i ndi c a t e s t h a t he t al ked
i ndi vi dual l y wi t h t hr e e persons f o r al most an hour . ) These i n-
t er vi ews, t oget her wi t h t h e i nf or mat i on al r eady possessed by
Henderson from per sonal obser vat i on and conver sat i ons wi t h TF
Barker per sonnel , shoul d have provi ded a f u l l awareness of t he
nat ur e and e xt e nt of t h e i nc i de nt a t My Lai ( 4 ) . From a t l e a s t
t h i s poi nt forward, Henderson' s a c t i ons appear t o have been
l i t t l e more t han a pr et ens e of an i nve s t i ga t i on and had a s t h e i r
goal t h e suppr essi on of t he t r u e f a c t s concerni ng t h e event s of
16 March.
Following h i s i nt er vi ew wi t h a vi a t i on per sonnel , Henderson
quest i oned CPT Medina, whose expl anat i on concerni ng c i v i l i a n cas-
u a l t i e s l e f t him "suspi ci ous. " The remainder of Henderson' s "i n-
ve s t i ga t i on" was wi t hout subst ance; h i s "i nt er vi ew wi t h a sub-
s t a n t i a l number of C Company personnel " cons i s t ed of a di s cus s i on
on t h e af t er noon of 18 March wi t h a group which, COL Henderson
cl ai ms, numbered from 30 t o 40 personnel . Af t er complimenting
them on t h e i r performance i n t h e oper at i on, he asked them col -
l e c t i v e l y i f t hey had wi t nessed any a t r o c i t i e s . Henderson s t a t e d
t h a t t h e response he r ecei ved was negat i ve. While COL Henderson
cl ai ms he spoke wi t h ot he r i ndi vi dual s and r es pons i bl e commanders,
a va i l a bl e evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t h i s so- cal l ed i nve s t i ga t i ve ac-
t i o n s ended a f t e r a b r i e f f l i g h t which he s t a t e d he made over t h e
a r e a of oper at i on on 18 March.
Commencing on 19 March, COL Henderson i s s a i d t o have made
a s e r i e s of o r a l r e por t s t o BG Young and MG Kost er i n which he
was pur por t ed t o have- r el at ed t o them t h e r e s u l t s of h i s " i nves t -
i ga t i on. " I t seems c l e a r t h a t i n h i s r e por t s Henderson de l i be r -
a t e l y mi srepresent ed bot h t he scope of h i s i nve s t i ga t i on and t he
i on he had obt ai ned. H e r epor t ed t h a t whi l e 20 c i v i l i a n s
had been k i l l e d by a r t i l l e r y and/or gunshi ps, t he r e was no ba s i s
i n f a c t t o t h e a l l e ga t i ons made by W01 Thompson. Henderson' s
f i n a l o r a l r e por t was accept ed by MG Kost er a s adequat el y r e-
sponding t o t h e charges made by W 0 1 Thompson. The mat t er appears
t o have r e s t e d t he r e u n t i l about mid-April 1968, when i nf or mat i on
was r ecei ved a t Di vi si on Headquart ers from Vietnamese sour ces.
2 . React i on t o Informat i on from Vietnamese Sources
The i n i t i a l r e por t s from Vietnamese sour ces concerni ng
t h e i nci dent were appar ent l y r ecei ved by t h e US Advisory teams i n
Son Tinh Di s t r i c t and Quang Ngai Provi nce.
The Son My Vi l l age Chief submi t t ed a r e por t t o t he Son Tinh
Di s t r i c t Chief cont ai ni ng a l l e ga t i ons of mass k i l l i n g s by US
Forces i n Son My Vi l l age. The Di s t r i c t Chief i n t ur n forwarded
two r e por t s of t h e i nc i de nt t o t h e Quang Ngai Provi nce Chief
based on t he i nf or mat i on f ur ni shed t o him by t h e Vi l l age Chi ef.
The f i r s t of t he s e r e por t s , dat ed 28 March 1968, cont ai ned l i t t l e
of subst ance and remained wi t hi n Vietnamese channel s. The second
was dat ed 11 Apr i l 1968, and copi es of it were provi ded t o bot h
t h e Provi nce and Di s t r i c t Advisory teams. I n addi t i on, a copy of
t h e Di s t r i c t Chi ef ' s 11 Apr i l l e t t e r went t o COL Toan, t h e Com-
manding Of f i cer of t h e 2d ARVN Di vi si on.
I n h i s 11Apr i l l e t t e r , t he Di s t r i c t Chief r e f e r r e d t o an
i nc i de nt of 16 March i n which it was al l eged t h a t a US Army u n i t
had assembled and k i l l e d more t han 400 c i v i l i a n r e s i de nt s of Tu
Cung Hamlet* of Son My Vi l l age and had k i l l e d an a ddi t i ona l 90
peopl e a t Co Luy Hamlet.** He s t a t e d t h a t , i f t r u e , he consi -
dered t h i s an a c t of i nsane vi ol ence.
Also i n t h e f i r s t hal f of Apr i l , VC propaganda a l l e gi ng
t ha t US f or ces had k i l l e d 500 peopl e i n Son My Vi l l age i n t h e
middle of March came i n t o t h e hands of COL Toan and LTC Khien,
t he Provi nce Chief of Quang Ngai Provi nce and, possi bl y somewhat
l a t e r , i n t o US hands. Both COL Henderson and MG Kost er appear
t o have di scussed t he Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s r e por t and t he VC
propaganda wi t h COL Toan and LTC Khien, and appar ent l y wi t h
LTC Guinn, t h e US Deputy Provi nce Advisor.
MG Kost er i ndi cat ed t h a t t h e r e c e i p t i n mid-April 1968 of
t he VC propaganda and t h e i nf or mat i on from t h e Di s t r i c t Chief
reopened t h e s ubj e c t of c i v i l i a n c a s ua l t i e s i n t h e 16 March
oper at i on. However, itdi d not s t i mul a t e any f r e s h i nqui r y. COL
Henderson had al r eady completed h i s " i nve s t i ga t i on" and had gi ven
an o r a l r e por t t o MG Kost er. Th e z e c e i p t of t h e a l l e ga t i ons from
Vietnamese sour ces r e s ul t e d onl y i n MG Kos t er ' s di r e c t i ng COL
Henderson t o commit h i s o r a l r e por t t o wr i t i ng.
I n response t o t h i s di r e c t i on, COL Henderson prepared and
submi t t ed a so- cal l ed "Report of I nves t i gat i on" dat ed 24 Apr i l
1968 t o MG Kost er. The r e por t cons i s t ed of two t ypewr i t t en pages
and two i ncl os ur es . The f i r s t i ncl os ur e was a t yped copy of a
st at ement dat ed 1 4 Apr i l 1968wi t h t h e s i gnat ur e bl ock removed,
which t h i s I nqui r y det ermi ned was pr epar ed by t he Deputy Seni or
Advisor, Son Tinh Di s t r i c t , a t t h e r eques t of t he Provi nce Ad-
vi sor y Team. Thi s st at ement i ndi cat ed t h a t t h e r e por t of t h e
Son My Vi l l age Chief a l l e gi ng mass- ki l l i ngs was not gi ven much
importance by t he Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Chi ef. The second i ncl os ur e
was a t r a n s l a t i o n of t h e VC propaganda message r egar di ng t he i n-
ci dent . COL Henderson' s r e por t b r i e f l y summarized t h e oper at i on,
l i s t e d per sonnel pur por t edl y i nt er vi ewed ( but made no r ef er ence
t o W01 Thompson o r t o any ot he r members of t h e aer o s cout u n i t ) ,
and summarized what purport ed t o be t h e Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s a t t i t u d e
toward t h e a l l e ga t i on. The concl usi on s t a t e d by COL Henderson i n
t he r e por t was t h a t 20 noncombatants were i nadver t ent l y k i l l e d by
a r t i l l e r y and by c r o s s f i r e between t h e US and VC For ces, t h a t no
c i vi l i a ns were gat her ed and s hot by US For ces, and t h a t t h e a l -
l egat i on t h a t US Forces had s hot and k i l l e d 450-500 c i v i l i a n s
was obvi ousl y VC propaganda.
MG Kost er t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he r ecei ved t h e 24 Apr i l r e-
por t he found itunaccept abl e and di r e c t e d t he conduct of a f or -
mal i nve s t i ga t i on t hrough e i t h e r BG Young o r COL Parson, t h e
* I ncl udes t h e subhamlet of My Lai ( 4 ) .
** I ncl udes t h e subhamlet of My Khe ( 4 ) .
Di vi si on Chief of St a f f . Both Young and Parson deni ed havi ng
r ecei ved o r passed on any such i ns t r uc t i ons . MG Kost er and COL
Henderson agreed t h a t such an i nve s t i ga t i on was conducted, and a
r e por t submi t t ed, by LTC Barker. Both descr i bed i n d e t a i l t he
form and subst ance of t h i s r e por t , but t h e evi dence appears con-
c l us i ve t h a t no such r epor t was ever prepared.
D . SUPPRESSION AND WI THHOLDI NG OF INFORMATION
Within t h e Americal Di vi si on, a t every command l e ve l from
company t o di vi s i on, a c t i ons were t aken or omi t t ed which t oget her
e f f e c t i v e l y conceal ed t h e Son My i nci dent . Out si de t h e di vi s i on,
advi sory teams a t Provi nce, Di s t r i c t and pos s i bl y t he 2d ARVN D i -
vi s i on a l s o cont r i but ed t o t h i s end. Some of t he a c t s and omis-
s i ons t h a t r e s ul t e d i n concealment of t he i nci dent were i nadver-
t e n t whi l e ot he r s c ons t i t ut e d de l i be r a t e suppr essi on o r wi t h-
hol di ng of i nf or mat i on.
Ef f or t s i n i t i a t e d i n 1968 de l i be r a t e l y t o wi t hhol d informa-
t i o n cont i nue t o t h i s day. Si x o f f i c e r s who occupi ed key posi -
t i o n s a t t h e t i me of t he i nc i de nt exer ci sed t h e i r r i g h t t o remain
s i l e n t bef or e t h i s I nqui r y, ot he r s gave f a l s e or mi sl eadi ng t e s t i -
mony o r wi t hhel d i nf or mat i on, and key documents r e l a t i n g t o t he
i nc i de nt have not been found i n US f i l e s .
1. A t Company Level
No r e por t s of t he cri mes committed by C/ 1- 20 I nf and
B/4-3 Inf dur i ng t h e oper at i on were made by members of t h e u n i t s ,
al t hough t he r e were many men i n bot h companies who had not par -
t i c i p a t e d i n any cr i mi nal a c t s . The commander of C/1-20 Inf as-
sembled h i s men a f t e r t he oper at i on and advi sed them not t o d i s -
cuss t h e i nc i de nt because an i nve s t i ga t i on was bei ng conducted,
and he advi sed one i ndi vi dua l not t o wr i t e t o h i s Congressman
about t he i nc i de nt . He a l s o made a f a l s e r epor t t h a t onl y 20-28
noncombatants had been k i l l e d and a t t r i but e d t he cause of deat h
t o a r t i l l e r y and gunshi ps.
The commander of B/4-3 I nf submi t t ed f a l s e r e por t s ( possi bl y
wi t hout knowing t hey were f a l s e ) t h a t 38 VC had Seen k i l l e d by h i s
1st Pl at oon and t h a t none of them were women and chi l dr en.
2. A t Task Force and Bri gade Level s
Si gni f i c a nt i nf or mat i on concerni ng i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n t h e
oper at i on and t he commission of war cri mes by C/ 1- 20 I nf was known
t o t he comander s and s t a f f o f f i c e r s of bot h TF Barker and t he
11t h Brigade on 16 March but was never t r ans mi t t ed t o t he Americal
Di vi si on. Report s of VC k i l l e d by C/1-20 I nf on 16 March term-
i nat ed a t 0840 hours when t he t o t a l reached 9 0 , al t hough t h e k i l -
l i ng cont i nued. I n addi t i on t o wi t hhol di ng i nf or mat i on, t h e
l l t h Bri gade headquar t er s submi t t ed f a l s e and mi sl eadi ng r e por t s
t o Di vi si on. One i ns t ance concerned a C/1-20 I nf VC body count
r epor t of 69, which was changed t o a t t r i b u t e t h e cause of deat h
t o a r t i l l e r y and t o move t h e l oc a t i on a t which t he purport ed VC
were k i l l e d from i ns i de t h e haml et of My Lai ( 4 ) t o 'a s i t e 600
meters away. A second f a l s e r e por t i nvol ved an i nt e r r oga t i on
r epor t from C/ 1- 20 I nf t h a t 30-40 VC had depar t ed t h e haml et
immediately p r i o r t o t h e combat a s s a ul t . The r ecor d of t h i s
i nt e r r oga t i on r e por t a s r ecei ved a t t he America1 Di vi si on on
1 6 March s t a t e d t h a t t he r e were many VC i n t he C/ 1-20 I nf ar ea
of oper at i on.
A r e por t e r and phot ographer at t ached t o t h e l l t h Brigade
Informat i on Of f i ce accompanied TF Barker on 16 March and observed
many war cri mes committed by C/ 1- 20 I nf . Both i ndi vi dual s f a i l e d
t o r e por t what t hey had seen, t h e r e por t e r wrot e a f a l s e and m i s -
l eadi ng account of t h e oper at i on, and t h e phot ographer wi t hhel d
and suppressed from proper a u t h o r i t i e s t he phot ographi c evi dence
of a t r o c i t i e s he had obt ai ned.
I n response t o a r out i ne di vi s i on requi rement , LTC Barker
submi t t ed a Combat Act i on Report , dat ed 28 March 1968, concerni ng
h i s u n i t ' s oper at i ons on 16 March. The r e por t s i gni f i c a nt l y
omi t t ed any r ef er ence t o noncombatant c a s ua l t i e s and ot her i r r e g-
u l a r i t i e s , f a l s e l y depi ct ed a hot l y- cont est ed combat act i on, and
appears t o have been an out r i ght e f f o r t t o suppress and mi sl ead.
Perhaps t he most s i g n i f i c a n t a c t i on t aken t o suppress t h e
t r ue f a c t s of t h e Son My oper at i on was t h e decept i on employed by
COL Henderson t o mi sl ead h i s commander a s t o t h e scope and f i nd-
i ngs of h i s i nve s t i ga t i on of t h e Thompson a l l e ga t i ons . H i s l a t e r
submission -- t h e so- cal l ed Report of I nve s t i ga t i on, dat ed 24
Apr i l 1968, which di smi ssed t he a l l e ga t i ons from Vietnamese
sources a s bas el es s propaganda and r e s t a t e d t h e f i c t i o n t h a t 20
noncombatants had been i nadver t ent l y k i l l e d , cont i nued t he o r i g i -
nal decept i on pr a c t i c e d upon h i s commander.
3. A t Di vi si on Level
a. Within Avi at i on Uni t s
There i s no evi dence t o suggest t h a t t he r e were del i b-
e r a t e at t empt s wi t hi n t h e di vi s i on a vi a t i on u n i t t o conceal i nf or -
mation concerni ng t he Son My i nc i de nt . However, t he r e were a c t s
and omi ssi ons by t he commanders of t h e 123d Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on,
and of Company B of t h a t u n i t , which cont r i but ed t o conce,alment
of t h e f a c t s . One of t h e pr i nc i pa l r easons why t h e f u l l import
of t h e Thompson Report was probabl y not appr eci at ed a t t h e d i v i -
s i on command l e ve l can be a t t r i b u t e d t o t he s e two commanders and
t h e i r f a i l u r e t o ve r i f y or document t h e s er i ous charges made by
W 0 1 Thompson and ot he r s . Nei t her t ook act i on t o obt ai n documen-
t a r y s ubs t a nt i a t i on, t o conduct a l ow-l evel a e r i a l reconnai s-
sance o r ot her wi se t o v e r i f y t he a l l e ga t i ons , or t o confirm i n
wr i t i ng what t hey r epor t ed o r a l l y t o B.G Young. The i n i t i a l del ay
i n r e por t i ng t h e mat t er t hrough command channel s needl essl y pr e-
vent ed t h e r e por t from r eachi ng t h e Americal Di vi si on ,command
group u n t i l approxi mat el y 24 hours a f t e r t he i nc i de nt had occurred.
A second s e r i ous charge agai ns t bot h of t hes e two commanders
i s t h a t t hey f a i l e d t o t a ke any act i on when t hey became convinced
t h a t t h e i nve s t i ga t i on 'of t h e i nci dent was a "cover-up. " An ad-
monition was i s s ue d by t he B Company Commander t o h i s u n i t t o
h a l t f ur t he r di s cus s i on of t h e i nci dent whi l e it was bei ng i nves-
t i ga t e d. Thi s a c t i on was not t aken t o conceal i nf or mat i on, but
it probabl y had t h e unf or t unat e, al t hough uni nt ended, r e s u l t of
ai di ng i n t h e suppr essi on o f - t he f a c t s .
b. Within Headquart ers, Americal Di vi si on
Americal Di vi si on Headquart ers was t he r e c i pi e nt of
much i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h e Son My oper at i on from bot h US and
GVN sour ces. Except f o r r out i ne oper at i onal da t a forwarded on 16
March, none of t h e r e por t s o r a l l e ga t i ons concerni ng i r r e g u l a r i -
t i es a t Son My were t r ans mi t t ed t o hi gher headquar t er s, al t hough
di r e c t i ve s from I11 MAF and MACV c l e a r l y r equi r ed such act i on.
As pr evi ousl y i ndi cat ed, t h e I nqui r y has concluded t h a t on 17
March, when t he y r ecei ved a muted ver si on of t h e Thompson Report ,
MG Kost er and BG Young may have viewed t h e r e por t i n r e l a t i o n t o
i nf or mat i on pr evi ousl y r ecei ved t h a t 20-2 8 noncombatant casual -
t i e s had been caused by a r t i l l e r y and gunships. While COL Hen-
der s on' s l a t e r r e por t s were f a l s e , and t he gener al o f f i c e r s were
negl i gent i n havi ng accept ed them, t hey probabl y bel i eved t hey
w e r e wi t hhol di ng i nf or mat i on concerni ng a much l e s s s e r i ous I nc i -
dent t han t h e one t h a t had a c t ua l l y occurred.
Addi t i onal i nf or mat i on from Vietnamese sour ces r eachi ng t h e
Americal Di vi si on sometime i n Apr i l i mpl i ed t h a t a f a r more s e r i -
ous event had t aken pl a c e a t Son My. The command response t o
t h i s i nf or mat i on was s o i nadequat e t o t h e s i t u a t i o n and s o i ncon-
s i s t e n t wi t h what would or di na r i l y be expect ed of o f f i c e r s of t h e
a b i l i t y and exper i ence of MG Kost er and BG Young t h a t it can only
be expl ai ned a s a r e f u s a l o r an i n a b i l i t y t o gi ve credence t o i n -
format i on o r r e por t s which were not cons i s t ent wi t h t h e i r o r i g i -
na l , and er r oneous, concl usi ons.
I n summary form, t h e f ol l owi ng a r e t he s i g n i f i c a n t a c t s done
o r omi t t ed a t t h e Americal Di vi si on headquar t er s which cont r i but ed
t o t h e conceal mnt of t h e t r u e f a c t s concerni ng Son My:
(1) There was a f a i l u r e t o r epor t i nf or mat i on concerni ng
noncombatant c a s ua l t i e s and a l l e ga t i ons of war cri mes known t o be
of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t t o COMUSMACV and r equi r ed t o be r epor t ed
by d i r e c t i v e s of bot h I11 14AF and MACV;
( 2 ) Having deci ded t o wi t hhol d from hi gher headquar t er s
i nformat i on concerni ng c i v i l i a n c a s ua i t i e s , MG Koster di r e c t e d
t h a t the mat t er be i nve s t i ga t e d by COL Henderson. However, he
did not i ns ur e t h a t a thorough i nve s t i ga t i on was conducted nor
did he s ubj e c t COL Henderson' s r e por t s t o adequat e review, t her e-
by n u l l i f y i n g h i s e f f o r t s t o det ermi ne t he t r u e f a c t s ;
( 3 ) The Di vi si on command group act ed t o cont r ol cl os el y a l l
i nformat i on r egar di ng t h e Son I4y i nci dent . Informat i on r egar di ng
t he i nc i de nt was not i ncl uded i n da i l y br i e f i ngs or provi ded t he
General o r Speci al St a f f , and t he i nve s t i ga t i ve r esour ces of t he
s t a f f were not employed.
4 . By Persons Out si de t he America1 Di vi si on
Among t h e Vietnamese o f f i c i a l s who came i n cont act wi t h
i nformat i on concerni ng pos s i bl e war cri mes i n Son My dur i ng t he
peri od 16-19 March, t he r e was a na t ur a l r el uct ance t o conf r ont
t h e i r American count er par t s wi t h such s e r i ous a l l e ga t i ons and t o
i n s i s t upon i nqui r y i n t o t h e mat t er . Such i nf or mat i on as di d
reach US advi sor y personnel was not forwarded through advi sory
channel s, but r e f e r r e d onl y t o t h e America1 Di vi si on and i t s l l t h
Brigade. I n addi t i on, t he r e i s evi dence t h a t a t t he Quang Ngai
Provi nce and Son Tinh Di s t r i c t l e v e l s and probabl y a t t h e 2d ARVN
Di vi si on, t h e s e n i o r US mi l i t a r y advi sor s ai ded i n suppr essi ng
i nformat i on concerni ng t h e i nci dent .
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS*
I t i s concluded t h a t :
1. During t h e per i od of 16-19 March 1968, t r oops of Task
Force Barker massacred a l a r ge number of Vietnamese nat i onal s i n
t he v i l l a g e of Son My.
2. Knowledge a s t o t h e ext ent of t h e i nc i de nt e xi s t e d a t
company l e ve l , a t l e a s t among t h e key s t a f f o f f i c e r s and commander
a t t h e Task Force Barker l e ve l , and a t t h e l l t h Bri gade command
l evel .
* The complete f i ndi ngs and recommendations a r e cont ai ned
i n Chapt er 1 2
3 . Ef f or t s a t t he Americal Di vi si on command l e ve l t o
conceal i nf or mat i on concerni ng what was probabl y bel i eved t o be
t h e k i l l i n g of 20-28 c i v i l i a n s a c t ua l l y r e s ul t e d i n t he suppres-
s i o n of a war cri me of f a r gr e a t e r magnitude.
4. The commander of t h e 11t h Bri gade, upon l ear ni ng t h a t
a war crime had probabl y been committed, de l i be r a t e l y s e t out t o
conceal t h e f a c t from pr oper a ut hor i t y and t o decei ve h i s com-
mander concerni ng t h e , mat t er.
5. I nve s t i ga t i ons concerni ng t he i nci dent conducted wi t hi n
t h e Americal Di vi si on were s u p e r f i c i a l and mi sl eadi ng and not sub-
j ect ed t o s ubs t a nt i ve review.
6. Ef f or t s were made a t every l e ve l of command from company
t o di vi s i on t o wi t hhol d and suppr ess i nf or mat i on concer ni ngyhe
i nc i de nt a t Son My.
7. Fa i l ur e of Americal Di vi si on headquar t er s personnel t o
a c t on i nf or mat i on r ecei ved from GVN/ARVN o f f i c i a l s sel ved t o
suppr ess e f f e c t i v e l y i nf or mat i on concerni ng t he Son My i nc i de nt .
8. Ef f or t s of t h e Americal Di vi si on t o suppr ess and wi t h-
hol d i nf or mat i on were a s s i s t e d by US o f f i c e r s s e r vi ng i n advi s-
ory pos i t i ons wi t h Vietnamese agenci es.
Chapter 3
BACKGROUND
A. ENEMY SITUATION I N MARCH 1968
AS a ba s i s f o r eval uat i ng t h e enemy s i t u a t i o n i n Quang Ngai
Pro~vi nce, it i s not ed t h a t i n March 1968, enemy s t r e ngt h through-
out, South Vi et n am was est i mat ed t o be approxi mat el y 263,200 men.
0f t h i s t o t a l , about 55,900 were V i e t Cong (VC) combat f or c e s ,
87
400 w e r e North Vietnamese Army (NVA) combat t r oops , and
69
100 were g u e r r i l l a s , wi t h t h e remai ni ng 50,800 compri si ng ad-
mi ni s t r a t i ve per sonnel .
The enemy maneuver b a t t a l i o n s i n South Vietnam were est i -
mated by HQ, Mi l i t a r y Assi st ance Command, Vietnam (MACV) t o t o t a l
278 (158 North Vietnamese and 1 2 0 Vi et Cong), d i s t r i b u t e d through-
out t he f our corps t a c t i c a l zones a s f ol l ows:
I Corps - 77 North Vietnamese and 18 V i e t Cong
I1 Corps - 55 North Vietnamese and 18 Vi e t Cong
I11 Corps - 26 North Vietnamese and 50 Vi et Cong
I V Corps - 34 Vi e t Cong
Consi deri ng onl y Quang Ngai Provi nce ( sket ch 3 - l ) , enemy
strength ranged between 10,000 and 20,000 men dur i ng t h e 4
years pr ecedi ng t h e Son My i nc i de nt . I n e a r l y 1968 enemy s t r e ngt h
was est i mat ed t o be between 10,000 and 1 4 , 0 0 0 men of which 2,000-
4,000 were r e gul a r f or c e s , 3,000-5,000 were g u e r r i l l a s , and 5,000
were assi gned t o admi ni s t r at i ve uni t s .
A number of VC and NVA regi ment s oper at ed i n Quang Ngai Pro-
vi nce from 1964 t o 1966. However, f our l o c a l f or c e b a t t a l i o n s
and el even companies of VC were t h e f or c e s pr i mar i l y r esponsi bl e
f or har as s i ng t h e ' a r e a unde? government c ont r ol . The 48th Local
Force (LF) Ba t t a l i on became t h e pr i nc i pa l enemy f or c e i n Son Tinh
D i s t r i c t , al t hough it a l s o oper at ed i n t h e Batangan a r e a t o t h e
nor t h a s w e l l a s t o t h e sout h of t h e Song Tr a Khuc. Members of
t he 48th LF Ba t t a l i on r epor t edl y l i ve d wi t h t h e l o c a l v i l l a g e r s
i n or der t o conceal t h e i r pr esence, of t e n working a s farmers
dur i ng t h e day and f i ght i ng a s g u e r r i l l a s a t ni ght .
While enemy main f o r c e r egi ment s w e r e ope r a t i ng pr i ma r i l y t o
t h e w e s t and s out h of Quang Ngai Ci t y i n 1967, el ement s of t h e
1st VC Regiment and t h e 21s t NVA Regiment of t h e 2d NVA Di vi s i on
pr obabl y oper at ed i n Son Ti nh D i s t r i c t e a r l y i n t h e ye a r . Duri ng
Febr uar y and March t h e 1st VC Regiment moved sout hwest of Quang
Nqai Ci t y and i n Ap r i l t h e 21s t NVA Regiment was depl oyed t o
Quang Tin. Af t e r t h i s , enemy main f or c e / l oc a l f o r c e b a t t a l i o n s
oper at ed i n i n c r e a s i n g numbers i n Son Ti nh Di s t r i c t i n 1967.
The 409th Sapper Ba t t a l i o n began ope r a t i ng i n t h e nor t he r n por -
t i o n of t h e d i s t r i c t i n Januar y, augmenting t h e 48t h LF Bat -
t a l i o n . Toward t h e end of 1967, t h e s e two b a t t a l i o n s were
j oi ned by t h e g i s t and 85t h LF Ba t t a l i o n .
P r i o r t o t h e 1968 -T e t o f f e n s i v e , t h e VC formed two r egi ment s
i n Quang Ngai Pr ovi nce by c ons ol i da t i ng main and l o c a l f o r c e b a t -
t a l i o n s . The 401st NVA Regiment was formed from main f or c e s and
i n f i l t r a t i o n packet s , and t h r e e of t h e promi nent LF b- a t t a l i ons i n
t h e ar ea, t h e 38t h, 48t h, and 81s t Ba t t a l i o n s , w e r e cons ol i dat ed
t o form t h e 328t h YC Regiment. Duri ng -Tet t hos e two r egi ment s,
p l u s an i ndependent b a t t a l i o n and a t l e a s t 10 l o c a l f o r c e compa-
n i e s t o t a l i n g ove r 3, 000 men, a t t a c ke d Quang Ngai Ci t y and o t h e r
towns i n t h e pr ovi nce. These a t t a c k s w e r e e ve nt ua l l y r epul s ed,
b u t t h e VC cont i nued t o pos e a t h r e a t , caus i ng t h e Quang Ngai
Pr ovi nce o f f i c i a l s ext r eme concer n over t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a
second a t t a c k on Quang Ngai Ci t y. I n t h e -T e t o p e r a t i o n t h e 48th
LF Ba t t a l i o n over r an t h e Regi onal For ce/ Popul ar For ce Tr ai ni ng
j Cent er ne a r Son Ti nh and h e l d it b r i e f l y u n t i l dr i ve n o u t by coun-
t e r a t t a c k i n g 2d ARVN Di vi s i on f or c e s . I n t h e ens ui ng f i g h t t h e
1- 48th LF Ba t t a l i o n r e p o r t e d l y s u f f e r e d about 150 c a s u a l t i e s , i n -
c l udi ng t h e b a t t a l i o n commander and two company commanders, and
a t h i r d company commander capt ur ed.
With t h e f a i l u r e of t h e a s s u a l t of Quang Ngai Ci t y and o t h e r
pr ovi nce towns, VC u n i t s f i l t e r e d back t o t h e i r home a r e a s , most-
l y t o t h e s o u t h and w e s t . Because of i t s heavy l o s s e s dur i ng -Tet ,
el ement s of t h e 48t h LF Ba t t l i o n wi t hdrew t o t h e mount ai ns i n
wes t er n Quang Ngai t o r eor gani ze and r e f i t , whi l e o t h e r el ement s
of t h e b a t t a l i o n r e t ur ne d t o t h e i r h a b i t u a l ar ea of ope r a t i on on
t h e Batangan Peni ns ul a. By l a t e Febr uar y, t h e 48th LF Ba t t a l i o n
headquar t er s had r e por t e dl y r e t ur ne d t o t h e peni ns ul a, b u t t h e
u n i t remained o u t of c o n t a c t dur i ng t h e f i r s t p a r t of March, ap-
p a r e n t l y t o cont i nue r e c upe r a t i ng from t h e T e t -s et back. A t t h e
t i m e of t h e Son My i n c i d e n t , t h e 48t h LF Ba t t a l i o n had an es-
t i mat ed s t r e n g t h of 200-250 and was t h e onl y maj or enemy u n i t
wi t h el ement s i n t h e Son My a r e a . However, t h e r e w e r e two ad-
d i t i o n a l l o c a l f o r c e companies i n t h e d i s t r i c t which on occas i on
j oi ned t h e 48t h LF Ba t t a l i o n i n c a r r yi ng o u t s p e c i f i c oper at i ons .
Over al l g u e r r i l l a s t r e n g t h i n Son Tinh d i s t r i c t was r epor t ed t o
be about 700 s t r ong.
B. SON MY VILLAGE
Son My Vi l l a ge i s l ocat ed approxi mat el y 9 ki l omet er s nor t h-
e a s t of QuangNgai Ci t y and f r ont s on t he South China Sea. I n
March 1968, t h e v i l l a g e was composed of f our haml et s, Tu Cung,
My Lai , My Khe, and Co Luy, each of which cont ai ned s e ve r a l sub-
hamlets ( sket ch 3-2). * Most of t he r e s i de nt s of Son My e i t h e r
farm t h e r i c h a l l u v i a l s o i l al ong t he r i v e r s and s t r e a m o r en-
gage i n of f s hor e f i s h i n g oper at i ons.
C. THE PEOPLE OF QUANG NGAI PROVINCE
Hi s t or i c a l l y, t h e peopl e of Quang Ngai Provi nce have a l ong
record of suppor t i ng r ebel l i on. I n t h e 19t h cent ur y t hey had
been a f o c a l poi nt of r e s i s t a nc e t o French cont r ol of Indochi na.
Lat er , i n t h e 19301s, t hey had fomented peasant r e vol t s agai ns t
Vietnamese suppor t i ng t h e French. Af t er World War I1when t he
French sought t o r e e s t a b l i s h t hemsel ves i n Indochi na, Quang
Ngai became a V i e t Minh st r onghol d and by 1948 Ho Chi Minh
consi dered it f r e e from French r ul e . Duc Pho, i n sout her n Quang
Ngai, became one of t h e l a r ge s t r e s t and r e c r e a t i on ar eas f or t h e
Vi et Minh f or c e s u n t i l t h e count ry was di vi ded by t he Geneva
Accords i n 1954.
Although most of t h e Vi et Minh depar t ed f o r t he nor t h a f t e r
t he s et t l ement of t h e Geneva Accords, some remained behi nd and
t h e i r i nf l ue nc e was p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r ong i n t he r u r a l ar eas. By
t he 19601s, a whole gener at i on of young peopl e had grown up under
t he cont r ol of t h e V i e t Minh and t h e l a t e r Nat i onal Li ber at i on
Front .
When t h e ~over nment of Sout h Vietnam launched t he St r a t e gi c
Hamlet Program i n 1962, Quang Ngai Provi nce became a pr i nc i pa l
obj ect i ve. The government at t empt ed t o s e pa r a t e t he v i l l a g e r s
from t h e Nat i onal Li ber at i on Front s ol di e r s and or gani zer s, usu-
a l l y by f or ci ng t h e peopl e t o move t o new f o r t i f i e d vi l l a ge s .
*The Vietnamese knew many of t he s e subhamlets by names d i f -
f e r e nt from t hos e i ndi cat ed on US t opographi c maps of t h e ar ea.
Where t he r e i s a di f f er ence, t he American desi gnat i on i s shown
i n par ent heses on t h e sket ch map. For example, t he subhamlet
1
i de nt i f i e d on t h e t opographi c map as My Lai ( 4 ) i s a c t ua l l y named
Thuan Yen; t h e subhamlet i d e n t i f i e d on t h e map as My Khe ( 4 ) i s
known t o t h e Vietnamese a s My Hoi. Except f o r Thuan Yen and My
/ Lai ( 4 ) , which a r e used i nt er changeabl y, t h e US Map desi gnat i ons
f or t he subhaml et s a r e used thoughout t h i s r e por t , s i nc e t hose
names a r e c i t e d by wi t nesses i n t est i mony.
The o l d v i l l a g e s and f i e l d s w e r e o f t e n burned t o pr e ve nt t h e i r
us e by t h e r e b e l el ement s. The program f r e que nt l y ar ous ed re-
sent ment and, itwas e ve nt ua l l y super seded by t h e New Li f e Ham-
l e t Program which emphasized a i d and devel opment f o r t h e v i l l a g -
ers r a t h e r t han bei ng pr i ma r i l y s e c u r i t y o r i e n t e d . The end
r e s u l t of bot h t h e s e programs was us ua l l y l e s s t han s a t i s f a c t o r y ,
f o r t h e c onc e nt r a t i on of v i l l a g e r s i n s t r a t e g i c haml et s d i d . n o t
a l t e r t h e i r a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e Nat i onal Li be r a t i on Fr ont . Many
- v i l l a g e s remained under t h e domi nat i on of t h e Fr ont and cont i nu-
ed t o pr ovi de r e c r u i t s , t a x e s , f ood, s u p p l i e s , and i nf or mat i on t o
t h e VC and North Vietnamese u n i t s ope r a t i ng i n t h e i r l o c a l e .
The v i l l a g e of Son My f e l l i n t o t h i s cat egor y. Some of i t s
subhaml et s, such a s My Lai ( I ) ,had been bur ned t o t h e ground by
ARVN For ces w e l l bef or e American f or c e s w e r e depl oyed t o Quang
Ngai. Many of t h e v i l l a g e r s had been br ought t o Quang Ngai Ci t y
a s r ef ugees wi t h pl a ns t o r e s e t t l e them i n o t h e r a r e a s . Li f e i n
t h e r ef ugee c e n t e r s was depr es s i ng; cons equent l y, many v i l l a g e r s
d r i f t e d back t o t h e i r o l d home a r e a s and t o VC c o n t r o l . I n t h e
eyes of t h e Government of Vietnam (GVN) t h e peopl e who cont i nued
t o l i v e i n t h e Son My a r e a were cons i der ed ge ne r a l l y t o be e i t h e r
VC o r VC sympat hi zer s.
D. ENEMY TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
As pr evi ous l y di s c us s e d, t h e enemy f o r c e s which ope r a t e d i n
Quang Ngai Pr ovi nce and Son Tinh D i s t r i c t i ncl uded g u e r r i l l a s ,
l o c a l and main f o r c e u n i t s and, a t t i m e s , NVA u n i t s . These f o r -
ces were hi ghl y s k i l l e d i n hi t - and- r un g u e r r i l l a t a c t i c s and had
t h e a b i l i t y t o s ur vi ve i n a count er i ns ur gency envi r onment .
During t h e i n i t i a l phases of t h e war , t h e Communists pl aced
pr i mar y r e l i a n c e on t h e employment of g u e r r i l l a t a c t i c s which were
c a r r i e d o u t by b a s i c three-man VC g u e r r i l l a cel l s. Working co-
v e r t l y , t h e s e g u e r r i l l a cel l s performed a s s a s s i n a t i o n s , a c t s of
t e r r or i s m, and cofiducted s abot age and l i mi t e d c l a n d e s t i n e m i l i -
t a r y ope r a t i ons wi t h t h e o b j e c t i v e of gr a dua l l y br i ngi ng more and
more v i l l a g e s under VC c o n t r o l .
As t h e war expanded, t h e Communists i ncr eas ed t h e i r f o r c e s i n
Sout h Vietnam by t h e or ga ni z a t i on of l o c a l and main f o r c e u n i t s up
t o b a t t a l i o n and r egi ment al s i z e and i n l a t e 1964, began a l a r ge -
s c a l e i n f i l t r a t i o n of NVA u n i t s . The l o c a l f or c e u n i t s w e r e nor -
mal l y r e c u i t e d from a p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i c t and l i mi t e d t h e i r oper a-
t i o n s t o wi t hi n t h e d i s t r i c t . They l i v e d wi t h t h e peopl e a s a
means of conceal ment and a s a s our ce of s uppor t . Main f o r c e u n i t s
were or gani zed and oper at ed a t pr ovi nce l e v e l , us ua l l y from s e-
cur e bas e a r e a s l oc a t e d i n t h e mount ai ns o r j ungl e from where
t hey coul d s t r i k e t a r g e t s i n t h e popul at ed a r e a s . Normally NVA
u n i t s had as s i gned a r e a s of ope r a t i on b u t coul d be employed
wherever t h e s i t u a t i o n r equi r ed.
Regar dl ess of t h e t ype u n i t , t h e t a c t i c s employed by t h e
communist f o r c e s r ecogni zed t h e i r own shor t comi ngs and w e r e de-
si gned t o e x p l o i t t h e weaknesses of t h e US, ARVN and o t h e r Fr ee
world Mi l i t a r y As s i s t ance For ces. Lacki ng t h e s t r e n g t h and f i r e -
power t o s ur vi ve an ext ended major b a t t l e , t hey r e l i e d pr i ma r i l y
on ope r a t i ons which per mi t t ed them t o mass, a t t a c k , and wi t hdraw
bef or e US o r GVN/ARVN f or c e s coul d r e a c t . Thei r oper at i ons a t
every l e v e l w e r e c ha r a c t e r i z e d by met hodi cal pl anni ng, d e t a i l e d
r e he a r s a l s , and v i o l e n t execut i on.
P r i o r t o under t aki ng an ope r a t i on, t h e VC/NVA nor mal l y would
obt ai n ver y d e t a i l e d i nf or mat i on r egar di ng t h e i r p o t e n t i a l t a r -
get s i nc l udi ng t h e l o c a t i o n of f i g h t i n g p o s i t i o n s , key i n s t a l l a -
t i o n s , and t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of s e c u r i t y weaknesses. Using t h i s
i nf or ma. t i on, which mi ght r e q u i r e weeks o r months t o devel op, t hey
would t hen pr epar e a d e t a i l e d st ep- by- st ep pl a n f o r t h e oper at i on.
The pl a n would t hen be r ehear s ed u n t i l ever y man i n t h e f o r c e was
t hor oughl y f a mi l i a r wi t h d e t a i l s of t h e t a r g e t a r e a and t h e f unc-
t i o n s he was t o perform;
The VC had t h e choi ce of t h e t i m e t hey wanted t o f i g h t and
were wi l l i n g t o del ay execut i on of an ope r a t i on f o r a s l ong a s
necessar y i n o r d e r t o improve t h e i r chances of s ucces s . Once
t he d e c i s i o n was made t o a t t a c k , t h e u n i t was moved, us i ng cl an-
d e s t i n e t echni ques , t o t h e t a r g e t a r e a . I n doi ng t h i s , t h e VC
would o f t e n at t empt t o i n f i l t r a t e d e mo l i t i o n i s t , s apper t ype
per sonnel i n t o t h e a r e a t o de s t r oy key i n s t a l l a t i o n s , and a r t i l -
l e r y and aut omat i c weapons p o s i t i o n s . Thei r f i n a l a t t a c k norm-
a l l y was execut ed onl y a t a pr edet er mi ned t i me o r a f t e r t h e pr e-
sence of t h e i r i n f i l t r a t o r s had been de t e c t e d. A s an a l t e r n a t e
t ype of a t t a c k t hey sometimes employed mor t ar s , r oc ke t s , and
r e c o i l l e s s r i f l e s i n s t and- of f a t t a c k s a g a i n s t popul at i on c e n t e r s
and mi l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s t o pr epar e o r s o f t e n t h e t a r g e t f o r
a t t a c k. These same b a s i c pr ocedur es were ge ne r a l l y f ol l owed i n
ever y t ype of ope r a t i on, ope r a t i ons c h a r a c t e r i z e d by s t e a l t h , s u r -
p r i s e , and shock a c t i on.
Typi cal ope r a t i ons conduct ed a t t h e l o c a l f o r c e l e v e l i n-
cl uded t h e ambushing of s mal l convoys, a t t a c k i n g of v i l l a g e and
d i s t r i c t o f f i c e s o r s e c u r i t y out pos t s , t he a s s a s s i n a t i o n o r ki d-
napping of l o c a l Vietnamese o f f i c i a l s and o t h e r a c t s desi gned t o
i l l u s t r a t e t h e i r c o n t r o l of t h e a r e a i n which t hey oper at ed. The '
main f o r c e and NVA u n i t s a s s i s t e d t h e l o c a l f o r c e u n i t s b u t p r i -
mar i l y conduct ed l a r ge - s c a l e ope r a t i ons a g a i n s t US and ARVN f o r c e s
and i n s t a l l a t i o n s .
The VC made e xt e ns i ve use of mines and boobyt r aps, e s p e c i a l l y
a t t h e haml et and v i l l a g e leve.1. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e men i n t h e i r
combat u n i t s , c h i l d r e n , women, and o l d men were used t o c o n s t r u c t
homemade boobyt r aps and mines which t hey nor mal l y emplaced a t
ni ght under t h e cover of dar knes s . The mines and boobyt r aps w e r e
used i n a wide va r i e t y of ways. Some of them were employed a s
weapons of t e r r o r a ga i ns t t he popul at i on; such a s mines pl ant ed
under o r al ong wel l used roadways t o blow-up buses and ot he r
vehi cl es ; demol i t i on devi ces i n s t a l l e d i n t he a t e r s and ot he r
crowded ar eas ; o r a si mpl e grenade thrown i n t o a group of peopl e.
I n anot her t a c t i c , t hey used them a s def ensi ve weapons t o cover
r oads, pat hs , and ot he r avenues of approach t o and wi t hi n t h e i r
c ont r ol l e d ar eas . Some such ar eas were l i t e r a l l y i nf e s t e d wi t h
VC mines and boobyt raps and had t he e f f e c t of sl owi ng and r e s t r i c t -
i ng f r i e ndl y of f ens i ve oper at i ons. I t was t h i s l a t t e r t ype of
employment which tended t o c r e a t e hat r ed and f r u s t r a t i o n a ga i ns t
t he unseen enemy.
The oper at i ons of a l l VC/NVA f or ces i n a p a r t i c u l a r ar ea were
c l os e l y cont r ol l ed and coor di nat ed wi t h t he l oc a l VC i nf r a s t r uc -
t u r e ' s p o l i t i c a l and admi ni s t r at i ve appar at us i n t he at t empt t o
achi eve t h e i r obj ect i ve of t o t a l domination of t he peopl e. The
Communist recogni zed but few r e s t r a i n t s i n t h e i r oper at i ons and
w e r e of t e n r ut hl e s s i n. conduct i ng them. A l l oper at i ons were pl an-
ned and execut ed keeping i n mind t he ul t i mat e goal of s e i z i ng con-
t r o l of t he government of South Vietnam and t he peopl e.
E. FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES ( F ~ I AF )OBJECTIVES
FOR 1968
I n f ur t her ance of t he obj ect i ve of a t t a i ni ng a s t a b l e and
i ndependent non-Communist government i n South Vietnam, t h e M i l i -
t a r y Assi st ance Command, Vietnam (PIACV) , i n coor di nat i on wi t h t he
GVN and ot he r FWMAF s e t f or t h t hr e e mi l i t a r y obj ect i ves a f t e r t h e
Ts t of f ensi ve i n January-February 1968 t o: (1) Counter t he enemy' s
=of f ens i ve and dest r oy and e j e c t North Vietnamese i nvasi on
f z c e s ; ( 2) r e s t or e s e c ur i t y t o popul at i on cent er s and ot he r
v i t a l ar eas and emphasize recovery from t h e r ecent pa c i f i c a t i on
di s r upt i ons ; and (31 resume t he e f f o r t t o f u l f i l l t he obj ect i ves
of t he 1968 Combined Campaign Plan t o dest r oy enemy f or ces i n t he
Republic of Vietnam and ext end government c ont r ol t hroughout t h e
count ry.
To car r y out t he mi l i t a r y obj e c t i ve s , MACV proposed t he f ol -
lowing mi l i t a r y t a s ks t o: (1)I n f l i c t maximum a t t r i t i o n upon t h e
'enemy; (2) abandon no t e r r i t o r y ; ( 3) suppor t t he Government of
Vietnam i n provi di ng t e r r i t o r i a l s e c ur i t y f o r pa c i f i c a t i on; ( 4 )
open and secur e l i n e s of communication; and ( 5) bui l d t h e armed
f or ces of t he Republic of Vietnam physi cal l y and psychol ogi cal l y
i n t o an e f f e c t i ve f i ght i ng f or ce.
Operat i ons f o r t he remainder of t he year were t o be di r e c t e d
a t sear chi ng out and dest r oyi ng enemy main, l o c a l , and g u e r r i l l a
f or ces and a t i de nt i f yi ng and el i mi nat i ng t he enemy's i nf r a s t r uc -
t ur e. Pa r t i c ul a r a t t e n t i o n was t o be give^ t o t he pur s ui t and
des t r uct i on of enemy f or ces i n t he densel y popul at ed ar eas and t o
t he cont ai nment of t he enemy i n t he bor der ar eas . Renewed e f f o r t s
were a l s o t o be made t o dest r oy base a r e a s and t o ne ut r a l i z e pro-
gr es s i vel y t h e l e s s i mport ant st r onghol ds.
I n t h e I Corps, nor t h of t h e Hai Van Pass, MACV obj e c t i ve s
were t o r e s t or e s e c ur i t y i n Hue and ot he r popul at ed c e nt e r s ; t o
count er and dest r oy t he North Vietnamese enemy f or ces ; t o dest r oy
the enemy base complexes al ong t h e Laot i an border and i n and t o
t he nor t h of t h e de mi l i t a r i z e d zone; t o secur e Route 1, and t o
open Route 9 , t he v i t a l l o g i s t i c s a r t e r y from Dong Ha t o Khe Sanh;
t o occupy t h e Ashau Val l ey and t o de s t r oy. t he i n f i l t r a t i o n com-
pl exes l eadi ng t o t he val l ey; t o el i mi nat e t he t h r e a t posed by
enemy f or ces oper at i ng from Base Areas 1 0 1 and 1 1 4 ; and t o a s s i s t
t he Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces i n r e s t or i ng s e c ur i t y and
t he pa c i f i c a t i on program i n Quang T r i and Thua Thien Provi nces.
South of t h e Hai Van Pass, t he main t a s ks were t o dest r oy t he 2d
NVA Di vi si on; t o ne ut r a l i z e t h e Do Xa ar ea; and t o e s t a b l i s h a
more secur e s i t u a t i o n f o r Da Nang, Hoi An, Tam Ky, Quang Ngai Ci t y,
and ot he r popul at i on c e nt e r s i n t he pa c i f i c a t i on p r i o r i t y ar ea.
F. STATUS OF PACIFICATION
The enemy Fe t of f ens i ve had a s e r i ous impact upon t he pa c i f i -
.-
cat i on e f f o r t i n Quang Ngai Provi nce. Two d i s t r i c t s , Duc Pho and
Nghia Hanh, came under v i r t u a l VC cont r ol and two ot he r s , Tu Nghia
and Son Ti nh, where Son My Vi l l age i s l ocat ed, had what was con-
si der ed a heavy VC presence i n t he wake of t he Tet - -oper at i ons.
In addi t i on, because of i t s l a r ge popul at i on, Son Tinh had t aken
t he he a vi e s t l os s es i n Quang Ngai i ns of a r a s human l i v e s , cr ops,
and l i ves t ock were concerned. .
There were f our Regional Force ( RF) companies, each wi t h an
aut hor i zed s t r e ngt h of 123, and 33 Popular Force (PF) pl at oons,
each wi t h an aut hor i zed s t r e ngt h of 33, t o provi de s e c ur i t y f o r
t he popul at i on of over 120, 000, people i n Son Tinh Di s t r i c t . Ad-
di t i ona l l y, t hr e e b a t t a l i o n s of t he 2d ARVN Di vi si on support ed
t he Rural Development Program i n t h e provi nce under t h e oper at i on-
a l c ont r ol of t h e Provi nce Chi ef. The provi nce a l s o had 4 1
Revol ut i onary Development (RD) Teams of- 59 men each. Of t he s e ,
25 were working i n t he haml et s. However, many of t he RD teams
removed from t he ar ea of Route l * di d not remain i n t h e haml et s
over ni ght , a s t hey were supposed t o , but r e t i r e d t o pr ot ect ed
bases u n t i l t h e f ol l owi ng day.
* Route 1 i s t he major nort h-sout h l and r out e of communica-
t i on i n South Vietnam. I t i s c or r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d a s QL 1 but
i s commonly r e f e r r e d t o by US per sonnel a s Route 1 o r Highway 1.
Many of t he RF and PF di d not r e t ur n t o t h e i r pre-Tet
-
posi -
t i ons i n Son Tinh Di s t r i c t u n t i l l a t e February and e a r l y March
due t o t h e cont i nui ng t h r e a t of VC f or ces a ga i ns t t he popul at i on
c e nt e r s and t he l i n e s of communication. For t he gr e a t e r p a r t t h e
W/PF were employed i n manning s t a t i c defense pos i t i ons , pro-
vi di ng br i dge and l i n e of communications s e c ur i t y, and guard-
i ng t h e approaches t o Quang Ngai Ci t y.
They were not or i e nt e d toward v i l l a g e or haml et s e c ur i t y nor
had t hey been t r a i ne d f u l l y as r e a c t i on f or ces f o r r a pi d deploy-
ment t o c r i t i c a l a r e a s a s needed. Thus, t he RF/PF were not posi -
t i oned t o provi de pr ot e c t i on f or popul at i on c e nt e r s , except f o r
Quang Ngai Ci t y, and seldom vent ured away from t h e i r def ensi ve
pos t s . Thei r preoccupat i on wi t h t h e i r own f o r t i f i e d bases l e d t o
a l ack of communication o r cont act wi t h t he peopl e, t hereby min-
i mi zi ng government i nf l uence i n t he d i s t r i c t and provi nce.
A t t h e begi nni ng of March 1968 s e c ur i t y , condi t i ons i n Quang
Ngai di d not per mi t a resumption of normal r u r a l development
a c t i v i t i e s . Fear s t i l l e xi s t e d t h a t a second phase of t he Tet
-
of f ens i ve might be l aunched a t any t i me, de s pi t e s t r ong i ndi ca-
t i ons t h a t onl y enemy l o c a l f or c e b a t t a l i o n s were i n t h e a r e a and
t he f a c t t h a t no s t r ong p o s s i b i l i t y of imminent oper at i ons had
been uncovered. I n Son Tinh Di s t r i c t , l i t t l e e f f o r t had been made
a s of March t o broaden government c ont r ol of t he count r ysi de o r t o
renew i t s pa c i f i c a t i on a c t i v i t i e s . Government o f f i c i a l s were
pr i mar i l y occupi ed wi t h t h e r e s t or a t i on of a ut hor i t y i n ar eas
l o s t duri ng- Tet and had l i t t l e t i me t o concern themselves wi t h
v i l l a g e s , s u c h a s Son My, which had been long under t h e c ont r ol
of t h e VC.
G. US PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOPS)
The J o i n t Uni t ed St a t e s Publ i c Af f a i r s Of f i ce (JUSPAO),
which was formed i n 1965, was r es pons i bl e f o r t he development
of US psychol ogi cal oper at i ons pol i cy i n Vietnam. Wi t hi n t he
cont ext of t h i s gui dance and publ i shed campaign pl a ns , MACV
pol i cy s pe c i f i e d t h a t commanders would pl an and conduct
psychol ogi cal oper at i ons i n suppor t of each mi l i t a r y oper at i on
and pa c i f i c a t i on program. The JUSPAO e s t a bl i s he d theme f o r t he
pos t r Fet PSYOPS campaign;which ext ended from 4 February t o 2 1
~ a r c h ' m6 8 ,was "Chieu-Hoi" which means r a l l y t o t h e Government
of Vietnam.
Accordi ngl y, t he Chieu Hoi program was bei ng emphasized
t hroughout t he America1 ~ i v i s i o n A0 immediately p r i o r t o t h e
Son My i nci dent . I n a ddi t i on, PSYOPS mi ssi ons emphasizing t h e
Vol unt eer Informant Program and t he Return t o Government Cont r ol
program were bei ng conducted.
The TF Oregon SOP, which was s t i l l a p p l i c a b l e a t t h i s p o i n t ,
c i t e d t h e f ol l owi ng s i t u a t i o n s a s a ppr opr i a t e f o r e x p l o i t a t i o n
by PSYOPS:
(1) Expl ai n t h e pr es ence of American and f r i e n d l y
powers and show t h a t t h e VC cannot match t h e GVN,
US, and a l l i e d commitments.
( 2 ) Ex p l o i t v i c t o r i e s by bot h ARVN and f r i e n d l y
f o r c e s t o mai nt ai n a wi nni ng s p i r i t wi t h i n t h e
ARVN f o r c e s and t h e c i v i l i a n popul ace.
( 3 ) Expl oi t t h e Chieu Hoi program t o encour age
VC r a l l i e r s a t ever y oppor t uni t y,
( 4 ) Take advant age of VC/NVA v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s ,
such a s mounting c a s u a l t i e s , a l i e n a t i o n of
popul at i on due t o : i nc r e a s e d t e r r o r i s m, t a x a t i o n ,
i mpressment , l owered l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s , examples
of l ower mor al e, and i n c r e a s i n g d e f e c t i o n s .
( 5) Expl oi t i nf or mat i on from VC/NVA r a l l i e r s o r
PW's.
MAJ (now LTC) St a nl e y E. Holtom, Di vi s i on PSYOPS Of f i c e r i n
March 1968, s t a t e d t h a t whi l e PSYOPS s houl d s uppor t t a c t i c a l op-
e r a t i o n s , development of t h e program was l e f t p r i ma r i l y t o h i s
i n i t i a t i v e a s t o t h e t i me, t hemes, and media of di s s emi nat i on
which shoul d be employed. Appar ent l y, t h e r e was minimum coor di n-
a t i on wi t h G3 o r o t h e r s t a f f s e c t i o n s . Accordi ng t o Holtom,
t he r e was l i t t l e o r no e f f o r t t o pl a n PSYOPS t o s uppor t t a c t i c a l
oper at i ons p r i o r t o June 1968. I n f a c t , t h e r e seemed t o be l i t t l e
emphasis on PSYOPS wi t hi n t h e America1 Di vi s i on dur i ng t h i s pe r i od.
A l l ps ychol ogi cal ope r a t i ons were conduct ed i ndependent l y and were
gener al l y l i mi t e d t o t h e a v a i l a b l e s t a nda r d pr er ecor ded messages
or l e a f l e t s which a ppl i e d t o any l o c a l e r a t h e r t han bei ng t a r -
get ed a t a s p e c i f i c a r e a . Ci t i n g t h e Son My ope r a t i on a s an
example, he s t a t e d t h a t he had no knowledge of t h e pl anni ng of
t he ope r a t i on. H e added t h a t he d i d work i n c l o s e c oor di na t i on
wi t h GVN o f f i c i a l s regar' di ng programs aimed a t i n s t i l l i n g i n
t he peopl e a s e ns e of l o y a l t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t h e govern-
ment.
The 11t h Br i gade t a c t i c a l SOP ( d r a f t ) s t a t e d t h a t commanders
would pl a n and i nc or por a t e PSYOPS i n t o a l l t a c t i c a l ope r a t i ons
and a c t i v i t i e s i nvol vi ng c o n t a c t wi t h t h e l o c a l popul ace. The
SOP s p e c i f i e d t h a t a l l PSYOPS a c t i v i t i e s wi t h i n t h e br i ga de would
be d i r e c t e d a t achi evi ng t h e f ol l owi ng o b j e c t i v e s :
(1) Convince a l l audi ences t h a t GVN v i c t o r y i s
i n e v i t a b l e wi t h t h e s uppor t of t h e US and FWMAF.
( 2 ) Persuade a l l audi ences t h a t t he f a s t e s t way t o
end t he war and achi eve peace and s e c ur i t y i s t o
suppor t f r e e Vietnam and oppose t he Vi et Cong.
( 3) Convince a l l audi ences t h a t t h e US presence
i n Vietnam i s t o hel p t he RVN and i s temporary i n
nat ur e.
( 4 ) Convince t he Vi et Cong t h a t r et ur nees w i l l be
s i nc e r e l y welcome.
While t he s t a f f coor di nat i on a t br i gade l e ve l appears t o
have been somewhat c l os e r t han t h a t a t di vi s i on, t h e Bri gade
S5 s t i l l was not completely informed o r always consul t ed r egar di ng
PSYOPS suppor t f o r t a c t i c a l oper at i ons. The 11t h Bri gade S5
s t a t e d t h a t most psychol ogi cal oper at i ons were conducted r out i ne-
l y , and somewhat i ndependent l y, except f o r mul t i ba t t a l i on opera-
t i ons conducted west of Route 1f o r which t he S3 would d i r e c t him
t o pr epar e an annex t o t he oper at i ons or der . According t o t h e
S5, t he r e were no PSYOPS ever conducted i n d i r e c t suppor t of any
t a c t i c a l oper at i on al ong t h e c oa s t a l pl a i ns . He s t a t e d t h a t
PSYOPS i n such ar eas of oper at i on cons i s t ed pr i mar i l y of st andar d
br oadcast s and l e a f l e t drops t a r ge t e d a t ar eas normally s e l e c t e d
by him spread t hroughout t h e Duc Pho and Mo Duc a r e a s pl us t he TF
Barker AO. Areas i n which e f f e c t i v e r e s u l t s were achi eved were
t a r ge t e d r epeat edl y.
H. FRIENDLY SITUATION
I n March 1968, FWMAF i n South Vietnam t ot a l e d 576,200 of
which over 515,200 were US. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
(RVNAF) had a s t r e ngt h of over 310,700. I n a ddi t i on, t he r e were
over 400,000 Vietnamese s er vi ng i n t h e Regional For ces, Popul ar
For ces, Pol i ce Forces, Sel f-Defense Forces, and ot her such or -
gani zat i ons , A t t h a t t i m e t he r e were 300 f r i e ndl y maneuver bat -
t a l i o n s deployed t hroughout South Vietnam. Of t h i s t o t a l , 55
US, 4 Free World, and 36 RVNAF ba t t a l i ons were deployed i n t h e I
Corps ar ea.
During t h e year p r i o r t o t h e Son My i nc i de nt , Quang Ngai
Provi nce had been t h e r e s pons i bi l i t y of ARVN, ROK Marine, US
Marine, and US Army f or ces a l l of which had conducted many smal l
u n i t oper at i ons i n t h e provi nce. Those which were more s i g n i f i -
c a nt a r e summarized below.
I n Febr uar y' l 967, US Marines, ROK Marines, and t h e 2d ARVN
Di vi si on conducted t he f i r s t combined oper at i on i n t he I Corps
a ga i ns t t h e 2 1 s t NVA Regiment, 2d NVA Di vi si on, i n west er n Quang
Ngai, employing seven ba t t a l i ons , t hr e e of them ARVN ai r bor ne.
As t h e 21s t NVA Regiment pul l ed back under ROK Marine pr es s ur e,
t he ai r bor ne f or ces made heavy cont act wi t h t he North Vietnamese
uni t s and r epor t edl y i n f l i c t e d over 800 c a s ua l t i e s upon them.
During September, t he '2d ROK Marine Brigade launched
oper at i on Dragon Fi r e a ga i ns t enemy f or ces i n e a s t e r n Son Tinh
and Binh Son Di s t r i c t s . Thi s t hr e e - ba t t a l i on oper at i on l a s t e d
u n t i l t h e end of October wi t h t h e ROK Marines cl ai mi ng over 540
enemy k i l l e d and 138 s us pect s capt ur ed dur i ng t he campaign.
The 2d ARVN Di vi si on c a r r i e d out s e ve r a l sear ch and des t r oy
mi ssi ons i n e a s t e r n Son Tinh Di s t r i c t dur i ng December 1967. One
such oper at i on employed two companies i n coor di nat i on wi t h one
RF company and a PF pl at oon i n a one-day oper at i on nort hwest of
MY Lai ( 4 ) . The Vietnamese f or ces r epor t ed t h a t t hey had k i l l e d
40 of t he enemy, whi l e s uf f e r i ng c a s ua l t i e s of 11 k i l l e d and 8
wounded,
When t h e deci s i on was made t o depl oy t he 2d ROK Marine
~ r i g a d e out of Quang Ngai Provi nce i n t o Quang Nam Provi nce t o
r ei nf or ce nor t her n I Corps, t he Americal Di vi si on, i n cooper at i on
with t h e 2d ARVN Di vi si on, was t asked t o t a ke over t he ROK ar ea
of r e s pons i bi l i t y; a r e a s of oper at i on were changed accor di ngl y
( sket ch 3-3) . Elements of t h e 198t h I nf a nt r y Bri gade moved i n t o
t he a r e a i n l a t e December wi t h t he mi ssi on of l oc a t i ng and des-
t r oyi ng enemy MF/LF u n i t s and ext endi ng government c ont r ol over
t he d i s t r i c t s . I n i t i a l cont act s were l i g h t and f r i e ndl y casual -
t i e s were low.
On 2 January 1968, t h e 3d Bri gade, 4t h I nf a nt r y Di vi si on, as-
sumed ope r a t i ona l c ont r ol of most of t h e Muscatine A0 ( sket ch 3- 4) ,
t he 198t h Bri gade r e t a i ni ng a smal l s e c t o r i n t h e nor t h. Rel i ef of
t he 2d ROK Marine Bri gade cont i nued u n t i l compl et i on on 22 January.
i n t h e meantime, t h e Americal u n i t s which conducted oper at i ons i n
t he a r e a t ook a st eady t o l l of c a s u a l t i e s from enemy mines and
boobyt raps. I n one heavy cont act on 17 Januar y, about 1 0 mi l es
nort h of My Lai ( 4 ) , el ement s of t h e 198t h Bri gade combat a s s a ul t e d
t he v i l l a g e of An Thinh (1). Blocking t he escape r out e s and usi ng
gunships e f f e c t i v e l y , t h e b a t t a l i o n s e n t one company t o sweep t he
vi l l age. A s t h e enemy t r i e d t o f l e e , t hey were engaged by gun-
shi ps and t h e u n i t s i n t he bl ocki ng pos i t i ons . A t t h e end of t he
day, i t was r epor t ed t h a t 83 VC had been k i l l e d and 34 weapons
capt ured, whi l e t h e US f or ces had f i v e men wounded.
The 198t h Bri gade resumed c ont r ol of t he e n t i r e ~ u s c a t i n e
ar ea on 25 January t o i ncl ude t he oper at i onal c ont r ol of t he 11t h
I nf ant r y Br i gade' s , 4t h Ba t t a l i on, 3d I nf a nt r y ( - ) and of Task
Force (TF) Bar ker ~whi ch had been formed t o a s s i s t i n c ont r ol l i ng
t he a r e a vacat ed by t he ROK Marine Bri gade. Subsequent l y, t h e
3d Bri gade, 4t h I nf a nt r y Di vi si on, moved nor t h i n t o Quang Ngai
Province t o r epl ace t h e 3d Bri gade, 1st A i r Caval ry ~ i v i s i o n , i n
Operat i on Wheeler/Wallowa.
When t h e 2d ARVN Di vi s i on l ear ned t h a t el ement s of t h e 22d
NVA Regiment, 3d NVA Di vi s i on, had moved i n t o t h e a r e a sout hwest
of Quang Ngai Ci t y f ol l owi ng t h e -T e t o f f e n s i v e , it l aunched Oper-
a t i o n Quyet Thang 22 on 24 Febr uar y 1968, t o s eek o u t and de s t r oy
them. Aided by s t r o n g t a c t i c a l a i r and a r t i l l e r y s uppor t dur i ng
a 2-week campaign, t h e Sout h Vietnamese mai nt ai ned cont i nuous
p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t h e a v i l y dug-i n enemy p o s i t i o n s u n t i l t h e l a t t e r
f i n a l l y br oke c o n t a c t and wi t hdrew on 1 0 March.
I n t h e meantime, i n Oper at i on Muscat i ne, t h e ground c o n t a c t s
had been l i g h t . Si nce most of t h e enemy l o c a l f o r c e u n i t s had
been committed t o t h e a t t a c k s on Quang Ngai Ci t y dur i ng -T e t , it
was n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e s e c t o r was i n a c t i v e . Gunshi ps, how-
e v e r , engaged a f o r c e of 150 VC about 8 ki l omet er s nor t h of My
Lai ( 4 ) on 30 J anuar y and r e por t e d t h a t t hey had k i l l e d over 40
of t h e enemy. TF Bar ker u n i t s made s c a t t e r e d c o n t a c t s wi t h s mal l
gr oups of VC i n t h e Batangan Peni ns ul a a r e a dur i ng t h e Te t pe r i od,
-
b u t none of any s i g n i f i c a n c e .
On 4 Febr uar y, t h e l l t h Br i gade assumed c o n t r o l of t h e sout h-
e r n and wes t er n p o r t i o n s of t h e Muscat i ne A0 and of i t s own 4t h
Ba t t a l i o n , 3d I n f a n t r y ( - ) , and TF Bar ker . The l l t h Br i gade now
had o p e r a t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r bot h t h e Muscat i ne A0 and t h e
Duc Pho/Mo Duc Di s t r i c t a r e a s . The d i s t r i c t s l y i n g between t h e
11t h Br i ga de ' s a r e a s - - Tu Nghia and Nghia Hanh - - and t h e
s out her n p a r t of Son Ti nh Di s t r i c t , nor t h and w e s t of Quang Ngai
Ci t y , w e r e t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e 2d ARVN Di vi s i on ( s ket ch 3- 5) .
I n t h e Muscat i ne AO, TF Bar ker was r e s pons i bl e f o r t h e r egi on
l y i n g e a s t of Route 1 i n Son Ti nh and s out her n Binh Son Di s t r i c t s
and t h e 4t h Ba t t a l i o n , 3d I n f a n t r y ( - ) f o r t h e t e r r i t o r y w e s t
of t h e r oad ( s ket ch 3- 6) . For TF Bar ker t h e main t a s k was t o
conduct ope r a t i ons t o l o c a t e and de s t r oy main and l o c a l f o r c e
u n i t s and g u e r r i l l a s and t o e l i mi n a t e t h e VC i n f r a s t r u c t u r e
i n t h e a r e a n o r t h and n o r t h e a s t of Quang Ngai Ci t y.
Headquar t er s TF Bar ker was a t LZ Do t t i e , about 11 ki l omet er s
nor t hwes t of My La i ( 4 ) . I t s d i r e c t s uppor t a r t i l l e r y , D Ba t t e r y,
6t h Ba t t a l i o n , l l t h Ar t i l l e r y (105mm h o wi t z e r ) , was l o c a t e d a t
LZ Upt i ght , about 8 ki l omet er s nor t h of My Lai ( 4 ) . Troop
l i f t and gunshi ps f o r t h e TF were pr ovi ded by t h e 174t h As s a ul t
He l i c opt e r Company, l oc a t e d a t LZ Bronco i n Duc Pho, and aer o-
s c o u t a c t i v i t i e s were c a r r i e d o u t by Company B, 123d Avi at i on
Ba t t a l i o n , whose r e a r bas e was a t Chu Lai and f or war d bas e a t LZ
Dot t i e . Two "Swi f t Boat s" from t h e ~ o a s t a ' l Su r v e i l l a n c e For ce, US
Navy were a v a i l a b l e f o r p a t r o l l i n g ope r a t i ons o f f s h o r e i n conj unc-
t i o n wi t h t h e TF1s ground ope r a t i ons .
SKETCH 3-1
SKETCH 3-3
30 40 50 60 70 80
I J
SKETCH 3-4
90
SKETCH 3 -5
SKETCH 3-6
Chapter 4
ORGANI ZATI ON, OPERATIONS, AND TRAI NI NG OF US UNI TS
The p r i n c i p a l uni t s i nvol ved i n t h e Son My i nc i de nt were
~ / 4 - 3 Inf and C/1-20 I nf of t h e l l t h I nf ant r y Bri gade which,
upon i t s deployment t o Vietnam, was at t ached t o t h e Americal
Di vi si on.
A. AMERICAL (23D) DIVISION
The Americal Di vi si on was orqani zed i n September 1967 and
formal l y a c t i va t e d i n Oct ober, when MG,S. W. Kost er was pr es ent -
ed t h e di vi s i on col or s . Li ke i t s pr edecessor , Task Force (TF)
Oregon, and t h e o r i q i n a l Ameri cal , t h e di vi s i on was a patchwork
or qani zat i on. Only one of t h e t h r e e s e pa r a t e br i gades t o be
at t ached t o t h e di vi s i on, t h e 196t h I nf a nt r y, was i n Vietnam a t
t he t i me of a c t i va t i on. The remai ni ng two br i gades , t h e 198t h
I nf ant r y and t h e l l t h I nf a nt r y, were bot h s t i l l i n t r a i n i n q i n
Texas and Hawaii, r es pect i vel y. I n t h e meantime, t h e Americal
Di vi si on as-sumed temporary oper at i onal cont r ol of 3d Bri gade,
4th I nf a nt r y Di vi si on, and t h e 1st Bri gade, l O l s t Ai rborne D i -
vi s i on, pl us t h e f or c e s suppor t i nq TF Oreqon. On 4 Oct ober, t h e
3d Bri gade, 1st A i r Caval ry Di vi si on, was a l s o pl aced under t h e
oper at i onal cont r ol of t h e Americal Di vi si on, t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n
Operat i on Wheelerfiallowa and s o remained u n t i l 25 January 1968.
I n l a t e Oct ober, t h e 198th Li qht I nf ant r y Bri qade a r r i ve d i n
Vietnam, and, a f t e r a month' s t r a i n i n q a t Duc Pho, r el i eved t h e
196th I nf ant r y Bri gade i n pl ace a t Chu Lai . The l a t t e r , i n t u r n ,
r el i eved t h e 1st Bri gade, l O l s t Ai rborne Di vi si on, which depar t -
ed from I Corps i n l a t e November. I n December, t h e l l t h I nf ant r y
Brigade depl oyed from Hawaii, t r a i ne d i n t h e Duc Pho ar ea under
t h e sponsor shi p of t h e 3d Bri qade, 4t h I nf ant r y Di vi si on, and
subsequent l y assumed r e s pons i bi l i t y f o r t h e Duc Pho ar ea on
2 January 1968. The 3d Bri qade, 4t h I nf ant r y Di vi si on, was r e-
l eased from t h e Americal Di vi si on, was moved t o I1 Corps, and
was pl aced under t he oper at i onal c ont r ol of I Fi e l d Force on
29 February. The 3d Bri gade, 82d Ai rborne Di vi si on, was a l s o
at t ached t o t he Americal Di vi si on ( l e s s oper at i onal c ont r ol )
f o r a s h o r t t i m e on 16 February t o 1 2 March 1968.
By mid-March, t he Americal Di vi si on was composed of
t hr e e at t ached br i gades: l l t h , 196t h, and 198t h, pl us sup-
por t i ng f or ces . The di vi s i on i n i t i a l l y was organized. wi t h
a l i g h t di vi s i on base, s i nc e t h e necessar y suppor t el ement s
were or gani c t o each of t h e t hr e e s e pa r a t e br i gades. These
br i gades were i n i t i a l l y e s t a bl i s he d a s i ndependent br i gades
t o provi de t he Commander, United St a t e s Mi l i t ar y Assi st ance
Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) f or ces which coul d be det ached
and immediately deployed t o hi gher p r i o r i t y a r e a s wi t hout
di s r upt i ng one of t he combat di vi s i ons o r t he normal admin-
i s t r a t i v e and l o g i s t i c a l suppor t system. It was not u n t i l
Apr i l 1969 t h a t t he di vi s i on was f u l l y r eor gani zed and t he
br i gades made or gani c t o t he di vi s i on. Thi s was accom-
pl i s he d by a t t a c hi ng each of t h e br i gade headquar t er s t o
t h e di vi s i on and r e l i e vi ng t he maneuver b a t t a l i o n s from
assi gnment t o t he br i gades and assi gni ng them t o t h e di vi -
s i on.
I t was a l s o necessary t o r eor gani ze t h e a us t e r e TF
Oregon s t a f f i n t o a f u l l di vi s i on s t a f f . Thi s proceeded
i n a pi ecemeal f ashi on over a l ong per i od of t i m e and, wi t h
t he di vi s i on c ont r ol l i ng t h e oper at i ons -of up t o f i v e b r i -
gades and about 24,000 men i n i t s e a r l y s t a ge s , many of t h e
di vi s i on s t a f f s e c t i ons experi enced d i f f i c u l t y . The s t ag-
gered a r r i v a l of t h e 198t h and l l t h Bri gades from t h e Uni t ed
St a t e s , f o r example, ne c e s s i t a t e d t h e gr adual merger of t h e
personnel s e r vi c e s el ement s of a l l t hr e e br i gades i n t o a
consol i dat ed u n i t . New r egul at i ons and procedures had t o
be publ i shed qui ckl y t o i ns ur e uni f or mi t y and r esponsi veness
of t he per sonnel management system t o suppor t t he once i n-
dependent br i gades.
The di vi s i on f aced major per sonnel problems i n meet i ng
t h e 12-month r o t a t i o n a l pol i cy, a s di d a l l u n i t s i n Vietnam.
Cont rol of t he r o t a t i o n a l "hump" wi t hi n t he br i gades was pa r t i c -
u l a r l y acut e and r equi r ed t he t r a n s f e r of per sonnel between
t he br i gades, known a s t he i nf us i on program, t o reduce t he
impact and t o remain wi t hi n t he r e s t r i c t i o n s e s t a bl i s he d a s
t o per cent age of u n i t s t r e ngt h al l owed t o r o t a t e wi t hi n
any one month. Thi s i nf us i on program, pl us t he r e c e i p t of
l a r ge numbers of repl acement s a r r i vi ng from t he Uni t ed
St a t e s , cr eat ed consi der abl e per sonnel t ur bul ence. New ar -
r i v a l s had t o be i nt e gr a t e d and t o become f a mi l i a r wi t h t h e i r
new commanders and noncommissioned o f f i c e r s and t h e oper at i ng
procedures of t h e i r new u n i t . For t h e two br i gades a r r i v i n g
from t he United St a t e s i n October and December, per sonnel
shor t ages and t h e i nf us i on pr ocess t ended t o f ur t he r reduce
t he e f f e c t i ve ne s s of t h e i r t r a i n i n g and oper at i onal r eadi -
ness.
As t h e 11t h I nf a nt r y Brigade completed i t s movement t o
Vieknam, t h e Replacement Detachment of t h e Americal Di vi si on
moved t o Chu Lai and t ook over t h e Di vi si on Combat Cent er
where t h e t o t a l repl acement s r ecei ved f o r t r a i n i n g each
week i ncr eased from 300 t o a peak of 1,000 f or an average
of over 500 pe r week. The Combat Cent er conducted a 6-day
i n-count ry or i e nt a t i on and repl acement t r a i n i n g course f or
a l l repl acement per sonnel pl us assi gned and at t ached uni t s .
Thi s course was climaxed by a l i v e combat pat r ol - ni ght
ambush oper at i on. Pa r t of t h e f i r s t da y' s i n s t r u c t i o n was
devoted t o t h e handl i ng of pr i s oner s of war (PW's) and t h e
pr ovi si ons of t h e Geneva Conventions. Records of t h e
Americal Di vi si on s t a t e t h a t 7,700 repl acement s r ecei ved
i ns t r uc t i on i n t h e Geneva Conventions dur i ng t he per i od
1 2 December 1967 t o 29 March 1968. (The Uni t ed St a t e s Army,
Vietnam (USARV) I ns pect or . General ( I G ) i ns pect i on r e por t
of 31 J ul y 1968 l i st s as a def i ci ency t he l ack of i ns t r uc -
t i o n on t h e Geneva Convent i ons. ) Cl asses were a l s o pr e-
sent ed i n combat l eader s hi p and long-range pa t r ol t ech-
ni ques. As f a c i l i t i e s a t Chu Lai were subst andar d i n many
cases, consi der abl e t i me was devot ed t o t h e i r improvement
i n or der t o pr ovi de adequat e housi ng and t r a i n i n g f a c i l i -
t i es f o r t h e new repl acement s. Beginning i n December 1967,
r e f r e s he r t r a i n i n g was conducted f or u n i t s t o c or r e c t de-
f i c i e n c i e s not ed dur i ng combat oper at i ons and was t a i l o r e d
s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e needs of t h e squad or pl at oon under-
going t h e course.
The combat c a pa bi l i t y of t h e Arnerical-.. Di vi si on dur i ng
t he September 1967-March 1968 per i od i s d i f f i c u l t t o as s es s ,
s i nce t he composition of t h e di vi s i on changed cont i nual l y,
wi t h onl y t h e 196t h Bri gade at t ached t o t h e Americal f or
t he e n t i r e 6 months. The 196t h Bri gade, oper at i ng agai ns t
el ement s of t h e 2d North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Di vi si on
i n Operat i on WheelerFJallowa i n January 1968, performed
wel l and account ed f o r 192 enemy ki l - l ed i n act i on ( K I A ) on
a s i n g l e day. Americal Di vi si on t o t a l s i n Wheeler/Wallowa
from 1 November 1967 t o 31 January 1968 claimed 1, 718 V i e t
Cong (VC) and 1, 585 North Vietnamese K I A and 492 i ndi vi dua l
weapons and 115 crew-served weapons capt ur ed. Di vi si on
l os s e s over t h e same per i od i n t h e oper at i on were 220 k i l l e d ,
713 wounded evacuat ed, and 342 minor wounded.
B. THE l l T H INFANTRY BRIGADE ( LT)
The l l t h I nf ant r y Brigade was r e a c t i va t e d i n Hayai i i n
1966 and was or gani c t o t h e 6t h I nf a nt r y Di vi si on. I n i t i a l l y
t h e br i gade cons i s t ed of t h r e e i nf a nt r y ba t t a l i ons -- t h e 3d
Ba t t a l i on, 1st I nf ant r y; t h e 4th Ba t t a l i on, 3d I nf a nt r y; and
t h e 1st Ba t t a l i on, 20th Infant ry--and had t h e mi ssi on of a c t -
i n g as t h e US Army Pa c i f i c r eser ve.
When t h e Secr et ar y of Defense approved, i n J ul y 1967,
General Westmoreland' s r equest f o r deployment of a ddi t i ona l
US ground f or ces t o Vietnam by February 1968, t h e l l t h In-
f a nt r y Brigade was s e l e c t e d as one of t h e uni t s t o be de-
pl oyed. Si nce t h e br i gade was desi qnat ed f o r at t achment
t o t h e America1 Di vi si on, it had t o be r eor gani zed as a
s e pa r a t e l i g h t br i gade t o conform wi t h i t s two s i s t e r
br i gades. The gener al e f f e c t was t o i nc r e a s e t h e number
of i nf a nt r y t r oops , t o reduce t h e amount of vehi cl es and
ot he r heavy equipment, and t o provi de t h e br i qade wi t h
a ddi t i ona l suppor t el ement s.
During 1967, t h e br i qade had conducted an a c t i ve t r a i n -
i ng program which beqan wi t h a i r mobi l i t y t r a i n i n g and was
fol l owed by t a c t i c a l exer ci s es dur i ng February and March.
I n Apr i l , an a c c e l e r a t e d t r a i n i n g program was i n i t i a t e d .
Speci al emphasis was pl aced upon advanced i ndi vi dua l
t r a i n i n g which i ncl uded use of t h e Jungl e Warfare Tr ai ni ng
Cent er ( JWTC) . Thi s f a c i l i t y was renovat ed a f t e r bei ng
i n a car et aker s t a t u s s i n c e depar t ur e of t h e 25th I nf a nt r y
Di vi si on. Each company used t h e f a c i l i t y f o r one week.
I ns t r uc t or per sonnel w e r e s e n t t o Hawaii from t h e US Con-
t i n e n t a l Army Command (USCONARC) t o a i d i n t h e t r a i n i n g
program and 400 f u l l y t r a i ne d i nfant rymen j oi ned t h e
br i gade t o a s s i s t i n meeting t h e c r i t e r i a necessary f o r
an emergency deployment.
I n l a t e May and June, t h e br i qade admi ni st er ed b a t t a l i o n
and company Army Tr ai ni ng Test s ( ATT) . Af t e r t h e a l e r t
was r ecei ved i n J ul y, t h e br i gade began pr epar at i on f o r
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a 10-day amphibious e xe r c i s e (Coral
Sands 11) which was conducted i n August of f t h e i s l a n d
of Molokai. Thi s provi ded one of t h e l i mi t e d opport uni -
t i e s f o r t h e br i gade headquar t er s t o pr a c t i c e command and
cont r ol over a l l subor di nat e maneuver el ement s dur i ng a
f i e l d e xe r c i s e . '
Upon completion of t h e amphibious e xe r c i s e , t h e
br i gade concent r at ed upon pr epar i nq per sonnel f o r deploy-
ment. Language t r a i n i n q f o r men who were t o be used as
i n t e r p r e t e r s , i ndi vi dua l weapons f a mi l i a r i z a t i on and r e-
cord f i r i n g , cl assroom i ns t r uc t i on and f i e l d f i r i n q f o r
crew-served weapons per sonnel , and or i e nt a t i on l e c t ur e s
on t h e Vietnam s o c i a l and t a c t i c a l environment hel ped
t o pr epar e br i gade members f o r t h e i r upcominq mi ssi on.
One of t h e more s e r i ous problems f aci ng t h e br i gade
was t h e repl acement of over 1, 300 men who were nonde-
pl oyabl e under e x i s t i n g depl oyabi l i t y c r i t e r i a . The de-
c i s i on i n Oct ober 1967 t o deploy t h e br i qade t o Vietnam
i n December r a t h e r t han January f ur t he r maqni fi ed t h e
repl acement problem. Many f i l l e r personnel were added t o
t h e br i gade t o meet t h e personnel s h o r t f a l l s . Replacements
cont i nued t o a r r i v e up u n t i l t h e deployment da t e , r equi r i ng
numerous adj ust ment s i n t h e t r a i n i n q program. It was nec-
es s ar y t o s hor t en t h e t r a i n i n q schedul e from t h e normal 8
weeks t o 4 which made it d i f f i c u l t t o pr ovi de adequat e u n i t
t r a i ni ng. The combination of a l l t he s e f a c t or s r e s ul t e d i n
consi der abl e confusi on and caused s i g n i f i c a n t t ur moi l i n t h e
br i ga de ' s per sonnel s t a t u s which was det r i ment al t o t h e i r
predeployment pr epar at i on. Even wi t h t h e i nf l ux of r epl ace-
ments, t h e br i gade was s t i l l s hor t over 700 men a t t h e t i me
of deployment.
Subordi nat e uni t s were reschedul ed t hrouqh t h e JWTC f or
a 3-day cour se which a l l uni t s of t h e br i gade had t o a t t e nd
and complete. One of el even s t a t i o n s s e t up f o r t h e t r a i n -
i ng was a t y p i c a l Sout heast Asian v i l l a g e where t h e s o l d i e r
was t aught t h e pr oper methods of s ecur i ng, sear chi ng, and
c l e a r i ng v i l l a g e s as wel l as how t o work b e s t wi t h t h e c i v i l -
i a n popul at i on. I n addi t i on, new M-16 r i f l e s w e r e i s s ued t o
a l l per sonnel j u s t 2 weeks bef or e deployment which r equi r ed
t h a t f a mi l i a r i z a t i on and range f i r i n q be conducted up t o t h e
l a s t minute.
The 4t h Ba t t a l i on, 21st I nf ant r y, was assi gned as t h e
11t h Br i gade' s 4th Ba t t a l i on i n November 1967 but di d not
de'ploy wi t h t h e br i gade t o Vietnam i n December. It remained
i n Hawaii t o complete i t s or gani zat i on and t r a i n i n g , and ar -
r i ved i n Vietnam i n Apr i l 1968.
The main body of t h e br i gade moved by s e a from Hawaii t o
Vietnam dur i ng t h e per i od 5-22 December, debarki ng a t Qui
Nhon and moving t o Duc Pho by l and and a i r . It r epl aced t h e
3d Bri gade, 4t h I nf ant r y Di vi si on, which act ed as t h e hos t
uni t , i n t h e Duc Pho ar ea of oper at i on.
To compensate f o r t h e shor t ened t r a i n i n g per i od i n Hawaii,
Mi l i t ar y Assi st ance Command, Vietnam (FIIACV) had agreed t o
provi de t h e br i gade wi t h a month of a ddi t i ona l t r a i n i n g i n-
count ry bef or e it was committed t o oper at i ons . The 3d Bri gade,
4t h I nf a nt r y Di vi si on, provi ded 3 days of a pl anned 7-day
o r i e n t a t i o n cour se ( c ur t a i l e d due t o oper at i onal requi rement s)
and t h e 174t h Avi at i on Company i ns t r uc t e d br i gade per sonnel
on t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of - he l i c opt e r . guns hi ps and t r oop c a r r i e r s
"Slicks-" and conducted combat a s s a u l t t r a i n i n g f o r t h e i nf a nt r y
uni t s . The 2d ARVN Di vi si on provi ded a. Vi et namese v i l l a g e t r a i n -
i n g course t h a t l a s t e d, one day. Conducted i n a de s e r t e d v i l l a g e
near Duc Pho, t he cour se gave a pr a c t i c a l - de mons t r a t i on of VC
methods of concealment and boobyt rappi ng and emphasized c or r e c t
s ear ch t echni ques. Ot her i ns t r uc t i on r ecei ved by Dhe br i gade i n
January i ncl uded sear ch procedures f o r l oc a t i ng VC bunkers
and " hol es , " ambush t echni ques, and t he de s t r uc t i on of enemy
f o r t i f i c a t i o n s and rice caches.
As t h e br i gade made i t s l ast - mi nut e pr epar at i ons f o r com-
mitment t o combat, t he r e was one di s t ur bi ng el ement . Addi t i onal
repl acement s t o br i ng t h e br i gade up t o s t r e ngt h pl us t he i n-
f us i on of per sonnel t o eas e t he r o t a t i o n a l hump had produced
consi der abl e per sonnel t ur bul ence. -Although undesi r abl e,
t h i s was not an uncommon occurrence f o r many of t h e u n i t s
deployed t o Vietnam who performed e f f e c t i v e l y de s pi t e t h i s
d i f f i c u l t y .
C. TASK FORCE BARKER
When t h e l l t h Bri gade assumed r e s pons i bi l i t y f o r t h e Mus-
c a t i n e a r e a of oper at i ons ( AO) , it was necessar y f o r t h e
br i gade commander t o r eor gani ze h i s f or ces i n or der t o occupy
t h e a r e a wi t h s i x r i f l e companies, which t he di vi s i on commander
consi der ed t he minimum f or c e r equi r ed t o c ont r ol t h e ar ea.
BG Andy A. Lipscomb, t he br i gade commander, opt ed t o e s t a b l i s h
a s epar at e TF dur i ng t he per i od 20-22 January t o man t h e e a s t -
e r n p a r t of t he Muscatine A0 and desi gnat ed t he 4t h Ba t t a l i on,
3d I nf ant r y ( - ) a s t he u n i t r esponsi bl e f o r t h e west er n s e c t i on.
Thi s per mi t t ed t h e br i gade commander.to put s i x companies i n
t h e ar ea.
The TF commander pl us an a us t e r e s t a f f were drawn from t he
s t a f f of t he l l t h Bri gade. Thi s weakened and reduced t he
e f f e c t i ve ne s s of t he br i gade s t a f f . LTC Frank A. Barker, Jr . ,
t h e br i gade S3, was chosen t o be t h e TF commander. MAJ
Charl es C. Calhoun, t he br i gade S1, was desi gnat ed a combina-
t i o n Execut i ve Of f i cer / S3, and CPT Eugene M. Kotouc was l a t e r
assi gned a s khe TF S2.
TF Barker (named a f t e r i t s commander) cons i s t ed of t h r e e
companies, one from each of t he br i ga de ' s ba t t a l i ons . These
were: A/3-1 I n f , B/4-3 I n f , C/1-20 I nf . Each was consi der ed
by t he br i gade commander t o be t h e b e s t company i n i t s bat -
t a l i o n . Also at t ached t o t h e TI? were: t h e 3d Pl at oon, Troop
E, 1st Caval ry ( - ) ; el ement s of t h e 2d Pl at oon, Company C ,
26th Engi neer Ba t t a l i on; and a squad from t h e l l t h MP Pl at oon.
Bat t er y D , 6t h Ba t t a l i on, l l t h Ar t i l l e r y ( a pr ovi s i ona l ba t t e r y
cons i s t i ng of f our 105 howi t zers i ns t e a d of t h e normal s i x )
l ocat ed a t Landing Zone ( LZ) Upt i ght was i n d i r e c t suppor t .
From 22 January throuqh 15 March 1968 t h e TF s uf f e r e d
over 100 f r i e ndl y c a s ua l t i e s , about 40 per cent of which oc-
curred dur i ng oper at i ons i n t h e Son My ar ea dur i ng t h e month
of February. During t h e same per i od t h e TF est i mat ed enemy
c a s ua l t i e s t o be about 300 k i l l e d and wounded and 50 cap-
t ur ed; t h e recorded i ndi vi dua l weapons capt ur ed t o t a l e d
about 20.
D. COMPANY C , 1ST BATTALION, 20TH INFANTRY (C/l-20 INF)
Company C had an aut hor i zed s t r e ngt h of s i x o f f i c e r s and
175 e n l i s t e d men u n t i l e a r l y March 1968, when t h e aut hor i zed
e n l i s t e d s t r e ngt h was reduced t o 158 men by an Army-wide
change t o t h e r i f l e company Table of Or gani zat i on and Equip-
ment (TOE) . However, t h e oper at i ng s t r e ngt h of t h e u n i t was
much lower. Of t h e 5 o f f i c e r s and 125 e n l i s t e d men avai l abl e
f or dut y i n mid-March, approxi mat el y 20 were r equi r ed t o remain
a t t h e company' s r e a r bas e t o pr ovi de a dmi ni s t r a t i ve and l ogi s-
t i c s backup f o r t h e company. Eleven e n l i s t e d men from ot he r
u n i t s were at t ached t o t h e company i nc r e a s i ng f i e l d oper at i ng
s t r e ngt h t o about 120 men.
Organized as a st andar d r i f l e company, t h e u n i t had a head-
qua r t e r s pl at oon, t h r e e r i f l e pl at oons, and a weapons pl at oon.
Because of t h e company under st r engt h, some of t h e pl at oons op-
e r a t e d wi t h onl y two squads.
Si nce December 1966, t h e company had been commanded by CPT
Er nest L. Medina. He had l e d t h e u n i t through t h e r e gul a r
t r a i n i n g program conducted by t h e l l t h I nf a nt r y Bri gade i n
Hawaii, where Company C had pa r t i c i pa t e d i n i nt e ns i ve j ungl e
t r a i n i n g , as wel l a s l i mi t e d amphibious and a i r mobi l i t y
t r a i n i n g and e xe r c i s e s and had passed i t s ATT. Af t e r t h e
br i gade was a l e r t e d i n mid-1967 f o r deployment t o Vietnam a t
t h e end of t h e ye a r , t h e company began an accel er at ed t r a i n i n g
program f o r t h e oversea movement.
Among t h e many s ubj e c t s covered, accor di ng t o t est i mony
of some wi t nesses, was r out i ne i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e handl i ng and
t r eat ment of pr i s oner s . Thi s i ns t r uc t i on was di r e c t e d p r i -
mar i l y toward t h e so- cal l ed 5 S ' s -- Search, Si l e nc e , Segr egat e,
Speed, and Safeguard. During t h i s i ns t r uc t i on, l i t t l e emphasis
w a s pl aced on t h e t r eat ment of c i v i l i a n s and r ef ugees o r t h e
r e s pons i bi l i t y f o r r e por t i ng war cri mes o r a t r o c i t i e s ;
Company C was s e l e c t e d t o deploy wi t h t he advance el ement of
t h e br i gade i n t h e move t o Vietnam and was consequent l y schedul ed
t o l eave Hawaii on 1December 1967. The e a r l i e r depar t ur e da t e
f u r t h e r compressed a l l t r a i n i n g t o a minimum dur i ng November as
t h e company was heavi l y engaged i n scr eeni ng out per sonnel i n e l i -
gi bl e t o depl oy, r ecei vi ng new repl acement s, and drawing and
pr epar i ng equipment f o r t h e move. The i n f l u x of newly assi gned
per sonnel i n t o t he company ( over 50 per cent of t h e s t r e ngt h)
dur i ng t he predeployment per i od t ended t o f u r t h e r reduce t h e
e f f e c t i ve ne s s of t h e t r a i n i n g program.
Af t er a r r i v i n g i n t h e Duc Pho a r e a i n e a r l y December, t he
company at t ended t he br i ga de ' s i n-count ry i ndoc t r i na t i on
t r a i n i n g program. I ndi cat i ons a r e t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e
handl i ng and t r eat ment of c i v i l i a n s o r r ef ugees was not covered
dur i ng t h i s t r a i ni ng. The company immediately began t o car r y
out smal l squad-si ze p a t r o l s , t o man t he br i gade per i met er
a t ni ght , and t o c ons t r uc t bunkers dur i ng t h e day. Or i ent at i on
and t r a i n i n g i n t he Duc Pho a r e a cont i nued u n t i l January 1968
when t he company was assi gned t o TF Barker and moved t o t h e
Muscatine AO.
During t he 7 weeks p r i o r t o t he Son My oper at i on, Company
C- d i d not engage i n any major combat act i on. Itdi d p a r t i c i -
pa t e i n p a t r o l l i n g and ot he r of f ens i ve oper at i ons and a l s o
act ed a s a base s e c ur i t y f or ce. Cont act s wi t h t h e enemy
. were l i g h t and confi ned t o s ni pe r f i r e . The bul k of t h e com-
pany' s c a s ua l t i e s from h o s t i l e a c t i on dur i ng t he January t o
mid-March per i od w e r e caused by enemy mines and boobyt raps.
Of t he , cas ual t y t o t a l of 4 k i l l e d and 38 wounded, onl y 1
of t he k i l l e d and 2 of t h e wounded r e s ul t e d from d i r e c t enemy
cont act .
A survey of t he per sonnel a s s e t s of Company C i ndi c a t e s
t h a t none of t he men had had s i g n i f i c a n t combat exper i ence be-
f or e t he Son My oper at i on and t h a t t h i s was t h e i r f i r s t major
a s s a ul t r ol e . I n t he mat t er of l eader s hi p, CPT Medina was
consi dered t o be an out st andi ng company commander by h i s men
and s uper i or s , but t he pl at oon l eader s were not s o regarded.
Two-thirds of t he 23 noncommissioned o f f i c e r s i n t he
company were e n l i s t e e s and t he maj or i t y were above t he aver-
age i n a l l eval uat ed ar eas . There was a hi gher per cent age of
hi gh scho5l gr aduat es and men wi t h col l ege c r e d i t s i n t h i s
group t han was found t hroughout t he Army a t t h a t t i me wi t h t h e
maj or i t y bei ng above t h e average i n gener al l e a r ni ng and i nf an-
t r y a b i l i t y .
The remai nder of t h e e n l i s t e d men r epr esent ed an average
cr oss s e c t i on of e n l i s t e e s and i nduct ees wi t h about 40 per-
c e nt bei ng e n l i s t e e s and s l i g h t l y over 60 per cent i nduct ees.
The i nduct ees, a s a group, had less educat i on and were less
t r a i na bl e t han t he average f o r Army-wide accessi ons f o r t he
per i od. Despi t e t h i s , t hey were b e t t e r t han average i n
i nf a nt r y a pt i t ude . Well over 50 per cent were hi gh school
gr aduat es and al most a f our t h of t he e n l i s t e e s had some
col l ege c r e d i t s . The average age of t h e e n l i s t e e s was j u s t
under 21 year s . The i nduct ees were above t he average i n
p r a c t i c a l l y every eval uat ed a r e a . Close t o 80 per cent were
hi gh school gr aduat es and about 17 per cent had c ol l e ge c r e d i t s .
Average age of t he i nduct ees was 22 year s.
About 8 per cent of t he e n l i s t e d per sonnel , less noncom-
missioned o f f i c e r s , f e l l i n t o t he Pr oj e c t One Hundred Thousand
cat egory and were i n t he l owest ment al group. The per cent age
of t h i s group was lower t han t h e Army-wide accessi on f i gur e
of 12 per cent .
Taken a s a whole, t he personnel composi t i on of Company C
cont ai ned no s i g n i f i c a n t devi at i on from t h e average and t he r e
was l i t t l e t o di s t i ngui s h it from ot her r i f l e companies.
E. COMPANY B, 4TH BATTALION, 3D INFANTRY (B/4-3 INF)
Company B had an aut hor i zed s t r e ngt h of 6 o f f i c e r s and 175
e n l i s t e d men u n t i l March 1968, when t he e n l i s t e d s t r e ngt h was
reduced t o - 158 men. I n mid-March 1968, t he r e were 5 o f f i c e r s
and 134 e n l i s t e d men assi gned t o t he company. Of t he s e , 2
o f f i c e r s and 63 e n l i s t e d men had been assi gned s i nc e t he com-
pany' s a r r i v a l i n Vietnam. Because of per sonnel requi rement s
f o r admi ni s t r at i ve and l o g i s t i c backup f o r t he company, t he
f i e l d oper at i ng s t r e ngt h was reduced t o approxi mat el y 115 men.
The company was organi zed a s a st andar d r i f l e company, but
because it w a s under st r engt h, t he f i r s t and second pl at oons
were reduced t o two r i f l e squads each f o r t h e Son My oper at i on.
During 1967 t h e company fol l owed t h e r e gul a r t r a i n i n g
program conducted by t he 11t h I nf a nt r y Bri gade i n Hawaii.
Af t er t he br i gade was a l e r t e d i n mid-March 1967 f o r deployment
t o Vietnam, t h e company began, as. di d a l l ot he r u n i t s , an
i nt e ns i ve t r a i n i n g program t o pr epar e f o r t a c t i c a l oper at i ons
i n Vietnam emphasizing weapons t r a i n i n q , t h e Vietnam s o c i a l
envi ronment , and count eri nsurgency oper at i ons. Rout i ne i n-
s t r u c t i o n on t h e handl i ng and. t r eat ment of pr i s oner s was
a l s o covered. Again, no s p e c i a l emphasis was pl aced on' t h e
t r eat ment of c i v i l i a n s and refugees o r t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
f o r r e por t i ng war cri mes o r a t r o c i t i e s . The as signment of
approxi mat el y 50 repl acement per sonnel dur i ng t h e 2-month
per i od bef or e embarkat i on undoubtedly r e s ul t e d i n deployment
of some per sonnel wi t hout adequat e u n i t t r a i ni ng.
Af t e r a r r i v i n g i n t h e Duc Pho ar ea i n mid-December, t h e
company r ecei ved t h e same i ndoc t r i na t i on t r a i n i n g as a l l ot he r
r i f l e companies of t h e br i qade and soon began t o c a r r y out
smal l squad-si ze p a t r o l s , t o man t h e per i met er a t ni ght ,
and t o cons t r uct bunkers dur i ng t h e day. Or i ent at i on and t r a i n -
i ng i n Duc Pho ar ea cont i nued u n t i l January 1968 when t h e com-
pany was assi gned t o TF Barker and moved t o t h e Muscatine AO.
A survey of t h e per sonnel a s s e t s of Company B i ndi c' at es
t h a t few of t h e men had had s i q n i f i c a n t combat exper i ence.
There were no Vietnam r et ur nees i n t h e company and only two
noncommissioned o f f i c e r s had previ ous combat exper i ence be-
f or e Vietnam. However, t h e company was f a mi l i a r wi t h and r e-
spect ed t h e hazards of t h e Son My ar ea due t o i t s pr evi ous
oper at i ons t he r e .
I n t h e mat t er of l eader s hi p, t h e company commander, CPT
Michles, was consi der ed an ext remel y consci ent i ous, car eer -
mt i v a t e d o f f i c e r . He had commanded Company B f o r 15 months
and had demonst rat ed s i n c e r e i n t e r e s t i n t h e wel f ar e of h i s
of f i c e r s and men. H e l e d h i s company i n t o t h i s oper at i on
s hor t one commissioned pl at oon l eader . H e t ook t o t h e f i e l d
two l i e ut e na nt s . One was consi dered a mature,, s o l i d ' of f i ce. r
t r yi ng t o do a j ob. The ot he r was descr i bed as q u i e t , i n t e l -
l i g e n t , b u t ba s i c a l l y not mot i vat ed toward a c a r e e r as an Army
o f f i c e r . The l a t t e r o f f i c e r had a r r i ve d i n-count ry onl y 3
weeks bef or e t h e Son My oper at i on.
The noncommissioned o f f i c e r s i n t h e company were appar ent l y
wel l s e l e c t e d wi t h emphasis on qua l i t y. Two-thirds of t h e 27
noncommissioned o f f i c e r s were e n l i s t e e s . The maj or i t y were
above t h e average found t hrouqhout t h e Army i n a l l eval uat ed
s r e a s . Thi s i ncl uded ove r a l l t r a i n a b i l i t y , i nf a nt r y apt i t ude,
gener al l e a r ni ng a b i l i t y , d i s t r i b u t i o n among t h e f our ment al
cat egor i es , and per cent aqe of hi qh school gr aduat es o r hi gher .
The remainder of t h e e n l i s t e d men ranked below t h e average
f o r t h e Army i n a l l ar eas eval uat ed except pr ei nduct i on ed-
ucat i on. Thi s group was composed of 29 per cent e n l i s t e e s and
71 per cent i nduct ees. The onl y s i g n i f i c a n t di f f e r e nc e s wi t hi n
t he cat egor i es of i nduct ees and e nl i s t e e s were t h a t t he en-
l i s t e e s were b e t t e r i n i nf a nt r y a pt i t ude and t he i nduct ees had
a hi gher percent age of hi gh school gr aduat es and men who had
at t ended col l ege.
When t h e noncomn~ssi oned o f f i c e r s an'd ot he r men a r e ana-
l yzed a s a group, t h e e nl i s t e d personnel of t he company a r e
near l y i d e n t i c a l t o t he accessi ons t h a t ent er ed the Army dur i ng
t he same per i od of time.
Taken a s a whole, t h e personnel composition of Company B
cont ai ned no s i g n i f i c a n t devi at i on from t he Army-wide average
and t he r e was l i t t l e t o di s t i ngui s h it from ot her r i f l e com-
pani es.
F. PREVIOUS TASK FORCE BARKER OPERATIONS I N THE SON MY AREA
There were two s i g n i f i c a n t oper at i ons conducted i n t he Son
My Area by TF Barker dur i ng t h e month of February 19 6 8.
The f i r s t of t he s e oper at i ons began on 13 February and was
t ar get ed a ga i ns t t h e 48th Local Force (LF) Bat t al i on. The
gener al concept was f o r C/1-20 I nf t o a c t as a bl ocki ng f or ce
nort h and nort hwest of My Lai ( 4 ) f o r el ement s of B/4-3 I nf
pushing toward t h a t pos i t i on from j u s t nor t h of Route ,521. *
A/3-1 Inf was t o a t t a c k e a s t on t he nor t hs i de of Route 521
t o My Lai (1). Elements of t he 2d ARVN Di vi si on a l s o p a r t i c i -
pat ed i n t h i s oper at i on but remained sout h of Route 521, t he
boundary between t h e uni t s .
As B Company approached My Lai ( 4 ) , heavy f i r e was r ecei ved
from t he enemy occupying prepared pos i t i ons i n t he hedgerows
and t r e e l i n e s . A pl at oon of B Company at t empt ed t o f l ank
t he enemy pos i t i on and was pinned down. A pl at oon of armored
personnel c a r r i e r s (APC' s) was committed and, by usi ng heavy
suppr essi ve f i r e s , ext r act ed t h e pl at oon. ARVN withdrew t h e i r
f or ces dur i ng t h e ni ght and B Company was withdrawn. Company B
had one man k i l l e d and f i v e men wounded i n t he act i on. There
were 78 VC r epor t edl y k i l l e d by t he end of t he day.
Company A cont i nued t h e a t t a c k t he f ol l owi ng day and en-
count ered heavy r e s i s t a nc e from My Lai (1). The t h i r d day,
B Company was a i r l i f t e d i n t o t h e ar ea t o suppor t A Company
i n a sweep of My Lai (1). However, t he VC had s l i pped away
dur i ng t he ni ght and onl y l i g h t r e s i s t a nc e was encount ered.
A sear ch of t h e hamlet r eveal ed an i n t r i c a t e and deep t unnel
complex wi t h r ei nf or ced br i c k rooms l ocat ed 1 2 t o 20 f e e t
underground. Af t e r s ecur i ng approxi mat el y 3 t ons of enemy
equipment, t h e two companies p a r t i a l l y dest royed t he t unnel
syst em and r et ur ned t o t h e i r base ar ea. Resul t s of t h e 3-day
oper at i on were 3 US k i l l e d and 15wounded wi t h 80 VC r epor t ed
k i l l e d ; no enemy weapons were capt ur ed.
The second oper at i on began on 23 February wi t h t he 48th
LF Bat t al i on agai n bei ng t he t a r g e t . Two r i f l e companies,
A/3-1 I nf and B/4-3 I n f , pl us t h e same pl at oon of APC's,
were t h e pr i nc i pa l f or c e s i n t h e oper at i on. C/1-20 I nf
was l ocat ed about 1 0 ki l omet er s nor t h of My Lai ( 4 ) .
Company B occupi ed bl ocki ng pos i t i ons nor t h and nor t heas t
of My Lai ( 4 ) . Company A had t he mi ssi on of a t t a c ki ng t o t h e
e a s t toward My Lai (1)whi l e t h e pl at oon of AP C ' s scr eened
t he r i g h t f l ank al ong Route 521. Heavy enemy f i r e was r ecei ved,
i ncl udi ng mor t ar s, r e c o i l l e s s r i f l e s , r ocket s, and aut omat i c
weapons, a s Company A and t h e APC's advanced toward t he coas t .
Ar t i l l e r y and a i r s t r i k e s were qui ckl y c a l l e d i n and t h e APC's
swept toward t h e enemy out post l i n e ; two APC's were h i t and
t h e pl at oon l eader was s e r i ous l y wounded. Fol l owi ng a ddi t i ona l
a r t i l l e r y and a i r s t r i k e s agai ns t t he enemy pos i t i ons , t h e
APC's agai n at t acked and, t h i s t i me, took a heavy t o l l of t he
enemy. I n t he meantime, Company A cont i nued t o put pr essur e
on t he VC, but l o s t some of i t smomentum when t he company com-
mander was wounded. By l a t e af t er noon .the enemy broke cont act
and was abl e t o escape by i nt er mi ngl i ngwi t h c i v i l i a n s evacu-
a t i n g t he combat zone and by usi ng t he complex t unnel syst em
honeycombing t h e s e c t or .
Company B , which had onl y l i g h t cont act t hroughout t he
oper at i on, l i nked up wi t h Company A, and, wi t h t he APC ' s, wi t h-
drew t o t he TF base. During t h e ni ght and t he f ol l owi ng day
Company B l o s t one man and had 1 0 men wobded from enemy gre-
nades and boobyt raps. To t he nor t h, Company C s uf f er ed f i v e
c a s u a l t i e s from s ni pe r f i r e and k i l l e d two VC.
The t o t a l c a s ua l t i e s f o r t he 2-day oper at i on were t hr e e
US k i l l e d and 28 wounded, pl us two APC's damaged. There
were 75 VC r epor t ed k i l l e d , one PW, and s i x i ndi vi dua l weapons
capt ur ed dur i ng t h e oper at i on. Thi s was t he l a s t major of-
f ens i ve act i on i n t h e Son My ar ea pr i or t o t he 16 March 1968
a s s a ul t .
I n addi t i on t o t he s e t a c t i c a l oper at i ons, t he r e were some
psychol ogi cal oper at i ons conducted i n t he ar ea dur i ng t h e per-
' i od irmnediately p r i o r t o t h e Son My i nc i de nt , al t hough none
were t a r ge t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y a t Son My. * The Son My ar ea had
been a f r equent t a r g e t of e a r l i e r p:;ychological campaigns
aimed a t encouragi ng t h e peopl e t o l eave t h e VC-controlled
ar ea and r e t ur n t o Government of Vietnam (GVN) c ont r ol . Ac-
cordi ng t o t h e Di vi si on Psychol oqi cal Operat i ons (PSYOP) of -
f i c e r , st andar d l e a f l e t s and br oadcast s which fol l owed t h e theme
of "move out now and begi n a new l i f e under t h e GVN" were nor-
mally used f o r t h i s purpose. Some l e a f l e t s appar ent l y i mpl i ed
t h a t t hos e who e l e c t e d t o -remain i n t h e ar ea would be consi dered
as VC o r VC sympat hi zers. Even so, t h e r e was no i ndi c a t i on t h a t
a l l t h e noncombatants had moved out of t h e ar ea.
* AERIAL BROADCASTS
Date Locati on Lenuth Theme
1Mar 3 KIW NW of Thuan 2 0 min Uni t e wi t h GVN t o bui l d
Yen (My Lai
( 4 ) )
an economical powerful
Vietnam
214 3 K ms N-NW of Thuan 20 min
Sur r ender t o t h e j u s t
Mar Yen cause of t h e GVN
13Mar 4 Kms NW of Thuan 30 min Chieu Hoi
Yen
LEAFLET DROPS :
Date Locati on Number Theme
4 Mar 3 Kms N-NW of 100,000 Reward f o r VC Weapons
Thuan Yen
13 Mar 4 K m s NW of Thuan 250,000 (1)Chieu Hoi; ( 2) These
Yen pl anes w i l l dest r oy you
( 3) Message f o r I n f i l -
t r a t i o n Troops
13 Mar 2 Kms NE of Thuan 150,000 Chieu Hoi
Yen
Chapter 5
THE SON MY OI' ERATION, 16- 19 MARCH 1968
The purpose of t h i s chapt er i s t o pr ovi de an overview of'
t h e pr epar at i ons f o r and conduct of t h e Son My oper at i on con-
duct ed by TF Barker dur i ng t h e per i od 16-19 March 1968.
A. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION
The Son My oper at i on was conceived and pl anned by LTC Frank
A. Barker, CO of Task Force (TF) Barker, and h i s immediate
s t a f f . Wi t hi n t h e America1 Di vi si on, it was normal procedure
f o r s >a t t a l i o n o r TF commander t o pl an and conduct oper at i ons
w l ~ h i nh i s assi gned a r e a of oper at i ons (AO) . I t was a l s o t h e
pol i cy f o r t h e di vi s i on commander t o approve t h e scheme of
oper at i on p r i o r t o i t s execut i on. Al-though MG Kost er t e s t i f i e d
t h a t he di d not r e c a l l approvi ng t h e oper at i on, he remembers
p a r t of t h e pl an bei nq descr i bed t o him, and it i s l i k e l y t h a t
he di d approve it. I t i s a l s o probabl e t h a t BG Lipscomb, com-
mander of t h e l l t h Bri qade u n t i l 15 March 1968, approved t h e
concept and t i mi ng of t h e oper at i on as t h e b a s i s f o r obt ai ni ng
an ext ensi on of t h e br i ga de ' s normal A0 from t h e 2d Army
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Di vi si on ( s ee s ket ch 5-1). COL
Henderson, who became CO of t h e l l t h Bri qade on 15 March 1968,
was a l s o br i e f e d on t h e oper at i on and gave it h i s appr oval . I t
i s pr obabl e, however, t h a t none of t he s e commanders was br i e f e d
on t h e d e t a i l s f o r execut i ng t h e pl an. '
The concept of t h e oper at i on was t h a t TF Barker, employing
a l l t h r e e of i t s at t ached r i f l e companies, would conduct a
sear ch and dest r oy oper at i on i n t h e Son My ar ea begi nni ng on
16 March 1968. Search and dest r oy oper at i ons were a t t h a t t i me
o f f i c i a l l y def i ned by Mi l i t a r y Assi st ance Command, Vietnam
(IIACV) d i r e c t i v e a s t hos e oper at i ons conducted f o r t h e purpose
of seeki ng out and des t r oyi ng enemy f or ces , i n s t a l l a t i o n s ,
r esour ces, and base a r e a s . These oper at i ons were or i e nt e d on
enemy f or c e s i n s i d e o r out s i de of US uni t s ' assi gned t a c t i c a l
ar eas of r e s pons i bi l i t y. I n t h e case of TF Barker, t h e ob jec-
t i v e was t h e ent rapment and el i mi nat i on of t h e 48th Vi et Conq
(VC) Local Force (LF) Ba t t a l i on and two s e pa r a t e l o c a l f or ce
companies, and t h e de s t r uc t i on of t h e i r l o g i s t i c a l suppor t
base and s t a gi ng ar ea. The 4 8t h had, f o r sever al ' ye a r s ,
roamed t hroughout Son T-inh D i s t r i c t and, more r e c e nt l y, had
used t h e Son My a r e a a s a base f o r i t s l o g i s t i c a l suppor t
a c t i v i t i e s . During t he March 1968 t i me frame t he 48t h probabl y
r ecei ved pe r i odi c resuppl y by enemy s ea t r awl er s oper at i ng of f
t he Batangan Peni nsul a.
A t t h e t i me of t he 16-19 March oper at i on, t h e 48th was
consi dered a s posi ng a cont i nui ng and imminent t h r e a t a ga i ns t
Quang Ngai Ci t y. A MACV i nt e l l i ge nc e assessment , i s s ued t h e
l a t t e r p a r t of February 1968, i ndi c a t e d t h a t t he 48th had
r e c e nt l y been f ur ni shed wi t h a ddi t i ona l t r oops from d i s t r i c t
f or ces and a pos s i bl e North Vietnamese Army (NVA) repl acement
packet , and i nt ended t o combine wi t h ot he r l o c a l f or ces t o
i n i t i a t e an of f ens i ve a ga i ns t Quang Ngai Ci t y. Previ ous
oper at i ons by TF Barker el ement s i n t h e Son My a r e a had c l e a r l y
e s t a bl i s he d t h a t t h e 48t h possessed heavy weapons, i ncl udi ng
12.7mm machineguns, r ocket s , and mor t ar s. I t was bel i eved by
t he TF headquar t er s t h a t t h e 48t h had been i nst r ument al i n
i n f l i c t i n g c a s ua l t i e s on TF el ement s dur i ng t hos e pr evi ous
oper at i ons ( s e e chap 4 ) .
Si nce t h e Son My ar ea* was not wi t hi n TF Bar ker ' s normal
AO, cl ear ance f o r t h e temporary ext ensi on of t h e A0 was obt ai ned
through Son Tinh D i s t r i c t and Quang Ngai Provi nce headquar t er s,
and from t h e 2d ARVN Di vi si on which had pri mary t a c t i c a l
r e s pons i bi l i t y f o r t he ar ea.
B. ISSUANCE OF ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS
The or der f o r t h e Son My oper at i on was i s s ued o r a l l y by LTC
Barker a t Landing Zone (LZ) Dot t i e, s i t e of t h e TF Barker com-
mand pos t , on t h e af t er noon of 15 March 1968. LZ Dot t i e was
l ocat ed approxi mat el y 11ki l omet er s nort hwest of t h e Son My
ar ea. No wr i t t e n or der s w e r e i ssued by t h e 11t h Bri gade con-
cer ni ng t h e oper at i on and t he r e has been no s u b s t a n t i a l evi dence
developed t o i n d i c a t e t h a t TF Barker i s s ue d e i t h e r an oper at i on
overl ay o r a wr i t t e n fragment ary or der t o supplement t h e o r a l
i ns t r uc t i ons . (One wi t ness [CPT Gamble] t e s t i f i e d t h a t he
r ecei ved an i nf or mat i on copy of a wr i t t e n oper at i on or der
subsequent t o t h e 15 March b r i e f i n g , but it appears from t h e
t est i mony of CPT' (now Mr . ) Vazquez, who was t h e TF Barker f i r e
suppor t coor di nat or , t h a t CPT Gamble i s r e f e r r i n g t o an
* Vi l l age, haml et , and subhamlet t i t l es used i n t h e r econst r yc-
t i o n of event s descr i bed i n t h i s chapt er (and depi ct ed on accom-
panying s ket ch maps) a r e based on US Army Topographic maps i n
exi s t ence a t t h e t i me of t he Son My oper at i on. Refer t o chapt er
3 f o r t i t l es c ur r e nt l y used by Government of Vietnam ( G W)
a u t h o r i t i e s f o r t he var i ous p o l i t i c a l subdi vi si ons wi t hi n Son
My Vi l l age.
a r t i l l e r y f i r i n g over l ay prepared by Vazquez, r a t h e r t han an
oper at i ons over l ay from TF Barker. I n any event , t h e over l ay
wa s dest r oyed by Gamble soon a f t e r he r ecei ved it.) Ot her
wi t nesses who t e s t i f i e d a s - t o t h e pos s i bl e i ssuance of opera-
t i o n s over l ays/ or der s were not a bl e t o r e c a l l s p e c i f i c a l l y
t h e i r cont ent o r event ual di s pos i t i on.
At t endi ng t h e 15 March b r i e f i n g were:
LTC Frank A. Barker CO, TF ~ a r E e r
MAJ Fr eder i c W. Watke CO, B Company (Aero-
Scout ) , 123d Avn Bn
MAJ Charl es C. Calhoun S3, TF Barker
CPT Eugene M. Kotouc S2, TF Barker
CPT st ephen J. Gamble CO, D Bat t er y,
Art y
6-11th
CPT (now M r . ) Dennis R. Vazquez Ar t i l l e r y
Of f i cer
Li ai son
CPT (now Mr . ) William C. Riggs CO, A/3-1 I nf
CPT Ea r l R. Michles CO, B/4-3 I nf
CPT Er nest L. Medina CO, C/1-20 I n
*1LT (now Mr . ) Donald R. Mi l l i ki n P l t Leader ("Dol phi ns") ,
174t h Avn Co
*W01 (now ~LT' ) Michael 0. Magno. As s i s t a nt S3, 174t h
Avn Co
COL Henderson had a r r i ve d a t LZ Dot t i e a t 1330 hour s, and
p r i o r t o i ssuance of t h e oper at i on or der addressed a l l o r most
of t he assembled group. H e b r i e f l y reviewed t h e concept of t h e
fort hcomi ng oper at i on and t hen di scussed s e ve r a l combat per f or -
mance a r e a s i n which he and BG Lipscomb, pr evi ous commander of
t h e 11t h Bri gade, f e l t t h a t TF Barker el ement s had been de f i -
c i e n t and, a s - a r e s u l t , had f a i l e d t o accomplish t h e i r obj ect i ve.
H e emphasized t h e ne c e s s i t y and advant ages of e s t a bl i s hi ng and
mai nt ai ni ng cl os e and aggr essi ve cont act wi t h t h e enemy.
Sever al wi t nesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t he a l s o al l uded t o t h e
el i mi nat i on of t h e 48th LF Ba t t a l i on "once and f o r a l l . " .
* Probabl e At t endees
CPT Medina t e s t i f i e d t h a t COL Henderson' s b r l e f i n g a l s o l i nked
t oget her t h e u n i t ' s p a s t f a i l u r e t o aggr essi vel y pr osecut e enemy
cont act s wi t h t h e low r a t e of enemy weapons capt ur ed i n t hos e
oper at i ons. According t o CPT Medina,.COL Henderson r e f e r r e d t o
t h e i r l ack of aggr essi veness a s per mi t t i ng "men, women, o r
chi l dr en, o r ot he r VC s ol di e r s i n t he ar ea" t o pi ck up t he
weapons and g e t away. CPT Medina' s r e c ol l e c t i on of t h i s
aspect of COL Henderson' s b r i e f i n g i s not s ubs t a nt i a t e d by t h e
t est i mony of ot he r wi t nesses who were i n at t endance a t t h e
br i e f i ng, but MAJ Calhoun, t he S 3 , di d t e s t i f y con&rni ng an
e a r l i e r oper at i on i n t h e Son My a r e a dur i nq which a capt ur ed
enemy mort ar was r e t r i e ve d by tw"6 armed VC-women i n t h e mi dst
of a f i r e f i g h t .
INTELLIGENCE
Following COL Henderson' s remarks and h i s depar t ur e from
LZ Dot t i e a t 1415 hour s, CPT Kotouc, t h e TF S2, gave an i n t e l -
l i gence br i e f i ng t o t he assembled group. I n h i s br i e f i ng, he
i ndi c a t e d t h a t t h e 48t h VC LF Ba t t a l i on was di s per s ed through-
out t he Son My ar ea. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t bot h he and LTC
Barker f e l t t h a t t he VC headquar t er s and two companies, t o t a l -
i ng over 200 enemy, would be l ocat ed i n t h e subhamlet of My
Lai ( 4 ) .- , MAJ Calhoun and MAJ Watke t e s t i f i e d , however,
t h a t t h e TF command group deduced t h a t t h e enemy headquar t er s
wa s l ocat ed i n " Pi nkvi l l e" o r My Lai (1). Whatever t h e ba s i s
f o r t h e i nt e l l i ge nc ' e es t i mat e, t h e t est i mony of CPT Medina and
ot he r members of C Company i ndi c a t e s c l e a r l y t h a t t hey f ul l y.
expect ed, based on t he i n t e l l i g e n c e br i e f i ng, t o encount er an
enemy f or c e of between 200-250 i n My Lai ( 4 ) on t h e f ol l owi ng
morning.
During t he i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g and/or LTC Bar ker ' s
oper at i onal b r i e f i n g ( see bel ow), t h e c i v i l i a n popul at i on
wi t hi n t h e Son My a r e a was a s c a t e g o r i ~ ~ d " a c t i ve sympat hi zers
wi t h t he VC." Sever al wi t nesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t it was s t a t e d
by bot h B,arker and Kotouc t h a t most of t h e c i v i l i a n i nha bi t a nt s
would be out of t he Son My haml et s and on t h e i r way t o l o c a l
markets by 0700 hours on t h e morning of 16 March 1968 ( t h i s
was a Sat urday morning, normally a market i ng day f o r t h e
-
Vi et namese). Some r ef er ence was a l s o appar ent l y made, o r
had been made, t o pr evi ous l e a f l e t drops and hel i copt er - bor ne
l oudspeaker br oadcast s which had a l l e ge dl y warned t h e c i v i l i a n
i nha bi t a nt s of Son My t o evacuat e t h e a r e a and move t o GVN-
c ont r ol l e d a r e a s i n or der t o avoi d p o t e n t i a l i nj ur y from f or t h-
coming a l l i e d oper at i ons. The cont ext i n which t h e l e a f l e t
drop/ l oudspeaker i nf or mat i on was br i e f e d t o TF Barker per sonnel
on 15 March, and, i n f a c t , whether it was a c t ua l l y br i e f e d on
15 March ( a s opposed t o an e a r l i e r o r l a t e r da t e ) i s not c e r t a i n
from t h e t est i mony developed. Examination of pe r t i ne nt r ecor ds
of TF Barker, t h e 11t h Bri gade, and t h e America1 Di vi si on,
however, r eveal s no evi dence of any l e a f l e t drop o r a e r i a l
br oadcast di r e c t e d a t t h e i nha bi t a nt s 'of My Lai ( 4 ) dur i ng t h e
per i od 1 through 20 March 1968, and t hose drops and br oadcast s
which w e r e conducted i n t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e Son My a r e a dur i ng
t h i s t i me di d not advi se t h e i nha bi t a nt s t o evacuat e t he
ar ea. I n any case, t h e probabl e presence of c i v i l i a n s
wi t hi n t he oper at i onal a r e a on t he morning of 16 March 1968 was
t aken i n t o account by LTC Barker i n t h e development of h i s
oper at i onal pl an, p a r t i c u l a r l y a s it per t ai ned t o t h e employ-
ment of a r t i l l e r y pr epar at or y f i r e s .
D. OPERATIONAL ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS
Following t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g by CPT K O ~ O U C , an
oper at i ons b r i e f i n g and implementing~instructionswere gi ven
by MAJ Calhoun, TF S3, and LTC Barker. MAJ Calhoun t e s t i f i e d
t o t he e f f e c t t h a t he does not r e c a l l s p e c i f i c a l l y what i nf or -
mation was pr esent ed by him and what information/instructions
were gi ven by LTC Barker, but t h a t Barker had per s onal l y
s e l e c t e d t h e l oc a t i on f o r t he l andi ng zones and t h e a r t i l l e r y
pr epar at i on which w e r e t o be used on t h e f ol l owi ng day. MAJ
Calhoun a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t t he i ns t r uc t i ons pr esent ed a t t he
15 March b r i e f i n g per t ai ned onl y t o pl ans f o r t h e f i r s t day of
t h e oper at i on, 16 March.
LTC Bar ker ' s deat h i n a c t i on on 13 June 1968 and t h e
absence of any wr i t t e n i ns t r uc t i ons o r oper at i onal over l ays
provi ded dur i ng t h e oper at i ons br i e f i ng, have made it neces-
s a r y t o r econs t r uct t h e pl anned scheme of maneuver and opera-
t i o n a l i ns t r uc t i ons al most excl us i vel y from t est i mony of
wi t nesses pr es ent a t t h e b r i e f i n g and/or who ha bi t ua l l y worked
i n t he TF Headquart ers. While t h e i ns t r uc t i ons descr i bed he r e i n
and t he planned scheme of maneuver depi ct ed on s ket ch map 5-2
a r e pr esent ed as a cohesi ve e n t i t y , t h e prepbnderance of t h e
pe r t i ne nt t est i mony i ndi c a t e s t h a t t h e or der s and i ns t r uc t i ons
were i s s ued t o var i ous i ndi vi dua l s i n a somewhat pi ecemeal
f ashi on t hroughout t h e af t er noon of 15 March, and t h a t dur i ng
MAJ Cal houn' s b r i e f i n g on t h e planned scheme of maneuver, t h e
d e t a i l s were depi ct ed onl y on t h e t a c t i c a l oper at i ons c e nt e r
(TOC) map, which was presumably er as ed or di scar ded subsequent
t o t he Son My oper at i on. ( As p a r t of a Combat Aft er-Act i on
Report which he submi t t ed on 28 March 1968, LTC Barker i ncl os ed
a sket ch de pi c t i ng t h e maneuver of h i s at t ached and suppor t i ng
u n i t s [ see e xhi bi t R-21 . The sket ch gener al l y cor r obor at es t h e
t e s t i moni a l r econs t r uct i on of h i s o v e r a l l scheme of maneuver,
but it i s i nc ons i s t e nt i n i t s depi ct i on of t he movement of C
Company, wi t h t h a t di scussed dur i ng t h e 15 March 1968 b r i e f i n g
and wi t h t he a c t ua l maneuver of C Company which occur r ed dur i ng
t h e combat a s s a ul t . )
LTC Bar ker ' s pl an c a l l e d f o r t h e oper at i on t o commence a t
0725 hours on 16 March wi t h a 3- t o 5-minute a r t i l l e r y
pr epar at i on t o precede t he i n i t i a l ai r mobi l e combat a s s a u l t
by Company C i n t o a LZ w e s t of t h e subhamlet of My Lai ( 4 ) ( s ee
sket ch 5- 2) . Planned i ns e r t i on t i me f o r t h e f i r s t l i f t of
Company C was 0730 hour s, t o be fol l owed by a second l i f t a s
soon a s pos s i bl e. I ns e r t i on of t he f i r s t l i f t , f ol l owi ng t he
a r t i l l e e * pr epar at i on, was t o be support ed by suppr essi ve f i r e
from he l i c opt e r gunships dur i ng t h e touchdown and unl oadi ng of
t h e a s s a u l t t r oops. Following compl et i on of t h e combat a s s a u l t ,
Company C was t o move gener al l y e a s t t hrough My Lai ( 4 ) . (The
pr eoper at i onal b r i e f i n g appar ent l y di d not ' i ncl ude i ns t r uc t i ons
pe r t a i ni ng t o C'-Company act i ons which occur r ed i n t h e subhamlet
of Binh Tay and ot he r subhamlets e a s t of My Lai ( 4 ) on 16 March.
Those a c t i ons r e s ul t e d from supplementary or der s i s s ued dur i ng
t he course of t h e oper at i on ( s ee chap 6 ) ) . Af t e r compl et i ng
t he sweep of My Lai ( 4 ) , C Company was t o move nor t he a s t t o
l i nk up wi t h Company B i n a ni ght t i me def ensi ve pos i t i on
approxi mat el y 1-1/2 t o 2 ki l omet er s t o t he nor t he a s t of My Lai
( 4 ) . The ni ght t i me pos i t i on was appar ent l y desi gnat ed a s an
obj e c t i ve a r e a pr i mar i l y t o provi de a ba s i s f o r coor di nat i ng
t he movements of Company C and Company B.
Fol l owi ng i n s e r t i o n of Company C, a second combat a s s a u l t
was t o be conducted by Company B i n t o an LZ sout h of My Lai ( I ) ,
unl ess t hey w e r e r equi r ed t o r e i nf or c e Company C i n t h e a s s a u l t
on My Lai ( 4 ) . A second a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on was a l s o planned
on t h e LZ sout h of My Lai (1) t o precede i n s e r t i o n of B Company
el ement s. Ther eaf t er , B Company was t o move nor t h t hrough My
Lai (1), t hen w e s t t o l i n k up wi t h C Company.
Company A, t h e t h i r d at t ached r i f l e company, was assi gned
t he mi ssi on of moving t he ni ght of 15-16 March from f i el d posi -
t i o n s l ocat ed e a s t of LZ Dot t i e i n t o bl ocki ng pos i t i ons on t h e
nor t her n bank of t h e Song Diem Di e m, al most &ue nor t h of t h e
Son My ar ea. Company A was t o mai nt ai n t hes e bl ocki ng pos i t i ons
t hroughout 16 March i n or der t o t r a p enemy f or ces at t empt i ng t o
escape from t h e Son My a r e a t o ' t h e nor t h.
The 174t h Avi at i on Company was t o pr ovi de f i v e t roop-
car r yi ng he l i c opt e r s , LTC Bar ker ' s command and c ont r ol he l i -
copt er , and accompanying gunshi ps r equi r ed t o suppor t and c ont r ol
t h e combat a s s a ul t s by C Company and B Company. Four a ddi t i ona l
t r oop l i f t he l i c opt e r s were t o be provi ded by t h e 71s t Avi at i on
Company.
An aero-scout team from B Company, 123d Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on,
which provi ded d i r e c t suppor t f o r TF' Barker, was t o s cr een t h e
a r e a t o t h e sout h of t h e My Lai ( 4 ) and My Lai (1)complex.
(The aero-scout team cons i s t ed of one OH-23 obser vat i on he l i -
copt er and two accompanying UH-1B armed he l i c opt e r gunshi ps. )
TF Barker had a l s o arranged t o have US Navy "Swi f t Boat s"
p a t r o l t h e c oa s t a l wat er s e a s t of t he Son My a r e a of f t h e
Batangan Cape.
A f our t h r i f l e company, A/4-3 I n f , was a l s o pl aced under
t h e oper at i onal c ont r ol of TF Barker dur i ng t h e per i od 14-18
March 1968. I t pl ayed no a c t i ve r o l e t he Son My oper at i on
p e r s e , but was employed t o pr ovi de l o c a l s e c ur i t y f o r LZ Dot t i e
and LZ Upt i ght dur i ng t h e cour se of t h e oper at i on. It was
r et ur ned t o c ont r ol of i t s par ent b a t t a l i o n a t 1700 hours on
18 March.
From t h e evi dence a va i l a bl e , it appears t h a t u n i t movements
fol l owed subsequent t o 16 March were not s p e c i f i c a l l y pl anned
o r di scussed dur i ng t he 15 March br i e f i ng. The scheme of
maneuver f o r 17, 18, and 19 March was appar ent l y cont i ngent on
t h e event s of 16 March and was execut ed i n response t o sup-
pl ement ary o r a l or der s i s s ued by LTC Barker f ol l owi ng t h e
combat a s s a ul t s on 16 March.
Af t er t h e ope r a t i ona l b r i e f i n g , LTC Barker t ook s e ve r a l of
h i s subor di nat es on an a e r i a l reconnai ssance of t h e t a r g e t ar ea.
E. ISSUES CONCERNING LTC BARKER'S BRIEFING
I n view of subsequent event s a t Son My, t h e key i s s ue s which
emerge concerni ng t h e 15 March br i ef i ng i nvol ve t h e or der s and
i ns t r uc t i ons i s s ued by LTC Barker and h i s s t a f f (and subsequent -
l y by h i s subor di nat es) concerni ng ( a ) t h e pl anned a r t i l l e r y and
gunshi p pr epar at or y f i r e s , ( b) t h e burni ng o r de s t r uc t i on of
houses and ot he r s t r u c t u r e s , ( c ) t h e k i l l i n g of l i ve s t oc k and
de s t r uc t i on of ot he r f oods t uf f s , and ( d) t h e handl i ng of
noncombatants encount ered dur i ng t h i s oper at i on.
The a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on was t o be f i r e d by D/6-11 Art y
( c ons i s t i ng of f our 105mrn howi t zer s) which was l ocat ed a t LZ
Upt i ght . There i s c onf l i c t i ng t est i mony a s t o whet her LTC
Barker planned t o have t h e a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on f i r e d on t h e
LZ f o r C Company, on t h e hamlet o,f My Lai ( 4 ) , o r on p a r t s of
each. CPT Vazquez, a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n o f f i c e r t o t h e TF, t e s t -
i f i e d t h a t LTC Barker wanted t he pr epar at i on pl aced on t h e LZ
but had a l s o s pe c i f i e d t h a t he wanted t h e t r e e and bunker l i n e
al ong t he west ern edge of t he hamlet "covered" t o knock out
enemy weapon pos i t i ons which he expect ed t o be set up t he r e .
CPT Gamble, CO of D/6-11 Art y, t e s t i f i e d from memory t h a t t h e
gener al l oc a t i on of t he pl anned pr epar at i on was t o t h e w e s t of
My Lai ( 4 ) but s t a t e d t h a t any confi rmat ory r ecor ds which would
have cont ai ned t h e pr e c i s e map coor di nat es of t he pl anned pre-
par at or y f i r e s w e r e dest r oyed ( i n accordance wi t h h i s u n i t SOP)
a f t e r r e t e nt i on i n t he u n i t ' s f i l e s f o r a per i od of 6 months.
CPT Gamble' s immediate s upe r i or , LTC (now COL) Luper, s t a t e d
t h a t he di scussed t h e pl anned pr epar at or y f i r e s wi t h LTC Barker
on 15 March 1968 and t h a t LTC Barker wanted t h e f i r e s pl aced
on My Lai ( 4 ) . MAJ Calhoun and CPT Kotouc bot h t e s t i f i e d t o
t he e f f e c t t h a t LTC Barker consi der ed t he pr oba bi l i t y of non-
combat ant s' bei ng pr e s e nt i n My Lai ( 4 ) a t t h e t i me of t h e
a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on, and deci ded t o f i r e t h e pr epar at i on any-
way a s a means of minimizing f r i e ndl y c a s ua l t i e s from t h e
ent renched enemy which he a l s o expect ed t o be pr e s e nt a t My Lai
( 4 ) on t h e morning of 16 March. The preponderance of t h e t e s t i -
mony t hus i ndi c a t e s t h a t LTC Bar ker ' s pl an c a l l e d f o r t h e a r t i l -
l e r y pr epar at i on t o be f i r e d ont o t h e LZ f o r Company C and i n t o
t he west ern and sout hwest ern - por t i ons of My Lai ( 4 ) wi t hout
p r i o r warning t o t h e i nha bi t a nt s ( s e e s ket ch 5-3). Testimony
provi ded by a vi a t i on wi t nesses a l s o i ndi c a t e s t h a t LTC Bar ker ' s
pl an c a l l e d f o r he l i c opt e r gunship suppr essi ve ' f i r e s t o be
pl aced on and around t h e LZ t o pr ot e c t t h e t r oop- car r yi ng h e l i -
copt er s i n t h e i n t e r v a l from t h e t i m e t he a r t i ~ l l e r y pr epar at i on
ceased u n t i l t he t r oops were i ns e r t e d on t h e ground.
While t he r e i s some c o n f l i c t i n t h e t est i mony a s t o whet her
LTC Barker or der ed t he de s t r uc t i on of houses, dwel l i ngs, l i ve -
s t ock, and ot he r f oods t uf f s i n t h e Son My a r e a , t h e preponder-
ance of t he evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t such de s t r uc t i on was
i mpl i ed, i f not s p e c i f i c a l l y di r e c t e d, by h i s or der s of 15
March. (CPT Medina t e s t i f i e d t h a t dur i ng t h e a e r i a l reconnai s-
sance of t he t a r g e t ar ea, subsequent t o t h e b r i e f i n g a t LZ
Dot t i e, he r ecei ved e x p l i c i t i ns t r uc t i ons from LTC Barker t o
dest r oy My Lai ( 4 ) . These i ns t r uc t i ons were appar ent l y not
overheard by ot he r p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e a e r i a l reconnai ssance,
but would have been c ons i s t e nt wi t h t h e pl anned obj e c t i ve of
ne ut r a l i z i ng o r des t r oyi ng t h e 48th VC Ba t t a l i on' s l o g i s t i c a l
suppor t base i n t h e Son My a r e a . ) Whether LTC Barker at t empt ed
t o make any d i s t i n c t i o n s , dur i ng t h e b r i e f i n g o r i n h i s subse-
quent i ns t r uc t i ons , between dwel l i ngs, l i ve s t oc k, and f oods t uf f s
of noncombatants versus t hos e bel ongi ng t o t h e VC i s hi ghl y
doubt f ul s i n c e he and h i s s t a f f appar ent l y act ed upon t h e
i n t e l l i g e n c e assessment t h a t v i r t u a l l y t h e e n t i r e Son My a r e a
was c ont r ol l e d and i nhabi t ed by VC and VC sympat hi zers.
Fur t her , CPT Kotouc t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t some t i me on t h e 15t h he
was informed by LTC Barker t h a t t h e v i l l a g e was t o be dest r oyed,
i ncl udi ng homes, l i ves t ock, and f oods t uf f s .
The preponderance of t h e evi dence a l s o i ndi c a t e s t h a t a t
t he TF l e ve l no s p e c i f i c pl ans o r arrangements were made f o r
t h e handl i ng of any noncombatants found i n t h e Son My ar ea.
Fur t her , t he t est i mony of persons who were pr e s e nt a t t h e 15
March b r i e f i n g i ndi c a t e s s t r ongl y t h a t LTC Barker di d not i s s ue
any i n s t r u c t i o n s pe r t a i ni ng t o t h e problem of c o l l e c t i n g and
pr ocessi ng noncombatants who might be encount ered dur i ng t h e
planned oper at i on. Sever al wi t nesses have t e s t i f i e d t o a
vague r e c ol l e c t i on of t h e u n i t s t andi ng oper at i ng procedure
(SOP) t o be fol l owed i n evacuat i ng noncombatants from opera-
t i o n a l a r e a s , but t h e r e i s no i ndi c a t i on t h a t such an SOP was
r e f e r r e d t o by LTC Barker o r any of h i s s t a f f dur i ng t h e 15 March
br i e f i ng. (While t h e evi dence a l s o i ndi c a t e s t h a t TF Barker had
no wr i t t e n SOP, it would be normal f o r a b a t t a l i o n o r t a s k f or ce
t o oper at e on t h e b a s i s of unwr i t t en but gener al l y underst ood
"st andi ng oper at i ng procedures. ' I )
There i s no s u b s t a n t i a l evi dence t h a t LTC Barker d i r e c t l y
or der ed t h e de l i be r a t e k i l l i n g of noncombatants. However, when
consi dered i:n t h e l i g h t of t h e i nf or mat i on concerni ng ( a ) t he
al l eged l e a f l e t drops and . l oudspeaker br oadcast s, ( b) t h e
g e n e r a l . 1 ~accept ed i n t e l l i g e n c e p i c t u r e of Son My aS bei ng
comprised al most excl us i vel y of :'VC and VC sympat hi zer s, " ( c )
t he assumption t h a t most of t h e c i v i l i a n s woul d' be "gone t o
market " a t t h e t i me of t h e a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on and combat
a s s a ul t , ( d) LTC Bar ker ' s deci s i on t o f i r e t h e a r t i l l e r y pr e-
pa r a t i on on a t l e a s t a por t i on of My Lai ( 4 ) , (e t h e commonly
known r e s u l t s of pr evi ous oper at i ons by TF Barker i n t he Son My
ar ea, and ( f ) , t he ove r a l l concept of t h e oper at i on, it seems
r easonabl e t o concl ude t h a t LTC Bar ker ' s minimal o r nonexi st ent
i ns t r uc t i ons concerni ng t h e handl i ng of noncombatants cr eat ed
t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r grave mi sunderst andi ngs as t o h i s i nt e nt i ons
and f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s or der s as a ut hor i t y t o f i r e ,
wi t hout r e s t r i c t i o n , on a l l persons found i n t h e t a r g e t ar ea.
Fol l owi ng t h e b r i e f i n g , LTC Barker t ook a l l of h i s company
commanders, CPT Vazquez , and possi bl y CPT Kotouc on an a e r i a l
reconnai ssance of t h e Son My ar ea. The reconnai ssance was
appar ent l y i nt ended t o pr ovi de t h e company commanders and t he
a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n o f f i c e r wi t h a f i n a l vi s ua l f a mi l i a r i z a t i on
of t h e t a r g e t ar ea, tr . ~c l ude t h e i r own l andi ng zones and
assi gned obj e c t i ve s , dnd t o pr ovi de CPT Gamble and CPT Michles
wi t h t r a ns por t a t i on back t o LZ Upt i ght . As not ed e a r l i e r , CPT
Medina t e s t i f i e d t h a t dur i ng t h e reconnai ssance LTC Barker
s p e c i f i c a l l y i n s t r u c t e d him t o dest r oy My Lai ( 4 ) . There i s no
evi dence t o suggest , however, t h a t LTC Barker embel l i shed h i s
or i gi na l or der s and i ns t r uc t i ons dur i ng t h e r econnai ssance or
a t any subsequent t i m e p r i o r t o t h e a c t ua l begi nni ng of t h e
oper at i on.
F . SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS BY COMPANY COMMANDERS
Fol l owi ng LTC Bar ker ' s b r i e f i n g and t h e a e r i a l r econnai s-
sance, h i s company commanders r et ur ned t o t h e i r u n i t ar eas and
i s s ued t h e i r -own implementing or der s. (Si nce t h e evi dence
developed i n t h i s I nqui r y shows no pos i t i ve i ndi c a t i ons of war
cri mes pe r pe t r a t e d by members of A Company dur i ng t h e ensui ng
oper at i on, onl y t h e br i e f i ngs gi ven by t h e B and C Company
commanders a r e descr i bed he r e i n) .
CPT Mi chl es, t h e B Company commander, fol l owed h i s normal
procedure of i s s ui ng h i s or der s t o t h e pl at oon l eader s , h i s
a r t i l l e r y forward obser ver (FO), and s e l e c t e d members of h i s
command group. Key per sonnel who at t ended h i s b r i e f i n g were: .
1LT (now CPT) Kenneth W. Boatman Ar t i l l e r y F O
1LT (now CPT) Thomas K. Willingham Pl at oon Leader,
Pl at oon
1st
1LT Roy B. Cochran Pl at oon Leader,
Pl at oon
2d
SSG (now M r . ) Fr ankl i n ~ McCloud Act i ng Pl at oon
Leader, 3d Pl at oon
SSG Edward 0. Vann Act i ng Pl at oon Leader,
Weapons Pl at oon
SGT (now M r . ) Barry P. Mars h a l l Squad Leader, CP
Secur i t y Squad
SP4 (now M r . ) Lawrence Congleton Radio/Telephone
Operat or (RTO )
(CPT Michles was k i l l e d i n a he l i c opt e r cr as h wi t h LTC Barker
on 13 June 1968. The d e t a i l s of t h e or der s which he i s s ued on
15 March 1968 have been developed from t he t est i mony of some
of t h e i ndi vi dua l s l i s t e d above. )
1LT Boatman t e s t i f i e d t h a t CPT Michles began h i s b r i e f i n g
by quot i ng LTC Barker as havi ng s a i d, "ever yt hi ng down t he r e
was VC o r VC sympat hi zers. I' 1LT oat man a l s o s a i d Michles t o l d
them, "we' ve had a l o t of t r oubl e t he r e , not j u s t a l i t t l e , "
and t he y were t o "go down and cl ean t h e pl ace out . "
1LT Willingham s t a t e d t h a t he r ecei ved i ns t r uc t i ons from
CPT Mi chl es t o "bum a l l v i l l a g e s . " 1 LT Boatman a l s o t e s t i f i e d
t h a t s i mi l a r i n s t r u c t i o n s were i s s ued by CPT Michles. The
command group and pl at oon l eader s a l l underst ood t h a t t he opera-
t i o n was t o be a s ear ch and dest r oy oper at i on. I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
1LT Willingham s a i d t h i s was t h e f i r s t oper at i on dur i ng which
t he company had t o dest r oy t h e haml et s of t he " Pi nkvi l l e" ar ea.
SP4 Congleton l e f t t h e b r i e f i n g wi t h t h e i mpressi on t h a t t he
ar ea was t o be compl et el y dest r oyed.
The t est i mony from i ndi vi dua l members of t h e r i f l e and
weapons pl at oon has provi ded c onf l i c t i ng i nf or mat i on concerni ng
t he i ssuance of or der s f o r t h e oper at i on. The maj or i t y r e c a l l e d
t h a t t h e b r i e f i n g s were conducted by t h e i r squad l e a de r s ,
al t hough t h e second pl at oon may have been br i e f e d by 1LT
Cochran. The t est i mony i ndi c a t e s t h a t t he s e br i e f i ngs provi ded
more d e t a i l s on t h e e s s e n t i a l s of g e t t i n g t o t h e obj ect i ve ar ea
t han a t horough or i e nt a t i on on t h e methods of accompl i shi ng t h e
mi ssi on. Gener al l y, t h e subst ance of t h e br i e f i ngs was
consi der ed Goutine and st andar d procedures were t o be used.
They di d not r ecei ve any s p e c i a l i ns t r uc t i ons on de s t r uc t i on of
v i l l a g e s and l i ve s t oc k o r on t h e handl i ng of VC s us pect s and
noncombatants. Because of t h e i r exper i ence from two pr evi ous
oper at i ons i n t h e a r e a , t hey expect ed t o encount er numerous
mines and boobyt raps. Although t h e t e r m "search and dest r oy"
wa s used t o des cr i be t h e mi ssi on by most wi t nesses, t hey w e r e
not t o l d , nor di d t hey expect t o ge t or der s on de s t r uc t i on
procedures u n t i l t hey were i n t h e obj e c t i ve ar ea.
There were except i ons t o t h e above i nt e r pr e t a t i on. Three
men, two from t h e f i r s t pl at oon, bel i eve t hey were t o shoot
anyone found i n t he obj e c t i ve ar ea. One of t hes e men r e c a l l e d
e i t h e r CPT Michles o r h i s pl at oon l e a de r sayi ng, "Thi s i s what
you have been wai t i ng f or - - ' sear ch and de s t r oy' . " Undoubtedly
t he r e i s some subst ance t o t he s e except i ons. The t est i mony
does not suggest t h a t t he r e was a s pe c i a l e f f o r t t o pr epar e
t h e company emot i onal l y f o r a revenge-type mi ssi on. CPT Michles
di d not stress t h i s oper at i on ( i n t h e same manner a s CPT Medina)
by assembl i ng h i s men and di s cus s i ng it wi t h them on 15 March.
While a t t h e pi ckup zone on t h e morning of t h e 16t h, however,
he di d remind t h e men t o be e x t r a caut i ous.
CPT Medina assembled most of t h e o f f i c e r s and men of C
Company t o i s s u e h i s or der s and i ns t r uc t i ons f o r t h e pl anned
oper at i on. ( C Company wi t nesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t CPT Medina' s
b r i e f i n g was hel d f ol l owi ng a memorial s e r vi c e f o r a former
member of t h e company who had been k i l l e d i n a c t i on a few days
pr evi ousl y. The t est i mony of t he s e wi t nesses i s i nconcl usi ve
a s t o whether t h e s e r vi c e was hel d on 15 March immediately
p r i o r t o t h e b r i e f i n g , o r whether it was hel d p r i o r t o t h e
15t h. )
Key per sonnel who at t ended CPT Medina' s b r i e f i n g were:;
CPT Eugene M. Kotouc TF S2
2LT (now Mr . ) Roger L. Alaux, Jr. Ar t i l l e r y FO
2LT (now 1LT) William L. Cal l ey
-
Pl at oon Leader,
P l t
1st
2LT Stephen K. Brook's Pl at oon Leader,
Plt
2d
2LT (now M r . ) J e f f e r y U. LaCross Pl at oon ~ e a d e r , 3d
P l t
SFC I s a i a h Cowan Pl at oon SGT, 1st P l t
I
SSG David Mi t chel l 1st Squad Leader, 1st P l t
SSG L. G. Bacon 2d Squad ~ e a d e r , 1st P l t
SFC (now 1SG) Jay A. Buchanon Pl at oon SGT, 2d P l t
SGT Kenneth L. Hodges 1st Squad Leader, 2d P l t
CPL (now SGT) Kenneth Schi el 2d Squad Leader, 2d P l t
SGT Lawrence C. LaCroix 3d Squad Leader, 2d P l t
SSG (now SFC) Manuel R. Lopez pl at oon SGT, 3d P l t
SGT (now M r . ) John H. Smail 1st Squad Zeader , 3d P l t
SP4 (now Mr . ) Joe Grimes, Jr. 3d Squad Leader, 3d P l t
S%C Leo M. Maroney Pl at oon SGT, Mortar P l t
(One wi t ness from C Company t e s t i f i e d t h a t t he r e were one o r
more f i e l d grade o f f i c e r s a l s o i n at t endance a t Medina' s br i e f -
i ng. Thi s i s not s ubs t a nt i a t e d by ot he r a va i l a bl e evi dence. ) '
CPT Medina t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t he- t i m e of h i s b r i e f i n g he
f e l t s ur e t h a t t he company would make heavy cont act wi t h t he
enemy t he next morning and would probabl y s u f f e r heavy casual -
t i e s . H e s t a t e d t h a t he was deepl y concerned about it and
t h a t he " t r i e d t o convey t h i s same message t o t h e peopl e i n
Char l i e Company" dur i ng t he cour se of h i s br i e f i ng. Using a
s t i c k o r some such devi ce he sket ched out t h e pl anned scheme
of maneuver on t h e ground a s he br i e f e d h i s men. A l l of h i s
or der s and i ns t r uc t i ons w e r e i s s ued o r a l l y , a s i s t h e usual
case wi t h a company-size u n i t .
During h i s br i e f i ng, CPT Medina r e i t e r a t e d t he pur por t ed
i nt e l l i ge nc e concerni ng t h e 48th VC Ba t t a l i on' s l oc a t i on i n My
Lai ( 4 ) . He t o l d h i s men t h a t t hey would probabl y be outnum-
bered approxi mat el y 2 t o 1 and t h a t he expect ed t h e LZ t o be
" hot , " o r under enemy f i r e , when t he f i r s t l i f t touched down.
He informed h i s men of t he a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on and t hen
descr i bed h i s pl anned scheme of maneuver ( s ee sket ch 5-4).
The 1st Pl at oon, which was t o be i ns e r t e d ont o t he LZ f i r s t ,
was assi gned t he r i g h t ( or sout her n) s e c t or of t he haml et wi t h
t he mi ssi on of "sweeping t he enemy out t o t h e open a r e a on t h e
e a s t s i d e of t h e vi l l a ge . " The 2d Pl at oon was assi gned t h e
l e f t ( or nor t her n) s e c t or of t he hamlet and had t h e same mi ssi on
a s t h e 1st Pl at oon. The 3d Pl at oon was t o be used i n i t i a l l y a s
t he company r e s e r ve , wi t h t he mi ssi on of pr ovi di ng s e c ur i t y f o r
t he LZ and t hen t o sear ch and c l e a r t he haml et i n gr e a t e r d e t a i l
a f t e r t he 1st and 2d Pl at oons had completed t h e i r &weeps. A
mort ar squad from t h e Weapons Pl at oon was t o accompany t h e 3d
Pl at oon i n t o t h e LZ and pr ovi de mort ar f i r e suppor t t o t h e
company, i f needed. I f not r equi r ed, t h e squad was t o move
wi t h and a s s i s t t he 3d Pl at oon. CPT Medina a l s o i s s ued gener al
i ns t r uc t i ons concerni ng cl eani ng of weapons, and di scussed
ammunition l oads t o be c a r r i e d t h e next day. He reminded h i s
men of t he need t o be thorough and c a r e f ul i n sear chi ng and
des t r oyi ng t he numerous t unnel s and bunkers which he expect ed
t o encount er a t My Lai ( 4 ) . A t t h e same t i me, a l l e ge dl y because
of COL Henderson' s e a r l i e r remarks, CPT Medina reemphasized t he
neces s i t y f o r aggr essi vel y c l os i ng wi t h t h e enemy i n or der t o
pr event r e t r i e v a l of enemy weapons from dead VC by " ot her men,
women, chi l dr en, o r ot he r VC s ol di e r s i n t he a r e a . "
With r es pect t o t h e key i s s ue s i nvol ved i h h i s i ssuance of
or der s and i ns t r uc t i ons , t h e evi dence i s concl usi ve t h a t CPT
Mediaa ordered t h e men of h i s company t o burn and des t r oy My
Lai ( 4 ) , and t o k i l l a l l l i ve s t oc k and dest r oy ot he r f oods t uf f s
found i n t he ar ea. The evi dence i s l e s s e x p l i c i t but equal l y
convi nci ng t h a t CPT Medina' s or der s and i ns t r uc t i ons concerni ng
t h e i nha bi t a nt s of My Lai ( 4 ) l e f t l i t t l e o r no doubt i n t h e
minds of a s i g n i f i c a n t number of men i n h i s company t h a t a l l
persons remai ni ng i n t h e My Lai ( 4 ) a r e a a t t h e t i me of combat
a s s a u l t were enemy, and t h a t C Company ' s mi ssi on was t o des t r oy
t h e enemy. According t o h i s own t est i mony, t h i s was based on
h i s havi ng been t o l d ( dur i ng t h e TF br i e f i ng) t h a t " t he r e would
be no c i v i l i a n popul at i on i n t h e vi l l a ge . Any men, any women
and c hi l dr e n would be gone t o market a t 0700 hours. " CPT
Medina' s accept ance of t h i s e s t i ma t e i s f ur t he r evi nced by
h i s own t est i mony t h a t dur i ng h i s remarks t o h i s men "any
r ef er ence made a s t o what we might f i nd i n My Lai ( 4 ) was t h a t
of t he 48th VC Bat t al i on. " H e expl ai ned t h a t he was t r y i n g t o
pr epar e h i s men "ment al l y and phys i cal l y t o meet a VC Main
Force Ba t t a l i on ...t r y i n g t o bui l d t h e i r morale up, gi vi ng them
psychol ogi cal bread t o go i n and do b a t t l e wi t h t h e 48t h VC
Bat t al i on. " . Many wi t nesses have t e s t i f i e d t h a t CPT Medina
a l s o made r ef er ence t o c a s ua l t i e s which t he company had r e c e nt l y
t aken from enemy mines, boobyt raps, and s ni pe r f i r e , and t h a t
he al l uded t o t he fort hcomi ng oper at i on a s an oppor t uni t y f o r
"revenge" o r t o " get even" wi t h t h e enemy. I n a ver y r e a l
sense, t hen, it appears t h a t t h e oper at i on took on t h e added
as pect of a grudge match between C Company and an enemy f or ce
i n My Lai ( 4 ) .
There i s no s u b s t a n t i a l evi dence t o i ndi c a t e t h a t CPT
Medina di scussed procedures t o be fol l owed i n case any c i v i l i a n
i nha bi t a nt s of My Lai ( 4 ) e l e c t e d t o s t a y home from t h e market
on t he morning of 16 March 1968.
Lat er i n t h e eveni ng, CPT Medina hel d anot her meet i ng wi t h
h i s pl at oon l e a de r s and t h e i r pl at oon ser geant s. Testimony
concerni ng t h e subst ance of t h i s meet i ng i s c onf l i c t i ng, but it
appears t h a t not hi ng was s a i d which a l t e r e d i n any way h i s
e a r l i e r i ns t r uc t i ons concerni ng t he next day ' s oper at i on.
The t est i mony of key per sonnel i s a l s o i nconcl usi ve wi t h
r egar d t o t h e conduct o r cont ent of subsequent pl at oon- l evel
br i e f i ngs by 2 LT' s Cal l ey, Brooks, o r LaCross. LT LaCross
t e s t i f i e d t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t any i ns t r uc t i ons i s s ued by him
r e l a t e d onl y t o or gani zi ng and equi ppi ng h i s men f o r t h e opera-
t i on. Br i ef i ngs of a s i mi l a r nat ur e appar ent l y ere given by
LT1s ' Cal l ey and Brooks. '
The preponderance of t h e t est i mony from most C Company
personnel i s c ons i s t e nt i n t h e i r de s c r i pt i on of t he men' s reac-
t i o n t o CPT Medina' s b r i e f i n g as descr i bed i n t he fol l owi ng
r epr es ent at i ve examples:
"When we l e f t t h e b r i e f i n g we f e l t we were going t o
have a l o t of r e s i s t a nc e and we knew we were supposed
t o k i l l everyone i n t h e vi l l a ge . "
-William Cal vi n Lloyd, 1st P l t , C/ 1- 20 I nf
"... t he a t t i t u d e of a l l t h e men, t h e maj or i t y, I
would say was a r evengef ul a t t i t u d e , t hey a l l ; f e l t a
l i t t l e bad because (we) l o s t a number of buddi es p r i o r
t o My Lai ( 4 ) ."
-SGT Gregory T. Olson, 1st P l t , C/1-20 I n
"That eveni ng, a s w e cl eaned our weapons and got
our gear ready, we t a l ke d about t h e oper at i on. Peopl e
w e r e t a l k i n g about k i l l i n g ever yt hi ng t h a t moved.
Everyone knew what we were goi ng t o do. I'
-Robert Wayne Pendl et on, 3d P l t , C/ 1- 20 I nf
" I would des cr i be t h e mood (of C Company) as a
f e e l i ng t h a t t hey were goi ng t o wreak some vengeance
on someone--things ha dn' t been very good t o us up
u n t i l t h a t t i me. "
-SGT Michael A. Bernhardt , 2d P l t , C/1-20 I nf
"Although CPT Medina di dn ' t say t o k i l l everyone i n
t h e v i l l a g e , I heard guys t a l k i n g and were of t he opi n-
i on t h a t everyone i n t h e v i l l a g e was t o be k i l l e d . A t
t h i s t i m e we had had a l o t of c a s ua l t i e s from a mine-
f i e l d and everybody was p r e t t y wel l shook up. "
-James Robert Bergt hol d, 1st P l t , C/ 1- 20 Inf
" . . .we w e r e a l l ' psyched ' up because we wanted
revenge f o r some of our f a l l e n comrades t h a t had been
k i l l e d p r i o r t o t h i s oper at i on i n t h e gener al ar ea of
' Pi nkvi l l e ' ."
-Al l en Joseph Boyce, 1st P l t , C/1-20 I nf
"We expect ed s t r ong VC r e s i s t a nc e . We were
r e a l l y expect i ng t r oubl e . we were a l l psyched up."
-Dennis I r vi ng Cont i , 1stP l t , C/1-20 I nf
" . . . i t seemed l i k e itwas a chance t o ge t revenge
o r something l i k e t h a t f o r t he l i v e s we had l o s t . "
-Tommy L. Moss, 2d P l t , 1C/ 1- 20 I nf
* * * *
The succeedi ng por t i ons of t h i s chapt er pr ovi de a summary
of t h e chronology and sequence of event s which occur r ed through-
out t he Son My oper at i on. Chapt er 6 cont ai ns a more de t a i l e d
account of C Company a c t i ons i n and around t h e subhamlet of My
Lai ( 4 ) on 1 6 March and i n t h e hamlet of My Khe on 17 March.
Chapt er 7 cont ai ns a s i mi l a r account of B Company a c t i ons i n
t h e haml et s of Co Luy and My Lai dur i ng t h e per i od 16-19 March.
G. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS ON' 16 MARCH
During t he ni ght of 15-16 March, t h e 2d Pl at oon of A Company
moved from t h e company's ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on i n t h e vi ci n-
i t y of H i l l 108 (seesket ch 5-5) t o a bl ocki ng pos i t i on al ong
t h e r i v e r due sout h of t h e h i l l mass. A t approxi mat el y 0530
hours on t h e morning of t h e 16t h, t he remainder of t h e company
began i t s movement by f oot toward desi gnat ed bl ocki ng pos i t i ons
al ong t he Song Diem Diem, nor t h of t h e Son My ar ea. A s t h e com-
pany moved t o t h e e a s t , i t s l ead el ement s r ecei ved f i r e from an
est i mat ed squad-si ze enemy f or ce l ocat ed i n t he v i c i n i t y of Phu
My (1), and one man from Company A was s l i g h t l y wounded. The
f i r e was r et ur ned, t h e enemy di s per s ed, and t he 1stand 3d Pl a-
t oons cont i nued moving toward t h e i r r es pect i ve bl ocki ng posi -
t i o n s l ocat ed t o t h e e a s t and sout h of Phu My (1). A t 0725 hours
a l l el ement s of A Company w e r e r epor t ed t o be i n pos i t i on.
By 0708 hour s, f i v e t r oop- car r yi ng he l i c opt e r s and two
accompanying gunshi ps from t h e 174t h Avi at i on Company, and f our
t r oop- car r yi ng he l i c opt e r s from t he 71st Avi at i on Company
a r r i ve d a t LZ Dot t i e. They were l oaded wi t h t he 1stPl at oon
( c ons i s t i ngof approxi mat el y 28 men), wi t h a 6-8 man command
group from t h e company headquar t er s ( i ncl udi ngCPT Medina), and
wi t h 18-24 members of t he 2d Pl at oon. The f i r s t l oad l i f t e d
of f from LZ Dot t i e a t approxi mat el y 0715 hours.
The i n i t i a l marking round f o r t he a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on was
f i r e d from LZ Upt i ght a t approxi mat el y 0722 hours and det onat ed
about 1,000 met ers t o t h e nor t h of My Lai ( 4 ) . CPT Vazquez, t h e
a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n o f f i c e r , s t a t e d t h a t he observed t h e smoke
marking round from h i s vant age poi nt i n LTC Bar ker ' s command and
c ont r ol he l i c opt e r , and r el ayed f i r i n g adj ust ment i n s t r u c t i o n s
t o t he f i r e di r e c t i on c e nt e r a t LZ Upt i ght . He has t e s t i f i e d
t h a t t h e f i r i n g adj ust ment i ns t r uc t i ons were coupl ed wi t h h i s
or der f o r t h e e n t i r e b a t t e r y t o " f i r e f o r e f f e c t " immediately
f ol l owi ng t h e 1,000-meter s h i f t . CPT Vazquez subsequent l y
t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h i s or der was gi ven t o conserve t i me and " get
on wi t h t h e oper at i on. "
The f u l l a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on began a t approxi mat el y 0724
hour s and impacted bot h on t h e LZ f o r C Company and i n t h e
sout hwest ern por t i on of My Lai ( 4 ) . There i s c onf l i c t i ng
t est i mony a s t o t h e number and t ype of rounds t h a t were f i r e d
i n t h e pr epar at i on. Sever al wi t nesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e
pr epar at i on probabl y cons i s t ed of a s few as 30 rounds and
cont ai ned no whi t e phosphorous s h e l l s . The preponderance of
t h e evi dence, however, i ndi c a t e s t h a t from 60 t o 120 mixed
rounds of poi nt det onat i ng hi gh expl os i ve ammunition al ong wi t h
some whi t e phosphorous ammunition, were f i r e d i n t h e pr epar a-
t i on.
Shor t l y bef or e i n s e r t i o n of C Company's f i r s t l i f t , t h e
aero-scout team from B Company, 123d Avi at i on Bat t al i on a r r i ve d
i n t h e Son My ar ea and e s t a bl i s he d t h e i r a e r i a l scr een gener al l y
p a r a l l e l t o and sout h of Route 521. Sever al members of t he
aero-scout team observed t h e a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on goi ng i n t o
t h e nor t h of t h e i r l ocat i on.
The l ead s h i p of t h e t r oop- car r yi ng he l i c opt e r s , inbound
toward t h e LZ a t about 0727 hour s, cont act ed LTC Barker by
r adi o and was advi sed by him t h a t t h e r e were "no r e s t r i c t i o n s
on door gunners" i n t h e pl a c i ng of he l i c opt e r suppr essi ve f i r e s
on t h e ar ea. Fol l owi ng compl et i on of t h e a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on
a t about 0729 hour s, gunshi p suppr essi ve f i r e s , c ons i s t i ng of
r ocket s and machinegun f i r e , were pl aced on t h e LZ and
probabl y on por t i ons of My Lai ( 4 ) .
The l e a d el ement s of C Company t ouched down a t 0730 hour s,
approxi mat el y 100-150 meters west of My Lai ( 4 ) . The LZ was
o f f i c i a l l y recorded as "col d" o r f r e e of enemy f i r e . C Company
personnel h i t t h e ground runni ng and immediately t ook up posi -
t i o n s from which t o s ecur e t h e LZ f o r subsequent l i f t s . The
t r oop l i f t he l i c opt e r s r et ur ned t o LZ Dot t i e f o r pi ck up of
t he second l i f t whi l e t h e two accompanying "Shark" gunshi ps
remained o r b i t i n g over t h e My Lai ( 4 ) ar ea.
The second l i f t of C Company depar t ed from LZ Dot t i e a t
0738 hours. It cons i s t ed o f t h e remai ni ng p r s o n n e l from t h e
2d Pl at oon, t h e e n t i r e 3d P.latoon (approxi mat sl y 30 men) , seven
t o ni ne men from t h e company mort ar pl at oon, two men from t h e
52d Mi l i t a r y I nt e l l i ge nc e detachment, and two per sonnel from
t h e 11t h Bri gade Publ i c Informat i on Of f i ce (PIO).
The second and f i n a l l i f t of C Company was i ns e r t e d a t 0747
hours. As t h e he l i c opt e r s were depar t i ng t he LZ, t h e l ead s h i p
r epor t ed havi ng r ecei ved f i r e from one of t h e haml et s i n t h e vi -
c i n i t y of My Lai ( 4 ) but appar ent l y s us t ai ned no h i t s on t h e
a i r c r a f t nor any c a s u a l t i e s among t h e t r oop passenger s.
COL Henderson' s command group, on t he morning of
16 March, cons i s t ed of COL Henderson, MAJ McKnight (11t h
Bri gade S3) , LTC Luper (CO 6-11th Ar t i l l e r y ) , LTC MacLachlan
( A i r Force Li ai son Of f i c e r t o t h e l l t h Br i gade) , CSM Walsh
( l l t h Bri gade Ser geant Maj or ) , and SGT Adcock (COL Henderson' s
r a di o ope r a t or ) . COL Henderson and MAJ McKnight have t e s t i -
f i e d t h a t t h e command and c ont r ol he l i c opt e r had r epor t ed l a t e
t o t he br i gade headquar t er s t h a t morning, and t h e command
group consequent l y di d not a r r i v e over t h e ope r a t i ona l a r e a
u n t i l approxi mat el y 0750 hours. However, LTC MacLachlan and
SGT Adcock t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e command group a r r i ve d over t h e
a r e a i n t i m e t o observe t he a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on and f i r s t
i n s e r t i o n by C Company (approxi mat el y 0725 hour s ) . LTC Luper
a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t t he pr epar at i on was v i s i b l e from a di s -
t ance a s t hey a r r i ve d i n t h e a r e a and t h a t t hey observed t h e
l andi ng of C Company's f i r s t el ement s. CSM Walsh remembered
few of t h e d e t a i l s concerni ng t he combat a s s a u l t .
Upon a r r i v i n g i n t h e v i c i n i t y of My Lai ( 4 ) , bot h COL
Henderson and MAJ McKnight r e c a l l obser vi ng he l i c opt e r gunshi ps
o r b i t i n g t o t h e nor t he a s t of t he LZ and droppi ng r e d smoke
markers on t h e ground. COL Henderson or bi t e d above t h a t poi nt
and observed two bodi es dr essed i n uniforms wi t h web gear and
two weapons. H e and MAJ McKnight t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t about t h i s
same t i m e , t hey a l s o observed a l a r ge number of per sonnel
(approxi mat el y 300) moving out of t h e oper at i onal a r e a i n "an
or der l y manner" al ong Route 521 t o t he sout hwest . A t approxi -
mat el y 0800 hour s, MAJ McKnight cont act ed LTC Barker by r a di o
t o advi se him of t he mass depar t ur e. Barker acknowledged t he
t r ansmi ssi on and informed McKnight t h a t he would send t h e aero-
scout team over t h e a r e a t o "check out " t h e peopl e al ong t h e
road. Shor t l y af t er war ds, MAJ McKnight cont act ed t h e aero-
scout team hi msel f and informed them t h a t COL Henderson' s
command and c ont r ol s hi p was o r b i t i n g over t h e column of de-
pa r t i ng per sonnel and had observed t h r e e i ndi vi dual s dr essed
i n bl ack. The scout team subsequent l y n o t i f i e d MAJ McKnight
t h a t two of t he t hr e e i ndi vi dua l s had been st opped and were
a va i l a bl e t o be pi cked up. A t approxi mat el y 0810 hour s,
t h e two s us pect s were pi cked up by COL Henderson' s command and
c ont r ol he l i c opt e r . COL Henderson t hen observed B Company's
combat a s s a ul t .
Af t er compl et i on of t h e C Company combat a s s a u l t , t h e
t r oop l i f t he l i c opt e r s had flown t o LZ Upt i ght where t hey loaded
t h e f i r s t l i f t of B Company. A second a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on,
which wa s t o suppor t t h e B Company l andi ng, began a t 0808
hours and was completed a t approxi mat el y 0812 hours. Shor t l y
af t er war ds, t h e f i r s t l i f t of B Company was i ns e r t e d ont o
t he LZ , l ocat ed approxi mat el y 500 met ers sout h of My Lai (1).
The LZ was r epor t ed a s bei ng "col d. " By 0830 hour s, t he r e-
maining el ement s of B Company had been l i f t e d from Upt i ght
i n t o t h e same LZ.
Fol l owi ng B Company's combat a s s a u l t , COL Henderson
appar ent l y r et ur ned t o t h e a r e a nor t h of My Lai ( 4 ) where he
had pr evi ousl y observed t h e two bodi es wi t h weapons.
On t he ground, C Company had e a r l i e r formed up wi t h
t he 1st and 2d Pl at oons gener al l y on l i n e and had begun i t s
movements t o t he e a s t toward My Lai ( 4 ) ( s ee sket ch 5-6).
Lead el ement s of t h e company ent er ed i t s west ern edge a t
approxi mat el y 0750 hours. CPT Medina and t h e command group
i n i t i a l l y remained behi nd on t he LZ a s el ement s of t h e com-
pany ent er ed t h e haml et .
A t approxi mat el y 0830 hour s, dur i ng t h e cour se of
t he company's movement t hrough t he haml et , t h e 2d Pl at oon
moved out i n t o t h e open a r e a t o t h e nor t h of My Lai ( 4 ) t o
r e t r i e v e t h e two enemy weapons observed by COL Henderson.
The l oc a t i on of t h e weapons was marked by "Shark" gunshi ps
which had r et ur ned from suppor t i ng t h e B Company combat as-
s a u l t . Af t e r r e t r i e v i n g t he weapons, t h e pl at oon was di r e c t e d
by CPT Medina t o move t o t h e subhamlet of Binh Tay l ocat ed
400 meters nor t h of My Lai ( 4 ) pr oper .
Following h i s obser vat i on of t h e C Company el ement s,
COL Henderson r et ur ned t o LZ Dot t i e , a r r i v i n g t h e r e a t ap-
proxi mat el y 0845 hours. He r el eas ed t he two VC s us pect s t o
a Mi l i t a r y I nt e l l i ge nc e pr i s one r i nt e r r oga t i on team and spoke
t o MG Kost er who a r r i ve d l a t e r . COL Henderson deni ed havi ng
spoken t o LTC Barker dur i ng t h i s t i m e o r havi ng v i s i t e d - t h e
TOC where t h e d e t a i l s of t h e oper at i on were bei ng moni t ored,
recorded, and r epor t ed t o h i s headquar t er s a t Duc Pho. LTC
MacLachlan and MAJ Calhoun t e s t i f i e d , however, t h a t t hey
observed COL Henderson t a l ki ng wi t h LTC Barker, i ns i de t h e TOC,
dur i ng t h i s per i od of t i me.
MG Kost er a r r i ve d a t LZ Dot t i e a t 0935 hours. H e
appar ent l y spoke t o COL Henderson f o r approxi mat el y 15-30
minutes and t hen depar t ed. According t o h i s t est i mony, he
had s pent t h e e a r l i e r p a r t of t he morning i n t h e nor t her n
p a r t of t h e America1 Di vi s i on' s zone, and i s uncer t ai n a s
t o whet her he fl ew over t h e Son My a r e a p r i o r t o h i s a r r i v a l
a t LZ D 0 t t i . e . COL Henderson t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was under t h e
i mpressi on, a t t h e t i m e he spoke t o MG Kost er , t h a t Kost er
had flown over t h e ar ea.
LTC Barker s pent most of t h e morning i n h i s command
and cont r ol he l i c opt e r over t h e ope r a t i ona l ar ea, c ont r ol l i ng
and coor di nat i ng t h e conha$ a s s a ul t s . Evidence i ndi c a t e s t h a t
he r et ur ned t o LZ Dot t i e on a t l e a s t t h r e e occasi ons dur i ng
t h e morning. H e r et ur ned t h e f i r s t time a t approxi mat el y 0835
hours f o r r ef uel i ng. The evi dence avai l abl e i ndi c a t e s t h a t he
remained on t h e ground u n t i l approxi mat el y 0855 hours and t h a t
he t ook advantage of t h e t i me not onl y t o r e f ue l h i s he l i c opt e r ,
but a l s o t o b r i n g t h e per sonnel i n h i s TOC up t o da:e on t he
r e s u l t s of t h e oper at i on.
Back i n t h e Son My ar ea, t h e 2d Pl at oon of C Company
reached t h e subhaml et of Binh Tay a t approximately 0845 hour s,
and remained i n and around t h a t ar ea f o r approxi mat el y one
hour. Fol l owi ng compl et i on of i t s a c t i on, t h e pl at oon r e-
t ur ned t o My Lai ( 4 ) t o r e j oi n t h e r e s t of t h e company which
had s e t up a per i met er al ong t h e e a s t e r n edge of t h e haml et .
To t h e e a s t , B Company had encount ered no r epor t ed
r e s i s t a nc e t o i t s movement nor t h toward My Lai ( I ) ,but
s uf f e r e d one man k i l l e d ( t he 2d Pl at oon l e a de r ) and f our
wounded from a boobyt rap det onat ed on t h e sout hwest ern edge
of t h e haml et ( see sket ch 5-7).
A t approxi mat el y 0850 hour s, t h e aero-scout team
scr eeni ng t o t h e sout hwest of B Company r epor t ed capt ur i ng
two 60mm mort ar t ubes al ong wi t h 60mrn and 82mm mort ar am-
muni t i on. Thi s r e por t was l a t e r amended t o r e f l e c t onl y t h e
6 0 d mort ar ammunit i on.
As B Company pr ogr essed toward My Lai (1), anot her
enemy boobyt rap was det onat ed, wounding t h r e e men. LTC
Barker had r et ur ned from LZ Dot t i e t o t h e My Lai (1) a r e a
and used h i s command and cont r ol he l i c opt e r t o evacuat e t h e
t h r e e wounded men from B Company a t approximately 0945 hour s.
Because of t h e heavy concent r at i on of mines and booby-
t r a p s i n and around My Lai ( 1 1 , t h e 3d Pl at oon of B Company
was di ve r t e d t o t h e nort hwest t o s ear ch out t h e haml et of My
Lai (6) whi l e t h e 2d Pl at oon and t h e command group remained
i n t h e ar ea west of My Lai (1).
Following. h i s pi ckup of t h e B Company wounded, LTC
Barker had t h e he l i c opt e r dr op him of f f o r a second t i me a t
LZ Dot t i e a t approxi mat el y 0950 hour s, whi l e t h e wounded men
were t aken by h i s he l i c opt e r t o t h e medical f a c i l i t y a t Chu
Lai .
Af t e r l eavi ng LZ Dot t i e a t approxi mat el y 1 0 0 0 hour s,
COL Henderson r et ur ned t o t h e oper at i onal ar ea u n t i l about
1030 hour s, when he depar t ed f o r a cour t esy c a l l on t h e 2d
ARVNDi vi si on Commander a t Quang Ngai Ci t y, and a subsequent
lunch break a t h i s headquar t er s i n Duc Pho. MG Kost er appar-
e nt l y a l s o depar t ed LZ Dot t i e a t approxi mat el y 1000 hours.
Although l ead el ement s of t he 1st Pl at oon of C Company
had reached t he e a s t e r n edge of My Lai ( 4 ) by about 0900 hours,
t he company cont i nued t o oper at e i n t h a t a r e a u n t i l about 1330
hours bef or e moving on t o t h e nor t he a s t t o l i n k up wi t h B Com-
pany -
By t he t i me t h e company was ready t o begi n i t s move-
ment t o t he nor t he a s t f o r t he l i nk- up, a t o t a l of 90 VC had been
r epor t ed k i l l e d al ong wi t h 3 weapons capt ur ed, and 23 VC sus-
pect s det ai ned i n t he v i c i n i t y of My Lai ( 4 ) . One s o l d i e r from
C Company had been wounded i n t h e f oot appar ent l y a s a r e s u l t
of t h e a c c i de nt a l di schar ge of a weapon whi l e i n s i d e My Lai
(4)
B Company's 1st Pl at oon, which was oper at i ng al ong t h e
coas t t o t h e e a s t of My Lai ( I ) , r epor t ed k i l l i n g s e ve r a l groups
of enemy and capt ur i ng a s s or t e d enemy equipment a t t h e same
gener al l oc a t i on begi nni ng a t 0955 hours ( s ee sket ch 5- 7) . The
pl at oon r epor t ed a t o t a l of 30 enemy KIAaccumulated by 1025
hours and by 1420 hours had r epor t ed k i l l i n g a t o t a l of 38
enemy and capt ur i ng as s or t ed gear . By t ha-t t i m e , t he remainder
of t h e company had completed i t s sweep tl?rough My Lai ( 6 ) and
t he a r e a w e s t of My Lai (1) and had reached t h e ni ght def ensi ve
pos i t i on w e s t of t h e haml et . The 1st Pl at oon subsequent l y moved
nor t h from t h e s i t e of t he r epor t ed enemy dead and e s t a bl i s he d
a pl at oon def ensi ve pos i t i on al ong t h e c oa s t l i ne near My Lai
(3) (see sket ch 5- 8) .
COL Henderson t e s t i f i e d t h a t he r et ur ned t o the oper at i onal
ar ea e a r l y i n t h e af t er noon, f ol l owi ng h i s meet i ng a t Quang
Ngai Ci t y and a subsequent st opof f a t t h e br i gade headquar t er s
a t Duc Pho: During t he af t er noon, he st opped of f a t LZ Dot t i e
on a t l e a s t two occasi ons, dur i ng which time he di scussed t h e
oper at i on wi t h LTC Barker. He a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t he overfl ew
t he Son My a r e a , observi ng t h e oper at i on, a t l e a s t t w i c e dur i ng
t he af t er noon. H e r et ur ned t o Duc Pho i n t h e l a t e a f t e r noon. - - '
By approxi mat el y 1530 hour s, C Company had completed
i t s movement from My Lai ( 4 ) t o t h e ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on
and s hor t l y t h e r e a f t e r l i nked up wi t h B Company ( s ee sket ch
5-9). (According t o t h e TF J our nal , t h e 1st Pl at oon of C
Company subsequent l y moved t o a ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on
l ocat ed about 800 met ers t o t he sout hwest of t h e main de-
f ens i ve si t e. ) C Company brought 1 0 s us pect s t o t h e ni ght
def ensi ve pos i t i on where t hey were subsequent l y i nt e r r oga t e d
by Vietnamese Nat i onal Pol i ce el ement s. The Nat i onal
Pol i ce had been flown i n t o t h e pos i t i on by he l i c opt e r
and were accompanied by CPT Kotouc, TF S2. CPT Kotouc
a l s o del i ver ed i ns t r uc t i ons from LTC Barker concerni ng
t h e cont i nuat i on of t h e oper at i on on 17 and 18 March,
During t h e day, A Company had s uf f e r e d two booby-
t r a p c a s ua l t i e s wi t hi n t h e 3d Pl at oon bl ocki ng pos i t i on,
but had f a i l e d t o de t e c t any enemy f l e e i ng nor t h toward
t h e i r pos i t i ons .
The aero-scout team from B Company, 123d Avi at i on
Ba t t a l i on had cont i nued t o suppor t t h e oper at i on i n Son My
and t h e pe r i phe r a l ar ea throughout most of t he af t er noon
of t h e 16t h.
Oper at i ng t o t h e e a s t of B Company, t h e Navy "Swi ft
Boats " s i ght e d and boarded s e ve r a l sampans cont ai ni ng Vi et -
namese males and chi l dr en. A t approxi mat el y 1700 hour s, t hes e
det ai nees were t ur ned over t o B Company el ement s.
Af t e r havi ng v i s i t e d t h e 11t h Brigade headquar t er s a t
Duc Pho (from 1510 t o 1535 hour s ) , MG Kost er r et ur ned t o LZ
Dot t i e a t 1645 hour s, br i ngi ng wi t h him LTG Edgar C. Doleman
(Ret . ) who was v i s i t i n g t h e America1 Di vi si on i n conj unct i on
wi t h a s pe c i a l st udy of communications systems i n Sout heast
Asi a (COMSEA). ,MG Kost er and LTG Doleman (Ret .) were br i e f e d
on t h e oper at i on by LTC Barker, and depar t ed LZ Dot t i e a t 1715
hours.
By t h e eveni ng of 16 March 1968, TF Barker had r e-
por t ed a t o t a l of 128 VC k i l l e d , 3 weapons capt ur ed, as s or t ed
mines, boobyt raps and equipment capt ured and dest r oyed, and
f r i e ndl y c a s ua l t i e s of 2 k i l l e d and- 11 wounded from t h e f i r s t
da y' s a c t i on i n t h e Son My oper at i on. With t h e pos s i bl e ex-
cept i on of one man, s l i g h t l y wounded, from A Company, none of
t h e TF Barker c a s ua l t i e s was i n f l i c t e d by d i r e c t enemy f i r e . .
H. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS ON 17 MARCH
A t 0400 hours on t h e morning of t h e 17t h, persons
assumed t o be VC were det ect ed cr os s i ng t he br i dge sout h of
t h e bl ocki ng pos i t i on occupi ed by A Company's 1st Pl at oon.
They were engaged by t h e pl at oon and withdrew i mmedi at el y.
Following t h i s encount er , A Company remained i n i t s desi gnat ed
bl ocki ng pos i t i ons t hroughout most of t h e remainder of t h e
day.
Earl y t h a t morning, bot h C Company and B Company
began moving toward t h e sout h from t h e i r ni ght def ensi ye
pos i t i on. B Company s k i r t e d t h e sout her n edge of My Lai (1)
and moved t o t h e br i dge l ocat ed t o t h e s out heas t of t h e
hamlet ( s e e sket ch 5-10). The company began cr os s i ng t h e
Song My Khe a t t h a t poi nt a t about 0800 hours. A t 0810
hours t h e company had one man wounded from a boobyt rap de-
t onat ed near t h e e a s t e r n end of t h e br i dge and s hor t l y
t he r e a f t e r r epor t ed r e c e i vi ng s ni pe r f i r e from t h e v i c i n i t y
of My Khe ( 4 ) . The company cont i nued moving t o t h e sout h
al ong t h e c oa s t l i ne . A t ,132 0 hour s, B Company ' s 2d Pl at oon
r epor t ed k i l l i n g one VC approximately 400 met ers nor t h of
Co Lay (1). Subsequent l y, t h e company passed through Co Lay
( 2 ) and Co Lay ( 3 ) bef or e r e t ur ni ng t o t h e nor t h agai n l a t e r
i n t h e day.
C Company a l s o moved t o t h e sout h, gener al l y p a r a l l e l
t o B Company, and passed t hrough t h e subhamlets of My Khe ( 3 ) ,
My Khe ( I ) , and My Khe ( 2) ( see sket ch 5-10). En r out e, one
man was wounded by an enemy mine o r boobyt rap det onat ed i n
t he v i c i n i t y of H i l l 85 a t 0930 hour s. He was evacuat ed by
he l i c opt e r a t 1000 hours.
During t h e cour se of i t s movement t o t h e sout h, C
Company di scover ed s e ve r a l mines and boobyt raps i n and around
t he haml et s, and a t 1 4 1 0 hours r epor t ed engagi ng and k i l l i n g
two VC t o t h e sout hwest of My Khe (1). A t 1530 hour s, whi l e
moving i n t o My Khe ( 2 ) , C Company r epor t ed apprehending t h r e e
VC s us pect s c ons i s t i ng of two men and one woman.
Af t e r r eachi ng t h e Song Tra Khuc, C Company t ur ned
back t o t h e nor t h toward a ni ght def ensi ve pos i t on l ocat ed
t o t h e e a s t of My Khe (1) and on t h e west er n s i d e of t h e
Song Kinh Giang ( see sket ch 5-11). While en r out e t o t h i s
l ocat i on, el ement s of t h e company were r epor t ed t o have
found one VC hi di ng i n a t unnel approxi mat el y 1, 000 meters
nort h of My Khe ( 2) . The i ndi vi dua l w a s k i l l e d by t h e
throwing of a grenade i n t o t h e t unnel . C Company reached
t h e i r s e l e c t e d ni ght l oc a t i on a t approxi mat el y 1800 hours.
Af t e r r eachi ng t h e Song Tra Khuc, B Company a l s o
t urned back t o t h e nor t h and moved al ong t h e coas t u n t i l it
reached i t s def ensi ve pos i t i on, l ocat ed approxi mat el y halfway
between Co Lay (1)and My Khe ( 4 ) (see sket ch 5:ll). B
Company was cl osed i n t o t h a t l oc a t i on by 1900 hour s, and
r epor t ed no f ur t he r act i on dur i ng t h e remainder of t h e 17t h.
Lat e i n t h e af t er noon, A Company (minus t h e 2d Pl at oon)
had moved from i t s nor t her n bl ocki ng pos i t i ons t o ni ght ambush
s i t e s l ocat ed i n t h e v i c i n i t y of Giem Dien ( 1 1 , on t h e sout her n
s i de of t h e Song Diem Diem ( see sket ch 5-12). I n t h e meantime,
t h e 2d Pl at oon had moved from i t s pos i t i on al ong t h e Song
Diem Diem, t o e s t a b l i s h a ni ght ambush pos i t i on approxi -
mately 1 t o 1-1/ 2 ki l omet er s t o t h e nort hwest . A t 2115
hour s, t h e company commander r epor t ed t h a t t h e company ( - )
had r ecei ved s i x t o seven rounds of enemy 60mm mort ar f i r e .
Fr i endl y c a s ua l t i e s from t h e f i r e were two k i l l e d and f i v e
wounded. The c a s ua l t i e s were subsequent l y det ermi ned t o
have been caused by hand grenades appar ent l y hur l ed i n t o
t h e company's pos i t i ons by enemy sapper s. The wounded were
evacuat ed by 2245 hours and A Company r epor t ed no f ur t he r
act i on on t h e 17t h.
I. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS ON 18 MARCH
By 0800 hours on t h e morning of 18 March, bot h B
and C Companies had moved o u t from t h e i r pr evi ous ni ght
pos i t i ons . C Company i n i t i a l l y moved west back t hrough
My Khe (1) and t he n swung nor t h toward t h e pi ckup zone i n
t h e v i c i n i t y of My Lai ( 3) . B Company cont i nued t o move
al ong t h e coast i n t h e di r e c t i on of t h e f i s h ponds nor t h
of My Lai ( 2 ) ( s e e s ket ch 5-13).
A s C Company passed t o t h e w e s t of My Lai ( I ) , it
s uf f e r e d two more c a s u a l t i e s from an enemy boobyt rap. One
pl at oon was l e f t behi nd t o s ecur e a pi ckup zone f o r t h e
medi cal evacuat i on he l i c opt e r and t h e remainder of t h e com-
pany cont i nued i t s movement t o t h e nor t h.
A t approxi mat el y 1300 hour s, t h e company Lecei ved
word t h a t COL Henderson was en r out e t o i t s l ocat i on t o t a l k
wi t h t h e company commander, CPT Medina. A l andi ng s i t e was
secur ed approxi mat el y 900 met ers t o t h e nort hwest of My Lai
(1) and COL Henderson and members of h i s command group l anded
s hor t l y t he r e a f t e r . They remained on t h e ground 10-30 mi nut es,
t hen depar t ed, and t h e company cont i nued i t s movement t o t h e
he l i c opt e r e xt r a c t i on s i t e near My Lai ( 3 ) .
Af t er r eachi ng t h e My Lai ( 3) ar ea, C Company secur ed
i t s own pi ckup zone. The e xt r a c t i on began a t 1 4 2 0 hours and
was completed, wi t h a l l el ement s back a t LZ Dot t i e, by 1630
hours. The e xt r a c t i on was c a r r i e d out through t h e use of two
o r t h r e e UH- 1 "Sl i ck" he l i c opt e r s . The f i r s t l oad of C Company
men t o be e xt r a c t e d was m e t a t LZ Dot t i e by COL Henderson.
Ea r l i e r t h a t morning, A Company ( - ) had begun moving
nort hwest from t h e Giem Dien ar ea. The company c r o s ~ e d t h e
Song Ham Giang a t a f or di ng s i t e and by 2045 hours t h a t ni ght
had reached a ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on i n t h e v i c i n i t y of H i l l s
108 and 109 ( s ee s ket ch 5-14). The company r epor t ed no f ur t he r
act i on t h a t ' ni ght .
By 1900 hour s, B Company had reached t h e f i s h ponds
i n t he v i c i n i t y of Ky Xuyen ( I ) , and c ol l e c t e d t h e i nha bi t a nt s
t o f a c i l i t a t e a sear ch of t he a r e a ( s ee s ket ch 5-15). Sub-
sequent l y, t h e i nha bi t a nt s of Ky Xuyen ( 2 ) and An Ky were a l s o
rounded up and moved i n t o Ky Xuyen (1)s o t h a t t h e two subham-
l e t s would be c l e a r f o r sear ches t o be conducted by B Company
on t he f ol l owi ng day. The 1st Pl at oon t hen e s t a bl i s he d an
ambush l ockt i on approxi mat el y 200 met ers t o t h e nor t h of Ky
Xuyen (1). No f u r t h e r a c t i v i t y was r epor t ed by B,Company on
18 March.
J. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS ON 19 MARCH
A t 0130 hours on 19 March, CPT Michles r epor t ed t h a t
B Company was r ecei vi ng incoming mort ar rounds. Approximately
15-16 mort ar rounds and enemy smal l arms f i r e were r ecei ved i n
t he i n i t i a l vol l e y, r e s u l t i n g i n one s o l d i e r k i l l e d and f i v e
wounded. CPT Michles r equest ed a medi cal evacuat i on he l i c opt e r
and a l i g h t f i r e team (two gunshi ps) t o a s s i s t him. By 0245
hours t h e wounded had been evacuat ed and t h e gunshi ps were on
s t a t i on. They remai ned. on s t a t i o n u n t i l 0300 hours and t hen
r et ur ned t o Duc Pho. A t 0440 hour s, CPT Michles r epor t ed
r ecei vi ng an a ddi t i ona l two rounds of enemy mort ar f i r e wi t h
no r e s u l t a n t f r i e ndl y c a s ua l t i e s .-
Af t e r f i r s t l i g h t , t h e 1st Pl at oon sear ched t h e a r e a t o
t he nor t he a s t of i t s ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on i n an at t empt
t o l oc a t e t he enemy mort ar pos i t i on and found t h e mort ar f i r i n g
pos i t i on but no enemy mort ar.
A t 1050 hour s, LTC Barker began e xt r a c t i on of B
Company from t he Son My a r e a , usi ng h i s command and c ont r ol
he l i c opt e r f o r t r oop l i f t . The 1st.Pl at oon was e xt r a c t e d
f i r s t and was t aken t o LZ Upt i ght . The remai nder of t h e
company was e xt r a c t e d t o LZ Dot t i e and had cl os ed a t t h a t
l ocat i on by 1345 hours.
B Company's r e t ur n t o LZ Dot t i e on 19 March 1968
concluded TF Barker oper at i ons i n t h e Son My ar ea.
K. SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS BY TF BARKER (See s ket ch 5-16)
There i s . no evi dence t o i ndi c a t e t h a t any TF Barker
elements ent er ed t h e Son My a r e a agai n f ol l owi ng t h e 16-19
March oper at i on.
Fol l owi ng t h e oper at i on, t h e r i f l e companies of t h e
TF were employed i n oper at i ons which were appar ent l y
r out i ne and of no pr e s e nt s i gni f i c a nc e , u n t i l t hey l e f t t h e
TF t o r e j oi n t h e i r pr e s e nt ba t t a l i ons . Unt i l t hey l e f t t h e
TF, t h e companies were employed i n t he ar eas and t i m e per i ods
descr i bed below. During t h i s per i od t hey were appar ent l y
broken down i n t o pl at oon and squad-si ze el ement s and con-
duct ed semi-independent oper at i ons wi t hi n t h e i r assi gned
ar eas .
Following i t s a r r i v a l i n an ar ea nor t heas t of LZ
Upt i ght on 19 March, A Company cont i nued t o conduct oper at i ons
al ong t h e e a s t e r n coas t of Binh Son Di s t r i c t u n t i l 24 March.
These oper at i ons were appar ent l y desi gned t o a s s i s t i n pro-
t e c t i n g t h e r i c e ha r ve s t which was t hen i n pr ogr ess. No
s i g n i f i c a n t enemy cont act s were r epor t ed dur i ng t h i s per i od.
The company r et ur ned by he l i c opt e r t o LZ Dot t i e on 24 March,
remained t h e r e t hrougb t h e 25t h, and t hen moved t o pr ovi de
l o c a l s e c ur i t y f o r LZ Thunder l ocat ed t o t h e sout h near Duc
Pho. Fol l owi ng i t s movement t o LZ Thunder, A Company di d not
p a r t i c i p a t e i n any f u r t h e r oper at i ons by TF Barker.
On 19 March, B Company was a i r l i f t e d from t h e Son My
ar ea t o LZ Dot t i e, an$ remained a t t h a t l oc a t i on t hrough 23
March, t o pr ovi de l o c a l s e c u r i t y f or ces f or bot h LZ Dot t i e
and LZ Upt i ght . On 24 March, t h e company moved by f oot t o
t h e v i c i n i t y of h i l l mass 108-109, approxi mat el y 3 t o 5 ki l o-
met ers t o t h e sout hwest of LZ Upt i ght , and cont i nued oper at i ons
i n t h a t ar ea t hrough 1Apr i l . Only s c a t t e r e d cont act s occurred
dur i ng t h i s per i od, wi t h a t o t a l of f i ve VC r epor t ed as k i l l e d
by t h e t i m e B Company r et ur ned t o LZ Dot t i e and LZ Upt i ght on
t h e af t er noon of 2 Apr i l . B Company remained a t LZ Dot t i e u n t i l
t h e TF was di sbanded on 8 Apr i l .
Af t er bei ng r e l i e ve d of t h e l o c a l s e c u r i t y mi ssi on by
B Company, C Company moved overl and on 20 March t o an ar ea ap-
proxi mat el y. 5 ki l omet er s e a s t of LZ Dot t i e. Oper at i ons were
conducted from t h a t l oc a t i on t o a di s t a nc e of , about 5 ki l omet er s
t o t h e nort hwest dur i ng t h e per i od 20-25 March wi t h no r epor t ed
enemy cont act . On 26 March, t h e company was a i r l i f t e d back t o
LZ Dot t i e where it assumed t h e s e c ur i t y mi ssi on from A Company
u n t i l 2 Apr i l . On 3 Apr i l t h e company conducted a one-day . oper-
a t i on approxi mat el y 6 ki l omet er s nort h-nort heas t of LZ Dot t i e,
and r et ur ned t o Dot t i e by n i g h t f a l l of t h a t same day. On 4
Apr i l , t h e company moved by f oot t o an ar ea approxi mat el y 6
ki l omet er s nort h-nort hwest of LZ Dot t i e and conducted oper-
a t i ons i n t h a t ar ea u n t i l 8 Apr i l . On 8 Apr i l , C Company was
e xt r a c t e d by he l i c opt e r and was moved t o r e j o i n i t s par ent
ba t t a l i on, (1st Ba t t l i on, 20t h I nf a nt r y) which was t hen engaged
i n Operat i on Norfolk Vi ct ory ( I ) sout hwest of Quang Ngai Ci t y.
TF Barker was o f f i c i a l l y di s e s t a bl i s he d a t 1200 hour s,
8 Apr i l 1968.
SKETCH 5-1
SKETCH 5-2
SKETCH 5-3
SKETCH 5-
SKETCH 5-6
SKETCH 5-7
SKETCH 5-
APPROX 1330HRS
SKETCH 5-9
SKETCH5-10
SKETCH5-12
SKETCH 5-13
SKETCH 5-15
TFBARKER ELEMENTS
SON MY OPERATION
SKETCH 5-16
Chapt er 6
COMPANY C, IST BATTALION, 20TH INFANTRY:
ACTIONS ON 16 AND 17 MARCH 1968
The purpose of t h i s chapt er i s t o des cr i be i n d e t a i l t hose
event s i nvol vi ng act i ons of Company C, 1st Bat t al i on, 20th In-
f ant r y (C/l-20 I n f ) and i t s suppor t i ng el ement s i n and around
My Lai ( 4 ) on 16 March, and i n My Khe Hamlet on 17 March.
A. OPERATIONS ON 16 MARCH
1. 0700-0750 Hours: The Combat Assaul t Phase
Shor t l y bef or e 0700 hour s, t h e men of C Company
completed t h e i ssuance of ammunition and -made f i n a l checks of
t h e i r weapons and equipment. They t hen moved t o t h e l oadi ng
ar ea a t Landing Zone (LZ) Dot t i e where t h e l i f t he l i c opt e r s
and gunshi ps w e r e a r r i vi ng ( see e xhi bi t P-26).
LTC Barker had depar t ed e a r l i e r i n h i s command and con-
t r o l he l i c opt e r and began t o make f i n a l coor di nat i on f o r t h e
a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on and subsequent combat a s s a u l t .
A t approxi mat el y 0720 hour s, "War Lord" gunshi ps f xs n t h e
aero-scout team, which had flown from t h e i r base a t Chu Lai ,
approached t h e Son My a r e a from t h e nor t h. The l e a d gunshi p
cont act ed Task Force (TF) Barker by r adi o and advi sed t h e n e t
cont r ol s t a t i o n t h a t t h e team would remain over t h e ope r a t i ona l
ar ea pendi ng commencement of t h e combat a s s a ul t .
A t 0722 hour s, t h e f i r s t el ement s of C Compank were l i f t e d
of f from LZ Dot t i e and headed t o t h e sout hwest . The s e l e c t e d
f l i g h t pa t h was i nt ended t o s e r ve as a di ver s i onar y move away
from t h e t a r g e t a r e a , and t o per mi t t h e l i f t s hi ps t o make
t h e i r f i n a l approach i n t o t h e LZ (from s out h t o nor t h) wi t hout
havi ng t o c r os s t h e gun-t arget l i n e f o r t h e a r t i l l e r y prepara-
t i o n (see s ket ch 6-1). -.'
The a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on began a t 0724 hours and cont i n-
ued f o r about 5 mi nut es. The rounds impacted on t h e LZ and
por t i ons of My Lai ( 4 ) . As t h e pr epar at i on began, t hos e
i nha bi t a nt s of My Lai ( 4 ) who had been working i n t he r i c e
paddi es surroundi ng t h e haml et sought cover al ong di kes and
i n t h e numerous buf f a l o wallows which dot t ed t h e r i c e f i e l d s .
I nsi de t h e haml et , ot he r i nha bi t a nt s t ook cover i n homemade
s h e l t e r s o r bunkers adj acent t o t h e i r houses and i n t h e s e ve r a l
w e l l s l ocat ed t hroughout My Lai ( 4 ) .
The a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on ceased j ;st p r i o r t o 0730 hour s,
a s t h e t r oop l i f t he l i c opt e r s were inbound on t h e i r f i n a l
approach t o t h e LZ. Smoke and f i r e s , caused i n s i d e t hg haml et
by t h e a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on, were c l e a r l y v i s i b l e from t h e
inbound he l i c opt e r s ( s ee exh i b i t P-195 ) . Accompanying "Shark"
gunshi ps preceded t h e C Company i n s e r t i o n by pl a c i ng r ocket
and machinegun f i r e s on bot h f l anks of t h e LZ and probabl y
i n t o t h e west er n por t i on of My Lai ( 4 ) . The f i r s t l i f t of C
Company t ouched down a t 0730 hours.
CPT Medina t e s t i f i e d t h a t upon l andi ng he r epor t ed t h e
LZ as "col d" ( f r e e of enemy f i r e ) . Shor t l y t h e r e a f t e r , accord-
i n g t o Medina, a he l i c opt e r p i l o t cut i n on t h e r adi o and
r epor t ed "Negat i ve, negat i ve - t h e LZ i s hot . You a r e r ecei v-
i n g f i r e . We a r e t a ki ng f i r e . There a r e VC wi t h weapons
runni ng from t h e v i l l a g e , and we a r e engagi ng them now" o r
words t o t h a t e f f e c t . Medina has f ur t he r t e s t i f i e d t h a t
based on t h i s i nf or mat i on, he immediately informed h i s
pl at oon l eader s t h a t t h e LZ was "hot . " Medina' s r e c ol l e c t i on
of t h i s event i s s ubs t a nt i a t e d ne i t he r by t h e TF Barker Jour nal ,
which o f f i c i a l l y recorded t h e LZ a s "col d, " nor by t h e r ecor d
of LTC Bar ker ' s r adi o conver sat i on wi t h t h e l eader of t h e
l i f t s hi ps who confirmed t h a t t h e LZ was f r e e of enemy f i r e .
It i s pos s i bl e t h a t CPT Medina gai ned t h e i mpressi on t h a t t h e
LZ was "hot "' by moni t or i ng t r ansmi ssi ons between LTC Barker
'and t h e "Shark" and/or "War Lord" gunshi ps which were, i n f a c t ,
t hen i n t h e pr ocess of engagi ng a few armed enemy f l e e i n g from
t h e haml et . . Whether CPT Medi na' s or der s t o h i s pl at oon
l eader s were based on f a c t s o r on an assumption it seems l i ke -
l y t h a t such or der s , i f i s s ued, may have ser ved as a f i n a l
r e l e a s e f o r t h e e ve nt s which fol l owed.
As t h e f i r s t el ement s of C Company began t o deploy on
t h e LZ, an OH-23 he l i c opt e r from t h e aero-scout team a r r i ve d
i n t h e a r e a s out h of My Lai ( 4 ) . The p i l o t of t h e s cout
s h i p immediately s pot t e d an armed Vi et Cong (VC) sout h
of Route 521 runni ng toward t h e sout h-sout hwest ( s ee sket ch
6-2) . The door gunner i n t h e s c out s h i p f i r e d a t t h e VC but
missed. Accompanying "War Lord" gunshi ps t hen s e t up and made
a nor t heas t t o sout hwest r ocket run on h i s l a s t observed l oca-
t i on. Subsequent l y t hey were unabl e t o confi rm t h a t t h e VC had
been k i l l e d . '
While t h e l i f t he l i c opt e r s r et ur ned t o LZ Dot t i e f o r t h e
second l i f t of C Company, t h e i r accompanying "Shark" gunshi ps
began t o o r b i t count ercl ockwi se over t h e ar ea t o t h e nor t h of
Route 521. As t hey passed al ong t h e sout her n edge of My Lai
(4), an ai r bor ne forward a i r c ont r ol l e r (FAC) s pot t ed an arm-
ed VC runni ng t o t h e e a s t on a t r a i l al ong t h e sout her n edge
of t h e haml et . The FAC immediately n o t i f i e d t he "Sharks" who
t ook t h e VC under f i r e , missed him, t ur ned out t o t h e nor t h-
e a s t , and set up f or a sout h t o nor t h r ocket run. Af t e r
coor di nat i ng a i r space wi t h t h e "War Lords", t h e "Sharks" en-
gaged and appar ent l y k i l l e d t h e man i n t h e extreme sout heast er n
edge of t h e haml et . Af t e r s h i f t i n g t h e i r o r b i t back t o t he
nor t h of Route 521, t h e "Sharks" were n o t i f i e d by t h e FAC t h a t
he had s pot t e d two more armed VC f l e e i ng t o t h e nor t he a s t of
t h e LZ. The VC were qui ckl y engaged and k i l l e d by "Shark" door
gunners. I n a subsequent o r b i t t o t h e sout h, t h e "Sharks"
spot t ed a f our t h i ndi vi dua l (equipped wi t h web g e a ~ ) who was
runni ng t o t h e s out h of t h e haml et . H e was a l s o engaged and
r epor t ed as k i l l e d . The "Sharks" t hen began t o drop smoke
markers near t h e bodi es t o mark t h e i r l oc a t i ons f o r subsequent
r e t r i e v a l of weapons and equipment by el ement s of C Company.
Because of t h e congest i on of a i r space around My Lai ( 4 1 ,
t h e "War Lord" aero-scout team deci ded t o s h i f t i t s o r b i t
f a r t he r t o t h e s out heas t and s hor t l y t h e r e a f t e r began t o re-
. connoi t er al ong t h e c oa s t a l peni nsul a.
From t h e LZ, t h e 1st Pl at oon of C Company had moved e a s t -
s out heas t f o r about 150 met ers and s e t up i t s por t i on of t h e
s e c ur i t y per i met er wi t h t h e 1st Squad on t h e r i g h t ( sout h) and
t he 2d Squad t o t h e l e f t ( nor t h) (see sket ch 6-3).
Elements of t h e 2d Pl at oon moved approxi mat el y 200 met ers
t o t h e eas t - nor t heas t and e s t a bl i s he d a p a r t i a l per i met er
ext endi ng from t h e west er n edge of My Lai ( 4 ) back t o t h e nor t h-
west.
While t h e pl at oons moved t o e s t a b l i s h t h e s e c ur i t y per-
i m e t e r , CPT Medina and t h e command group remained near t h e
cent er of t h e LZ ( s e e e x h i b i t P-202).
A s t h e pl at oons moved away from t h e LZ, Vietnamese began
t o appear from var i ous s h e l t e r s and hi di ng ar eas i n and around
t he r i c e paddi es. They were t aken under f i r e by el ement s of bot h
t he 1st and 2d Pl at oons and a number of them (approxi mat el y
4-9) were k i l l e d .
The 1st Pl at oon was ha l t e d when i t reached t h e west ern
edge of t h e haml et and s e t up s e c ur i t y pos i t i ons al ong t h e
di kes i n t h a t a r e a , wi t h SGT Mi t c he l l ' s 1st Squad on t h e r i g h t
( sout h) . SSG Bacon I s 2d Squad s e t up t o t h e l e f t ( nor t h)
f l ank of t h e pl at oon and qui ckl y opened f i r e on what was r e-
por t ed t o be an armed i ndi vi dua l o r group of armed i ndi vi dual s
observed i n s i d e t h e sout hwest ern edge of t h e haml et . Most of
t h e remainder of t h e pl at oon t hen began f i r i n g toward t h e ham-
l e t i n t o "suspect ed enemy pos i t i ons " such as bushes, bunkers,
and w e l l s , and a t Vietnamese f l e e i n g t o t h e sout hwest of t h e
haml et .
Af t er h a l t i n g and at t empt i ng t o t i e i n i t s r i g h t f l ank
wi t h t h e 1st Pl at oon, t h e 2d Pl at oon a l s o began t o f i r e upon
Vietnamese i n t h e r i c e paddi es t o i t s nor t h, and pl aced a heavy
volume of f i r e i n t o t h e nort hwest ern por t i on of My Lai ( 4 ) .
Sever al Vietnamese were h i t and appar ent l y k i l l e d a s a r e s u l t
of t h i s f i r e .
The second and f i n a l l i f t of C Company depar t ed LZ Dot t i e
a t 0738 hours ( see e x h i b i t P-27). As t h e l i f t , s hi ps w e r e
making t h e i r f i n a l approach i n t o t h e secur ed LZ, CPT Medina
marked t h e desi gnat ed touchdown poi nt wi t h smoke and a s s i s t e d
i n gui di ng t h e s h i p s i n . The second l i f t touched down a t 0747
hour s ( see e xhi bi t P-65 and P-29). A s t h e l i f t s hi ps were de-
pa r t i ng t h e LZ, t h e l e a d p i l o t r epor t ed t o LTC Barker, who was
overhead i n h i s he l i c opt e r , t h a t t h e l i f t had r ecei ved f i r e
from one of t h e sur r oundi ng haml et s as t hey w e r e making t h e i r
descent i n t o t h e LZ. Based on t h i s i nf or mat i on, t h e LZ was
recorded i n t h e TF J our nal a s "hot . " Nei t her t h e he l i c opt e r s
nor t h e i r passengers s us t ai ned any h i t s from t h e f i r e
To t h e sout h of t h e LZ, t h e "Sharks" t hrew smoke markers
near t h e body of t h e VC k i l l e d pr evi ousl y t o t h e nor t h of Route
521. They r equest ed t h a t Barker di s pat ch ground el ement s t o t h e
sout h t o r e t r i e v e t h e man' s equipment. The "War Lords I' who
w e r e by t h a t t i me conduct i ng a e r i a l reconnai ssance al ong t h e
coas t , r epor t ed t o Barker t h a t t he y had a l s o k i l l e d two add-
i t i o n a l armed enemy sout h of t h e LZ. Based on t h i s i nf or mat i on,
Barker di r e c t e d Medina t o di spat ch an el ement t o t h e sout h.
Almost immediately a f t e r l andi ng, t h e 3d Pl at oon Leader
(LT [now M r . 1 LaCross) r ecei ved or der s from CPT Medina t o send
an el ement from h i s pl at oon t o r e t r i e v e t he' enemy equipment and
weapons t o t h e sout h ( s e e s ket ch 6-4 ) .
LT LaCros s di r e c t e d h i s 3d Squad Leader, SP4 (now M r . )
Grimes, t o move h i s men out t o t h e sout h toward t h e smoke mark-
ers dropped by t h e "Sharks" gunshi ps. As t hey moved out ( see
e x h i b i t P-64) , t he y were accompanied by LaCross, h i s r a di o
oper at or , and two 11t h Bri gade Publ i c Informat i on Of f i c e (PIO)
men. The remai nder of t h e 3d Pl at oon and a mort ar squad from'
t h e company weapons pl at oon had meanwhile moved a s h o r t di s t a nc e
o f f t h e LZ t o t h e nort hwest . They or i e nt e d t h e i r def ensi ve
per i met er gener al l y toward t h e west .
The remai ni ng el ement s of t h e 2d Pl at oon, who had l anded
i n t h e second l i f t , moved r api dl y t o t h e nor t heas t and assembled
wi t h t h e rest of t h e pl at oon. Af t e r l i nk-up, t h e pl at oon was
deployed wi t h SGT Hodges' 1st Squad on t h e l e f t ( nor t h) , CPL
(now SGT) Sc h i e l ' s 2d Squad i n t h e cent er , and SGT LaCroi x' s
3d Squad on t h e r i g h t ( s out h) .
The 1st and 2d Pl at oons were deployed gener al l y al ong t h e
west ern edge of t h e haml et , and a t approxi mat el y 0750 hours be-
gan moving t o t h e e a s t . A s t hey ent er ed My Lai (9),CPT Medina
and t h e command group-moved a s hor t di s t a nc e t o t h e nor t heas t
and set up a temporary command.post l ocat i on out s i de t he ham-
l et .
2. 0750-0845 Hours: Act i ons of 3d Pl at oon, Avi at i on, and
Command Elements Out si de of My Lai ( 4 )
A t about 0755 hour s, LTC Barker cont act ed h i s t a c t i c a l
oper at i ons c e nt e r (TOC) a t LZ Dot t i e t o not i f y them t h a t a l l of
C Company's el ement s were on t h e ground and t h a t t h e 3d Pl at oon
element was moving out t o s ecur eweapons and equipment from VC
k i l l e d by t h e gunshi ps. He a l s o r epor t ed t h a t C Company had had
no cont act as of t h a t t i m e but was informed by t h e TOC t h a t C
Company had al r eady been c r e di t e d wi t h 15 VC k i l l e d . These
appar ent l y had been r epor t ed pr evi ousl y by CPT Medina.
As LT _Lacrossand h i s 3d Squad approached t h e ar ea where
t he VC body had been marked by t h e "Sharks, " t h e smoke markers
burned out ( see s ket ch 6-5). They sear ched t h e ar ea f o r a s h o r t
t i m e but w e r e unabl e t o f i nd t h e weapon, and consequent l y began
t o move back toward t h e LZ. LT LaCross cont act ed CPT Medina
and advi sed him t h a t t he ywere r e t ur ni ng t o My Lai ( 4 ) . Medina,
however, or der ed them t o remain i n t h a t ar ea and cont i nue t h e i r
sear ch f o r weapons and equipment. To t h e i r sout h, t h e "Sharks"
had s pot t e d anot her armed VC runni ng sout hwest al ong t h e s ~ u t h -
er n edge of Route 521. The "Sharks" t ook him under f i r e as he
evaded toward a smal l t ree l i n e runni ng s out h from t h e road.
By 0800 hour s, s e v e r a l groups of Vietnamese from My Lai
( 4) and sur r oundi ng subhaml et s had begun moving out of t h e ar ea
t o t h e sout hwest al ong Route 521. As t h e "Sharks" f i r e d on t h e
VC sout h of t h e highway, many of t h e Vietnamese s qua t t e d al ong
t he road. These groups w e r e composed pr i mar i l y of ol d men,
women, and chi l dr en.
Af t e r appar ent l y k i l l i n g t h e armed VC, the "Sharks" began
droppi ng smoke markers on h i s l oc a t i on and t he l oc a t i on of sev-
e r a l ammo boxes which t h e VC had di scar ded i n h i s at t empt s t o
evade. The "Sharks" n o t i f i e d LTC Barker of t h e d e t a i l s , and
LT LaCross' 3d Squad, which was al r eady moving f a r t h e r sout h,
was t o l d t o o r i e n t i t s movement on t h e "Sharks" smoke mark-
e r s . .
A t approxi mat el y 0800 hours, LTC Barker was cont act ed by
MAJ McKnight, who was ai r bor ne over t h e a r e a wi t h COL Hend-
erson, and was informed about t h e l a r ge number of peopl e moving
out al ong Route 521 t o t h e sout hwest . MAJ McKnight a l s o i ndi -
cat ed t h a t COL Henderson' s command and c ont r ol he l i c opt e r was
o r b i t i n g over t h e de pa r t i ng group of peopl e.
As LT LaCross and SP4 Grimes' 3d Squad approached Route
521, t he y observed t h e group of Vietnamese moving t o t h e sout h-
w e s t . The squad t ook t h e group under f i r e ( see e x h i b i t P-30).
Members of t h e squad and "Shark" crew members who were overhead
t e s t i f i e d t h a t from t h r e e t o 15 Vietnamese were k i l l e d by t h e
squad' s i n i t i a l vol l ey (see e xhi bi t s P-31, P-38)
Fol l owi ng t h e k i l l i n g of t h e Vietnamese, a p a r t of t h e 3d
Squad remained al ong t h e road t o sear ch f o r documents and equi p-
ment (see e xhi bi t P-26).. The remainder of t h e squad proceeded
acr os s t h e r oad t o t h e sout h. A s t hey cr ossed t h e road, a
woman ( possi bl y accompanied by a smal l g i r l ) was observed hi di ng
i n a di t c h which pa r a l l e l e d t h e road. "Shark" c r e w members who
w e r e s t i l l o r b i t i n g over t h e ar ea observed an i ndi vi dua l , f ol -
lowed by a r adi o oper at or , shoot and k i l l t h e woman (see P-32).
(The two PI0 men who had accompanied t h e 3d Squad t o t h e sout h
a l s o observed t h e woman when s he was a l i v e and subsequent l y saw
he r a f t e r s he had been k i l l e d . ) The squad element t hen moved
f a r t h e r s out h and r e t r i e ve d a weapon and two ammunition boxes,
probabl y from t h e body of t h e VC k i l l e d by t h e "Sharks. " Af t er
r ecover i ng t h e weapon, t h e s ol di e r s who had gone sout h of t h e
road, r et ur ned t o r e j oi n t h e rest of t h e squad. .
A t approxi mat el y 0810 hour s, t h e aero-scout team cont act ed
COL Henderson' s he l i c opt e r and n o t i f i e d MAJ McKnight t h a t two
VC suspect s had been s epar at ed from t h e l ar ge group of Vi et -
namese moving t o t h e sout hwest , and t h a t t h e two suspect s
were s t r i ppe d down ( i . e . had t aken t h e i r s h i r t s o f f ) and were
a va i l a bl e f o r pi ckup. Shor t l y t h e r e a f t e r , COL Henderson ' s
he l i c opt e r l anded 400-500 met ers sout hwest of t h e 3d Squad' s
l oc a t i on and pi cked u p t h e two suspect s. W 0 1 (now 1LT) Thomp-
son was p i l o t of t h e s c out s h i p t h a t had separ at ed and cornered
t h e suspect s.
Af t e r a s s i s t i n g COL Henderson wi t h t h e apprehensi on of t h e
two VC s us pect s , W01 Thompson began a e r i a l reconnai ssance of
t h e ar ea around t h e c r e s t of H i l l 85 and di scover ed a cache of
enemy 60mrn mort ar ammunition. An i nf a nt r y pl at oon from t he
aero-scout company was subsequent l y i ns e r t e d on t h e h i l l t o
capt ur e and dest r oy t h e ammunition. Because of i t s involvement
wi t h t h e capt ur e of t h e ammunition, and because of i t s r e t ur n
t o LZ Dot t i e f o r r e f ue l i ng, t h e aero-scout team was somewhat
separ at ed from t h e a c t i ons i n and around My Lai ( 4 ) from about
0815 hours u n t i l a f t e r 0900 hours. The "Shark" gunshi ps a l s o
r et ur ned t o LZ Dot t i e f o r r e f ue l i ng and rearmi ng between 0845
and 0900 hours. .
The 3d Squad l e f t Route 521 and began r e t r a c i ng its r out e
back t o t h e nor t h toward t he LZ ( s e e ' s ke t c h 6-6). En r out e,
members of t h e squad det ect ed two Vietnamese runni ng sout hwest
from t h e v i c i n i t y of My Lai ( 4 ) acr os s t h e s quad' s pat h. They
were f i r e d on by t h e squad and were e i t h e r k i l l e d or wounded.
There i s evi dence t o i ndi c a t e t h a t a t l e a s t one of t he i n -
di vi dual s was a c hi l d. The evi dence a l s o i ndi c a t e s t h a t t hes e
two peopl e, o r a subsequent group of Vietnamese encount ered by
t he 3d Squad ( bef or e r eachi ng t h e L Z ) , were k i l l e d o r " f i ni s h-
ed o f f " a t c l os e range by a machinegunner working wi t h t h e
squad ( see e x h i b i t P-39). As t h e squad cont i nued nor t h, a t
l e a s t one of i t s members observed a l a r ge group of Vietnamese,
under t h e guard of US s ol di e r s , of f t o h i s e a s t near t he sout h-
er n edge of My Lai
The squad r et ur ned t o t h e sout hwest cor ner of t he hamlet
a t approxi mat el y 0845 hours. The e n t i r e 3d Pl at oon t hen began
mv i n g i n t o t h e west er n edge of My ~ L a i ( 4 ) , f o r t h e mop-up
oper at i on. The PI 0 men who had accompanied SGT Gri mes' s squad
t o .the s out h, observed t h e squad as itbegan t o burn th, ehouses
i n t h e sout hwest ern por t i on of t h e hamlet ( s ee e xhi bi t s P-60,
59, 69, and 68) and t hen moved of f t o t he nort hwest where CPT
Medina and t h e command group were s t i l l l ocat ed j u s t i n s i d e
t he west ern edge of t h e haml et .
3. 0750-0845 Hours: I n i t i a l Act i ons of 1st Pl at oon
I ns i de My Lai ( 4 )
I n t h e 1stPl at oon s e c t or , LT Cal l ey and h i s r adi o opera-
t o r fol l owed behi nd t h e r i g h t (1st)squad l e d by SGT Mi t chel l .
The pl at oon s er geant , SFC Cowan, moved behi nd SSG Bacon' s 2d
squad. (The gener al di r e c t i ons of squad movements shown on sket ch
6-7 r e s u l t from a de t a i l e d r econs t r uct i on based on wi t ness s t a t e -
ments a s t o l ocat i on/ di st ance/ t i me where t hey observed o r pa r t -
i c i pa t e d i n c e r t a i n act i ons . The r out e s por t r ayed a r e a t be s t
t he c e n t r a l axes of t h e pat hs fol l owed by most members of t he
squads. )
As t he 1st Platoon' moved i n t o t he haml et , i t s s ol di e r s
began pl aci ng heavy f i r e on f l e e i n g Vietnamese, t hrowi ng grenades
i n t o houses and bunkers, s l a ught e r i ng l i ves t ock, and dest r oyi ng
f oodst uf f s. Sever al wi t nesses t e s t i f i e d t o havi ng observed an
ol d Vietnamese man bei ng bayoneted t o deat h by a mgmber of t h e ,
pl at oon and t o havi ng seen anot her man thrown a l i v e i n t o a w e l l
and subsequent l y k i l l e d wi t h a hand grenade. Sever al members
of t h e pl at oon a l s o t e s t i f i e d t o havi ng pa r t i c i pa t e d i n "mercy"
k i l l i n g s of badl y wounded Vietnamese a s t h e pl at oon advanced.
The 1st Pl at oon' s a c t i ons i n t h e sout hwest ern por t i on of My Lai
( 4 ) were char act er i zed by one not abl e, a l b e i t t r a ns i e nt , d i f f e r -
ence from t h e a c t i ons of t he 2d Pl at oon - l i v e det ai nees were
rounded up, i n t h e mi dst of t h e s c a t t e r e d k i l l i n g and dest r uc-
t i on. As t h e v i l l a g e r s were c ol l e c t e d, t hey were moved gener-
a l l y east ward t o t h e main nort h-sout h t r a i l runni ng thr'ough
t h e cent er of t h e v i l l a g e ( see sket ch 6-7). Af t e r r eachi ng t h e
t r a i l , t hey w e r e moved sout h i n two main groups toward LT Cal-
l e y ' s l ocat i on. The f i r s t group consi st ed of 60-70 peopl e,
comprised pr i mar i l y of women and chi l dr en. A few e l d e r l y males
were a l s o among t h e group. Af t e r r eachi ng t h e sout her n edge
of t h e haml et , t h e f i r s t groupwas es cor t ed by a few s ol di e r s
from t h e 1st Squad t o a d i t c h l ocat ed approxi mat el y 100-150
met ers t o t h e e a s t of t h e s out heas t er n edge of t h e vi l l a ge .
Af t e r r eachi ng t h e di t c h t he y were herded i n t o itand kept
under guard.
A second group of v i l l a g e r s , numbering between.20 and 50,
a l s owas moved s out h al ong t h e main nort h-sout h t r a i l and t hen
moved o u t i n t o t h e r i c e paddi es where t hey were pl aced under
t h e guard of s e ve r a l men (probabl y a f i r e team) from t h e 1st
Squad. Thi s second group of v i l l a g e r s reached t h e sout her n
edge of t h e haml et a t approxi mat el y 0830 hours.
4. 0750-0845 Hours: I n i t i a l Act i ons of 2d Pl at oon and
Command Elements i n and North of My Lai ( 4 )
As t h e 2d Pl at oon ent er ed My ~ a i ( 4 ) , LT Brooks (2d
Pl at oon Leader) fol l owed behi nd t h e r i g h t f l ank (3d) squad l ed
by SGT LaCroix. Pl at oon Sergeant Buchanon t e s t i f i e d t h a t he gen-
e r a l l y fol l owed behi nd SGT Hodges' l e f t f l ank (1st)squad. CPL
Schi el l e d t h e 2d Squad l ocat ed i n t h e c e nt e r ( s ee sket ch
6-8) . As t h e pl at oon advanced t hrough t h e nort hwest ern and
nor t h- cent r al p a r t of t h e haml et , members of t h e var i ous squads
became i nt er mi ngl edwi t h each ot he r and, i n some cas es , wi t h
el ement s of t h e 1st Pl at oon l ocat ed t o t h e i r r i g h t f l ank.
Members of t h e 2d Pl at oon began k i l l i n g Vietnamese i n -
ha bi t a nt s of My Lai ( 4 ) a s soon a s t hey ent er ed i t swest er n
edge. The evi dence a va i l a bl e i ndi c a t e s t hey n e i t h e r sought t o
t a ke nor di d t hey r e t a i n any pr i s one r s , s us pect s , o r det ai nees
whi l e i n My Lai ( 4 ) . As t hey advanced and di scover ed homemade
bunkers o r bomb s h e l t e r s , many of t h e s ol di e r s y e l l e d "Lai
Day" ( t he Vietnamese words f o r "come he r e " ) . Fa i l i ng any r e-
sponse from t h e Vietnamese i n s i d e t h e bunkers, t h e s o l d i e r s
t ossed fragment at i on grenades i n t o t h e bunkers, and fol l owed up
by spr ayi ng t he i n s i d e wi t h smal l arms f i r e . Mhny wi t nesses
a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t when Vietnamese di d respond most of them
w e r e s hot down a s t hey e xi t e d t h e bunkers. I n a t l e a s t t hr e e
i ns t a nc e s i ns i de t h e v i l l a g e , Vietnamese of a l l ages were round-
ed up i n groups of 5-10 and were s hot down. Ot her i nha bi t a nt s
w e r e s hot down i n t h e paddi es bor der i ng t h e nor t her n edge of t h e
haml et whi l e at t empt i ng t o escape. Women and chi l dr en, many of
whom w e r e smal l babi es, were k i l l e d s i t t i n g o r hi di ng i n s i d e
t h e i r homes. A t l e a s t two r apes were pa r t i c i pa t e d i n and ob-
served by members of t h e pl at oon. Most of t h e l i ve s t oc k and
fowl i n s i d e t h e haml et were a l s o sl aught er ed. A pr e c i s e det er -
mi nat i on of t h e number of Vietnamese k i l l e d by t h e 2d Pl at oon
i s v i r t u a l l y i mpossi bl e. However, t h e preponderance of t h e
evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t a t l e a s t 50 and perhaps as many as 1 0 0
i nha bi t a nt s , comprised al most excl usi vel y of ol d men, women,
chi l dr en, and babi es , w e r e k i l l e d by members of t h e 2d Pl at oon
whi l e t hey were i n My Lai ( 4 ) .
As t h e pl at oon approached t h e nor t heast er n por t i on of t h e
vi l l a ge , LT Brooks r ecei ved a c a l l from CPT Medina d i r e c t i n g
him t o move t h e e n t i r e pl at oon t o t h e nor t h t o s ecur e two wea-
pons from VC k i l l e d e a r l i e r by "Shark" gunshi ps' whi ch were, by
t h i s t i m e , re-marking t h e l oc a t i on of t h e VC bodi es wi t h smoke.
The 2d Pl at oon e xi t e d t h e nor t her n edge of My ljai ( 4 ) a t
approxi mat el y 0830 hour s. Up t o t h a t t i m e it had t aken no cas-
u a l t i e s , and t h e preponderance of t h e t est i mony s t r ongl y i ndi -
c a t e s it had r ecei ved no enemy f i r e .
COL Henderson had cont i nued t o o r b l t t h e oper at i onal ar ea
a f t e r h i s pi ckup of t h e two VC s us pect s , and a f t e r obser vi ng
t h e B Company combat a s s a u l t , r et ur ned t o t h e ar ea where "Shark"
gunshi ps w e r e marking t h e l oc a t i on of t h e two VC t hey had k i l l e d
t o t h e nor t h of My Lai ( 4 ) . The smoke was used t o a s s i s t i n
or i e nt i ng t h e movements o f t h e 2d Pl at oon which was moving nor t h
from t h e haml et toward t h e smoke markers. Af t er obser vi ng t h e
ground t r oops move t o wi t hi n 100-150 met ers of t h e two bodi es
and weapons, COL Henderson appar ent l y depar t ed f o r LZ Dot t i e
t o r e f u e l and dr op of f t h e two suspect s.
LTC Barker a l s o had been o r b i t i n g over t h e oper at i onal
ar ea f o r most of t h e morning. Af t er coor di nat i ng t h e B Company
combat a s s a ul t on My Lai (1), he made a f i n a l check wi t h CPT
Medina and t hen headed back t o LZ Dot t i e f o r r e f ue l i ng. During
t he conver sat i on wi t h CPT Medina, he was appar ent l y informed
t h a t C Company had account ed f o r a t o t a l of 84 enemy k i l l e d .
Fi f t e e n enemy k i l l e d had been r epor t ed e a r l i e r by CPT Medina
t o t h e TF TOC. En r out e, LTC Barker cont act ed t h e TOC and ad-
vi sed them t h a t he was r e t ur ni ng t o r e f ue l and would br i ng them
up t o d a t e on t h e r e s u l t s of t h e oper at i on. LTC Barker a r r i ve d
a t LZ Dot t i e a t approxi mat el y 0835 hours. An e nt r y, c r e d i t i n g
C Company wi t h t h e a ddi t i ona l 69 enemy k i l l e d , was made on t h e
TF Barker J our nal as of 0840 hours.
Using t h e smoke markers of t h e "Sharks" t o gui de on, t h e
2d Pl at oon found t h e two VC bodi es nor t h of My Lai ( 4 ) and re-
t r i e ve d a car bi ne and an M- 1 r i f l e from nearby. The two VC had
been k i l l e d whi l e runni ng from t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e smal l subham-
l e t of Binh Tay (see sket ch 6-9) l ocat ed t o t h e nort hwest of t h e
2d Pl at oon' s pos i t i on. The pl at oon was consequent l y ordered t o
proceed t o Binh Tay t o check it out and reached i t s sout her n
edge a t approxi mat el y 0845 hours. '
5. 0845-0945 Hours: Locat i on and Act i ons of Command
Elements, and C Company a t My Lai ( 4 ) and Binh Tay
By 0855 hour s, LTC Barker completed h i s r e f ue l i ng s t o p
at LZ Dot t i e and was ai r bor ne over t h e oper at i onal ar ea.
COL Henderson, who a r r i ve d a t LZ Dot t i e a t approxi mat el y
0845 hours, appar ent l y remained t h e r e u n t i l a f t e r 0950
hour s.
Between 0845-0900 hour s, t h e group of v i l l a g e r s (20-50) who
had been moved by t h e 1stpl at oon t o t h e sout h of t h e haml et
and he l d under guard i n t h e r i c e paddi es w e r e s hot down by
members of t h e pl at oon ( s e e s ket ch 6-10). Fol l owi ng t h e k i l -
l i ng, t h e f i r e team t h a t had guarded t h e v i l l a g e r s wa s s e n t
t hrough t h e s out heas t er n por t i on of t h e haml et t o round up
a ddi t i ona l v i l l a g e r s and move them f a r t h e r e a s t t o t h e di t c h.
LT Cal l ey and t h e command group moved from sout h of t h e haml et
t o t h e e a s t and a r r i ve d a t t h e di t c h a t approxi mat el y 0900
hours. SGT Mi t c he l l ' s 1st Squad (minus a f i r e team) had set
up a def ensi ve per i met er j u s t t o t h e e a s t of t h e di t c h. SSG
Bacon' s 2d Squad, which was moving through t h e nor t heas t er n
por t i on of t h e haml et , subsequent l y s e t up def ensi ve pos i t i ons
as t h e l e f t f l ank el ement of t h e pl at oon.
The f i r e team of t h e 1stSquad, which had sear ched t hrough
t h e s out heas t er n por t i on of t h e haml et , a r r i ve d a t t h e di t c h a t
about 0900 hours and brought wi t h it approxi mat el y 10 a ddi t i ona l
v i l l a g e r s . The v i l l a g e r s w e r e herded i n t o t h e d i t c h wi t h t h e
l a r g e r group of 60-70. (Therehas been t est i mony from V i e t -
namese wi t nesses t h a t an a ddi t i ona l number of v i l l a g e r s , pos-
s i b l y 50 o r more, w e r e e i t h e r brought t o t h e di t c h from s ur -
roundi ng subhaml et s o r sought r ef uge i n t h e di t c h from t h e
. C Company act i on. Testimony from US personnel t o s ubs t a nt i a t e
t h e Vietnamese s t at ement s has not been developed by t h i s
I nqui r y. ) A t approxi mat el y 0900-0915 hours, Vietnamese person-
n e l who had been herded i n t o t h e di t c h were s hot down by members
of t h e 1stPl at oon.
I ns i de t h e subhaml et of Binh Tay, t h e 2d Pl at oon cont i nued
t h e p a t t e r n of bur ni ng, k i l l i n g s , and r apes which ithad fol l ow-
ed i n My Lai ( 4 ) . Besi des s c a t t e r e d k i l l i n g which t ook pl ace
i n s i d e t h e subhaml et , a group of Vietnamese women and c hi l dr e n
(approximately 10-20 ) were rounded up, brought t o t h e sout her n
end of Binh Tay, and made t o s quat i n a c i r c l e . Sever al 40mm
rounds from an M-79 grenade l auncher w e r e f i r e d i n t o t h e i r
mi dst , k i l l i n g s e ve r a l and wounding many. The wounded w e r e
subsequent l y k i l l e d by smal l arms f i r e from members of t h e pl a-
t oon. Wi t nesses from t h e pl at oon have t e s t i f i e d t o obser vi ng
a t l e a s t one gang-rape of a young Vietnamese g i r l , an a c t of
sodomy, and s e ve r a l ot he r r ape/ ki l l i ngs whi l e i n s i d e Binh
Tay.
On t h e LZ, t h e 3d Squad of t h e 3d Pl at oon had r et ur ned
a t approxi mat el y 0845 hours from i t s movement t o t h e sout h.
LT LaCross l e f t t h e squad and moved t o t h e nort hwest cor ner
of t h e haml et where he conf er r ed wi t h CPT Medina f o r a s hor t
whi l e. CPT Medina t o l d him t o have h i s pl at oon begi n moving
through t h e v i l l a g e f o r t h e mop-up oper at i on. LT LaCross
followed behi nd SGT (now Mr . ) Smail ' s 1st Squad on t h e l e f t
( nor t h) f l a nk (see s ket ch 6-11). SGT G r i m e s ' 3d Squad moved
gn t h e sout her n f l ank. The pl at oon, accompanied by SFC Maroney' s
mort ar squad, ent er ed t h e west ern edge of t h e haml et between
0845-0900 hours. CPT Medina and h i s command group fol l owed
behi nd t h e pl at oon.
Af t e r CPT Medina and t h e command group had moved i n t o t h e
haml et f o r a s h o r t di s t a nc e ( s ee sket ch 6-12 ) , an o l d V i e t -
namese man wi t h two chi l dr en was apprehended and brought t o
their l ocat i on. H e was i nt e r r oga t e d by SGT Phu, CPT Medina' s
Vietnamese i n t e r p r e t e r (see e xhi bi t s P-66 and 67) . The ol d
man informed Medina t h a t 30-40 VC had been i n My Lai ( 4 ) t h e
previ ous eveni ng but had depar t ed t h e haml et t h a t morning p r i o r
t o t h e combat a s s a ul t . (Thi s i nf or mat i on was r epor t ed and re-
corded on t h e 11t h Bri gade J our nal . ) The command group t hen
moved f a r t h e r i n t o t h e v i l l a g e toward t h e e a s t and sout h-
e a s t
Forward of t h e command group, t h e 3d Pl at oon went about
t h e de s t r uc t i on of cr ops - and t h e burni ng of houses i n a thorough
and syst emat i c manner ( see e xhi bi t s P-15, 35, 16, 33, 56, and
1 4) . Throughout t h e haml et , members of t h e pl at oon and t h e two
PI0 men who accompanied them observed t h e bodi es of Vietnamese
k i l l e d e a r l i e r dur i ng t h e 1st and 2d Pl at oons' advance ( see
e xhi bi t s P-34, 37, and 32) . Members of t h e 3d Pl at oon s l aught -
er ed most of t h e remai ni ng l i ve s t oc k, and i n a t l e a s t one
i ns t ance pa r t i c i pa t e d i n t h e k i l l i n g of about f i ve o r s i x
s e r i ous l y wounded Vietnamese t o "put them out of t h e i r mi sery"
s i nc e "t hey di d n o t gi ve them medi cal a i d , "
Af t e r compl et i on of h i s f i r s t r e f ue l i ng s t o p a t LZ Dot t i e,
a t approxi mat el y 0845-0900 hour s, W01 Thompson r et ur ned t o t h e
My Lai (4) ar ea. MAJ Watke t e s t i f i e d t h a t s i nc e t h e "Shark"
gunshi ps had depar t ed a t t h i s t i m e , he had r ecei ved permi ssi on
f o r t h e aero-scout team t o commence reconnai ssance i n t h e ar ea
nor t h of Route 521. Af t e r a r r i v i n g i n t h e ar ea, Thompson no-
t i c e d numerous wounded Vietnamese sout h of t h e haml et and ob-
ser ved t h e woman k i l l e d e a r l i e r by t h e 3d Pl at oon sout h of Route
521. Thompson t e s t i f i e d t h a t he marked t h e l ocat i on of t h e
wounded wi t h smoke and cont act ed h i s lower gunshi p t o r equest
t h a t t h e ground e l e mn t s pr ovi de medical a i d t o t h e wounded.
(The lower gunshi p had t h e onl y r adi o wi t h which Thompson coul d
communicate. H i s t r ansmi ssi ons were t hen r el ayed by t h e low
gunshi p t o t h e hi gh gunshi p which i n t u r n passed t h e i nf or mat i on
on t o TF Barker el ement s over t h e TF,command n e t ) . While r e-
connoi t er i ng f o r a ddi t i ona l wounded t o t h e e a s t of t h e haml et ,
h i s c r e w chi ef s pot t e d t h e d i t c h cont ai ni ng t h e bodi es of V i e t -
namese k i l l e d e a r l i e r by t h e 1st Pl at oon. Seei ng t h a t some of
t h e Vietnamese w e r e s t i l l a l i v e , Thompson l anded between t h e
d i t c h and t h e 1st Pl at oon' s def ensi ve per i met er a t approxi mat el y
0915-0930 hours. While on t h e ground, he spoke t o a f i r e team
l eader i n t h e 1st Squad and t hen wi t h LT Cal l ey. Thompson
t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e s e r ge a nt ' s response t o h i s ques t i on about
hel pi ng t h e wounded was t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e onl y way he
coul d he l p them w a s t o k i l l them. Thompson s t a t e s t h a t he
t hought t h e s er geant was j oki ng. (The subst ance of Thompson's
conver sat i on wi t h LT Cal l ey i s unknown, inasmuch as Thompson
d i d not r e c a l l LT Cal l ey a t t h e d i t c h and LT Cal l ey e l e c t e d t o
remain s i l e n t bef or e t h i s I nqui r y. Sever al members of t h e 1st
Pl at oon, i ncl udi ng t h e s er geant wi t h whom W 0 1 Thompson spoke,
t e s t i f i e d o r made sworn st at ement s t h a t LT Cal l ey and W 0 1
Thompson d i d t a l k wi t h each ot he r dhr i ng t h e i nc i de nt a t t h e
di t c h. ) Thompson subsequent l y took o f f , and h i s c r e w chi ef
observed a s er geant s hoot i ng i n t o t h e di t c h. Thompson di d not
per s onal l y observe t h e shoot i ng.
Fol l owi ng W01 Thompson's depar t ur e, s e ve r a l members of t h e
1st Squad of t h e 1st Pl at oon w e r e ordered t o r e t ur n t o My Lai
( 4 ) t o a s s i s t t h e 3d Pl at oon i n s ear chi ng t h e e a s t e r n por t i on
of t h e haml et .
I n t h e subhaml et of Binh Tay, t h e k i l l i n g and r apes of
Vietnamese by t h e .2d Pl at oon were st opped when LT Brooks re-
cei ved an or der from CPT Medina a t approxi mat el y 0915-0930
hours t e l l i n g hi m t o "cease f i r e " o r " s t op t h e k i l l i n g , " t o
round up t h e remai ni ng i nha bi t a nt s and move them out of t h e
ar ea, and t o b u m t h e houses. (Whether t h i s same or der was
a l s o r ecei ved by t h e 1st and 3d Pl at oons i s not e n t i r e l y c l e a r
inasmuch as a ddi t i ona l k i l l i n g , i nvol vi ng members of bot h t h e
1st and 3d Pl at oons, appar ent l y di d occur a f t e r t h i s t i me. The
b a s i s f o r CPT Medina' s or der i s even less c l e a r . Si nce Medina
and t h e cormnand group w e r e appar ent l y moving i n s i d e My Lai ( 4 )
a t t h i s t i m e , what Medina observed i n s i d e t h e haml et may have
caused him t o i s s u e t h e 0915-0930 or der . I f t h a t w e r e t h e case,
however, it would appear t h a t t h e same or der would a l s o have
been i s s ued t o t h e 1st and 3d Pl at oons. The evi dence i ndi c a t e s
t h a t k i l l i n g by me mbe r s of t h e company, except f o r t hos e i n
t h e 2d Pl at oon, cont i nued u n t i l a t l e a s t 1015 hours .-) Testimony
concl usi vel y i ndi c a t e s t h a t fol l owi ng r e c e i pt of t h e or de r from
CPT Medina, t h e remai ni ng i nha bi t a nt s of Binh Tay ( c ons i s t i ng
of about 50-60 peopl e) w e r e rounded up by t h e 2d Pl at oon and
i ns t r uc t e d t o move out of t h e ar ea. They depar t ed t o the sout h-
w e s t wi t hout f u r t h e r harm bei ng done t o them.
6. 0945-1045 Hours: ContinuingAct i ons Involving C Com-
pany and Avi at i on El emnt s Around My Lai ( 4 ) - Return
of 2d Platoon From Binh Tay
Following WO1, Thompson ' s depar t ur e from t he di t ch e a s t
of My Lai ( 4 ) , s ever al members of t he 1stPlatoon r et ur ned t o
t he hamlet.t o a s s i s t t he 3d Platoon i n cl ear i ng t he east er n por-
t i on. They became i nt ermi ngl edwi t h members of t he 3d Platoon
i n t he vi c i ni t y of t he main north-south t r a i l running through t he
cent er of t he hamlet ( seesket ch 6-13). Various members of both
pl at oons observed numerous dead Vi et nams e al ong t he north-south
t r a i l i nsi de' t he hamlet and s ever al dr i f t e d f a r enough t o t he
south t h a t t hey observed t he group k i l l e d e a r l i e r i n t he r i c e
paddies (seeexhi bi t P-41). During t he time t h a t the two e l e -
ments were t oget her , addi t i onal ki l l i ngs al s o took pl ace. I n
one i nci dent , a group of 7-12 women and chi l dr en were herded
t oget her , and members of t he 3d Pl at oon attempted t o r i p t he
bl ouse of f a Vietnamese g i r l . They hal t ed t h e i r at t empt s a f t e r
observi ng t h a t t h e PI 0 photographer was near t h e i r l ocat i on and
had t aken a pi ct ur e of t he scene ( seeexhi bi t P-40). The women
and chi l dr en were t hen ki l l e d.
A t approximately 0930-0945, t he 2d Pl at oon depart ed Binh
Tay and headed sout heast toward t he nor t heast er n corner of My
Lai ( 4) ( s eesket ch 6- 14) . As t hey approached My Lai ( 4 ) some
of t h e members of t he pl at oon re-ent ered t he nor t her n edge of
t he hamlet. Other elements of t he pl at oon apparent l y moved
f ar t her t o t h e e a s t toward a poi nt where t hey were event ual l y
t o e s t a bl i s h a pa r t of t he company's defensi ve peri met er. The
pl at oon ar r i ved i n t he ar ea a t approximately 0945-1000 hours.
Following t he di t ch i nci dent wi t h t he 1stPl at oon, W01
Thompson had r et ur ned t o t he ar ea sout h of My Lai ( 4 ) where he
had e a r l i e r marked t he posi t i ons of wounded Vietnamese. He
t e s t i f i e d t ha t he cont act ed h i s low gunship t o request t h a t
ground elements be s ent t o a s s i s t t he wounded, H i s i nt e nt was
evi dent l y misunderstood by t he gunships, f or a t approximately
0945 hours t he high gunship cont act ed LTC Barker and i de nt i f i e d
t he wounded/killed t o t he sout h of My Lai ( 4 ) as "8-9 ' di nks' . ..
with web gear and everyt hi ng. " The gunship al s o suggest ed t h a t
ground elements pi ck up t he web gear and equipment from t he
bodies. (The pr obabi l i t y t h a t Thompson's message was e i t he r
garbl ed o r misunderstood by t h e gunships i s f ur t her s ubs t ant i at -
ed by t he f a c t t h a t dur i ng t he event s-which folluwed t her e i s no
evidence t o i ndi cat e t h a t e i t h e r wounded or k i l l e d VC ( or any
enemy equipment) were di scovered by t he C Company command el e-
ment. )
Af t er di r e c t i ngCPT Medina t o recover t he equipment from
t he bodi es bei ng marked by Thompson, LTC Barker proceeded t o
t he B Company ar ea where he landed t o pi ck up t hr e e s ol di er s
wounded by a boobytrap. He had h i s command and cont r ol hel -
, i copt er t hen drop him of f a t LZ Dot t i e a t approximately 0950
hours, whi l e t he B Company wounded were flown t o a medical
f a c i l i t y a t Chu Lai
The C Company command group had exi t ed t he sout hern edge
of My Lai ( 4) a t approximately 0930-0945 hours ( seesket ch
6-15). They moved f a r t he r sout h a f t e r CPT Medina recei ved LTC
Bar ker ' s c a l l i ndi cat i ng t ha t VC bodi es and weapons were bei ng
marked by smoke i n t h a t area. CPT Medina t e s t i f i e d t h a t he
decided t o check t he ar ea out himself s i nce t he pl at oons were
engaged elsewhere. He s t a t e d t h a t en rout e t out hesmoke markers.
he observed t hr ee dead Vietnamese, consi st i ng of a man, a woman,
and a ahi l d (see sket ch 6-15). Both he and LT (now M r . ) ~ l a u x ,
h i s a r t i l l e r y forward observer (FO), t e s t i f i e d t h a t t he appear-
- a c e of t he bodi es i ndi cat ed t hey had been ki l l e d by a r t i l l e r y
o r gunships. LT Alaux al s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t as t hey were approach-
i ng t h e smoke, he bel i eves someone i n t he command group f i r e d
a t and h i t a f l eei ngVietnamese who was subsequently determined
t o be a woman. (The de t a i l s surrounding CPT Medina's subse-
quent k i l l i n g of t h e woman ar e, of course, a mat t er of cur r ent
cri mi nal i nves t i gat i on. CPT Medina admitted shoot i ng t h e woman.
The t r u t h concerning t he circumstances which caused him t o shoot
her i s out si de t h e scope of t h i s I nqui r y) . Following t he shoot -
i ng of t he woman, CPT Medina and t he command group searched t he
surroundi ng ar ea f or a s hor t whi l e, and t hen headed back toward
My Lai ( 4 ) .
LT LaCross, 3d Pl at oon Leader, reached t he nor t her n edge
of t he hamlet and t r i e d unsuccessful l y t o cont act CPT Medina
by radi o. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he wanted Medina t o pass on t o
LT Brooks t ha t he (LaCross) had spot t ed 15-20 Vietnamese males
running i n t he vi c i ni t y of Binh Tay. LT LaCross' pl at oon medic
t e s t i f i e d t h a t LaCross had t r i e d , unsuccessful l y, t o cont act
Medina i n an e f f o r t t o f i nd out t he reason f or a l l t he ki l l i ng.
In any event , LaCross decided t o move south.t o per sonal l y con-
t a c t Medina who was t hen approaching t he sout hern' edge of t he
hamlet from t he southwest. LaCross went sout h on t he main
north-south t r a i l as he t r avel ed t o meet Medina.
Af t er t h e command group ret urned t o My Lai ( 4 ) ( seesket ch
6-16), CPT Medina spoke t o LT LaCross f or a few minutes and
t hen di r ect ed him t o r et ur n t o t he nort hern pa r t of t he hamlet
t o complete t he sweep through t he eas t er n edge of t he haml et . '
Evidence i ndi cat es t h a t duri ng t he time frame i n which Medina
spoke t o LaCross, vari ous members of t he command group st r ayed
from Medina' s l ocat i on and were involved i n random k i l l i n g of
wounded Vietnamese l ocat ed i n t he vi c i ni t y of t he i nt er s ect i on
formed by t he north-south t r a i l and t he east-west t r a i l a t t he
southern edge.of t he hamlet. Af t er LaCross l e f t , Medina pro-
ceeded f a r t he r e a s t , al ong t he east-west t r a i l , and observed t he
bodi es of t he vi l l a ge r s l ocat ed t o t he sout h i n t h e r i c e pad-
di es. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he observed 20-24 bodi es. He di d not
examine t h e bodi es t o a c t ua l l y det ermi ne t h e cause of deat h, but
t e s t i f i e d t h a t he consi der ed them "i nnocent c i v i l i a n s . " There
i s evi dence t h a t dur i ng t h e t i me he observed t h e bodi es, a
member of h i s comand group a l s o s hot and k i l l e d a smal l c hi l d
who was st andi ng, cr yi ng, i n t h e mi dst of t h e group of bod-
i e s . '
Fol l owi ng t h e i nc i de nt i nvol vi ng CPT Medina' s shoot i ng of t h e
woman, W01 Thompson cont i nued t o r econnoi t er t h e a5ea e a s t of My
Lai ( 4 ) . While s o engaged, Thompson's crew chi ef s pot t e d a bun-
ker occupi ed by Vietnamese chi l dr en (see sket ch 6-17). Thompson
observed US t r oops approachi ng t h e ar ea and landed near t h e bun-
ker. SP4 (now M r . ) Colburn, Thompson's door gunner, t e s t i f i e d
t h a t Thompson t o l d h i s crew t h a t i f t h e American t r oops f i r e d
on t h e Vietnamese, whi l e h e (Thompson) was t r y i n g t o ge t them
out of t h e bunker, t h e crew was t o f i r e back a t them. Thompson
t hen got out of t h e a i r c r a f t . Thompson t e s t i f i e d t h a t he spoke
wi t h a l i e ut e na nt and t o l d him t h e r e w e r e women and chi l dr en
i n t h e bunker, and asked i f t h e l i e ut e na nt would he l p g e t them
out . According t o Thompson, "he [ t he l i e ut e na nt ] s a i d t h e onl y
way t o g e t them out was wi t h a hand grenade. " Thompson t est i -
f i e d he t hen t o l d t h e l i e ut e na nt t o " j u s t hol d your men r i g h t
where t hey a r e , and I ' 11 ge t t h e ki ds out . " ( I n June 1969,
Thompson i d e n t i f i e d t h e l i e ut e na nt , from a per sonnel l i neup, as
havi ng been LT Cal l ey. While t h e evi dence i s c l e a r t h a t Thompson
had spoken t o LT Cal l ey e a r l i e r a t t h e d i t c h , t he r e i s evi dence
t o i n d i c a t e t h a t it was probabl y t h e 2d Pl at oon l eader , LT Brooks,
who t a l ke d wi t h Thompson a t t h e bunker . ) Thompson t hen walked
over t o t h e bunker, motioned f o r t h e Vietnamese t o come out ,
and di scover ed t h a t t h e r e were approxi mat el y 12-16 peopl e con-
s i s t i n g of one o r two o l d men, s e ve r a l women, and chi l dr en.
Thompson t hen went back t o h i s a i r c r a f t and c a l l e d t h e low gun-
s hi p p i l o t , W01 (now CW2) Mi l l i ans . H e asked Mi l l i ans t o set
down and a s s i s t i n t h e evacuat i on. W 0 1 Mi l l i ans l anded j u s t
nor t h of t h e bunker. H e subsequent l y made two o r t h r e e t r i p s
t o evacuat e t h e Vietnamese from t h e bunker t o a s a f e ar ea sout h-
west of My Lai (4) al ong Route 521.
W01 Thompson, W01 Mi l l i ans , and ot he r "War Lords" crew
members who were ai r bor ne over t h e ar ea dur i ng t h i s t i me, t est -
i f i e d t h a t s e ve r a l l a r ge groups of bodi es w e r e c l e a r l y v i s i b l e
from t h e a i r - one group was l ocat ed al ong Route 521, anot her
i n t h e di t c h, a f ur t he r one s out h of t h e haml et , and anot her
nor t h of t he - haml et .
COL Henderson t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r de pa r t i ng LZ Dot t i e
( a t approxi mat el y 1000 hour s) h e r et ur ned t o and overfl ew t h e
oper at i onal ar ea f o r a per i od of t i m e . He depar t ed t he ar ea
a t approxi mat el y 10 30 hour s.
Af t e r obser vi ng t h e bodi es of t h e v i l l a g e r s l ocat ed i n t h e
6 -15
r i c e paddi es t o h i s sout h, CPT Medina and t h e command group
probabl y moved e a s t from t h e i nt e r s e c t i on of t h e nort h-sout h
t r a i l and east -west t r a i l ( s ee sket ch 6-18). As t he y were
moving, CPT Medina r ecei ved a r e por t t h a t a member of t h e 1st
Squad, 1st Pl at oon, had been wounded i n s i d e t h e vi l l a ge . The
s ol di e r , PFC (now M r . ) Car t er , s hot hi msel f t hrough t h e f oot
whi l e t r y i n g t o c l e a r h i s .45 c a l i b e r p i s t o l . Thi s p i s t o l
jammed whi l e bei ng used by a member of CPT Medina' s command
group. Sever al members of t h e squad t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e p i s t o l
was used t o f i n i s h of f wounded Vietnamese, i ncl udi ng one 4-5
year ol d c hi l d.
Ca r t e r ' s wound was i n i t i a l l y t r e a t e d i ns i de t h e v i l l a g e
where he had di schar ged t h e weapon (see e xhi bi t s P-6 and 7 ) .
He was t hen c a r r i e d sout h on t h e nort h-sout h t r a i l (see e xhi bi t
P-9 ) and was he l d ne a r ' t h e nort h-sout h and east -west t r a i l i n-
t e r s e c t i o n u n t i l a medi cal evacuat i on he l i c opt e r coul d be pro-
vi ded ( see e xhi bi t s P-8, 1 0 , and 36. )
LTC Bar ker ' s command and c ont r ol he l i c opt e r , which had
j u s t r et ur ned from t a ki ng t h e B Company wounded t o Chu Lai ,
was di spat ched t o My Lai ( 4 ) t o pi ck up Ca r t e r and r e t ur n him
t o LZ Dot t i e. LTC Barker remained a t Dot t i e dur i ng t h e med-
i c a l evacuat i on.
LTC Bar ker ' s he l i c opt e r a r r i ve d i n -an ar ea j u s t sout hwest
of t h e i nt e r s e c t i on of t h e two t r a i l s and Ca r t e r was brought
out i n t o t h e rice paddy f o r pi ckup ( s ee e xhi bi t s P-11 and 12) .
The c opi l ot of t h e he l i c opt e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he observed t h e
group of bodi es on t h e nort h-sout h t r a i l , whi l e wa i t i ng f o r
Ca r t e r t o be put aboard. Ca r t e r was evacuat ed t o LZ Dot t i e
a t 1025 hours.
Fol l owi ng Ca r t e r ' s medi cal evacuat i on, t h e command group
remained i n t h e gener al ar ea of t h e i nt e r s e c t i on f o r approxi -
mat el y 15-20 mi nut es (see s ket ch 6-19). Sever al wi t nes s es
t e s t i f i e d t h a t dur i ng t h i s per i od, a few remai ni ng Vietnamese
were rounded up and i nt e r r oga t e d by CPT Medina and t h e at t ached
mi l i t a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e ( M I ) team, whi l e most of t h e command
group r e s t e d ( s ee e xhi bi t s P-4, 3, 2 , and 13) . There i s some
evi dence t o i ndi c a t e t h a t one of t h e Vietnamese, an e l de r l y
male, may have been s hot and k i l l e d by a Vietnamese i n t e r p r e t e r ,
subsequent t o i nt e r r oga t i on.
During t h i s same per i od, t h e at t ached PI0 and M I teams
r equest ed and r ecei ved a he l i c opt e r t o t a ke them from My Lai
( 4 ) t o t h e B Company ar ea (see Exhi bi t P-17) .
A t approxi mat el y 1030-1045, CPT Medina r ecei ved an or der
from MAJ Calhoun, TF S3, t o "st op t h e k i l l i n g " o r " s t op t h e
shoot i ng. " CPT Medina t e s t i f i e d t h a t he assumed t h e or der was
generat ed by t h e he l i c opt e r p i l o t (W01 Thompson) havi ng observed
h i s shoot i ng of t h e woman. MAJ Calhoun admi t s t h a t he i s s ued
such an or de r , but was not c l e a r as t o t h e t i mi ng i nvol ved.
H i s t est i mony i s a l s o i nconcl usi ve as t o whether t h e or der
was based on an accumul at i on of i ndi c a t or s of unnecessary k i l -
l i n g of c i v i l i a n s by TF eleroents o r merely t h e r e por t of t h e
Medina/woman i nc i de nt . ) Following t h e i ssuance of the or der
t o a l l of h i s pl at oon l eader s , CPT Medina and, t h e command
group began t o move t o t h e nor t he a s t through t h e haml et ( s ee
sket ch 6-19). 1LT Alaux, who was wi t h CPT Medina t hroughout
t h e oper at i on, t e s t i f i e d t h a t dur i ng t h i s t i me he observed
17-18 bodi es al ong t h e nort h-sout h t r a i l i n s i d e t h e haml et
and had observed a t o t a l of 60-70 t hroughout t h e a r e a , ex-
cl udi ng t hos e probabl y k i l l e d i n bunkers.
7. 1045-1330 Hours: Act i ons I nvol vi ng C Company and
Avi at i on Elements East of My Lai ( 4 )
W01 Thompson t e s t i f i e d t h a t f ol l owi ng t h e evacuat i on of
t he Vietnamese from t h e bunker, he agai n fl ew over t he, di t c h
t o t h e e a s t of t h e haml et . Observing t h a t some of t h e Vietnam-
ese i n t h e d i t c h were s t i l l a l i ve , he s t a t e d t h a t he l anded
h i s he l i c opt e r i n approxi mat el y t h e same ar ea as on h i s f i r s t
t r i p . According t o Thompson and h i s door gunner, t h e door
gunner and c r e w chi ef went down i n t o t h e d i t c h and found a
smal l boy who was s l i g h t l y wounded. The door gunner and
crew chi ef t o l d Thompson t h a t ot her s were s t i l l a l i v e i n t h e
di t c h a t t h e t i me, but s i n c e t h e OH-23 had room f o r onl y one
person ( t he boy was he l d on t h e crew c h i e f ' s l a p) t h e boy
was evacuat ed t o t h e Vietnamese hos pi t a l a t QuangNgai. Fol -
lowing t h i s , Thompson and h i s crew r et ur ned t o LZ Dot t i e, where
Thompson cont act ed h i s company commander, MAJ Watke, and
rendered what' i snow r e f e r r e d t o as t h e "Thompson Report "
(seechap l o ) ,
Af t e r r eachi ng t h e e a s t e r n edge of My Lai ( 41, CPT Medina
st opped, or der ed a l unch br eak, and c a l l e d a meeting wi t h h i s
pl at oon l eader s . MAJ Calhoun a r r i ve d over t h e ar ea i n LTC
Barker' s he l i c opt e r a t approxi mat el y 1145. During t h e t i me
t h a t he was over t h e ar ea, he r ecei ved from LTC Barker and
r el ayed t o CPT Medina an or der t o make s u r e t he r e was no
unnecessary k i l l i n g b u r n i n g o r words t o t h a t e f f e c t . Bar ker ' s
order was appar ent l y i s s ue d i n response t o i nf or mat i on which
he had r ecei ved from MAJ Watke concerni ng t h e "Thompson
Report" .
A t approxi mat el y 1245 hour s, WO1 'Thompson r et ur ned t o
t he My Lai ( 4) a r e a , and whi l e i n t h e pr ocess of conduct i ng
low-level r econnai ssance of t h e a r e a , h i s he l i c opt e r s t r uc k
some t r e e l i mbs, s uf f e r e d minor damage t o i t s main r o t o r
bl ade, and he had t o l and near C Company pos i t i ons . An e l e -
ment from t h e company secur ed t h e he l i c opt e r f o r a s hor t whi l e
u n t i l t h e r o t o r bl ade was checked and Thompson depar t ed f o r
LZ Dot t i e.
COL Henderson r et ur ned t o t h e oper at i onal a r e a a t ap-
proxi mat el y 1330 hour s. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he overfl ew t h e
ar ea a t l e a s t t wi ce dur i ng t h e af t er noon. LTC (now COL)
Luper, who had flown wi t h COL Henderson dur i ng t h e morning
hour s, t e s t i f i e d t h a t dur i ng t h e morning he had observed ap-
proxi mat el y 15-20 bodi es sout h of My Lai ( 4 ) . SGT (now M r . )
Adcock, COL Henderson' s r adi o oper at or , t e s t i f i e d t h a t
dur i ng t h e i r ove r f l i ght s of My Lai ( 4 ) dur i ng t h e morning
hour s, he had a l s o observed 35-40 bodi es from t h e a i r .
8. 1330 Hours: Summary of Resul t s of C Company Act i ons
I n and Around My Lai ( 4 )
Based excl us i vel y on t h e t est i mony of US per sonnel who
pa r t i c i pa t e d i n o r observed t h e act i ons i n and around My Lai
( 4 ) on 16 March, iti s evi dent t h a t by t h e t i me C Company was
pr epar ed t o depar t t h e ar ea, i t s members had k i l l e d no less
t han 175-200 Vietnamese men, women, and chi l dr en. The com-
pany s uf f e r e d onl y t h e one c a s ua l t y pr evi ousl y di scussed. From
among t h e group of Vietnamese k i l l e d , t h e evi dence i ndi c a t e s
onl y t h r e e o r f our confirmed VC. There were q u i t e pos s i bl y
s e ve r a l unarmed VC (men and women) among t h e group and many
more who were a c t i v e and pas s i ve suppor t er s of and sympat hi zers
wi t h t h e VC f or ces . Three enemy weapons, and a l l e ge dl y s e ve r a l
sets of web gear and grenades w e r e a l s o capt ur ed. There i s no
s ubs t a nt i ve evi dence t o i ndi c a t e t h a t t h e company r ecei ved any
enemy f i r e o r any ot he r form of r e s i s t a nc e dur i ng i t s movement
t hrough t h e ar ea.
The Vietnamese c a s ua l t y f i gur e s c i t e d above a r e based on
t hos e i nc i de nt s i n and around My Lai ( 4 ) ( i ncl udi ng t h e sub-
haml et of Binh Tay) wherei n c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i a b l e k i l l i n g s of
Vietnamese ( i ndi vi dual s and groups) w e r e t e s t i f i e d t o and
cor r obor at ed by US wi t nes s es who were on t h e scene. ' It i s con-
s i de r e d t h a t t h e f i gur e s a r e conser vat i ve as many of t h e Vi et -
namese k i l l e d i n s i d e bunkers and houses were not observed by
t h e wi t nesses. The f i gur e s do not i ncl ude a ddi t i ona l k i l l i n g s
which may have t aken pl ace as C Company passed t hrough t h e
s e ve r a l subhaml et s e a s t of My Lai ( 4 ) en r out e t o t h e i r ni ght
def ensi ve pos i t i on, nor do t he y i ncl ude a ddi t i ona l k i l l i n g s
which di d t a k e pl ace l a t e on t h e af t er noon of 16 March, a f t e r
C Company had reached t h e ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on.
I n a s epar at e s t udy ( s e e e xhi bi t M-124) t h e Cri mi nal
I nves t i gat i on Di vi si on ( CI D) agency es t i mat es t h a t 347 Vi et -
namese r e s i de nt s of My Lai ( 4 ) were k i l l e d on 16 March. Thi s
f i gur e , which i s based on a popul at i on census of My Lai ( 4 )
(i.e. bef or e and a f t e r t h e 16 March oper at i on) does not i ncl ude
Vietnamese who l i v e d i n t h e s e ve r a l subhamlets around My Lai
( 4 ) (such as Binh Tay) nor does iti ncl ude t hos e who may have
come t o My Lai ( 4 ) from surroundi ng subhamlets on t h e morning
of t h e oper at i on.
Addi t i onal k i l l i n g s which appar ent l y occur r ed i n t h e B
Company a r e a a r e not i ncl uded i n t h e 175-200 f i gur e c i t e d above
nor i n t h e C I D agency' s es t i mat e.
9. 1330-1530 Hours: Movement of C Company From My Lai ( 4 )
t o Night Defensi ve Pos i t i on
A t approxi mat el y 1330 hour s, C Company depar t ed My Lai ( 4 )
and moved nor t he a s t toward t h e l i nk-up pos i t i on wi t h B Company.
C Company appar ent l y brought no det ai nees from t h e My Lai ( 4 )
area. En r out e, however, t h e 2d Pl at oon which was moving on
t he nor t her n f l a nk of t h e company passed through t h e subhamlet
of My Lai (5) (Binh Dong) and rounded up approxi mat el y 50-75
vi l l a ge r s . Ei ght t o 10 mi l i t a r y aged males were s epar at ed from
t he group and were t aken wi t h t h e company t o t h e ni ght def ensi ve
pos i t i on. The remainder of t h e v i l l a g e r s were t o l d by CPT
Medina' s i n t e r p r e t e r t o move out of t h e ar ea and head sout hwest
toward Quang Ngai Ci t y.
There was some t est i mony t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t a ddi t i ona l
k i l l i n g and bur ni ng of houses occur r ed as C Company el ement s
. passed t hrough subhaml et s e a s t of My Lai ( 4 ) . The preponderance
of t h e t est i mony, however, does not support t h i s cont ent i on.
10. 1530-1700 Hours: The Night Defensi ve Pos i t i on
Af t e r r eachi ng t h e ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on and l i nki ng
up wi t h B Company, t h e VC s us pect s who had been brought i n t o t h e
ar ea by bot h C Company and B Company were i nt e r r oga t e d by t h e
Vietnamese Nat i onal Pol i ce. The pol i c e had been brought i n t o
t h e ar ea v i a he l i c opt e r by t h e S 2 . The S2 a l s o pa r t i c i pa t e d
i n t h e i nt e r r oga t i on. During t h e cour se of t h e i nt e r r oga t i on,
one of t h e s us pect s was t or t ur e d and maimed. H e was subse-
quent l y s hot and k i l l e d al ongwi t h s e ve r a l (1-7) a ddi t i ona l
suspect s. Both t h e t o r t u r e and t h e k i l l i n g s were wi t nessed by
a s i g n i f i c a n t number of C Company s o l d i e r s and o f f i c e r s .
(Thi smat t er i s a l s o c ur r e nt l y under i nve s t i ga t i on by t h e CI D. )
A t 1555 hour s, CPT Medina n o t i f i e d t h e TF headquar t er s
t h a t approxi mat el y 10-11 women and chi l dr en had been k i l l e d
( e a r l i e r ) by gunshi ps o r a r t i l l e r y , but w e r e not incQudedi n
h i s pr evi ous r e por t of enemy k i l l e d .
B. OPERATIONS ON 17MARCH
C company depar t ed t h e ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on e a r l y on
t h e morning of 17 March and moved toward t h e sout h (see sket ch
6-20) . As t h e l e a d el ement s of t h e company pas sed t o t h e e a s t
of H i l l 85, t h e 1st Pl at oon, which was- on t h e r i g h t (west ern)
f l ank of t h e company, was -ordered t o e s t a b l i s h an obser vat i on
pos t on t h e hi gh ground. CPT Medina t e s t i f i e d t h e obser vat i on
post was s e t up t o de t e c t any e f f o r t s by t h e VC t o f l ank o r
s t r i k e t h e r e a r of t h e company. I n t h e pr ocess of e s t a bl i s hi ng
t h e out pos t , t h e 1st Pl at oon' s poi nt man det onat ed and was
s ever el y wounded by an enemy mine o r boobyt rap. Hec was evacuat ed
by he l i c opt e r a t 1 0 0 0 hours. The pl at oon t hen r ej oi ned t h e
company,
As C Company moved sout h t hrough t h e subhamlets of My Khe
( 3 ) , (1), and ( 2 ) it . burned t h e houses i n t hos e ar eas. CPT
Medina t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e subhamlets w e r e des er t ed and t h a t he
had r ecei ved permi ssi on t o des t r oy t h e houses. As My Khe ( 2)
was bei ng burned, members of t h e 1st Pl at oon det ect ed and ap-
prehended f our s us pect s c ons i s t i ng of t h r e e males, and one f e-
male who was brought t o CPT Pledina' s l oc a t i on wi t h he r bl ouse
o f f .
During i nt e r r oga t i on of t h e s us pect s , CPT Medina t e s t i f i e d
t h a t two of t h e males w e r e i d e n t i f i e d as VC and t h e female as
a VC nur se. He admi t t ed h i t t i n g one of t h e male suspect s
s u f f i c i e n t l y har d t o cause pr of use bl eedi ng from a s ki n l acer a-
t i on. He a l s o t e s t i f i e d t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t a f t e r di s cus s i nq t h i s
i ndi vi dua l wi t h SGT Phu ( hi s Vietnamese i n t e r p r e t e r ) he deci ded
t o make t h e s us pect " t a l k. " CPT Plledina pl aced t h e i ndi vi dua l
a ga i ns t a t r e e and t e s t i f i e d t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t he per s onal l y
i nduced t h e s us pect t o " t a l k" by f i r i n g an M-16 round i n t o t he
t r e e approxi mat el y 8 i nches over t h e man' s head (from a di s t ance
of 10-15 meters). Fa i l i ng a response from t h e i ndi vi dua l , CPT
Medina f i r e d a second round from t h e same di s t a nc e t o a poi nt
4-5 i nches over t h e man' s head. Af t er i ndi c a t i ng t o t h e i ndi v-
i dua l t h a t t h e t h i r d round would h i t " r i ght between t h e eyes, "
CPT Medina t hen moved away t o f i r e a t h i r d round. Medina t est -
i f i e d t h e man t a l ke d bef or e t h e t h i r d round was f i r e d and t h a t
he admi t t ed bei ng a "car d car r yi ng member i n t h e Communist
Par t y f o r 1 3 year s . " CPT Medina' s r e c ol l e c t i on of f i r i n g over
t he man' s head i s e s s e n t i a l l y s ubs t a nt i a t e d by t h e t est i mony
of many ot her C Company wi t nesses. The t est i mony of s e ve r a l
wi t nesses a l s o i ndi c a t e s t h a t t h e female s us pect may have been
mi s t r eat ed dur i ng t h i s same per i od. The suspect s were subse-
quent l y evacuat ed from t h e ar ea by he l i c opt e r . A r eadout of
o f f i c i a l i nt e r r oga t i on r e por t s concerni ng t h e f our suspect s
i ndi c a t e s t h a t two of t h e males and t h e female were subsequent l y
c l a s s i f i e d as c i v i l defendant s. The remai ni ng male was c l a s si -
f i e d a s a VC.
Following i nt e r r oga t i on of t h e VC s us pect s , C Company
t ur ned back t o t h e nor t h toward t h e i r ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on
a r r i vi ng a t t h a t l oc a t i on by l a t e eveni ng.
F I RS T GROUP
OF VI LLAGERS
1st PLATOON'S ROUTE
OF 2 VC KILLED
(WITH WEAPONS)
2d PLATOON'S ROUTE
THROUGH MY LA1 (4)
THROUGH MY LA I (4)
,. ,
SKETCH 6 - 10
,;' ,,'
SKETCH 6 - 11
I.
WHERE THOMPSON
LANDED NEAR DITCH
BY CPT MEDINA AND
COMMAND GROUP
ME T E RS 100
d' SKETCH 6- 13
COMMAND GROUP
.AT MY LA1 (4)
SKETCH 6 -16
Chapter 7
COMPANY B, 4TH BATTALION, 3D INFANTRY:
ACTIONS ON 16- 19 MARCH 1968
A. INTRODUCTION
I n t he cour se of t h e i nve s t i ga t i on of Task Force (TF)
Bar ker ' s oper at i ons i n Son My Vi l l age on 16-19 March 1968,
evi dence was r ecei ved of t he pos s i bl e commission of war
cri mes and vi ol a t i ons of r egul at i ons by members of B Com-
pany, 4t h Ba t t a l i on, 3d "Infant ry ( B/ 4- 3 I n f ) and t h e US
and Vietnamese per sonnel working wi t h t h e company. Although
t he r e a r e no i ndi c a t i ons t h a t any of t he s e a c t i v i t i e s were
e i t h e r r epor t ed t o o r i nve s t i ga t e d by hi gher headquar t er s,
an at t empt has been made by t h i s I nqui r y t o e s t a b l i s h t h e
f a c t s r e l a t i n g t o t he s e i nc i de nt s i n or der t o pr e s e nt t h e
most complete p i c t u r e of t he Son My oper at i on pos s i bl e under
t he ci rcumst ances.
I n t he gr aves t of t he i nc i de nt s , a number of Vietnamese
sources al l eged t h a t on 16 March 1968 approxi mat el y 80-90
noncombatants, i ncl udi ng women and c hi l dr e n, w e r e k i l l e d by
US s o l d i e r s i n My Hoi subhamlet of Co Luy Hamlet, a c o a s t a l
ar ea of Son My Vi l l age shown on US maps a s "My Khe ( 4 ) ."
Thi s a l l e ga t i on was i ncl uded i n a number of contemporary
r e por t s submi t t ed t hrough Government of Vietnam (GVN) channel s
i n March and Apr i l 1968, copi es of which were obt ai ned by t h e
I nqui r y from GVN sour ces. A Census Gri evance cadreman sub-
mi t t ed a r e por t , dat ed 18 March 1968, which i ncl uded t he
st at ement t h a t " a t Co Luy Hamlet 80 peopl e, young and ol d,
were k i l l e d " by US f or ces . On 22 March 1968, t he Vi l l age
Chief of Son My wrot e a r e por t t o t h e Son Ti nh D i s t r i c t Chief
concerni ng t he oper at i ons i n h i s v i l l a g e on 16 March which
s t a t e d t h a t 90 c i v i l i a n s had been k i l l e d i n Co Luy Hamlet on
t h a t day. The D i s t r i c t Chief passed t h i s a l l e ga t i on on t o
t he Quang Ngai Provi nce Chief i n a l et t er dat ed Apr i l 11,
1968. -
More r e c e nt st at ement s by a Vietnamese woman, who cl ai ms
t o have been pr es ent a t My Khe ( 4 ) on 16 March 1968, and by
t he Chief of Co Luy Hamlet (who has not been i n t h e a r e a s i nc e
bef or e t h e i n c i d e n t ) , a l s o a l l e ge t h a t approxi mat el y 90 peopl e
we r e k i l l e d t he r e on 16 March 1968. Fi na l l y, a Nat i onal Li ber-
a t i o n Fr ont Committee not i c e , dat ed 28 March 1968, charged
t h a t 92 c i v i l i a n s were k i l l e d i n Co Luy Hamlet on 16 March
1968.
Consi derabl e evi dence has been developed t endi ng t o show
t h a t el ement s of B Company's 1st Pl at oon di d i n f a c t k i l l a
number of Vietnamese women and c hi l dr e n a t My Khe ( 4 ) e a r l y
on 16 March, but it has not been pos s i bl e t o e s t a b l i s h e i t h e r
t h e f u l l ci rcumst ances o r t h e number of vi ct i ms of t h i s
i nc i de nt ,
Only 22 men of B Company's 1st Pl at oon appear t o have
wi t nessed o r pa r t i c i pa t e d i n t h e My'Khe ( 4 ) i nc i de nt . Of t hes e
men, two w e r e l a t e r k i l l e d i n a c t i on, e i g h t have r ef used t o
ansQer ques t i ons about t h e i nc i de nt , and s e ve r a l ot he r s who
t e s t i f i e d claimed t o have l i t t l e o r no r e c ol l e c t i on of t h e i r
a c t i ons and obser vat i ons on 16 March 1968. I n a ddi t i on, t he
' e n t i r e c oa s t a l a r e a i n which My Khe ( 4 ) i s l ocat ed has been
v i r t u a l l y l evel ed i n t h e per i od s i nc e t he i nc i de nt t ook pl ace.
The dwel l i ngs, t r a i l s , and much of t h e f ol i a ge e x i s t i n g i n t he
a r e a i n 1968 have been o b l i t e r a t e d , and t h e s ur vi vi ng popul ace
has moved out of t h e ar ea. These and ot he r f a c t or s have pre-
cl uded a r econs t r uct i on of what occur r ed a t My Khe ( 4) on t h e
morning of 16 March i n t he same d e t a i l gi ven i n t he pr ecedi ng
chapt er t o t he event s i n My Lai
I n a ddi t i on t o event s of My Khe ( 4 ) on 16 March, t he r e i s
evi dence t h a t det ai nees hel d by t h e company on 19 March w e r e
beat en and t or t ur e d by bot h US and Army Republ i c of Vietnam
' (ARVN) per sonnel . On 17 March, t h e company dest r oyed t h r e e
subhaml et s by burni ng. Ther eaf t er , t he company's modus operandi
changed, and on 18 March it assembled hundreds of Vietnamese
f o r a TF-supported Medical Ci vi c Act i on Program (MEDCAP) .
The purpose of t h i s chapt er i s t o pr e s e nt such f a c t s and
evi dence a s have been developed bear i ng upon B/4-3 I nf
pa r t i c i pa t i on i n t he Son My Vi l l age oper at i on. While t h i s i s
an expansi on of i nf or mat i on r e l a t i n g t o B Company pr esent ed i n
Chapter 5, t h e f u l l s t o r y must awai t t he compl et i on of ongoing -
cr i mi nal i nve s t i ga t i ons and any r e s u l t i n g pr osecut i ons.
B. OPERATIONS 16 MARCH
1. 0800-0830 Hours: The Combat Assaul t
The men of B Company w e r e assembled a t t h e l oadi ng
ar ea a t Landing Zone (LZ) Upt i ght p r i o r t o 0800' hours f o r a
planned combat a s s a u l t a t about 0900 hour s. I ssuance of
ammunition and f i n a l checks of weapons and equipment w e r e
completed, and CPT Michles reminded h i s men t o be al ert f o r
t he mines and boobyt raps t hey coul d expect t o encount er i n
t he Son My a r e a .
Af t er compl et i ng t he combat a s s a u l t of C Company i n t o
My Lai ( 4 ) a t 0751 hour s, t h e l i f t he l i c opt e r s proceeded
immediately t o LZ Upt i ght (see e xhi bi t P-203) t o pi ck up t he
f i r s t lift of B Company t r oops. LTC Barker had changed t he .
oper at i on pl an by advancing by one hour t he schedul ed pi ckup
time f o r B Company.
The a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on of B Company's LZ sout h
of My Lai (1) commenced a t 0808 hour s, about t he t i me t he
f i r s t l i f t was depar t i ng LZ Upt i ght . Avoiding t h e gun/ t ar get
l i n e from LZ Upt i ght t o t h e obj e c t i ve LZ t he he l i c opt e r s fl ew
s out heas t over t h e South China Sea t o a poi nt near t h e mouth
of t he Song Tra Khuc ( s e e e x h i b i t P-205) bef or e t ur ni ng i nl and
and t hen nor t h toward t he LZ l ocat ed j u s t sout h of Route 521
near t h e sout hwest cor ner of MY Lai (1) ( s e e sket ch 7-1).
As t he he l i c opt e r s approached t he LZ, t h e a r t i l l e r y prepara-
t i on di d not t er mi nat e a s pl anned, wi t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t t he
he l i c opt e r s we r e f or ced t o make a 360 degree go-around i n
or der t o del ay t h e i r a r r i v a l a t t h e LZ. When t h e a r t i l l e r y
ceased f i r i n g , LTC Barker marked t h e LZ- wi t h v i o l e t smoke
and t h e f i r s t l i f t touched down a t 0815 hours ( s ee e x h i b i t
P-207). No r e s i s t a nc e wa s encount ered a s the t r oops secur ed
t he LZ and it remained "col d" a s t he second l i f t t ouched down
a t 0827 hour s.
2. 0830-0845 Hours: Deployment from t h e Landing Zone
Some members of B Company bel i eved t h a t s ni pe r f i r e
was r ecei ved from t h e w e s t a s t h e company moved out from t h e
LZ, but it i s pos s i bl e t h a t t he s e i ndi vi dual s mistook f o r
h o s t i l e f i r e some occasi onal rounds l andi ng i n t h e a r e a which
had been f i r e d by C Company a s it advanced i n t h e i r di r e c t i on
some 2,000 met ers t o t he w e s t . No s e r i ous r e s i s t a nc e was
encount ered a s t he company deployed from t h e LZ.
The 2d Pl at oon, l e d by 1LT Roy B. Cochran, had t h e
mi ssi on of sear chi ng t h e subhaml et pr oper of My Lai ( I ) , and
it moved d i r e c t l y nor t h acr oss Route 521 toward i t s obj e c t i ve
( see sket ch 7-2). To t he west , t h e 3d Pl at oon t oge t he r wi t h
t he Weapons Pl at oon and company command group a l s o moved
nor t h t o Route 521 where t hey ha l t e d t empor ar i l y t o s ecur e
t he ar ea along and j us t t o t he nor t h of t ha t t r a i l ( s ee sket ch
7-2).
The 1st Pl at oon, under 1LT (now CPT) Thomas K.
Willingham, had preceded t he 2d Pl at oon nort h t o Route 521
and t hen moved e a s t al ong t h a t road toward t he cement br i dge
over t he Song My Khe ( al s o cal l ed Song Kinh Giang) which had
t o be crossed t o reach i t s obj ect i ve, My Khe ( 4 ) ( see sket ch
7-2). The 1st Pl at oon' s mission was t o search t he ar ea
around My Khe ( 4 ) and t o block any enemy at t empt t o escape
t o t he e a s t from t he My Lai (1)ar ea. For t he remainder of
16 March and u n t i l t he fol l owi ng morning, t he 1st Pl at oon
wa s t o be separat ed physi cal l y from CPT Michles and t he r e s t
of B Company, although t hey were i n continuous cont act by
r adi o. '
3. 0845-0945 Hours: The Attempt t o Ent er My Lai (1)
Within 15 minutes of touchdown of t he second l i f t ,
B Company experienced i t s f i r s t cas ual t i es . Af t er l eadi ng
t he 2d Pl at oon across Route 521, LT Cochran was k i l l e d by a
land mine whi l e at t empt i ng t o cr oss a hedgerow a t t he peri met er
of My Lai (1) ( see sket ch 7-3) . Four members of hi s pl at oon
were wounded by t he same expl osi on. A dus t of f wa s request ed,
and a l l of t he company except t he 1st Pl at oon hel d i n pl ace
u n t i l t he medical evacuat i on of dead and wounded was completed
about 09 15 hours.
A t t h a t time a second at t empt t o ent er My Lai (1)
began wi t h t he pl at oon ser geant commanding t he 2d Pl at oon.
When t he pl at oon had moved approximately 150 meters nor t h al ong
t he peri met er of My Lai (l ),a second mine was det onat ed a t 0930
hours wounding t hr ee more men of t he 2d Pl at oon. "
The TF commander, LTC Barker, was ai r bor ne over t he
ar ea when B Company report ed encount eri ng t he second mine,
and he not i f i ed CPT Michles and t he TF t act i ca1, oper at i ons
cent er (TOC) t ha t he would pi ck up t he. addi t i onal cas ual t i es
i n h i s command and cont r ol hel i copt er . Landing i n a f i e l d
j us t west of My Lai (1) about 0940 hours, LTC Barker took
t he t hr ee wounded men aboard and immediately depart ed f or
LZ Dot t i e where he was dropped of f before t he command and
cont r ol hel i copt er took t he wounded t o medical f a c i l i t i e s
a t Chu Lai .
.. .
Although he di d not meet wi t h CPT Michles whi l e h i s
hel i copt er was on t he ground, LTC Barker a t t h i s time appar-
ent l y resci nded t he or der f or t he planned search of My Lai
(1) as a r e s u l t of t he heavy cas ual t i es al r eady suf f er ed by
t he 2d Pl at oon i n i t s e f f o r t s t o ent er t he hamlet. The
remaining men of t he 2d Platoon were ordered by CPT Michles
t o withdraw from t he approaches t o My Lai- (1) by r et r aci ng
t he i r st eps. B Company made no f ur t hef at t empt s t o ent er My
~ a i (1) duri ng t he operat i on
4. 0845-0930 Hour-: 1stPlatoon Movement t o My Khe ( 4 )
The 1stPl at oon, -commandedby LT Willingha?, was
provi si o. nal l y organized i nt o two r i f l e squads and a poi nt team
with a machinegun team at t ached t g each r i f l e squad. The
poi nt team was composed of f our s ol di er s who had vol unt eered
t o a c t as t he pl at oon' s permanent poi nt element and who were
widely respect ed i n t h e pl at oon f or t h e i r courage and t h e i r
a bi l i t y t o l ocat e mines and boobytraps. They a l s o handled
demolitions f or t he pl at oon and had a PRC-25 r adi o f or
communication wi t h t he pl at oon l eader . The poi nt team l ed
t he order of march from t he LZ t o Route 521 followed i n
order by t he 1stSquad, t he pl at oon l eader wi t h h i s r adi o/
telephone oper at or (RTO) and mortar forward observer ( FO) ,
2d Squad, and t he medic and pl at oon ser geant .
The movement from t he LZ t o t he cement br i dge
l eadi ng t o My Khe ( 4 ) was completed wi t hout s i gni f i c a nt ,
r esi st ance o r cas ual t i es . While on t he t r a i l sout h of My
Lai (l),a member of t he poi nt team report ed seei ng a dud
grenade hur l ed i n t he vi c i ni t y of t he poi nt team ( s eesket ch
7-3). The pl at oon took evasi ve act i on by f a l l i n g t o t he
ground and f i r i n g i n t he di r ect i on from which t he grenade
was bel i eved t o have been thrown. Af t er an unsuccessful
search f or t he.grenade, movement toward t he br i dge continued
a t a slow pace.
A t o r s hor t l y a f t e r 0900 hours, t he poi nt team
reached t he west ern approach t o t he br i dge and LT Willingham
t r ansmi t t ed a r equest t o CPT Michles f or gunships t o support
hi s pl at oon' s crossi ng. The gunships were rearming and not
immediately avai l abl e, s o LTC Barker advised t he company t o
use i t smortar i n pl ace of gunship f i r e t o support t he br i dge
-.
crossi ng. ~1
The FO at t ached from t he Weapons Platoon came forward
t o adj us t 81mm mortar f i r e i nt o t he ar ea acr oss t he Song My Khe
near t he eas t er n approaches t o t he bri dge. Four o r f i ve rounds
were f i r e d and t he mission t ermi nat ed because a maj or i t y of t he
rounds were duds. Personnel on a Navy "Swi ft Boat" of f t he
coast observed two of t hese rounds impacting "on t he beach,"
which wa s e a s t of t he t a r ge t ar ea. CPT Michles t hen i ns t r uct ed
LT Willingham t o c l e a r t h e a r e a acr oss t h e br i dge wi t h a
machinegun.
The pl at oon deployed al ong t h e r i v e r i n or der t h a t
t h e maj or i t y of i t s members coul d cover t h e f a r bank of t h e r i ve r .
One machinegun was s e t up near t h e t r a i l l eadi ng ont o t h e br i dge,
and t h e a r e a around t h e f a r end of t h e br i dge was t aken under
f i r e . The poi nt team began cr os s i ng t h e br i dge a t approxi mat el y
0915 hours. .
Members of t h e 1stPl at oon heard t h e expl osi ons of
t h e mines encount ered by t h e 2d Pl at oon and word of t h e cas ual t y
r e por t s wa s a l s o passed al ong. LT Cochran had formerl y l e d
t h e 1stPl at oon and t he news of h i s deat h s t r ongl y a f f e c t e d
some of t h e men.
There i s some c onf l i c t i ng t est i mony a s t o whet her
t he pl at oon r ecei ved s ni pe r f i r e e i t h e r bef or e o r i n
t h e pr ocess of cr os s i ng t h e br i dge. The pl at oon l e a de r s t a t e d
t h a t h i s pl at oon r ecei ved heavy s ni pe r f i r e and was dr i ven
back i n i t s i n i t i a l at t empt t o c r os s t h e br i dge. The pl at oon
ser geant and s e ve r a l ot he r s t e s t i f i e d t h a t a few rounds of
s ni pe r f i r e w e r e r ecei ved e i t h e r bef or e o r dur i ng t h e cr os s i ng.
The r i f l e squad l eader s and ot he r s pr e s e nt a t t h e scene r e c a l l e d
no s ni pe r f i r e , and t he r e i s no r ecor d of any r e por t bei ng made
of t h i s al l eged enemy cont act . The procedures used i n cr os s i ng
t h e br i dge, i ncl udi ng t h e pr epar at or y f i r e s , appear t a c t i c a l l y
sound whether t h e pl at oon r ecei ved f i r e o r not . Members of t h e
pl at oon were wary of t h e ar ea; t hey would be exposed t o enemy
f i r e wi t hout a va i l a bl e cover w h i h on t h e br i dge; and t h e news
of t h e c a s ua l t i e s s uf f e r e d by t h e 2d Pl at oon added emphasis t o
t h e i r caut i on.
5. 0945 - 1500 Hours: B Company ( - ) Movement t o Ni ght
Defensive Pos i t i on wi t h C Company
I t appears t h a t t he heavy c a s ua l t i e s s uf f e r e d by t h e
2d Pl at oon bef or e ithad even reached i t s obj e c t i ve a r e a had
a demoral i zi ng e f f e c t not onl y upon t h e remainder of t h e 2d
Pl at oon but a l s o upon t he members of t h e 3d Pl at oon, Weapons
Pl at oon, and command group, who were c l os e t o t h e scene and
observed bot h t h e expl osi ons and t he r e s u l t i n g c a s ua l t i e s .
Whether f o r morale r easons o r because t he el i mi nat i on of t he
mi ssi on t o s ear ch My Lai (1) l e f t them wi t h no t a c t i c a l obj ec-
t i v e s , t hes e el ement s of B Company had no f ur t he r a c t i v i t y of
any s i gni f i c a nc e bef or e l i nki ng up wi t h C Company i n t h e
af t er noon.
B Company ( - ) di d move s e ve r a l hundred met ers t o t he
nor t heas t l a t e i n t he morning where t h e 3d Pl at oon sear ched t he
smal l haml et shown on US maps a s My Lai ( 6) (see s ket ch 7-3).
The i nha bi t a nt s were c ol l e c t e d and scr eened, and s e ve r a l were
det ai ned, but i n c ont r a s t t o t h e a c t i ons of ot he r u n i t s earlier
t ha t day, i ncl udi ng t hos e of i t s own 1st Pl at oon 1,000 m e t e r s
t o t h e e a s t , B Company ( - ) ne i t he r harmed t h e i nha bi t a nt s nor
burned t h e dwel l i ngs i n My Lai ( 6 ) . Lat er i n t h i s chapt er it
w i l l be not ed t h a t CPT Michles had i s s ued an or der t o t he 1st
pl at oon t o i ns ur e t h a t women and c hi l dr e n w e r e not k i l l e d . It
i s pos s i bl e t h a t event s prompting t h i s or der a l s o i nf l uenced
t he conduct of t h e sear ch of My Lai ( 6) ,
Between 1100 and 1200 hour s, t he r e p c r t e r and photo-
grapher cover i ng t h e oper at i on f o r t h e Bri gade Publ i c Informa-
t i on Detachment a r r i ve d by- he l i c opt e r from t h e C Company ar ea.
They st ayed wi t h B Company ( - ) u n t i l mi daft ernoon, t a ki ng a
number of phot ographs which t end t o confi rm t h e complete
c ont r a s t between t h e a c t i v i t i e s of B Company a t t h i s t i m e and
t he a c t i ons recorded e a r l i e r i n t h e day by t h e same phot ographer
i n My Lai ( 4 ) (see e xhi bi t s P-18 and 19) .
Ar r i vi ng wi t h t he r e por t e r and phot ographer were 1LT
(now CPT) Dennis H. Johnson, from t h e Br i gade' s at t ached M i l i -
t a r y I nt e l l i ge nc e Detachment, and h i s ARVN i n t e r p r e t e r . They
i nt er r ogat ed some of t h e det ai ned i nha bi t a nt s bef or e r e t ur ni ng
t o LZ Dot t i e a t approxi mat el y 1700 hour s. They w e r e j oi ned a t
1500 hours by t h e TF S2 who a r r i ve d wi t h f i v e ARVN s o l d i e r s and
t hr ee Nat i onal Policemen. The ARVN s o l d i e r s and Nat i onal Pol i ce-
men had been brought t o t h e f i e l d t o i d e n t i f y t h e VC from among
t he det ai ned i nha bi t a nt s
Af t e r remai ni ng f o r s e ve r a l hours i n t h e a r e a of My
Lai ( 6 ) , B Company (less t he 1st Pl at oon) l i nked up a t about
1500 hours wi t h C Company which moved i n from t h e sout hwest
a f t e r compl et i ng i t s sweep t hrough My Lai ( 4 ) and My Lai ( 5) .
The two u n i t s e s t a bl i s he d a j o i n t ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on.
The event s which t ook pl ace i n t h e ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on
a f t e r t he l i nk-up of t h e two companies have been t r e a t e d i n
Chapter 6.
6. 0930-1500 Hours: The 1st Pl at oon i n My Khe ( 4 )
The 1st Pl at oon cr ossed t h e br i dge over t h e Song My
Khe i n s i n g l e f i l e and wi del y spaced t o l i m i t t h e number of men
exposed on t h e br i dge a t one t i m e . A l l of t h e men w e r e acr oss
t he br i dge and t he pl at oon was moving out t o sear ch t h e My Khe
( 4 ) a r e a by about 0930 hours. Two men ( l a t e r j oi ned by a t h i r d )
were or der ed t o remain a t t h e br i dge t o s ecur e t he pl at oon' s
r e a r and t o pr event enemy movement acr oss t h e Song My he. ' :'
There i s some doubt a s t o t h e exact l oc a t i on of t h e
t r a i l s l eadi ng from t h e br i dge and a s t o t h e number and l oca-
t i o n of t h e dwel l i ngs and ot he r s t r uc t ur e s i n My Khe ( 4 ) .
As pr evi ousl y not ed, l i t t l e t r a c e remains of t h e t e r r a i n
f e a t ur e s e x i s t i n g i n March 1968. On t he ba s i s of a va i l a bl e
evi dence, i ncl udi ng contemporary maps, it appears t h a t a
t r a i l l e d eas t - nor t heas t from t h e br i dge f o r about 200 m e t e r s
bef or e t ur ni ng due sout h p a r a l l e l t o and about 100 met ers
i nl and from t h e c oa s t l i n e (see sket ch 7- 4) . Between t h e
nort h-sout h por t i on of t h i s t r a i l and t h e South China Sea
i s a not i ceabl e r i dge o r rise which pr event s obser vat i on of
t h e beach and t h e s e a from t h e t r a i l and vi c e ver s a. The
15 t o 20 dwel l i ngs i n My Khe ( 4 ) a t t h a t t i m e w e r e l ocat ed
on bot h s i de s of t he t r a i l and ext ended al ong i t f o r about
2n0 m e t e r s , begi nni ng about 100 met ers s out h of t h e poi nt
aher e t he t r a i l cur ves t o t h e sout h.
The poi nt t e a m w i t h i t s RTO l e d t h e pl at oon movement
al ong t he t r a i l l eadi ng from t h e br i dge, fol l owed i n or der by
t h e 1st Squad ( wi t h at t ached machinegun team) , t h e pl at oon
command group, and t h e 2d Squad. The pl at oon moved i n s i n g l e
f i l e , s t a yi ng on t h e t r a i l t o avoi d boobyt raps. A t about 0935
hours, t he poi nt team and 1st Squad had approached t o wi t hi n
about 75 met ers of My Khe ( 4 ) a t which t i m e t hey opened f i r e
on t he hamlet ( s e e sket ch 7-4) .'
It has not been e s t a bl i s he d whet her t h e l ead el ement s
of t he pl at oon opened f i r e i n accordance wi t h a pr evi ous pl an,
upon or der s from t he pl at oon l e a de r , i n response t o s ni pe r f i r e ,
o r spont aneousl y. There i s evi dence t o suppor t each of t hes e
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I n any case, an i nt e ns e volume of f i r e from
M-16 r i f l e s and t h e M-60 machinegun at t ached t o t h e 1st Squad
wa s di r e c t e d i n t o and around t h e haml et f o r 4 o r 5 mi nut es.
During t h i s per i od, a r a di o oper at or aboard a Navy "Swi ft Boat "
j u s t of f s hor e r epor t ed t h a t " t he r e i s a l o t of s mal l arms f i r e
coming from t h a t d i r e c t i o n on t h e beach. " I nha bi t a nt s of t h e
haml et , most l y women and chi l dr en, w e r e c ut down a s t hey r a n
f o r s h e l t e r o r at t empt ed t o f l e e over t h e r i dge of hi gher
ground toward t h e beach. A t about 0940 hours, LT Willingham
gave t h e or der t o cease f i r e , and t h e poi nt team, t oget her
wi t h a machinegun team, t hen moved sout h al ong t h e t r a i l
i n t o t he haml et .
A t 0955 hour s, CPT Michles r epor t ed t o TF Barker t h a t
t h e 1st Pl at oon had k i l l e d 12 VC wi t h web equipment i n My Khe
( 4 ) . There i s no r e l i a b l e evi dence t o suppor t t h e cla5m t h a t
t h e persons k i l l e d were i n f a c t VC.
LT Willingham' s or der t o cease f i r e p r i o r t o moving
i n t o t he v i l l a g e may have r e s ul t e d from i ns t r uc t i ons r ecei ved
from CPT Mi chl es. A t about t h i s t i m e , CPT Michles di r e c t e d
LT Willingham t o i ns ur e t h a t women and c hi l dr e n were not
ki l l e d. Thi s or der may have or i gi na t e d wi t h TF Barker, which
was i s s ui ng s i mi l a r i ns t r uc t i ons t o C Company about t h i s t i m e .
on t he ot he r hand, s e ve r a l RTO' s wi t h B Company bel i eve t h a t
t hese i ns t r uc t i ons were gi ven by CPT Michles e i t h e r upon hear-
i ng t he heavy volume of f i r e i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e 1st Pl a-
toon, o r i n response t o LT Willingham' s r e por t of k i l l i n g 1 2
vC. A number of wi t nesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t CPT Michles cont i nu-
a l l y s t r e s s e d t o h i s company t h e i mport ance of saf eguar di ng non-
combatants and avoi di ng i ndi s cr i mi nat e f i r i n g , and t h e RTO
with t he 1st Pl at oon t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h i s or der ' was r ecei ved
before t h e pl at oon had even cr ossed t h e br i dge i n t o t h e My Khe
( 4 ) ar ea.
The 1st Pl at oon s t ayed i n t h e gener al a r e a of My Khe
( 4 ) u n t i l about 1500 hours. Af t e r t h e i n i t i a l f i r i n g i n t o t he
hamlet, t h e poi nt team and t h e 1st Squad moved down t h e t r a i l
sear chi ng and t hen bur ni ng t h e houses and des t r oyi ng t he bun-
ker s o r s h e l t e r s which each fami l y had const r uct ed i n o r near
t h e i r home. The 2d Squad remained t o t h e nor t h of t h e haml et .
The el ement s of t h e pl at oon s ear chi ng t h e haml et k i l l e d an
undetermined number of noncombatants i n t h e pr ocess
The de s t r uc t i on of bunkers was accomplished by t h e
,
poi nt team usi ng one o r two pound TNT charges, which would
a t l e a s t c ol l a ps e t h e ent r ances t o most s h e l t e r s i f t hey di d
not dest r oy them e n t i r e l y . Some wi t nesses a l l e ge d t h a t t h e
members of t he poi nt team made no at t empt t o det ermi ne i f
s he l t e r s were occupi ed bef or e t hrowi ng expl osi ves i n t o t h e
ent r ances, and t h a t i n some cases unarmed Vietnamese w e r e s hot
down a s t hey e xi t e d from t h e i r s h e l t e r s .
I t i s bel i eved t h a t onl y 10 men d i r e c t l y pa r t i c i pa t e d
i n t he s ear ch and de s t r uc t i on of My Khe ( 4 ) , and of t he s e two
ar e dead and a l l t h e ot he r s have e i t h e r r ef used t o t e s t i f y
about t h e event o r di scl ai med any r e c ol l e c t i on of t h e i r obser-
vat i ons. For t h i s r eason, it has not been pos s i bl e t o est ab-
l i s h t h e f a c t s wi t h any degree of c e r t a i nt y. However, bot h
t est i mony and c i r c ums t a nt i a l evi dence s t r ongl y suggest t h a t a
l ar ge number of noncombatants w e r e k i l l e d dur i ng t h e sear ch
of t he haml et .
I n response t o a r eques t by LT Willingham, a r esuppl y
he l i c opt e r de l i ve r e d a cas e of TNT and a ddi t i ona l ammunition
t o t he pl at oon some t i m e bef or e 1200 hour s. A t 1025 hour s,
LT Willingham r epor t ed t o CPT Michles t h a t t he pl at oon had
k i l l e d 18 more VC, and a t 1420 hours he r epor t ed k i l l i n g an
a ddi t i ona l 8 VC, making a t o t a l of 38 f o r t h e day.
No c a s ua l t i e s were s uf f e r e d by t h e pl at oon; it made
no r eques t s f o r f i r e suppor t a f t e r cr os s i ng t h e br i dge; and i t
capt ur ed no weapons. LT Willingham' s RTO t e s t i f i e d t h a t he
accompanied LT Willingham i n a walk down t h e t r a i l l eadi ng
t hrough t he haml et l a t e r i n t h e morning, and he ( t h e RTO) ob-
ser ved t he bodi es of about 20 dead Vietnamese -- a l l women
and chi l dr en .
A Vietnamese woman, Nguyen Thi Bay, cl ai ms t o have
been pr e s e nt i n t h e a r e a of My Khe ( 4 ) on 16 March 1968.
Although she i s c l a s s i f i e d a s a c i v i l defendant by RVN aut h-
o r i t i e s , Mrs. Bay' s account of he r exper i ences on 16-17 March
wa s cor r obor at ed i n some r e s pe c t s by members of t h e 1st Pl at oon.
According t o M r s . Bay, about 20 US s o l d i e r s came i n t o My
Khe ( 4 ) between 0900-1000 hours on 16 March. There w e r e no
VC t r oops i n t h e haml et and t he US s o l d i e r s were not f i r e d upon,
but 90 peopl e pr e s e nt i n t h e haml et w e r e k i l l e d , many bei ng
s hot a s t hey emerged from t h e i r s h e l t e r s . She was hi di ng i n a
bunker o r s h e l t e r wi t h two ot he r women and t h r e e chi l dr en. They
we r e not s hot when t hey came out , but M r s . Bay cl ai ms t h a t s he
was raped by two s o l d i e r s , one of whom a l s o s t r uc k he r and t h e
ot he r woman wi t h t h e b u t t of h i s r i f l e . About noontime, she
was t aken i n t o a hoot ch where s he was shown two s pe nt c a r t r i dge s
t i e d wi t h a r ubber band (perhaps an expended booby t r a p ) and was
accused of bei ng a VC, which she deni ed. Lat er , s he was t aken
away from t he haml et and made t o spend t h e ni ght i n a t l e l d wi t h
t h e s ol di e r s . The next morning she was t o l d by t h e s o l d i e r s t o
t a ke them back t o My Khe ( 4 ) . Af t e r doi ng so, s he encount ered
ARVN s o l d i e r s who had come acr oss t h e br i dge.
Testimony from numerous members of t h e 1st Pl at oon
c l os e l y p a r a l l e l s c e r t a i n as pect s of M r s . Bay' s s t or y. A booby-
t r a p c ons i s t i ng of a c a r t r i dge r i gged wi t h a f i r i n g mechanism
was di scover ed dur i ng t h e s ear ch of My Khe ( 4 ) . A woman cap-
t ur e d by t h e poi nt team wa s used t o l ead t h e pl at oon t o
i t s ni ght ambush pos i t i on a m i l e nor t h of My Khe ( 4 ) . The woman
s t ayed i n t he open wi t h t h e pl at oon over ni ght and t h e f ol l owi ng
morning l e d them back down t h e t r a i l t o t h e br i dge, a t which
t i m e t he ot he r el ement s of B Company, accompanied by t h e ARVN
s ol di e r s , j oi ned t h e 1st Pl at oon. The woman was t hen t ur ned
over t o t h e at t ached ARVN s o l d i e r s . -
he above f a c t s concerni ng t h e woman used a s a poi nt by
t h e 1st Pl at oon ( r e c a l l e d by many wi t nesses) t end t o cor r obor at e
Mr s . Bay' s story and l end credence t o h e r account of t h e k i l l i n g
of 90 noncombatants a t My Khe ( 4 ) e a r l y on 16 March.
The Chief of Co Luy Hamlet (of which My Hoi o r "My
Khe ( 4 ) ,"i s a subhaml et ) has s t a t e d t h a t 87 peopl e w e r e k i l l e d
i n t he a r e a of My Khe ( 4 ) on 16 March 1968. Although he was
not pr es ent a t t h e t i me and has not r et ur ned t o t h e a r e a s i nc e
t he event , he provi ded t he f ol l owi ng breakdown of vi ct i ms: 15
VC s o l d i e r s ; 20 VC cadr e; 25 VC g u e r r i l l a and suppl y per sonnel ; 13
VC female cadr e; and 1 4 c i v i l i a n s . I t shoul d be not ed , t ha t t h e
hamlet c h i e f ' s anal ys i s of t he c a s ua l t i e s i s based pr i mar i l y on
Communist a f f i l i a t i o n r a t h e r t han s ex o r age. For example, t h e
cat egory of "VC female cadr e" i ncl uded mothers of VC s ol di e r s .
7. 1500-1800 Hours: Displacement t o Ni ght Defensive
Pos i t i on
Sometime a f t e r 1500 hours t he pl at oon moved nor t h
approxi mat el y 2,000 meters from My Khe ( 4 ) and e s t a bl i s he d i t s
ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on. A Vietnamese f emal e, t i ed wi t h a r ope,
probabl y M r s . Bay, walked i n f r o n t of t h e pl at oon a s poi nt
( s ee sket ch 7-5). It was assumed she would know i f t he t r a i l s
were mined and, i f s o, l ead t h e pl at oon s a f e l y around t hem. .
Af t e r t h e pl at oon a r r i ve d a t i t s ni ght def ensi ve
pos i t i on on 16 March, Navy "Swi ft Boat s" caused s i x sampans t o
beach near t he 1stPl at oon' s pos i t i on. These boat s w e r e manned
by men and young boys. There were approxi mat el y 20 persons
on board and t hey were det ai ned u n t i l an i nt e r r oga t i on team
ar r i ved. Af t er i nt e r r oga t i on, approxi mat el y f i v e of t h e de-
t ai nees were evacuat ed t o Duc Pho f o r f u r t h e r scr eeni ng. The
ot her s w e r e r el eas ed. There were no s i g n i f i c a n t a c t i v i t i e s
r epor t ed dur i ng t h e hours of darkness.
C. OPERATIONS 17 MARCH
1. 0730-0930 Hours: Company Links Up
By 0730 hours, . B Company had begun moving f o r l i nk-up
with t he 1stPl at oon j u s t nor t h of My Khe ( 4 ) (see sket ch 7-6) .
The or der of march from t he company ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on
west of My Lai (1)was t h e 3d Pl at oon, company command group,
Weapons Pl at oon, and 2d Pl at oon. An ARVN i n t e r p r e t e r and
s ever al ARVN s o l d i e r s , who had been brought t o t h e f i e l d by t h e
TF S2, w e r e at t ached t o and moving wi t h B Company. They moved
sout h t o Route 521 and fol l owed itt o t h e e a s t . Concurrent l y,
t he 1stPl at oon was moving sout h al ong t h e coas t . The female
apprehended i n My Khe ( 4 ) was s t i l l i n t h e i r cust ody and con-
t i nued t o walk i n f r o n t of t he 1stPl at oon a s p o i n t . #
During t he cour se of cr os s i ng t he Song My Khe, one
man from t he 1stPl at oon was wounded a t 0810 hours from a
boobyt rap det onat ed near t h e e a s t e r n end of t h e br i dge. Af t e r
h i s evacuat i on and a thorough check of t he br i dge f o r mines,
t h e 3d Pl at oon began cr os s i ng a t approxi mat el y 0835 hour s. A t
t h i s t i m e t h e company r ecei ved s ni pe r f i r e from t h e v i c i n i t y
of My Khe ( 4 ) . Thi s f i r e was suppressed by company el ement s
suppor t ed by two he l i c opt e r gunshi ps t h a t made s t r a f i n g passes
from nor t h t o sout h over t h e v i l l a g e . The s ni pe r f i r e caused
no US c a s u a l t i e s and no enemy c a s ua l t i e s were r epor t ed from
t h e ground and gunshi p f i r e s .
2. 0900-1800 Hours: Company Searches Co Luy Hamlet
Af t er cr os s i ng t h e Song My Khe, CPT Michles
assi gned mi ssi ons t o each pl at oon ( s e e sket ch 7-7). The 2d Pl a-
t oon moved sout h near t h e s eacoas t whi l e t h e 1st Pl at oon
fol l owed t he i nl and t r a i l t hrough Co Lay ( I ) , Co Lay ( 2 ) , and
Co Lay ( 3 ) .
The 3d Pl at oon secur ed t h e br i dge acr oss t h e Song My
Khe and s e n t one squad nor t h approxi mat el y 1,000 meters t o
e s t a b l i s h a bl ocki ng pos i t i on acr oss t he peni nsul a (see sket ch
7-7). The Weapons Pl at oon pos i t i oned t he 81mm mor t ar a t t he
br i dge i n t h e 3d Pl at ooh a r e a i n or der t o cover t h e movements
of t h e company.
While t h e company was between My Khe ( 4) and Co Lay (1),
1LT (now Mr . ) John E. Mundy, t he company execut i ve o f f i c e r ,
a r r i ve d by he l i c opt e r . H e was accompanied by 2LT Michael L.
Lewis, a newly assi gned o f f i c e r . LT Lewis was assi gned t o t h e
2d Pl at oon and j oi ned h i s pl at oon on t h e beach nor t h of Co Lay
(1)where t hey ha l t e d f o r l unch. When t he company commenced
moving a f t e r l unch, hoot ches i n Co Lay (1)w e r e dest r oyed by
burni ng.
Shor t l y a f t e r l unch, members of t h e 2d Pl at oon s i ght ed
two Vietnamese males. The Vietnamese began runni ng and were
engaged by smal l arms f i r e . One was appar ent l y h i t and seen
droppi ng t o t he ground. The a r e a was sear ched, but a body was
not l ocat ed. Never t hel ess, t h i s a c t i on was recorded i n t h e TF
Barker Jour nal a t 1320 hours a s "Co B-20 el ement engaged 2 VC
Vic 742781, 1VC KIA.",
The subhaml et s of Co Lay ( I ) , Co Lay ( 2 ) , and Co Lay
( 3) appeared t o have been r e c e nt l y vacat ed, and t h e company d i d
not encount er a s i z a b l e number of i nhabi - t ant s. These subhaml et s
were sear ched and most of t h e hoot ches dest r oyed by burni ng.
Demolition of most bunkers and t unnel s was accomplished by t h e
1st Pl at oon' s poi nt team. The two at t ached engi neer demol i t i on
s p e c i a l i s t s were i ns t r uc t e d t o dest r oy onl y two bunker s. -
The two pl at oons and command group r et ur ned nor t h al ong
t he t r a i l t o an a r e a near Co Lay (1) and went i n t o pos i t i on f o r
t he ni ght (see sket ch 7-8). The Weapons Pl at oon di s pi aced from
t he 3d Pl at oon a r e a and cl osed i n t o t h e company pos i t i on.
A l l t h a t day, t h e 3d Pl at oon had secur ed t h e a r e a near
t he br i dge and mai nt ai ned a bl ocki ng pos i t i on t o t h e nor t h.
There was no a c t i v i t y i n t he s e ar eas . Members of t he pl at oon
di d not v i s i t My Khe ( 4 ) . Toward eveni ng, a s t he per i met er was
bei ng pul l ed i n , a femal e body wi t h a neck wound was di scover ed
al ong t h e r i dge near t he sea. She was bur i ed i n a shal l ow
grave t he next morning,
D. OPERATIONS 18 MARCH
1. 0730-1000 Hours: Company Deploys t o Ky Xuyen (1)
The primary company a c t i v i t y on 18 March was sear chi ng
t he upper peni nsul a. Operat i ons on t h i s da t e e xhi bi t e d a s t a r k
c ont r a s t t o t h e pr evi ous days ' a c t i v i t i e s . Dest r uct i on was di s -
cont i nued; bur ni ng and demol i t i on di d not occur ; and t h e e n t i r e
a t t i t u d e seemed t o be benevol ent . The i nha bi t a nt s of t he upper
peni nsul a were c ol l e c t e d i n t h e v i c i n i t y of Ky Xuyen (1) and
a MEDCAP team was di spat ched t o t h i s a r e a i n t h e af t er noon.
Movement nor t h from t he company ni ght def ensi ve posi -
t i on had begun by 0730 hours. When t h e company reached t h e 3d
Pl at oon' s pos i t i on nor t h of My Khe ( 4 ) , CPT Michles had t he
Weapons Pl at oon emplace i t s mort ar t o cover el ement s of t he
company moving toward Ky Xuyen (1). The 2d Pl at oon remained
t he r e t o pr ovi de s e c ur i t y f o r t he Weapons Pl at oon. These pl a-
t oons a r e bel i eved t o have begun moving nor t h p r i o r t o 0930
hours. -
The company r epor t ed i t s l oc a t i on a t 0955 hours a s
Ky Xuyen (1). There w e r e no engagements o r ot he r s i g n i f i c a n t
event s recorded dur i ng i t s movement t o t h i s l oc a t i on (see sket ch
7-91 .
2. 1000-1700 Hours: Company Searches Upper Peni nsul a
Two r i f l e pl at oons cont i nued al ong t h e shor e beyond
An Ky. From t h i s pos i t i on, one of t h e pl at oons. moved i nl and
and t oget her t hey began s ear chi ng t h e a r e a and d i r e c t i n g i n-
ha bi t a nt s w e s t toward Ky Xuyen (1). The company's ot he r r i f l e
pl at oon sear ched and c ol l e c t e d t h e i nha bi t a nt s of Ky Xuyen ( 2)
whi l e t h e Weapons Pl at oon j oi ned and remained wi t h t he company
command group.
A t 1135 hour s, TF Barker n o t i f i e d t he 11t h I nf a nt r y
Bri gade t h a t it was sendi ng a MEDCAP team t o B Company's
l ocat i on. The Task Force r epor t ed t h a t t he r e were approxi mat el y
1, 000 peopl e i n B Company's a r e a and t h a t t h e peopl e di d not
appear t o be VC. '
Medical t r eat ment and scr eeni ng of t h e i nha bi t a nt s f o r
VC s us pect s w e r e performed i n t h e v i c i n i t y of Ky Xuyen (1) t h a t
af t er noon. The t h r e e r i f l e pl at oons s pent t h e day sear chi ng
t h e upper peni nsul a and sendi ng t he i nha bi t a nt s t o t he Ky
Xuyen (1) ar ea. There we r e no r e por t s of f i ndi ng enemy equip-
ment and no c a s ua l t i e s . Approximately seven Vietnamese w e r e
det ai ned over ni ght .
. -
3. 1700-2000 Hours: Ni ght Defensi ve Pos i t i on Secured
The ni ght def ensi ve pos i t i on was e s t a bl i s he d s e ve r a l
hundred met ers up t he shor e l i n e from Ky Xuyen (1) ( s e e s ket ch
7-10). Before dusk, t h e a r t i l l e r y obser ver wi t h t h e company
f i r e d i n marking rounds. Lat er t h a t eveni ng, t he Vietnamese
brought t o t he company pos i t i on a female who appar ent l y had
been wounded by t he a r t i l l e r y adj ust ment . A dus t of f was r e-
quest ed a t 1900 hours and completed a t 1925 hour s.
,E. OPERATIONS 19 MARCH
1. 0130-0600 Hcdrs: Company Pos i t i on At t acked
A t 0130 hour s, 60mm mort ar rounds began i mpact i ng
wi t hi n t he company per i met er . Enemy per sonnel manning t h e mor-
t a r were pos i t i oned from 300 t o 400 meters nor t heas t of t h e
company pos i t i on and succeeded i n "walking" s i x t o t e n rounds
t hrough t he pos i t i on. A machinegunner from t h e 1st Pl at oon was
k i l l e d when a mort ar round impacted i n h i s foxhol e. Fi ve ot he r
men were wounded, one of whom di ed l a t e r . A l l but one of t he
c a s ua l t i e s were from t h e 1st Pl at oon.
Personnel on guard observed t he muzzle f l a s he s a t t h e
enemy mort ar pos i t i on. The company opened f i r e wi t h smal l arms
a l l around t he per i met er . Countermortar concent r at i ons were
f i r e d by t he company' s 81mm mort ar and t h e a r t i l l e r y l ocat ed
a t LZ Upt i ght . There were some men who bel i eved t h e company
pos i t i on r ecei ved smal l arms f i r e from t h e nor t h i n conj unct i on
wi t h t he mort ar a t t a c k. s :
A dus t of f and an accompanying l i g h t . f i r e team were
r equest ed by t h e company a t 0143 hour s, fol l owed by a cas ual t y
r e por t a t 0146 h.ours. Lat er , LT Willingham had one of h i s men
i l l umi nat e an open a r e a al ong t h e beach wi t h t r i p f l a r e s , which
may have been f o r t he purpose of i de nt i f yi ng t h e company
pos i t i on, t o t h e dus t -of f p i l o t . Evacuat i on of t h e wounded was
completed a t 0244 hours and t he he l i c opt e r l i g h t f i r e team
remained on s t a t i o n over t h e company u n t i l 0300 hours.
I ns t r uc t i ons t o " r e a l l y d i g i n " w e r e i s s u e d . i n pr epar at i on
f o r an expect ed major a t t a c k.
Pr i or t o t he depar t ur e of t he l i g h t f i r e team, an AC-47
("Spooky") had been r equest ed t hrough t he 11t h I nf a nt r y Bri gade.
This a i r c r a f t a r r i ve d i n t h6 a r e a a t 0325 hours and remained
t he r e u n t i l 0600 hours. Radio communication was e s t a bl i s he d
wi t h t he "Spooky" and t he company l oc a t i on was i d e n t i f i e d t o
t he crew by usi ng a f l a s h l i g h t . The a r e a t o t he nor t heas t of
t he company was i nt e r mi t t e nt l y "hosed down" by t he miniguns
of t h e "Spooky".
Two a ddi t i ona l mort ar rounds were r ecei ved a t 0440
hours. There w e r e no c a s ua l t i e s o r r e por t s of obser vi ng t h e
muzzle f l a s h.
2. 0630-1030 Hours: Search Operat i ons
A t da yl i ght , a squad p a t r o l from t h e 1st Pl at oon began
sear chi ng f o r t he mort ar pos i t i on. They were s ucces s f ul i n l o-
c a t i ng t h e f i r i n g si t e but not hi ng more. During t h i s sear ch,
two Vietnamese who had been hel d over ni ght i n t he company posi -
t i on walked poi nt f o r t h e pa t r ol . The p a t r o l l e a de r , a c l os e
f r i e nd of t h e man k i l l e d dur i ng t h e mort ar a t t a c k, began beat i ng
one of t he Vietnamese wi t h h i s weapon. H e was phys i cal l y r es -
t r a i ne d by anot her member of t h e squad. Fa i l i ng t o f i nd t h e
mort ar and conc1udin.g t h a t f ur t he r sear ch would be us el es s , t h e
p a t r o l r et ur ned t o t he company command pos t .
During t h e morning, an American a s s i s t e d by an ARVN
i n t e r p r e t e r i nt e r r oga t e d det ai nees hel d i n t h e company pos i t i on.
A f i e l d t el ephone wi t h l eads, at t ached t o var i ous p a r t s of t he
body t o produce el ect ri c shocks was one t echni que bei ng employed
t o obt ai n i nf or mat i on. Knife wounds were i n f l i c t e d acr oss t h e
back of t he hand of one det ai nee who was t hen t aken t o t h e beach
where s a l t wa s rubbed i n t h e f l e s h wounds. These wounds w e r e
probably i n f l i c t e d by t he same American usi ng t he f i e l d t el ephone.
The det ai nees were a l s o bei ng ki cked and s ever el y beat en by
t he ARVN i n t e r p r e t e r .
One of t he det ai nees promised t o show t he i nt e r r oga t i on
team a t unnel ent r ance l eadi ng t o a weapons cache. CPT Mi chl es,
t he ARVN i n t e r p r e t e r and t hr e e ARVN s o l d i e r s , and t h e
1st Pl at oon fol l owed t h e det ai nees . En r out e t o t h e supposed
t unnel l oc a t i on, one of t h e det ai nees broke and r an. He was
not immediately f i r e d upon and escaped (see e xhi bi t P-215).
Ther eaf t er , t he ot he r det ai nees e i t h e r decl ar ed t hey had no
knowledge of a t unnel ent r ance o r r ef used t o l ead t h e i r capt or s
t o i t s l ocat i on. The pl at oor r et ur ned t o t h e company pos i t i on
and t hen pr epar ed f o r e xt r a c t i on
3. 1050-1340 Hours: Company Ret urns t o Base Camp
Ext r act i on of t h e company began a t 1050 hours and was
completed a t 1342 hours. The 1st Pl at oon was e xt r a c t e d f i r s t
and t aken t o LZ Upt i ght , and t h e remainder of t h e company was
t aken t o LZ Dot t i e. B Company's r e t ur n t o LZ Dot t i e on 19 March
concluded TF Bar ker ' s oper at i on i n t he Son My Vi l l age ar ea.
During t he opef at i on, B Company r epor t ed k i l l i n g a
t o t a l of 39 VC, of which a l l but one were r epor t ed k i l l e d i n
My Khe ( 4 ) on 16 March. Although t he number k i l l e d may be
s ubs t a nt i a l l y hi gher t han r epor t ed, and t h e t o t a l c e r t a i n l y
i ncl uded women and chi l dr en, t h e r e i s no i ndi c a t i on t h a t t h e
Task Force and ot he r hi gher headquar t er s e ve r became aware of
t h e a c t u a l r e s u l t s of t h e a t t a c k on My Khe ( 4 ) . I n t h e a f t e r -
noon of 16 March, CPT Michles r epor t ed t o TF Barker t h a t t he r e
were no women and c hi l dr e n among t h e 38 VC r epor t ed a s k i l l e d .
Addi t i onal l y, t h e f a c t t h a t some of t h e vi ct i ms were appar ent l y
k i l l e d i n bunkers o r s h e l t e r s may have f u r t h e r a s s i s t e d i n con-
c e a l i ng t h e a c t ua l number of persons k i l l e d from bot h t he men
on t he ground and anyone f l y i n g over My Khe ( 4 ) . It shoul d
never t hel es s be not ed t h a t al t hough 39 VC KI A were r epor t ed,
no weapons were r epor t ed capt ur ed, no c a s ua l t i e s were s uf f e r e d,
and t h e r e were no ot he r i ndi c a t i ons t h a t t h e 1st Pl at oon was
engagi ng an armed f or ce. These ci rcumst ances shoul d have
prompted i n q u i r i e s from hi gher headquar t er s, but appar ent l y
none was made.
Although t he r e was some subsequent t a l k among t h e men
i n B Company concerni ng t h e peopl e k i l l e d by t h e 1st Pl at oon i n
My Khe ( 4 ) , t hey r e c a l l e d no i nqui r i e s o r i nve s t i ga t i ons about
B Company's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t he oper at i on.
J
583- 668 CI - i4 - I l
SKETCH 7-1
SKETCH7-2
SKETCH 7- 5
SKETCH 7-7
SKETCH 7 - 10
Chapt er 8
SI GNI FI CANT FACTORS WH I CH CONTRI BUTED
THE SON M Y TRAGEDY
The purpose of t h i s chapt er i s t o pr ovi de a br i e f di s cus s i on
of some of t h e major f a c t or s which appear t o t h e I nqui r y t o have
cont r i but ed t o t h e t r agedy of Son My.
A. GENERAL
I n revi ewi ng t he event s which l ed up t o t h e Son My oper at i on
of 16 March 1968 and t he mi l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n t h a t e xi s t e d i n t h e
ar ea a t t h a t t i me, c e r t a i n f a c t s and f a c t or s have been i ndent i -
f i e d as havi ng pos s i bl y cont r i but ed t o t h e t r agedy. No s i n g l e
f a c t or was, by i t s e l f , t he s o l e cause of t he i nc i de nt . Col-
l e c t i v e l y , t h e f a c t or s di scussed i n t h i s chapt er w e r e i n t e r -
dependent and somewhat r e l a t e d , and each i nf l uenced t he a c t i on
which t ook pl ace i n a d i f f e r e n t way.
Undoubtedly, t he r e were f a c t s and ci rcumst ances beyond
t hose d e a l t wi t h i n t h i s chapt er which coul d be s a i d t o have
had a major i nf l uence upon t h e event . The di s cus s i on which f ol -
lows i s not i nt ended t o be exhaust i ve, nor a d e f i n i t i v e explana-
t i o n of why Son My happened. Such an e f f o r t would be c l e a r l y
beyond t h e competence of t h i s I nqui r y. Consi der at i on of t h e
fol l owi ng f a c t o r s does, however, t end t o hi ghl i ght t h e d i f f e r -
ences between t h e Son My oper at i on and numerous ot he r oper at i ons
conducted t hroughout South Vietnam over a per i od of year s .
I t a l s o poi nt s up t he pot e nt i a l dangers i nher ent i n t he s e opera-
t i o n s , which r e qui r e const ant vi gi l ance and scr upul ous a t t e n t i o n
t o t h e e s s e n t i a l s of d i s c i p l i n e and t he uni que r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
of command. Consi der at i on of t he s e f a c t or s a l s o may a s s i s t i n
underst andi ng how t he i nci dent coul d have occurred.
B. PLANS AND ORDERS
There i s s ubs t a nt i a l evi dence t h a t t h e event s a t Son My re-
s ul t e d pr i mar i l y from t he nat ur e of t he or der s i s s ued on 15 March
t o t he s o l d i e r s of Task Force (TF) Barker. Previ ous chapt er s of
t h i s r e por t have descr i bed t he cont ent of t h e d i f f e r e n t or der s i s.
sued by LTC Barker, CPT Medina, CPT Mi chl es, and t he var i ous pl a-
t oon l eader s and have i ndi c a t e d t h e c r u c i a l e r r o r s and omi ssi ons
i n t hos e or der s . The evi dence i s c l e a r t h a t a s t hose or der s
were i s s ued down t hrough t h e chai n of command t o t h e men of C
Company, and perhaps t o B Company, t hey were embel l i shed and,
e i t h e r i nt e nt i ona l l y o r uni nt ent i onal l y, were mi sdi r ect ed t o-
ward end r e s u l t s presumably not f or eseen dur i ng t h e format i ve
s t a ge of t h e or der s .
The or der s der i ved from a pl an conceived by LTC Barker and
approved by s e ve r a l of h i s immediate s uper i or s . There i s no
evi dence t h a t t h e pl an i ncl uded e x p l i c i t o r i mp l i c i t pr ovi si ons
f o r t h e d e l i b e r a t e k i l l i n g of noncombatants. It i s evi dent t h a t
t h e pl an was based on f a u l t y assumptions concerni ng t h e s t r e ngt h
and di s pos i t i on of t h e enemy and t h e absence of noncombatants -
from t h e ope r a t i ona l ar ea. There i s a l s o evi dence t o i ndi c a t e
widespread confusi on among t h e o f f i c e r s and men of TF Bgrker a s
t o t he purpose and l i mi t a t i ons of t h e "sear ch and dest r oy" nat ur e
of t he oper at i on, alth-ough t he purpose and or i e nt a t i on of such
oper at i ons were c l e a r l y s pe l l e d out by MACV di r e c t i ve s i n e f f e c t ,
a t t h a t t i me. The f a u l t y assumptions and poor l y def i ned obj ec-
t i v e s of t h e oper at i on were not expl or ed nor quest i oned dur i ng
\
such revi ews of t he pl an a s were made by MG Kost er, BG Lipscomb,
and COL Henderson. LTC Bar ker ' s deci s i on and or der t o f i r e t h e
a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on on por t i ons of My Lai ( 4 ) wi t hout p r i o r
warning t o t h e i nha bi t a nt s i s quest i onabl e, but was t e c hni c a l l y
permi ssabl e by t h e d i r e c t i v e s i n e f f e c t a t t h a t t i me. The imple-
menting f e a t ur e s of t h a t deci s i on were i nadequat e i n t e r m s of
r easonabl e s t e ps t h a t coul d have been t aken t o minimize o r avoi d
consequent Vietnamese c a s ua l t i e s from t he a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on.
The or der s i s s ue d by LTC Barker t o burn houses, k i l l l i ve s t oc k,
des t r oy f oods t uf f s (and pos s i bl y t o cl os e t h e wel l s ) i n t h e Son
My a r e a were c l e a r l y i l l e g a l . They were r epeat ed i n subsequent
br i e f i ngs by CPT Medina and pos s i bl y CPT Michles and i n t h a t
cont ext were a l s o i l l e g a l .
While t h e e vi de nc e ' i ndi c a t e s t h a t ne i t he r LTC Barker nor
h i s subor di nat es s p e c i f i c a l l y ordered t he k i l l i n g of noncombat-
a nt s , t hey di d f a i l , e i t h e r i nt e nt i ona l l y o r uni nt e nt i ona l l y,
t o make any c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n s between combatants and noncombat-
a nt s i n t h e i r or der s and i ns t r uc t i ons . Coupled wi t h ... ot he r f a c t or s
descr i bed i n t h i s r e por t , t h e or der s t hat . were i s s ued through
t he TF Barker chai n of coriunand conveyed an underst andi ng t o
a s i g n i f i c a n t number of s o l d i e r s i n C Company t h a t onl y t h e
enemy remained i n t h e oper at i onal ar ea and t h a t t h e enemy was
t o be des t r oyed .
C. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE
TF Bar ker had some-men who had been law v i o l a t o r s and hood-
lums i n c i v i l i a n l i f e and who cont i nued t o e xe r c i s e t hos e
t r a i t s , where po s s i b l e , a f t e r e nt e r i ng t h e Army. It appear s
from t h e evi dence, however, t h a t t h e men w e r e ge ne r a l l y r epr e-
s e n t a t i v e of t h e t y p i c a l cr os s - s ect i on of American yout h as-
s i gned t o most combat u n i t s t hr oughout t h e Army. Li ke t h e men
i n t hos e o t h e r u n i t s , t h e men of TF Bar ker brougHt wi t h them
t h e d i ve r s e t r a i t s , pr e j ud i c e s , and a t t i t u d e s t y p i c a l of t h e
var i ous r egi ons of t h e count r y- and segment s of s o c i e t y from
whence t hey came.
There has been t est i mony t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t a "di nk" o r
"s l ope" complex may have e x i s t e d among many of t h e men of C
Company. These t e r m s w e r e i n f a c t used f r e que nt l y by C Company
wi t nes s es i n r e f e r r i n g t o Vietnamese i n gener al . For some, t h e
t er ms were appar ent l y used i n t h e same cont ext i n which "Kr aut ",
" J a p I n and "Gook" w e r e used i n r e f e r r i n g t o t h e enemy i n p a s t
war s. For o t h e r s , i t s use e vi de nt l y s ugges t ed s ubor di nat i on
( i n t h e i r view) of t h e Vietnamese t o an i n f e r i o r s t a t u s . For
s t i l l o t h e r s , t h e us e of t h e s e t e r m s appear s t o have been si mpl y
a c a s e of goi ng al ong wi t h t h e ma j or i t y, us i ng t h e terms used by
most of t h e o t h e r men, t o de s c r i be Vietnamese (whet her f r i e n d l y
or enemy). The a v a i l a b l e evi dence does n o t i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e
us e of t h e t e r m "di nk, " " s l ope , " o r "gook" by the men of C
Company s i g n i f i e d any wi despr ead s ubl i mi nal c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of
Vietnamese a s subhuman, however d i s t a s t e f u l such t e r m s mi ght
be. I n f a c t , some of t h e men were fond of t h e Vietnamese
na t i o na l s . Many i nd i c a t e d a d i s l i k e f o r and, on a r e c ur r i ng
b a s i s , mi s t r e a t e d Vietnamese c i v i l i a n s . Many of t h e men ac-
cept ed Vietnamese noncombatants on a n e u t r a l b a s i s p r i o r t o
t h e Son My oper at i on. Addi t i ona l l y, t h e r e i s evi dence t h a t
a s u b s t a n t i a l number of t h e men i n C Company d i d n o t t r u s t t h e
Vietnamese. Pa r t of t h e r eason f o r t h i s l a y i n pr evi ous ex-
per i ences dur i ng which Vietnamese v i l l a g e r s had f a i l e d t o warn
them of t h e pr es ence of mines and boobyt r aps whi ch, when sub-
s equent l y det onat ed, wounded and k i l l e d many of t h e i r f e l l ow
s o l d i e r s . Se ve r a l of t h e men appar ent l y f e l t , wi t h some j u s t i -
ki c a t i on , t h a t i f t h e Vietnamese i nvol ved had been t r u l y
" f r i e n dl y" t hey would have warned t h e s o l d i e r s about t h e mines
and boobyt r aps. Whether t h e var i ous commanders i n TF Bar ker
had d e t e c t e d t h i s ge ne r a l f e e l i n g of mi s t r u s t and had at t empt ed
t o pr event it from devel opi ng i n t o a danger ous t endency t o
c a t e g or i z e a l l Vi et namese, n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d ot he r -
w i s e , a s bei ng t h e "enemy" i s n o t c l e a r from t h e t est i mony
a va i l a bl e .
While it i s i mpos s i bl e t o judge t h e ma t t e r wi t h pr e c i s i on,
it i s cons i der ed l i k e l y t h a t t h e unf avor abl e a t t i t u d e of some
of t h e men of TF Barker toward t he Vietnamese was a c ont r i -
but i ng f a c t o r i n t he event s of Son My.
D. CASUALTIES FROM MINES AND BOOBYTRAPS
A s i g n i f i c a n t number of wi t nesses t e s t i f i e d concerni ng
t h e e f f e c t of mine and boobyt rap c a s ua l t i e s .on t h e morale
and a t t i t u d e s of t h e s o l d i e r s of TF Barker. Besi des t h e gen-
e r a l l y demoral i zi ng e f f e c t which t hes e i nc i de nt s had upon. t h e
men, it i s appar ent from t h e evi dence t h a t t hey a l s o ser ved t o
aggr avat e a f e e l i ng of f r u s t r a t i o n among t h e men which der i ved
pr i mar i l y from t h e i r pr evi ous f a i l u r e s t o come t o gr i ps wi t h
t h e enemy.
The men of C Company had s p e c i f i c a l l y been s ubj ect ed t o
such f r u s t r a t i o n s dur i ng t h e pr evi ous oper at i ons conduct ed by
TF Barker i n Son My. While employed out s i de t h e p r i n c i p a l
a r e a where s o l i d enemy c ont a c t s were developed by ot he r TF
el ement s (on 13 February and agai n on 23 February) , C Company
s us t ai ned, dur i ng t h e same t i me frames, a t o t a l of 15 casual -
t i es from enemy mines "and boobyt raps. It had s uf f e r e d anot her
f i v e c a s u a l t i e s from enemy boobyt raps 2 days bef or e t h e Son
My oper at i on. The company had not encount ered i d e n t i f i a b l e
enemy f or ces dur i ng e i t h e r per i od of t i me.
I t i s evi dent t h a t t he enemy' s ext ensi ve use of mines and
boobyt raps had a consi der abl e e f f e c t upon t h e men and c ont r i -
but ed s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o t h e event s of Son My.
E. PRIOR FAILURE TO CLOSE WITH THE ENEMY
One of LTC Bar ker ' s major f r u s t r a t i o n s was t h e p a s t f a i l u r e
of t he TF t o come t o gr i ps wi t h, i n h i s words " t o do b a t t l e "
wi t h, t he VC 48th Local Force (LF) Bat t al i on. These f a i l u r e s
had been hi ghl i ght ed by BG Lipscomb i n pr evi ous a f t e r - a c t i on
c r i t i q u e s , and were underscored agai n by COL Henderson i n h i s
remarks t o TF per sonnel on t he af t er noon of 15 March. Given
t h e compet i t i ve nat ur e of command assi gnment s and t h e gener al
tendency t o eval uat e command performance on t he b a s i s of t an-
g i b l e r e s u l t s , it appears t h a t LTC Barker and h i s subor di nat e
commanders probabl y viewed t he Son My oper at i on a s a r e a l oppor-
t uni t y t o overcome t h e i r p a s t f a i l u r e s ( or l ack of oppor t uni t y)
t o cl os e e f f e c t i v e l y wi t h and de f e a t a major i d e n t i f i a b l e enemy
f or ce. Whether t h i s f a c t o r had an e f f e c t on t he l ack of di scr i m-
i na t i on shown i n t h e i r pl anni ng and or der s i s not c l e a r from
t h e evi dence.
As i ndi cat ed pr evi ousl y, pa s t f a i l u r e o r l ack of oppor t uni t y
t o f i g h t an enemy f or c e had a l s o had a s i g n i f i c a n t l y f r u s t r a t i n g
e f f e c t on t he morale and a t t i t u d e s of t he s o l d i e r s of C Company.
Rat her t han t h e cont i nuat i on of e s s e n t i a l l y nonproduct i ve recon-
nai ssance- i n- f or ce oper at i ons wi t h at t endant hi gh c a s u a l t i e s
from mines and boobyt raps, t he Son My oper at i on of f e r e d them
t h e oppor t uni t y t o f i g h t what was ( descr i bed t o them a s ) al most
c e r t a i nl y t h e 48t h VC Local Force Ba t t a l i on, under condi t i ons
and a t a t i m e f avor abl e t o them. Given t h e i r p a s t f a i l u r e o r
l ack of oppor t uni t y t o do b a t t l e wi t h t h e enemy and t h e . i n f o r -
mation which t hey were provi ded by CPT Medina, t h e evi dence i s
c l e a r t h a t many of them a l s o consi dered t h e Son My oper at i on
a s a t a ngi bl e chance t o a l l e v i a t e some of t h e i r pa s t f r u s t r a t i o n s .
F. ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS
I n pr evi ous chapt er s , t h i s r e por t has provi ded an exami-
nat i on of t h e or gani zat i onal d i f f i c u l t i e s which conf r ont ed
t he Americal Di vi si on and i t s subor di nat e el ement s a t t h e t i me
of t h e Son My oper at i on. To a t t a c h undue importance t o t h i s
f a c t would i nvol ve i gnor i ng s i mi l a r or gani zat i onal d i f f i c u l t i e s
faced and s uc c e s s f ul l y r esol ved by ot her US Army di vi s i ons i n
Vietnam and i n ot he r wars. Never t hel ess, it i s appar ent from
t h e evi dence and t est i mony made a va i l a bl e t o t h e I nqui r y t h a t
t h e Americal Di vi s i on' s or gani zat i onal pr ocess, coupled wi t h
ot her f act or s. , de t r a c t e d from t h e a b i l i t y of key personnel t o
pr oper l y super vi se t o i ns ur e t h a t combat oper at i ons w e r e bei ng
conducted i n t h e appr opr i at e manner. Thi s was most evi dent i n
t h e appar ent demands pl aced on t h e t i me a va i l a bl e t o t h e var i ous
commanders who had d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r super-
vi s i ng t h e pr epar at i on and execut i on of t h e Son My oper at i on,
and i n t h e evi dence which i ndi c a t e s t h a t dur i ng t h e post -Tet -
1968 t i me frame t he r e was a l ack of any pos i t i ve enforcement
(by means of di s c i pl i na r y a c t i on) of t h e pr ovi si ons of di vi s i on
and br i gade d i r e c t i v e s deal i ng wi t h t h e t r eat ment of noncombat-
ant s .
A commander a t t h e b a t t a l i o n ( t a s k f or ce) , br i gade, o r
hi gher l e v e l normal l y depends heavi l y upon h i s s t a f f t o a s s i s t
him i n pl anni ng, coor di nat i ng, i nf l uenci ng, and super vi si ng h i s
subor di nat e u n i t s and t he men i n t hose u n i t s . A t t h e l l t h
Brigade l e v e l , c r e a t i on of TF Barker appar ent l y r e s ul t e d i n a
weakening of t h e br i gade s t a f f because of t h e l o s s of t h e former
S3/XO, LTC Barker, t h e former S1, MAJ Calhoun, and s e ve r a l
ot he r o f f i c e r s and noncommissioned o f f i c e r s . Coupled wi t h
t h e br i gade change of command which occurred on 15 March,
t he s e f a c t or s probabl y cont r i but ed to a de c l i ne i n ' t h e pro-
f i ci ency and super vi sor y c a pa bi l i t y of t h e l l t h Bri gade head-
qua r t e r s .
TF Barker was organi zed wi t h an aus t er e s t a f f and had
no i ndi vi dua l who performed excl us i vel y a s t h e TF execut i ve
o f f i c e r . The evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t t he a us t e r e s t a f f i n g
of t h e TF may have had some i nf l uence on t he Son My oper at i on,
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t erms of t h e adequacy of t he pl anni ng ph,ase, and
t h a t a di s pr opor t i onat e amount of LTC Bar ker ' s .,time and e f f o r t
may have been s pent on mat t er s which, under or di nar y circum-
s t a nc e s , would have been handl ed by t h e s t a f f .
It is, e vi de nt t h a t t he or gani zat i onal problems i nvol vi ng
t h e America1 Di vi si on and subor di nat e el ement s cont r i but ed t o
i nadequat e super vi si on of t h e pl anni ng phase f o r t h e Son My
oper at i on and, i n t h a t s ens e, pl ayed a p a r t i n t he event s which
fol l owed.
G. LACK OF COMMAND RAPPORT WI THI N TF BARKER
There i s s u b s t a n t i a l evi dence t h a t LTC Barker di d not have
a c l os e per sonal r e l a t i ons hi p wi t h h i s company commanders. Thi s
may have been Bar ker ' s chosen method of oper at i ng a s TF com-
mander. A more t a ngi bl e f a c t o r was t h e appar ent ne c e s s i t y f o r
Barker t o devot e a di s pr opor t i gnat e amount of h i s time. and
e f f o r t t o mat t er s which an adequat e s t a f f might ot her wi se have
been capabl e of handl i ng.
From LTC Bar ker ' s vant age poi nt , h i s was s ol e l y a t a c t i c a l
mi ssi on. The maj or i t y of t he r out i ne admi ni s t r at i ve and log-
i s t i c a l suppor t f o r t h e r i f l e companies s t i l l came from t h e i r
par ent ba t t a l i ons . The evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t such an arrange-
ment probabl y had a det r i ment al e f f e c t on t h e morale of t h e s ol -
d i e r s and t h e i r commanders, and may wel l have caused t he com-
pany commanders and t h e i r men t o f e e l t h a t t hey w e r e a t r a n s i e n t
el ement i n a temporary or gani zat i on.
Whatever t h e cause, t h e evi dence suggest s t h a t t h e l ack of
command r appor t wi t hi n TF Barker may have gi ven rise t o a voi d
i n communications between Barker and h i s subor di nat es. Thi s
voi d was appar ent l y f i l l e d i n p a r t by t h e TF S3, MAJ Calhoun.
Given t h e i nt e r i m nat ur e of t h e TF, t h e demands on Bar ker ' s
t i me i n or der t o overcome d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s i n g from t h e a us t e r e
s t a f f i n g of t he TF, and t he underst andabl e l o y a l t i e s of t h e
t h r e e company commanders toward t h e i r pa r e nt ba t t a l i ons and
b a t t a l i o n commanders, Bar ker ' s detachment from h i s subor di nat es
may have been more appar ent t han r e a l . Of more s i gni f i c a nc e i s
t h e pr oba bi l i t y t h a t t h e absence of a c l os e per sonal r e l a t i on-
s h i p between Barker and h i s subor di nat es may have gi ven rise t o
a l ack of under st andi ng on h i s p a r t a s t o t h e pr of e s s i ona l capa-
b i l i t i e s of each of h i s company commanders, and an uncer t ai nt y
on t h e i r p a r t t o what he s p e ~ i f i c a l l y ~ e x p e c t e d a s of them and
t h e i r companies. Ul t i mat el y t h e l ack of per sonal r appor t and
c ont a c t between LTC Barker and h i s company commanders may have
i nf l uenced t he gener al breakdown i n di s c i pl i ne , r e s t r a i n t ,
and c ont r ol which were evi dent on t h e f i r s t day of t he
Son My oper at i on.
H. ATTITUDE OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) OFFICIALS
The gener al pol i c y and a t t i t u d e of Vietnamese o f f i c i a l s
toward t h e Son My a r e a has been descr i bed el sewhere i n t h i s
r epor t . The Army, Republ i c of Vietnam f or ces were, dur i ng t h e
post -Tet -per i od, r e l u c t a n t t o conduct s us t ai ned oper at i ons i n
t he ar ea. Thi s f a c t , coupled wi t h GVN t r eat ment of t he a r e a
as a f r e e f i r e zone and t he aut omat i c, per f unct or y cl ear ances
by GVN o f f i c i a l s t o f i r e ordnance i n t o t h e a r e a , were gener al l y
known by key members of t h e TF. I t i s evi dent t h a t GVN o f f i c i a l s
consi dered Son My a s l ong-st andi ng VC-controlled t e r r i t o r y and
t h a t i t s i nha bi t a nt s were consi der ed a s low p r i o r i t y and of
l i t t l e immediate consequence t o GVN i n t e r e s t s a t ' t h a t t i me.
These gener al a t t i t u d e s w e r e w e l l known by key members of t he
11t h Bri gade and TF Barker and undoubtedly a f f e c t e d t h e i r
f eel i ngs toward t he a r e a and i t s peopl e.
I. NATURE OF THE ENEMY
While t h e Communist f or ces had achi eved a s u b s t a n t i a l psy-
chol ogi cal i mpact on t h e American publ i c dur i ng t h e Tet of f en-
_.
s i ve of 1968, t hey had a l s o t aken s u b s t a n t i a l l os s e s I n men and
equipment. Time t o r e f i t , r e c r u i t , and r e t r a i n t h e i r f or ces was
of c r i t i c a l i mport ance t o t h e i r f ut ur e s t a yi ng power. To pro-
vi de t h e r e q u i s i t e t i me, t h e i r f or ces were, dur i ng t h e post -Tet -
per i od, seeki ng t o a t t a i n sanct uar y and pr ot e c t i on by mel t i ng
back i n t o t he popul ace and by r e t r e a t i n g i n t o t h e i r base ar eas .
I n t h e i n i t i a l phase of t h e stepped-up l e v e l of a c t i ons by US
f or ces, t aken t o deny t he communists needed t i m e and concealment,
t her e was a consequent and unf or t unat el y hi gh l e v e l of c i v i l i a n
c a s ua l t i e s t hroughout most of t h e Republ i c of Vietnam.
The Communist f or c e s i n South Vietnam had l ong recogni zed our
gener al r el uct ance t o do b a t t l e wi t h them among t h e c i v i l i a n pop-
ul ace and had used t h a t knowledge t o our t a c t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c
di sadvant age t hroughout t he hi s t or y of t he war i n Vietnam. Ex-
p l o i t a t i o n of t h a t r el uct ance by Vi et Cong (VC) and North Vi et -
namese Army (NVA) ground f or ces caused a d i s t o r t i o n of t he c l a s -
s i c d i s t i n c t i o n between combatants and noncombatants. (It i s i m-
por t a nt t o bear i n mind t h a t t h e ol d d i s t i n c t i o n s have been di s -
t or t e d by Communist, not US, f or c e s ) . I n a war r e p l e t e wi t h i n-
s t ances of VC women bear i ng arms and k i l l i n g US s o l d i e r s and
chi l dr en of VC s e r vi ng a s boobyt rap s p e c i a l i s t s and would-be as-
s a s s i ns , it became a l i f e and deat h mat t er f o r US s o l d i e r s and
t h e i r commanders t o make and adhere t o d i s t i n c t i o n s between com-
ba t a nt and noncombatant, pr i mar i l y on t h e ba s i s of whether, t h e
i ndi vi dual s i n. que s t i on were armed, were committing h o s t i l e a c t s ,
or w e r e ot her wi se endangeri ng t he l i v e s of a l l i e d t r oops , r a t h e r
t han on t h e ba s i s of s ex o r age. (Such d i s t i n c t i o n s must, of
course, excl ude he l pl e s s persons such a s babi es from t he l i s t of
combatants. )
The Son My a r e a was popul at ed pr i nc i pa l l y by VC, t h e i r sympa-
t h i z e r s and s uppor t er s , and t h e i r r es pect i ve f a mi l i e s . I t had
been c ont r ol l e d by t h e VC f o r year s and most of t h e men i n TF
Barker were aware of t h i s f a c t . They were a l s o aware t h a t t h e
48th VC LF Bat t al i on was a t ough, wel l di s c i pl i ne d g u e r r i l l a u n i t
which had not onl y pl ayed a major p a r t i n t h e -T e t of f ens i ve but
r epor t edl y had a l s o fought wel l a ga i ns t TF Barker el ement s i n two
pr evi ous cont act s i n t h e Son My ar ea. It is appar ent from t h e
t est i mony of t he s e s o l d i e r s t h a t t h e e n t i r e ar ea and i t s popula-
t i o n were consi dered a s bel ongi ng t o t h e enemy, and t h a t t hey had
l i t t l e appar ent underst andi ng of t h e pr oba bi l i t y t h a t a s i g n i f i -
c a nt p a r t of Son My's unarmed popul at i on were dominated by t h e VC
because t h e VC' represent ed t h e onl y cont i nui ng pr esence i n t h e
ar ea.
The t a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i nvol ved i n f e r r e t i n g enemy f or ces '
out of popul at ed a r e a s , t he - pr a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i nvol ved i n
c l e a r l y i de nt i f yi ng f r i e nd f r om. f oe, and a gener al l y wi despread
knowledge of VC c ont r ol of t he Son My ar ea unquest i onabl y pl ayed
a major r o l e i n t h e event s of Son My.
J. LEADERSHIP
During t h e l a t t e r s t a ge s of t h i s I nqui r y, it b.ecame appar ent
t h a t i f on t h e day bef or e t he Son My oper at i on onl y one of t h e
l eader s a t pl at oon, company, t a s k f or c e , o r br i gade l e ve l - had
f or eseen and voi ced an obj ect i on t o t h e pr ospect of k i l l i n g non-
combat ant s, o r had mentioned t he problem of noncombatants i n
t h e i r pr eoper at i onal or der s and i ns t r uc t i ons , o r i f adequat e r e-
s t r a i n i n g or der s - had been i ssued e a r l y on t he f ol l owi ng day, t h e
Son My t r agedy might have been aver t ed a l t oge t he r , o r have been
s ubs t a nt i a l l y l i mi t e d and t h e oper at i on brought under cont r ol .
Fa i l ur e s i n l eader s hi p appear , t he r e f or e , t o have had a d i r e c t
bear i ng on t h e event s of Son My.
COL Henderson had served wi t h t h e 11t h Brigade a s t h e Deputy
CO o r Act i ng CO from t h e t i me of t h e br i ga de ' s a c t i va t i on i n
Hawaii u n t i l h i s assumption of formal command on 15 March 1968.
Perhaps more t han any ot he r s i ngl e i ndi vi dua l , he shoul d have r e-
cognized t h e s t r e ngt hs and weaknesses of t he key per sonnel and
oper at i ng procedures wi t hi n t h e br i gade. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s
job a s Deputy CO under BG Lipscomb was ba s i c a l l y admi ni s t r at i ve
i n nat ur e and di d not al l ow him a s much t i me a s he would have
l i ke d t o l e a r n t he var i ous oper at i onal a r e a s assi gned t o t h e b r i -
gade and t he subor di nat e commanders who were subsequent l y t o
ser ve under him. Thi s i s not an uncommon predi cament f o r a sec-
ond-in-command. I t a l s o shoul d have emphasized t o him t he neces-
s i t y and i mport ance of going over LTC Bar ker ' s pl an i n d e t a i l .
There i s always a bal ance t o be s t r uc k i n t h e amount of l a t i t u d e
and a ut hor i t y t o be vest ed i n a subor di nat e commander when weigh-
ed a ga i ns t t he commander's ove r a l l r e s pons i bi l i t y f o r what hap-
pens o r f a i l s t o happen i n h i s u n i t . I n COL Hend.ersonls case,
t he evi dence i s c l e a r t h a t he e l e c t e d dur i ng t he i n i t i a l phase of
hi s command t o v e s t maximum l a t i t u d e i n Barker, and i n s o doi ng,
he t r e a t e d s u p e r f i c i a l l y an oper at i onal pl an which deserved de-
t a i l e d exami nat i on.
The t est i mony a va i l a bl e i ndi c a t e s t h a t LTC Barker was consi d-
er ed by BG Lipscomb and by COL Henderson t o be an out st andi ng of-
f i c e r . H i s s e l e c t i on t o command t he TF was r e por t e dl y, ba s e d on
t h e i r eval uat i on of h i s excel l ence i n havi ng performed a s t he
bri gade S3 and execut i ve o f f i c e r . H i s performance a s TF command-
e r up u n t i l t h e t i me of t he Son My oper at i on appears t o have been
c r e di t a bl e i n t e r m s of r epor t ed r e s u l t s achi eved.
It i s appar ent t h a t LTC Barker was hi ghl y mot i vat ed and en-
t hused by t h e pr ospect of coming t o gr i ps wi t h what was bel i eved
t o be t he same enemy f or ce which had pr evi ousl y fought a ga i ns t and
i n f l i c t e d c a s ua l t i e s upon TF el ement s. H i s f r u s t r a t i o n s from
previ ous f a i l u r e s by t h e TF, h i s deci s i on t o f i r e t he a r t i l l e r y
pr epar at i on on a p a r t of My Lai (4), and t h e nat ur e of h i s or-
der s have been not ed el sewhere i n t h i s r e por t . I n a s s e s s i ng
ot her as pect s of h i s l eader s hi p which had an i nf l uence on t h e
event s of Son My, t he evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t h i s assumpt i ons,
pl ans, deci s i ons , and or der s r e f l e c t e d a degr ee of incompetence,
i ncl udi ng an i n a b i l i t y t o make t h e ki nd of d i s t i n c t i o n s r equi r ed
of s ucces s f ul commanders i n t heVi et nam war.
CPT Medina was ol de r t han most company commanders i n Vietnam
( hi s e a r l y 3 0 1 s ) , and, a s a former noncommissioned o f f i c e r , had
gained broad exper i ence i n deal i ng wi t h s ol di e r s . From t he evi -
dence devel oped, it i s c l e a r t h a t he was al most unanimously re-
spect ed by h i s men and by h i s s uper i or s and was, i n t h e i r opin-
i on, an out st andi ng company commander who hel d t h e wel f ar e of
h i s men a s one of h i s pri mary concerns. H i s no-nonsense approach
t o h i s mi ssi on and single-mindedness of purpose i n achi evi ng t h a t
mi ssi on caused him t o be t h e obj e c t of r e s pe c t , but i n some cases
f e a r , by some of h i s men and by h i s pl at oon l eader s . The evi -
dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t Medina was a s t r i c t a ut hor i t a r i a n concerni ng
most mat t er s i nvol vi ng h i s men and exer t ed an ext r aor di nar y de-
gr ee of i nf l uence over them. There was a l s o t est i mony t o i ndi -
c a t e t h a t he adopt ed a condescending and sometimes di spar agi ng
manner i n deal i ng wi t h h i s pl at oon l eader s . The evi dence i ndi -
c a t e s t h a t h i s pr i nc i pa l l eader s hi p weakness p r i o r t o Son My was
i n not e xe r c i s i ng f i r m c ont r ol over t h e a c t i ons of h i s men toward
Vietnamese. The evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t cal l ousness was not a
p a r t of h i s a t t i t u d e toward h i s own men, whose wel f ar e was appar-
e nt l y of pri mary concern t o him.
While most of t h e men of C Company r espect ed CPT Medina, t h e
evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t s i mi l i a r f e e l i ngs of r es pect appar ent l y
di d not e x i s t toward t he pl at oon l eader s . Any assessment of t h e
C Company platoon. l e a de r s , however, must t a ke i n t o account
t h e i r r e l a t i v e i nexper i ence and t h e i nf l uence exer t ed over them
by CPT Medina. Perhaps t he most r eveal i ng as pect of t est i mony
concerni ng t h e pl at oon l eader s i s t h a t each, wi t h t h e except i on
of LT Cal l ey, was consi der ed a "ni ce guy" by many of h i s men.
The i mpl i cat i ons of t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a r e s ubs t a nt i a t e d by
evi dence which i ndi c a t e s t h a t each l acked any r e a l i n t e r n a l
syst em f o r c ont r ol and d i s c i p l i n e of h i s pl at oon. What c ont r ol
and d i s c i p l i n e d i d e x i s t emanated from t h e company commander.
I t i s a l s o appar ent t h a t each pl at oon l e a de r was, t o an e xt e nt ,
f e a r f u l of h i s men and h e s i t a n t i n t r yi ng t o l ead. I ns t ead, t hey
at t empt ed t o become "buddi es" wi t h t h e i r noncommissioned o f f i c e r s
and men and, i n more t han one i ns t ance, al l egedl y j oi ned wi t h
t h e i r men i n immoral and i l l e g a l a c t s - a g a i n s t Vietnamese p r i o r t o
t h e Son My oper at i on. I t shoul d a l s o be poi nt ed out t h a t most of
t h e noncommissioned o f f i c e r s i n C Company were young and, i n gen-
e r a l , had no more combat exper i ence t han t h e men t hemsel ves. The
gener al l ack of experi enced l eader s hi p f or t he men of t h e pl at oons
was not uncommon i n ot he r Army u n i t s a t t h a t t i me.
CPT Michles was regarded by h i s men a s a good o f f i c e r and a
scrupul ous person. From t h e evi dence devel oped, it i s appar ent
t h a t he was genui nel y concerned wi t h t he wel f ar e of h i s men.
While it i s c l e a r t h a t he was a l s o mi ssi on- or i ent ed, he was not
regarded by h i s men a s a har sh di s c i pl i na r i a n and was not he l d i n
t h e same l i g h t of awe and f e a r a s CPT Medina. The i ndi c a t i ons
a r e t h a t he was a consci ent i ous c a r e e r o f f i c e r who enj oyed t h e
r es pect and est eem of most of h i s men.
The a va i l a bl e t est i mony suggest s t h a t CPT Mi chl es' r e l a t i on- -
s hi p wi t h h i s company o f f i c e r s was unst r ai ned and, whi l e t hey di d
not r egar d him a s unapproachabl e, t hey c l e a r l y r espect ed h i s po-
s i t i o n . There i s no evi dence t o suggest t h a t any of t h e B
Company pl at oon l eader s were pa r t i c ul a r l y weak o r s t r ong a s com-
ba t l eader s . A t t he t i m e of t h e Son My oper at i on, t h e B com-
pany pl at oon l eader s appar ent l y commanded a r easonabl e degr ee of
r es pect from t h e i r men and had t he f o r t i t u d e t o d i s c i p l i n e them
when r equi r ed.
The evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t t he r e was a hi gh degree of com-
pe t i t i ve ne s s between CPT Michles and CPT. I.ledina, and a--por t i on of
t h i s f e e l i ng was undoubtly communicated t o t h e i r r e s pe c t i ve pl a-
t oon l eader s and men and probabl y pl ayed a p a r t i n t he a t t i t u d e s
of t h e i r men toward t he forthcoming oper at i on.
America1 Di vi si on l e a de r s , down t o and, i ncl udi ng t h e TF. l eve1,
f a i l e d t o super vi se pr oper l y t he pl anni ng of t h e Son My opera-
t i on. Thi s gave r i s e t o a l oos el y conceived pl an wi t h a poor l y
def i ned purpose. These f a i l u r e s r e s ul t e d i n t he i ssuance of
ambiguous, i l l e g a l , and pot e nt i a l l y expl osi ve or der s by LTC
Barker and CPT Medina, and possi bl y CPT Mi chl es, who f a i l e d ,
e i t h e r de l i be r a t e l y o r uni nt ent i onal l y, t o provi de i n t h e i r pl ans
and or der s f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t noncombatants might be found
i n t h e obj e c t i ve ar eas. Implementation of t hes e or der s ul t i mat el y
became t h e t a s k of gener al l y weak and i n e f f e c t i v e l eader s a t t he
pl at oon l e ve l and below. Col l ect i vel y, t hes e f a c t or s had a pro-
nounced impact on t h e r e s u l t s of t he Son My oper at i on.
K. PERMISSIVE ATTITUDE
The evi dence developed dur i ng t h i s I nqui r y s t f ongl y i ndi c a t e s
t h a t a dangerousl y per mi ssi ve a t t i t u d e toward t he handl i ng and
saf eguar di ng of Vietnamese and t h e i r pr oper t y e xi s t e d wi t hi n e l e -
ments of t h e l l t h Bri gade chai n of command p r i o r t o t he Son My
oper at i on. Evidence a l s o i ndi c a t e s var yi ng degr ees of concern by
MG Kost er, BG Lipscomb, COL Henderson, and LTC Barker concerni ng
t he s ubj e c t , but i n t h e l i g h t of t h e mi st r eat ment , r api ng, and
some i ndi s cr i mi nat e k i l l i n g of Vietnamese known t o have occurred
pr i or t o Son My, and i n view of t h e event s a t Son My i t s e l f , it
i s evi dent t h a t i f such concern di d e x i s t , it had not been com-
municated e f f e c t i v e l y t o t h e s ol di e r s -of TF Barker. There had
been l i t t l e i n t h e way of pos i t i ve enforcement by r esponsi bl e
commanders ( i n t h e form of di s c i pl i na r y a c t i on) of t h e pr ovi si ons
of di vi s i on and br i gade di r e c t i ve s deal i ng wi t h t he t r eat ment and
saf eguar di ng of noncombatants and t h e i r pr oper t y p r i o r t o Son My.
While COL Henderson was o f f i c i a l l y t he br i gade commander a t
t he t i me of t h e Son My oper at i on, t he evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t BG
Lipscomb, t h e pr evi ous br i gade cormnander, may have cont r i but ed
t o t he a t t i t u d e of permi ssi veness which e xi s t e d wi t hi n t he b r i -
gade. Thi s assumption i s warrant ed i n t h a t t he a t t i t u d e s of t h e
l l t h Bri gade s o l d i e r s who c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y mi s t r eat ed Vietnam-
ese na t i ona l s di d not devel op over ni ght nor di d t hey come i n t o
bei ng concur r ent l y wi t h t he change i n br i gade commanders. Evi-
dence of s c a t t e r e d i -nci dent s i nvol vi ng t h e mi st reat ment , r ape,
and possi b' l y t h e murder of Vi et namese' by l l t h Bri gade s ol di e r s
p r i o r t o t h e Son My oper at i on, i ndi c a t e s t h a t a per mi ssi ve a t t i -
t ude e xi s t e d, and was not uncovered and cor r ect ed, under BG
Lipscomb' s command.
The f a c t t h a t bot h COL Henderson and LTC Barker were bot h
r e l a t i v e l y new i n t h e i r command assi gnment s may have cont r i but ed
t o some unc e r t a i nt y among t h e i r subor di nat es as t o exact l y what
was expect ed of them and t h e i r s o l d i e r s i n t he handl i ng of V i e t -
namese noncombatants, but di d not r e l i e v e e i t h e r from t he cormnand
r e s pons i bi l i t y f o r t h e a c t i ons of t h e i r uni t s .
The evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t a number of C Company s ol di e r s
were i nvol ved i n t h e i l l e g a l a c t s a ga i ns t Vietnamese p r i o r t o t he
Son My oper at i on. These a c t s may have mi rrored a permi ssi ve and
cal l oused a t t i t u d e by CPT Medina, or t hey may have r e s ul t e d from
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e company was e s s e n t i a l l y a one-man show run by
CPT Medina who was, r egar dl es s of h i s i nt e nt i ons , i ncapabl e of
e xe r c i s i ng si ngl e-handed cont r ol of 1 00-plus s ol di e r s . The evi -
dence i s i nconcl usi ve i n t h i s r egar d, but suggest s t he l a t t e r
s i t u a t i o n . As i ndi c a t e d pr evi ousl y, t he r e t i c e nc e and. l ack of
l eader s hi p among t h e pl at oon l eader s of C Company a l s o cont r i bu-
t e d t o t h e gener al permi ssi veness which e xi s t e d i n t h e company
a t t he t i m e of t h e oper at i on.
There was no evi dence developed t o i ndi c a t e t he e xi s t - .
ence of a per mi ssi ve a t t i t u d e among key members of B Company.
To t h e cont r ar y, t h e evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t CPT Mi chl es ne i t he r
condoned nor t o l e r a t e d mi st reat ment of Vietnamese by B Company
s ol di e r s p r i o r t o t h e Son My oper at i on.
It i s evi dent t h a t t h e gener al l y per mi ssi ve a t t i t u d e which
e xi s t e d i n some of t h e u n i t s of t h e l l t h Bri gade p r i o r t o Son My
was brought i n t o s ha r p focus f o r t he men of TF Barker by t he
or der s i s s ued on 15 March by LTC Barker, CPT Medina, and possi bl y
CPT Mi chl es, and s i g n i f i c a n t l y i nf l uenced t h e event s of t h e f ol -
lowing day.
L. LACK OF AFFIRMATIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL
A va r i e t y of f a c t or s , which became evi dent dur i ng t he
I nqui r y, c o l l e c t i v e l y i ndi c a t e t h a t t he r e was a gener al l ack of
a f f i r ma t i ve command and c ont r ol t hroughout t h e l l t h Bri gade, and
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n TF Barker a t t h e t i m e of t he Son My oper at i on.
The evi dence of pr evi ous mi st reat ment of Vietnamese by s o l -
d i e r s of t h e l l t h Bri gade and TF Barker, , t est i mony concerni ng
previ ous s c a t t e r e d de s t r uc t i on and bur ni ng of - Vietnamese homes,
t h e method i n which e a r l i e r TF oper at i ons were conducted, t he
a us t e r e s t a f f i n g of t h e TF and t h e s u p e r f i c i a l t r eat ment 05 pl ans
f o r t h e Son My oper at i on a l l poi nt t o t he l ack of an e f f e c t i v e
system of c ont r ol l i ng combat oper at i ons.
The evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t LTC Barker v i s i t e d h i s companies
i nf r equent l y whi l e t hey were oper at i ng i n t h e f i e l d . I t i s a l s o
evi dent t h a t t h e f a c i l i t i e s and equipment provi ded o r made a va i l -
abl e t o h i s i nt e r i m or gani zat i on were margi nal a t be s t . Thi s was
p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e wi t h r es pect t o t he communications f a c i l i t i e s
used i n h i s command and c ont r ol he l i c opt e r , and i n h i s t a c t i c a l
oper at i ons c e nt e r (TOC) . Thi s equipment had been drawn from
ot her or gani zat i ons of t he br i gade a t t he t i m e t h a t t h e TF was
e s t a bl i s he d.
A gener al pa t t e r n which emerged dur i ng t h i s I nqui r y was
t h a t some America1 commanders f a i l e d t o g e t on t h e ground wi t h
oper at i ng uni t s . Thi s was most pronounced on t h e day of t he Son
My oper at i on when not a s i n g l e commander above company l e ve l
landed i n t h e Son My ar ea t o per sonal l y communicate wi t h t he
ground f or c e s de s pi t e clear_ i ndi c a t i ons - t h a t unusual event s, of a
nat ur e r e qui r i ng command a t t e nt i on, weke t aki ng pl ace on t he
ground. Thi s i s brought i n t o even shar per focus by t he f a c t t h a t
t h i s was, on t h e f ace of it, t h e most s ucces s f ul oper at i on ever
conducted by an element of t he l l t h Brigade.
M. LACK OF EMPHASIS I N TRAI NI NG
Ear l y i n t h e I nqui r y, t he r e was a suspi ci on t h a t t he manner
i n which t h e l l t h Bri gade was act i vat ed, t r a i ne d, prepared f o r
over seas movement, and deployed t o Vietnam might have had some
i mpact upon t h e event s of Son My. I nves t i gat i on r eveal ed t h a t
t h i s was t h e cas e t o a l i mi t ed ext ent .
l l t h Bri gade el ement s underwent an accel er at ed t r a i n i n g pro-
gram, r ecei ved a s u b s t a n t i a l i nput of repl acement personnel
s hor t l y bef or e depl oyi ng, and event ual l y deployed e a r l i e r t han
or i gi na l l y had been schedul ed. Shor t l y a f t e r a r r i v i n g i n Vietnam,
planned makeup t r a i n i n g was e f f e c t e d by anot her i nf us i on of re-
placements ( t o overcome a pr oj ect ed r ot a t i on "hump") and by e a r l y
commitment of br i gade el ement s t o a c t i ve combat oper at i ons.
As a ne t r e s u l t of t he s e act i ons , t h e evi dence i ndi c a t e s
t h a t , a t b e s t , t h e s o l d i e r s of TF Barker had r ecei ved onl y mar-
gi na l t r a i n i n g i n s e ve r a l key ar eas p r i o r t o t h e Son My opera-
t i on. These ar eas were (1)pr ovi si ons of t h e Geneva Conventions,
( 2 ) handl i ng and saf eguar di ng of noncombatants, and ( 3 ) r u l e s of
engagement.
The problem of t r a i n i n g and i n s t r u c t i o n havi ng t o do wi t h
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of and response t o " i l l e g a l " or der s i s addressed
el sewhere i n t h i s r epor t . The evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t t r a i n i n g
de f i c i e nc i e s i n t h i s ar ea, t oget her wi t h de f i c i e nc i e s i n t hos e
t r a i n i n g ar eas descr i bed above, pl ayed a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t i n t he
Son My oper at i on.
N. PSYCHOLOGICAL BUILDUP
I n t h e . case of B Company, no f i r m concl usi ons can be drawn as
t o e i t h e r t h e na t ur e o r e f f e c t of any pr eoper at i onal psycholog-
i c a l bui l dup . t h a t may have been given t o t h e men. CPT Michles
di d not per s onal l y b r i e f h i s company, and t he r e i s some evi dence
t h a t t h e cont ent of t h e br i ef i ngs . gi ven by t h e pl at oon l eader s
was not uni form t hroughout t h e company. A l l t h e men appar ent l y
were t o l d t h a t t h e a r e a was popul at ed e n t i r e l y by "VC and VC
sympat hi zers" and t h a t t he mi ssi on was t o "cl ean t h e pl ace out , "
b u t t he r e was no suggest i on made of g e t t i n g revenge f o r pr evi ous
f r i e ndl y c a s ua l t i e s . Any at t empt t o eval uat e t h e psychol ogi cal
pr epar at i on gi ven t o B Company i s compl i cat ed by t h e f a c t t h a t
( a ) t h e main el ement s of B Company s uf f er ed heavy c a s u a l t i e s
and had t h e i r p r i n c i p a l mi ssi on abor t ed al most immediately a f t e r
t h e combat a s s a u l t , and ( b) t he s epar at ed 1st Pl at oon knew about
t hose c a s ua l t i e s ( i ncl udi ng t he deat h of t h e i r former pl at oon
l e a de r ) bef or e e nt e r i ng My Khe ( 4 ) . Undoubtedly, t h e c a s u a l t i e s
s uf f e r e d e a r l y on 16 March had a psychol ogi cal e f f e c t upon B
Company. Those e f f e c t s may have i nf l uenced, pos s i bl y i n d i f -
f e r e n t ways and t o a gr e a t e r e xt e nt t han pr eoper at i onal f a c t o r s ,
t h e subsequent a c t i ons of var i ous el ement s of t he company.
The men of C Company who pa r t i c i pa t e d i n t he Son My oper at i on
t e s t i f i e d , wi t hout except i on, t h a t t h e i r a c t i ons i n and around
My Lai ( 4 ) w e r e " di f f e r e nt " from anyt hi ng t hey had ever
been i nvol ved i n bef or e and from anyt hi ng t h a t t hey were ever i n-
vol ved i n af t er war ds. From t h e i r t est i mony it i s c l e a r t h a t a
l a r ge p a r t of t h e di f f e r e nc e der i ved from t h e i r under st andi ng of
t h e nat ur e and purpose of t he oper at i on. Thei r under st andi ng and
t h e a t t i t u d e s t h a t pr evai l ed bef or e t h e oper at i on appear t o have
been pr i mar i l y a pr oduct of t he f a c t or s pr evi ousl y descr i bed i n
t h i s chapt er . These f a c t or s were appar ent l y brought t o a shar p
focus by t h e b r i e f i n g which t hey r ecei ved on t h e day bef or e t h e
Son My oper at i on.
I n r e t r os pe c t , it is c l e a r t h a t i n h i s pr eoper at i onal br i e f -
i n g t o t he men of C Company, CPT Medina "pai nt ed t h e pi c t ur e "
t oo vi vi dl y, and exer ci s ed no di s cr i mi nat i on and l i t t l e r e s t r a i n t
i n h i s implementing or der s . He may a l s o have drawn some er r o-
neous concl usi ons from LTC Bar ker ' s br i e f i ng, o r si mpl y t wi s t ed
c e r t a i n el ement s of Bar ker ' s b r i e f i n g t o s u i t h i s own undi scr i -
mi nat i ng purposes. CPT Medina, l i k e h i s commander, i s s ued il-
l e g a l or der s t o burn and des t r oy pr oper t y i n t he t a r g e t a r e a ,
f a i l e d t o pr ovi de i n liis b r i e f i n g f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t non-
combatants might be found i n t h e a r e a , and f u r t h e r i nf l uenced
t h e event s t o fol l ow by f a i l i n g t o make any d i s t i n c t i o n s i n h i s
or der s concerni ng t he t r eat ment t o be accorded armed combat ant s,
suspect ed ( but unarmed) sympat hi zers, and out r i ght noncombatants.
CPT Medina' s e f f e c t i ve ne s s i n g e t t i n g h i s men psychol ogi cal l y
"up" f o r t h e expect ed f i g h t i s q u i t e c l e a r from t h e evi dence
pr esent ed t o t h i s I nqui r y.
Up u n t i l t h e t i me of t h e Son My oper at i on, t he men of C Com-
pany had pa r t i c i pa t e d i n l a r ge l y unproduct i ve oper at i ons and had
s uf f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t c a s ua l t i e s from enemy mines and boobyt raps.
During t h e cour se of t hose pr evi ous oper at i ons , s e ve r a l of them
had pa r t i c i pa t e d i n t h e mi st r eat ment , r ape, and pos s i bl e murder
of Vietnamese, wi t h no appar ent r e t r i but i on. They were t o l d by
t h e i r company commander t h a t t hey were going t o f ace an enemy
ba t t a l i on t h e f ol l owi ng day i n t h e Son My ar ea. They were t o l d
t h a t an a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on would be pl aced on t h e t a r g e t ar ea
bef or e t hey a r r i ve d and t h a t t h e l andi ng zone ( LZ) would probabl y
be "hot . " They were gi ven t he i mpressi on t h a t t he onl y peopl e
l e f t i n t h e a r e a would be t he enemy and t h a t t h e i r mi ssi on was t o
dest r oy t h e enemy and a l l h i s s uppl i es . They were t o l d t h a t
t h e b e s t way t o pr event t he enemy from r ecover i ng weapons from
t he b a t t l e f i e l d was t o cl os e wi t h t h e enemy aggr essi vel y. They
were reminded t h a t some of them would probabl y become' casual t i es
i n t h e oper at i on and were enj oi ned t o look out f o r each ot her .
They were reminded of t h e i r p a s t l os s e s t o enemy boobyt raps and
t h e i r f a i l u r e t o g e t revenge f o r t hose l os s e s . They were t o l d
t h a t t h e fort hcomi ng oper at i on would pr ovi de t he oppor t uni t y t o
obt a i n t h a t revenge. They were not t o l d of any r e s t r i c t i o n s of
any ki nd t h a t would be imposed on them i n accompl i shi ng t he as-
si gned mi ssi on.
0. SUMMARY
The f a c t or s descr i bed i n t h i s chapt er a r e consi der ed r e l e -
vant t o t he- pur pose of t h i s I nqui r y t o t he e xt e nt t h a t t hey as-
si st i n underst andi ng what happened a t Son My, and, t o a l e s s e r
e xt e nt , why it happened.
I n t h e t i m e a va i l a bl e t o t h i s I nqui r y, t he r e was no a t -
tempt t o anal yze t he f a c t or s i n dept h, nor t o eval uat e psycholog-
i c a l as pect s of what happened. Thi s i s consi dered a t a s k t h a t
can be b e s t performed by I team of hi ghl y q u a l i f i e d r esear ch
a na l ys t s wi t h t h e t e c hni c a l t a l e n t s and exper i ence necessary
. t o do j u s t i c e t o t h e s ubj ect .
Chapter 9
POLI CY AND DI.RECTIVES AS TO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
AND TREATMENT OF NONCOMBATANTS
A. US OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LAW OF WAR
The conduct of war among c i v i l i z e d nat i ons i s r egul at ed
by c e r t a i n wel l - est abl i shed r ul e s known a s t he r u l e s o r law
of war. Thi s law r e gul a t e s war f ar e on bot h t h e l and and t h e
sea. That which pe r t a i ns p a r t i c u l a r l y t o war on l and i s c a l l e d
t h e law of l and war f ar e.
Much of t h e law of war has been s e t out i n t r e a t i e s o r
convent i ons t o which t h e United S t a t e s i s a par t y. It i s com-
monly c a l l e d t h e wr i t t e n law of war.
Some of t he law of war never has been i ncor por at ed i n any
t r e a t y o r convent i on t o which t h e United St a t e s i s a si gnat or y.
Thi s law i s commonly c a l l e d t h e unwr i t t en o r customary law of
bar. For t h e most p a r t it i s w e l l def i ned by recogni zed aut hor-
i t i es on i nt e r na t i ona l law and i s f i r ml y e s t a bl i s he d by t he
Q U S ~ O ~ c i v i l i z e d nat i ons . and usage of
The pri mary sour ce of t h e wr i t t e n law of war a s it a ppl i e s
t o t h e Uni t ed St a t e s is i nt e r na t i ona l convent i ons (lawmaking
t r e a t i e s t o which t h e Uni t ed St a t e s is a p a r t y ) . Some of t h e
more i mpor t ant of t he s e ar e:
(1) Hague Convention No. I V Respect i ng t h e Laws and Customs
of War on Land and t h e Annex t he r e t o which embodies t h e Regula-
t i o n s Respect i ng t h e Laws and Customs of War on Land. '
( 2 ) The f our 1949 Geneva Conventions f o r t h e pr ot e c t i on
of t h e wounded and s i c k of armed f or ces i n t h e f i e l d ; wounded,
s i c k, and shipwrecked members of armed f or ces a t s ea; pr i s one r s
. -
of war; and c i v i l i a n persons i n t i mes of war.
( 3 ) The 1929 Geneva Conventions r e l a t i v e t o t h e t r eat ment
of pr i s oner s of war and amel i or at i on of t h e condi t i ons of t h e
wounded and s i c k of armi es i n t h e f i e l d .
The law o r w a r , bot h wr i t t e n and customary, had t h e pr i n-
c i p a l purpose of di mi ni shi ng t h e e v i l s of war by:
a. Pr ot e c t i ng bot h noncombatants and combatants
from unnecessary s uf f e r i ng;
b. Safeguardi ng c e r t a i n fundamental human r i g h t s
of persons who f a l l i n t o t h e hands of t h e enemy, par-
t i c u l a r l y pr i s oner s of war, t h e wounded and s i c k, and
c i v i l i a n s ; and
c. Fa c i l i t a t i n g t h e r e s t or a t i on of t he peace.
The, Uni t edSt a t e s r ecogni zes t h e c o n f l i c t i n Vietnam a s an
i nt e r na t i ona l c o n f l i c t t o which bot h customary and wr i t t e n o r
convent i onal law of war appl y, and t he. Uni t ed St a t e s has de-
c l a r e d i t s i n t e n t t o observe t h i s law.
The Uni t ed St a t e s has an obl i ga t i on t o i n s t r u c t i t s mi l i t a r y
per sonnel concerni ng t he convent i onal law of war which t h e United
St a t e s has recogni zed. Thi s obl i ga t i on i s i n p a r t f u l f i l l e d by
formal mi l i t a r y i ns t r uc t i ons and d i r e c t i v e s . Fur t her , t he Uni t ed
St a t e s has a f f i r ma t i ve r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o i nve s t i ga t e a l l e ge d
vi ol a t i ons of t h e pe r t i ne nt convent i ons. I t s obl i ga t i ons under
t he "grave br eaches" a r t i c l e of each of t h e 1949 Geneva Conven-
t i o n s a r e q u i t e s pe c i f i c :
The High Cont r act i ng Pa r t i e s undert ake t o enact
any l e g i s l a t i o n necessar y t o pr ovi de e f f e c t i v e penal
s anct i ons f o r persons committing, o r or der i ng t o be
committed, any of t h e grave breaches of t h e pr e s e nt
Convention def i ned i n t h e f ol l owi ng A r t i c l e .
Each High Cont r act i ng Par t y s h a l l be under t he
- obl i ga t i on t o sear ch f o r per sons a l l e ge d t o have com-
mi t t ed, o r t o have or der ed t o be committed, such
grave br eaches, and s h a l l br i ng such per sons, regard-
less of t h e i r na t i ona l i t y, bef or e i t s own cour t s . I t
may a l s o , i f itpr e f e r s , and i n accordance wi t h t h e
pr ovi si ons of i t s own l e g i s l a t i o n , hand such persons
over f o r t r i a l t o anot her High Cont r act i ng Pa r t y
concerned, provi ded such High Cont r act i ng Par t y had
made out a prima f a c i e case.
Each High Cont r act i ng Par t y s h a l l t a ke measures
necessar y f o r t he suppr essi on of a l l a c t s cont r ar y t o
t h e pr ovi si ons of t he pr e s e nt Convention ot he r t han
t h e grave breaches def i ned i n t h e fol l owi ng Ar t i c l e .
I n a l l ci rcumst ances, t he accused persons s h a l l
be ne f i t by saf eguar ds of pr oper t r i a l and def ense,
which s h a l l not be l e s s f avor abl e t han t hose provi ded
by Ar t i cl e. 105 and ' t hose fol l owi ng of t he Geneva
Convention Rel at i ve t o t h e Treatment of Pr i s oner s of
War of August 12, 1949.
Grave breaches t o which t h e precedi ng Ar t i c l e
r e l a t e s s h a l l be t hose invol' ving t he fol l owi ng a c t s ,
i f committed a ga i ns t persons o r pr oper t y pr ot ect ed by
pr es ent Convention: wi l f u l k i l l i n g , t o r t u r e o r
inhuman t r eat ment , i ncl udi ng bi ol ogi c a l experi ment s,
wi l f u l l y causi ng gr e a t s uf f e r i ng o r s e r i ous i nj ur y t o
body o r he a l t h, unl awful depor t at i on o r t r a n s f e r o r
unl awful confinement of a pr ot ect ed person, ...t aki ng
of host ages and ext ensi ve de s t r uc t i on and appropri -
a t i on of pr oper t y, not j u s t i f i e d by mi l i t a r y ne c e s s i t y
and c a r r i e d out unl awful l y and wantonly.
Most of t he "grave breaches" l i s t e d above had been
consi der ed a s vi ol a t i ons of customary law o r were denounced i n
ot he r convent i ons p r i o r t o t he 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Both US mi l i t a r y law and i nt e r na t i ona l law pl ace c e r t a i n
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s upon mi l i t a r y commanders t o c ont r ol t h e i r
t r oops , t o i nve s t i ga t e al l eged vi ol a t i ons of t he law of war,
and t o t ake appr opr i at e act i on. Furt hermore, many of f ens es
a ga i ns t t h e law of war a r e vi ol a t i ons of t he Uniform Code of
Mi l i t a r y J us t i c e .
The United St a t e s , as a c i v i l i z e d nat i on and a s a s i gnat or y
of Hague Convention No. I V (1907) and i t s Annex and t h e f our
Geneva Conventions of 1949, i s obl i gat ed t o observe t he law of
war, t o i nve s t i ga t e al l eged war cri mes, and, i n appr opr i at e
cas es , t o br i ng al l eged of f ender s t o t r i a l .
The t erm "war crime" i s t h e t e c hni c a l expr essi on f o r a
vi ol a t i on of t h e law of war by any person o r per sons, mi l i t a r y
o r c i v i l i a n . Every vi ol a t i on of t he law of war i s a war cri me. ,
B. UNI TED STATES DIRECTIVES
1. Pol i cy Guidance
a . General
The mi l i t a r y depart ment s wi t hi n t h e Department of
9-3
Defense (DOD) have promulgated r egul at i ons pr ovi di ng guidance
t o mi l i t a r y per sonnel on customary and t r e a t y law appl i cabl e
t o t h e conduct of war f ar e. As not ed pr evi ousl y, t h e law of
l and war f ar e r egul at es t he conduct of armed h o s t i l e s and i s
i ns pi r e d by t h e d e s i r e t o di mi ni sh t he e v i l s of war.
Within t he guidance e s t a bl i s he d- by DOD, each of t h e m i l i -
t a r y s e r vi c e s has publ i shed r e gul a t i ons pe r t a i ni ng t o bot h
sour ces of t h e law of ' wa r , a s w e l l a s de t a i l e d i ns t r uc t i ons
r egar di ng t h e engagement, apprehensi on, and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of
i ndi vi dual s pr es ent i n a h o s t i l e environment. Spe c i f i c a l l y,
t he Department of t h e Army (DA) has di r e c t e d a c t i ons through
t he chai n of command t o i ns ur e t h a t t he US s o l d i e r knows h i s
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n t h e conduct of war t h a t a r e based on t he
r ul e s of l and warfare. ' Thi s i s accomplished t hrough t he pub-
l i c a t i o n syst em which s p e l l s out t h e i ndi vi dua l ' s r esponsi bi -
l i t i es.
To accomplish t he r e q u i s i t e t r a i n i n g , DA has def i ned two
broad obj ect i ves :
(1) Def i ni t i on of t h e US na t i ona l pol i cy i n t h e conduct of
l and war f ar e t o i ncl ude t he r ul e s and law of war.
( 2 ) Tr ai ni ng r equi r ed t o i ns ur e t h a t t h e i ndi vi dua l s o l d i e r
underst ands h i s s p e c i f i c dut i e s and obl i ga t i ons i n t h e p u r s u i t
of t h e US na t i ona l pol i cy.
b. Geneva Conventions Tr ai ni ng
By Army Regul at i on (AR) 350-216, commanders ar e. re-
qui r ed t o pr ovi de i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t i s adequat e t o i ns ur e t h a t
a l l members of t h e i r commands underst and t h e pr i nc i pl e s and t h e
pr ovi si ons of t he Geneva and Hague Conventions, which a r e
bi ndi ng on t he Uni t ed St a t e s . [ 6] Thi s t r a i n i n g i s desi gned
t o be conducted i n a manner t h a t w i l l provi de each i ndi vi dua l
wi t h an underst andi ng of h i s r e s pons i bi l i t y under t h e pr ovi si ons
of t hes e convent i ons t o a f f or d humane t r eat ment bot h t o pr i s oner s
of war and t h e enemy c i v i l i a n popul at i on. As a f i r s t s t e p ,
t he s o l d i e r r ecei ves i n Basi c Combat Tr ai ni ng (BCT) an hour of
i ns t r uc t i on based on Army Subj ect Schedul e 21-18.[81 Thi s
s ubj ect schedul e i s publ i shed t o pr ovi de uni f or mi t y i n t he
f a mi l i a r i z a t i on of mi l i t a r y per sonnel wi t h t h e Geneva Conventions
of 1949. The l es s on out l i ne , t e x t and publ i c a t i on r ef er ences ,
and t r a i n i n g f i l ms a r e desi gned t o provi de t he r e q u i s i t e back-
ground and suppl ement al i ns t r uc t i on mat er i al . The scope of t h i s
i ns t r uc t i on i ncl udes t he s p e c i f i c pr ovi si ons of t h e Geneva Con-
vent i ons of 1949 and a di s cus s i on of i ndi vi dua l d u t i e s , r i g h t s ,
and obl i ga t i ons t her eunder .
AR 350-216 a l s o d i r e c t s t h a t commanders w i l l t a ke a c t i on t o
i ns ur e t h a t each member of t h e i r command r ecei ves t r a i n i n g i n
t h e convent i ons each 12-month per i od. Sui t a bl e e n t r i e s w i l l
be made annual l y i n t he i ndi vi dua l ' s per sonnel r ecor d i ndi c a t i ng
t h e da t e t h a t such i n s t r u c t i o n was l a s t completed. Qua l i f i e d
l e g a l o f f i c e r s a r e r equi r ed t o conduct t h i s annual i ns t r uc t i on.
Ther ef or e, t h e i ndi vi dua l s o l d i e r r ecei ves t h e f oundat i onal
i ns t r uc t i on i n ba s i c t r a i n i n g , and t h i s t r a i n i n g i s cont i nual l y
updat ed on an annual ba s i s usi ng Fi e l d Manual (FM) 27-10,
several DA pamphl et s, and c ur r e nt t r a i n i n g f i l ms .
As e a r l y a s 1964, Mi l i t a r y Assi st ance Command, Vietnam
(MACV) d i r e c t i v e s and r egul at i ons had been publ i shed t h a t per-
t a i ne d t o t h e i ndi vi dua l s o l d i e r ' s dut i e s and obl i ga t i ons under
t h e r u l e s of war f ar e. Subsequent l y, t hes e d i r e c t i v e s were ex-
panded, updat ed, and c l a r i f i e d a s subor di nat e headquar t er s were
act i vat ed. By 1967-68, di r e c t i ve s and r egul at i ons w e r e i n
e f f e c t t h a t per t ai ned t o a l l phases of mi l i t a r y oper at i ons and
t ' rai ni ng.
Army personnel ' normal l y a r r i ve d i n t he Republ i c of Vietnam
(RVN) a t a repl acement u n i t where it was r equi r ed by United
St a t e s Ar my Vietnam (USARV) Regul at i on 612-1 t h a t a l l mi l i t a r y
per sonnel would r e c e i ve , among ot he r s , t he f ol l owi ng i nf or mat i on
car ds :
(1) "The Enemy i n Your Hands;"
( 2 ) "Nine Rules ;"
( 3) "Code of Conduct;" and
( 4 ) "Geneva Convention. "
I n addi t i on, a l l commissioned o f f i c e r s would r ecei ve a car d
e n t i t l e d "Guidance f o r Commanders i n Vietnam." These car ds
were t o be kept i n t he i ndi vi dua l ' s possessi on a t a l l t i mes
because of t h e usef ul ness of t h e i nf or mat i on t hey cont ai ned.
These car ds s t r e s s e d h u ~ a n i t a r i a n t r eat ment and r e s pe c t f o r
t h e Vietnamese peopl e and s t i p u l a t e d t h a t each i ndi vi dua l would
comply wi t h t h e Geneva Conventions of 1949. I ndi vi dual methods
of capt ur e, c a r e , and t r eat ment w e r e s peci f i cal l y- i ncl uded i n;
t h e c a r ds . '
c. Rules of Engagement
The r u l e s of engagement (ROE) f o r mi l i t a r y oper at i ons
i n Vietnam a r e based on s p e c i f i c a ut hor i t y gr ant ed by t h e J o i n t
Chi efs of St a f f (JCS). I n 1966, Commander, Uni t ed St a t e s
Mi l i t a r y Assi st ance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) e s t a bl i s he d a
pol i cy of r epubl i s hi ng t h e ROE every 6 months t o i ns ur e maximum
v i s i b i l i t y t o a l l US personnel dur i ng t h e i r t our . These ROE
provi ded t h e gui dance f o r t h e conduct of combat oper at i ons
wi t hi n RVN and di r e c t e d t h a t a l l pr a c t i c a bl e means be e-rployed
t o l i m i t t h e r i s k t o t h e l i v e s and pr oper t y of f r i e ndl y f or ces
and c i v i l i a n s .
The c ont r ol of combat oper at i ons and a ppl i c a t i on of t he
ROE pe r t a i ni ng t o t he i ndi vi dua l s o l d i e r were vest ed i n t he
commander a t each subor di nat e l e ve l who, among ot he r r esponsi -
b i l i t i e s , .was di r e c t e d t o "use your fi repower wi t h c a r e and
di s cr i mi nat i on, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n popul at ed ar eas . " j The
chai n of command was t o be u t i l i z e d t o t h e f u l l e s t e xt e nt t o
i ns ur e s ucces s i n b a t t l e wi t h t h e minimum expendi t ur e of
r esour ces. The s o l d i e r was regarded as a member of a team r e s -
ponsive t o h i s l eader , y e t r esponsi bl e f or h i s i ndi vi dua l act i ons.
Ear l y i n t h e c o n f l i c t , t h e magnitude of t h e fi repower a va i l -
abl e f o r employment was recogni zed. The i ndi vi dua l s o l d i e r ' s
r i f l e f i r e was supplemented by huge q u a n t i t i e s of d i r e c t and i n-
d i r e c t fi repower from a l a r ge va r i e t y of sour ces. A l l means of
fi repower had t o be c a r e f ul l y c ont r ol l e d and coor di nat ed t o i n -
s ur e s uc c e s s f ul , y e t proper, employment. F i r e cont r ol and
coor di nat i ng el ement s were organi zed a t each l e v e l of command
down t o and i nc l udi ng r i f l e companies. These el ement s had t he
c a pa bi l i t y t o coor di nat e and c ont r ol a l l a va i l a bl e means and
sources of s uppor t i ng fi repower. However, because t h e var i ed
sour ces of f i r epower had d i f f e r e n t de l i ve r y means and accuracy,
t he r u l e s of employment f o r each var i ed. It was c l e a r a t an
e a r l y da t e t h a t t h e means of cont r ol and t h e r u l e s t h a t governed
t he employment of t h e d i f f e r e n t t ypes and s i z e s of ordnance
were ext remel y i mpor t ant .
MACV Di r e c t i ve s 95-4 and 525-18 were i n e f f e c t i n e a r l y
1968. These r e gul a t i ons d e a l t wi t h combat oper at i ons and, more
p a r t i c u l a r l y , wi t h t h e c ont r ol of fi repower del i ver ed by ar -
t i l l e r y , mort ar, a i r , and naval means.
MACV Di r ect i ve 95-4 s t i p u l a t e d t h a t ai rpower shoul d be
employed wi t h t h e obj ect i ve of el i mi nat i ng " i nci dent s i nvol vi ng
f r i e ndl y f or ces , noncombatants, and damage t o c i v i l i a n pr oper t y. "
I n ope r a t i ona l pl anni ng of ba t t a l i on- l e ve l oper at i ons, it
was r equi r ed , t h a t r e pr e s e nt a t i ve s of a vi a t i on u n i t s p a r t i c i p a t e
i n t h e t a c t i c a l ground pl anni ng t o pr ovi de f or t h e necessary
coor di nat i on and c ont r ol of t h e fi repower a va i l a bl e wi t hi n t he
avi at i on u n i t s .
The s p e c i f i c r e s t r i c t i o n s and ROE f o r US a i r c r a f t i n RVN
were ampl i f i ed i n Annex D t o MACV Di r ect i ve 95-4 which di r e c t e d
t h a t " a l l p i l o t s w i l l endeavor t o minimize noncombatant casual -
t i e s and c i v i l i a n pr oper t y damage." . Thi s annex a l s o
s t a t e d t h a t " i f such a s i n t h e t a r g e t i nvol ves ~~or ~c omba t a nt s ,
a haml et o r v i l l a g e , whenever pos s i bl e a Republ i c of Vietnam A i r
Force (RVNAF) obser ver w i l l be aboard t h e he l i c opt e r and US-GVN-
RVNAF approval of f i r e must be obt ai ned unl ess t he s i t u a t i o n
c l e a r l y pr es ent s an immediate t h r e a t t o l i v e s of t h e crew."
Cer t ai n a r e a s i n RVN were uni nhabi t ed or had been i d e n t i f i e d
a s such by Government of Vietnam (GVN) a u t h o r i t i e s . I n 1966,
c e r t a i n of t hes e a r e a s w e r e desi gnat ed a s c l e a r e d a r e a s t o a l l
Fr ee World Mi l i t a r y Assi st ance Forces (FWMAF) by t h e GVN and
became known a s " f r e e f i r e zones. " Simply s t a t e d , a f r e e f i r e
zone was a s p e c i f i c a l l y de l i ne a t e d geographi c a r e a , us ual l y f r e e
of any known popul ace, t h a t had been pr evi ousl y approved f o r use
of a l l means of f i r e and maneuver. Such an a r e a was c l e a r e d f o r
employment of fi repower unl ess n o t i f i c a t i o n t o t h e cont r ar y was
gi ven. I n 1967 MACV r epl aced i t s use wi t h t he t erm " s pe c i f i e d
s t r i k e zone (SSZ) ." An SSZ was def i ned a s "t hose ar eas approved
by a provi nce chi ef where s t r i k e s may be conducted wi t hout
a ddi t i ona l p o l i t i c a l cl ear ance. " l
The c ont r ol of a r t i l l e r y/ mor t a r and naval gunf i r e suppor t
wa s di r e c t e d by MACV Di r ect i ve 525-18. Re s t r i c t i ve c ont r ol s were
t o be hel d t o t h e minimum necessar y t o i ns ur e t h a t c i v i l i a n s and
t h e i r pr oper t y w e r e not dest r oyed o r damaged.' Thi s
d i r e c t i v e s t a t e d , however, t h a t f i r e mi ssi ons di r e c t e d a ga i ns t
known o r suspect ed VC/NVA t a r g e t s i n v i l l a g e s and haml et s
occupi ed by noncombatants " wi l l be" c ont r ol l e d by an obser ver
and "execut ed onl y a f t e r Provi nce Chief o r Di s t r i c t Chief
approves a s appr opr i at e. " Under c e r t a i n s pe c i f i e d condi t i ons ,
however, t h i s r e gul a t i on d i a aut hor i ze s t r i k i n g a r e a s known t o be
i nhabi t ed by noncombatants. I t s t a t e s : "Vi l l ages and haml et s
may be at t acked wi t hout p r i o r warning i f t h e a t t a c k i s i n con-
j unct i on wi t h a ground oper at i on i nvol vi ng maneuver of ground
f or c e s t hrough t he a r e a , and i f i n t h e judgment of t h e ground
commander, h i s mi ssi on would be j eopar di zed by such warning. "
During t he 1968 Tet -of f ens i ve, Headquart ers, MACV (Forward),
i s s ued temporary modi f i cat i ons t o MACV Di r ect i ve 525-18 f o r
s p e c i f i c purposes i n desi gnat ed a r e a s . o f I Corps Ta c t i c a l Zone
( I CTZ) . Some commanders were aut hor i zed t o a t t a c k i nhabi t ed
a r e a s wi t h weapons and f or ces most appr opr i at e t o i ns ur e prompt
r e s t r i c t i o n of t h e enemy. Even wi t h t he s e temporary modi fi ca-
t i ons , however, commanders w e r e enj oi ned t o e xe r c i s e pr udent
judgment t o pr ot e c t noncombatants and p r i v a t e pr oper t y.
d. Treat ment of Noncombatants and Pr i va t e Pr oper t y
9-7
MACV d i r e c t i v e s i n e f f e c t a t t he t i m e of t he Son My
oper at i on d e a l t s p e c i f i c a l l y wi t h t h e s ubj e c t of minimizing non-
combatant c a s ua l t i e s and t he c ont r ol of Vietnamese pr oper t y,
capt ur ed ma t e r i e l , and food suppl i es, . These di r e c t i ve s were
pol i cy di r e c t i ve s pe r t a i ni ng t o combat oper at i ons i n gener al .
MACV Di r ect i ve 525-3 d e a l t wi t h minimizing noncombatant
c a s ua l t i e s . Noncombatants were gener al l y descr i bed a s t h e "hap-
l e s s rice farmer and t he smal l town i nha bi t a nt , whether a t any
one t i me [he] l i v e s i n a VC o r a GVN c ont r ol l e d ha kl e t " not i ng
t h a t where he l i v e s depends " t o a l a r ge e xt e nt upon f a c t or s and
f or ces beyond h i s c ont r ol . " , Commanders were di r e c t e d t o
c ont r ol f or c e and not use "unnecessary f or c e l eadi ng t o noncom-
ba t a nt b a t t l e c a s ua l t i e s i n a r e a t empor ar i l y c ont r ol l e d by t h e
VC."
The e xe r c i s e of r e s t r a i n t by s o l d i e r s t o reduce t o a minimum
t he c a s ua l t i e s i n f l i c t e d on t he noncombatant popul ace was
s t r e s s e d. Commanders were di r e c t e d t o "mai nt ai n and conduct a
thorough and cont i nui ng program t o emphasize bot h t h e s hor t - and
long-range i mport ance of minimizing noncombatant c a s ua l t i e s . "
Troop i ndoc t r i na t i on br i e f i ngs were t o be hel d bef or e each opera-
t i on. Each b r i e f i n g was t o i ncl ude t h e l qc a t i on of noncombatants
and ot he r f r i e ndl y f or c e s , measures t o pre%ent mutual i nt e r f e r e nc e ,
s a f e t y pr ecaut i ons f o r f i r e c ont r ol suppor t , r ul e s of engagement,
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and r ecogni t i on s i gna l s , emergency procedures,
and ot he r appr opr i at e mat t er s.
Sever al ot he r s i g n i f i c a n t poi nt s w e r e covered i n t h e di r ec-
t i v e :
(1) The VC f u l l y e x p l o i t i nc i de nt s of noncom-
ba t a nt c a s ua l t i e s and de s t r uc t i on of pr oper t y by US
f or ces .
( 2) Commanders w i l l consi der t h e psychol ogi cal
a s w e l l a s t he mi l i t a r y obj ect i ves . Reconnaissance
by f i r e and poor l y s e l e c t e d har as s i ng f i r e s a r e
count er pr oduct i ve i n t he l ong run.
. ( 3 ) Speci f i ed s t r i k e zones shoul d be con-
f i gur ed t o excl ude popul at ed ar eas .
( 4 ) Es t abl i s hed r ul e s of good mi l i t a r y con-
duct and d i s c i p l i n e must be enforced.
( 5) Implementing i ns t r uc t i ons and SOP'S
concerni ng t h i s d i r e c t i v e , f i r e c ont r ol suppor t
and s a f e t y pr ecaut i ons w i l l be i s s ued by major
commanders. Commanders w i l l i ns ur e di s t r i bu-
t i o n t o t h e l owest echel ons.
MACV Di r ect i ve 525-9 e s t a bl i s he d p o l i c i e s and procedures
f o r c ont r ol , di s pos i t i on, and saf eguar di ng of p r i v a t e pr oper t y
and food s uppl i es as w e l l a s capt ur ed ma t e r i e l and s uppl i e s
dur i ng combat oper at i ons. Long-term US and GVN obj e c t i ve s w e r e
s t r e s s e d and cont i nui ng command emphasis was di r e c t e d t o t h e
pr ecl us i on of de s t r uc t i on. Spe c i f i c a l l y, t h i s document di r e c t e d
t h a t t h e di s pos i t i on of pr i va t e pr oper t y and s uppl i es i s t he
r e s pons i bi l i t y of GVN o f f i c i a l s and t h a t c i v i l i a n dwel l i ngs o r
p r i v a t e pr oper t y, i ncl udi ng l i ve s t oc k, w i l l not be dest r oyed
by US f or ces except a s an unavoided consequence of combat act i ons .
I f de s t r uc t i on i s t o be accomplished a s a de ni a l measure, such
a c t i on w i l l be l e f t t o GVN a u t h o r i t i e s o r RVNAF uni t s .
e . Det ai ni ng I ndi vi dual s
I n a ddi t i on t o t he car ds pr evi ousl y mentioned, pol i cy
and gui dance f o r t h e apprehensi cq, det ent i on, and t r eat ment o f .
i ndi vi dual s suspect ed of h o s t i l e a c t s were covered i n s e ve r a l
MACV di r e c t i ve s .
The Combined Campaign Pl an f o r 1968 di r e c t e d prompt,
thorough and e f f e c t i v e scr eeni ng, s egr egat i on, and di s pos i t i on
of suspect ed enemy c i v i l i a n per sonnel capt ur ed o r det ai ned by
f r i e ndl y f or ces. The scr eeni ng pr ocess was t o be accomplished
i n scr eeni ng c e nt e r s e s t a bl i s he d j o i n t l y wi t h US and Vietnamese
mi l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n r epr es ent at i on. Screeni ng and segr egat i on
were t o i de nt i f y t he det ai nees a s e i t h e r appar ent pr i s one r s of
war (PW's) , known VC i d e n t i f i e d by b l a c k l i s t s , suspect ed c i v i l
def endant s, o r i nnocent s. Once an i ndi vi dua l ' s s t a t u s was
det ermi ned, t he Combined Ta c t i c a l Scr eeni ng Cent ers (CTSC)
were t o r e l e a s e t hose not under suspi ci on. Suspect ed c i v i l
defendant s were t o be r el eas ed t o Vietnamese c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s
a f t e r i nt e r r oga t i on by mi l i t a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e ( MI ) and ARVN
i nve s t i ga t or s . The s p e c i f i c s of t he scr eeni ng pr ocess were
covered i n MACV Di r ect i ve 381-46.' The val ue of human sour ce
i n t e l l i g e n c e was descr i bed i n MACV Di r ect i ve 381-11.
When an i ndi vi dua l was c l a s s i f i e d a s a P W i n accordance wi t h
MACV Di r ect i ve 381-46, c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c handl i ng procedures be-
came e f f e c t i v e . The MACV pol i cy and gui dance f o r t hes e pro-
cedures w e r e cont ai ned i n MACV,Directive 190-3. Thi s document
s t a t e d t h a t " a l l per sonnel det ai ned by US-forces w i l l be ex-
t ended t he f u l l pr ot e c t i on of t h e Geneva Convention of 12
August 1949." '
MACV Di r ect i ve 20-5 di r e c t e d " pol i c i e s and procedures f o r
det ermi ni ng whet her per sonnel i n t he cust ody of t h e United St a t e s
who have committed b e l l i g e r e n t a c t s a r e e n t i t l e d t o pr i s oner s
of war s t a t u s . " During t h i s det er mi nat i on, however, and whi l e
det ai ned, t h e suspect ed PW i s pr ot ect ed by t h e Geneva Conventions.
Ar t i c l e 5 of t he Geneva Conventions "r equi r ed t h a t t he pro-
t e c t i ons of t he Conventions be ext ended t o a person who has
committed a b e l l i g e r e n t a c t and whose ent i t l ement t o Pr i s oner
of War (PW) s t a t u s i s i n doubt u n t i l such t i m e a s h i s s t a t u s
has been det ermi ned by a competent t r i buna l . " Unt i l such
time a s an i ndi vi dua l ' s s t a t u s has been det ermi ned, t he Geneva
Conventions and MACV Di r ect i ves pr evi ousl y i ndi c a t e d pr ot e c t
t he i ndi vi dua l ' s r i ght s .
f . War Crimes
Combat oper at i ons dur i ng t h e 1968 Tet -of f ens i ve were
r epor t ed i n a s e ns a t i ona l manner. A t t i m e s , some r e por t s and
photographs pur por t ed t o de pi c t a f l a g r a n t di s r egar d f o r human
l i f e , inhumane t r eat ment , and b r u t q l i t y i n t h e handl i ng of
det ai nees and PW's. ' : Because of t h i s s i t u a t i o n , on 21 Feb-
ruary 1968, GEN Westmoreland wrot e a per sonal l e t t e r t o GEN Cao
Van Vien, Chief of J o i n t General St a f f , RVNAF, r e i t e r a t i n g t h e
neces s i t y f o r obser vi ng t he Geneva Conventions and t aki ng "ap-
pr opr i a t e a c t i on a ga i ns t t hose who of f end a ga i ns t t h e law of
war. " As an i ncl os ur e t o t h i s l et t er , GEN Westmoreland
i ncl uaeu a copy of a c onf i de nt i a l message he had di spat ched t o
a l l US f or ces concerni ng t he mi st r eat ment o f det ai nees and PW1s.
This message, si gned by MG Wal t er T. Kerwin, Jr., Chief of St a f f
MACV, di r e c t e d vi gorous and immediate command a c t i on " t o i ns ur e
t h a t a l l per sonnel a r e f a mi l i a r wi t h and observe s t r i c t l y FM
27-10, UCMJ [Uniform Code of Mi l i t a r y J us t i c e ] Ar t i c l e 93,
Geneva Conventions r e l a t i v e t o t r eat ment of PW ( Ar t i c l e s 12
through 121) , Geneva Conventions f o r amel i or at i on of wounded
and s i c k armed f or ces i n t h e f i e l d , Ar t i c l e s 12, 17, and 50,
and MACV Di r ect i ves 20-4, 27-5, and 190-3." The message a l s o
r eaf f i r med t h a t : "Al l known, suspect ed o r al l eged war cri mes
or a t r o c i t i e s committed by o r agai nst - US per sonnel w i l l be i n-
ves t i gat ed IAW [ i n accordance wi t h] MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4.
MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4 has a s a s t a t e d purpose: "To pr ovi de
uniform procedures f o r . t he c ol l e c t i on and per pet uat i on of evi -
dence r e l a t i v e t o war cri mes i nc i de nt s and t o des i gnat e t h e
agenci es r es pons i bl e f o r t h e conduct of i nve s t i ga t i ons f o r
al l eged o r appar ent vi ol a t i ons of t h e Geneva Conventions of 1 2
August 1949 For t h e Pr ot ect i on of War Vi ct i ms. "'
War cri mes were def i ned i n t h i s d i r e c t i v e by r ef er ence ' t o
FM 27-10. Paragraph 499 of FM 27-10 s t a t e s " t he t erm war crime
i s t he t e c hni c a l expr essi on f o r a vi ol a t i on of t h e law of war
by any person o r per sons, mi l i t a r y o r c i v i l i a n . Every vi ol a t i on
of t he law of war i s a war cri me. " (See a l s o MACV Di r ect i ve
27-5).
Di r ect i ve 20-4 f ur t he r el abor at ed on t he d e f i n i t i o n of war
cr i mes by s t a t i n g i n p a r t t h a t a ' gr ave br each' of t he Geneva
Conventions c o n s t i t u t e s a war crime. Some examples of ' grave
br eaches' were expl ai ned (when committed agai ns t per sons t aki ng
no a c t i ve p a r t i n t h e h o s t i l i t i e s , i ncl udi ng members of armed
f or ces who l a i d down t h e i r arms and t hose pl aced hor s de combat
by s i cknes s , wounds, det ent i on, o r any cause) as wi l f u l k i l l i n q ,
t o r t u r e , o r inhumane t r eat ment , o r wi l f ul l y causi ng gr e a t suf -
f e r i n g o r s e r i ous i n j u r y t o body o r heal t h.
The d i r e c t i v e a l s o provi ded de t a i l e d gui dance t o a l l
personnel f o r i nve s t i ga t i ng al l eged o r apparent war cri mes
agai ns t an i ndi vi dua l -who, i n t he cont ext of t he d e f i n i t i o n ,
was mi st r e' at ed i n any way subsequent t o apprehensi on and/or
det ent i on. The d i r e c t i v e f ur t he r s t a t e d i n pa r t :
a. Iti s t h e r e s pons i bi l i t y of a l l mi l i t a r y
per sonnel havi ng knowledge o r r ecei vi ng a r e por t
of an i nc i de nt o r an a c t t hought t o be a war cri me
t o make such i nc i de nt known t o h i s commanding
o f f i c e r as soon as pr a c t i c a bl e . Personnel per -
forming i nve s t i ga t i ve , i nt e l l i ge nc e , pol i c e ,
phot ographi c, grave r e g i s t r a t i o n , o r medical
f unct i ons , a s wel l as t hose i n cont act wi t h t he
enemy, w i l l , i n t h e normal cour se of t h e i r dut y,
make ever y e f f o r t t o de t e c t t he commission of war
cri mes and w i l l r e por t t he e s s e n t i a l f a c t s t o t h e i r
commanding o f f i c e r . Persons di scover i ngwar cri mes
w i l l t a ke a l l r easonabl e a c t i on under t he circum-
s t a nc e s t o pr eser ve physi cal evi dence, t o not e
i d e n t i t y of wi t nes s es pr e s e nt , and t o r ecor d (by
photograph, sket ch, o r de s c r i pt i ve not es ) t h e
ci rcumst ances and surroundi ngs.
b. Commanders and MACV St a f f s e c t i ons
r ecei vi ng r e por t s of probabl e war crimes w i l l ,
i n a ddi t i on t o any ot he r r equi r ed r e por t s ,
r e por t t h e f a c t a s soon a s pr a c t i c a bl e t o t he
St a f f Judge Advocate, USPIACV, and w i l l make
pe r t i ne nt c o l l a t e r a l i nf or mat i on avai l abl e t o
t h e appoi nt i ns a ut hor i t y and i nve s t i ga t i ng
o f f i c e r s .
c. I nve s t i ga t i ons of al l eged o r apparent
war cri mes w i l l be coordi nat ed wi t h t he St a f f
Judge Advocate, USMACV.
The appoi nt i ng a ut hor i t y under t h e di r e c t i ve :
a. W i l l appoi nt an i nve s t i ga t i ng o f f i c e r
and, i f appr opr i at e, des i gnat e a q u a l i f i e d cr i mi naa
i nve s t i ga t or o r CI D agent a s t echni cal a s s i s t a n t .
t
Upon r e c e i p t of n o t i f i c a t i o n of an al l eged o r ap-
par ent w a r crime concerni ng a member of h i s command,
one of t h e f ol l owi ng appoi nt i ng a u t h o r i t i e s w i l l ,
wi t h a l l di s pat ch, appoi nt an i nve s t i ga t i ng o f f i c e r
t o pr epar e and t r ans mi t t o him a r e por t of i nves t i ga-
t i on.
b. Of f i cer s who exer ci s e General Cour t - mar t i al
j ur i s di c t i on ( or t h e i r desi gnees) a r e appoi nt i ng
a u t h o r i t i e s f o r cases i nvol vi ng per sonnel under t h e i r
General Cour t - mar t i al j ur i s di c t i on. The Commanding
General , Headquart ers Detachment, US Army Element,
USMACV ( o r h i s desi gnee) i s t he appoi nt i ng aut hor i t y
f o r cases i nvol vi ng US Army per sonnel assi gned t o
'
USMACV and any ot he r person bel i eved t o be a US ser-
viceman but not s u f f i c i e n t l y i d e n t i f i e d o r ot her wi se
provided f o r by anot her appoi nt i ng a ut hor i t y. Commanders
of br i gades ( or t h e i r desi gnees) ,who have Judge
Advocate assi gned t o t h e i r s t a f f , a r e appoi nt i ng
a u t h o r i t i e s f o r cases i nvol vi ng per sonnel of t h e i r
br i gades.
MACV Di r ect i ve 27-5 r eaf f i r med t he " pr ohi bi t i on a ga i ns t com-
mission of war cri mes and r e l a t e d a c t s " and def i ned, a s w e l l a s
i l l u s t r a t e d , what c ons t i t ut e s a war crime. I n p a r t some of t he
examples i ndi cat ed i n t h i s r egul at i on i ncl uded: Mal t reat ment of
pr i s oner s of war o r det ai nees ; k i l l i n g wi t hout t r i a l s pi e s o r
ot her per sons who have committed h o s t i l e a c t s ; t o r t u r e o r i n-
human t r eat ment of a pr i s oner of war o r det ai nee; and depr i vi ng
PW's o r det ai nees of t h e r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . [ ; ' Thi s
d i r e c t i v e was "appl i cabl e t o a l l US mi l i t a r y p e r ~ o n n e l and t o
US c i v i l i a n per sonnel s er vi ngwi t h o r accompanying t h e armed f or ces
i n t he f i e l d . " Cont i nui ng, its t a t e d "Commission of any a c t
enumerated. . . or c ons t i t ut i ng a war crime i s pr ohi bi t ed. Vi ol at i on
of t h i s d i r e c t i v e w i l l be puni shabl e i n accordance wi t h t he
pr ovi si ons of t he Uniform Code of Mi l i t ar y J u s t i c e . "
The commission of a war crime o r t h e knowledge of and
f a i l u r e t o r e por t an al l eged war crime was t hus a puni shabl e
of f ense. Report i ng any i nci dent t h a t coul d be const r ued as a
war crime was mandatory.
MACV Di r ect i ve 335-1 d i r e c t s t h e procedures f o r r epor t i ng
" a l l s er i ous c r i m e s or i nci dent s occur r i ngwi t hi n RVN i nvol vi ng
US Forces per sonnel . " A s er i ous i nci dent i s def i ned a s "ariy
i nci dent which may r e s u l t i n damaging publ i c conf i dence i n t h e
US Armed For ces. " A s p e c i f i c example of a r epor t abl e s er i ous
i nci dent i s one "i nvol vi ng det ai nees and pr i s oner s of war f o r
which t he US has r e s pons i bi l i t y under t h e Geneva Conventions,
i ncl udi ng deat h, mal t r eat ment , s er i ous i n j u r y , r i o t s , and suc-
c e s s f ul escapes. "
g. Report i ng of I nci dent s .
3
The ver y na t ur e of t h e c o n f l i c t i n RVN ne c e s s i t a t e d
an i ncr eased awareness of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of acci dent al i nj ur y
t o f r i e ndl y mi l i t a r y or c i v i l i a n noncombatants. The f r equent
employment of massed fi repower from a va r i e t y of sour ces i n-
creased t h e l i ke l i hood of mi sdi r ect ed ordnance i nci dent s . The
i nt er mi ngl i ng of t h e nonuniformed f oe and t h e popul ace not only
made pos i t i ve i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of h o s t i l e f or ces d i f f i c u l t but
a l s o cont r i but ed t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of acci dent al i nj ur y o r
deat h t o t h e i nha bi t a nt s of some ar eas. Ear l y i n t h e c o n f l i c t ,
t he s e f a c t or s and many ot he r s as s oci at ed wi t h t h i s unique war
caused gr e a t concern a t t h e hi ghes t l e ve l s f o r t h e pr ot ect i on
of t he noncombatants and t h e mi ni mi zat i on of c a s u a l t i e s t o t hose
persons not d i r e c t l y i nvol ved. Fur t her , when i nc i de nt s i nvol vi ng
e i t h e r f r i e ndl y mi l i t a r y personnel o r c i v i l i a n na t i ona l s occur r ed,
i nve s t i ga t i ng and r e por t i ng procedures were mandatory s o t h a t
proper c or r e c t i ve a c t i on coul d be i n i t i a t e d immediately.
I n November 1966, MACV Di r ect i ve 335-12 was f i r s t publ i shed
and was subsequent l y modi fi ed i n November 1967. This d i r e c t i v e
pr escr i bed t h e format f o r r e por t i ng s i g n i f i c a n t event s wi t hout
del ay. Si gni f i c a nt event s i ncl ude, but a r e not l i mi t e d t o:
1. A l l i nc i de nt s , acci dent al or de l i be r a t e , i ncl udi ng
d i s a s t e r s r e s u l t i n g i n major pr oper t y de s t r uc t i on or
l o s s t o f r i e ndl y per sonnel , o r t h e k i l l i n g s , wounding,
o r mi s t r e a t i ng of f r i e ndl y personnel by US , RVN, or
Fr ee World Forces.
2. I nci dent s which coul d be det r i ment al t o US/GVN r e-
l a t i ons hi p. Such i nc i de nt s i ncl ude, but a r e not li-
mi t ed t o , t h e f ol l owi ng when caused by Americans:
a. In j ur y, deat h, or mi s t r e a t i ng of noncombatants
o r s i g n i f i c a n t damage t o Vietnamese pr oper t y i n t he
cour se of t a c t i c a l oper at i ons.
b. Ri ot s or di s or der s and involvement i n cr i mi nal
i nc i de nt s of a s e r i ous nat ur e.
c . I nci dent s which, because of t h e i r nat ur e o r
t h e per sonnel i nvol ved, reasonabl y may be expect ed t o
arouse publ i c i n t e r e s t , o r which a r e of s u f f i c i e n t i m-
por t ance t o r ecei ve wi despread publ i c i t y-
I n i t i a l r e por t s were t o be followed by de t a i l e d and complete
r e por t s i n t h e di r e c t e d format .
MACV Di r e c t i ve 335-1, a s pr evi ousl y i ndi c a t e d, e s t a bl i s he d
r epor t i ng pr ocedur es f o r a l l s e r i ous i nc i de nt s or cri mes. Any
i nc i de nt which coul d ar ouse publ i c i n t e r e s t or cause unfavorabl e
publ i c i t y r equi r ed r e por t i ng under t h i s d i r e c t i v e and gener al l y
covered t hos e i nc i de nt s not s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned by MACV D i r -
e c t i ve 335-12.
h. Mi l i t a r y Assi st ance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Emphasis
MACV publ i shed s e ve r a l ot he r documents pe r t a i ni ng t o
US pol i cy wi t h r egar d t o ROE, t r eat ment of Vietnamese na t i ona l s ,
and t he r e por t i ng of war crimes. Le t t e r s , memoranda, and mes-
sages emphasizing COMUSMACV's cbncern f o r t he s e s ubj e c t s , and
r eaf f i r mat i ons of MACV pol i cy were publ i shed on many occasi ons.
In addi t i on, t h e COP4USMACV command pol i cy f i l e emphasized t hes e
s ubj ect s . A t h i s Commander ' s Conferences, COMUSI'IACV r epeat edl y
di scussed t h e ne c e s s i t y f o r proper t r eat ment of Vietnamese na-
t i o n a l s and pr oper cont r ol of f i r epower . For i ns t ance, on 28
August 1966, GEN Westmoreland emphasized t he fol l owi ng:
I have f i v e poi nt s t o cover bef or e we conclude.
A t your desks a r e r ul e s of engagement and procedures
on cont r ol of f i r e s of a l l t ypes. It i s ext remel y
i mport ant t h a t we do a l l we can t o use our f i r e s wi t h
di s cr i mi nat i on, and avoi d noncombatant b a t t l e casual -
t i es. Thi s i s a very s e n s i t i v e s ubj e c t , bot h l oc a l -
l y, and among our own pr e s s corps. Unf or t unat el y,
we' ve had a r a s h of i nc i de nt s caused by ever yt hi ng
from mechanical f a i l u r e t o human e r r or . I would ap-
p r e c i a t e your revi ewi ng now, and your cont i nued r e-
view, of your s a f e t y pr ecaut i ons and procedures on
cont r ol of f i r e s . Make s ur e your commanders a r e t hor -
oughly f a mi l i a r wi t h t h e appr opr i at e documents.
Hencefort h my s t a f f w i l l r epubl i sh t he s e qua r t e r l y, t o
count er l o s s of f a mi l i a r i t y through t ur nover of person-
ne l . The per cent age of i nci dent s has been minuscule;
nonet hel ess, every c i v i l i a n k i l l e d i s a cal ami t y, and
we must c ut t h e per cent age t o t h e minimum pos s i bl e.
On 3 December 1967, GEN Westmoreland cl osed h i s Commander's
Conference by d i r e c t i n g each commander t o reduce f i r i n g acci -
dent s, r e por t a l l acci dent s/ i nci dent s d i r e c t t o MACV, and i n-
s ur e t h a t a l l t r oops underst and t h e "Nine Rul es" t h a t govern
t h e i r conduct i n RVN. Documentation of COMUSI'IACV pol i cy
and i n t e r e s t i n t he s e ar eas was and i s p l e n t i f u l .
The ne c e s s i t y f o r subor di nat e commanders t o implement t h e
MACV d i r e c t i v e s a s wel l a s t h e s t a t e d and i mpl i ed p o l i c i e s was
al s o emphasized. The chai n of command wi t hi n t he MACV uni f i e d
command af f or ded t h e means f o r t he necessary del egat i on of au-
t h o r i t y t o implement MACV pol i c i e s . Within t h e chai n of com-
mand, subor di nat e uni t s usual l y publ i shed d i r e c t i v e s el abor at i ng
upon t h e r egul at i ons of t h e hi gher headquar t er s and i ns ur i ng ,
t h a t a t t h e i r lower l e ve l of command t he s p e c i f i c a l l y di r e c t e d
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s assi gned t o them were f ur t he r implemented. An-
ot her f a c t o r used by subor di nat e headquar t er s i n det er mi ni ng ap-
p l i c a b i l i t y o r t h e requi rement t o implement t h e d i r e c t i v e s of a
hi gher headquar t er s was t h e mi ssi on assi gned t o t he subor di nat e
u n i t .
I n t h e case of USARV, f o r i ns t ance, t h e absence of an oper-
a t i ona l combat mi ssi on negat ed t h e need f o r combat oper at i ons
or der s , whereas 111Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) had a r equi r e-
ment f o r oper at i onal combat mi ssi ons as wel l as l o g i s t i c a l and
admi ni s t r at i ve suppor t a c t i v i t i e s . For d i r e c t i v e s or r egul at i ons
t h a t were appl i cabl e t o a l l personnel r egar dl es s of pos i t i on o r
mi ssi on, t h e subor di nat e headquar t er s ndght e l e c t not t o publ i sh
a dupl i c a t e d i r e c t i v e o r r egul at i on.
I n such i ns t a nc e s , a s a gener al r ul e , t h e commander was '
t hen hel d r es pons i bl e f o r i ns ur i ng t h a t i ndi vi dua l s wi t hi n h i s
' I command w e r e made aware of t h e pr ovi si ons of t h e r e gul a t i on o r
' d i r e c t i v e from hi gher headquar t er s which per t ai ned t o an i ndi -
vi dua l ' s a c t i ons o r <nact i ons. The sour ce of t h e r egul at i on o r
d i r e c t i v e was t he r e f or e not l e ga l l y i mpor t ant , and t he neces s i t y
f or a subor di nat e u n i t t o r epubl i s h each d i r e c t i v e of a hi gher
headquar t er s was not absol ut e.
2 . Implementing Di r ect i ves
a. Uni t ed St a t e s Army, Vietnam (USARV)
USARV, as t h e US Army component command headquar t er s,
publ i shed d i r e c t i v e s not onl y implementing MACV pol i cy, but a l s o
i n i t i a t i n g i n t e r n a l pol i cy.
Pol i cy and guidance f o r a l l echel ons of command i n plan-
ni ng, conduct i ng, and s uper vi s i ng t h e mi l i t a r y t r a i ni ng of i ndi -
vi dual s and u n i t s assi gned t o o r at t ached t o USARV a r e publ i shed
i n USARV Regul at i on 350-1, dat ed 1 0 November 1967 . Thi s regul a-
t i o n pr es cr i bed t h e pol i c y and guidance f or a l l echel ons of com-
mand i n pl anni ng, conduct i ng, and s uper vi s i ng t he mi l i t a r y t r a i n -
i ng of i ndi vi dua l s and u n i t s assi gned o r at t ached t o USARV. A l l
uni t s were di r e c t e d, as a minimum, t o schedul e or i e nt a t i on and
r e f r e s he r t r a i n i n g f o r a l l repl acement s and t o s t r i v e t o achi eve
t he completion of DA mandatory t r a i n i n g requi rement s. I n t h i s
r egar d, t h e requi rement f o r annual r e f r e s he r t r a i n i n g i n t he
Geneva Conventions a s pr escr i bed by AR 350-216 was l i s t e d as
mandatory t r a i ni ng. Tr ai ni ng i n t he r u l e s of . land war and t he
handl i ng of PW' s and det ai nees was r equi r ed t o be i nt e gr a t e d i n
,ot her t r a i n i n g a s t h e need f o r such t r a i n i n g was as cer t ai ned.
The s t a t u s of i ndi vi dua l o r u n i t pr of i ci ency di c t a t e d t h e f r e -
quency and amount of t r a i n i n g t o be gi ven.
Procedures f o r t he i ssuance of t h e guidance car ds t o i ndi -
vi dual s were found i n USARV Regul at i on 612-1. This r egul at i on
a l s o e s t a bl i s he d pol i c y wi t h r egar d t o t h e possessi on of i nf or -
mation car ds by a l l US Army personnel assi gned t o Vietnam. It
s pe c i f i e d t h a t upon a r r i v a l a t e i t h e r of t h e replacement b a t t a l -
i ons, a l l incoming o f f i c e r and e n l i s t e d per sonnel would r ecei ve
t he i nf or mat i on car ds e n t i t l e d "The Enemy i n Your Hands, " "Ti ps
on VC Mines and Booby Traps, I' "Nine Rul es, " "St andi ng Orders,
Rogers ' Rangers, " "Ti ps on t h e M-16 Rif l e , " "Code of Conduct, "
and "Geneva Convention. " These car ds cont ai n i nf or mat i on
us ef ul i n t h e performance of t h e d u t i e s assi gned t o t he person-
nel assi gned t o USARV. Each i ndi vi dua l was t o keep t hes e car ds
i n h i s possessi on a t a l l - t i mes.
USARV implemented t h e MACV Di r ect i ve (3 35-12 ) pe r t a i ni ng t o
a r t i l l e r y - i nc i de nt s by publ i shi ng USARV Regul at i on 527-7. Thi s
r egul at i on provi ded t h e same t ype i nf or mat i on as t h e MACV 335-12
except t h a t r e por t s were t o be immediately e l e c t r oni ' c a l l y t r a ns -
mi t t ed d i r e c t t o USARV, and followup i nve s t i ga t i ons ( e i t h e r f or -
mal o r i nf or mal ) were t o b-e submi t t ed wi t hi n 15 days t o Head-
qua r t e r s , USARV. CG, America1 Di vi si on, was s p e c i f i c a l l y c i t e d
as a r e c i p i e n t of t h i s di r e c t i ve .
MACV pol i cy wi t h r egar d t o s e r i ous i nc i de nt r e por t s (SIR)
was implemented a t USARV by Regul at i on 335-6. Major commanders
subor di nat e t o USARV were di r e c t e d t o r e por t s e r i ous i nci dent s
( def i ned) d i r e c t t o CG, USARV. Def i ni t i ons of s e r i ous i nci dent s
cont ai ned i n t h e MACV d i r e c t i v e were provi ded, and i n i t i a l re-
por t s , a s w e l l a s i nt e r i m and f i n a l r e por t s , were r equi r ed i n a
s p e c i f i c format .
USARV a l s o publ i shed r egul at i ons t h a t provi ded implementing
pol i cy f o r t h e evacuat i on, pr ocessi ng, and account i ng f o r de-
t ai ned per sonnel (USARV Regul at i on 190-2). Thi s r e gul a t i on a l s o
di r e c t e d t h a t det ai ned per sonnel would be provi ded humane t r e a t -
ment under t h e pr ovi si ons of t he Geneva Conventions.
USARV appar ent l y di d not publ i s h an implementing d i r e c t i v e
t o MACV Di r ect i ve 20- 4; however, t h i s MACV r egul at i on was appl i -
cabl e t hroughout t h e chai n of command and di d i n f a c t e s t a bl i s h
t he b a s i s and requi rement t o i nform each i ndi vi dual s o l d i e r
wi t hi n RVN of h i s s p e c i f i c r e s pons i bi l i t i e s .
b. I11 Marine Amphibious Force (111MAF)
I11 MAF was an oper at i onal headquar t er s subor di nat e t o
MACV. The Americal Di vi si on was assi gned t o USARV f o r adminis-
t r a t i v e and l o g i s t i c a l suppor t , and, i n Apr i l 1967, was di r e c t e d
t o r ecei ve oper at i onal di r e c t i on from I11 MAF. Formal l y, t h e
Americal Di vi si on was under t h e oper at i onal c ont r ol (OPCON) of
I11 MAF. I11 MAF publ i shed an ext ens i ve set of f or ce or der s and
I Corps coor di nat i ng i ns t r uc t i ons t h a t provi ded guidance and
pol i cy t o t h e US Marine f or ces , and ot he r US f or c e s i n I CTZ i n-
cl udi ng t h e Americal Di vi si on.
Di r ect i ves publ i shed by 111ElAF covered t r a i n i n g i n t h e
Geneva Conventions (Force Order 1570.1A) a s w e l l as oper at i onal /
r e por t i ng mat t er s. I ns t r uc t i ons were publ i shed by 111MAF t hat .
were desi gned bot h t o pr event and t o pr e s c r i be c e r t a i n conduct
which was i ni mi cal t o t h e accomplishment of t he mi ssi on of US
f or c e s i n, Vi et nam. Thi s d i r e c t i v e r e f e r r e d t o t h e "Nine
Rul es" f o r per sonnel i n RVN s t a t i n g t h a t , i n conci se t er ms, t h i s
car d was t h e s t andar d of conduct r equi r ed of a l l US per sonnel .
The c ont r ol of fi repower i n I CTZ was di r e c t e d by 111MAF
Force Order 3330.1 implementing and r ef er enci ng MACV Di r ect i ve
525-18. De f i ni t i ons of a SSZ w e r e i ncl uded as we l l as t he r e-
s t r i c t i o n s pr evi ousl y quot ed (MACV 525-18) f o r t h e conduct of
f i r e by a r t i l l e r y , mor t ar , o r naval weapons. I nhabi t ed ar eas
could be f i r e d upon " i f , i n t h e judgment of t h e ground cormnander?
h i s mi ssi on would be j eopar di zed" by warning. Thi s 111MAF Force
, Order was t o s e r ve a s t h e s t andi ng oper at i ng procedure (SOP) as
, w e l l a s have " t he f or ce of a USMACV Di r ect i ve.
,'
The ROE were s pe c i f i e d i n Force Order 3121.5 which recog-
ni zed t h a t t h e requi rement s f o r cont r ol of fi repower were gr e a t e r
t han ever bef or e. It s t a t e d t h a t , "on t h e ot her hand, maximum e f -
f e c t i ve ne s s must be achi eved i n oper at i ons agai ns t t he VC; on
t he ot her hand, a consci ent i ous e f f o r t must be made t o minimize
b a t t l e c a s ua l t i e s among noncombatants and de s t r uc t i on of t h e i r
pr oper t y. I11 E4AF s t r e s s e d t h e need f or i na i vi dua l r e-
s pons i bi l l t y and awareness a t t h e l owest l evel s . The deci s i ons
made were recogni zed a s r e qui r i ng "keen, s wi f t , de c i s i ve a na l ys i s
of t he f a c t or s i nvol ved and must be based on a thorough under-
s t andi ng of t h e l e g a l and moral pr i nc i pl e s concerned" e s pe c i a l l y
when deal i ng wi t h bot h noncombatants and PW's. 111 MAF '
Force Order 3460.3 s p e c i f i c a l l y d i r e c t s t h a t "Nu vi ol ence w i l l
be done t o t h e i r l i f e o r per son, no out r ages of any ki nd commit-
t e d upon them, and, pending del i ver y t o hi gher headquar t er s, t he
wounded and s i c k w i l l be car ed f or .
Pr ocessi ng, scr eeni ng, c l a s s i f yi ng, account i ng, and evacu-
a t i n g PW's a r e t horoughl y di scussed i n Force Order 3451.2A which
i ncl udes d e f i n i t i o n s of t he c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s t o be accorded i n-
di vi dua l s p r i o r t o det ermi ni ng t h a t t hey a r e PW's.
War cri mes i nve s t i ga t i ons and t he r epor t i ng requi rement s
implementing MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4 a r e publ i shed i n Force Order
5820.1.
Ser i ous i nc i de nt r e por t i ng was di r e c t e d by I11 MAF I Corps
Coordi nat i ng I ns t r uc t i on 5830.1A. Thi s document r e f e r r e d t o
MACV Di r ect i ves 335-1 and 335-12, and r e i t e r a t e d t h e r equi r e-
ment f o r "immediate r e por t s t o hi gher headquar t er s o f . any i n -
ci dent t h a t r e s u l t s i n deat h o r s e r i ous i n j u r y t o f r i endl y
f or ces o r noncombatants. "
c. Americal Di vi si on
The Americal Di vi si on, i n i t i a l l y ' TF Oregon, was respon-
s i ve t o I11 MAF r egul at i ons a f t e r bei ng pl accd under t he opera-
t i ona l cont r ol of I11 MAF on 22 Apr i l 1967. ' Addi t i onal l y,
t he Americal Di vi si on was admi ni s t r at i vel y s ~ n n y d i n a t e t o USARV.
Both I11 MAF and USARV were w e l l organi zed, and, a s pr evi ousl y
i ndi cat ed, had publ i shed many d i r e c t i v e s deal i ng wi t h ROE, re-
qui r ed r e por t s , mi ni mi zi ng noncombatant c a s ua l t i e s , a r t i l l e r y
i nci dent requi rement s, and war cri mes i nve s t i ga t i ve procedures.
These d i r e c t i v e s were d i r e c t l y appl i cabl e t o t he Americal Di vi -
si on.
TF Oregon publ i shed Regul at i on 335-6 on 2 1 Wxrch 1967. Thi s
di r e c t i ve r equi r ed immediate r e por t s i n a pr es cr i bed format f or
s er i ous i nc i de nt s , which were def i ned and i l l u s t r a t e d i n t he
same manner a s i n MACV Di r ect i ve 335-1 and USARV Regul at i on
335-6. The TF Oregon d i r e c t i v e ser ved as di vi s i on- l evel pol i cy
guidance f o r Americal Di vi si on t r oops a t t h e t i me of t he Son My
i nci dent .
Di vi si on pol i c y wi t h r ef er ence t o t he cont r ol of fi repower
was publ i shed a s Americal Regul at i on 525-4 on 16 March 1968.
This r egul at i on r ef er enced MACV Di r ect i ves 95-4, 525-3, 525-9,
and 525-18. Although t h e r egul at i on was not publ i shed u n t i l 1 6
March 1968, t est i mony i ndi c a t e s t h a t Americal Regul at i on 525-4
was wr i t t e n, s t a f f e d , and coor di nat ed p r i o r t o t h e Son Ply i n c i -
dent ; and t h e p o l i c i e s s t i p u l a t e d t he r e i n w e r e wel l known wi t hi n
t he di vi s i on. Thi s r egul at i on cont ai ns no i ndi c a t i on, however,
t h a t it was i nt ended t o supersede e a r l i e r r egul at i ons of e i t h e r
TF Oregon or t h e Americal Di vi si on. The s p e c i f i c s of Americal
Regul at i on 525-4 i ncl ude de f i ni t i ons of ar eas , e. g. SSZ, guid-
ance concerni ng t h e conduct and cont r ol of f i r epower , t h e neces-
s i t y f o r minimizing f r i e ndl y and noncombatant c a s ua l t i e s , and
t he requi rement f o r subor di nat e u n i t s t o devel op SOP'S and i m-
pl ement i ng i ns t r uc t i ons .
The TF Oregon SOP was t h e primary d i r e c t i v e i n e f f e c t
t hroughout 1967 and e a r l y 1968 pr ovi di ng guidance and pol i cy t o
subor di nat e h i t s . The Americal Di vi si on appar ent l y di d not
publ i s h many r egul at or y d i r e c t i v e s dur i ng i t s e a r l y s t a ge s of
format i on and or gani zat i on. The SOP i s dat ed 2 1 March 1967 and
di d pr ovi de, i n one volume, s p e c i f i c procedures concerni ng op-
e r a t i ons , i nt e l l i ge nc e , personnel and admi ni st r at i on, l o g i s t i c s ,
and ot her mat t er s. Di r ect r ef er ence was made i n t h i s document
t o minimizing c a s ua l t i e s / f r i e ndl y and-noncombatant) and hand-
l i n g of det ai nees . I n addi t i on, t h e ' requi rement f or s pot r e-
por t i ng was covered i n some d e t a i l and di r e c t e d t h a t s pot r e-
por t s be made expedi t i ous l y i n a pr escr i bed format.
As TF Oregon became t h e Americil Di vi si on, t he SOP was aug-
mented by d i r e c t i v e s t h a t s p e c i f i c a l l y covered t h e , areas of i n -
t e r e s t i nvol ved i n t h e 111F4AFI USARV, and MACV di r e c t i ve s . On
1 December 1967, Americal Di vi si on Ar t i l l e r y publ i shed a SOP
which provi ded r out i ne and r e c ur r i ng f i e l d oper at i onal procedures
w i .hin t he a r t i l l e r y uni t s assi gned or at t ached t o t he Americal
D: d s i o n . Cl earance f o r a r t i l l e r y f i r e s i n o r near i nhabi t ed
a eas was i n accordance wi t h t h e ROE s t i p u l a t e d by I11 P4AF and
-WCV di r e c t i ve s , and s p e c i f i c a l l y r equi r ed s pot r e por t s t o be
rendered wi t hout del ay i n t h e event of heavy f r i e ndl y or c i v i l -
i a n c a s ua l t i e s occur r i ng i n s h o r t per i od of t i me. Supplemen-
t i n g t h i s SOP, t h e di vi s i on a r t i l l e r y commander i s s ued s e ve r a l
d i r e c t i v e s f u r t h e r r e i t e r a t i n g t h e requi rement f o r r e por t s of
a r t i l l e r y i nc i de nt s o r mi sdi r ect ed ordnance.
Unt i l 15Apr i l 1968, t h e Americal Di vi si on oper at ed under
t he TF Oregon SOP of March 1967. On 15 Apr i l 1968, t he Americal
Di vi si on publ i shed a SOP of t h e i r own. Ther eaf t er , ot her d i r -
e c t i ve s , r egul at i ons , messages, and l e t t e r s were i s s ued suppl e-
menting t hos e i n e f f e c t and pr ovi di ng implementing i ns t r uc t i ons
f or t hos e of hi gher headquar t er s. I t was onl y by mid-1968 t h a t
t he Americal Di vi si on achi eved, t o a reasonabl e degr ee, an ade-
quat e s e r i e s of pol i cy gui dance di r e c t i ve s .
d. l l t h Bri gade
The 11t h Bri gade developed a SOP dur i ng t h e i r or gani za-
t i o n phase i n Hawaii. I n September 1967, p r i o r t o t h e i r depl oy-
ment t o RVN, t h e br i gade r ecei ved a copy of t he Americal SOP
(presumably t h e TF Oregon SOP) and ot her pe r t i ne nt r egul at i ons
t h a t provi ded t h e d i r e c t i v e s and documentation p o l i c i e s of t h e
di vi s i on. A s pr evi ousl y i ndi cat ed, t he subor di nat e uni t s
of t h e 1ltL1dr i gade were s ubj ect ed t o an accel er at ed t r a i n i n g
program from l a t e Apr i l u n t i l deployment on o r about 4 December
1967, and, t he r e f or e , di d not devel op de t a i l e d r egul at i ons con-
cer ni ng ope r a t i ona l a c t i v i t i e s i n RVN.
Soon a f t e r deployment, however, t h e l l t h Bri gade was committed
t o combat oper at i ons. . A t t h i s t i m e , 11t h Bri gade oper at i onal
di r e c t i ve s were p r a c t i c a l l y nonexi st ent except f o r t h e SOP deve-
loped dur i ng t r a i ni ng. According t o t h e t est i mony, t h i s SOP
was i n . e f f e c t dur i ng t h e Son My i nc i de nt al t hough t he publ i cat i on
dat e was not i ndi cat ed. The SOP was appl i cabl e t o f i e l d combat
h -
oper at i ons i n a count eri nsurgency environment.
The ROE i ndi cat ed i n t he 11t h Bri gade SOP were gener al l y i n
accordance wi t h MACV guidance. The SOP s t a t e d :
b. Mi ssi ons a ga i ns t known o r suspect ed NVA/VC
t a r g e t s i n haml et s and v i l l a g e s occupi ed by noncom-
ba t a nt s w i l l be conducted a s fol l ows:
(1) A l l f i r e mi ssi ons on haml et s o r v i l -
l ages w i l l be c ont r ol l e d by an ai r bor ne o r ground
obser ver (FO) and w i l l be execut ed onl y a f t e r t he
t a r g e t has been decl ar ed h o s t i l e by GVN, Bde FSCC
[Brigade Fi r e Support Coordi nat i on Cent er] and/or
Bn Arty LNO [ Li ai son Of f i c e r ] .
( 2 ) Hamlets o r v i l l a g e s not as s oci at ed
wi t h ground oper at i ons w i l l not be at t acked by gun-
f i r e wi t hout p r i o r warning (by l e a f l e t s and/or
speaker systems o r ot he r appr opr i at e means) even
though l i g h t f i r e i s r ecei ved from them.
( 3) H a m l e t s and v i l l a g e s may be at t acked
wi t hout p r i o r warning i f t he a t t a c k i s i n conj unct i on
wi t h a ground oper at i on i nvol vi ng t he movement of
ground f or ces t hroughout t he a r e a , and i f , i n t he
judgment of t he ground commander (Bn o r h i g h e r ) ,
h i s mi ssi on would be j eopardi zed by such warni ngs.
c. A l l mi ssi ons f i r e d on t a r g e t s o r t a r g e t
ar eas t h a t a r e i n t he c oa s t a l wat er s of RVN must be
cl ear ed by t h e Bde FSCC ( cl ear ance from GVN Sect or
US Advisor r equi r ed) .
d. Fr ee- f i r e a r e a s a r e coor di nat ed wi t h t h e
sect or / subsect or US advi sor and h i s VN count er par t ,
t he pr ovi nc e / di s t r i c t c hi e f . The pr ovi nc e / di s t r i c t
chi ef w i l l e s t a b l i s h t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s on f i r i n g i n t o
t hese ar eas.
e. Temporary f r e e - f i r e ar eas may be negot i at ed
f o r a s p e c i f i c oper at i on e f f e c t i v e f o r t he per i od of
t he oper at i on, and a r e normal l y more r e s t r i c t i v e .
Consi derabl e emphasis was pl aced on minimizing noncombatant
c a s ua l t i e s . The SOP di r e c t e d t h a t "maximum e f f o r t w i l l be made
t o minimize noncombatant c a s ua l t i e s dur i ng t a c t i c a l oper at i ons"
and "t r oops w i l l be informed of t h e i mport ance of minimizing
c a s ua l t i e s and t h e de s t r uc t i on of pr oper t y, i ncl udi ng l i ve -
st ock. "
The SOP f u r t h e r i ndi cat ed t h a t det ai nees w e r e t o be prop-
e r l y processed by s t a t i n g t h a t " a l l per sonnel capt ur ed by US
f or ces a s enemy o r suspect ed enemy s h a l l be r e f e r r e d t o a s a
det ai nee u n t i l h i s s t a t u s i s det ermi ned by a br i gade i nt e r r o-
gat or " a s a PW, c i v i l defendant , r et ur nee, o r doubt f ul case. ' . .:
The pol i cy f o r handl i ng of det ai nees was t o be i n accordance
wi t h MACV Di r ect i ves 20-5 and 190-3.
Although no r ef er ence i s made t o r epor t i ng al l eged o r ap-
par ent war cri mes, t h e requi rement f or s pot r e por t i ng of i nc i -
dent s i s di r e c t e d by t h e SOP. Report i ng of s e r i ous i nci dent s
was di r e c t e d by t h e l l t h Bri gade Regul at i on 1-3, dat ed 31 March
1967. The i nc i de nt s di r e c t e d t o be r epor t ed by t h i s r egul at i on
i ncl uded "deat hs from ot her t han na t ur a l cause t o i ncl ude deat hs
of f or ei gn na t i ona l ~ e r s o n n e l when US Army per sonnel o r equi p-
ment a r e i nvol ved. " These r e por t s were t o be submi t t ed t o
t h e Brigade S1.
On 30 January 1968, t h e f i r s t oper at i onal di r e c t i ve ' wa s
publ i shed e s t a bl i s hi ng t he " c r i t e r i a f o r engaging t a r g e t s by
d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t f i r e i n combat oper at i ons . " Thi s 11t h
Bri gade Regul at i on, 525-1, di r e c t e d t he ROE f or t he or gani c
fi repower a va i l a bl e wi t hi n .the l l t h Brigade. The ROE f o r
a r t i l l e r y , mor t ar , naval gunf i r e, and a i r c r a f t , as di r e c t e d by
MACV and t h e l l t h Bri gade SOP, were r e i t e r a t e d. I n addi t i on,
t h e i ndi vi dual s o l d i e r was provi ded d e f i n i t i v e ROE by t h i s
r egul at i on. I t s t a t e d t h a t , i n t he employment of smal l arms
and aut omat i c weapons, t h e utmost car e must be exer ci sed t o
minimize noncombatant c a s ua l t i e s and pr oper t y damage. Speci -
f i c a l l y , t h e s o l d i e r wa s di r e c t e dby t h i s r egul at i on t o i de nt i f y
t h e enemy bef or e engaging:
Personnel who at t empt t o evade and a r e i de nt -
f i e d a s members of NVA o r VC Forces by t he weari ng
of a uniform, web gear o r pack and/or have posses-
s i on of a weapon may be engaged. Every at t empt
w i l l be made t o h a l t t he s e per sonnel by gi vi ng t he
command h a l t (Dung Lai ) and f i r i n g warni ng s hot s
overhead. I f at t empt s t o h a l t evadi ng per sonnel
f a i l t hey w i l l t hen be engaged by f i r e wi t h i n t e n t
t o wound by f i r i n g a t lower ext r emi t i es . The wounded
capt i ve w i l l t hen be t r e a t e d and evacuat ed as rap-
i d l y as pos s i bl e f o r e xpl oi t a t i on- of i nt e l l i ge nc e
he may possess.
The requi rement t o minimize c a s ua l t i e s and pr oper t y damage
i n t he employment of a l l forms of fi repower was adequat el y pre-
sent ed by t h i s r egul at i on. Fol l owi ng hi gher headquar t er s gui -
dance, commanders were di r e c t e d t ha t :
Immediately f ol l owi ng t h e a t t a c k of ar eas i n-
habi t ed by noncombatants, t he f or ce commander w i l l
i ns ur e t h a t an expl anat i on i s given t o t he populace
of t h e need f o r f i r i n g , s t r e s s i n g t h e poi nt t h a t
t h e enemy f or ced t h e a c t i on.
I f noncombatant c a s ua l t i e s occur r egar dl es s of
saf eguar ds, medi cal t r eat ment and evacuat i on shoul d
be provi ded by t h e r esponsi bl e commander, s ubj e c t
t o t a c t i c a l consi der at i ons and r esour ces avai l abl e.
Every pos s i bl e saf eguar d s h o r t of endangeri ng
f r i e ndl y l i v e s w i l l be used t o avoi d noncombatant
c a s ua l t i e s and i ndi f f e r e nc e and i ndi s cr i mi nat e de-
s t r u c t i o n of pr i va t e pr oper t y when such a c t i on i s
bei ng conducted i n popul at ed ar eas.
I ndi vi dual s t h a t appear t o be at t empt i ng t o es -
cape o r evade may be f r i ght ened, i nnocent c i v i l i a n s .
The commander on t h e s i t e must e xe r c i s e judgment as
t o whet her t o engage t he s e i ndi vi dual s o r not . The
commander must base h i s deci si ons on h i s ove r a l l
knowledge of t h e ar ea, s i t u a t i o n , mi ssi on, and
s a f e t y of h i s command.
Thi s r e gul a t i on, which had been publ i shed i n l a t e January
1968, provi ded t h e i n i t i a l framework which guided t he act i ons
of subor di nat e el ement s of t h e l l t h Bri gade. During t he e a r l y
months of . 1968, however, t h e br i gade depended pr i mar i l y upon
t he SOP f o r oper at i onal gui dance, pol i cy, and di r e c t i on.
I t i s evi dent t h a t on 16 March 1968, t h e personnel wi t hi n
t he l l t h Bri gade w e r e s ubj e c t t o and r esponsi bl e f o r not only
t he pr ovi s i ons of t h e var i ous d i r e c t i v e s and r egul at i ons pub-
l i s he d by MACV, USARV, I11MAF, and t h e America1 Di vi si on but
al s o t hose cont ai ned i n t h e i r own SOP. Implementation of t he
broad SOP gui dance which was l a t e r s pe l l e d out i n l l t h Bri gade
r egul at i ons was, a t t h e t i me of t h e Son My oper at i on, r e s t i n g
on t h e shoul der s of t h e l eader s wi t hi n- t he br i gade. The need
f or pr of e s s i ona l , l eader shi p, mature judgment, sound a na l yt i c a l
deci s i ons , and e f f e c t i v e cont r ol of combat act i ons was c l e a r l y
evi dent .
3. Anal ysi s
a. Employment of Firepower and Safeguardi ng of
Noncombatants
From t h e out s e t of US i nvol vement , Headquart ers MACV
recogni zed t h a t t h e appl i cat i on of mi l i t a r y f or c e i n Vietnam must
be c a r e f ul l y c ont r ol l e d a t a l l t i mes. The very nat ur e of count er-
i nsur gent war f ar e gener al l y precl uded t h e massing of fi repower
unl ess t h e t a r g e t was we l l away from i nhabi t ed ar eas or pos i t i ve
t a r g e t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n coul d be achi eved. The US soon a t t a i ne d a
va s t s upe r i or i t y i n fi repower t h a t coul d be pr oper l y expl oi t ed
onl y when t h e eLusi ve f oe al l owed hi msel f t o be caught i n t he
open and away from t h e popul ace. However, t he t a c t i c gener al l y
used by t h e VC/NVA i n t h e i r at t empt t o negat e t h e US fi repower
advantage was t o i nt er mi ngl e t hemsel ves wi t h t he Vietnamese c i vi -
l i a n popul at i on.
Recognizing t h a t a l ack of pos i t i ve cont r ol of fi repower i n
such ci rcumst ances would not be i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t he US
e f f o r t s i n Vietnam, MACV developed and promulgated ext ensi ve ROE
and command d i r e c t i v e s governing . t he employment of f i r epower by
ground, naval , and a i r f or ces i n Vietnam. By such d i r e c t i v e s ,
MACV e s t a bl i s he d t h a t t he saf eguar di ng of t he l i v e s and proper-
t y of noncombatants was a mat t er of prime importance t o a l l e l e -
ments of t h e command. MACV di r e c t i ve s governi ng t h e use of f i r e -
power were cons t ant l y updat ed, expl ai ned, and c l a r i f i e d ; and
from 1965 t o t h e pr es ent t he pol i cy t hey s e t f o r t h has been con-
s i s t e n t i n adheri ng t o t he humane st andar d of pr ot e c t i ng t h e c i -
v i l i a n s wi t hi n t h e combat zone. Ot her MACV di r e c t i ve s i n e f f e c t
dur i ng t h e Son My i nc i de nt provi ded gui dance and pol i cy wi t h r e-
s pe c t t o s e r i ous i nc i de nt r epor t i ng and s pot r e por t s t h a t a l s o
were c l e a r l y adequat e i n qua nt i t y and scope. A t t he same t i me,
MACV c ons i s t e nt l y recogni zed t h a t c or r e c t appl i cat i on of t he s e
p o l i c i e s i n t he Vietnam environment r equi r ed a hi gh c a l i b r e of
l eader s hi p and a s pe c i a l degree of judgment and di s cr i mi nat i on.
MACV Di r ect i ves 95-4 and 525-18, which were i n f or c e i n
March 1968, provi ded t h e ROE and r e i t e r a t e d i n d e t a i l t he ob-
j e c t i ve s pr evi ousl y descr i bed. The neces s i t y was c l e a r l y s t a t e d
f o r a l l commanders t o e xe r c i s e pr udent judgment and r e s t r a i n t i n
t h e a ppl i c a t i on of f i r epower t o i ns ur e t he ove r a l l p o l i c i e s and
mi ssi ons of FWMAF. Subor di nat e headquar t er s, i n some i ns t a nc e s ,
implemented t he MACV pol i c i e s wi t h d e f i n i t i v e and s p e c i f i c r u l e s
more appr opr i at e t o t h e i r s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s . I n a few cas es ,
t h e subor di nat e headquar t er s modi fi ed t he MACV di r e c t i ve s . Many
of t h e MACV di r e c t i ve s shoul d not have been modi fi ed nor imple-
menting r egul at i ons publ i shed by subor di nat e headquar t er s. MACV
pol i cy di r e c t i ve s t h a t e s t a b l i s h t h e ROE, t he procedures f o r
handl i ng of det ai nees and PW's, and t he d e f i n i t i v e need t o mini-
mize c a s ua l t i e s were appl i cabl e wi t hout modi f i cat i on o r amplify-
i ng i ns t r uc t i ons . The I nqui r y, dur i ng i t s v i s i t t o South Vi et -
nam, not ed t h a t s e ve r a l of t he more r ecent MACV di r e c t i ve s i ncl ude
i ns t r uc t i ons pr ecl udi ng any modi f i cat i on o r implementing di r e c -
t i v e s by subor di nat e commands.
I t shoul d be not ed, however, t h a t t he e xe r c i s e of judgment
demanded by COMUSMACV dur i ng t he t i m e of t h e i nc i de nt was r e-
t a i ne d i n t h e d i r e c t i v e s of subor di nat e commands. A l l such di -
r e c t i ve s emphasized t h a t pos i t i ve c ont r ol and prudent judgment
had t o be exer ci s ed i n t h e appl i cat i on of fi repower. By regu-
l a t i o n , l oc a l commanders were r equi r ed t o i ns ur e t h a t t h e i r sub-
or di nat es were t r a i ne d i n and c ont r ol l e d by t he ROE as wel l a s
t h e MACV pol i cy t o minimize s ens el es s dest . r uct i on and needl ess
c a s ua l t i e s dur i ng a l l combat oper at i ons. The pol i c i e s were
c l e a r l y def i ned chargi ng a l l commanders wi t h t he t a s ks of t r a i n -
i ng, di r e c t i ng, and c ont r ol l i ng t h e i r subor di nat es, and t h e r e-
s pons i bi l i t y f o r t h e or de r s and a c t i ons of t h e i r commands.
b. Report i ng of War Crimes
The t erm war crime i s a t echni kal expr essi on bf a vi o-
l a t i on of t h e law of war by any i ndi vi dual -- every vi ol a t i on of
t he law of war i s def i ned as a war crime. The s o l d i e r r ecei ves
t r a i ni ng i n war crime de f i ni t i ons and i l l u s t r a t i o n s i n i t i a l l y
i n ba s i c t r a i n i n g and annual l y t h e r e a f t e r a t u n i t l e ve l . He i s
t aught t h a t war cri mes a r e not condoned.and a r e a puni shabl e
of f ense. MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4 di r e c t e d t h a t a l l war cri mes -- or
an i nci dent or a c t t hought t o be a war cri me -- were t o be r e-
por t ed and i nve s t i ga t e d. Thi s d i r e c t i v e provi ded de f i ni t i ons
and examples of war cri mes i n addi t i on t o s p e c i f i c a l l y di r e c t i ng
t h a t any i ndi vi dua l havi ng knowledge of any a c t t hought t o be a
war crime had t h e r e s pons i bi l i t y t o r e por t t he a c t t o h i s com-
manding o f f i c e r . I nve s t i ga t i ve procedures w e r e a 1 ~ 6i ndi cat ed.
Thi s MACV d i r e c t i v e was implemented by I11 MAF, but not by
USARV o r t h e America1 Di vi si on. I n t h e I11 J!WF r egul at i on, t he
commanding o f f i c e r r ecei vi ng t h e r e por t of a suspect ed war crime
was r equi r ed t o t r ans mi t t h i s r e por t t o 111 F4AF u t i l i z i n g t he
spot r e por t format . No ot he r channel f or r epor t i ng suspect ed
crimes ot her t han t o h i s commanding o f f i c e r was af f or ded t he i n-
di vi dual r i f l eman. I f h i s commander pa r t i c i pa t e d i n a war cri me,
t he i ndi vi dual s o l d i e r ' s r ecour se was not s pe c i f i e d, al t hough it
i s appar ent t h a t an a l t e r n a t i v e i s r equi r ed. Channels f or r epor t -
i ng over t h e chai n of command a r e provi ded, and a r e a va i l a bl e t o
t he s o l d i e r , but t h e i r use needs t o be st r engt hened. Regul at i ons
di r e c t i ng i ndi vi dual s t o r e por t i nci dent s such as suspect ed war
cri mes shoul d r e i t e r a t e t h e use of not onl y t h e primary r epor t -
i ng channel s but t h e a l t e r n a t e channel s a s wel l .
c. I l l e g a l Orders
The t e r m i l l e g a l or der i s not def i ned i n t he di c t i ona r y
of Army t e r m s . A s o l d i e r i s t aught t h a t an or der i s l awf ul un-
l e s s f o r some -reason it i s beyond t h e a ut hor i t y of t he o f f i c i a l
i s s ui ng it. He i s a l s o t aught a s a p a r t of t h e Geneva Conventions
t r a i n i n g t h a t per sons t a ki ng no a c t i ve p a r t i n h o s t i l i t i e s or who
have l a i d down t h e i r arms s h a l l be t r e a t e d humanely.
I t i s appar ent t h a t di r e c t i ve s and t r a i n i n g a r e i nadequat e
concerni ng an i ndi vi dua l ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and a c t i ons concern-
i ng i l l e g a l or der s. There i s a dear t h of wr i t t e n i nf or mat i on con-
cer ni ng t h i s s ubj e c t . There i s but l i t t l e di s cus s i on of i l l e g a l
or der s i n Army r egul at i ons o r t r a i n i n g manuals and even l e s s a t
subor di nat e l e ve l s . What l i t t l e di s cus s i on i s i ncl uded i n any
publ i cat i on is cumbersome and i ndeci s i ve, and pr esent ed i n such
a manner t h a t it t a ke s a l e ga l o f f i c e r t o i n t e r p r e t it. Indeed,
t he average o f f i c e r o r e n l i s t e d man would have d i f f i c u l t y com-
prehendi ng it.
Fur t her , t h e di r e c t i ve s and r egul at i ons a r e de f i c i e nt i n
expl ai ni ng t h a t a s o l d i e r i s a r easoni ng human bei ng who i s
expect ed t o e xe r c i s e judgment i n obeyi ng t he or de r s of a s upe r i or .
Also l acki ng i s s u f f i c i e n t instruction pr ovl dl ng gui dance t o t he
s o l d i e r t h a t when an or der i s beyond t h e scope of t he i s s ui ng
a ut hor i t y and i s s o obvi ousl y i l l e g a l , he i s expect ed t o recog-
ni z e t h a t f a c t as a man of or di nar y sense and average underst and-
i ng. An i ndi vi dua l i s not expect ed t o bl i ndl y obey a l l or der s.
The a c t i ons an i ndi vi dua l shoul d t ake when he r ecei ves an
unl awful or der a r e not c l e a r l y def i ned i n any publ i cat i on. He
i s most of t e n (and pr oper l y) t o l d t h a t di sobedi ence of or der s i s
a t h i s own p e r i l , and a c t s i nvol ved i n t h e di sobedi ence of an il-
l e g a l or der w i l l normal l y r e s u l t i n a charge of i nsubor di nat i on
wi t h i t s at t endant di s c i pl i na r y act i on.
The Department of t h e Army needs t o promulgate guidance t h a t
w i l l more c l e a r l y de f i ne i l l e g a l or der s and i ndi vi dua l r esponsi -
b i l i t i e s and a c t i ons r e l a t e d t he r e t o, y e t cont i nue t o i ns ur e t he
proper bal ance between t h i s guidance and t he normal requi rement s
of command and cont r ol and t h e t r a d i t i o n s r egar di ng d i s c i p l i n e
wi t hi n t he Army.
d. Di r e c t i ve s Not a Subs t i t ut e f o r Leadershi p
The e a r l y p a r t of 1968 and e s pe c i a l l y t he -Tet of f ens i ve
pr esent ed gr e a t d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r t h e u n i t s and commanders charg-
ed wi t h implementing t he s e pol i c i e s . The enemy f or c e s had i n f i l -
t r a t e d i n t o t h e ci t i es and v i l l a g e s and had become i nt er mi ngl ed
wi t h t h e popul ace. Terrori sm and a c t s of sabot age were rampant,
and t h e i ndi vi dua l s o l d i e r had become i ncr eas i ngl y wary of t he
l oc a l popul at i on. The-VC di sr egar ded c i v i l i a n l i v e s i n t h e i r
wanton a t t a c ks and s u i c i d a l def enses, whi l e FWMAF w e r e det ermi ned
t o r out t h e i n f i l t r a t o r s from among t h e populace. Firepower was
employed i n s i d e many i nhabi t ed ar eas by bot h f r i e ndl y and enemy
f or ces. The purposes may have been d i f f e r e n t but a t t i mes
achi eved t h e same r e s u l t s .
Adequate d i r e c t i v e s and publ i cat i ons t h a t r egul at ed t he con-
t r o l of fi repower, s t i p u l a t e d t he ROE and di r e c t e d t he handl i ng
of det ai nees were i n e f f e c t dur i ng t h i s per i od, and many were
re-emphasized. However, it i s a f a c t t h a t , al t hough t he publ i sh-
ed pol i c i e s were c l e a r , t h e i r a ppl i c a t i on i n t he ci rcumst ances
t h a t e xi s t e d i n Vietnam a t t h e t i me of t he Son My i nc i de nt r e-
qui r ed above a l l pr of es s i onal l eader shi p, mature judgment , and
sound deci si ons.
C . GOVERNMENT. OF VIETNAM POLICY/DIRECTIVES .AS TO SON MY
Son My Vi l l age was l ocat ed wi t hi n t h a t s e c t i on of Quang Ngai
Provi nce which had been desi gnat ed as a p r i o r i t y ar ea f o r m i l i -
t a r y of f ens i ve oper at i ons and f o r pa c i f i c a t i on i n 1968. The I
ARVN Cor ps/ I I I MAF Combined Campaign Pl an 1-68 s pe c i f i e d t h a t GVN
pa c i f i c a t i on a c t i v i t i e s would be i ncr eased by 50 per cent over t he
1967 l e ve l wi t hi n Quang Ngai Provi nce. However, s i n c e Son My
Vi l l ages and t he surroundi ng a r e a were under VC c ont r ol , and had
been s i nce 1964, t he primary e f f o r t was devot ed t o conduct i ng m i l -
i t a r y of f ens i ve oper at i ons wi t hi n t h a t a r e a t o f or ce t he VC out so
as t o c r e a t e condi t i ons f avor abl e t o pa c i f i c a t i on. I n e a r l y 1968,
US and ARVN f or ces had s epar at el y assi gned ar eas of oper at i on i n
which t hey normally conducted i ndependent oper at i ons . Coordina-
t i on was r equi r ed onl y i f oper at i ons out s i de t h e normally assi gn-
ed A0 were pl anned and on mat t er s of s pe c i a l i n t e r e s t . ARVN f or -
ces had t he primary r e s pons i bi l i t y f o r t h e Son My a r e a . However,
s i nce t hey l acked t he c a pa bi l i t y t o oper at e i n t h e a r e a , o r a t
l e a s t were r e l u c t a n t t o , US f or ces f r equent l y obt ai ned an ext en-
s i on of t h e i r A0 from t h e 2d ARVN Di vi si on i n or der t o engage t he
48th Local Force Ba t t a l i on and ot he r VC f or ces .
Son My, bei ng VC c ont r ol l e d, had no GVN admi ni s t r at i ve aut hor-
i t i es l i v i n g t he r e . The government had r epeat edl y encouraged a l l
t he r e s i de nt s t o move i n t o e s t a bl i s he d secur e a r e a s , a s many had
done. The remai ni ng r e s i de nt s of Son My w e r e consi dered t o be
VC, o r VC sympat hi zers a t a minimum, by GVN a ut hor i t i e s . For
a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, t he l oc a l GVN a u t h o r i t i e s consi der ed t he
ar ea a f r e e f i r e zone ( unr e s t r i c t e d) f o r a r t i l l e r y f i r e s ; t hey
pl aced no r e s t r i c t i o n on t he t a r g e t s which coul d be engaged.
However, t he D i s t r i c t Chief di d r e t a i n t h e f i n a l a ut hor i t y f o r
approving f i r e s i n t h e a r e a t o i ns ur e t h a t Vietnamese f or ces
(ARVN, RF/PF) w e r e a t a s a f e di s t a nc e from proposed t a r g e t s .
An a r e a ' s bei ng consi dered a f r e e f i r e zone di d not negat e ~ I L C
e s t a bl i s he d ROE which shoul d have been consi der ed bef or e engag-
i ng any t a r g e t . The GVN o f f i c i a l s recogni zed t h e i r r es pons i bi l -
i t y f o r c i v i l i a n s remai ni ng i n t he a r e a but accept ed t he f a c t
t h a t t hes e peopl e would, by t h e i r own choi ce, be subj ect ed t o
a r t i l l e r y f i r e and t he r e s u l t s of any of f ens i ve a c t i on necessary
t o f r e e t h e a r e a of VC. According t o t he deput y Provi nce
Seni or Advi sor, QuangNgai Provi nce o f f i c i a l s pl aced no rest ri c-
t i ons on Vietnamese f or ces oper at i ng i n t h i s a r e a . . The D i s -
t ri ct Seni or Advisor s t a t e d t h a t itwas normal pr a c t i c e f o r t h e
Vietnamese f or ces , i f t hey were succe. 3sful i n pe ne t r a t i ng t he
ar ea, t o burn t he hoot ches and t o des t r oy t h e bunkers and t un-
nel s . '
Even though an ar ea. might be VC c ont r ol l e d, s p e c i f i c r u l e s ,
appl i cabl e t o bot h US and RVN f or c e s , were e s t a bl i s he d f o r t h e
saf eguar di ng of Vietnamese pr oper t y. The I ARVN Cor ps/ I I I MAF
Combined Campaign Pl an 1-68 s pe c i f i e d t h a t :
I n VC c ont r ol l e d a r e a s , RVNAF, US and ot he r
FWMAF must t ake a l l pr a c t i c a bl e measures t o min-
i mi ze t he de s t r uc t i on of bot h publ i c and p r i v a t e
pr oper t y and t a ke appr opr i at e measures a s f e a s i b l e
t o p r o t e c t such pr oper t y. I t must be remembered
t h a t c i v i l i a n s who l i v e i n VC c ont r ol l e d ar eas may
be under VC c ont r ol a ga i ns t t h e i r w i l l and may not
be sympat het i c t o t h e enemy. Tr eat i ng such persons
l i k e enemies, des t r oyi ng t h e i r pr oper t y o r depr i v-
i n g them of t h e i r goods i s i ncompat i bl e wi t h l ong
range obj e c t i ve s of expanding t he i nf l uence of t he
GVN t hroughout IIVN.
Pol i cy s t a t e d i n t he Combined Campaign Pl an r egar di ng pr i va t e
pr oper t y and goods i s as fol l ows:
(1) Di sposi t i on of pr i va t e pr oper t y and sup-
p l i e s i s t h e r e s pons i bi l i t y of GVN o f f i c i a l s .
( 2 ) Dest r uct i on of pr i va t e pr oper t y, homes,
l i ves t ock, and goods i s forbi dden except i n cas es
of over r i di ng ope r a t i ona l neces s i t y.
( 3 ) The de s t r uc t i on of dwel l i ngs and l i ves t ock
as a de ni a l measure, i s t h e r e s pons i bi l i t y of GVN
a u t h o r i t i e s f o r employment of US f or ces i n t he de-
l i b e r a t e de s t r uc t i on of noncombatants' pr oper t y
a s a de ni a l measure w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o Headquart-
e r s MACV f o r t h e per sonal deci s i on of COPUSMACV. [ 6 9 ]
No s p e c i f i c GVN pol i cy st at ement s or d i r e c t i v e s pe r t a i ni ng
s ol e l y t o Son My were obt ai ned by t he Peers Inqui ry. However,
t h e pol i cy r egar di ng t he pr ot ect i on of Vietnamese c i t i z e n s and
t h e i r pr oper t y was c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n t h e 1968 Combined Campaign
Pl an. I t i s equal l y c l e a r t h a t t h e GVN/ARVN a u t h o r i t i e s wi t hi n
Quang Ngai di d not appl y t h i s pol i cy t o VC-controlled ar eas , e s -
pe c i a l l y Son My. Because Son My was a VC st r onghol d, and had
been f o r many year s , GVN o f f i c i a l s had l i t t l e i n t e r e s t , i n t he
ar ea. They w e r e pr i mar i l y concerned wi t h t he r eest abl i shment of
GVN cont r ol i n ar eas l o s t dur i ng Tet and t he pr event i on of a s ec-
ond a t t a c k on Quang Ngai Ci t y whi chwas bel i eved t o be imminent.
As a p r a c t i c a l mat t er , GVN a ut hor i t i e s imposed no r e s t r i c t i o n s on
oper at i ons conducted i n t h e Son My ar ea.
Chapter 10
REPORTS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND REVIEWS
A. THE IMMEDIATE FEPORTS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND REVIEWS, MARCH-
EARLY APRIL 1968
1. Oper at i onal and I nt e l l i ge nc e Report s
Si g n i f i c a n t r e por t s concerni ng Task Force (TF) Bar ker ' s
oper at i ons on 16 March commenced s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e unopposed
l andi ng of t h e l ead el ement s of C Company a t 0730 hour s. For
t h i s per i od t h e r e i s no r ecor d of t he ope r a t i ona l r e p o r t s submit-
t e d by t h e r i f l e companies of TF Barker t o t h e i r c ont r ol
headquar t er s ; such r e por t s were normal l y submi t t ed v i a . r a di o
t o t h e TF Barker Ta c t i c a l Oper at i ons Cent er (TOC) , r ecor ded
i n t he Operat i ons J our nal t he r e , and i f deemed of s i g n i f i c a n t
i mport ance, r el ayed t o t h e l l t h Li ght I nf a nt r y Bri gade f o r
r ecor di ng and pos s i bl e f u r t h e r t r a n s mi t t a l t o headquar t er s of
t h e America1 Di vi si on.
a: Report s of Enemy Ca s ua l t i e s
The fi rst r e por t from TF Barker t o t h e l l t h Bri gade
concerni ng enemy c a s u a l t i e s came a t 0735 hours and not ed t h a t
one Vi e t Cong (VC) had been k i l l e d i n t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e l and-
i ng zone (LZ) by C Company. Wi t hi n 25 mi nut es of t h e i n i t i a l
r e por t , gunshi ps suppor t i ng t h e h e l i c o p t e r l i f t had r epor t ed
k i l l i n g an a ddi t i ona l s i x VC; f our of t he s e i n an a r e a 500 met ers
west of C Company's LZ ' and t h e remai ni ng two a t a l oc a t i on
approxi mat el y 2 ki l omet er s sout h-sout hwest of t h e same LZ.
A t 0758 hour s, 11mi nut es a f t e r t h e l a s t el ement s of C Company
had l anded on t h e LZ, t h e TF r epor t ed t o l l t h Bri gade t h a t C
Company r epor t ed k i l l i n g an a ddi t i ona l 1 4 VC approxi mat el y 200-
300 met ers e a s t of t h e LZ. The next r e por t of c a s u a l t i e s i s
recorded i n an 0840 e nt r y i n t h e TF Barker J our nal which s t a t e s
bhat C Company had count ed 69 VC k i l l e d i n a c t i o n ( KI A) a t t h e
same l oc a t i on where t he pr evi ous 1 4 VC c a s u a l t i e s were r epor t ed
bei ng k i l l e d . The j our nal e nt r y a l s o i ndi c a t e s t h a t t h e l l t h
Bri gade was n o t i f i e d . ,
Ent r i e s i n bot h t h e l l t h Bri gade and America1 Di vi si on Jour-
na l s i d e n t i f y 69 VC KI A i n t h e C Company a r e a ; however, t hey
c i t e t he l oc a t i on a s 600 met ers nor t hwest of t h a t r epor t ed i n
t h e TF Barker J our na l and a t t r i b u t e t h e c a s u a l t i e s t o a r t i l l e r y
f i r e No expl anat i on can be found f o r t h e di scr epancy i n
t he s e r e por t s ; however, s i nc e TF Barker i n a subsequent r e por t
i d e n t i f i e s 68 c a s u a l t i e s a s bei ng k i l l e d by a r t i l l e r y f i r e ,
it i s r easonabl e t o concl ude t h a t t h i s cause of deat h was spec-
i f i e d by TF Barker dur i ng some communication wi t h l l t h Bri gade.
Thi s di scr epancy i s examined i n d e t a i l i n a l a t e r s e c t i o n of
t h i s chapt er .
No f u r t h e r enemy c a s u a l t i e s were r epor t ed by C Company on
16 March al t hough an e nt r y i n t h e TF Barker J our na l a t 1555 hours
s t a t e s t h a t C Company had r epor t ed "10-11 women and c hi l dr e n
k i l l e d by a r t i l l e r y o r gunshi ps" and t h a t t h i s f i gur e was not
i ncl uded i n pr evi ous r e por t s of VC c a s ua l t i e s . ' Thi s informa-
t i o n i s not r e f l e c t e d i n j our nal e n t r i e s f o r t h e l l t h Bri gade
o r t h e Arnerical Di vi si on al t houqh t he TF Barker e n t r y i ndi c a t e s
t h e 11t h Bri gade w a s n o t i f i e d . Thi s same TF Barker J our nal
e nt r y a l s o r e por t s t h a t none of t h e prev' iously r epor t ed body
count of B Company were women and chi l dr en. A t o t a l of t h r e e
enemy weapons was r epor t ed capt ur ed by C Company; t he s e were t h e
onl y weapons r epor t ed capt ur ed by TF Barker on t h i s d a t e . ,
I n summary, TF Barker r epor t ed a t o t a l of 90 VC k i l l e d
i n C Company a r e a of oper at i ons (AO) wi t hi n a per i od of 70
mi nut es f ol l owi ng t h e i n i t i a l touchdown of i t s f or c e s i n t h e
LZ; a f t e r 0840 hour s, no a ddi t i ona l VC c a s u a l t i e s w e r e recorded
i n t h e C Company ar ea. Throughout t h e day C Company experi enced
onl y one US c a s ua l t y, an appar ent acci dent i n which a s o l d i e r
s hot hi msel f i n t h e f oot .
I n t h e a r e a t o t h e e a s t of C Company, B Company was re-
por t ed by TF Barker t o have k i l l e d 12 VC a t 0955, 18 more
k i l l e d a t 1025, and an a ddi t i ona l 8 k i l l e d a t 1420 hour s;
' a l l a t a l ocat i ol l approxi mat el y 700 meters e a s t of t h e B Com-
pany LZ. Thi s t o t a l of 38 VC KI A by B Company, when added
t o t hose r epor t ed by C Company, r epr esent ed a VC body count of
128 and a t o t a l of t h r e e weapons capt ur ed which was r epor t ed
t o t h e 11t h Bri gade and Arnerical Di vi si on by t h e eveni ng of 16
March. The America1 Di vi si on J our nal i n i t i a l l y r e f l e c t e d a t o t a l
of s i x weapons capt ur ed; t h i s w a s l a t e r changed t o t h r e e . Thi s
di scr epancy i s not expl ai ned.
b. Report s of US Ca s ua l t i e s
Tot a l US c a s u a l t i e s f o r TF Barker on 16 March were two
k i l l e d , t e n wounded, and one s e l f - i n f l i c t e d wound. Eleven
of t h e c a s u a l t i e s caused by enemy a c t i on were a r e s u l t of mines
and booby t r a ps . Only one c a s ua l t y, a man from A Company, was
wounded by smal l arms f i r e . No c a s u a l t i e s were caused by d i r e c t
c ont a c t wi t h t h e enemy i n t h e C Company o r B Company a r e a s .
c. Report s of Ci vi l i a n Ca s ua l t i e s
F i r s t r e por t s of pos s i bl e c a s u a l t i e s among noncom-
ba t a nt s occur r ed a s a r e s u l t of COL Henderson' s f l i g h t over
t he Son My a r e a a f t e r C Company had l anded i n i t s LZ. COL
Henderson s t a t e d t h a t he descended t o an a l t i t u d e of 100-200
f e e t t o examine t h e bodi es of two armed and uniformed VC who
had been k i l l e d e a r l i e r by gunshi ps of t h e 174t h Avn Co. Dur-
i ng t h i s maneuver he observed two s e pa r a t e groups of bodi es
which appeared t o be noncombatants. One group c ons i s t i ng of
an ol d man, a woman, and a c h i l d , was l ocat ed about 150 met ers
sout h of My Lai ( 4 ) , on a t r a i l l eadi ng t o Route 521. Approx-
i mat el y 150 meters f a r t h e r sout h, l yi ng i n a s mal l r avi ne near
a t r a i l , was anot her group c ons i s t i ng of two men and a woman.
Nei t her t h e l oc a t i on nor t h e number of t he s e c a s u a l t i e s coi n-
c i de s wi t h any c a s ua l t y r e p o r t submi t t ed by el ement s of TF
Barker.
COL Henderson f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t a t about 0930
hours, whi l e a t LZ Dot t i e , he m e t wi t h MG Kost er who had l anded
t he r e t o r e f u e l , and advi sed t h e l a t t e r t h a t he observed what
he bel i eved t o be s i x t o e i g h t noncombatant casual ' ci es i n t h e
a r e a of C Company's oper at i on. COL Henderson r e c a l l s MG Kos t er ' s
r e a c t i on t o t h i s a s a d i r e c t i v e t o COL Henderson t o det ermi ne
how t he s e c a s u a l t i e s had been i ncur r ed. I n h i s appearance bef or e
t he I nqui r y, MG Kost er coul d not r e c a l l t h i s s p e c i f i c i nc i de nt
but di d say t h a t on two s e pa r a t e occasi ons on 16 March, COL Hen-
der son advi sed him of noncombatant c a s u a l t i e s .
COL Henderson, i n a pr epar ed s t at ement dat ed 27 November
1969 ( e xhi bi t S - 3 ) , s t a t e d t h a t a f t e r speaki ng t o MG Kost er ,
he r et ur ned over t h e a r e a of My Lai ( 4 ) and di scover ed t h a t TF
Barker was not submi t t i ng t h e " r equi r ed r e por t s " t o t h e 11t h
Bri gade TOC. Henderson s t a t e d t h a t he t hen di r e c t e d LTC Barker
t o br i ng t h e TF headquar t er s "up-t o-dat e" and t o i ns ur e t h a t
r equi r ed r e por t s w e r e submi t t ed t o t h e br i gade TOC. H e s t a t e d
t h a t a t t h a t t i m e he a l s o t o l d Barker t o "det ermi ne how many
c i v i l i a n s had been k i l l e d and whet her t hey had been k i l l e d by
a r t i l l e r y , a i r , o r smal l arms f i r e . " I n t h i s same s t at ement ,
which i s i n c o n f l i c t wi t h t est i mony Henderson pr esent ed t o t h i s
I nqui r y, he a l s o s t a t e d t h a t he t a l ke d t o Barker t w i c e on t h e
af t er noon of t h e 16t h, pe r i odi c a l l y over - f l yi ng t h e A0
of t h e TF u n t i l 1900 hours t h a t da t e . During t he s e
di s cus s i ons , accor di ng t o Henderson, Barker advi sed him t h a t a
t o t a l of 128 enemy and 24 c i v i l i a n s had been k i l l e d i n t h e
oper at i on.
I n c ont r a s t t o h i s pr epar ed st at ement ( e xhi bi t S- 3) ,
COL Henderson i n h i s t est i mony bef or e t h i s I nqui r y s t a t e d
t h a t he r ecei ved a r e por t from .LTC Barker dur i ng t h e a f t e r -
noon of 16 March t h a t from 12 t o 1 4 noncombatants had been
k i l l e d t hus f a r i n t h e oper at i on. H e f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t
LTC Barker was unabl e t o pr ovi de d e t a i l e d i nf or mat i on coricern-
i n g t he s e c a s u a l t i e s , and t h a t he di r e c t e d Barker t o obt a i n
an e xa c t count of noncombatant c a s u a l t i e s and i nf or mat i on con-
cer ni ng t he age, s e x, and appar ent cause of deat h of each. .
As a r e s u l t of COL Henderson' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e ma t t e r , a t
about 1530 hours TF Barker oper at i ons s e c t i on r ecei ved a re-
qui rement from l l t h Bri gade t o det er mi ne t h e number of ci v-
i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s and t h e manner i n which t hey were k i l l e d o r
wounded. I t i s t h i s r e que s t which probabl y r e s u l t e d i n t h e
TF Barker J our nal e n t r i e s a t 1555 hours on 16 March which s t a t e
t h a t B Company r e por t s t h a t none of t h e VC body count pr evi ous l y
r epor t ed by t h a t u n i t i ncl udes women o r c hi l dr e n and t h a t C
Company r e por t s "approxi mat el y 10 t o 11" women and c hi l dr e n were
k i l l e d by a r t i l l e r y o r gunshi ps.
The next i nc i de nt concerni ng c a s u a l t i e s i s t h e s ubj e c t
of consi der abl e c o n f l i c t i n t h e t est i mony of t h e p r i n c i p a l s
i nvol ved. Thi s mat t er concerns t h e i ssuance of an or de r by
COL Henderson t o TF Barker t o have C Company r ever s e d i r e c t i o n
and sweep back t hrough My Lai ( 4 ) t o det ermi ne t h e e xa c t count
of c i v i l i a n and/ or VC c a s u a l t i e s . Testimony confi rms t h a t such
an or der w a s i s s ued, r ecei ved by TF Bar ker , and r el ayed by MAJ
Calhoun t o CPT Medina between 1500 and 1530 hours on 16
March. The evi dence f u r t h e r confi rms t h a t i t s i s s uance t o CPT
Medina v i a r a di o was moni t ored by MG Kost er who countermanded
t h e or der s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r and di r e c t e d t h a t COL Henderson
be s o advi sed. ' Both COL Henderson and MG Kost er cont ended
i n t h e i r t est i mony, however, t h a t t h i s a c t i on occur r ed a t a
l a t e r da t e ; Henderson r e c a l l e d i t - a s , a n a c t i on r e s u l t i n g from
h i s i nt er vi ew wi t h a he l i c opt e r p i l o t and an 18 March or de r t o
i n v e s t i g a t e c e r t a i n as pect s of t h e Son My oper at i on. MG
Kost er was l e s s c e r t a i n of h i s r e c ol l e c t i on but r e c a l l e d it
a s occur r i ng l a t e i n t h e af t er noon on 17 o r 18 March whi l e he
was r e t ur ni ng t o h i s command pos t a t Chu Lai , and r e l a t e d it t o
t h e c r i t i c a l na t ur e of he l i c opt e r a i r l i f t and t h e e x t r a c t i o n of C
Company from t h e Son My a r e a . I n h i s t est i mony, MG Kost er
di d not di smi ss t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e e ve nt ' s havi ng occur r ed
on 16 March. - A l l ot he r per sonnel r e l a t e d t o t h i s i nc i de nt
i . e . , l l t h Bri gade S3, TF Barker S2 and S3, and t h e CO, C Comp-
any were c e r t a i n t h e event t r a ns pi r e d on 16 March. - A r e-
view of a l l a va i l a bl e evi dence and a na l ys i s of event s a s t hey
occur r ed dur i ng t h e per i od 16-18 March, l eads t o t h e concl usi on
t h a t t h i s a c t i on occur r ed on t h e af t er noon of 16 March, about t h e
t i m e C Company had cl osed i n t o i t s ni ght def ens i ve pos i t i on.
During t h e cour se of t h e r a di o conver sat i on between
MG Kost er and CPT Medina, i n which t h e former countermanded COL
Henderson' s or de r , CPT Medina s t a t e d he advi sed h i s commanding
gener al t h a t C Com~any had observed 20-28 c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s
dur i ng t h e day. Lat er t h a t same day, a t about 1900 hour s,
COL Henderson s t a t e d he c a l l e d MG Kost er by t el ephone and ad-
vi sed him t h a t h i s most r e c e nt r e por t from LTC Barker r eveal ed
an i nc r e a s e i n t h e c i v i l i a n c a s ua l t y t o l l from "12 t o 14" t o
20. H e a l s o s t a t e d he informed MG Kost er t h a t he had di r e c t e d
LTC Barker t o obt a i n i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h e age, s e x, and
cause of deat h of t he s e c a s u a l t i e s . According t o COL
Henderson, MG Kost er r e pl i e d t h a t he was a l s o i n t e r e s t e d i n
obt ai ni ng t h i s i nf or mat i on. . MG Kost er t e s t i f i e d t h a t he
di d not r e c a l l t h e d e t a i l s of t h i s conver sat i on. According
t o COL ~ k n d e r s o n , LTC Barker subsequent l y provi ded a more
de t a i l e d r e p o r t of t h e 20 c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s which i d e n t i f i e d
t h e cause of deat h a s a r t i l l e r y and gunshi p f i r e .
On 18 March, sometime p r i o r t o 1400 hour s, COL
Henderson v i s i t e d C Company's l oc a t i on i n t h e f i e l d t o ques t i on
CPT Medina about t h e a l l e ga t i ons made by W01 (now 1LT) Thomp-
son, which a r e di scussed i n d e t a i l i n a l a t e r por t i on of
t h i s cnapt er . CPT Medina s t a t e d t h a t a t t h a t t i m e he r epor t ed t o
COL Henderson t h a t he bel i eved approxi mat el y 20 t o 28 noncom-
ba t a nt s had been k i l l e d dur i ng t h e operation--which compares wi t h
t he 20-28 r epor t ed by CPT Medina on 16 March t o MAJ ~ a i h o u n and
MG Kost er , and t h e 20 which had been r epor t ed t o COL Henderson
by LTC Barker on t h e 16t h and 17t h and r el ayed by him t o MG
Kost er.
To t h i s da t e t he r e i s no s a t i s f a c t o r y expl anat i on f o r
t h e c o n f l i c t i n c i v i l i a n c a s ua l t y f i gur e s of "12 t o 14" re-
por t ed by Barker on 16 March and t h e "10 t o 11" r epor t ed i n
TF Bar ker ' s J our nal a t t h a t same t i m e ; of t h e f i gur e 201submi t t ed
by Barker on t he eveni ng of 16 March and t h e "20 t o 28" r epor t -
ed by CPT Medina s h o r t l y bef or e t h a t per i od. It can onl y be
concluded t h a t n e i t h e r commanders nor s t a f f o f f i c e r s checked
r e por t s of noncombatant c a s u a l t i e s o r gave s u b s t a n t i a l a t t e n t -
i on i n t h i s i ns t a nc e t o such mat t er s .
Regardl ess of t h e di s cr epanci es i n f i gur e s , it i s c l e a r
t h a t LTC Bar ker , COL Henderson, and MG Kost er a l l had know-
l edge, a s e a r l y as; t h e morning of 16 March, t h a t a number of
noncombatants had been k i l l e d i n My Lai ( 4 ) . I t i s equal l y
c l e a r t h a t no, a c t i on was t aken t o r e por t such c a s u a l t i e s t o any
headquar t er s out s i de of t h e America1 Di vi si on d e s p i t e t h e f a c t
t h a t Mi l i t a r y Assi st ance Command, Vietnam, (MACV) and I11 Marine
Amphibious Force (111 MAF) d i r e c t i v e s r equi r ed t h i s a c t i o n . '
2. I nf or mat i on and Orders Tr ansmi t t ed on 16 March
During ' t he oper at i on o f . 16 March, i nf or mat i on
concerni ng i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n My Lai ( 4 ) was t r a ns mi t t e d over
t h e var i ous command and c ont r ol r a di o n e t s bei ng used by u n i t s
i nvol ved i n t h e oper at i on. Si mi l a r l y, or der s were i s s ued over
t he s e same networks which r e f l e c t e d a knowledge by var i ous
command el ement s of t he s e i r r e g u l a r i t i e s and an at t empt t o
r egai n c ont r ol over combat uni t s . Fi xi ng t h e e xa c t t i m e s and
sequence of such r a di o t r ansmi ssi ons was made d i f f i c u l t
because of t h e i n a b i l i t y of some wi t nesses s p e c i f i c a l l y t o
r e c a l l t i m e s and event s and of t h e e f f o r t s of ot he r s t o wi t h-
hol d i nf or mat i on from t h e I nqui r y. However, t h e p r i n c i p a l
s i gni f i c a nc e of t h e f ol l owi ng r econs t r uct i on of message t r a f f i c
of 16 March does not l i e i n t h e t i m e ' or t h e sequence of i ndi -
vi dual messages. Rat her , t h e s i gni f i c a nc e i s t h e i nf or mat i on
t he s e messages cont ai n and t h e awareness of event s i n My Lai
( 4 ) which had been gai ned by per sons who heard such t r a f f i c .
The f i r s t of t he s e t r ansmi ssi ons probabl y occur r ed
around 0900 hours and was a t t r i b u t e d by t h r e e wi t nes s es t o
COL Henderson. I n t h i s t r ansmi ssi on t o el ement s of TF Bar ker ,
COL Henderson i s quot ed a s sayi ng, " I d o n ' t want any unnecessary
k i l l i n g down t he r e . " Such a repo-rt coul d have been a l og-
i c a l r e s u l t of COL Herlderson' s e a r l i e r s i ght i ngs of noncombatant
c a s u a l t i e s . ' Thi s t r ansmi ssi on may expl ai n a subsequent
a c t i on by CPT Medina a t about 0915 hours when he i s s ue d an or de r
. t o a t l e a s t t h e 2d Pl at oon, t o s t o p t h e s hoot i ng. '
The next message which r e f e r r e d t o c a s u a l t i e s among
noncombatants probabl y occur r ed around 1000 hours and was broad-
c a s t over t h e ai r-ground r a di o n e t and moni t ored by t h e opera-
t i o n s s er geant of B Company, 123d Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on, SP5 (now
SSG) Kubert. The message came from an uni de nt i f i e d p i l o t who
s t a t e d t h a t "Shark" gunshi ps (174t h Avn Co) were making a gun r un
on c i v i l i a n s . . SP5 Kubert s t a t e d t h a t t h i s message prompted a
t el ephone c a l l from e i t h e r CPT Moe, t h e oper at i ons o f f i c e r , o r
MAJ Watke, t h e company commander, t o TF Barker, advi s i ng t h e
TF of t h e message. The preponderance of t h e evi dence a va i l -
' a b l e t o t h e I nqui r y i ndi c a t e s t h a t such a gun r un probabl y was not
made and t h a t t h e c a s u a l t i e s observed i n t h e v i c i n i t y of Route
521 were caused by ground t r oops . ' -
Approximately 30 mi nut es l a t e r ,' a t about 1 030 hour s,
a s t h e he l i c opt e r which was evacuat i ng an acci d, ent al l y wounded
s o l d i e r from C Company was depar t i ng t h e a r e a , t h e p i l o t broad-
c a s t a message t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t he had s e e n - a l a r ge number of
bodi es a t My Lai ( 4 ) . CPT Medina s t a t e d t h a t it was s h o r t l y
a f t e r t h i s t h a t he r ecei ved a c a l l from PIAJ Calhoun s t a t i n g t h a t
a he l i c opt e r p i l o t had s a i d he t hought some noncombatants
had been s hot and k i l l e d . CPT Medina s t a t e d t h a t MAJ Calhoun
advi sed t h a t he wanted t o make s ur e t h i s was not bei ng done.
MAJ Calhoun deni ed knowledge of t h i s event .
There i s t est i mony from CPT Kotouc, t h a t sometime dur i ng
t h e morning of t h e 16t h he hear d a r a di o t r ansmi ssi on from t h e
aero-s, cout team of Company B, 123d Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on, i n which
t he sender r epor t ed t h a t an unarmed person was bei ng s hot a t by
a machinegun. CPT Kotouc goes on t o say t h a t MAJ Calhoun t hen
c a l l e d l b o t h CPT Mi chl es and CPT Medina and t o l d them t o be s ur e
t h a t t hey w e r e n o t k i l l i n g any c i v i l i a n s . I n h i s t est i mony
bef or e t h e I nqui r y, MAJ Calhoun confi rmed t he event s a s r e l a t e d
by CPT Kotouc. '
Al so ab.out midmorning anot her c a l l came i n t o t h e TF
Barker TOC from Company B, 123d Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on advi si ng MAJ
Calhoun t h a t noncombatants were bei ng k i l l e d i n My Lai ( 4 ) . SFC
St ephens, t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e s e r ge a nt f o r TF Bar ker , overheard t h i s
message and a subsequent message by MAJ Calhoun t o LTC Bar ker ,
advi si ng him of t h e r e por t . MAJ Calhoun deni ed knowledge of t h i s
event i n h i s t est i mony. .
A s e r i e s of messages which were s a i d t o have been
t r ans mi t t ed over t h e C Company command n e t a r e a l s o of s i g n i f -
i cance. The f i r s t of t he s e probabl y occur r ed a t about 1030 and
was pur por t edl y made by MAJ Calhoun t o CPT Medina. The message
was an i n s t r u c t i o n " not t o k i l l women and c hi l dr e n. " MAJ Calhoun
i n h i s t est i mony deni ed knowledge of t h i s t r ansmi ssi on.
The second message was pur por t edl y from an uni de nt i f i e d h e l i -
copt er p i l o t who, accor di ng t o t h e wi t nes s , s t a t e d t h a t "from
up her e it l ooks l i k e a bl ood-bat h. What t h e h e l l a r e you
doi ng down t he r e ? " The wi t ness coul d a o t r e c a l l t h e t i me of
t he message o r t o whom it was di r e c t e d. The t h i r d i n t h i s
s e r i e s of messages was overheard by anot her s o l d i e r from C
Company who t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h o r t l y a f t e r noon, LTC Barker c a l l e d
CPT Medina. Barker pur por t edl y advi sed Medina t h a t he had a
r e por t "from hi ghe r headquar t er s t h a t t he r e w e r e some c i v i l i a n s
bei ng k i l l e d , " t o which Medina r e pl i e d t h a t he "was pos i t i ve i t
was n' t h i s peopl e. " I t i s appr opr i at e t o not e t h a t one of
t he r easons why Barker and Calhoun may have used t h e C Company
r a di o n e t . r a t h e r t han t h e TF n e t , was t o p'eclude t h e t r ansmi s-
s i ons bei ng moni t ored by commanders and s t a f f o f f i c e r s a t hi gher
headquar t er s.
A f u r t h e r message of s i gni f i c a nc e was s a i d t o have been
t r a ns mi t t e d over t h e ai r-ground r a di o n e t and was moni t ored by
SGM Ki r kpat r i ck, t h e 11t h Bri gade oper at i ons s e r ge a nt a t Duc Pho.
The message was n o t a r e por t but appar ent l y a conver sat i on
between two i ndi vi dua l s , one of whom s a i d , " I f you shoot t h a t
man, I ' m goi ng t o shoot you, " o r words t o t h a t e f f e c t . The
nat ur e of t h e t r ansmi ssi on prompted CPT Henderson, As s i s t a nt S3,
11t h Bri gade, t o c a l l t h e TF Barker TOC by t el ephone and i nqui r e
a s t o t h e r eason f o r t h a t ki nd of r a di o t r a f f i c . I n t h e i r
t est i mony, TF Barker per sonnel who were i n t h e TOC a t t h e t i m e ,
deni ed r e c ol l e c t i on of t h e i nc i de nt .
Each of t he s e r a di o t r ansmi ssi ons r e f l e c t e d t h e
e xi s t e nc e of unusual ci rcumst ances concerni ng t h e event a t Son
My. To t h e commanders and s t a f f o f f i c e r s moni t or i ng
t h e command ne t s , t he s e messages shoul d have act ed t o a l e r t
them t h a t t h e oper at i on of TF Barker was not a normal combat
a s s a u l t . No concl usi ons can be reached s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s of
t he s e t r ansmi ssi ons; however, when viewed i n l i g h t of ot he r
a c t i ons and r e por t s which occur r ed dur i ng t h i s same t i m e per i od,
it would appear t h a t commanders i n t h e Son My a r e a shoul d have
been a l e r t e d t o t he unusual na t ur e of TF Barker oper at i ons
dur i ng t he morning hours of 16 March.
3. Report of W01 Thompson and Ot her Avi at i on Per sonnel
As p a r t of t he combat suppor t bei ng pr ovi ded TF Barker
on 16 March, an aer o- scout team c ons i s t i ng of one l i g h t observa-
t i o n he l i c opt e r , OH-23, and two UH-1B gunshi ps from Company B,
123d Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on, was pr ovi di ng a e r i a l s ur ve i l l a nc e t o
l oc a t e and t a ke under f i r e enemy f or c e s i n and around t h e a r e a of
Son My. As p a r t of t h i s team, t h e OH-23 performed t h e s c out i ng
o r r econnai ssance f unct i on, f l y i n g c l os e t o t h e ground t o d e t e c t
enemy l oc a t i ons and movements, whi l e t h e two gunshi ps fl ew a t
hi gher a l t i t u d e s , pr ot e c t i ng t h e OH-23 and pr ovi di ng f i r epower
t o engage t h e enemy. The p i l o t of t h e OH-23 was W01 (now 1LT)
Hugh C. Thompson. H e was accompanied on t h i s oper at i on by h i s
crew chi ef SP4 Glenn W. Anderot t a and gunner, SP4 (now Mr . )
Lawrence M. Colburn .
Because. of t h e conf i gur at i on of t h e a i r c r a f t , communica-
t i o n s between t h e aer o- scout team and t h e ground u n i t t hey w e r e
suppor t i ng, were l i mi t e d t o i n t e r mi t t e n t frequency modulated
(FM) voi ce between t he hi gh gunshi p and t h e TF Barker command
n e t . Nei t her t h e OH-23 s cout nor t h e low gunshi p was i n d i r e c t
c ont a c t wi t h t h e ground u n i t t hey w e r e suppor t i ng. For W 0 1
Thompson t o communicate wi t h ground el ement s, i t was necessar y
f o r him t o t r a ns mi t t o t he hi gh gunshi p, which i n t u r n would
congact t h e ground u n i t . Thi s i nf or mat i on i s us e f ul i n under-
s t andi ng t he a c t i ons of t h e aero-scout team, which f ol l ow. -
Thi s aer o- scout team a r r i ve d i n t he v i c i n i t y of My Lai ( 4 )
i n t i m e t o obser ve t h e a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on t er mi nat i ng a t C
,Company's LZ and commenced i t s r econnai ssance a t around 0730
hours i n t he a r e a gener al l y sout h of Route 521. I t cont i nued
t o oper at e sout h of Route 521 u n t i l such t i me a s t h e h e l i c o p t e r
gunshi ps suppor t i ng t h e combat a s s a u l t of C Company had c l e a r e d
t he a r e a , a t which t i m e it began r econnoi t er i ng nor t h of t he
road i n t h e v i c i n i t y of My Lai ( 4 ) . From 0745 hours u n t i l
approxi mat el y 0830 hour s, t h e aero-scout team performed i t s
mi ssi on wi t hout unusual i nc i de nt . One enemy was t aken under
f i r e sout h of t h e haml et , approxi mat el y 40 rounds of 6 0 m
mort ar ammunition w e r e di scover ed s out he a s t of My Lai ( 4 ) on
H i l l 85, and a number of dead and wounded c i v i l i a n s were not ed
al ong t h e r oad and i n t h e rice paddy sout h of My Lai ( 4 ) .
Noting t h e absence of enemy f i r e , Thompson t o l d
t he gunshi p t h a t he would-mark t h e l oc a t i on of t h e wounded
wi t h smoke grenades and t h a t t h e i nf a nt r y u n i t shoul d send
a s s i s t a nc e t o t he s e per sonnel . Thompson proceeded t o
mark t he l oc a t i on of t he wounded dur i ng h i s r econnai ssance
sout h and w e s t of My Lai ( 4 ) u n t i l approxi mat el y 0830 hours
when he depar t ed f o r LZ Dot t i e t o r e f u e l .
W01 Thompson and h i s aero-scout team r et ur ned t o
t he My Lai ( 4 ) a r e a a t approxi mat el y 0900 hours and resumed
t h e i r r econnai ssance. From t h i s poi nt forward t h e r e i s some
c ont r a di c t i on i n t est i mony concerni ng t h e e xa c t t i m e and se-
quence of event s observed by W 0 1 Thompson. These di f f e r e nc e s
do not ext end t o any s i g n i f i c a n t var i ance i n t h e subst ance of
t est i mony and a r e not consi der ed c r i t i c a l t o t h e i nve s t i ga t i on.
The event s r e l a t e d below f ol l ow t h e ve r s i on r epor t ed by W01
Thompson and i ncl ude onl y t h e major i nc i de nt s exper i enced by
him. The f a c t s and t h e i r sequence a r e ge ne r a l l y cor r obor at ed
by ot he r members of t he aero-scout crew who were pr e s e nt i n
t h e ar ea.
Upon resumpt i on of t h e r econnai ssance mi ssi on over
My Lai ( 4 1 , W 0 1 Thompson and h i s c r e w not ed t h a t many of t h e
wounded c i v i l i a n s pr evi ousl y i d e n t i f i e d t o t h e ground el ement s,
' were now dead. A t about 0915 hour s, W01 Thompson not ed
t h e approach o t US-. mi l i t ary per sonnel t o a l oc a t i on Thompson
had pr evi ous l y marked wi t h a col or ed smoke grenade. Both
Thompson and h i s gunner, SP4 Col burn, s t a t e d t h a t t hey observed
an i ndi vi dua l weari ng a c a pt a i n' s i n s i g n i a of grade on h i s
hel met approach' a wounded g i r l who was l yi ng on t h e ground.
The c a pt a i n walked up t o t h e woman, accor di ng t o Col burn,
prodded he r wi t h h i s f oot , and t hen st epped back s e v e r a l
paces and f i r e d i n t o h e r body wi t h h i s M-16 r i f l e .
There is cons i der abl e t est i mony from ot he r wi t nesses who
r epor t ed t h i s a s an a c t of sel f - def ense.
-
The OH-23 he l i c opt e r t hen moved east war d t o an
i r r i g a t i o n d i t c h which r an al ong a t r e e l i n e approxi mat el y
100 met er s e a s t of My Lai ( 4 ) and 300 meters e a s t of t h e
l oc a t i on where TF Barker TOC had r ecor ded 84 VC havi ng been
k i l l e d some 90 mi nut es e a r l i e r . As t hey approached t h i s
d i t c h , bot h W 0 1 Thompson and h i s gunner not ed t h a t it con-
10-9
.-
,.
t a i ne d a number of bodi es which t hey l a t e r r epor t ed a s between
50 and 100 persons. Upon c l o s e r i nve s t i ga t i on, Thompson
not ed t h a t some of t h e per sons i n t h e d i t c h were s t i l l a l i v e .
H e s t a t e d he l anded h i s he l i c opt e r i n c l os e pr oxi mi t y t o t h e
d i t c h and spoke t o a "col or ed s er geant " who was s t a ndi ng near-
by, advi s i ng him t h a t t h e r e w e r e wounded women and c hi l dr e n i n
t h e d i t c h and aski ng i f t he r e were not some way i n which t h e
s e r ge a nt coul d he l p t h e wounded. The s e r ge a nt r e p l i e d i n words
t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t " t he onl y way he coul d he l p them was t o k i l l
them. " Thompson consi der ed t h e r epl y t o have been made i n
jest ana di d not t a ke t h e response s e r i ous l y. I ns t e a d, he
s t a t e d t o t h e s e r ge a nt , "Why d o n ' t you see i f you can he l p them",
and r et ur ned t o t he he l i c opt e r t o resume h i s r econnai ssance.
As t he he l i c opt e r was l e a vi ng t h e ground, t h e c r e w c h i e f , SP4
Andr eot t a, who wa s s i t t i n g i n a n out s i de s e a t , r e por t e d over
t h e i nt er com t h a t a s e r ge a nt ( not t h e one t o whom Thompson had
pr evi ousl y spoken) was shoot i ng i n t o t he di t c h. W01 Thompson
t ur ned and s a w t h e s o l d i e r hol di ng a weapon which was poi nt ed
toward t he di t c h. Testimony of ot he r wi t nes s es bef or e
t h e I nqui r y ge ne r a l l y s ubs t a nt i a t e d t he f a c t s a s r e l a t e d by
Thompson except t h a t t he s e r ge a nt t o whom he o r i g i n a l l y spoke
wa s i d e n t i f i e d by members of t h e pl at oon a s an i ndi vi dua l of
Phi l i ppi ne ances t r y who coul d not underst and Thompson. Wi t nesses
s t a t e d t h a t t he s er geant c a l l e d t o a l i e ut e na nt s t a ndi ng nearby
and t he conver sat i on a c t u a l l y ensued between Thompson and t h i s
l i e ut e na nt - - l a t e r i n d e n t i f i e d a s 2LT (now 1LT) Wi l l i am Cal l ey.
The s e r i e s of event s s o f ar - - t he shoot i ng of t h e
wounded g i r l ; t h e di scover y t h a t dur i ng t h e per i od of r e f ue l i ng,
t h e wounded c i v i l i a n s had di ed; t h e l a r ge number of bodi es i n
t h e d i t c k ; t he s hoot i ng i n t o t h a t d i t c h by t h e s e r ge a nt ; and
t h e number of bodi es al ong Route 521 and i n t h e vi l l a ge - - a l l
combined t o cause gr e a t concern on t he p a r t of W 0 1 Thompson. .
I n t h i s frame of mind, Thompson fl ew e a s t of My Lai ( 4 ) and
observed i n f r o n t of t h e advanci ng US f or c e s a s mal l bunker i n t o
which a group of Vietnamese--old men, women, and chi l dren--were
moving. Having seen h i s pr evi ous e f f o r t s t o s ave noncombatants
f r u s t r a t e d , Thompson e l e c t e d t o l and h i s he l i c opt e r between
t h e advanci ng t r oops and t h e bunker cont ai ni ng t h e noncornbat-
a nt s . W 0 1 Thompson t hen di r e c t e d h i s crew chi ef and gunner
t o t ake che M-60 machineguns which were mounted on t h e i r a i r -
c r a f t , and t o cover h i s movements " r e a l c l os e . " W01
Thompson t hen walked from h i s he l i c opt e r toward tF.- US l i n e s
and spoke t o an i ndi vi dua l whom he l a t e r i ndent i f: : J a s LT
Cal l ey. I t i s pos s i bl e t h a t t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n has been
confused by Thompson wi t h t h e o f f i c e r he pr evi ousl y spoke t o
a t t h e d i t c h ; t h e r e i s some evi dence t h a t t h i s o f f i c e r probabl y
was t h e pl at oon l e a de r of C Company's 2d Pl at oon.
W01 Thompson s t a t e d t h a t he advi sed t h e i ndi vi d-
u a l of t h e Vietnamese i n t h e bunker and sought h i s a s s i s t a nc e
i n g e t t i n g them out of t he bunker a l i v e . According t o Thompson,
when t h i s i ndi vi dua l r e pl i e d wi t h words t o t h e , e f f e c t t h a t
" t he onl y way t o g e t them out i s wi t h a hand grenade"
Thompson responded wi t h t he remark t h a t t he ground
commander shoul d " j u s t s t o p h i s men and I ' d g e t them out wi t h-
out k i l l i n g them." Wi t nesses agreed t h a t Thompson t hen
l e f t t he i ndi vi dua l , walked forward of t h e f r i e ndl y l i n e s
toward t h e bunker, and s i gna l l e d f o r t h e bunker occupant s
t o come forward. The occupant s l e f t t h e bunker; Thompson
gat her ed them t oge t he r and r adi oed f o r one of h i s gunshi ps
which l anded and, i n two t r i p s , evacuat ed t h e c i v i l i a n s t o
t he sout hwest near Route 521, wi t hout f u r t h e r i nc i de nt .
Becoming a i r bor ne once agai n, W 0 1 Thompson quer i ed h i s crew
t o det ermi ne i f t hey wished t o r e t ur n t o t h e l oc a t i on of t h e
d i t c h where t hey had seen t h e s e r ge a nt f i r i n g i n or de r t o det er-
mine i f t h e r e were s ur vi vor s . The c r e w responded a f f i r ma t i ve l y
and s o, once agai n, Thompson l anded t h e OH-23. Thompson di s -
mounted wi t h t h e M-60 machinegun t o pr ovi de s e c ur i t y. H i s
two c r e w member s went i n t o t h e d i t c h and removed a smal l chLl d
who had been s hi e l de d by t h e body of a young woman. Thompson
was t o l d by h i s c r e w t h a t t h e r e w e r e ot he r s ur vi vor s ; however,
t he capaci t y of t h e he l i c opt e r pr ecl uded evacuat i ng more t han
t he one c h i l d . One of t h e crewmen t hen he l d t h e c h i l d on h i s
l a p whi l e Thompson fl ew t h e he l i c opt e r t o a Vietnamese h o s p i t a l
a t Quang Ngai. Af t e r t h i s t hey once agai n r et ur ned t o LZ
Dot t i e t o r e f u e l cr~ea i r c r a f t .
W 0 1 Thompson a r r i ve d a t LZ Dot t i e between 1100 and
1130 hours. He wa s g r e a t l y concerned over t h e "unnecessary
k i l l i n g " he had seen and det ermi ned t h a t t h i s ma t t e r would be
r epor t ed t hrough pr oper channel s. On t h e f l i g h t - l i n e a t LZ
Dot t i e he encount ered ot he r p i l o t s and c r e w members from h i s
company who were a l s o concerned over s i mi l i a r i nc i de nt s t hey
had seen. I n t est i mony bef or e t h e I nqui r y, wi t nesses s t a t e d
t h a t s e ve r a l of t h e ai r-crew member s w e r e voi ci ng compl ai nt s
and a t l e a s t i n i t i a l l y , j oi ned wi t h W 0 1 Thompson i n s t a t i n g
t h e i r p r o t e s t s .
Upon l andi ng, W01 Thompson encount ered h i s s e c t i o n
l e a de r , CPT (now Mr . ) Barry C. Ll oyd, and r e l a t e d t o him h i s deep
concern over t h e event s he had observed t h a t morning. Both
Thompson and Lloyd, pos s i bl y i n t h e company of ot he r a vi a t i on
company per sonnel , went t o t h e B Comp'any oper at i ons van where
Thompson r epor t ed t o his' comrnanding o f f i c e r , MAJ Fr e de r i c
Watke . P. art of t h e ensui ng conver sat i on was hear d by SP5
Lawrence Kubert who was on dut y i11 t h e van a t t h e t i m e . ; - ' -
- -
There i s some di scr epancy between what W01 Thompson
bel i eved he t o l d h i s commanding o f f i c e r and t h a t which MAJ Watke
i n h i s t est i mony cl ai med he r ecei ved and subsequent l y r e por t e d
t hrough h i s chai n of command. W 0 1 Thompson s t a t e d he bel i eved
he gave MAJ Watke t he compl et e cont ent s of what has been r e f e r r e d
t o a s t h e Thompson Report . ' - Watke on t h e ot her , hand acknow-
l edged t h a t Thompson t o l d hlm of l o t s of "unnecessary" and
"needl ess" ki l l i ng- - " pr i nc i pa l l y women, c hi l dr e n, and ol de r
men" ; of t h e conf r ont at i on between Thompson and t h e ground
commander; t he evacuat i on of c i v i l i a n s by gunshi p; and t h e
evacuat i on of a c h i l d t o t he hos pi t a l . Watke cl ai med no
r e c ol l e c t i on of a c a pt a i n ( o r any i ndi vi dua l ) s hoot i ng a woman;
of a d i t c h cont ai ni ng bodi es; any groupi ng of more t han 2 o r 3
bodi es; o r of any per son shoot i ng i n t o bodi,es. MAJ Watke
s t a t e d he t hought h i s s ubor di nat es were "over-dramat i zi ng" what
t hey s a w, but never t hel es s gai ned t h e i mpr essi on t h a t about 30
noncombatants had been k i l l e d .
Those per sonnel who w e r e pr e s e nt f o r a t l e a s t p a r t
of t h e t i m e t h a t Thompson r epor t ed t o Watke--CPT Lloyd and SP5
Kubert--in t h e i r t est i mony gener al l y agr eed wj t h what Watke
s t a t e d was t o l d him by Thompson. Both agr ee t h a t Thompson
wa s angered, but n e i t h e r coul d r e c a l l Thompson's ment i oni ng
anyone shoot i ng a wounded woman, anyt hi ng about a d i t c h
cont ai ni ng bodi es, o r anyone s hoot i ng i n t o such a d i t c h .
They a l s o agr eed t h a t t h e a l l e g a t i o n of needl ess k i l l i n g was
c l e a r l y s t a t e d (Kubert s t a t e d t he t erm "murder" was used) and
t h a t a f t e r Thompson had completed h i s r e p o r t , t h e r e was a c l e a r
under st andi ng t h a t a s e r i ous charge had been a l l e ge d
a ga i ns t TF Barker. -. I t i s a ppr opr i a t e t o not e t h a t much of
what MAJ Watke r ecei ved from W01 Thompson was r e i nf or c e d by t h e
compl ai nt s of ot he r members a t t he t i me Thompson made h i s r e por t
and l a t e r on dur i ng t h e day when, accor di ng t o MAJ Watke, ot he r
peopl e who w e r e wi t nes s es t o t he event s a t My Lai ( 4 ) "came t o
me (and s a i d ) .... t h a t t h e r e were peopl e k i l l e d out t he r e . " .
I n succeedi ng p a r t s of t h i s r e por t , r ef er ences w i l l
be made t o t he Thompson Report--as such, t h e Thompson Report . i s
consi der ed an o u t l i n e of t he exper i ences of W01 Thompson from
t h e t i m e he a r r i ve d over My Lai ( 4 ) a t 0730 hour s, 16 March,
u n t i l he r et ur ned t o LZ Dot t i e t o r e f u e l a t approxi mat el y 1130
hour s.
4. ~o k n a n d Response t o t h e Thompson Report
A t t h i s poi nt , t h e r e was a requi rement f o r i mmedi at e
and p o s i t i v e r e a c t i on t o t h e Thompson Report . I ns t e a d, MAJ
Watke s t a t e d he "t hought t he mat t er over" f o r 15 mi nut es and
I
- t hen went t o t h e TF Barker TOC t o r e por t t h e a l l e g a t i o n t o
LTC Barker. Barker was r epor t ed by Watke t o have evi nced no
s u r p r i s e a t t h e charge--probably because he had al r eady gai ned
a knowledge of some of t h e i nc i de nt s t hrough r a di o t r ansmi ssi ons
and t el ephone c a l l s al r eady di scussed--and advi sed Watke t h a t he
would l ook i n t o t h e mat t er . According t o Watke;' LTC Barker t hen
made arrangement s t o de pa r t t h e a r e a and v i s i t t h e u n i t i nvol ved
i n t he a l l e ga t i on. ' Watke s t a t e d he was s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e
mat t er was now i n t he hands of someone who coul d t a ke t h e neces-
s a r y c or r e c t i ve act i on.
Watke' s subsequent a c t i a ns dur i ng t h e af t er noon of 16
March a r e not c l e a r s i nc e of t h e t h r e e p r i n c i p a l s involved--
Bar ker , Calhoun, and Watke--LTC Barker i s deceased and MAJ
Calhoun r ef used t o t e s t i f y f u r t h e r on t h e grounds t h a t such
a c t i on mi ght be s el f - i ncr i mi nat i ng. Watke s t a t e d t h a t sometime
dur i ng t h e af t er noon of t h e 16t h, he agai n. saw LTC Barker who
advi sed Watke t h a t a f t e r v i s i t i n g C Company's l oc a t i on and
speaki ng t o peopl e on t h e ground, he coul d not l oc a t e t h e i n-
di vi dua l wi t h whom Thompson had had t h e conf r ont at i on. MAJ
Watke t e s t i f i e d t h a t Barker f u r t h e r advi sed him t h a t whi l e a
smal l number of noncombatants had been k i l l e d i n My Lai ( 4 ) ,
itwas " a r e s u l t of j u s t i f i a b l e s i t u a t i o n s " and t h a t Barker
had found not hi ng t o i n d i c a t e t h a t a l a r ge number of peopl e
had been k i l l e d . I n consi der i ng t h e adequacy of MAJ
Wat ke' s. subsequent a c t i ons , itshoul d be not ed t h a t he (Watke)
"di dn ' t be l i e ve Col onel Barker. " .
Watke' s next known a c t i on r e l e va nt t o t h i s mat t er
came a t about 2200 hours 16 March, 1 0 hours a f t e r Thompson
had made h i s r e por t . . A t t h i s t i me, MAJ Watke a t l a s t went
t o h i s immediate s upe r i or , LTC Hol l aday, commander of t h e
123d Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on.
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o under st and why MAJ Watke, a f t e r
r ecei vi ng , a r e por t which he recogni zed a s "very s e ve r e , "
would i n i t i a l l y cont ent hi msel f wi t h advi s i ng
onl y t h e commander of t h e TF. While he had r ecei ved
consi der abl e cor r obor at i on of Thompson's s t o r y from ot he r
per sonnel , itwould have been a si mpl e and l ogi c a l s t e p t o
have confi rmed some of t h e a l l e ga t i ons t hrough l ow-l evel
r econnai ssance, usi ng one of Watke' s a va i l a bl e aer o- scout
teams. The need f o r such a c t i on shoul d have become even
more appar ent l a t e r i n t h e af t er noon of 16 March when LTC
Barker t o l d Watke t h a t he had found no subst ance t o t h e
Thompson' Report. I t shoul d have been c l e a r t o MAJ Watke,
a f t e r r e c e i p t of LTC Bar ker ' s de ni a l , t h a t no f u r t h e r act i on
would be t aken unl es s Watke i n i t i a t e d it. Yet d e s p i t e h i s
b e l i e f t h a t Barker was l yi ng, Watke t ook no f u r t h e r a c t i on
u n t i l l a t e t h a t ni ght when he r epor t ed t o LTC Hol l aday a t
t h e l a t t e r ' s qua r t e r s i n Chu Lai .
Testimony concerni ng t h e d e t a i l s of t h e information
which Watke passed t o Holladay i n t h e i r meet i ng c ont a i ns some
di s cr epanci es . LTC Hol l aday' s ver s i on of Wat ke' s r e por t t o
him on 16 March c i t e d s p e c i f i c i t ems of t h e Thompson Report
which Watke di d not r e c a l l pr ovi di ng him. Holladay s t a t e d
t h a t Watke i nformed him a t t h a t t i m e of such t hi ngs a s t h e
bodi es i n t h e d i t c h and t h e s e r ge a nt shoot i ng i , nt o t h e di t ch- -
i t e m s which Watke di d not remember, but ' di d not di s put e hear i ng
from Thompson o r r e por t i ng t o Holladay.
While puzzl i ng, such di s cr epanci es do not a f f e c t t h e
concl usi on t h a t a l l e ga t i ons of a major war cri me w e r e t r a n s -
mi t t ed by Watke t o Holladay. Both LTC Holladay and Watke
agreed t h a t Watke r epor t ed Thompson's charge t h a t t h e r e had
been l o t s of "unnecessary" and "needl ess" ki l l i ng- - " pr i mar i l y
women, c hi l dr e n, and o l d e r men." LTC Holladay s t a t e d t h a t he
was gr e a t l y concerned over t h e s e r i ous ne s s of t h e mat t er , but
a f t e r "agoni zi ng" over t h e r e por t f or a l ong t i m e , deci ded
a ga i ns t awakening h i s s upe r i or , BG George Young, As s i s t a nt
Di vi si on Commander.
/
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o under st and why LTC Holladay t ook
no s t e p s t o v e r i f y t h e a l l e ga t i ons made o r t o obt a i n i nf or mat i on
f i r s t - hand from Thompson o r any of t h e ot her p i l o t s o r crew
members who were l i v i n g a t Chu Lai . Thi s omi ssi on was t o be
r epeat ed a t t h e As s i s t a nt Di vi si on Commander and Di vi si on
Commander l e v e l s and was a maj or reason why t he f u l l cont ent s
of t h e Thompson Report , and an appr eci at i on of t h e enormi t y
of t h e a t r o c i t y , appar ent l y di d not reach t hos e l e v e l s of -
.command. Unt i l t h e Department of t h e Army i nve s t i ga t i on
was i n i t i a t e d a y e a r l a t e r , onl y MAJ Watke and COL Henderson
(which w i l l be expl ai ned i n more d e t a i l l a t e r ) had i nt er vi ewed
W 0 1 Thompson concer ni ng h i s obser vat i ons and a c t i ons oh 16
March.
A t 0800 t h e f ol l owi ngmorning, 17 March, LTC Holladay
and MAJ Watke r epor t ed t o t h e As s i s t a nt Di vi si on Commander, BG
Young. MAJ Watke r ecount ed f o r BG Young t h e a l l e ga t i ons
he had r ecei ved from Thompson and ot he r per sonnel of h i s u n i t .
I n h i s account of t h i s meet i ng, BG Young s t a t e d t h a t he was
not appr i sed of any char ges of i ndi s c r i mi na t e o r unnecessary
k i l l i n g of noncombatants; he gai ned t h e i mpr essi on from
MAJ Watke t h a t t h e mat t er of maj or concern was t h e f a c t t h a t
t h e r e had been a conf r ont at i on between t h e ground f or c e s , a nd
an a vi a t i on u n i t r e s u l t i n g from t h e f a c t t h a t noncombatants
had been caught i n a c r os s - f i r e between US and VC f or ces .
By BG Young' s account , Watke made no mention of a l a r ge number
of bodi es i n a di t c h; of an i ndi vi dua l f i r i n g i n t o a d i t c h con-
t a i n i n g bodi es; of a c a pt a i n s hoot i ng a woman; of any r ef er ence
t o noncombatant c a s ua l t i e s ; o r of ot he r a vi a t i on per sonnel
confi rmi ng Thompson ' s Report . LTC Hol l aday was equal l y
c l e a r t h a t a t t h i s meet i ng MAJ Watke t o l d BG Young of t he
a l l e ga t i ons concerni ng t he bodi es i n t h e d i t c h , t h e s e r ge a nt
f i r i n g i n t o t h e d i t c h , t he conf r ont at i on between Thompson
and a ,ground commander, and t h e exces s i ve k i l l i n g of noncom-
ba t a nt s by TF Barker. MAJ Watke t e s t i f i e d t h a t he
r epeat ed t o BG Young t h e same account he had hear d from h i s
men and r e l a t e d . t o LTC Holladay t h e ni ght bef or e, i ncl udi ng
t he f a c t t h a t Thompson wa s nok t h e onl y sour ce of t h e a l l e -
gat i ons .
A t about noon on t he same aay (Sunday, 17 March) ,
BG Young advi sed MG Samuel Kost er , t h e Commanding General
of t he America1 Di vi si on, of t h e a l l e ga t i ons he had r ecei ved
from t h e Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on. The t est i mony of bot h MG Kost er
and BG Young i s i n gener al agreement t h a t onl y a very smal l
p a r t of t h e Thompson Report was gi ven t o t h e Di vi si on Commander.
I n h i s t est i mony bef or e t h i s I nqui r y, MG Kost er s p e c i f i c a l l y
deni ed r e c e i vi ng any r e por t of a c a pt a i n s hoot i ng a woman, of
bodi es i n a d i t c h , of an i ndi vi dua l shoot i ng i n t o a d i t c h , of
unnecessary k i l l i n g of noncombatants, o r of t h e f a c t t h a t ot he r
a vi a t i on per sonnel had confirmed Thompson's a l l e ga t i ons .
MG Kost er t e s t i f i e d t h a t a s a r e s u l t of t he meet i ng, h i s two
pri mary concerns were t h a t ground t r oops had endangered c i v i l i a n s
by f i r i n g more t ha n t h e ci r cumst ances r equi r ed, and t h a t t h e r e
had been a conf r ont at i on between ground and a vi a t i on u n i t s .
However, i n a pr evi ous st at ement gi ven t o t h e Cri mi nal I nvest i ga-
t i o n Di vi si on ( CI D) , MG Kost er acknowledged t h a t dur i ng t h i s
meet i ng wi t h BG Young he was advi sed t h a t t he r e had been some
" i ndi s c r i mi na t e shoot i ng of Vietnamese c i v i l i a n s . " I n any
event , t he meet i ng t er mi nat ed wi t h MG Kos t e r ' s d i r e c t i n g BG
Young t o i n s t r u c t COL Henderson t o i n v e s t i g a t e a t l e a s t two
mat t er s , i . e. , t he . c onf r ont a t i on and t h e a l l e ga t i ons t h a t t r oops
had f i r e d more t han was r equi r ed.
The di s cr epanci es i n t h e t est i mony of BG Young and t h a t
of LTC Hol l aday and MAJ Watke a s t o what MAJ Watke r epor t ed t o
BG Young i s of c r u c i a l s i gni f i c a nc e i n t h e eval uat i on of a l l t h a t
fol l owed. I n h i s t est i mony MG Kost er confi rmed p a r t s of BG
Young's account of t h e i r conver sat i on on 17 March, which would
t end t o s uppor t BG Young's ver s i on of what MAJ Watke had r epor t ed
t o him t h a t morning. On t h e ot he r hand, it s e e m s most unl i kel y
t h a t Hol l aday and Watke would have r el ayed a ver s i on of t he
Thompson Report which emphasized t he conf r ont at i on between members
of t h e i r unit and t he ground f or c e s and omi t t ed mention of t h e
i ndi s c r i mi na t e k i l l i n g of noncombatants t h a t had caused t he
conf r ont at i on. Having ever y r eason t o expect t h a t t h e i r r e por t
would i n i t i a t e an immediate i nve s t i ga t i on, Hol l aday and Watke
had no d i s c e r n i b l e r eason f o r e l i mi na t i ng from t h e Thompson
Report t he a l l e g a t i o n s of i ndi s c r i mi na t e k i l l i n g of
noncombatants by TF Barker when t hey r el ayed it t o BG Young.
The t est i mony of LTC Hol l aday and'.MAJ Watke, suppor t ed by a l l
cons i der at i ons of l o g i c and s e l f - i n t e r e s t of t h e p a r t i e s , compel
t h e concl usi ons: (1) That BG Young w a s t o l d about Thompson's
charges of i ndi s c r i mi na t e k i l l i n g of noncombatants, and ( 2) t h a t
BG Young passed such- i nf or mat i on on t o MG Kost er.
It would appear t h a t bot h gener al o f f i c e r s sought i n t h e i r
t est i mony t o unde r s t a t e t h e compl ai nt of W01 Thompson a s r el ayed
t o them and t o r a t i o n a l i z e i n t h i s way t h e i r subsequent l ack of
a f f i r ma t i ve a c t i on. Such a concl usi on suggest s t h a t t he s e two
i ndi vi dua l s sought t o suppr ess t h e t r u e f a c t s concer ni ng t h e
event s sur r oundi ng t h e Son My oper at i on. The evi dence i ndi c a t i ng
such suppr essi on of i nf or mat i on i s pr esent ed i n Chapt er 11.
5. I ndi c a t or s of Unusual Event s
During t h e Son My oper at i on of 16-18 March, t h e r e were
many i ndi c a t or s of unusual event s . These shoul d have ai ded i n
making t h e chai n of command aware of t h e unusual event s which
t r a ns pi r e d on 16 March. Cer t ai n of t he s e a c t s w e r e i d e n t i f i e d
pr evi ous l y a s i nc i de nt s which were c i t e d i n o r a l and wr i t t e n r e-
p o r t s submi t t ed t hrough t h e normal chai n of command. There were,
however, a ddi t i ona l i nc i de nt s which, when observed by o r brought
t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of exper i enced per sonnel , shoul d have been s uf -
f i c i e n t cause t o a l e r t commanders and/ or s t a f f o f f i c e r s of t h e
e xi s t e nc e of an unusual s i t u a t i o n . The pri mary purpose of t h i s
s e c t i o n i s t o i d e n t i f y and di s c us s s p e c i f i c i nc i de nt s r e l e va nt t o
t h e Son My oper at i on which a r e not t r e a t e d a s s p e c i a l s ubj e c t s i n
ot he r s e c t i ons of t h e r e por t , and which a r e consi der ed t o be i n-
di c a t i ons of t h e occur r ence of an unusual event . The l i s t of i n-
di c a t or s i s not a l l i nc l us i ve ; onl y t hos e i nc i de nt s a r e di scussed
which, when consi der ed i n t h e cont ext of t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n
which e xi s t e d a t t h e t i me, shoul d have caused a r e a c t i on on t h e
p a r t of t h e commander and/or s t a f f o f f i c e r .
The r e a c t i on t o each s p e c i f i c i ndi c a t or shoul d be consi der ed
i n l i g h t of an awareness o r knowledge of ot he r event s o r i ndi c a t -
o r s by t h e i ndi vi dua l concerned. As an a i dc i n making t h i s judge-
ment, t he f ol l owi ng i s a l i s t of i nc i de nt s which have al r eady been
di s cus s ed i n t h i s chapt er of t h e r e por t and a r e consi der ed t o have
been an i ndi c a t i on t h a t an unusual event had occur r ed dur i ng t h e
Son My oper at i on:
(1) Report s and/ or Observat i ons of Noncombatant Ca s ua l t i e s
( 2) Report s of Conf r ont at i on Between W01 Thompson and a
Ground Uni t Commander
( 3 ) Report s of a Capt ai n Shoot i ng a Wounded Woman
( 4 ) Report s of Bodies Observed i n a Di t ch
( 5) Report s of Indiscriminate/Unnecessary Fi r i ng
( 6) Report s of a Sol di e r Fi r i ng i n t o a Di t ch Cont ai ni ng
' Bodies
( 7) Report s of Hel i copt er Gunships and Scout Shi p Landing
i n My Lai ( 4 )
, ( 8) Repor t s - of Complaints by W01 Thompson and ot he r
Avi at i on ~e r s ' onne l
I n addi t on t h e r e were i nc i de nt s not pr evi ous l y i d e n t i f i e d
which i n d i c a t e t h e occur r ence of an unusual e ve nt i n Son My.
Such i n c i d e n t s . o r i ndi c a t or s a r e l i s t e d i n ~Hr o n o l o g i c a l sequence
and a r e fol l owed by a di s cus s i on of each i n d i c a t o r t o i ncl ude
i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h e r e a c t i on of commanders and s t a f f
o f f i c e r s a t each l e v e l of command:
(1) Ar t i l l e r y Planned and Fi r e d on My Lai ( 4 )
( 2 ) Gunships and Li f t s hi ps Fi r e on My Lai ( 4 )
( 3 ) The Exodus of Ci vi l i a ns
( 4 ) Observat i on of Burni ng Bui l di ngs
( 5) I n i t i a l Report of High VC Body Count
( 6) Report of High VC Body Count At t r i but e d t o
A r t i l l e r y Fi r e
( 7)
LOW Rat i o of Weapons Capt ured t o VC K I A
( 8 ) Absence of Report s of Enemy Cont act and Request s
f o r Fi r e Support
( 9 ) Report of Depart ure of VC from My Lai ( 4 )
( 1 0 ) Low ~ a t i o of US Ca s ua l t i e s t o VC Ca s ua l t i e s
(11) Commander's Order t o Ret urn t o My Lai ( 4 )
a. Ar t i l l e r y Planned and Firec? on My Lai ( 4 )
One of t h e f i r s t i ndi c a t i ons t h a t t he Son My oper at i on
was t o be conduct ed wi t hout r egar d t o t h e wel f ar e of noncombat-
a nt s i s i n t h e pl anni ng of a r t i l l e r y suppor t f o r t h e combat as-
s a u l t of C/1-20 I nf . From t h e o u t s e t , itwas pl anned f o r a r t i l -
l e r y f i r e t o f a l l on o r al ongsi de t he i nha bi t e d haml et of My Lai
( 4 ) . LTC Luper, t he a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n commander; MAJ Calhoun,
TF Barker S3, CPT Vazquez, t h e a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n o f f i c e r wi t h TF
Barker; and CPT Medina, t h e C Company commander, a l l agr eed
t h a t it was p a r t of LTC Bar ker ' s pl an f o r t h e a r t i l l e r y pr epar a-
t i o n f o r t h e combat a s s a u l t t o l and on t h e edge of t h e haml et .
While such a c t i on was wi t hi n t h e l e g a l l i m i t s of t h e r u l e s of
engagement (ROE) i n e f f e c t a t t h a t t i m e , i t was, c l e a r l y i n
v i o l a t i o n of t h e s p i r i t of t h e pol i c y and wi t hout r egar d f o r
t h e l i v e s .of t h e i nha bi t a nt s of My Lai ( 4 ) .
The haml et of My Lai ( 4 ) was l ocat ed i n an a r e a
i d e n t i f i e d a s under VC domi nat i on and c ont r ol . Cl ear ance
t o f i r e was obt ai ned from Vietnamese a u t h o r i t i e s a f t e r a
check on t h e i r p a r t r eveal ed no-Vi et namese mi l i t a r y u n i t s
operaki ng i n t he ar ea. No check was made o r assur ance gi ven
t h a t noncombatants were not pr e s e nt i n t h e a r e a . For a l l
p r a c t i c a l pur poses, Provi nce and D i s t r i c t a u t h o r i t i e s regarded
Son My Vi l l age a s a f r e e - f i r e zone and would approve any re-
que s t f o r f i r e i f Army Republ i c of Vietnam (AAVN) u n i t s o r
per sonnel w e r e not endangered. Thi s was known by LTC Barker
and h i s s t a f f .
The i nha bi t a nt s of VC-dominated a r e a s , such a s My Lai
( 4 ) were f r equent l y encouraged t hrough Government of Vietnam (GVN)
and US e f f o r t s t o evacuat e t he s e a r e a s s i n c e t hey w e r e s ubj e c t t o
unannounced f i r e s by a r t i l l e r y and a i r . I t wa s known, how-
ever , t h a t many persons e l e c t e d o r were f or ced t o accept t h e
r i s k s a t t e nda nt i n remai ni ng and t hus t h e r e w e r e v i l l a g e s and
haml et s such a s My Lai ( 4 ) where r e l a t i v e l y l a r ge numbers of
per sons, bot h wi l l i n g l y and unwi l l i ngl y, l i v e d i n VC-cont rol l ed
ar eas . Thi s p r i n c i p l e was recogni zed i n MACV Di r e c t i ve 525-3
( e x h i b i t D-6) which s t a t e s t h a t per sonnel l i v i n g i n VC-controlled
ar eas w i l l not be consi der ed VC s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s of t h e i r
pr esence i n t he s e a r e a s .
While MG Kost er and COL Henderson bot h s t at , ed it was
not t h e i r pol i cy t o employ a r t i l l e r y on i nhabi t ed v i l l a g e s , :
t h e f a c t s of 1,6 March r e ve a l l i t t l e i n t h e way of c ont r ol s t o
pr event such i nc i de nt s . Even i f one w e r e t o assume i gnor ance
on t he p a r t of 11t h Bri gade per sonnel concerni ng knowledge
t h a t My Lai ( 4 ) wa s populated--an assumption not bor ne out i n
f a c t _ --such an assumpt i on was c l e a r l y dest r oyed when, a f t e r
t h e a r t i l l e r y pr e pa r a t i on was compl et ed, l a r ge groups of
peopl e w e r e seen de pa r t i ng t h e v i l l a g e by a l l of t h e commanders
d i r e c t l y concerned wi t h t h e oper at i on: CPT Medina, MAJ Watke,
LTC Barker, LTC Luper, and COL Henderson. Concur r ent l y,
wi t h t h e obs er vat i on of c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s on t h e ground by
each of t hese' same i ndi vi dua l s , less MAJ Watke, who dezi ed
s e e i ng c i v i l i a n c a s ua l t i e s , it shoul d have been appar ent
1
t ha t US fi repower had i n f l i c t e d cas ual t i es among t he noncom-
bat ant s i n My Lai ( 4 ) . Despi t e t hes e obser vat i ons, no act i on
was t aken t o provi de r e l i e f o r as s i s t ance t o t he noncombatant
cas ual t i es nor was any s i gni f i c a nt e f f o r t i n i t i a t e d t o det er -
mine t he ext ent of such cas ual t i es u n t i l much l a t e r i n t he day
when COL Henderson di r ect ed TF Barker t o send C Company back
through My Lai ( 4 ) t o determine t he exact nat ur e of noncombatant
cas ual t i es . Thi s bel at ed e f f o r t w a s st opped by MG Koster
who countermanded t he or der of COL Henderson, a t a time when he
al r eady had knowledge t h a t a t l e a s t "20 t o 28" noncombatants
had been ki l l e d.
b. Gunships and Li f t s hi ps Fi r e on My Lai ( 4 )
Another e a r l y i ndi cat or t h a t commanders i n t he Son
My oper at i on di sr egar ded t he s af et y and wel f ar e of noncombat-
ant s i s t he f a c t t h a t t he fi repower of avai l abl e hel i copt er s
was used f r e e l y and i n some cases i ndi scr i mi nat el y i n and
around t he i nhabi t ed hamlet of My Lai ( 4 ) .
CPT Medina s t a t e d t h a t as t he l i f t s h i p s made t h e i r
approach t o t he LZ, t he gunships were f i r i n g suppr essi ve f i r e ,
u t i l i z i n g 40mm grenades, 2.75 i nch r ocket s, and 5.56mrn "mini-
guns, " on bot h s i des of t he LZ. As t he l i f t s h i p s came i n ,
t he door gunners on t he out si de of t he "V" f i r e d M-60 machine-
guns i n suppr essi ve f i r e di r e c t l y i n t o t he hamlet u n t i l t he
hel i copt er s touched down. Many of t he t r oops on t he f i r s t
l i f t corroborat ed CPT Medina' s t est i mony.
LT (now Mr . ) Alaux, ( t he a r t i l l e r y forward observer
at t ached t o t he company) s t a t e d t h a t gunships f i r e d " i nt o t he
t r e e s and t he hoot ches" al ong t he. out s ki r t s of t he hamlet usi ng
r ocket s and miniguns. Alaux t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t l e a s t one
of t he bodi es he observed had been k i l l e d by miniguns.
CPT Vazquez i ndi cat ed t h a t t he gunships f i r e d al ong
t he s i des of t he LZ and on t he out s ki r t s of t he haml et , but he
di d not bel i eve t hey f i r e d di r e c t l y i n t o t he hamlet i t s e l f . ' ;.
W 0 1 Hugh Thompson s t a t e d t h a t he observed gunships
accompanying t he l i f t s h i p s "shoot i ng it up pr e t t y good."
He a l s o observed t hese same gunships "working over" t he ar ea
where he l a t e r observed numerous Vietnamese cas ual t i es . '
A t a pe r ecor di ng made by CPT Lewellen i n t he TF Barker
TOC r eveal s t h a t LTC Barker or der ed "no r e s t r i c t i o n s on door
gunners " which had t h e e f f e c t of per mi t t i ng them t o f i r e
suppr essi ve f i r e s i n t o t h e haml et of My Lai ( 4 ) on t he f i n a l
approach t o t h e LZ.
A s was t h e cas e i n t h e i ndi s c r i mi na t e use of a r t i l l e r y ,
a knowledge of t h e pl anned o r a c t u a l use of h e l i c o p t e r f i r e -
power i n suppor t of t h e Son My oper at i on, de s pi t e i t s t a c t i c a l
d e s i r a b i l i t y , c a r r i e d wi t h it t h e awareness t h a t t h e oper at i on
was bei ng conduct ed wi t h an unusual di s r e ga r d f o r t he s a f e t y
of noncombatants. Even agai n assuming an i gnor ance of t he i n-
ha bi t e d s t a t u s of My Lai ( 4 ) p r i o r t o t h e operat i on--and such
an assumpt i on cannot be subst ant i at ed- - such i gnor ance was di s -
pe l l e d when peopl e commenced de pa r t i ng My Lai ( 4 ) i n l a r g e
numbers, immediately f ol l owi ng t h e l andi ng of US t r oops . :
Again, a s was t h e case i n t h e use of a r t i l l e r y f i r e ,
commanders d i d n o t r e a c t when f aced wi t h t h e knowledge t h a t
noncombatant c a s u a l t i e s had been unnecessar i l y caused by
US f i r epower .
c. The Exodus of Ci vi l i a ns
Another e a r l y i ndi c a t i on t h a t t h e Son My oper at i on
was not a normal, r out i ne , combat a s s a u l t , occur r ed s hor t l y
a f t e r t h e a r t i l l e r y pr e pa r a t i on a t C Company's LZ t er mi nat ed.
A t t h i s poi nt , t h e a r e a i n t h e v i c i n i t y of My Lai ( 4 ) which
was t o be c l e a r of a l l " f r i e ndl y i nha bi t a nt s " by 0730, .
suddenl y became t h e scene of a mass exodus of per sonnel . COL
HendeYson, aboard h i s command and c ont r ol he l i c opt e r wi t h LTC
(now COL) Luper and t h e 11t h Bri gade S3, MAJ McKnight, observed
approxi mat el y 300 Vietnamese e x i t i n g t he haml et of My Lai ( 4 )
al ong Route 521.
According t o t h e t a pe r ecor di ng of a por t i on of t h e r adi o
t r ans mi s s i ons made dur i ng t h e oper at i on on t h e morning of 16
March, LTC Barker was informed by t h e 174t h Avi at i on Company
gunshi ps commander t h a t most of t h e Vietnamese i n t he group
moving al ong t h e r out e "l ook l i k e women a nd' c hi l dr e n and farm-
ers, " . There i s no i ndi c a t i on t h a t LTC Barker admonished CPT
Medina t o e xe r c i s e c a ut i on a t t h i s t i me because t he r e
were noncombatants i n t he ope r a t i ona l a r e a , cont r ar y t o
t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e gi ven him e a r l i e r i n t h e oper at i ons
or der . -
CPT Vazquez, who was accompanying LTC Barker on h i s
command and c ont r ol he l i c opt e r , not ed t h a t many v i l l a g e r s
evacuat ed t h e haml et a f t e r t h e gunshi ps had expended t h e i r
suppr essi ve ordnance around t h e LZ. He a l s o not ed t he
bodi es of Vietnamese i n an a r e a where t h e gunshi ps had made
a f i r i n g r un.
MAJ Watke observed t h e exodus whi l e f l y i n g a s co-
p i l o t on one of t h e gunshi ps, and p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t he scr een-
i ng of the' Vietnamese from t h e a i r .
1.t i s c l e a r t h a t a t t h i s poi nt i n t he Son My oper at i on
it shoul d have been appar ent t o commanders from t h e pl at oon t o
t h e br i gade l e v e l , t h a t something had gone wrong i n t h e oper at i on.
The f i r e s uppor t pl an f o r t he a s s a u l t a t My. Lai ( 4 ) was based
on an assumpt i on t h a t t h e haml et would e i t h e r be occupi ed by
t h e 48t h Local Force (LF) Ba t t a l i on o r uni nhabi t ed; t he event s
des cr i bed i n t h e pr ecedi ng paragraphs e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h i s
assumption r e l a t i n g t o t h e absence of i nha bi t a nt s was f a l s e
and t h a t noncombatants had been k i l l e d . Except f o r t he r e-
por t ed admoni t i on by COL Henderson a t about 0900 hours t h a t
he d i d n o t "want any unnecessary k i l l i n g goi ng on down t he r e "
--an or de r COL Henderson s p e c i f i c a l l y deni ed i s s ui ng - a l l
commanders concerned appar ent l y e l e c t e d t o i gnor e t he s i t u a t i o n .
d. Observat i on of Burning Bui l di ngs
During t h e Son My oper at i on on 16 March, many i ndi vi d-
ua l s not i ced bur ni ng bui l di ngs i n t he My Lai ( 4 ) haml et complex,
According t o COL Henderson' s t est i mony, he observed s e ve r a l
bui l di ngs bur ni ng whi l e he was o r b i t i n g over t he ope2at i onal a r e a
i n h i s command and c ont r ol he l i c opt e r . He cont act ed LTC
Barker t o a s c e r t a i n t h e r eason f o r t h e bur ni ngs and Bar ker , i n
t ur n, cont act ed CPT Medina on t h e ground and posed t h e ques t i on
t o him. LTC-Barker, a f t e r h i s c a l l t o CPT Medina, t hen
informed COL Henderson t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e s were bei ng dest r oyed
by t h e Vietnamese Nat i onal Pol i c e who were accompanying Company
C on t h e oper at i on. ( I n f a c t , t he r e were no Nat i onal
Pol i c e wi t h Company C a t t h i s t i m e . ) The Nat i onal Pol i ce
had r e por t e dl y found "weapons, o r hand grenades, o r ammunition,
o r i t e m s of mi l i t a r y equipment" i n t h e houses and w e r e burni ng
them f o r t h i s r eason, COL Henderson s t a t e d he t hen i nformed
LTC Barker t h a t any Nat i onal Pol i c e accompanying TF Barker
f or c e s f e l l under h i s ( Bar ker ' s ) ope r a t i ona l c ont r ol and or der ed
LTC Barker t o have t h e burni ng of s t r u c t u r e s st opped immediately
because "we had no a ut hor i t y t o burn houses. " Although
COL Henderson cl ai med t o have t aken a c t i on t o h a l t t h e bur ni ng
of s t r u c t u r e s , t h e r e i s consi der abl e evi dence i n t h e t est i mony
by members of Company C t h a t t h e burni ng of haml et s cont i nued
t hr oughout t h e remai nder of t h e ope r a t i on. -
I t i s c l e a r t h a t , once agai n, commanders from t h e pl at oon
t o t h e br i gade l e v e l wi t nessed t h e occur r ence of i nc i de nt s
which were i n t hemsel ves i l l e g a l , but even more i mpor t ant i n
t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , w e r e y e t anot her i ndi c a t i on t h a t el ement s of
TF Barker were engaged i n an unusual oper at i on. While MG
Kost er and COL Henderson i n t h e i r appearance bef or e t h i s In-
qui r y bot h mai nt ai ned t he e xi s t e nc e of a f i r m pol i cy a ga i ns t
t h e bur ni ng of Vietnamese s t r u c t u r e s , t h i s pol i cy was pa t e nt l y
i n e f f e c t i v e i n TF Barker on 16 March.
e. I n i t i a l Report of High Vi e t Cong Body Count
Another i ndi c a t i on of t h e unusual na t ur e of event s a t
My Lai ( 4 ) i s t h e r e p o r t concerni ng c a s u a l t i e s i n f l i c t e d a ga i ns t
t h e enemy f or ce. Wi t hi n 70 mi nut es of i t s touchdown, C Company
had r epor t ed 9 0 VC k i l l e d i n i t s a r e a of ope r a t i on. [ Such
r e por t s coul d be expect ed t o r e f l e c t a hi gh degr ee of s a t i s f a c -
t i o n i n t h e s ucces s of TF Barker and coul d l ogi c a l l y expect t o
cause i n q u i r i e s concerni ng t a c t i c s used, enemy u n i t s encoun-
t e r e d, and s i mi l a r r e que s t s f o r i nf or mat i on, I t i s e s s e n t i a l t o
not e t h a t t h i s appar ent l y resoundi ng success passed wi t h no sub-
s t a n t i v e i nqui r y by commanders a t t a s k f or c e , br i gade, o r di vi -
s i o n l e ve l - - t hi s d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t a l l t hr e e were i n t he
a r e a f o r var yi ng l engt hs of t i m e on t h e morning of 16 March.
There i s l i t t l e t o expl ai n why none of t he s e t h r e e commanders
ever l anded i n t h e immediate v i c i n i t y of My Lai ( 4 ) o r observed
*whatshoul d have been r e a di l y appar ent t o anyone over f l yi ng t h e
a r e a a t less t ha n 1, 000 f e e t .
The minimum command r e a c t i on t o t h e i n i t i a l r e por t of hi gh
VC c a s u a l t i e s shoul d have i ncl uded i nqui r y concerni ng l oc a t i on
and s i z e of enemy f or c e , u n i t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
of e xpl oi t a t i on. There i s no evi dence t h a t any such i nqui r y was
made.
f .
Report of High Vi e t Cong Body Count At t r i but e d t o
Ar t i l l e r y Fi r e
A t 0840 hour s, 16 March, TF Barker per sonnel recorded
i n t h e i r oper at i ons j our nal t h a t C Company had, "count ed 69 VC
KIA" a t a l oc a t i on which i s al most t h e c e nt e r of t he hamlet of
My Lai ( 4 ) . Thi s same e nt r y s t a t e s t h a t t h e 11t h Bri gade
was advi sed of t h i s i nf or mat i on. However, t h e Bri gade J our nal
r e f l e c t s no i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h i s s ubj e c t u n t i l 55 min-
ut e s l a t e r when t h e l oc a t i on i s s h i f t e d t o a poi nt over 600
met ers nor t hwest of t he o r i q i n a l s i t e and t h e cause of deat h i s
s t a t e d a s " a r t i l l e r y f i r e . " Thi s same i nf or mat i on i s r e-
corded i n t h e America1 Di vi si on J our nal a t 0940 hours and not es
t h a t t h e G2, G3, CofS, and I11 MAF have been n o t i f i e d . .
The del ay i n r e por t i ng t h i s i nf or mat i on, t he s i g n i f i c a n t change
i n l oc a t i on, and t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a r t i l l e r y f i r e a s t he
cause of deat h have not been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y expl ai ned. While
t he t r u t h of t h e r e por t i s c e r t a i n l y i n ques t i on, t he f a c t re-
mains t h a t s h o r t l y a f t e r 0940 hour s, 16 March, every headquar-
t e r s i n t h e chai n of command from TF Barker t o I11 MAF was a-
ware of t h e r e p o r t t h a t a r t i l l e r y f i r e had k i l l e d 69 VC i n t h e
Son My oper at i on.
Testimony of a l l per sonnel concerned wi t h t h e Son My op-
e r a t i o n r e ve a l s t h a t t h i s r e por t of out st andi ng a r t i l l e r y suc-
c e s s caused l i t t l e r e a c t i on among e i t h e r a r t i l l e r y o r i nf a nt r y
commanders. The a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n commander, LTC Luper,
s t a t e d t h a t he r ecei ved not i c e of t he s e c a s u a l t i e s about 0930
hour s, 16 March, whi l e f l yi ng aboard COL Henderson' s he l i c opt e r
and a f t e r he had seen 15-20 bodi es, a number of which
were women and c hi l dr e n, l ocat ed on t h e road sout h of My Lai
( 4 ) . When quest i oned concerni ng h i s r e a c t i on t o t h i s
mat t er , LTC Luper s t a t e d t h a t he d i d not check i n t o it f ur -
t h e r s i nc e he consi der ed it a "normal oper at i on" and
t h a t t h e k i l l i n g of 69 VC i n an a r t i l l e r y preparation of 1 0 0
rounds i s n o t unusual " i f you a r e f or t una t e enough t o cat ch t h e
enemy i n t h e open. ". There i s not hi ng t o i ndi c a t e t h a t
LTC Luper o r any ot he r person e i t h e r saw o r r ecei ved a r e p o r t
of VC i n t h e open. To t h e cont r ar y, LTC Luper ' s s us pi ci ons
shoul d have been aroused when t he f i r s t l a r ge group of peopl e
he observed was approxi mat el y 50 c i v i l i a n s depar t i ng t h e a r e a
of My Lai ( 4 ) immediately f ol l owi ng t he a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on - k l
on a v i l l a g e which he had bel i eved was "not popul at ed. "
Despi t e t h e f a c t t h a t LTC Luper knew t h a t women and c hi l dr e n had
been k i l l e d i n t h i s oper at i on, and by h i s own admi ssi on,
he was aware of t h e f a c t t h a t 20 c i v i l i a n s were r epor t ed
k i l l e d by " a r t i l l e r y and/or gunshi ps, " Luper made no
e f f o r t t o det er mi ne i f a r t i l l e r y from h i s u n i t had k i l l e d
noncombatants nor di d he ques t i on h i s a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n
o f f i c e r (LNO) a t TF Bar ker , t h e a r t i l l e r y forward obser ver
wi t h t h e r i f l e company i n My Lai ( 4 ) , o r t h e a r t i l l e r y ba t -
t e r y commander concerni ng t h i s mat t er .
I t would appear t h a t t h e s i n g l e pos i t i ve a c t i on i n re-
sponse t o t he hi gh c a s ua l t y count a t t r i b u t e d t o a r t i l l e r y , was
t aken by COL Henderson. While COL Henderson i ndi c a t e d h i s or de r
t o t ur n C Company around and r e t ur n t o My Lai ( 4 ) occur r ed 2
days l a t e r , t h e r e i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h i s occur r ed on t h e
af t er noon of 16 March. I n COL Henderson' s words, he was
"suspi ci ous of t h e body count " ' and " d i d n ' t be l i e ve it
w a s c o r r e c t , p a r t i c u l a r y t h e a r t i l l e r y f i r e . " - While t he r e
is some ques t i on concerni ng MG Kos t er ' s knowledge of t h e r e por t
of 69 VC KI A by a r t i l l e r y a t t h e t i m e he countermanded t h i s or -
de r , t h e r e i s no ques t i on t h a t he was, a t t h a t t i me, aware of
t h e f a c t t h a t from "20 t o 28" noncombatants had been k i l l e d i n
My Lai ( 4 ) , and t h a t t h e VC body count had r eached 128.
g.
Low Rat i o of Weapons ~ a ~ t u r e d ' t o Cong Ki l l e d i n V i e t
Act i on (VC KI A)
Another f a c t concerni ng t h e Son My oper at i on of TF
Barker which i ndi c a t e d an oper at i on of an unusual na t ur e was
t h e pauci t y of capt ur ed weapons exper i enced by TF Barker. While
t h e TF had a ge ne r a l l y low r a t i o of weapons capt ur ed t o VC KIA--
it averaged approxi mat el y 1 t o 10 --t he r a t i o of less t han
1 t o 40, exper i enced on 16 March shoul d have caused some
i nqui r y. The combined e f f e c t of many smal l i nc i de nt s r e l a t e d
t o t h i s low r a t i o and t he gener al na t ur e of t he oper at i on r e-
por t ed by TF Barker on 16 March was s u f f i c i e n t cause f o r consi der -
a bl e concern and s us pi ci on.
On 15 March t h e br i gade commander v i s i t e d TF Barker and,
i n di s c us s i ng t h e Son My oper at i on wi t h t h e assembled command-
ers and s t a f f o f f i c e r s of TF Bar ker , made t h e s u b j e c t of cap-
t u r i n g enemy weapons a mat t er of pri mary concern. COL Henderson
s t a t e d he advi sed a l l concerned t h a t t hey shoul d make a-much
g r e a t e r e f f o r t t o improve t h e i r performance i n r egar d t o capt ur i ng
and r ecover i ng enemy weapons. Yet on t he f ol l owi ng day, when
t he enemy was pur por t edl y caugnr by s u r p r i s e i n l a r g e numbers,
t h e number of weapons capt ur ed dropped t o a t oken f i gur e . Again
COL Henderson' s " s us pi ci ons " concerni ng. body count appear t o
have been w e l l founded. What i s d i f f i c u l t t o under st and i s t h a t
no such "suspi ci ons" e xi s t e d a t di vi s i on l e v e l . The most cur sor y
a na l ys i s of TF Bar ker ' s oper at i on of 16 March would have r eveal ed
i nc ons i s t e nc i e s which, a s a minimun, d i c t a t e d a need f o r gui dance
from s e ni or commanders. F i r s t , t h e r e w e r e 90 enemy r e por t e d k i l l -
ed i n a per i od of 70 mi nut es' I ' $--69 of which had been k i l l e d by
an a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on l a s t l n g onl y 5 mi nut es and whi ch, was
fol l owed i mmedi at el y by a combat a s s a u l t of one r i f l e company.
No f u r t h e r enemy c ont a c t was r epor t ed by t h i s company f o r t h e
remai nder of t he day and y e t no command a t t e n t i o n was pl aced
on t h e f a c t t h a t t he u n i t had not onl y f a i l e d t o e x p l o i t i t s
i n i t i a l success, but a l s o had f a i l e d t o p o l i c e t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .
Ei t he r t h a t concl usi on must be drawn o r t h e a l t e r n a t e and more
l o g i c a l concl usi on must be examined, vi z unarmed c a s u a l t i e s
were bei ng i d e n t i f i e d as VC. The l o g i c of t h i s l a t t e r t h e s i s
shoul d have been appar ant t o t hos e who fl ew i n t h e v i c i n i t y of
My Lai ( 4 ) and observed t h e l a r ge number of peopl e evacuat i ng
t h e a r e a al ong Route 521. As pr evi ousl y not ed, commanders who
di d over f l y t he a r e a t h a t morning i ncl uded: MAJ Watke, LTC
Barker, COL Henderson, and MG Kost er.
h. Absence of Report s of Enemy Cont act and Requests . f or
Fi r e Support
One of t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t s t o emerge from an
exami nat i on of event s of 16 March 1968 concerni ng TF Barker i s
t he al most t o t a l absence of r e por t s of enemy c ont a c t . Except
f o r a s i n g l e r a di o r e por t by an uni de nt i f i e d l i f t s h i p o r gun-
s hi p p i l o t dur i ng t he i n i t i a l l andi ng of C Company, not one
member of TF Barker r epor t ed any exchange of f i r e on 16 March.
, Commencing a t 0735 hours el ement s of TF Barker r epor t ed
k i l l i n g VC; r e por t s of enemy c a s u a l t i e s cont i nued t o be
r ecei ved u n t i l 1420 hours. Not a s i n g l e j our nal e n t r y
a t t he TF Barker o r 11t h Bri gade r e f l e c t s any enemy cont act
o r a c t i v i t y except r e por t s of enemy k i l l e d . * During t h e cour se
of t h i s I nqui r y, no i ndi vi dua l was encount ered who coul d r e c a l l
enemy c ont a c t on 16 March, ot he r t han a few i s o l a t e d r e por t s of
s ni pe r f i r e , nor coul d any r e c a l l r eques t s f o r suppor t i ng f i r e s
* A s ear ch of Americal Di vi si on f i l e s by an i nve s t i ga t i on
team from t h e Of f i ce of t h e Pr ovost Marshal General (OPMG) i n
Oct 1969 di scover ed what pur por t ed t o be a carbon copy of
t he Di vi si on J our nal f o r 16 March 1968 ( e x h i b i t M-138). The
copy was found i n t h e Di vi si on Hi s t or i a n' s f i l e s ; t h e o r i g i n a l
r epor t edl y- havi ngbeen forwarded t o t h e USARV ' r ecor ds hol di ng
ar ea.
A s ear ch of t h e USARV Adj ut ant Gener al ' s f i l e s i n November
1969 uncovered a pur por t ed r ecor d copy of t h e 16 March 1968
Americal Di vi si on J our nal which cont ai ns one s ubs t a nt i ve d i f -
f er ence when compared wi t h t he carbon copy. I n t he carbon copy
t he r e i s an i t e m #94, a 2400 hours summary i t em concerni ng TF
Barker which r eads: "Heavy combat r e s ul t e d i n t he a r e a and
cont i nued u n t i l approxi mat el y 1500 hour s. " Thi s sent ence does
not appear i n t h e r ecor d copy uncovered a t USARV, al t hough t h e
j our nal i n ge ne r a l , and i t e m #94 i n p a r t i c u l a r , a r e e s s e n t i a l l y
t he same i n a l l o t h e r r e s pe c t s .
Thi s di f f e r e nc e r a i s e s s us pi ci ons which have not been
s a t i s f a c t o r i y expl ai ned. An i nve s t i ga t i on of t h e mat t er i s
bei ng conduct ed by OPMG.
which would nor mal l y have been r equi r ed when enemy c ont a c t was
made. *
Af t e r t h e a r t i l l e r y pr e pa r a t i on was f i r e d , 'no s uppor t i ng
f i r e s were request ed--no t a c t i c a l a i r , no guns hi ps , no a r t i l -
l er y- - a most unusual occur r ance i n t h e Vietnam c o n f l i c t where
c ont a c t wi t h t h e enemy i s t y p i f i e d by a heavy r e l i a n c e on sup-
por t i ng f i r e .
Equal l y d i f f i c u l t t o comprehend i s t he absence of i nqui r y
from commanders a t t h e br i gade and d i v i s i o n l e v e l f o r i nforma-
t i o n concerni ng c ur r e nt ope r a t i ons . As t h e s i t u a t i o n was re-
por t e d on 16 March, a b a t t a l i o n - s i z e t a s k f o r c e was. engaged i n
a hi ghl y s uc c e s s f ul ope r a t i on, y e t t h e r e were no r e p o r t s bei ng
forwarded out s i de t h e TF concerni ng anyt hi ng except f i n a l re-
s u l t s . Even t h e most cur s or y i nqui r y by a s e ni or commander
concer ni ng t ype of oppos i t i on, l oc a t i on of enemy, u n i t i d e n t i -
f i c a t i o n of VC KI A, na t ur e o r s i z e of enemy f or c e , would have
r eveal ed t h e e xi s t a nc e of a hi ghl y unusual s i t u a t i o n r e qui r i ng
a more d e t a i l e d s t udy. As a minimum, an i nqui r y shoul d have been
made a s t o t h e r eas ons f o r s ucces s and i t s t a c t i c a l and i n t e l -
l i ge nc e s i gni f i c a nc e ,
I t i s a l s o a ppr opr i a t e t o not e a t t h i s poi nt t h a t t h e uni que
na t ur e of combat ope r a t i ons i n Vietnam c r e a t e s an immediate hi gh
l e v e l of communications a c t i v i t y when c ont a c t i s made wi t h an
enemy f or c e . Radio net works suddenl y come a l i v e wi t h a cont i n-
ui ng s e r i e s of messages; s uppor t i ng arms a r e employed v i a r a di o;
h e l i c o p t e r a s s e s t s a r e c ont r ol l e d by r adi o; and hi ghe r head-
q u a r t e r s a r e e i t h e r ke pt advi sed of devel opment s t hr ough r a di o
messages o r i n q u i r i e s begi n t o fl ow t o s ubor di nat e u n i t s . I n
t h e c a s e of TF Barker on 16 March, t h e s ens e of urgency and
cl os enes s of combat which f ol l ows from t h i s communications
a c t i v i t y coul d not have e x i s t e d i n t h e absence of r e que s t f o r
s uppor t i ng f i r e s . To t h e exper i enced combat commander, t h i s ab-
sence of a c t i v i t y and l ack of enemy c ont a c t coul d no,t be equat ed
wi t h t h e s ucces s bei ng r epor t ed by TF Barker,
i. ~ e p o r t s of Depart ure of VC from My Lai ( 4 )
* It has not escaped t h e I nqui r y' s a t t e n t i o n t h a t s t at ement s
s uppor t i ng recommendations f o r a posthumous award t o SP4 Glenn U.
Andr eot t a ( e xhi bi t M-42) and awards t o W01 Thompson ( e x h i b i t M-44)
and SP4 Lawrence M. Col burn ( e x h i b i t M-43) f o r t h e i r performances
on 16 March 1968 r e f e r r e d t o h o s t i l e f i r e o r c r o s s f i r e i n t h e
a r e a of My Lai ( 4 ) ; nor t h a t c e r t a i n of t he s e recommendations
were s i gned o r i ndor s ed by MAJ Watke and LTC Hol l aday. . Such
r e f e r e nc e s t o enemy a c t i o n on 16 March a r e e n t i r e l y i n c o n s i s t e n t
wi t h t h e evi dence bef or e t h i s I nqui r y i ncl udi ng t h e t est i mony
gi ven by t he s e i ndi vi dua l s . I t i s r ecogni zed t h a t t h e d e s i r e t o
gi ve r e c ogni t i on t o per s onnel i n a combat envi ronment sometimes
l e a ds t o c e r t a i n l i b e r t i e s bei ng t aken i n t he de s c r i pt i on of t h e
a t t e nde nt condi t i ons .
As has been pr evi ous l y s t a t e d , t he Son My oper at i on was pl an-
ned by t h e l l t h Bri gade and TF Barker t o des t r oy 48t h LF Bat t a-
l i on. Wi t nesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e br i gade and t a s k f or c e
l e ve l , i n t e l l i g e n c e i ndi c a t e d t h i s enemy b a t t a l i o n was l ocat ed
i n and near t h e haml et of My Lai ( 4 ) . Assuming such i n t e l l i g e n c e
was val i d--and t h e r e i s a preponderance of t h e evi dence t o i ndi -
c a t e it was not --t he h i g h VC body count r epor t ed by TF Barker on
16 March 1968 shoul d not have caused any gr e a t s ur pr i s e among
commanders and s t a f f o f f i c e r s ~ i n t h e l l t h Bri gade.
In view of t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e ba s i s f o r the Son My oper at i on,
t he r e shoul d have been s us pi ci bns aroused when, e a r l y i n t h e
oper at i on, it was di scover ed t h a t t h e VC had, i n fact, l e f t t h e
a r e a bef or e t h e oper at i on commenced! A t 09'00 hours t h e l l t h
Bri gade recorded i n i t s j our nal a r e por t r ecei ved from Barker TOC
t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t i nf or mat i on obt ai ned from i nha bi t a nt s of My
Lai ( 4 ) r eveal ed t h a t "30-40 VC had depar t ed t h e a r e a a t 0700
hour s. , .." The j our nal e nt r y a l s o s t a t e s t h a t bot h t he br i gade
S2 and S3 w e r e n o t i f i e d of t h i s f act - - t he br i gade S3 a t t h i s t i m e
was t h e br i gade commander a t LZ Dot t i e.
LT (now CPT) Johnson, t h e Mi l i t a r y I nt e l l i ge nc e ( M I ) o f f i c e r
who accompanied C Company i n t h e f i e l d on March 16, t e s t i f i e d
t h a t a f t e r l andi ng i n My Lai ( 4 ) , and i nt e r r oga t i ng v i l l a g e i n-
ha bi t a nt s , he l ear ned t h a t " t he VC had depar t ed t he v i l l a g e p r i o r
t o t h e combat a s s a u l t . "
LT Alaux, t h e C Company forward obser ver (FO) s t a t e d i n h i s
t est i mony he r e c a l l e d r ecei vi ng i nf or mat i on t h a t i nt e r r oga t i on
of a Vietnamese i n My Lai ( 4 ) had r eveal ed i nf or mat i on t h a t an
enemy pl at oon had been i n t he v i l l a g e but . ha d depar t ed j u s t p r i o r
t o t h e oper at i on.
From t h e f or egoi ng, i t i s evi dent t h a t by 0915 hour s, a t l e a s t
t he commander of C Company (who i s ' t he most pr obabl e sour ce of
t he r e por t which or i gi na t e d wi t h LT Johnson and was t r a ns mi t t e d
t hrough TF Barker TOC t o t h e l l t h Bri gade TOC) ; t h e commander,
S2 and S3 of TF Barker; and t he commander, S2 and S3 of t h e l l t h
Bri gade were a l l aware of t h i s s i g n i f i c a n t r e por t . J our nal
e n t r i e s a t t h e America1 Di vi si on do not r e f l e c t t h i s i nf or mat i on
and MG Kost er t e s t i f i e d t h a t he does not r e c a l l r ecei vi ng
such a r e por t .
A t t h e Same t i me t he s e o f f i c e r s possessed i nf or mat i on concern-
ing t h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e r e por t , t hey were a l s o cogni zant of t h e
r e por t of hi gh VC body count ; t he- low r a t i o of weapons capt ur ed
t o VC k i l l e d ; t h e absence of r e por t s of enemy cont act ; and many
of t h e ot he r " i ndi c a t or s " which have been di scussed i n t h i s chap-
t e r , What i s d i f f i c u l t t o underst and i s why none of t he of f i c e r s - -
e s p i c a l l y t hos e i n t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e f i el d- - act ed on t h i s i nf or -
mat i on. I f t h e VC had l e f t t he haml et , who were t h e peopl e C
Company had r epor t ed k i l l i n g ? To what u n i t d i d t h e "30-40" VC
bel ong? Where d i d t hey go--and a h o s t of ot he r ques t i ons a l l re-
qui r e d answers. Yet appar ent l y none of t h e commanders o r s t a f f
o f f i c e r s asked t he s e ques t i ons , sought a ddi t i ona l i nf or mat i on,
o r connect ed t h i s r e por t wi t h ot he r i nf or mat i on t hey had concer-
i n g t h e uni que na t ur e of t h e Son My oper at i on.
As s t a t e d pr evi ous l y, t h e America1 Di vi si on Oper at i ons
J our na l f o r 16 March 1968 does not r e f l e c t t h i s r e p o r t of 30-40
VC de pa r t i ng My Lai ( 4 ) . It does, however, c ont a i n e n t r i e s con-
cer ni ng t h e Vietnamese per sonnel who w e r e det ai ned by C/ 1-20 I nf
a t . t h a t t i m e . One s i g n i f i c a n t e nt r y concerni ng t h e onl y s t a t u s
t h a t t h i s i ndi vi dua l r e por t s " l o t s of VC" a t t h e map coor di nat es
which coi nci de wi t h t hose r ecor ded i n t h e 11t h Bri gade J our nal a s
t h e l oc a t i on a t which C Company i nt e r r oga t e d t h e Vietnamese de-
t a i n e s s . The s i gni f i c a nc e of t h i s er r oneous and/ or a l t e r e d re-
p o r t i s di s cus s ed i n Chapt er 11.
j. Low Rat i o of Uni t ed St a t e s Ca s ua l t i e s t o V i e t Cong
Ca s ua l t i e s
One f a c t which shoul d have become i nc r e a s i ngl y e vi de nt t o
commanders a s t h e event s a t Son My unfol ded on 16 March, 1968,
e s p e c i c i a l l y i n t h e C Company ar ea. By 1030 hour s, TF Barker had
r epor t ed a t o t a l of 120 VC k i l l e d and 13 US cas ual t i es - - 2 KI A,
10 WIA, and 1 s e l f - i n f l i c t e d wound. Of t h e 12 c a s u a l t i e s caused
by enemy c ont a c t ; t h a t one i ndi vi dual was s hot by enemy smal l
arms f i r e i n t h e a r e a of A/3-1 I nf . On t h e s ur f a c e , t h i s
r a t i o of 10 t o 1mi ght be consi der ed t h e r e s u l t of a hi ghl y suc-
c e s s f u l oper at i on. However, when cons i der at i on i s gi ven t o t h e
f a c t t h a t C Company, which account ed f o r 84 VC c a s u a l t i e s i n 70
mi nut es, exper i enced onl y one c a s ua l t y, a s e l f - i n f l i c t e d
wound, t h e r e i s cause f o r i nqui r y.
An awareness a t t h e company and TF l e v e l of t h e d e t a i l s con-
cer ni ng US c a u a l t i e s i s presumed because of t h e i nvol vement of
commanders i n medi cal evacuat i on procedures and s i mi l i a r a c t i ons
r e qui r i ng r a di o t r ansmi ssi ons. A s a minimum, t h e commanders a t
t he s e l e v e l s , i f t hey w e r e not aware of t h e t r u e condi t i ons a t
My Lai ( 4 ) , shoul d have been making e f f o r t s t o det er mi ne what
t a c t i c s and/or procedures were causi ng such remarkabl e success.
I t i s c l e a r t h a t any such pr obi ng would probabl y have r eveal ed
t h e t r u e event s which had t r a ns pi r e d i n My Lai ( 4 ) .
A t t h e l l t h Bri gade l e ve l , COL Henderson acknowledged
t h a t he was s us pi ci ous of t h e C Company body count and
or der ed C Company back t hrough My Lai ( 4 ) t o r es ol ve t he mat t er .
Yet when t h e or de r was countermanded by MG Kost er, COL Hender-
son t ook no f u r t h e r a c t i on t o a l l a y h i s s us pi ci ons u n t i l d i r -
ect ed t o i n v e s t i g a t e W 0 1 Thompson's a l l e ga t i ons 2 days l a t e r .
A t t h e Ameri cal Di vi si on headquar t er s, knowledge cf a
b e t t e r t han 10 t o 1 r a t i o of VC c a s u a l t i e s was known not l a t e r
t han t he eveni ng b r i e f i n g of 16 March. Taken a t f ace val ue and
viewed i n i s o l a t i o n from ot he r i nf or mat i on, t he s e s t a t i s t i c s
r e f l e c t e d an out s t andi ng t a c t i c a l s ucces s on t h e p a r t of TF
Barker and l l t h Bri gade. Thi s concl usi on i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e
congr at ul at or y message which was s e n t t o t h e Americal Di vi si on
by Commander, Uni t ed St a t e s Mi l i t a r y Assi st ance Command, Vietnam
(COMUSMACV) a s a r e s u l t of r ecei vi ng a s t a t i s t i c a l summary of
t h e Son My oper at i on. That such a concl usi on coul d be
reached a t t h e America1 Di vi si on headquar t er s i s not a s r e a di l y
underst ood. By t h e t i me t h e 16 March eveni ng b r i e f i n g was con-
duct ed and an announcement made concerni ng f r i e ndl y c a s ua l t i e s ,
t he f ol l owi ng a ddi t i ona l i nf or mat i on had a l s o been p r o v i d e d t o -
t he di vi s i on commander:
(1) Approximately 20-28 noncombatant c a s u a l t i e s had oc-
cur r ed i n t h e C/1-20 I n a r e a of oper at i ons.
( 2) The l l t h Bri gade Commander had i ndi c a t e d h i s concern
over i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n My Lai ( 4 ) t o t h e e xt e nt of d i r e c t i n g a
r i f l e company t o r e t r a c e i t s s t e ps .
I nf or mat i on concerni ng t he s e i t e m s was not t r a ns -
mi t t ed out s i de t h e Americal Di vi si on.
k. Commander's Order t o Ret urn t o My Lai ( 4 )
Of a l l t h e event s which t r a ns pi r e d on 16 March, t h e one
which most c l e a r l y i ndi c a t e d t h a t somet hi ng had gone wrong i n
t he Son My oper at i on, was t h e or de r i s s ued by COL Hen,derson t o
have C Company r e t u r n t hrough My Lai ( 4 ) t o count - c i vi l i a n
c a s u a l t i e s and t o det ermi ne t h e age, s ex, and cause of deat h
of each. I ssued t o TF Barker a t about 1530 hour s, it was t r a ns -
mi t t ed t o CPT Medina and al most immediately countermanded by
MG Kost er . Although bot h MG Kost er and COL Henderson bel i eved
t h a t t h i s or der was gi ven on 18 March, t h e preponderance
of t h e t est i mony and t h e sur r oundi ng ci r cumst ances e s t a bl i s he d
t h a t t h e or de r was gi ven on 16 March.
COL Henderson t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e he gave t h e
or der , he was aware of from "12 t o 14" c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s ,
which had been r epor t ed t o him by LTC Barker, and , t ha t he
was " s us pi ci ous " of t h e 128 body count because t h e number of
weapons capt ur ed ( 3 ) was t oo low. H e s t a t e d t h a t he d i r -
- -
e c t e d LTC Barker t o have a company r e t ur n t o ?4y Lai ( 4 ) t o
examine t h e bodi es t o det er mi ne t h e e xa c t number of noncombat-
a nt c a s u a l t i e s , by s e x, age qroup, and apparent cause of
deat h. H e a l s o s t 2 t e d t h a t LTC Barker t hen suqgest ed t h a t
C Company shoul d r e t ur n t o make t h e count s i nc e t hey were more
f a mi l i a r wi t h t h e qr ea and because t hev knew where t h e bodi es
were. '
Both CPT Medina, - t he company commander, and .MAJ Calhoun,
the, TF S3, agr eed i n t h e i r t est i mony t h a t t h i s command t o r e t ur n
t o My Lai ( 4 ) was r el ayed to*.CPT Medina by MAJ Calhoun over t h e
r adi o; and t h a t CPT Fledina cont est ed t h e or der because of t h e
l a t e hour and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of mines and boobyt raps; t h a t CPT
Medina r epor t ed 20 t o 28 c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s had occur r ed dur i ng
t h e oper at i on; and t h a t P4G Kost er br oke i n t o t h e series of t r a ns -
mi ssi ons and countermanded t h e or der .
PIG Kost er d i d not r e c a l l t a l k i n g t o e i t h e r MAJ Calhoun o r
CPT lledina b u t s t a t e d t h a t he bel i eved h i s conver sat i on over
t h e r a di o was wi t h LTC Barker. He f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t he
knew a t t h e t i m e he countermanded t h e or der , t h a t a t l e a s t 20
noncombatant c a s u a l t i e s had been r epor t ed, - and t h a t t h e
purpose of t h e or de r t o r e t ur n t o My Lai ( 4 ) was t o r ecount t he
noncombatant c a s u a l t i e s and det ermi ne t h e cause of deat h.
According t o MG Kost er , he based h i s de c i s i on t o countermanu
t h e or der on t h e mines and boobyt raps r epor t edl y i n f e s t i n q t h e
a r e a , t h e l a t e hour , h i s f e e l i n g t h a t t h e cause of deat h pro-
babl y coul d not b e det ermi ned accur at el y by t h e s o l d i e r s , and
t h e s hor t age o f he l i c opt e r s . MG Kost er deci ded t o count er-
mand t h e or de r de s pi t e t h e f a c t t h a t he knew t h e r e had been a t
l e a s t 20 noncombatants r epor t ed k i l l e d dur i nq t h e oper at i on,
and t h a t t h e br i qa de commander was appar ent l y concerned enouqh
about t he s e c a s u a l t i e s t o or de r a r e t ur n t o My Lai ( 4 ) f o r
t h e purpose of det er mi ni ng t h e number of and t h e reason f o r
t he s e c a s u a l t i e s . MG Kost er cont ended t h a t h i s a c t i on di d n o t
pr ecl ude COL Henderson' s sendi nq t h e u n i t back the f ol l owi nq
day. I n countermandinq t h e or der he s p e c i f i c a l l y di r e c t e d LTC
Barker t o i n s u r e t h a t COL Henderson was advi sed of t h e a c t i on.
The p o i n t i n i s s u e i s not whet her t h e or der shoul d have
been countermanded, b u t r a t he r , t h a t t h e i ssuance of t h e or der
i t s e l f sho,uld have been a s i g n a l t o PIG Kost er t h a t one of h i s
s e ni or sul 5ordi nat e commanders suspect ed somet hi ng had gone
awry. The f a c t t h a t CPT Medina advi sed MG Kost er of 20-28
c i v i l i a n ' c a s ua l t i e s shoul d have act ed t o r e i nf or c e t h a t s us -
pi ci on o r ' t o cause FIG Kost er t o consi der a s u b s t i t u t e cour se
of a c t i on; a va i l a bl e t est i mony i n d i c a t e s it di d ne i t he r .
6 . I n i t i a l I nve s t i qa t i on and Review
A s a r e s u l t of i n s t r u c t i o n s r ecei ved from MG Kost er t o
have COL Henderson i n i t i a t e an i nve s t i ga t i on of W01 Thompson's
a l l e ga t i ons , BG Young a f t e r depar t i ng MG Kos t e r ' s o f f i c e on 17
March, made arrangement s f o r a meeting of t he f i v e pr i n-
c i pa l s i n t h e chai n of command who were i nvol ved: hi ms el f , COL
Henderson, LTC Barker, LTC Hol l aday, and MAJ Watke. The meet-
i ng was i nexpl i cabl y not schedul ed u n t i l 0900 hours t he f o l -
lowing day, 18 March. However, BG Young di d make a v i s i t
t o LZ Dot t i e on t h e af t er noon of 17 March and, accor di ng t o MAJ
Calhoun, was br i e f e d by him,
MG Kost er t e s t i f i e d t h a t on t h e af t er noon of 17 March he
t oo went t o LZ Dot t i e and spoke t o LTC Barker concerni ng t he a l -
l egat i ons of W01 Thompson. MG Kost er s t a t e d t h a Barker advi sed
him t h a t e i t h e r he o r MAJ Calhoun had been over t he a r e a of My
Lai ( 4 ) t hroughout t h e morning of 16 March and t h a t t hey had not
wi t nessed o r hear d of any i r r e g u l a r i t i e s . MG Kost er s t a t e d t h a t
Barker gave him ever y assur ance t h a t t h e i nc i de nt a l l e ge d by
Thompson had not t aken pl ace.
During t h e i n i t i a l phase of t h i s I nqui r y, consi der abl e
di sagreement was experi enced' among wi t nesses concerni ng t h e
t i m e and d a t e of t h i s meeting ar r anged by BG Young. I t was
f i n a l l y f i xe d a f t e r MAJ Watke produced a s e r i e s of l e t t e r s
wr i t t e n t o h i s wi f e and dated. . 1 6 , 17, and 18 March 1968. The
l a s t of t he s e l e t t e r s made s p e c i f i c r ef er ence t o t h i s meeting
and e s t a bl i s he d t h e d a t e a s 18 March.
On t h e morning of t h e meet i ng, t h e f i v e o f f i c e r s concerned
met a t TF Ba r ke r ' s Command Pos t a t LZ Dot t i e a t about 0900
hours. BG Young s t a t e d t h a t he m e t wi t h t h e group onl y b r i e f -
l y , addr essi ng hi msel f pr i ma r i l y t o COL Henderson and r epeat i ng
t he a l l e g a t i o n a s underst ood by BG Young, i . e. , t h a t t he r e had
been a conf r ont at i on between per sonnel of TF Barker and Company
B, 123d Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on and t h a t f or c e s of TF Barker had f i r e d
i n t o noncombatant c i v i l i a n s whi l e engaging an enemy f or ce. Young
advi sed Henderson of t h e Di vi si on Commander's d i r e c t i v e t o con-
duct an immediate i nve s t i ga t i on and t o r e p o r t t h e r e s u l t s t o MG
Kost er a s soon a s pos s i bl e. BG Young s t a t e d t h a t wi t hout
wai t i ng t o hear any expl anat i on of t h e a l l e ga t i ons by Watke o r
Hol l aday, he depar t ed LZ Dot t i e. While such a c t i on i s
pos s i bl e , it seems q u i t e unusual l f not unl i kel y t h a t an
As s i s t a nt Di vi si on Commander, havi ng been charged by h i s Com-
manding General wi t h t h e t a s k of d i r e c t i n g a br i gade commander
t o i n i t i a t e an i nve s t i ga t i on, would de pa r t bef or e he was reason-
abl y s ur e t h a t t h e br i gade commander underst ood t he mi ssi on.
The cont ent i on t h a t BG Youpg remained a t Dot t i e f o r more t han
a few mi nut es i s support ed by e n t r i e s i n t h e TF Barker J our nal
which i n d i c a t e t h a t BG Young s pe nt a t o t a l of 20 mi nut es a t
LZ Dot t i e a t t h i s t i me.
LTC Hol l aday r e c a l l e d t h e i nc i de nt as a b r i e f i nt r oduc t i on
by BG Young and a complete r e c i t a t i o n of t h e Thompson Report by
E4AJ Watke. _MAJ Watke aqreed i n h i s t est i mony t h a t he pr e-
s ent ed an expl anat i on i n t h e pr esence of BG Young which was t h e
same i n cont ent as h i s two pr evi ous r e c i t a t i o n s of t h e event .
COL Henderson r e l a t e d t h e event s of 18 March as commencing
wi t h an encount er a t LZ Dot t i e wi t h t he Execut i ve Of f i c e r of
Company B, 123d Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on, MAJ (now M r . ) Wi l son, who
i nt r oduced W01 Thompson a s an i ndi vi dua l wi t h a s e r i ous mat t er
t o. r e por t . Accordinq t o Henderson, Thompson t hen des cr i bed t h e
event s of "ext r emel y- wi l d shoot i nq" by t r oops and he l i c opt e r s ; .
t r oops shoot i nq a t ever yt hi nq t h a t moved; of havi nq seen "a l o t
of c i v i l i a n bodi es on t h e ground" and an i nc i de nt where a c a pt a i n
s hot a unarmed and wounded female c i v i l i a n . COL Henderson .
f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t wi t hi n an hour of t h i s meet i ng wi t h Thompson
and Wilson, t h e meetinq wi t h BG Younq t ook pl ace and dur i ng which
t h e conf r ont at i on between t h e h e l i c o p t e r p i l o t and qround t r oops
and ot he r i nc i de nt s which occur r ed on 16 March was di scussed.
?4AJ Wilson s t a t e d t h a t he had no knowledue of t aki nq W 0 1 Thompson
t o LZ Dot t i e t o s e e COL Henderson on anv occasi on and deni es any
knowledge of t h e event r e l a t e d bv COL Henderson.
Once agai n, a f t e r consi der i ng a l l a va i l a bl e evi dence, it
appears t h a t t h e event s a s r e l a t e d by LTC Holladay and MAJ Watke
r epr es ent t h e most pr obabl e occur r ences of t h a t t i me. BG Young' s
cont ent i on t h a t he merely summarized t h e a l l e qa t i ons of W01
Thompson and t he n depar t ed, i s r e f ut e d by t h e t est i mony of Watke
and Holladay and i s i ncompat i bl e wi t h t h e conduct t h a t would be
normal f o r a gener al o f f i c e r under t h e ci r cumst ances.
There i s qener al aqreement t h a t t h e exchange of i nf or mat i on
between W01 Thompson and COL Henderson di d not occur bef or e t h e
meet i ng wi t h BG Younq b u t took pl ace a f t e r t h a t event . The pr e-
vi ous paraqsaph pr ovi des a summary of COL Henderson' s ver s i on
of t h e meet i ng between t he s e two i ndi vi dual s which i s i n sub-
s t a n t i v e c o n f l i c t wi t h W01 Thompson's r e c ol l e c t i on t h a t he
t o l d COL Henderson a l l t h e d e t a i l s of t h e i nc i de nt a t My Lai
( 4 ) i n an i nt e r vi e w which t ook from 2 0 t o 30 mi nut es. COL
Henderson a l s o s t a t e d t h a t he spoke t o no ot her p i l o t of crewmen
concerni nq t h i s mat t er . However, MAJ Watke s t a t e d he s e n t
t h r e e i ndi vi dua l s t o see him. There i s t est i mony by W01 Thompson,
SP4 Colburn, and C40 Cul verhouse t h a t each of t he s e i ndi vi dua l s
was i nt er vi ewed by COL Henderson and t h a t each ~ r o v i d e d him de-
t a i l e d i nf or mat i on concerni nq t h e i nc i de nt s which occur r ed a t Fly
Lai ( 4 ) on t h e morninq of 16 March.
It i s s i q n i f i c a n t t o not e t h a t dur i nq t he s e i nt er vi ews ,
none of t h e i ndi vi dua l s was pl aced under oat h nor w e r e any
st at ement s reduced t o wr i t i nq; r ecor ds of t h e event were l i m i t -
ed t o not e s COL Henderson made i n a smal l qreen notebook which
was subsequent l y dest royed.
While t h e r e i s some evi dence t o i n d i c a t e t h a t two of t he s e
i ndi vi dua l s may have spoken t o "anot her col onel a t LZ Dot t i e"
ot he r t han COL Henderson, t h e r e i s l i t t l e doubt concerni ng
t he e xt e nt o f COL Henderson' s nowl ledge a t t h i s poi nt i n t i me.
There i s no ot he r evi dence t o show t h a t t h e r e was anot her
o f f i c e r i n t h e grade of Col onel a t LZ Dot t i e on t h a t day. A l l
a va i l a bl e evi dence confi rms t h e f a c t t h a t not l a t e r t han t h e
morning of 18 March, COL Henderson was i n r e c e i pt of a l l a l l e q-
a t i ons cont ai ned i n t h e Thompson Report ; t h a t t he s e a l l e ga t i ons
had been pr esent ed t o him by a l e a s t one and probabl y t hr e e
eyewi t nesses; and t h a t he was aware of t h e e xi s t e nc e of many
more pos s i bl e eyewi t nesses.
There a r e ot he r i nc ons i s t e nc i e s i n COL Henderson' s t e s t i -
mony a t t h i s poi nt , but f o r t h e purpose of cont i nui ng wi t h a
pr es ent at i on of f a c t s concerni ng t h e chai n of event s f ol l owi ng
My Lai ( 4 ) , it i s s u f f i c i e n t t o s t a t e t h a t f ol l owi ng t h e meet-
i ng a t LZ Dot t i e , BG Young depar t ed wi t h t h e under st andi ng t h a t
COL Henderson was t o under t ake a prompt and thorough i n v e s t i -
gat i on i n t o t h e a l l e g a t i o n made by WO l Thompson concerni ng t h e
oper at i ons of TF Barker on 16 March 1968.
A b r i e f summary r e ve a l s t h e f ol l owi ng s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t s
which emerge at t h i s poi nt : f i r s t , COL Henderson had been
charged wi t h i n v e s t i g a t i n g event s which a c t ua l l y r epr es ent
onl y a p a r t of what happened a t My Lai ( 4 ) ; second, COL Hender-
son was aware of a d i s p a r i t y between t h e a l l e ga t i on he was
charged wi t h i n v e s t i g a t i n g and t h e di mensi ons of t h e event s
which had been observed and des cr i bed by eyewi t nesses; and
f i n a l l y and most s i g n i f i c a n t l y , COL Henderson may w e l l have
concluded t h a t MG Kost er and BG Young were not aware t h a t ex-
t e ns i ve k i l l i n g of noncombatants had occur r ed on 16 March 1968.
I t is i n t h e cont ext of t h i s knowledge t h a t COL Henderson' s
subsequent a c t i ons w i l l be consi der ed.
As pr evi ous l y mentioned, t h e r e i s di sagreement concerni ng
bot h t h e sequence of event s as t he y occur r ed on t he morning of
18 March and t h e subst ance of t h e i nf or mat i on di scussed by per -
sonnel i nt er vi ewed by COL Henderson. For t h e purpose of r e l a t -
i ng l a t e r event s , it i s s u f f i c i e n t a t t h i s poi nt t o s t a t e t h a t
on t h e morning of t h e meet i ng s i t h BG Young a t LZ Dot t i e , COL
Henderson a l s o met wi t h W01 Thompson and, as a r e s u l t of t h i s
meet i ng, f l ew d i r e c t l y t o t h e f i e l d l oc a t i on of C Company t o
speak t o CPT Medina about t h e Thompson a l l e ga t i on. CPT
Medina expl ai ned t h e s hoot i ng i nc i de nt t o COL Henderson' s s a t i s -
f act i on- - a mat t er of sel f - def ense- - but coul d not s a t i s f y COL
Henderson' s r equi r ement s f o r d e t a i l e d i nf or mat i on concerni nq
noncombatant c a s u a l t i e s . CPT Medina expl ai ned a t t h i s poi nt
t h a t he had seen "between-20 and 28" c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s .
COL Henderson cont ended i n h i s t est i mony t h a t it was a t t h l s
poi nt t h a t he a l e r t e d -C Company t o a pos s i bl e requi rement t o
move back t hrouqh Vy Lai ( 4 ) t o conduct a count of a l l non-
combatant c a s u a l t i e s . COL Henderson s t a t e d t h a t he i s s ue d
t h e or de r f o r such a move s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e meet i nq, and
a f t e r . di s cus s i nq t h e mat t er . whi t h LTC Barker. The evi dence
t o r e f u t e t h i s cont ent i on i s overwhelminq and 1~ i s c l e a r t h a t
such an or de r was i s s ued on t h&- af t er noon of 16 March.
There i s asreement i n t h e t est i mony of Henderson and
Yedina t h a t t h e subst ance of t h i s meet i ns concerned t h e i n -
c i de nt of Fledina' s shoot i nq t h e wounded woman and a di s c us s i on
concerni ng noncombatant c a s u a l t i e s and t h e body count of 128
VC KI A. No mention was made of such i nc i de nt s as t h e confron-
t a t i o n , t h e bodi es i n t h e d i t c h , o r t h e f i r i n q i n t o t h e di t c h.
I n h i s t est i mony, LTC (now r e t . ) Bl ackl edqe s t a t e d t h a t
he e s pe c i a l l y r e c a l l e d t h i s meet i nq because of t h e s ubj e c t mat-
t e r di cussed and t h e e xt e nt t o which COL Henderson quest i oned
Medina. Bl ackl edqe s t a t e d he had not been advi sed of t h e purpose
of t h e meet i ng and observed t h a t Henderson pursued t h e mat t er of
c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s t o a poi nt t h a t Bl ackl edqe consi der ed a
" l i t t l e unusual " and i n a mat t er which seemed t o be i n v e s t i -
ga t i ve . I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t o not e t h a t t h i s c ons t i t ut e d
t h e onl y meet i nq of COL Henderson wi t h CPT Vedina a t which t h e
s ubj e c t of Thompson ' s a l l e qa t i ons was di scussed. Again,
as was t h e cas e i n t h e i nt e r vi e ws wi t h a vi a t i on u n i t per sonnel ,
no oa t hs were admi ni st er ed nor were st at ement s reduced t o w r i t -
i ng.
The next s t e p of COL Henderson' s "i nqui r y" i nvol ved a
v i s i t wi t h t r oops of C Company as t he y depl aned on t h e a f t e r -
noon of 18 March a t LZ Dot t i e . COL Henderson assembled a qroup
of 30 t o 40 s o l d i e r s pr i ma r i l y from t h e 1st and 2d Pl at oons of
C Company who had j u s t debarked from he l i c opt e r s . Af t e r com-
pl i ment i ng them on t h e i r performance dur i nq t h e pr evi ous few
days, he t o l d them t h a t t h e r e had been some " uns ubs t ant i at ed
r e por t s t h a t w e had k i l l e d s or e noncombatants" and t hen asked
t h e qroup i f any of them had any knowledqe of "anybody k i l l i n q
c i v i l i a n s dur i nq t h i s oper at i on. " COL Henderson t e s t i f i e d t h a t
t h e response t o t h i s was s i l e n c e and he t hen d i r e c t e d h i s com-
ments t o s p e c i f i c i ndi vi dua l s , sayi nq: "How about you?" and
poi nt i ng t o an i ndi vi dua l o r smal l qroup. The response i n
each case, COL Henderson s t a t e d , was a "l oud and c l e a r , 'No
sir! " Thi s t o t a l l y meani nql ess a c t i on c ons t i t ut e d t h e e n t i r e
e f f o r t by COL Henderson t o i n t e r r o q a t e members of Company C.
Testimony by i ndi vi dua l s who were pr e s e nt dur i nq COL Henderson' s
i nt e r r oga t i on of t h i s group r eveal ed t h a t , i n a t l e a s t one
case, when addressed i ndi vi dua l l y by COL Henderson, a s er qeant
responded t o - h i s ques t i on concerni ng pos s i bl e i r r e q u l a r i t i e s
dur i ng t h e My Lai ( 4 ) oper at i on wi t h "no comment" b u t , i nex-
pl i cabl y, he was not quest i oned f ur t he r .
COL Henderson s t a t e d t h a t he t hen depar t ed LZ Dot t i e and
r et ur ned t o h i s headquar t er s a t Duc Pho and e i t h e r a t t h a t
t i me, o r a f t e r t h e eveni n9 b r i e f i n g on 18 March, spoke t o PlAJ
Gibson, CO, 174t h Avi at i on Companv. COL Henderson r e l a t e d t h a t
he advi sed IIAJ Gibson of t h e a l l e qa t i ons made by W 0 1 Thompson
concerni nq wi l d shoot i nq and k i l l i n q of c i v i l i a n noncombatants
and asked MAJ Gibson t o sur vey a l l of h i s p i l o t s who had p a r t i -
ci pat ed i n t h i s oper at i on t o det ermi ne i f any of them coul d
provi de f u r t h e r i nf or mat i on. COL Henderson f ur t he r s t a t e d
t h a t a f t e r t h e eveni nq b r i e f l n q on e i t h e r t h e 18t h o r 19t h of
Yarch a t br i gade headquar t er s, he c a l l e d MAJ Gibson as i de and
asked f o r h i s r e por t . Accordinq t o Henderson, Gibson r e d i e d
t h a t he had spoken t o each of t h e p i l o t s who had been i nvol ved
i n t h e My Lai oper at i on and t h a t "not a s i n g l e one of them ob-
ser ved any noncombatants bei nq k i l l e d nor were any (174t h) qun-
s hi ps out of c ont r ol . . .." , VAJ Gibson deni ed t h a t he was
ever r equest ed t o pr ovi de t n t i nf or mat i on and t h a t he made such
a r e por t t o Henderson
Except f o r COL Henderson' s cl ai m of an 18 March vi s ua l re-
connai ssance over t h e v i l l a q e of ply Lai ( 4 ) i n which f i e l d
gl a s s e s were used t o a i d i n obser vat i on, t h e aforement i on-
ed a c t i ons c o n s t i t u t e t h e t o t a l e f f o r t expended i n t h e i n i t i a l
i nqui r y by COL Henderson. I t shoul d be not ed t h a t a t no t i me
dur i ng COL Henderson' s " i nqui r y" was t h e r e ever an e f f o r t made
t o put peopl e on t h e qround a t Ply Lai ( 4 ) o r even t o make a
meaningful r econnai ssance of t h e ar ea. I n summary, COL Hender-
s on' s i n v e s t i q a t i v e e f f o r t s , by h i s own account , were completed
not l a t e r t han t h e eveni nq hours of 18 March except f o r t he r e -
por t he had pur por t edl y r equest ed from !lAJ Gibson.
COL Henderson t e s t i f i e d t h a t on 1 9 March he advi sed BG
Young of t h e peopl e t o whom he had spoken ,and t h e neqat i ve
f i ndi ngs he had reached and was advi sed by BG Young t o make
h i s r e por t t o t l G Kost er on 20 March.
COL Henderson s t a t e d t h a t on t h e morninq of 20 March he
r epor t ed t o t h e Chi ef of St a f f of t h e America1 Di vi s i on, COL
Parson, advi s i ng him of t h e purpose of t h e meetinq and t hen,
bef or e compl et i nq t h e subst ance of t h e r e por t , was ushered i n
t o see MG Kost er. COL Parson was unabl e t o shed a ddi t i ona l
l i q h t on t h i s mat t er s i n c e he s t a t e d he coul d n o t r e c a l l t h e
i nc i de nt . COL Henderson s t a t e d t h a t h i s o r a l r e por t was sub-
mi t t ed wi t h no wi t nes s es pr es ent . H e recount ed t h a t he com-
menced h i s di s cus s i on by f i r s t advi si nq t h e Cornmandinq General
t h a t t h e t o t a l number of c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s r epor t ed by TF
Barker f o r 16 March was 20. He t hen proceeded t o advi se
P G Kost er t h a t r e ~ o r t sof i ndi s c r i mi na t e k i l l i n q were not
s ubs t a nt i a t e d; t h a t CPT Medina had been abl e t o pr ovi de a
s a t i s f a c t o r y expl anat i on f o r t h e shoot i nq of t h e wounded
femal e; t h a t t h e mat t er of t h e conf r ont at i on had been "put
t o bed" wi t h t h e r e- est abl i shment of a r appor t between MAJ
Watke and LTC Bar ker ; and t h a t a f t e r compl et i nq t h e i nqui r y,
W01 Thompson was t h e onl y i ndi vi dua l COL Henderson coul d f i nd
who coul d a l l e q e t h a t "somethinq" happened i n My Lai ( 4 ) .
COL Henderson s t a t e d t h a t MG Kost er t hen r e p l i e d t h a t
Henderson' s r e por t had al r eady been di scussed wi t h him by
BG Young, t h a t he wanted t o di s c us s it once more wi t h BG Young
and h e gave Henderson no f u r t h e r i ns t r uc t i ons . . COL Henderson
s t a t e d t h a t he a l s o mentioned t o MG Kost er t h e i nc i de nt of t he
l a t t e r ' s countermanding h i s or de r t o move C Compan,y back
t hrough My Lai ( 4 ) but t h a t MG Kost er ' s response t o t h i s mat t er
i ndi c a t e d " d i s i n t e r e s t " and a tendency t o minimize t h e impor-
t ance of any i nf or mat i on which mi aht have been obt ai ned as a
r e s u l t of t h e oper at i on. COL Henderson t hen depar t ed t o awai t
f u r t h e r developments.
YG Kost er t e s t i f i e d t h a t he r ecei ved t h i s i n i t i a l - r e p o r t
i n a s e r i e s of conver sat i ons; some wi t h BG Younq who r el ayed
i nt e r i m r e por t s from COL Henderson, and t h e ~e ma i n d e r as d i r e c t
di scussi o' ns wi t h Henderson. P4G Kost er di d not r e c a l l a meetinq
i n which t hk e n t i r e r e por t was pr es ent ed as a "s i nql e wrap-up. "
However, h i s r e c ol l e c t i on of t h e subst ance of a l l t h e conver-
s a t i o n s i s i n qener al aqreement wi t h what Henderson t e s t i f i e d
t h a t he pr esent ed i n h i s 2 0 74arch r e por t . MG Kos t er ' s
t est i mony i s i n qener al agreement wi t h t h a t of BG Younq who
a l s o r e c a l l e d t h a t Henderson' s r e por t was a s e r i e s of conver-
s a t i o n s wi t h BG Younq, conver sat i ons which Younq t hen r el ayed
t o FIG Kost er. BG Younq a l s o r e c a l l e d t h a t Henderson t o l d him
he had de l i ve r e d an o r a l r e por t t o MG Kost er who had i n s t r u c t e d
him t o reduce t h e r e por t t o wr i t i nq. BG Younq t e s t i f i e d t hat .
he confirmed t h i s w i t h MG Kost er , but he coul d not r e c a l l any
of t h e d e t a i l s of t h e di s cus s i on f or t h i s I nqui r y.
There was a f u r t h e r r e por t rea. ching t h e America1 Di vi si on
command group which deser ves mention,. LTC Holladay s t a t e d t h a t
a f t e r t h e meet i nq wi t h hi ms el f , Watke, and BG Young, h'e went t o
t he Di vi si on Chi ef of St a f f and r e l a t e d t o him t h e a l l e qa t i ons
-which had been made by W01 Thompson. It i s - s i qni f i c a nt t o not e
t h a t Hol l aday' s ver s i on of t h e a l l e qa t i ons i ncl uded a l l of MAJ
Watke' s ver s i on pl us i nf or mat i on concerni nq a di t c h cont ai ni ng
bodi es, an i ndi vi dua l shoot i nq i n t o t h a t di t c h, and t h e use of
t h e t erm "murder. " COL Parson t e s t i f i e d t h a t he di d not
pas s t h i s i nf or mat i on on t o BG Younq o r flG Kost er because " I n
my mind,' t h e qe ne r a l s w e r e doi nq what needed t o be done. The
qener al s t ook t h i s p a r t over . Such a det at ched a t t i t u d e
on t h e p a r t of a di vi s i on chi ef o r s t a f f of t h e rank and expe-
r i ence of COL Parson seems unl i kel y.
COL Henderson s t a t e d t h a t t h e mat t er was next brought t o
h i s a t t e n t i o n approxi mat el y. 2 weeks a f t e r t h e 20 March meet i nq,
when BG Young advi sed him t h a t MG Kost er de s i r e d t h e o r a l r e p o r t
of 20 !larch be submi t t ed i n wr i t i n s , as a mat t er of r ecor d.
COL Henderson t e s t i f i e d t h a t he t hen pr epar ed a t hr ee- t o-
fi ve-page t ype wr i t t e n r e por t and per s onal l y de l i ve r e d itt o COL
Parson a t di vi s i on headquar t er s o n e i t h e r 4 , 5, o r 6 Apr i l '
and t h a t s e ve r a l days a f t e r , BG Younq advi sed him t h a t MG Koscer
had seen t h e r e p o r t , passed iton t o BG Younq, and t h a t BG Young
bel i eved MG Kost er t o be s a t i s f i e d wi t h t h e r e por t . FIG
Kost er deni ed or der i nq such a r e por t pr epar ed; BG Younq deni ed
advi si ng COL Henderson t o pr epar e it;and COL Parson deni ed any
knowledge of it.
There i s some cor r obor at i on of COL Henderson' s st at ement
r egar di ng t h i s wr i t t e n r e por t . MAJ FlcKniqht t e s t i f i e d
t h a t he r ead a wr i t t e n r e por t which was shown t o him by
COL Henderson " i n l a t e March o r e a r l y Apr i l " ; however, when
shown e x h i b i t 9-1 ( a r e por t submi t t ed on 24 Apr i l by COL
Henderson and which i s di scussed i n d e t a i l i n s e c t i o n B) ,
YcKniqht i d e n t i f i e d t h e e x h i b i t as t h e r e por t he had r ead i n
1968. CPT Henderson, who was MAJ b4cKniqhtts a s s i s t a n t ,
t e s t i f i e d t h a t he r e c a l l e d s e e i nq a one-paqe wr i t t e n r e por t
"about a week a f t e r 16 March. " CPT Henderson s t a t e d t h a t
McKniqht was i n possessi on of t h e r e por t which concerned t h e
mat t er of c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s and a l l e ga t i ons bv he l i c opt e r
p i l o t s . When asked i f he coul d i d e n t i f y t h e pr evi ous l y
mentioned 24 Apr i l 1968 r e por t of COL Henderson ( e xhi bi t
R - l ) , CPT Henderson s t a t e d he coul d not and t h a t he was c e r t a i n
e x h i b i t 9-1 was not t h e r e por t he had seen i n FlAJ PlcKniqht1s
hands.
A thorouqh s ear ch of c ur r e nt l y a va i l a bl e r ecor ds and f i l e s
f a i l e d t o r e ve a l a t r a c e of any r e por t .which coul d pos s i bl y f i t
th.e de s c r i pt i on which COL Henderson pr ovi ded. To da t e , t h e
onl y wr i t t e n r e por t recovered has been t h e r e por t of 24 Apr i l
1968.
There i s consi der abl e c o n f l i c t i n t h e t est i mony of F4G
Kost er, BG Y,ounq, and COL Henderson concerni nq t h e a c t ua l sub-
mi ssi on of t h e i n i t i a l r e por t bv t h e l a t t e r ' and t h e subsequent
event s and d i r e c t i v e s as t he y concern a ddi t i ona l i n v e s t i g a t i v e
e f f o r t s . FIG Kost er was c l e a r t h a t he consi der ed BG Young t o be
h i s pr i nc i pa l a s e nt i n over seei ng t h e i nve s t i ga t i ve e f f o r t s of
COL Henderson ; BG Younq, on t h e ot he r hand, t ook t h e
pos i t i on t h a t a r t e r t h e i n i t i a l d i r e c t i v e was i s s ue d t o COL
Henderson, and t h e o r a l r e por t was made t o MG Kost er, t h e mat-
t er became one of d i r e c t cont act between t h e Di vi si on Commander
and t h e CO of t h e 11t h Br i sade, and l a r qe l y excl uded t h e A s s i s t -
a nt Di vi si on Commander According t o BG Young's t est i mony,
a f t e r 20 March, when MG Kost er r ecei ved a pr el i mi nar y r e por t
from COL Henderson, BG Younq t ook no f ur t he r a c t i on i n
pur sui nq t h e a l l e qa t i ons made by 901 Thompson o r i n s uper vi s i ng
t h e i n v e s t i g a t i v e e f f o r t s of COL Henderson. However, -FIG
Kost er and ot he r s s t r e s s e d t h e cont i nui nq c ont a c t of BG Younq
wi t h t h e mat t er and t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s , as ot he r di vi s i on
bus i nes s , was r out i ne l v s har ed wi t h t h e maneuver ADC.
As concerns a c t i ons between MG Kost er and COL Henderson,
c o n f l i c t s i n t est i mony can b e r esol ved t o t h e e xt e nt t h a t an
o r a l r e por t was r ecei ved by MG Kost er from COL Henderson some-
t i me between 20 March and e a r l y Apr i l . As a r e s u l t of
t h i s r e por t , MG Kost er concl uded t h a t COL Henderson had i n t e r -
r ogat ed r es pons i bl e per sonnel i n t h e chai n of command, as wel l
a s a cr os s - s ect i on of bot h a vi a t i on and qround t r oops , and t h a t
t h e r e was no b a s i s f o r a formal i nve s t i qa t i on. 14G Kost er con-
s i de r e d t h e mat t er cl osed and pl aced no f ur t he r requi rement on
COL Henderson concerni nq t h i s mat t er u n t i l sometime i n mid-April
when r e c e i p t of VC propaqanda and f u r t h e r i nf or mat i on from
GT7N channel s reopened t h e que s t i on of c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s
i n t h e Son My oper at i on.
7. Report Throuqh Chaplairi Channels
There i s one f u r t h e r r e por t which was made dur i ng the
Son r4y oper at i on and which concerned t h e a c t i ons of C Com-
pany as observed by W01 Thom~son. On e i t h e r 16 o r 17 Yarch,
W01 Thompson went t o see t h e Di vi si on Ar t i l l e r y Chapl ai n, CPT
(now Rev. ) Car l C r e s w e l l , r eqar di nq t h e event s he had wi t nessed
a t My Lai ( 4 ) . Thompson was a t t h e t i m e t a ki nq i ns t r uc t i ons
r eqar di nq conf i r mat i on i n h i s f a i t h by Chapl ai n Creswel l and
i n t h e cour se of such i n s t r u c t i o n s , he saw t h e chapl ai n r equl ar -
IY-
Accordi ng t o Chapl ai n C r e s w e l l , when Thompson came t o s e e
him, he was " t e r r i b l y ups et " and asked f o r advi ce concerni ng
what a c t i ons he shoul d t a ke . W01 Tho,mpson r e l a t e d t o t h e chap-
l a i n t h e subst ance of h i s obs er vat i ons , and Chapl ai n Creswel l
advi sed him t h a t he shoul d make h i s o f f i c i a l p r o t e s t through
command channel s whi l e he, CPT Creswel l , would do t h e same
t hi ng t hrough "Chapl ai n Channel s. "'
Chapl ai n Creswel l t hen went t o s e e LTC L e wi s , t h e
Di vi si on Chapl ai n, r e l a t e d t h e s t o r y t o l d t o him by WO1
Thompson, and recommended t h a t an i n v e s t i s a t i o n be con-
duct ed. Chapla-in Creswel l s t a t e d t h a t Chapl ai n Lewis
assur ed him t h a t he would t a ke t h e mat t er up wi t h t h e ap-
~ r o p r i a t e a u t h o r i t i e s . Approximatelv 3 weeks l a t e r , a f t e r
cont i nual ~ r o d d i n q of Chapl ai n Lewis bv Chapl ai n Creswel l
and r epeat ed assur ances by Chapl ai n Lewis t h a t an o f f i c i a l
i nve s t i ga t i on was underwav, Chapl ai n Creswel l acknowledqed
wi t h remorse t h a t he di d not hi nq f u r t h e r .
Chapl ai n Lewis r e c a l l e d t h a t Chapl ai n Creswel l came
t o s e e him on 17 March wi t h i nf or mat i on concerni ng WO1
Thompson's compl ai nt s. Chapl ai n Lewis coul d not r e c o l l e c t
t h e d e t a i l s of t h e conver sat i on but di d r e c a l l t h a t it i n-
cl uded t h e s p e c i f i c a l l e qa t i on t h a t a s e r s e a nt had f i r e d i n t o
women and c hi l dr e n and t h a t t h e qener al cont ent of t he a l -
l e ga t i on d e a l t wi t h t h e unnecessary k i l l i n q of women and c hi l -
dren. When quest i oned concerni nq t h e or der of masni t ude
of t h e ~ l l l i n q s , Chapl ai n L e wi s s t a t e d t h a t whi l e he was not
s ur e of t h e s our ce of t h e f i qur e , t h e f i s u r e 1 2 4 i s what he
seemed t o r e c a l l a s t h e number of noncombatants k i l l e d .
I n r econs t r uct i nq Ch a ~ l a i n Le wi s ' a c t i ons r e l e va nt t o t h i s
event , it can be e s t a bl i s he d t h a t he spoke t o t h e Americal Div-
i s i o n CofS, COL Parson, and t h e G5 , LTC Ani s t r ans ki . LTC Lewis
s t a t e d he a l s o spoke t o t h e G 1 , LTC Qual l s; t h e G2, LTC Tr exl er ;
and t h e G3, LTC Balmer. These l a t t e r t hr e e , i n t h e i r t est i mony,
deni ed any r e c ol l e c t i on of an occasi on wherei n LTC Lewis made
i nqui r y concer ni ns s e r i ous a l l e qa t i ons a s a i n s t TF Bar ker , t h e
11t h Bri gade, o r any oper at i ons which i nvol ved W01 Thompson
I n t h e two i ns t a nc e s where key s t a f f o f f i c e r s r e c ol l e c t e d a a l s -
cussi on wi t h Chapl ai n Le1&7is, it i s c l e a r t h a t t h e di s cus s i on
was not one of an o f f i c i a l na t ur e concerni nq a s e r i ous a l l e qa t i on
but r a t h e r , a r eques t from Chapl ai n Lewis concerni nq t h e s t a t u s
of any i nve s t i ga t i on concerni nq "some p r e t t y bad t hi nqs " t h a t
Lewis had hear d. From t h e t est i mony of i ndi vi dua l s fami l -
i a r wi t h Chapl ai n Le wi s , it was common p r a c t i c e f o r him t o v i s i t
wi t h key members of t h e s t a f f on an i nf or mal b a s i s and dur i ns
such v i s i t s t h e Chapl ai n would f r equent l y make r ef er ence t o
rumors o r r e por t s he had hear d concer ni ns t h e unnecessary us e
of f or c e or f i r epower by combat t r o o ~ s . I t appears prob -
abl e t h a t any " r e por t s " Chapl ai n L e wi s may have made concerni nq
W01 Thompson ' s a l l e qa t i ons were most l i k e l y de l i ve r e d and re-
cei ved i n t h a t cont ext . It i s c l e a r t h a t Chapl ai n Le wi s di d
not make any t i mel y e f f o r t t o t r ans mi t t h e i nf or mat i on he r e-
cei ved from Chapl ai n Creswel l t o t h e command qroup of t h e
Americal Di vi si on. By h i s own r e c ol l e c t i on, i t was approxi -
mately 1 0 days a f t e r r ecei vi nq t h e r e por t from Creswel l t h a t
he made h i s "i nf or mal " c a l l on t h e CofS.
Chapl ai n Lewis s t a t e d he cont i nued h i s per s onal i nqui r y
i n t o t h e mat t er , speaki ng t o LTC Bar ker , and MAJ (now LTC)
Hoffman, 11t h Bri gade Chapl ai n. Chapl ai n L e wi s s t a t e d
t h a t LTC Barker assur ed him t h a t wnl l e t he r e had been some
c a s u a l t i e s among t he noncombatants, t hes e were i nadver t ent
and were a n a t u r a l consequence of t he t ype of combat u n i t s
f aced i n i nhabi t ed a r e a s #
MAJ Hoffman i n t e s t i f y i n g bef or e t he I nqui r y s t a t e d t h a t
Chapl ai n Cr eswel l s a i d t h a t he had hear d r e por t s t h a t "our
peopl e had f i r e d i n t o women and chi l dr en. " Chapl ai n Hoffman
f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t Cr eswel l cont i nual l y "ragged" him and
"pul l ed h i s l e g" and Hoffman d i d n o t t ake him s e r i ous l y. Chap-
l a i n Hoffman s t a t e d t h a t a f t e r t h i s mat t er was br ought up on
s e ve r a l occasi ons, he r e p l i e d t o Creswel l t h a t t he l l t h Bri gade
had n o t k i l l e d t h e c i v i l i a n s , " i t was Div Arty f i r i n g t he
( a r t i l l e r y ) pr ep. " Chapl ai n Hoffman s t a t e d t h a t t h i s caused
Cr eswel l t o " s t oph i s r aggi ng a l i t t l e b i t . I' Hoffman went on
t o s t a t e t h a t Creswel l never gave him s p e c i f i c i nf or mat i on nor
d i d he make any s p e c i f i c a l l e ga t i ons . H e a l s o s t a t e d t h a t he
was q u i t e c e r t a i n t h a t Chapl ai n Lewis d i d n o t speak t o him
about t h i s mat t er a t any t i me.
It i s c l e a r from t he act i ons--and t h e a c t s of omission--
of Chapl ai ns Lewis and Cr eswel l , t h a t whi l e bot h were aware of
t h e s e r i ous nat ur e of t he char ges al l eged by W01 Thompson,
n e i t h e r t ook adequat e o r t i mel y s t e p s t o br i ng t hes e char ges
t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of h i s commander. I t shoul d have been evi dent
, t o bot h t hes e chapl ai ns t h a t t he i dea of conduct i ng an i n v e s t i -
gat i on of a war crime t hrough chapl ai n channel s was pr epost er ous.
8. Summary of t h e I n i t i a l Repor t s, I nve s t i ga t i ons , and
Reviews
I n concl udi ng t h i s por t i on of t he r e p o r t , itshoul d be
not ed t h a t t he I nqui r y has been f aced wi t h a d i f f i c u l t t a s k of
at t empt i ng t o det er mi ne pr e c i s e l y what a c t i ons t r a ns pi r e d among
t h e members of t h e America1 Di vi si on command groups upon r e-
c e i p t of t h e Thompson Report . No wr i t t e n r ecor d of anyt hi ng
pe r t a i ni ng t o Thompson's compl ai nt has been found--if one ever
d i d e x i s t . A l l r ef er ences t o t h e Thompson Report and i t s a l -
l e ga t i ons were omi t t ed from such wr i t t e n r e por t s as have been
found. Thus itwas s o l e l y t hrough t est i mony t h a t t h e f a c t s have
been r econs t r uct ed. The t a s k has been compl i cat ed by t he ap-
par ent r el uct ance of some of t h e p r i n c i p a l s t o t e s t i f y f r ankl y
on t h e mat t er and by t h e s i g n i f i c a n t cont r adi ct i ons i n t h e i r
t estimony.
While t h e r e i s evi dence t h a t t h e s er i ous nes s of t h e Thompson
Report may have been muffl ed i n t h e pr ocess of bei ng passed t o BG
Young and MG Kos t er , iti s c l e a r t h a t t h e r e was a v a i l a b l e a t t h e
t i me t h e r e p o r t was r ecei ved, s u f f i c i e n t i nf or mat i on of an oper -
a t i o n a l and i n t e l l i g e n c e na t ur e a v a i l a b l e from o t h e r s our c e s ,
which shoul d have pl aced t he r e c i p i e n t s on not i c e t h a t t he event s
a t Son My were of an e xc e pt i ona l na t ur e . * Eval uat i on of , subseq-
uent a c t i ons by key per s onnel of t h e America1 Di vi s i on, i n d i c a t e s
t h a t such n o t i c e was not acknowledged. I ns t e a d, it seems l i k e l y
t h a t when t h e Thompson Report was r ecei ved a t Di vi s i on Headquar-
t e r s itwas r e l a t e d t o t h e r e p o r t concer ni ng 20-28 noncombat ant s
deat hs which MG Kos t er had pr e vi ous l y r ecei ved.
There was a t l e a s t a t a c i t de c i s i on t o wi t hhol d from hi ghe r
headquar t er s any i nf or mat i on concer ni ng t h e i nc i de nt . Adopt i ng
a "cl os e- hol d" a t t i t u d e concer ni ng a l l i nf or mat i on r e l a t i n g t o
t h i s ma t t e r , MG Kos t er d i r e c t e d t h e i n c i d e n t be i n v e s t i g a t e d by
COL Henderson, b u t n e i t h e r MG Kost er nor ot he r s i n t h e Di vi s i on
command el ement t ook any s t e ps t o i n s u r e t h a t an adequat e i nves -
t i g a t i o n would be conduct ed. From t h e s t a r t , COL Henderson must
have r ecogni zed t h e l a c k of any r e a l a ppr e c i a t i on a t Di vi s i on f o r
t h e enor mi t y of t h e i n c i d e n t and itappear s t h a t he d e l i b e r a t e l y
s e t about t o conceal i nf or mat i on which would i n d i c a t e i t s t r u e
na t ur e .
The I nqui r y does n o t excl ude t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t from an
e a r l y t i m e t h e r e was a g r e a t e r a ppr e c i a t i on a t Di vi s i on a s t o t h e
s e r i ous ne s s of t h e s i t u a t i o n . MG Kos t er acknowledged t h a t he and
BG Young a t some t i me di s c us s e d and dwel t upon t he i mpl i c a t i ons of
t h e a l l e g a t i o n s . However, i n t he absence of more s p e c i f i c pr oof ,
t h e I nqui r y cannot concl ude t h a t i n March and e a r l y Apr i l t h e Div-
i s i o n command el ement was aware of t h e na t ur e and e x t e n t of t h e
e ve nt s which had t r a n s p i r e d a t Son My.
I n t h e s e c t i o n which f ol l ows , t he a c t i ons of t h e p r i n c i p a l s
w i l l be examined i n l i g h t of t he a d d i t i o n a l i nf or mat i on r ecei ved
from Vietnamese s our c e s ,
B. THE SUBSEQUENT REPORTS (THE ABSENCE OF FURTHER INVESTI-
GATION OR REVIEW) APRIL - MAY 1968
1. I nt r oduc t or y
Almost i mmedi at el y f ol l owi ng t h e e ve nt s of 16 March 1968,
rumors, r e p o r t s , and VC propaganda r e l a t i n g t o t h e ope r a t i on be-
gan t o move from t h e VC-cont rol l ed Son My Vi l l a ge a r e a i n V i e t -
namese channel s . While itappear s t h a t t he s e d i d not come immedi-
a t e l y t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of r e s pons i bl e US per s onnel , s uch i nforma-
t i o n d i d be gi n t o r each some US mi l i t a r y and pos s i bl y c i v i l i a n
per s onnel a t l e a s t by t he e a r l y days of Apr i l 1968.
* See I nc' l o' sur e 1f o r gr aphi c p o r t r a y a l of knowledge pos s es s ed
by key i ndi vi dua l s .
The s u r f a c i n g of t h i s i nf or mat i on from Vietnamese s our ces i n
t h e f i r s t h a l f of Ap r i l r e s u l t e d , i n f u r t h e r r e p o r t s b u t v i r t u a l l y
no a d d i t i o n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o r r evi ew wi t h i n t h e US chai n of com-
mand, and a l o s t oppor t uni t y f o r t h e America1 command a ga i n t o r e-
view what had t r a n s p i r e d . I n t h i s s e c t i o n of t h e r e p o r t t h e s e
e ve nt s a r e examined.
2, Repor t s Wi t hi n Vietnamese Channel s.
I n March 1968, s i n c e Son My Vi l l a ge and t h e s ur r oundi ng
a r e a w e r e VC- cont r ol l ed, no Government of Vietnam (GVN) o f f i c i a l s
r e s i d e d i n t h e v i l l a g e o r i t s haml et s. The Son My Vi l l a g e
Chi ef , Do Dinh Luyen, and t h e Tu Cung Hamlet Chi ef , Do Tan Nhon,
l i v e d i n e x i l e a t Son Ti nh appr oxi mat el y 1 0 ki l omet er s from Son
My Vi l l age. Accor di ngl y, i nf or mat i on a v a i l a b l e t o GVN o f f i -
c i a l s r egar di ng a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e v i l l a g e was based p r i ma r i l y on
i nf or mat i on obt ai ned from r e s i d e n t s of t h e v i l l a g e who, from t i me
t o t i m e , v i s i t e d t h e mar ket i n Son Ti nh. Through t h i s means,
and t hr ough VC propaganda, some i nf or mat i on r egar di ng t h e US oper -
a t i o n i n Son My Vi l l a g e on 16 March 1968 r eached t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
o f f i c i a l s and was r e por t e d t hr ough GVN channel s .
a . Census Gr i evance Repor t
Based on i nf or mat i on obt ai ned from uns pe c i f i e d s our c e s ,
a Census ~ r i e v a n c e Cadreman of Son My Vi l l a ge s ubmi t t ed a wr i t t e n
r e p o r t t o t h e Census Gr i evance Chi ef , Quang Ngai , on 18 March
1968, summarizing t h e r e s u l t s of t h e a l l i e d ope r a t i on i n Tu Cung
Hamlet on 15 March 1968. Thi s r e p o r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t :
(1) Af t e r a f i e r c e b a t t l e wi t h d i s t r i c t VC and l o c a l
g u e r r i l l a s , t h e a l l i e s k i l l e d 320 peopl e a t subhaml et s Thuan
Yen and Binh Dong.
( 2) Twenty-seven peopl e w e r e k i l l e d a t My La i .
( 3) Ei ght y peopl e, young and o l d , w e r e k i l l e d a t Co Luy
haml et .
( 4 ) Duri ng t h e 3-day ope r a t i on, a t o t a l of 427 c i v i l i a n s
and g u e r r i l l a s w e r e k i l l e d .
While t h i s r e p o r t r e f e r s t o an ope r a t i on on "15 March, " it
appar ent l y r e f e r r e d t o t h e e ve nt s of 16 March s i n c e no ope r a t i ons
w e r e conduct ed i n t h a t a r e a on t h e pr ecedi ng day. Thi s i s t h e
e a r l i e s t r e p o r t s ubmi t t ed t hr ough GVN channel s r e ga r di ng t h e i n-
c i d e n t which t h e I nqui r y found. The r e p o r t cont ai ned no expl an-
a t o r y d e t a i l s . A copy of t h e r e p o r t was' pr ovi ded t o t h e I nqui r y
i n e a r l y 1970 from t h e f i l e s of t h e Quang Ngai Census Gr i evance
Committee, b u t t h e r e were no i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t it had been forward-
e d t o Pr ovi nce Headquar t er s; hence it appear s t h a t no a c t i o n was
t aken on it. The Census Gr i evance r e p o r t , r e f e r r e d t o l a t e r i n
t h i s s e c t i o n , which i s s a i d t o have cont ai ned d i f f e r e n t i nf or ma-
t i o n was n o t l o c a t e d by t h e I nqui r y.
b. Report of t h e Son My Vi l l age Chief
Mr . Do Dinh Luyen, Son My Vi l l age Chi ef , submi t t ed a
wr i t t e n r e p o r t , dat ed 22 March 1968, t o t h e Son Tinh Di s t r i c t
Chief pr ovi di ng t h e r e s u l t s of t h e 16 March 1968 a l l i e d oper at i on
a t Tu Cung and Co ,Luy haml et s (My Lai ( 4 ) i s a subhaml et of . Tu
Cung and My Khe ( 4 ) of Co Luy). The r e p o r t s p e c i f i e d t h a t :
(1)One US s o l d i e r was k i l l e d i n a c t i o n ( KI A) and two
wounded i n a c t i o n (WIA) a t Thuan Yen subhaml et .
( 2 ) For t y- ei ght VC were KIA. and 52 WIA.
( 3) 570 c i v i l i a n s were k i l l e d ; 480 i n Tu Cung and 90
i n Co Luy.
( 4 ) Animals, pr oper t y, and houses were 90 per cent de-
st r oyed.
The Son Ti nh Di s t r i c t Chief s t a t e d t o t h i s I nqui r y t h a t
t h i s r e p o r t had been submi t t ed pur suant t o h i s d i r e c t i o n - f o l -
lowing t h e r e c e i p t of an e a r l i e r o r a l r e p o r t from t he Hamlet
Chief 'and Vi l l age Chi ef . M r . Luyen s t a t e d t h a t h i s r e-
p o r t t o t h e Di s t r i c t Chief had been based on hear say informa-
t i o n obt ai ned from peopl e who had t a l ke d w i t h r e s i d e n t s of
Thuan Yen subhaml et [My Lai ( 4 ) 1 . Pr i o r t o t h e I n q u i r y ' s
l oc a t i ng a copy of h i s r e p o r t , i n izne Di s t r i c t Ch i e f ' s f i l e s , M r .
Luyen r e c a l l e d t h a t he had submi t t ed onl y an o r a l r e p o r t t o t h e
Di s t r i c t Chi ef and he d i d not r e c a l l wr i t i n g a l e t t e r . He t ended
t o pl ay down t h e subst ance of h i s r e p o r t , s t a t i n g t h a t t h e peopl e
had r epor t ed t h a t n o t more t han 30 c i v i l i a n s were k i l l e d i n Thuan
Yen, and t h a t hundreds of VC were k i l l e d . He f u r t h e r vol unt eer ed
t o t h e I nqui r y t h a t , accor di ng t o t h e rumors which he had hear d,
t h e deat hs were t h e r e s u l t of a r t i l l e r y , gunshi ps, and smal l arms
f i r e dur i ng t h e b a t t l e t o e n t e r t h e haml et and t h e Americans had
not assembled t h e peopl e and s hot them. Luyen s t a t e d h i s be-
l i e f t h a t most of t h e i nf or mat i on he had r ecei ved was VC propaganda
and t hus he had n o t got t e n p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned about it. -
The wr i t t e n r e p o r t of M r . Luyen dat ed 22 March 1968which was
i n f a c t passed i n GVN channel s cont ai ned s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r -
e n t a l l e g a t i o n s from t hos e suggest ed by h i s s t at ement t o t h i s
I nqui r y.
c. The I n i t i a l Report of t h e Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Chi ef ,
28' March 1968.
LT (now CPT) Tran Ngoc Tan, t h e Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Chi ef ,
a s a r e s u l t of t h e r e p o r t from t he Son My Vi l l age Chi ef , submi t t ed
an i n t i a l r e p o r t t o t h e Quang Ngai Pr ovi nce Chief on 28 March-1968
i n d i c a t i n g t h a t US f or c e s had conducted an oper at i on a t Tu Cung
Hamlet on "19 March 1968" (an appar ent e r r o r ) which r e s u l t e d i n
i n j u r i e s t o a number of haml et r e s i d e n t s . I t was r epor t ed t h a t
when t h e US f o r c e ent er ed t h e haml et , one s o l d i e r was k i l l e d and
o t h e r s wounded by a VC boobyt rap f ol l owi ng which t h e VC opened
f i r e from t h e i r p o s i t i o n s wi t hi n t h e haml et . The US f or c e s r e-
sponded wi t h i nt e ns e f i r epower , i ncl udi ng a r t i l l e r y and a i r ,
causi ng i n j u r y t o haml et r e s i d e n t s wi t h whom t h e VC f or ce was
i nt er mi ngl ed. The r e p o r t s t a t e d , a d d i t i o n a l l y , t h a t Tu Cung Ha m-
l e t , and o t h e r haml et s of Son My Vi l l a ge , had been under VC con-
t r o l s i n c e 1964 and t h a t t h e VC would pos s i bl y t ake advant age of
t h e i nc i de nt t o undermine, t hrough propaganda, t h e p r e s t i g e of t h e
Republ i c of Vietnam Armed Forces and t h e Government' s p a c i f i c a t i o n
program.
I n a ddi t i on t o s ubmi t t i ng t h e r e p o r t t o t h e Pr ovi nce Chi ef , a
copy was a l s o forwarded t o t h e S2 and S3 of QuangNgai Sect or .
The Pr ovi nce Chi ef , LTC Ton That Khien, acknowledged r e c e i p t or
t h i s r e por t i n a ddi t i on t o havi ng pr evi ous l y hear d about t h e i n-
c i de nt from t h e Di s t r i c t Chief and t hrough some rumors from t h e
peopl e From t h e i nf or mat i on which i s a v a i l a b l e , i n d i c a t i o n s
a r e t h a t t h e Pr ovi nce Chief t ook no s p e c i f i c a c t i on i n r esponse
t o t h i s r e p o r t , b u t he may have i nformed t h e Commanding Of f i c e r
of t h e 2d ARVN Di vi s i on.
d. The Second Report of t h e Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Chi ef ,
11 Apr i l 1968
Fol l owi ng up h i s i n i t i a l r e p o r t , t he Di s t r i c t Chi ef sub-
mi t t ed a subsequent r e p o r t t o t h e Pr ovi nce Chief dat ed 11 Apr i l
1968 pr ovi di ng more d e f i n i t e i nf or mat i on r egar di ng t h e i n c i d e n t of
16 March and i ncl udi ng t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t a US Army u n i t had as-
sembled and k i l l e d c i v i l i a n r e s i d e n t s of Son My Vi l l age. LT Tan
s t a t e d t h a t t h i s r e p o r t was based on a ddi t i ona l i nf or mat i on pro-
vi ded by t h e Vi l l age Chi ef , i ncl udi ng a l i s t of r e s i d e n t s k i l l e d .
Although LT Tan s t a t e d t h a t t h e l i s t of c i v i l i a n s t h a t had been
k i l l e d would be found i n t h e f i l e s of Son Tinh Di s t r i c t , when t h e
f i l e s were sear ched t h e l i s t coul d not be l ocat ed. The 11 Apr i l
r e p o r t s p e c i f i e d t h a t , a f t e r det onat i ng a VC mine and r ecei vi ng
f i r e from Tu Cung, t he US Army u n i t at t acked t h e haml et , assembled
t h e peopl e, and s h o t and k i l l e d more t han 400 i nha bi t a nt s . An
a d d i t i o n a l 90 peopl e were s a i d t o have been k i l l e d a t Co Luy Ham-
l e t . The Di s t r i c t Chi ef added t h a t he bel i eved t h e US u n i t a c t e d
i n anger and k i l l e d t o o many c i v i l i a n s i n t h i s cas e even though
Son My had l ong been under VC c ont r ol and a l l i e d f or c e s f r equent l y
oper at ed i n t h e a r e a wi t hout r e s t r i c t i o n . He s t a t e d t h a t , i f t r u e ,
he consi der ed t h i s an a c t of i ns ane vi ol ence and r eques t ed t h e
Pr ovi nce Chief t o i nt e r ve ne on behal f of t h e peopl e,
Thi s r e por t of t h e Di s t r i c t Chief was not based on any i nves-
t i g a t i o n of t h e i nc i de nt , b u t a s al r eady not ed, on r e p o r t s re-
cei ved by t h e Vi l l a ge Chief from r e s i d e n t s of Son My who came o u t
from t h e a r e a t o v i s i t t h e market i n Son Tinh and f o r o t h e r
r easons. Si nce Son My was under VC c ont r ol , no e f f o r t was made t o
cor r obor at e t h e r e p o r t a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t i me by an on- s i t e i nves-
t i g a t i o n , al t hough t h e Hamlet Chief and Vi l l age Chief were purpor-
t e d l y a bl e t o devel op a l i s t of r e s i d e n t s who had been k i l l e d .
According t o t he d i s t r i b u t i o n s t a t e d on LT Tan' s 11 Apr i l r e- '
por t , copi es of t h i s r e por t were forwarded t o Headquart ers, 2d ARVN
Di vi si on, and MACV, Quang Ngai Sect or [US Advi sors] wi t h a cour t -
esy copy t o t h e Major, US Advisor, Son Tinh ~ i s t r i c t . While
i n Vietnam, t he I nqui r y was provi ded copi es of t h i s r e por t from t h e
f i l e s of bot h t he Provi nce Chief and t he Di s t r i c t Chi ef. How-
ever , ne i t he r a copy of t he r e por t nor any r ef er ence t o itcould
be found i n t h e f i l e s of t he US Advisory Teams a t Quang Ngai Pro-
vi nce and Son Tinh Di s t r i c t al t hough exhaust i ve sear ches were
made.
I .
e . Memorandum t o t he Commanding Of f i c e r of t h e 2d ARVN
Di vi si on
Based on t he Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s 11 Apr i l r e por t and VC
propaganda which he had r ecei ved, t he G2 , 2d ARVN Di vi si on, sub-
mi t t ed a memorandum, dat ed 1 2 Apr i l 1968, t o t he CG, 2d ARVN ~ i v i -
s i on, summarizing t he a l l e ga t i ons r egar di ng t he i nc i de nt .
A copy of t h e VC propaganda message (which i s di scussed i n t h e
fol l owi ng s e c t i on of t h i s chapt er ) des cr i bi ng t he i nc i de nt and a
copy of t h e Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s re. port were at t ached t o t h e memoran-
dum. Upon r ecei vi ng t h i s i nf or mat i on, COL Toan di r e c t e d t h a t
Quang Ngai Sect or i nve s t i ga t e t he i nc i de nt . I n a margi nal not e
on t he G 2 ' s memorandum, COL Toan s t a t e d : "QuangNgai Sect or r e-
view t h i s i nve s t i ga t i on. I f t he r e i s not hi ng t o i t , have t he
Di s t r i c t r e c t i f y t he r epor t - - I f iti s t r u e , l i nk-up wi t h t he
America1 Di vi si on t o have itst opped. " Ther eaf t er , on 15
Apr i l 1968, a message, si gned by t he Chief of S t a f f , di r e c t i ng
t he i nve s t i ga t i on i n accordance wi t h COL Toan' s gui dance, was di s -
pat ched t o QuangNgai Sect or . COL Toan s t a t e d t o t h i s In-
qui r y t h a t he recogni zed t h a t t he a r e a was under VC cont r ol and
t h a t i n f a c t ithad not been pos s i bl e t o conduct an on- s i t e i n-
vest i ga t i on.
COL Toan subsequent l y di scussed t he i nc i de nt wi t h LTG Hoang
Xuan Lam, CG, I CTZ. Thi s di s cus s i on appears t o have been t he
onl y r e por t dur i ng 1968 by e i t h e r QuangNgai Provi nce o r t h e 2d
ARVN Di vi si on t o a hi gher a ut hor i t y i n t he GT.TN chai n of com-
mand.
3 . VC Propaganda
During 1967 and 1968, itwas a comrrlon t echni que of t h e
VC t o at t empt t o e xpl oi t a c t i ons i n which t hey had s uf f e r e d heavy
l os s es by di ssemi nat i ng propaganda cl ai mi ng t h a t a l l i e d f or ces
had k i l l e d many c i v i l i a n s , burned houses, dest royed. pr oper t y, and
committed ot he r such a c t s . Thi s was done through a va r i e t y of
means i ncl udi ng publ i c gat her i ngs , br oadcast s, and publ i shed
l e a f l e t s o r l e t t e r s . Such propaganda was r egul - ar l ymonitored by
US and Vietnamese i nt e l l i ge nc e teams, but i t s gr os s l y exaggerat ed
and drumbeat q u a l i t y r e s ul t e d i n any pur por t ed s p e c i f i c i nf or mat i on
it mi ght c ont a i n bei ng t r e a t e d wi t h cons i der abl e s kept i ci s m and
more f r e que nt l y t han not , di s mi s s ed a s pur e f a b r i c a t i o n .
I t would appear t h a t much of t h e VC propaganda i s s ue d concer -
ni ng t h e Son My i nc i de nt was di s mi s s ed i n ' t h i s f as hi on al t hough
some of it di d c ont a i n an unusual number of s p e c i f i c char ges .
While t h e propaganda was i n some r e s pe c t s an obvi ous d i s t o r t i o n ,
it r e c i t e d some of t h e e ve nt s of t h a t day wi t h r eas onabl e accur acy.
I n f a c t , t h i s p a r t i c u l a r propaganda, e s p e c i a l l y when combined
wi t h o t h e r i nf or mat i on a v a i l a b l e t o US and Vietnamese command
el ement s shoul d have prompted f ol l ow- up a c t i on.
The f ol l owi ng i s a summary of t h e propaganda which t h i s
I nqui r y found, which i n var yi ng degr ees came t o t h e a t t e n t i o n
of US and/or ARVN per s onnel i n t h e Spr i ng of 1968. Thi s sum-
mary of propaganda i s i n a d di t i o n t o t h e rumors hear d by v i l -
l a ge , d i s t r i ' c t , and pr ovi nce o f f i c i a l s whi ch, f o r t h e most p a r t ,
appear t o have been di s mi s s ed by t h e s e o f f i c i a l s a s VC- i ni t i at ed
and t o which t h e i r r e a c t i on was tempered by p a s t exper i ence wi t h
VC propaganda, a s mal l concer n f o r VC-cont rol l ed a r e a s , and an
obvi ous r e l uc t a nc e on t h e p a r t of GVN o f f i c i a l s t o embar r ass t h e i r
US a l l i e s .
The inquiry obt ai ned i n Vietnam a copy of a Quang Ngai Nation-
a l Li be r a t i on Fr ont Committee no t i c e which was da t e d 28 March
1968. Thi s n o t i c e was e n t i t l e d "Concerning t h e C r i m e s Committed
by US I mp e r i a l i s t s and Thei r Lackeys Who Ki l l e d More Than 500
Ci v i l i a n s of Tinh Khe Vi l l a ge (Son My), Son Ti nh Di s t r i c t . " I t
s p e c i f i e d t h a t :
Xa m Lang (Thuan Yen) Subhamlet of Tu Cung Hamlet and Xom
Go Subhamlet of Co Luy w e r e pounded by a r t i l l e r y f o r
hour s. Af t e r s h e l l i n g , ni ne h e l i c o p t e r s l anded t r oops
who bes i eged t h e two s mal l haml et s. The US s o l d i e r s were
l i k e wi l d ani mal s , char gi ng v i o l e n t l y i n t o t h e haml et s ,
k i l l i n g and des t r oyi ng. They formed t hemsel ves i n t o
t h r e e gr oups: one group was i n char ge of k i l l i n g c i v-
i l i a n s , one group burned h u t s , and t h e t h i r d group des-
t r oyed ve ge t a t i on and t r e e s and k i l l e d ani mal s. Where-
e ve r t hey went , c i v i l i a n s w e r e k i l l e d , houses and vege-
t a t i o n were des t r oyed and cows, b u f f a l o, chi cken, and
ducks were a l s o k i l l e d . They even k i l l e d o l d peopl e and
c hi l dr e n; pr egnant women were r aped and k i l l e d . Thi s
was by f a r t h e most ba r b a r i c k i l l i n g i n human h i s t o r y .
I
The not i c e s t a t e d t h a t 5 0 2 peopl e w e r e massacred a t Tu Cung
and Co Luy Haml et s, i ncl udi ng 67 o l d peopl e, 170 c h i l dr e n , and
130 women. Although dat ed 28 March 1968, t h e copy of t h i s
not i c e which appear s i n t h e r ecor d was capt ur ed by t h e America1
Di vi s i on on 11 December 1969 appr oxi mat el y 20 ki l omet er s nor t h-
w e s t of Son My Vi l l a ge . While t h e r e i s no r e l i a b l e evi dence
one way o r t h e o t h e r it i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a pr e- dat ed n o t i c e was
publ i s hed i n l a t e 1969 i n o r d e r t o c a p i t a l i z e on t h e wi despr ead
p u b l i c i t y a t t h a t t i me concer ni ng t h e Son'My i n c i d e n t . The
I nqui r y found no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t it i n f a c t r eached GVN o r US
hands a t anyt i me p r i o r t o December 1969.
One - i t em found by e a r l y Ap r i l 1968 was a s c r i p t f o r a pr o-
posed VC br oadcas t e n t i t l e d "American Ev i l Appear s. " I t i s n o t
c l e a r how i t was obt ai ned. The s c r i p t i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e propos-
ed br oa dc a s t was t o be used i n coor di nat i on wi t h VC l e a f l e t s wi t h
t h e t i t l e " Let American Enemy Pay Thi s Bloody Debt . " I n a d d i t i o n
t o t h e g e n e r a l char ges of murder, mi s t r eat ment of Vi et namese peo-
p l e , and t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of pr oper t y by US f o r c e s , t h e s c r i p t
s p e c i f i c a l l y h i g h l i g h t e d . t h e Son My i n c i d e n t . Thi s was t h e i t em
of VC propaganda t h a t t h e G2 of t h e 2d ARVN Di vi s i on br ought t o
t h e a t t e n t i o n of COL Toan. The s c r i p t a s pr ovi ded t o COL Toan
s t a t e d , i n p a r t , i n t r a n s l a t i o n :
I n t h e ope r a t i on of 15 March 1968, i n Son Ti nh D i s -
t r i c t t h e American enemi es went cr azy. They used ma-
chi neguns and ever y o t h e r ki nd of weapon t o k i l l 500
peopl e who had empty hands, i n Ti nh Khe (Son My) V i l l -
age (Son Ti nh Di s t r i c t , Quang Ngai- Pr ovi nce) . Ther e
w e r e many pr egnant women some of which w e r e onl y a
few days from c h i l d b i r t h . The Americans would s hoot
everybody t hey saw, They k i l l e d peopl e and cows, burn-
ed houses. Ther e were some f a mi l i e s i n which a l l
members were k i l l e d .
The propaganda went on t o encour age ARVN s o l d i e r s t o use t h e i r
guns a g a i n s t American per s onnel . Se ve r a l l a t e r enemy pr o-
paganda br oa dc a s t s w e r e made from Hanoi dur i ng t h e pe r i od Apr i l -
June 1968 al ong t h e theme t h a t a l l i e d f o r c e s were commi t t i ng a t -
r oci ous war cr i mes i n Sout h Vietnam by mur der i ng i nnocent c i v i l -
i a n s , bur ni ng hous es , abus i ng women, and de s t r oyi ng pr ope r t y.
The Son My i n c i d e n t was c i t e d a s one s p e c i f i c example of such
an a t r o c i t y i n each of t h e s e br oadcas t s . Br oadcas t s a r e known
t o have been made on 16 Ap r i l ( 2 ) , 17 Ap r i l , 23 Ap r i l , and 2
June which pr ovi ded g e n e r a l l y t h e same d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e
i n c i d e n t a s t h e propaganda messages pr e vi ous l y di s cus s ed.
An i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t which was r ecei ved i n Ap r i l 1968 i n -
d i c a t e d t h a t s o l d i e r s of t h e V i e t Cong w e r e wear i ng r e d arm bands
on which was a s l ogan expr es s i ng det er mi nat i on t o avenge t h e mass-
a c r e o r murder a t Son My. A VC who s ubs equent l y r e t ur ne d t o
government c o n t r o l a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t arm bands wi t h a s l ogan
concer ni ng t h e i n c i d e n t w e r e worn a t Binh Duc, an a r e a i n e a s t e r n
Binh Son Di s t r i c t . Thi s same i n d i v i d u a l a l s o r e por t e d t h a t
he had a t t e nde d two propaganda l e c t u r e s i n Tu Cung concer ni ng t h e
i n c i d e n t .
On 16 J ul y 1969, a propaganda message publ i shed i n May 1968
and e n t i t l e d "The American Aggressors Must Pay For Thei r Debts
i n Blood Agai nst t he People of Son My" was capt ur ed approxi mat el y
50 ki l omet er s nort hwest of Son My. Thi s message, a s ot he r s , pro-
vi ded a summary of t h e event s on 16 March pl us a vi vi d de s c r i pt i on
of t he al l eged a t r o c i t i e s a ga i ns t t he r e s i de nt s of Son My. The
message encouraged t h e peopl e t o ha t e t h e Americans and t o seek
revenge f o r t he murder of t h e i r r e l a t i v e s .
From t h e f or egoi ng, iti s appar ent t h a t by mid-April 1968,
r e por t s and propaganda r e l a t i n g t o Son My were c i r c ul a t i ng i n
Vietnamese channel s which cont i nued f o r a t l e a s t s e ve r a l months
t he r e a f t e r . I n t he next s e c t i on, t he i nf or mat i on r ecei ved by US
o f f i c i a l s from t hese sour ces and t he r e s ul t i ng a c t i ons a r e exam-
i ned.
4. Informat i on Received From Vietnamese Sources and Fur t her
US Act i on
a . The Problem ~f Cont r adi ct or y Testimony
The I nqui r y met wi t h a wel t er of cont r act i on, de ni a l s
of knowledge, and vague r e c ol l e c t i ons when examining what, when,
and how i nf or mat i on r e l a t i n g t o t he al l eged i nc i de nt passed from
Vietnamese sour ces t o US per sonnel . But wi t h . t h e a i d of documents
and i nf or mat i on obt ai ned from GVN a ut hor i t i e s and t h e t est i mony
of a few i ndi vi dual s who were i n pos i t i ons t o observe por t i ons of
t h e event s ithas been pos s i bl e t o r econs t r uct i n a t l e a s t broad
o u t l i n e t h e i nf or mat i on r ecei ved and t o det ermi ne t hose who had
t h e knowledge and were pr i nc i pa l l y r esponsi bl e f o r t he l ack of
any e f f e c t i v e response i n t he chai n of command.
b. Informat i on Received and Act i ons Taken By t he US
Advisory Teams
LTC William D. Guinn was t h e Deputy Provi nce Seni or Ad-
vi s or of Quang Ngai Provi nce i n March, Apr i l , and May 1968. H e
t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n March 1968 he r ecei ved a handwr i t t en t r a ns l a t i on
of a r e por t t h a t he was' t o l d had come through Census ~ r i e v a n c e
channel s i n Quang Ngai. He coul d not r e c a l l who s p e c i f i c a l l y
had gi ven itt o him. A s LTC Guinn var i ousl y r e c a l l e d t he
r e por t i n h i s t est i mony i n 1969, ithad s t a t e d t h a t ~ me r i c a n f or -
ces had k i l l e d 1 , 0 0 0 or 1, 500 o r 2, 000- i nan oper at i on i n e a s t e r n
Son Tinh Di s t r i c t . When i n i t i a l l y quest i oned a bout . t he r e por t i n
May 1969, LTC Guinn, t e s t i f i e d t h a t "because of t h e s er i ous nes s
of t he a l l e ga t i on" he c a r r i e d t he r e por t immediately t o COL Hen-
derson a t h i s headquar t er s i n Duc Pho s o t h a t COL Henderson "coul d
s t a r t conduct i ng an i nve s t i ga t i on on h i s own. He l a t e r
t e s , t i f i e d t h a t he had t aken t he r e por t t o COL Henderson j u s t a s
soon a s he c oul d. ge t a he l i c opt e r , but was unabl e t o r e c a l l t h e
exact dat e.
When Guinn r e t o l d t he s t or y i n h i s te.stimony i n
December 1969 bef or e t h i s I nqui r y, he added t h a t t h e r e p o r t , i n
a ddi t i on t o s t a t i n g t he l ar ge number of c a s u a l t i e s r e s u l t i n g fxom
t he a c t i on of t h e US f or c e s , had s a i d t h a t t hey had been k i l l e d
"by bombing and a r t i l l e r y " and t h a t t h e r e was "no i ndi c a t i on i n
t h e r e t h a t t hey had been k i l l e d by smal l arms o r ground a c t i on. "
LTC Guinn expl ai ned t h a t i n h i s opi ni on he had no dut y t o
r e p o r t t h e mat t er s i nc e no war cri me was a l l e ge d, it bei ng ex-
pr e s s l y s t a t e d t h a t t he c a s u a l t i e s had r e s u l t e d from bombing and
a r t i l l e r y .
LTC Guinn f u r t h e r expl ai ned t h a t .he had not bel i eved t h e r e-
p o r t and had not consi der ed t h a t any a t r o c i t y had been committed.
He a l s o s t a t e d t h a t he had t o l d COL Henderson of t h e un-
r e ~ ~ a b i l i t y of i t s s our ce, but t h a t he, Guinn, had made no
e f f o r t t o check o u t t h e r e por t . According t o Guinn, COL
Henderson s t a t e d t h a t he would check o u t t h e r e por t .
Henderson f l a t l y deni ed t h a t he r ecei ved any such r e p o r t from
Guinn, e i t h e r o r a l l y o r i n wr i t i ng, and s t a t e d t h a t he bel i eved
t h a t he had not even met Guinn up t o t h a t t i me.
I n a ddi t i on t o t hes e c o n f l i c t s i n t est i mony, Gui nn' s r e f u s a l
upon bei ng r e c a l l e d a s a wi t ness t o answer f u r t h e r ques t i ons l e f t
unr esol ved j u s t what r e p o r t he d i d r ecei ve i n March 1968 and spec-
i f i c a l l y how and from whom he r ecei ved it. Guinn pr evi ous l y had
t o l d t h e I nqui r y t h a t he had mai nt ai ned no f i l e of such t hi ngs a s
t he Census Gri evance r e por t and t h a t accor di ngl y t h e onl y pl ace a
copy coul d pos s i bl y be found would be a t t h e Census Grievance
o f f i c e . Ther eaf t er , when t h i s I nqui r y obt ai ned from t he
Census Grievance o f f i c e i n Quang Ngai a copy of t he Census Griev-
ance r e p o r t of 18 March 1968 ( e xhi bi t M-31), Guinn, exer ci s i ng
h i s p r i v i l e g e , r ef us ed f u r t h e r t o t e s t i f y and accor di ngl y, it
was not pos s i bl e t o a s c e r t a i n whet her t h e 18 March Census Griev-
ance r e p o r t was i n f a c t t h e one which he r e c a l l e d havi ng r ecei ved.
H i s pr evi ous de s c r i pt i on of t h e document and i t s cont ent s
i s not c ons i s t e nt wi t h Exhi bi t M-31, hence t h e r e may have been
anot her Census Gri evance r e por t .
LTC Guinn t e s t i f i e d , on h i s f i r s t appearance bef or e t h i s In-
qui r y, t h a t t h e r e p o r t from Census Grievance was t h e onl y one of
which he had hear d cover i ng t h e k i l l i n g of Vietnamese c i v i l i a n s
by Americans. However, i n p r i o r t est i mony gi ven t o t h e I G
i n May 1969, he had s t a t e d t h a t LTC Khien, t he Pr ovi nce Chi ef ,
had r ecei ved t h e same i nf or mat i on r egar di ng t he a l l e ge d k i l l i n g
of c i v i l i a n s by US f or ces and had forwarded it t o t h e 2d ARVN
d i v i s i o n , H e f u r t h e r s t a t e d h i s under st andi ng t h a t COL
Toan, LTC Khien, and MG Kost er a l l had conduct ed i nve s t i ga t i ons
t o f i n d o u t what had happened. As pr evi ous l y not ed, when
t h i s I nqui r y went t o Vietnam it obt ai ned copi es of bot h t h e 22
March 1968 r e p o r t from Mr, Luyen, t h e Son My Vi l l age Chi ef , t o
t h e Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Chief ( e x h i b i t M-49) and t h e 11 Apr i l 1968
r e p o r t from LT (now CPT) Tan, t h e Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Chi ef , t o
LTC Khien cont ai ni ng a l l e g a t i o n s of a mass k i l l i n g i n Son Fly
Vi l l a ge ( e xhi bi t s 74-29, M-34, M-36).
The evi dence does not e s t a b l i s h t h a t e i t h e r LTC Guinn o r MAJ
(now LTC) Gavin, t h e Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Advi sor , o r any member of
t h e i r advi sor y teams had any immediate knowledge of t h e v i l l a g e
Ch i e f ' s r epor t a t ' t h e t i me it was made. Nor does it appear
t h a t members of e i t h e r advi s or y team say LT Tan' s f i r s t r e por t
of 28 March 1968 t o LTC Khien ( e xhi bi t M- 5 ) . Althouqh Tan s t a t e s
t h a t he di s cus s ed it wi t h Gavin, Gavin' deni es t h i s . However,
d e s p i t e t h e d e n i a l s by Guinn and Gavin of knowledge of &h i s Vi et -
namese compl ai nt i t i s c l e a r t h a t LT Tan' s 11 Apr i l 1968
l e t t e r , r e f e r r i n g t o t h e V i l l ~ q e Ch i e f ' s compl ai nt , was pr ovi ded
t o bot h t h e i r headquar t er s and was t h e s u b j e c t of cons i der abl e
di s cus s i on. -
FWJ Hancock, t h e G3 advi s or t o t h e 2d ARVN Di vi s i on, has
t r a c e d t o t h e Di s t r i c t Advi sory Team and presumably MAJ Gavin,
t h e i n i t i a l Vietnamese r e por t concerni nq the Son Ply i nc i de nt . H e
s t a t e d t h a t LTC Guinn t o l d him i n l a t e March o r e a r l y Apr i l t h a t
Gavin had r ecei ved from t h e Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Chi ef a r e por t of
s e v e r a l hundred c i v i l i a n s havi ng been k i l l e d by US f or c e s . PIAJ
Hancock appar ent l y f i xe d t h e t i me of t h i s o r a l r e p o r t as pr eced-
i n g t h e Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s 11 Apr i l l e t t e r .
Shor t l y a f t e r he a r i ng t hrough Guinn of t h i s i nf or mat i on r e-
cei ved from t h e Di s t r i c t Advisory team, IUIJ Hancock r e c a l l e d hav-
i n g s een t h e s c r i p t f o r t h e propaganda br oadcas t ( e x h i b i t P4-33)
and t a l k i n g about it wi t h Guinn. H e f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t h e l a t e r
saw i n an Advi sory Team r eadi ng f i l e a t t h e 2d ARVN Di vi s i on t h e
memorandum from t h e G2 of t h e di vi s i on t o COL Toan on which COL
Toan had not ed h i s d i r e c t i o n f o r s e c t o r t o i n v e s t i g a t e .
I4AJ Ear l e, t h e G2 advi s or o f t h e 2d ARVN Di vi s i on, f u r t h e r
cor r obor at es LTC Gui nn' s knowledqe and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e act -
i ons which ensued. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t LTC Guinn, i n Apr i l 1968,
spoke bot h of t h e Di s t r i c t Ch i e f ' s r e por t and of t h e VC propaq-
anda r e l a t i n g t o t h e i nc i de nt . Guinn a l s o mentioned CPT Rodriquez,
t h e As s i s t a nt Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Advi sor. Guinn f u r t h e r mentioned
t h a t he was havi ng someone look i n t o t h e mat t er and was s eeki ng
a ddi t i ona l i nf or mat i on. Guinn a l s o s t a t e d t h a t he was pas s i nq
t h e i nf or mat i on up t hrouqh h i s channel s.
CPT Rodriguez confi rms t h a t he r ecei ved a r eques t from t h e
Pr ovi nce Advi sory Team, dur i nq MAJ Gavi n' s temporary absence from
Son Tinh between 10 and 16 Ap r i l , t o obt a i n i nf or mat i on r egar di ng
t h e a l l e g a t i o n s cont ai ned i n LT Tan' s 11 Apr i l l et t er . Si nce Son
My Vi l l a ge was i n a VC-controlled a r e a , an on- s i t e i n v e s t i q a t i o n
by CPT Rodriguez was not pos s i bl e. He s t a t e d t h a t , i n r esponse
t o t h i s r e que s t , he l i mi t e d h i s act i ons t o d i s c u s s i n s t h e mat t er
wi t h LT Tan and pr epar i ng a s t at ement , dat ed 1 4 Apr i l 1968, i n
which he expr essed t h e concl usi on t h a t LT Tan di d not gi ve t h e
Vi l l age Chi e f ' s compl ai nt much i mport ance ( e x h i b i t 14-30) .
The a t t i t u d e of LT Tan a s t hus r e f l e c t e d i n t h e Rodriquez
s t at ement appear s t o c o n t r a s t wi t h t h e s e r i ous a l l e g a t i o n s , i n
Tan' s 11 Apr i l l e t t e r . During i n t e r r o q a t i o n by t h e I nqui r y i n
Vietnam, LT Tan s t a t e d t h a t he had seen and agr eed wi t h
Rodr i quez' s s t at ement . He added t h a t t h e s ubs t ance and i n t e n t of
h i s di s cus s i on wi t h Rodriguez had not been t h a t t h e i nf or mat i on
pr ovi ded by t h e Vi l l aqe Chi ef was i n v a l i d o r i n c o r r e c t ; r a t h e r
t h a t i n view of t h e s i t u a t i o n t hr oughout Son Tinh Di s t r i c t , which
was under ext r eme pr e s s ur e from t h e VC wi t h out pos t s bei nq at t ack-
ed ni ght l y, h e consi der ed a r e por t a l l e qi ng t h a t some c i v i l i a n s
had been k i l l e d i n a VC-controlled ar ea t o be of less i mpor t ance
under t h e ci r cumst ances.
CPT Rodriguez t e s t i f i e d t h a t two copi es of h i s 1 4 Apr i l
s t at ement were s e n t t o t h e Pr ovi nce Advi s or ' s o f f i c e i n Quang
Nqai and one copy was pl aced i n t h e f i l e s of t he Son Ti nh Advis-
ory Team. Then t h e I nqui r y team was i n Vietnam, t h e only
copy of t h e 1 4 Apr i l s t at ement which coul d be found was i n the
per s onal f i l e s of LTC Khien who made a va i l a bl e f i l e s t o t h e I n-
qui r y and pr ovi ded t h e copy ent er ed i n t h e r ecor d. The of -
f i c e f i l e s of t h e D i s t r i c t , Pr ovi nce, and 2d ARVN Di vi s i on Advis-
ory teams were s i mi l a r l y b e r e f t of any o t h e r paper r e l a t i n g t o
t h e 1968 r e por t s .
CPT Rodriguez s t a t e d t h a t f ol l owi nq t h e forwardi nq of h i s 1 4
Apr i l s t at ement t o t h e Pr ovi nce Advisory o f f i c e he coul d r e c a l l
di s cus s i ng t h e mat t er wi t h no one o t h e r t han MAJ Gavin, whom h e
b r i e f e d on t h e mat t er and showed a copy of h i s 1 4 Apr i l s t at ement
upon MAJ Gavi n' s r e t u r n t o Son Tinh on 16 Apr i l LT Tan and
LT Dawkins, t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e advi s or a t t h e District' Headquar t er s,
r e c a l l e d t a l k i n g t o bot h CPT Rodriquez and MAJ Gavin about t h e
i n c i d e n t , h u t PIIAJ Gavin, d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t he was t h e
addr essee o r a cour t es y copy of Tan' s 11 Apr i l l e t t e r and t h e
cont r ar y t est i mony not ed above, cl ai med h e was kept e n t i r e l y i n
t h e dar k r egar di ng t h e r e p o r t s on Son My and knew not hi nq of what
CPT Rodriguez had done o r of h i s di s cus s i on wi t h LT Tan dur i nq
Gavin ' s absence.
Although LTC Khien s t a t e d t h a t he had t a l ke d wi t h bot h M r .
James May, t h e Pr ovi nce Seni or Advi sor, and LTC Guinn, who was
May's deput y, about t h e 11 Apr i l l e t t e r , Mr. May was appar ent l y
absent from Quanq Nqai a t t h e t i me t h e l e t t e r was r ecei ved and he
deni ed e ve r havi ng hear d of t h e l e t t e r o r of t h e Rodriquez 1 4
Apr i l s t at ement . No o t h e r evi dence l i n k s 14r. May d i r e c t l y
t o t h e l et t er o r t n e s t at ement .
As t o LTC Guinn, h i s r e f u s a l t o answer any ques t i ons r egar d-
i n g t h e ma t e r i a l s found by t h e I nqui r y i n RVN t hrouqh t h e cooper-
a t i on of t h e GVN aut hor i t i es - - i ncl udi nq t h e Tan 11 Apr i l l e t t e r
and t h e ~ o a r i q u e z 1 4 Apr i l st at ement - - has pr event ed t h e devel op-
ment of evi dence a s t o t h e s p e c i f i c manner i n which Rodr i guez' s
14 Apr i l s t at ement was subsequent l y t r a ns mi t t e d t o COL Henderson
a t Duc Pho. Moreover, when Guinn f i r s t t e s t i f i e d bef or e t h e I n-
qui r y, he was shown t h e ver s i on of t h e 1 4 Apr i l s t at ement found
i n t h e f i l e s of t h e S2 a t t h e l l t h Briqade (from which CPT
Rodri guez' s s i gna t ur e bl ock had been el i mi nat ed) and he pr of es s -
ed not havi ng seen t he st at ement bef or e. Di s as s oci at i ng
hi msel f from t h e mat t er , Guinn bef or e t h i s I nqui r y deni ed di scus-
s i ng t h e a l l e ga t i ons r eqar di ng t h e i nc i de nt wi t h LTC Khien, COL
Toan, PIG Kost er, BG Younq o r M r . May, and he di d not mn t i o n
e i t h e r MAJ Ea r l e o r I.IAJ Hancock. He i n s i s t e d t h a t h i s onl y
di scussi on had been t h e one wi t h COL Henderson when he brouqht
t h e Census Gri evance r e por t t o Duc Pho.
The sur r oundi ng ci rcumst ances and t h e t est i mony of var i ous
wi t nesses pl ace LTC Guinn s quar el y i n t h e c e n t r a l pos i t i on a t
Quang Ngai bot h i n handl i ng Tan' s 11 Apr i l l et t er - - of which he
was an addressee--and i n ar r anqi ng f or t h e pr epar at i on and sub-
sequent d i s t r i b u t i o n of Rodr i guez' s 1 4 Apr i l st at ement concerni ng
Tan' s l e t t e r .
BG Young ( l i k e MAJ Ea r l e ) s t a t e d t h a t Guinn expr essl y t o l d him
about t h e Di s t r i c t Chief ' s r e por t and COL Henderson confirmed
t h a t Guinn was pr es ent when he talKed t o LTC Khien r egar di ng
" t h i s a l l e ga t i on a ga i ns t US t r oops. " Si mi l a r l y, MG Kost er
confirmed t h a t he a l s o t a l ke d wi t h Gulnn &out t h e Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s
r e por t t o t h e Provi nce Chief when he had gone t o Quang Ngai t o
speak wi t h LTC Khien r egar di ng t he s e mat t er s. Another appar-
e n t l y knowledgeable member of t h e advi sor y teams who has sought t o
di s a s s oc i a t e hi msel f from t h e event s i s COL Hut t er , t he US Seni or
Advisor t o COL Toan. Both i'4G Kost er and MAJ Hancock as wel l as
COL Toan and l l AJ Pho, pl ace him a t c r i t i c a l meetings i n t h i s t i me
frame .
Whatever may have been t he e xt e nt and d e t a i l of Gui nn' s r e-
por t t o t h e l l t h Bri qade and t h e America1 Di vi si on r eqar di nq
t he s e mat t er s , o r t h e knowledqe of COL Hut t er , t h e r e i s no evi dence
t h a t t hey e ve r br ouqht t he s e mat t er s t o t h e a t t e nt i on of t h e i r
s uper i or s wi t hi n t h e i r r es pect i ve chai ns of command, (DCORDS
and DSA I CTZ) o r t ook any s t e ps t o s e e t h a t such mat t er s were
i ncl uded i n t h e monthly Advisory Team r e por t o r any ot he r r e por t s
submi t t ed by t h e 2d ARVN Di vi si on o r Provi nce Advisory Teams.
( I r oni c a l l y, t h e monthly provi nce r e por t s cont ai ned l audat or y
account s concerni ng TF Barker. )
c. Informat i on Received and Act i ons Taken by t h e l l t h Bri gade
As pr evi ousl y not ed, l4AJ PIcKnight, t h e S3 of t h e l l t h
Bri gade, t e s t i f i e d t h a t by l a t e March or e a r l y Apr i l 1968 COL
Henderson' s i nve s t i qa t i on concerni ng t h e Son My oper at i on was
completed and cl osed wi t h t he pr epar at i on 05 a l e t t e r t o t h e CG
America1 Di vi si on gi vi nq an . expl anat i on of t h i s oper at i on and of
what had occur r ed. He f ur t he r t e s t i f i e d , however, t h a t t h e
mat t er was reopenea I n t h e f i r s t h a l f of Apr i l because of t h e
r e c e i pt of a VC propaganda l e a f l e t a l l e gi ng t h a t US f or c e s had
massacred 300-400 peopl e i n t h e 16 March oper at i on. MAJ YcKniqht
knew not hi ng of a r epor t from Census Gri evance channel s, and t he
t est i mony of LTC Guinn and COL Henderson i s i n c o n f l i c t as t o
whether t h e f i r s t r e por t r eachi nq t he l l t h Bri qade from Vi et -
namese s our ces was del i ver ed by Guinn. Never t hel ess, it i s
c l e a r t h a t it was i n f o h a t i o n from Vietnamese channel s which
prompted f u r t h e r a c t i on by COL Henderson.
LTC Bl ackl edqe confi rms t h e r e c e i pt a t t h e l l t h Bri qade of
a r epor t on such VC propaqanda. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he "sei zed"
on t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s pi e c e was of a d i f f e r e n t ki nd t han t h e
usual run of VC propaqanda and brouqht it t o COL Henderson' s
a t t e nt i on around t h e middle of Apr i l . He r e c a l l e d r ecei v-
i nq one o r two l a t e r pi e c e s of VC propaqanda of s i mi l a r import
which he a l s o showed t o COL Henderson. COL Henderson acknow-
ledqed havi ng been shown some such r epor t around mid-April (which
he t houqht had been obt ai ned by t h e i n t e l l i q e n c e l i a i s o n o f f i c e r
t o Quanq Ngai Pr ovi nce) and s t a t e d t h a t it had al l eqed t h a t US
f or ces had k i l l e d some 470 c i v i l i a n s on 16 March and on an
e a r l i e r oper at i on.
LTC Bl ackl edqe a l s o r e c a l l e d a f ur t he r i n t e l l i g e n c e r epor t
which he r ecei ved about t h e same t i me i ndi c a t i nq t h a t s o l d i e r s of
t he Vi et Cong w e r e weari ng r ed arm bands on which was a sl oqan
expr essi ng det er mi nat i on t o avenge t h e massacre o r murder a t Son
P4y .
The evi dence i ndi c a t e s t h a t COL Henderson moved qui ckl y t o
a l l a y any s us pi ci ons r a i s e d by t h e VC propaganda and t h e r epor t s
emanating from Son Tinh Di s t r i c t . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he went
"immediately" t o s e e COL Toan and LTC Khien wi t hi n 24 t o 36
hours . However, h i s de s c r i pt i on of t h e di scussi ons which
ensued i s confused, cont r adi ct or y, and be l i e d by ot he r t est i mony
and t h e documentary r ecor d. MAJ Hancock, t h e S3 advi sor t o t h e
2d ARVN Di vi si on, was pr e s e nt when Henderson spoke t o Toan, as
appare' ntly were MAJ PlcKniqht, COL Hut t er , and possi bl y FIAJ
Ear l e. - He seemed t o r e c a l l t h a t t h e meetinq t ook pl ace
a f t e r 12 Apr i l when t h e G2 , 2d ARVN Di vi si on, s e nt h i s memorandum
t o COL Toan. MAJ Hancock s t a t e d f ur t he r t h a t COL Henderson,
when asked by COL Toan about t h e a l l e ga t i ons of t h e k i l l i n g of
c i v i l i a n s a t Son P4y, assur ed COL Toan t h a t t h e mat t er had been
f u l l y i n v e s t i ~ a t e d bv Henderson hi ms el f , t h a t he had landed i n
t he obj e c t i ve a r e a and quest i oned t h e t r oops i n t h e f i e l d about
t h e al l eged k i l l i n s of c i v i l i a n s , and t h a t he had been assur ed i n
t a l ki ng wi t h t h e men t h a t t h e r e was not hi nq t o t h e char ses.
Apparently no r ef er ence was made by Henderson t o t h e e a r l i e r a l l e -
qat i ons i n t h e Thompson Report which had l e d t o Henderson' s i n i -
t i a l i nve s t i ga t i on. Hancock r e c a l l e d t h a t Toan seemed t o
accept t h e expl anat i on and t h a t he, Hancock, reqarded t h e mat t er
as cl osed and concluded t h a t not hi nq wronq had happened.
MAJ McKnight i n h i s de s c r i pt i on of t h e meet i ng s t a t e d t h a t whi l e
COL Toan regarded t h e charqes as ,a VC ~ r o ~ a s a n d a t h e r e was s t u n t ,
an ARVN i nve s t i qa t i on of t h e mat t er which was appar ent l y i n pros-
r e s s a t t h e t i m e of t h e meet i ns.
COL Henderson, i n h i s account of t h e meetinq wi t h COL Toan,
s t a t e d t h a t he had t o l d COL Toan t h a t he was very di s t ur be d by
t h e a l l e ga t i ons and asked whet her he had any knowledqe o r i nf or -
mation t h a t Henderson di d not have. COL Toan appar ent l y t o l d
Henderson t h a t he had r ecei ved t h e Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s l e t t e r and
t he VC propaganda message a day o r two e a r l i e r a nd- t ha t he had
di r e c t e d an i nve s t i ga t i on which was i n pr ogr ess. In h i s t e s t i -
mony Henderson s a i d not hi ng about t e l l i n g Toan of havi nq made
h i s own i nve s t i ga t i on i n March, r a t he r t h a t he simply t o l d Toan
t h a t he was very much i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e mat t er and t h a t h e t oo
"was t r y i n g t o f e r r e t out t h e t r u t h . " Henderson a t t r i b u t e d
t h e ARVN i nve s t i ga t i on t o a d i r e c t i v e from LTG Lam, CG I CTZ,
and claimed t h a t he of f e r e d t o make avai l abl e t o COL Toan anv
number of t r oops t o go i n t o t h e ar ea and he l p him s ecur e it whi l e
t h e mat t er was looked i nt o. COL Henderson f ur t he r t e s t i f i e d t h a t
COL Toan r epl i ed: "No. Thi s i s VC propaganda. There i s no
t r u t h t o t h i s , " and t h a t when Henderson pr essed him t o a' ccept
t h e a s s i s t a nc e , Toan r e pl i e d t h a t he had t o l d LTC Khien, t h e
Provi nce c hi e f , t o handl e t h e i nve s t i s a t i on. . .
From MAJ Hancock' s t est i mony it would appear t h a t t h e meetinq
wi t h Toan t er mi nat ed on a not e suqqest i ng t h a t t h e a l l e qa t i ons
were qr oundl ess and t h e mat t er was cl osed ( or a t l e a s t Hancock
s o regarded it), but appar ent l y COL Henderson, s t i l l very much
concerned, went d i r e c t l y t o s e e LTC Khien.
COL Henderson' s account of h i s v i s i t t o LTC Khien i n h i s t e s -
timony bef or e t h i s I nqui r y fol l ows qener al l v h i s de s c r i pt i on of
h i s meeting wi t h COL Toan but was a t s u b s t a n t i a l var i ance wi t h
h i s t est i mony i n May 1969 bef or e t h e I G. In h i s May t est i monv h e
s t a t e d t h a t t h e pr ovi nce advi sor s arranqed t h e meetinq and t h a t
he bel i eved t h a t t h i s was t h e f i r s t t i me t h a t he had met LTC
Guinn. Si nce Guinn deni ed e ve r havi ns such a meetinq wi t h Hen-
derson and Hender son' . ~ t est i mony on t h e poi nt i s compl et el y
vague, it i s l e f t t o conj ect ur e what Guinn and Henderson a c t ua l l y
s a i d t o each o t h e r r eqar di ng t h e a l l e qa t i ons from t he Di s t r i c t
Chief and t h e VC propaqanda. I t was j u s t about t h i s t i me t h a t t h e
Provi nce Advisory Team was obt ai ni ng t he st at ement pr epar ed by
CPT Rodriguez on 1 4 Apr i l which COL Henderson used i n h i s l a t e r
r epor t t o MG Kost er. LTC Khien was a l s o qi ven a copy of t h e '
Rodriguez s t at ement , presumably by LTC Guinn. It seems reason-
abl e t o assume t h a t LTC Guinn provi ded Henderson a copy of t h e
Rodriguez st at ement a t t h i s t i me o r arranqements were made t o
provi de a copy.
As t o t h e meet i ng wi t h LTC Khien, Henderson t e s t i f i e d bef or e
t h i s I nqui r y t h a t he expr essed t o him "my r e qr e t and 'how d i s -
t ur bed I was over t h i s t hi nq, and t h a t I wanted t o qe t t o t h e
bottom of it, and i f t he r e was any t r u t h t o it I would make
t r oops a va i l a bl e t o qo wi t h h i s RF/PF f or ces , o r any ot her
f or ces , i n t o t h e ar ea i f he was qoi nq t o conduct such an i nves-
t i ga t i on. ' ( At t h i s poi nt it shoul d be not ed t h a t COL
Henderson haa a va i l a bl e t o him s u f f i c i e n t a s s e t s i n terms of
ground f or c e s , a i r l i f t , and f i r e suppor t t o go i n t o t h e ar ea a t
any t i m e , had he r e a l l y de s i r e d t o a s c e r t a i n t he f a c t s . ) COL
Henderson made no mention i n h i s t est i mony of what he miqht have
t o l d LTC Khien r egar di ng h i s own i nve s t i ga t i on i n March which he
had al r eady completed. I ns t ead, he t e s t i f i e d onl y about what
Khien had s a i d t o him r eqar di nq t h e Vi l l aqe Chi e f ' s a l l e ga t i ons .
According t o COL Henderson, LTC Khien descr i bed them as VC propa-
ganda and expl ai ned h i s pl an t o conduct a counterpropaqanda cam-
paign. Henderson a l s o s t a t e d t h a t Khien showed him e i t h e r t h e
Vi l l age Chi e f ' s o r t h e Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s l e t t e r which s t a t e d t h a t
t he US f or ces had gat her ed up qroups of c i v i l i a n s and k i l l e d a
t o t a l of 470 i n two oper at i ons . Henderson a t one t i me
acknowledged t h a t he obt ai ned a cspy of some such l e t t e r from
Khein, but he was not c l e a r as t o which one it was. LTC Khien
pur por t edl y s t a t e d t o Henderson t h a t he di d n o t consi der an
i nve s t i ga t i on t o he appr opr i at e LTC Khien has no r ecol -
l e c t i on of such a di scussi on w i t h COL Henderson
I n c ont r a s t t o h i s t est i mony t o t h i s I nqui r y, COL Henderson
t o l d t h e I G i n Play 1969 t h a t t h e Provi nce Chi ef , LTC Khien, re-
quest ed Henderson t o a s s i s t i n h i s i nve s t i ga t i on: "He asked i f
I would send US f or ces - i n t o t h a t ar ea wi t h h i s ARVN and Local
Forces t o g e t some t r u t h out of t h i s . I assur ed him t h a t I would
and t o l d him t h a t I would conduct t h e oper at i on anytime t h a t he
was ready. Henderson went on t o s t a t e t h a t t hey conducted
such an opera' cion i n J ul y 1968 b u t t h a t it was abor t i ve. Never-
t he l e s s , LTC Khien t o l d him af t er war ds " t h a t from h i s i nves t i ga-
t i o n t h a t he coul d f i nd no t r u t h t o t h e a l l e ga t i ons t h a t US f or -
ces had k i l l e d some 400 c i v i l i a n s i n t h i s ar ea. " -
Although Henderson acknowledged i n h i s t est i mony bef or e t h i s
I nqui r y i n December 1969 t h a t he had obt ai ned from Khien a copy
of a l e t t e r cont ai ni ng t h e Vi l l age Chi e f ' s a l l e qa t i ons on
r e c a l l i n February 1970, a f t e r t h e I nqui r y had succeeded - , I ob-
t a i ni ng copi es of bot h t h e Vi l l age Chi e f ' s 22 March 1968 l e t t e r
( e xhi bi t M-49) and t h e Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s 11 Apr i l 1968 l e t t e r
( e xhi bi t M-34), COL Henderson deni ed t h a t he had ever seen e i t h e r
of them.
COL Henderson t e s t i f i e d t o t h i s I nqui r y t h a t it was immedi-
a t e l y a f t e r h i s v i s i t t o COL Toan and LTC Khien i n mid-April t h a t
he f ur ni shed t o t h e America1 Di vi si on copi es of t h e Vietnamese
documents, wi t h Enql i sh t r a n s l a t i o n s , i n which t h e a l l e ga t i ons
were cont ai ned. Accordinq t o Henderson t h i s " t r i pped" FIG Kos t e r ' s
memory and l e d t o a r eques t , del i ver ed t o him by BG Younq, t h a t
Henderson shoul d reduce h i s e a r l i e r o r a l r e por t t o wr i t i n s s o
t h e r e would be "some back-UD i n t h e f i l e s he r e i f anyt hi ns f ur -
t h e r shoul d devel op on t h e mat t er . " However, accor di ng t o
Henderson, BG Young made it c l e a r t h a t MG Kost er di d not want t o
re-open t h e mat t er o r t o conduct a formal i nve s t i qa t i on.
The t est i mony qi ven by rlG Kost er t ends t o conf i r m COL Hender-
s on' s t est i mony i n t h i s r es pect . He i ndi c a t e d t h a t t h e r e c e i pt
i n mid-April 1968 of VC pr o~a qa nda , "pl us somet hi nq from t h e D i s -
t r i c t Chi ef " reopened t h e s ubj e c t of c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s i n t h e
16 March oper at i on, but t h a t it di d not s t i mul a t e any f r e s h i n-
qui r y s i nc e COL Henderson had al r eady completed h i s i nve s t i qa t i on
and had r epor t ed upon it a t l e a s t o r a l l y . Rat her , t h e r e c e i pt of
t h e VC propaganda l e d MG Kost er t o d i r e c t COL Henderson t o commit
h i s o r i g i n a l r e por t t o wr i t i nq. He s t a t e d he di d not rememb-
er t h a t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s t o Henderson were i n wr i t i nq, b u t i f
t he y were he would s ay t h a t e i t h e r BG Younq o r COL Parson would
have pr epar ed t h e l e t t e r . Nei t her of them r e c a l l s havi nq
gi ven nor havi ng pr epar ed any such i n s t r u c t i o n s t o COL Henderson
nor havi ng s een any wr i t t e n i ns t r uc t i ons i n t h i s r eqar d.
However, SGM Ger ber di nq, from t h e S2 o f f i c e of t he 11t h Br i qade,
seemed t o r e c a l l a t one t i me havi nq seen such a d i r e c t i v e from ptlG
Kost er i n t h e f i l e a t Duc Pho. Althouqh it i s pos s i bl e t h a t
such a l e t t e r was s e n t bv r4G Kost er t o COL Henderson, and might
be a nt i c i pa t e d had t h e mat t er i n ot he r r es pect s been handl ed wi t h
qr e a t e r f or mal i t y, s i n c e SGlll Gerberdi nq i s t h e onl y person who
s t a t e d t h a t he had s een such a document, t h i s I nqui r y cannot
pl a c e much cr edence upon i t s exi s t ance.
I n any e ve nt , it was a t t h i s t i me i n t h e second h a l f of Apr i l
t h a t COL Henderson pr epar ed and submi t t ed t o PIG Kost er h i s so-
c a l l e d Report of I nve s t i qa t i on dat ed 24 Apr i l 1968. COL Henderson
confirmed t h a t i n accordance wi t h t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s he had r ecei ved
he conduct ed no a ddi t i ona l i nt e r r oqa t i on and merely ~ u t down i n
l e t t e r form t h e i nf or mat i on from h i s notebook which he had r e -
corded a t t h e t i me of h i s e a r l i e r i nve s t i qa t i on. "And wi t h t h i s
I pr epar ed what I t ermed a r e por t of i nve s t i qa t i on which I ackno~q-
l edge l oud and c l e a r i s not a r e por t of i nve s t i qa t i on. "
Thi s s o- cal l ed Report of I nve s t i qa t i on was wr i t t e n i n lonqhand
by COL Henderson and when t yped cons i s t ed of a two-paqe l e t t e r
wi t h two i nc l os ur e s . - Secause of t h e i mport ance of t h i s
s o- cal l ed Report of I nves t i q a t i o n t o an eval uat i on of what t ook
pl ace, t h e l e t t e r i s s e t f or t h i n f u l l . The l e t t e r r ead as
f ol l ows :
DEPARTPENT OF THE ARMY
Headquar t er s, l l t h I n f a n t r y Br i gade, Americal Di vi s i on
APO San Fr anci sco 96217
XI CO 24 Apr i l 1968
SUBJECT: Report of I nve s t i qa t i on
Commanding General
Americal Di vi si on
APO SF 96374
1. ( U) An i nve s t i ga t i on has been conduct ed of t h e
a l l e g a t i o n s c i t e d i n I ncl os ur e 1. The f ol l owi ng a r e
t h e r e s u l t s of t h i s i nve s t i ga t i on.
2. ( C) On t h e day i n ques t i on, 16 March 1968, Co C
1stBn 20t h I nf and Co B 4t h Bn 3d I nf as p a r t of Task
Force Bar ker , l l t h I nf Bde, conducted a combat a i r
a s s a u l t i n t h e v i c i n i t y of Ply Lai Hamlet (Son My Vi l l aqe)
i n e a s t e r n Son Tinh Di s t r i c t . Thi s ar ea has l ong been
an enemy s t r onq hol d, and Task Force Barker had met heavy
enemy oppos i t i on i n t h i s ar ea on 12 and 23 February 1968.
A l l per sons l i v i n g i n t h i s ar ea a r e consi der ed t o be VC
o r VC sympat hi zer s by t h e Di s t r i c t Chi ef . Ar t i l l e r y and
qunshi p pr epar at or y f i r e s were pl aced on t h e l andi ng
zones used by t h e two companies. Upon l andi ng and
dur i ng t h e i r advance on t h e enemy p o s i t i o n s , t h e at t ack-
i n g f or ces were suppor t ed by qunshi ps from t h e 174t h
Avn Co and Co B, 23d Avn Bn. By 1500 hour s a l l enemy
r e s i s t a nc e had ceased and t h e remai ni nq enemy f or ces
had withdrawn. The r e s u l t s of t h i s oper at i on were
128 VC s o l d i e r s KI A. During pr epar at or y f i r e s and t h e
ground a c t i on by t h e a t t a c ki ng companies 20 noncom-
b a t a n t s caught i n t h e b a t t l e ar ea were k i l l e d . US
For ces s u f f e r e d 2 KI A and 10 WI A by booby t r a p s and
1man s l i g h t l y wounded i n t h e f oot by smal l arms f i r e . -
No US s o l d i e r was k i l l e d by s n i p e r f i r e as was t h e
al l eged r eason f o r k i l l i n g t h e c i v i l i a n s . I nt er vi ews
wi t h LTC Frank A. Bar ker , TF Commander; C'IAJ Char l es
C. Calhoun, TF S3; CPT Er nes t L. Medina, CO Co C , 1- 20;
and CPT Ea r l Mi chl es, CO Co B, 4-3 r eveal ed t h a t a t
no t i m e w e r e any c i v i l i a n s gat her ed t oget her and k i l l e d
by US s o l d i e r s . The c i v i l i a n ha bi t a nt s i n t h e a r e a
began wi t hdr awi ng t o t h e sout hwest as soon as t h e
oper at i on began and wi t hi n t h e f i r s t hour and a h a l f
a l l v i s i b l e c i v i l i a n s had cl ear ed t h e ar ea of opera-
t i o n s . *
3 . (C) The Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Chief does not qi ve t h e
al l egat i ons any importance and he poi nt ed out t h a t t h e
two haml et s where t h e i nci dent i s al l eged t o have
happened a r e i n an ar ea cont r ol l ed by t h e VC s i nc e
1964. COL Toan, Cmdr 2d Arvn Div r epor t ed t h a t t h e
making of such a l l e ga t i ons agai ns t US Forces i s a
common t echni que of t h e VC propaqanda machine.
I ncl os ur e 2 i s a t r a n s l a t i o n of an act ual VC propa-
ganda message t a r ge t e d a t t h e AWN s o l d i e r and ur gi ng
him t o shoot Americans. This message was given t o
t h i s headquar t er s by t h e CO, 2d ARVN Di vi si on o/a
17 Apr i l 1968 a s a mat t er of i nf or mat i on. I t makes
t h e same al l egat i ons as made by t h e Son My Vi l l age
Chief i n addi t i on t o ot he r claims of a t r o c i t i e s by
American s ol di e r s .
4. ( C) I t i s concluded t h a t 2 0 non-combatants were
i nadver t ent l y k i l l e d when caught i n t h e ar ea of prep-
ar at or y f i r e s and i n t h e cr os s f i r e s of t h e US and
VC f or ces on 16 March 1968. It i s f ur t he r concluded
t h a t no c i v i l i a n s were gat her ed t oget her and s hot by
US s o l d i e r s . The a l l e ga t i on t h a t US f or ces s hot and
k i l l e d 450-500 c i v i l i a n s i s obvi ousl y a Vi et Cong
propaganda move t o d i s c r e d i t t h e United St a t e s i n
t h e eyes of t h e Vietnamese peopl e i n gener al and t h e
ARVN s o l d i e r i n p a r t i c u l a r .
5. ( C) I t i s recommended t h a t a counter-propaganda
campaign be waged agai ns t t h e VC i n e a s t e r n Son Tinh
Di s t r i c t .
2 I ncl ORAN K. HENDERSON
a/ s
COL, I nf ant r y
Commanding
Although SGM Gerberding s t a t e d t h a t f our copi es of t h i s re-
p o r t were t yped (COL Henderson put t h e number a t t h r e e ) , t h e on-
l y copy of t h i s r epor t which was found was a carbon copy r et ai ned
i n a s epar at e per s onal f ol der i n t h e S2 o f f i c e of t h e 11t h B r i -
gade by SGM Gerberding who was gi ven it by LTC Bl ackl edge, t h e
Brigade S2, i n Apr i l 1968. SGM Gerberding t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had
been i ns t r uc t e d by LTC Bl ackl edqe " t o keep it conf i dent i al , " t o
i ns ur e t h a t it r ecei ved no publ i c i t y and not t oo many peopl e
shoul d hear o r know about it. , Found wi t h t h e carbon copy
* I t w i l l be not ed t h a t t h e r e i s no r ef er ence i n t h i s para-
graph t o any member of t h e 123d Avi at i on Bn or t o W01 Thompson's
complaint.
of t h e l e t t e r w e r e carbon copi es of t h e two documents which ap-
pa r e nt l y w e r e t h e i nc l os ur e s t o t h e l et t er . The f i r st i nc l os ur e
was a t yped copy of t h e 9odr i quez 14 Apr i l 1969 s t a t e me nt , b u t
wi t h t h e s i q n a t u r e bl ock e n t i r e l v omi t t ed. It r ead as f ol l ows:
St at ement 1 4 Apr i l 1968
Thi s s t at ement i s i n r e f e r e nc e t o l et t er from t h e
Son Ti nh D i s t r i c t Chi ef t o t h e Quanq Nqai Pr ovi nce Chi ef
Subj ect : Al l i e d For ces Gat hered Peopl e of Son My Vi l l a s e
f o r Ki l l i n g , d a t e d 11 Apr i l 1968.
The Son Ti nh D i s t r i c t Chi ef r ecei ved a l e t t e r from
t h e Vi l l a ge Chi ef o f Son Ely Vi l l a ge c ont a i ni nq t h e com-
p l a i n t of t h e k i l l i n q of 450 c i v i l i a n s i nc l udi nq c hi l d-
r en and women by American t r oops . The Vi l l a ge Chi ef
a l l e ge d t h a t an American u n i t ope r a t i ng i n t h e a r e a on
16 March 1968 gat her ed and k i l l e d t h e s e c i v i l i a n s wi t h
t h e i r own pe r s ona l weapons. The i n c i d e n t t ook pl a c e i n
t h e haml et s of Tu-Conq and Co-Luy l oc a t e d i n t h e e a s t e r n
por t i on of Son Ti nh D i s t r i c t . Accordi nq t o t h e Vi l l a g e
Chi ef t h e American u n i t qat her ed 400 c i v i l i a n s i n Tu-Cong
haml et and k i l l e d them. Then moved t o Co-Luy haml et .
A t t h i s l o c a t i o n t h e u n i t gat her ed 90 more c i v i l i a n s
and k i l l e d them.
The Son-.My Vi l l a qe Chi ef f e e l s t h a t t h i s a c t i o n
was t a ke n i n revenge f o r an American s o l d i e r k i l l e d by
s n i p e r f i r e i n t h e v i l l a g e .
The l et t er was not qi ven much i mpor t ance by t h e
Di s t r i ct Chi ef b u t itwas s e n t t o t h e Quang Ngai Pro-
vi nce Chi ef . La t e r t h e Son Tinh-Di s t r i c t Chi ef was
c a l l e d and d i r e c t e d by t h e 2d Di vi s i on Commander, Col
Toan, t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e i n c i d e n t and pr e pa r e a re-
p o r t . The D i s t r i c t Chi ef pr oceeded t o i nt e r vi e w t h e
Son-My Vi l l a ge Chi ef and got t h e same i nf or mat i on t h a t
I have di s c us s e d above. The Di s t r i c t Chi ef i s not cer -
t a i n of t h e i nf or mat i on r ecei ved and he has t o depend
on t h e word o f t h e Vi l l a ge Chi ef and o t h e r peopl e
l i v i n g i n t h e a r e a .
The two haml et s where t h e i n c i d e n t i s a l l e ge d
t o happen a r e i n a VC c o n t r o l l e d a r e a s i n c e 1964.
There was not hi nq on t h i s document i t s e l f which di s c l os e d i t s
aut hor s hi p; and none of t h e wi t ne s s e s i n t e r r o g a t e d by t h e
I nqui r y, be. fore a copy of t h e Rodri guez St at ement was obt ai ned
from Vi et namese s our c e s , di s c l os e d from where itcame. Those
ques t i oned i nc l ude d Henderson, McKnight, Bl ackl edge, Guinn, and
Gavin. Most of them deni ed any knowledqe as t o t h e o r i q i n of t h e
s t at ement . A t one p o i n t i n h i s t es t i mony, COL Henderson seems t o
s uqqes t t h a t h e obt a i ne d t h e i nf or mat i on f o r t h e s t a t e me nt ( or
perhaps a copy of CPT Rodriquez' St at ement ) from VAJ Gavin a t
Son Tinh Di s t r i c t . I t a l s o appears pos s i bl e t h a t he, COL
Henderson, coul d have obt ai ned it from LTC Guinn. I r r e s pe c t i ve
of how COL Henderson may have obt ai ned t h e st at ement , t h e i m-
pr es s i on conveyed i n h i s so- cal l ed Report of I nve s t i ga t i on was
t h a t t h e st at ement was of Vietnamese or i qi n and was a c t ua l l y a
t r a n s l a t i o n of a st at ement prepared by a Vietnamese o f f i c i a l .
A s pr evi ousl y not ed, it was onl y when t h e I nqui r y obt ai ned
from LTC Khien i n Quanq Nqai a si qned copy of t h e Rodriquez 1 4
Apr i l st at ement t h a t it was pos s i bl e t o e s t a b l i s h t h e o r i q i n
of t h i s document which COL Henderson used i n h i s s o- cal l ed
Report of I nve s t i ga t i on a s t h e b a s i s f o r summarily di smi ssi nq
t h e a l l e ga t i ons i n t h e Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s l e t t e r of
11Apr i l 1968 r eqar di nq t h e qat her i nq and k i l l i n q by US f or c e s
of peopl e i n Son Vy Vi l l age. I t appears t h a t COL Henderson
and t hose who p a r t i c i p a t e d wi t h him i n making t h i s r e por t of h i s
i nve s t i ga t i ve e f f o r t s t r i e d t o make it appear t h a t t h e eval ua-
t i o n of t h e Vi l l aqe Chi e f ' s a l l e ga t i ons came from Vietnamese
and not American sour ces. Taken wi t h t h e t o t a l absence i n any
US u n i t ' s f i l e s of a copy of e i t h e r t h e Sodriquez st at ement
o r t h e 11 Apr i l l et t er , it s t r onql v suqqest s a consci ous e f f o r t
t o decei ve.
The second i nc l os ur e found wi t h t he copy of COL Henderson' s
24 Apr i l l et t er was an Enql i sh t r a n s l a t i o n of t he s c r i p t f o r a
VC propaganda br oadcast which COL Henderson i d e n t i f i e d as havi nq
been f ur ni shed t o him on o r about 17 Apr i l 1968 by COL Toan.
Thi s i s t h e same s c r i p t f o r a VC br oadcast which was at t ached t o
t h e memorandum dat ed 1 2 Apr i l 1968 from t h e G2 of t h e 2d ARTTN
Di vi si on t o COL Toan a s descr i bed above. (See e xhi bi t 14-36. )
The f u l l t e x t of t h i s pi e c e of VC propaqanda i s s e t f or t h as
I ncl osur e 2 t o t h i s chapt er .
I t w i l l be not ed t h a t COL Henderson i n h i s 24 Apr i l r e por t ,
on t h e b a s i s of h i s e a r l i e r " i nves t i qat i on" of t h e i nc i de nt
summarily di smi ssed a l l of t h e new a l l e ga t i ons as "obvi ousl y
a V i e t Cong propaganda move t o d i s c r e d i t t he Uni t ed S t a t e s i n
t h e eyes of t h e Vietnamese peopl e i n gener al and t he ARV'N s ol -
d i e r i n p a r t i c u l a r . " H e , accor di nql y, recommended t h a t a
counterpropaganda campaiqn be waged agai ns t t h e VC i n eas t er n
Son Tinh Di s t r i c t .
The evi dence e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t de s pi t e some t est i mony from
MG Kost er and COL Henderson t o t h e cont r ar y, t o which r ef er ence
i s made i n t h e f ol l owi ng s e c t i on, ne i t he r COL Henderson nor any-
one i n t h e 11t h Bri qade t ook any f ur t he r a c t i on wi t h r es pect
t o t h e i nve s t i qa t i nq o r r e por t i nq of t h e Son Ply oper at i on of 16
March 1968, a f t e r t h e del i ver y of t h i s s o- cal l ed Report of
I nves t i gat i on t o t h e America1 Di vi si on.
d. I nf or mat i on Received bv t h e Americal Di vi s i on and t h e
Termi nat i on of a l l I nves t i qat i on
No ques t i on was more d i f f i c u l t f o r t h i s I nqui r y t o
answer t han p r e c i s e l y when and what i nf or mat i on reached Americal
Di vi si on headquar t er s from Vietnamese channel s r eqar di nq t h e
k i l l i n g of c i v i l i a n s i n t h e Son Fly oper at i on. The t est i mony
i s conf usi ng as t o t h e t i me a t which p a r t i c u l a r i nf or mat i on
reached var i ous i ndi vi dua l s and t h e e x t e n t of t h a t i nf or mat i on.
There i s some evi dence t h a t t h e s er i ous nes s of t h e a l l e q a t i o n s
may have been muted by t h e t i me t hey cane t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of
t h e d i v i s i o n command el ement . Never t hel ess, t h e evi dence i s
convi nci ng t h a t d i v i s i o n headquar t er s was p u t f i r ml y on not i c e
by s e ve r a l i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t somethinq most unusual had t aken
pl ace i n Son My Vi l l a qe on 16 March and t h e r e f o r e i s r es pons i bl e
f or t h e f u r t h e r s uppr es s i on of c r u c i a l i nf or mat i on r eqar di nq t h e
i nc i de nt .
Knowledge of t h e a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e Son My Vi l l aqe Chi ef as
s e t f o r t h i n t h e Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s 11 Apr i l r e por t and of t h e VC
propaganda r e l a t i n q t o t h e event s i n Son My came t o d i v i s i o n
headquar t er s i n a t l e a s t t h r e e ways, al t houqh t h e r e remains a
ques t i on a s t o when itr eached , 5i vi si on i n each way. F i r s t ,
from LTC Guinn: as pr evi ous l y not ed, BG Younq s t a t e d t h a t he
r ecei ved a r e p o r t r eqar di nq t h e Di s t r i c t Ch i e f ' s l e t t e r whirh he
passed t o PIG Kos t er ; moreover, MG Kost er hi msel f m e t wi t h LTC
Guinn dur i ng t h i s t i me frame.- Second, from t h e 2d A R W '
Di vi si on Commander and t h e Sect or Commander: YC, Kost er b r i e f l v
di s cus s ed t h e a l l e q a t i o n s wi t h bot h COL Toan and LTC Khien.[3;1
Fi na l l y, from COL Henderson and t h e l l t h Bri qade: t h e 24 Apr i l
Report of I nve s t i qa t i on i s s p e c i f i c evi dence of what was pr ovi ded
from t h i s s our ce. F4G Kost er was asked who had pr ovi ded him t h e
i nf or mat i on r egar di nq t h e VC propaqanda, and t ha t . from t h e
Di s t r i c t Chi ef , be f or e he or der ed COL Henderson' s 24 Apr i l r e-
por t . H e r e pl i e d: "I ' m ki nd of fogqy. I t coul d have come di -
r e c t l y from t h e pr ovi nce, 2d ARVN Di vi s i on, l l t h Br i qade, I ' d
say t hos e w e r e t h e most l i k e l y s our ces . " I n h i s t est i mony
t o t h e ' I G i n May 1969 LTC Guinn, omi t t i ng r ef er ence t o h i s own
cont act s wi t h MG Kost er , s t a t e d t h a t he t hought COL Toan had
passed t h e i nf or mat i on t o MG Kost er .
BG Young r e c a l l e d havi ng been t o l d by Guinn of t h e v i l l a q e
c h i e f ' s a l l e g a t i o n s dur i ng one of Younq' s v i s i t s t o t h e Quanq
Nqai Pr ovi nce headquar t er s . According t o BG Younq, Guinn t o l d
him t h a t t h e Pr ovi nce Chi ef had r ecei ved a l e t t e r from t h e
Vi l l age Chi ef i n d i c a t i n q t h a t a number o f c i v i l i a n s had been
k i l l e d nor t h and e a s t of Quanq Nqai Ci t y. He bel i eved t h a t
Guinn mentioned t h e Di s t r i c t Ch i e f ' s 11 Apr i l r e por t al t houqh
he s t a t e d t h a t h e was not shown a copy of t h e l e t t e r .
Guinn appar ent l y i n d i c a t e d t o Young t h a t LTC Khien was qolnq t o
i n v e s t i g a t e t h e mat t er . - Althouqh BG Younq pl aced LTC
Gui nn' s r e p o r t i n l a t e May i 968, from a l l t h e sur r oundi nq c i r -
curnst a nc e s it appear s most unl i kel y t h a t itwas l a t e r t han
mid-April. I n view of BG Younq' s f r equent v i s i t s t o Pr ovi nce
headquar t er s and cont act wi t h t h e Pr ovi nce Advi sory team, it i s
q u i t e pos s i bl e t h a t Gui nn' s r e por t t o Younq was amonq t h e bar -
l i e s t of t h e r e p o r t s t o d i v i s i o n on t he s e a l l e q a t i o n s . Gui nn' s
gener al de ni a l of di s cus s i n q t h e Di s t r i c t Ch i e f ' s r e por t and
h i s subsequent r e f u s a l t o t e s t i f y f u r t h e r pr event ed t h e I nqui r y
from det er mi ni ng more pr e c i s e l y t h e cont ent and f i x i n q t h e t i m e
and ci r cumst ances of t h i s r e por t t o BG Younq. Despi t e- t h e
tandem i n which t h e Di s t r i c t Ch i e f ' s r e por t and t h e VC propa-
ganda r epeat edl y appear , BG Younq i n s i s t e d t h a t h e was n o t
aware of t h e VC propaganda; y e t var i ous i ndi vi dua l s s p e c i f i c a l l y
r e c a l l e d s e e i ng some of t h e VC propaqanda r e l a t i n g t o Son My
i n Di vi s i on headquar t er s .
With r es pect t o i nf or mat i on obt ai ned from LTC Guinn by
d i v i s i o n headquar t er s , it shoul d a l s o be not ed t h a t F4G Kost er i n
h i s t est i mony i n February 1970 r e c a l l e d di s cus s i nq wi t h Guinn
t h e a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e l o c a l o f f i c i a l s . To f i x t h e t i me, h e
s t a t e d t h a t t h e onl y t i me he r e c a l l e d bei nq i n a conver s at i on
wi t h Guinn was when Guinn accompanied him on a v i s i t t o LTC Khien
a t which t h e a l l e q a t i o n s were di s cus s ed. He had t h e i m-
pr es s i on t h a t Guinn and Khien had done some checki nq on t h e
mat t er p r i o r t o t h e t i me he t a l k e d t o t hem. , Subsequent l y ,
bef or e t h i s I nqui r y when shown t h e 11 Apr i l l e t t e r from t h e D i s -
t r i c t Chi ef t o t h e Pr ovi nce Chi ef , %G Kost er s u i d t h a t he di d
not r e c a l l s e e i ng t h e l e t t e r and di d not s p e c i f i c a l l y remember
any r ef er ences t o it by LTC Guinn, LTC Khien, o r COL Toan. But
when pr es s ed on i n t e r r o g a t i o n , h i s r epl y was equi vocal , "I c a n ' t
say t h a t I ' v e s een it. I don' t know."
Regarding i nf or mat i on f ur ni s hed t o 14G Kost er by t h e CO of t h e
2d ARVN Di vi si on and LTC Khien, t h e evi dence i n d i c a t e s t h a t some
i nf or mat i on r egar di nq bot h t h e VC propaqanda and t h e a l l e q a t i o n s
i n t h e D i s t r i c t Chi e f ' s 11 Apr i l r e por t was gi ven t o MG Kost er by
COL Toan. MG Kost er acknowledqed t h a t h e had a meet i ng wi t h COL
Toan i n mid-April 1968 a t t h e l a t t e r ' s headquar t er s i n Quanq
Nqai. COL Toan remembered such a meet i ns wi t h a qener al from
t h e America1 Di vi s i on sometime i n t h e f i r s t h a l f of Apr i l , and
P4AJ Pho, t h e ARVN G2 and t h e aut hor of t h e 12 Apr i l memorandum
t o COL Toan, f i xe d t h e d a t e as s e v e r a l days f ol l owi ng h i s memo-
randum and i ndi c a t e d t h a t MG Kost er was accompanied by COL Hut t er ,
t h e Seni or Advi sor of t h e 2d ARVCJ Di vi si on. Pho r e c a l l e d b e i n s
asked t o b r i n g h i s memorandum wi t h i t s at t achment s i n t o t h e
meet i ng and MG Kost er confi rmed t h a t t h e ove r a l l s u b j e c t of
di s cus s i on r e l a t e d , al t houqh h e coul d not be s p e c i f i c , t o t h e
Di s t r i c t Ch i e f ' s l e t t e r and t h e VC propaganda. MG Kost er
r e c a l l e d t h a t COL Toan e i t h e r had i nve s t i qa t e d o r was i n v e s t i -
gat i nq t h e a l l e g a t i o n s and Kost er asked him t o l e t them know i f
anyt hi ng t h e r e a f t e r t ur ned up.
MG Kost er f ur t he r s t a t e d t h a t he t o l d COL Toan t h a t h e had
made a check of t h e Son My oper at i on due t o t h e he l i c opt e r
p i l o t ' s r epor t and had not been abl e t o det ermi ne t h a t t he r e
was any such t hi nq t aki nq pl ace as had been al l eqed. Toan
r e c a l l e d speaki nq about t h e "rumor" wi t h Kost er s o he coul d
check out i f anyt hi nq had happened, but i ndi c a t e d t h a t he di d
not gi ve Koqter a copy of e i t h e r t he VC propaqanda o r t h e D i s -
t r i c t Chief ' s l e t t e r . This accorded wi t h Kos t er ' s r ecol -
l e c t i on t h a t 3e l ear ned of t h e a l l e qa t i ons e i t h e r from "seei ng
t he propaganda l e a f l e t o r possi bl y t h e l e t t e r " bef or e he v i s i t e d
Toan. i MG Kost er was unabl e t o s t a t e who had e a r l i e r shown
him t h i s ma t e r i a l . A t anot her poi nt i n h i s t est i mony, he s a i d
t h a t he met wi t h Toan immediately f ol l owi nq h i s v i s i t wi t h Guinn
t o Khien. But he seemed t o r e c a l l t h a t h i s v i s i t s t o bot h Khien
and Toan were s t i mul at ed by what he al r eady had heard and
seen. [
While a t t i mes suqqest i ng t h a t h i s meetings wi t h Toan and
wi t h Khien were i n May r a t h e r t han i n Apr i l , a t ot he r t i mes MG
Kost er i ndi c a t e d t h a t t hey coul d have preceded COL Henderson' s
24 Apr i l wr i t t e n r e por t . Thi s i s c ons i s t e nt wi t h h i s
st at ement t o t h e C I D e a r l y i n December 1969: "I had been i n-
formed of t h e a l l e qa t i ons made bv v i l l a q e r s . As I r e c a l l , a l -
though t hes e' appear ed t o be VC propaqanda, t hey prompted my
di r e c t i on f o r a wr i t t e n r e por t . " La t e r , t o t h i s I nqui r y,
he s t a t e d t h a t he di r e c t e d COL Henderson t o put h i s o r a l r epor t
i n wr i t i ng t o r ebut VC a l l e ga t i ons of an a t r o c i t y . [
Fur t her i ndi c a t i ons t h a t some of t he s e documents reached
Di vi si on headquar t er s i s found i n COL Par son' s t est i mony. He
s t a t e d t h a t f ol l owi nq t h e Thompson r epor t : "I r e c a l l I dropped
t he i nc i de nt i n my mind because I don' t r e c a l l hear i nq any more
about it. Sometime l a t e r t he r e was a document which I be l i e ve
was on t h e same s ubj e c t wr i t t e n by e i t h e r t h e Provi nce Chief
or t h e 2d ARVN Di vi si on Commander. I r e c a l l t h e s ubj e c t had t o
do wi t h t h e k i l l i n q o r t h e unnecessary k i l l i n q of c i v i l i a n s ,
possi bl y [by] a r t i l l e r y . . . . " COL Parson s t a t e d t h a t he
bel i eved he saw t h e document i n MG Kos t er ' s of f i c e . . - Al so
i n h i s st at ment t o t h e C I D on 1 4 January 1970 COL Parson s t a t e d
"I saw a l e t t e r t h a t had been wr i t t e n by a Vietnamese o f f i c i a l
+out t h i s i nc i de nt . Here agai n, I am not s ur e what it s a i d ,
and I am s ur e t h a t I gave it t o t h e Di vi si on Commanding General . "
When r e c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y , COL Parson was shown t h e Di s t r i c t
Chi ef ' s 11 Apr i l l e t t e r and asked i f t h a t wa s t h e document he
had seen. Having bef or e him bot h t h e Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s l et t er of
28 March and of 11 Apr i l , he s t a t e d , "I' m unabl e t o say which
of t he s e two--I d o n ' t r e c a l l two, I r e c a l l one. " From a l l t h e
ci rcumst ances, it seems c l e a r t h a t i f COL Parson saw e i t h e r one
of t h e Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s l e t t e r s t o t h e Provi nce Chief it
neces s ar i l y would have been t h e 11 A p r i l r e por t of which bot h
LTC Guinn and ElAJ Gavin were i ndi cat ed as r ecei vi nq copi es;
whereas, t h e 28 Varch l e t t e r di d not i ndi c a t e any US r e c i -
pi e nt s .
SGM Gerberdinq l e n t some suppor t f or t h e f a c t t h a t a copy
of t h e Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s 11 Apr i l l e t t e r reached Di vi si on
headquar t er s and MG Kost er. As pr evi ousl y not ed, he r e c a l l e d
t h a t he had seen a per sonal l e t t e r from EG Kost er t o COL
Henderson s t a t i n g t h a t t h e Di s t r i c t Chief of Son Tinh had made
a compl ai nt t o t h e Provi nce Chief i n Quanq Ngai t h a t dur i nq
t h e oper at i on i n March by TF Barker some 450 c i v i l i a n s were
k i l l e d by TF Barker. H e s t a t e d t h a t a l e t t e r i n Vietnamese was
at t ached, t oge t he r wi t h an Engl i sh t r a ns l a t i on. I n t h e l e t t e r ,
as Gerberdi ng r e c a l l e d it, FIG Kost er asked COL Henderson. t o
answer t h e a l l e qa t i ons made by t h e Di s t r i c t Chi ef. As
pr evi ousl y s t a t e d , t h e I nqui r y was unabl e e i t h e r t o accept o r
t o r e j e c t SGM Ger ber di nq' s r e c ol l e c t i on on t h i s poi nt . He was
t h e cust odi an of t h e f i l e copy of Henderson' s 24 Apr i l Report
of I nve s t i ga t i on and undoubtedly was i n a unique pos i t i on t o
s e e what papers were a t t h e br i qade headquar t er s a t t h a t t i me.
However, no ot he r wi t nes s r e c a l l s any wr i t t e n di r e c t i ve wi t h
r espect t o t h e i nve s t i qa t i on and no copy of any such cornmuni-
cat i on has been found.
As al r eady not ed, t h e t h i r d channel throuqh which t h e i n-
format i on from t h e Vietnamese sour ces reached America1 Di vi si on
headquar t er s was by way of COL Henderson and t he 11t h Bri qade.
COL Henderson c l e a r l y f ur ni shed some i nf or mat i on, b o t h as t o
t h e Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s 11 Apr i l r e por t and t h e VC propaganda, wi t h
h i s 24 Apr i l so- cal l ed Report of I nves t i qat i on; but t he evi dence
al r eady out l i ne d, i ncl udi nq t h e wordinq of t h e 24 Apr i l l e t t e r
i t s e l f , s t r ongl y suggest s t h a t MG Koster was aware of t he s e mat-
t e r s and, i n f a c t , had r equest ed t h a t Henderson reduce t o wr i t i ng
h i s e a r l i e r o r a l r e por t because of t h e i nf or mat i on t h a t al r eady
had been r ecei ved a t di vi s i on. However, by t h e 24 Apr i l l e t t e r
it i s concl usi vel y e s t a bl i s he d t h a t t he command el ement a t
di vi s i on headquar t er s no l a t e r t han t h e t i me of r eadi ng t h a t
r e por t , wi t h i t s i nc l os ur e s , was expr essl y informed of t h e i n-
format i on cominq from Vietnamese channel s and on not i c e of what
was bei ng s a i d: namely, t h a t i n each of t h e two haml et s where
C/ 1-20 and B/4-3 oper at ed on 16 March l a r s e numbers of c i v i l i a n s
had been k i l l e d .
SGM Gerberdi nq who pr epar ed t h e l e t t e r from COL Henderson' s
handwri t t en d r a f t r e c a l l e d t h a t t he 24 Apr i l Report of I nve s t i -
gat i on was del i ver ed t o di vi s i on by t he d a i l y c our i e r i n a
double s e a l e d envel ope marked "Eyes of t h e CG onl y. On
t h e ot her hand, COL Henderson t e s t i f i e d a t one t i me t h a t he per -
s onal l y c a r r i e d t h e " r e por t " t o Chu Lai and handed it t o COL
Parson, which Parson s a i d was a p o s s i b i l i t y ; but Henderson
l a t e r s t a t e d t h a t he bel i eved he gave one r epor t t o t h e l i a i s o n
I
o f f i c e r f o r de l i ve r y t o di vi s i on. MG Kost er r e c a l l e d t h a t
he di d not s e e t h e r e por t u n t i l he r et ur ned from R & R on about
8 May. Althouqh BG Younq was t he a c t i nq Di vi si on Comman-
der dur i ng MG Kos t er ' s absence and t h e one t o whom mat t er s would
normally be r e f e r r e d i n t h e C G ' s absence, he t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e
di d not see t h e 24 Apr i l r epor t u n t i l he was shown a copy by
t h i s I nqui r y on 13 December 1969. However, he di d say
t h a t he was c e r t a i n t h a t Henderson had submi t t ed a wr i t t e n r e -
por t ( but not as l a t e as 24 Apr i l ) and t h a t he di d not be l i e ve
t h a t Henderson submi t t ed two wr i t t e n r e por t s .
LTC Holladay t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was unof f i c i a l l y shown t h e
24 Apr i l Report by COL Parson and upon r eadi nq t h e paper made
c l e a r i n an e p i t h e t h i s per sonal view t h a t t he r e had been a
cover-up. COL Parson s t a t e d t h a t he di d not r e c a l l t h i s
i nc i de nt , but added "I' m s u r e it happened, i f h e s a i d s o. "
As t o t h e 24 Apr i l r e por t i t s e l f , he s a i d t h a t he coul d not
s p e c i f i c a l l y r e c a l l havi ng seen it but t h a t he "might very wel l
have seen it. " Lat er , however, i n response t o a ques t i on
he expr essl y based h i s answer upon t h e 24 Apr i l r e p o r t , t h a t
he r e c a l l e d " pr i nc i pa l l y t h i s paper [ t he 24 Apr i l r e por t ] he r e
as r e f ut i ng t h i s as a war cri me. "
The view was uni ver s al l y expressed by t h e wi t nesses t h a t t he
24 Apr i l l e t t e r was a t o t a l l y i nadequat e r e por t f o r any i n v e s t i -
qat i on . I t was e n t i r e l y unresponsi ve t o t h e a l l e qa t i ons of
VO1 Thompson (which F4G Kost er s t a t e d he had i nt ended it t o
cover ) . The omi ssi on of any r ef er ence t o e i t h e r t h e Thompson
Seport o r any per sonnel of t h e a vi a t i on u n i t i ndi c a t e s a desi qn
t o de l e t e from t h e r ecor d any r ef er ence t o t h e f a c t t h a t such
a compl ai nt had been made.
MG Kost er and COL Henderson were s o c l e a r as t o t h i s i n-
adequacy of t h e 24 Apr i l r epor t when t hev reviewed it i n 1969
t h a t i n conver sat i ons bef or e t hey qave t est i mony t hey apparent l y
concluded t h a t t h e r e must have been a f ur t he r i nve s t i qa t i on and
l a t e r r e por t . MG Kost er s t a t e d t h a t because t he 24 Apr i l r epor t
was uns a t i s f a c t or y, he di r e c t e d BG Younq o r COL Parson, or
possi bl y bot h, t o have a formal i nve s t i qa t i on conducted as BG
Young had recommended. BG Young, however, deni ed t h i s . He
s t a t e d: " ... . I cannot r e c a l l him di r e c t i ng me t o pass t he s e
i ns t r uc t i ons t o COL Henderson. . . I ' m not wa r e t h a t a formal
i nve s t i ga t i on was conducted. I cannot r e c a l l a formal i n v e s t i -
gat i on bei ng conducted. " COL Parson a l s o s t a t e d t h a t he had
no r e c ol l e c t i on of ever bei nq informed t h a t PIG Kost er de s i r e d
t h a t a formal i nve s t i ga t i on be conducted.
According t o COL Henderson, BG Young t o l d him i n e a r l y May
t h a t MG Kost er had di r e c t e d t h a t a formal i nve s t i ga t i on be con-
duct ed. Henderson went on t o say t h a t he a l s o di scussed '
I
wi t h BG Young t h e f a c t t h a t he i nt ended t o appoi nt LTC Barker
as t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n q o f f i c e r and t h a t BG Younq concurred.
rieqardinq h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s t o LTC Barker, Henderson s t a t e d :
"The r equi r ement was t h a t he conduct a formal i n v e s t i s a t i o n
of t h e 16 Varch i nc i de nt . I be l i e ve I a l s o t o l d him t h a t as
f a r as I knew not hi nq new had devel oped. Thi s was t o have
f i r s t p r i o r i t y and e i t h e r a t t h a t t i me o r a few days l a t e r I
t o l d him itwas t o be completed be f or e he went on R & R on
t h e 20t h of May.. . "
Both Kost er and Henderson t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n May 1968 a f or -
mal r e por t was pr epar ed and submi t t ed. Both cont ended t h a t t h e
r e por t was approxi mat el y t h r e e paqes i n l e nqt h and had at t ached
t o . i t t h e s i gned s t at ement s of 15 t o 20 wi t nes s es . The I nqui r y
expr es s l y i n t e r r o g a t e d each i ndi vi dua l who miqht have qi ven such
- a si qned s t a t e me nt and n o t one coul d r e c a l l ever havi nq made
such a s t at ement . No t r a c e of such a document has been found,
and not onl y BG Younq and COL Par son, b u t a l s o ot he r per sonnel
of t h e America1 headquar t er s a l l t e s t i f i e d t h a t t he y had never
seen o r hear d of such a r e por t of i nve s t i qa t i on. - The
i nes capabl e concl usi on i s t h a t no such formal r e p o r t of i n v e s t i -
gat i on ever e x i s t e d.
From what w e were a bl e t o a s c e r t a i n PlG Kost er appar ent l y
accept ed t h e 24 Apr i l r e por t wi t hout any c r i t i c a l revi ew of i t s
cont ent . The document had been r equest ed i n or der t o make a
r ecor d of COL Henderson' s i n v e s t i q a t i v e e f f o r t s i n March--in
MG Kos t e r ' s words "To show what we had done i n t h i s casew--and
itwas assumed t h a t - t h i s had been done. The r ef er ence i n t h e
i ncl os ed 1 4 Apr i l s t at er r ent t o an 11 Apr i l l et t er of t he Son
Tinh Di s t r i c t Chi ef br ouqht f o r t h no r eques t t o pr ovi de a copv
of t h a t l e t t e r , nor d i d t h e absence of any i ndi c a t i on on t h a t
st at ement a s t o i t s o r i q i n s evoke any ques t i ons . As PIG Kost er
s t a t e d i n h i s t est i monv be f or e t h e I nqui r y i n February 1970 when
shown t h e o r i q i n a l Rodriquez st at ement : " I wondered whose s t a t e -
ment t h a t was. I have never r e a l l y known."
It a l s o i s a ppr opr i a t e t o not e t h a t when VG Kost er r et ur ned
from ri & R i n e a r l v Flay 1968 and t h e 24 Apr i l r e por t probabl y
came t o h i s a t t e n t i o n f o r t h e f i r s t t i me, he was al most immedi-
a t e l y i nvol ved i n a maj or ope r a t i ona l problem r e l a t i n q t o t h e
r e l i e f and evacuat i on of Kham Duc which concei vabl y pushed . t o
one s i d e o t h e r mat t er s r e qui r i nq t h e C G ' s a t t e n t i o n .
I n a l l e ve nt s , condi t i oned bv what Henderson had r epor t ed t o
t h e command el ement r eqar di nq t h e r e s u l t s of h i s immediate i nves -
t i g a t i v e e f f o r t s i n March and t h e i r accept ance of h i s o r a l r e p o r t ,
when t h e a l l e q a t i o n s of t h e Son Ply v i l l a q e r s and t h e VC propaqan-
da reached d i v i s i o n headquar t er s t hos e who l ear ned of them were
qui ck t o di smi ss them as boqus propaqanda. I n h i s test;mn-y
bef or e t h i s I nqui r y MG Kost er descr i bed h i s own r eact i on: " I
j us t d i d n ' t f e e l t h a t an i nc i de nt l i k e t h i s was a pt t o have
happened. " Thus MG Kost er assur ed bot h COL Toan and LTC
Khien t h a t t h e mat t er had al r eady been i nve s t i ga t e d and found
t o be wi t hout subst ance. COL Henderson del i ver ed a s i mi l a r
message t o . the GVN o f f i c i a l s .
Agai nst t h i s backqround, MG Kost er f ur t he r s t a t e d i n h i s
t est i mony t h a t he had not bel i eved t h a t a war crime had been
al l eged because t h e i nf or mat i on came from a VC ar ea; i t di d
not c o r r e l a t e wi t h t h e i nf or mat i on from Henderson ' s i nves t i qa-
t i o n ; t he a l l e ga t i ons concerned many more c i v i l i a n c a s ua l t i e s
than t h e number of c i v i l i a n s r epor t ed t o l i v e i n t he ar ea; and
"t he document I r ead" i ndi c a t e d t h a t t h e Di s t r i c t Chief di d not
gi ve i ~- i ps r t ance t o t h e mat t er .
The combination of a na t ur a l pr e di s pos i t i on t o di scount a l l
charges from VC-controlled ar eas as ba s e l e s s propaqanda, a nat u-
r a l r e t i c e nc e on t h e p a r t of GT7N and ARTm o f f i c i a l s t o expr ess
f or t hr i ght l y any c r i t i c i s m of US f or ces , t he f a i l u r e of US per -
sonnel t o r ecogni ze t h e s er i ous nes s of t h e a l l e qa t i ons as sub-
t l y passed t o them, and an appar ent decept i on on t h e p a r t of t h e
Brigade Commander a l l cont r i but ed t o a completely neqat i ve
command response t o t h e a ddi t i ona l a l l e qa t i ons t h a t came t o
di vi s i on from t h e Vietnamese sour ces.
C . GVN/ARVN INVESTIGATIONS
Informat i on r egar di ng Ouang. Nqai Se c t or ' s - e f f o r t s t o i nves-
t i g a t e t h e Son My Vi l l age i nc i de nt , as di r e c t e d by COL Toan, i s
confusi ng. The Provi nce c hi e f di d i n i t i a t e an oper at i on on 11
June 1968, which cont i nued u n t i l 13 June, which he s t a t e d had
t he purpose of qoi ng t o Thuan Yen subhamlet f o r an on- s i t e
i nve s t i ga t i on of t h e i nci dent . However, Thuan Yen was never
reached supposedl y because of t h e VC s t r e ngt h and f i r e from
t he subhamlet and because t h e oper at i on was di ve r t e d t o s ecur e
a he l i c opt e r ( i n which LTC Barker and CPT f l i chl es were passen-
ge r s ) and an 0- 2 a i r c r a f t which had c ol l i de d and cr ashed i n t h e
immediate v i c i n i t y .
Any suggest i on t h a t t h e oper at i on was f o r t he purpose of
i nve s t i ga t i ng t h e i nc i de nt i s neqat ed al most t o t a l l y by t he
t est i mony of MAJ Wi l l i a ~n Ford who accompanied t h e oper at i on.
_WFord s t a t e d t h a t t h e RF Group, which he ser ved as a Mobile
Advisory Team (MAT) advi sor , secur ed t h e r i s h t f l ank of t h e
a i r c r a f t cr as h s i t e and i n doi ng s o passed t hrouqh, st opped i n ,
and r et ur ned throuqh Thuan Yen subhaml et . MAJ Ford t a l ke d wi t h
some of t h e remaininq i nha bi t a nt s , but s t a t e d t h a t he had never
recei ved a r equest t o check t h e e a r l i e r i nc i de nt , nor di d he be-
l i e ve t h a t h i s RF count er par t had been s o di r e c t e d. That
t h e purpose of t h e oper at i on was not t o i n v e s t i s a t e t h e Son My
i nc i de nt i s f u r t h e r s ubs t a nt i a t e d bv t h e i nt e r r os a t i on r epor t s OF
t h e t h r e e pr i s oner s captures dur i nq t h e oper at i on. A l l ques t i ons
posed t o t he s e pr i s one r s were bi oqr aphi c i n nat ur e; no quest i ons
were asked concerni nq t h e i nci dent .
I n h i s e f f o r t s t o reach Thuan 'Yen, e i t h e r i n June o r dur i ng
a l a t e r oper at i on i n Auuust o r September, t h e Provi nce Chi ef
s t a t e d t h a t he di d meet and i nt e r r oqa t e approxi mat el y 20 r e s i -
dent s of Thuan Yen about 2 ki l omet er s west of t he subhaml et .
M r . Burke, t h e t hen Provi nce Seni or Advi sor, and LTC Green of
t h e advi sory team bot h confi rm s eei nq t h e Provi nce Chief t a l ki nq
t o r es i dent s i n t h i s a r e a i n an oper at i on i n t he l a t e summer
o r f a l l of 1968. These peopl e had no s p e c i f i c i nf or mat i on
r egar di nq t h e event s of 16 Varch but appar ent l y r epor t ed t h a t
some r e s i de nt s had been k i l l e d . They i ndi cat ed t h a t when t h e
Americans and t h e VC began t o s hoot , t h e peopl e moved t o t h e i r
s h e l t e r s o r ran t o ot he r haml et s and t hus t hey were unabl e t o
see how many peopl e were k i l l e d . The f ol l owi nq day t hey went t o
t h e haml et and bur i ed an unknown number of bodi es, which t hey
est i mat ed t o be about 1 0 0 .
The Provi nce Chief s t a t e d t h a t he di d not submit a formal
a f t e r act i on r epor t cover i nq t h i s oper at i on o r a r e por t of
i nve s t i ga t i on, s i n c e he had been unabl e t o reach Thuan Yen.
Apparently t h e r e were no f ur t he r e f f o r t s by t h e GVN t o
i nve s t i ga t e t h e event s of 16 March 1968 u n t i l 1969 when t he i n-
ci dent was brouqht t o publ i c a t t e nt i on.
KNOWLEDGE OF INCIDENTS
RELATED TO THE SON MY
LEGEND
C O N F I R M E D
P R O B A B L E
INCLOSURE I
Broadcast American Evi l Appears
(Coordinate t h i s br oadcast wi t h 1eaf l et s: "Let American
Enemy Pay Thi s Bloody Debt .)
American i mpe r i a l i s t s make Vietnam aggr essi ve war, but he s a i d t h a t he
came her e t o "help" our peopl e and he c a l l s hi msel f as our f r i e nds .
When he a r r i v e s i n South Vietnam he t r i e s t o hi de h i s bad aggr essi ve ambi t i on.
He t o l d h i s t r ooper s t o r espect Vietnamese people and make good r e l a t i ons hi p
wi t h them. H i s psyops a l s o gi ve t r oops "commandments" whose cont ent s a r e
"Have t o r espect women and Vietnamese t r a d i t i o n s and customs."
When American t r oops had j u s t a r r i ve d i n Vietnam, t hey t r i e d t o show them-
s el ves as "Honorable gentlementt s e l l i n g or buying f a i r and squar e, even, pay-
i ng hi gher t han market pr i c e s . When t hey dest r oyed something, they pai d f o r
i t wi t h money. Then some pos t s allowed people t o come, and doct or s were
s e n t t o some where t o gi ve peopl e medi cal ai d. American pr es s shows some pi c-
t ur e s of Americans and Vietnamese shaki ng hands - Americans k i s s Vietnamese
peopl e and gi ve them candi es - o r Americans wi t h Red Cross s i gns a t t h e i r
arms gi ve medical a i d t o Vietnamese people . . . and t hey boast t h a t t h i s is
one of f a mi l i a r pi c t ur e s around American t r oops l ocat i ons .
Thi s demagogy makes some ARVN t r oops bel i eve Americans a r e good f r i ends . How
happy i t is i f we have such good and r i c h f r i ends!
But any pl ay has t o end, al t hough t he a c t or s a r e s k i l l f u l , but t hey pl ay only
one a c t , they w i l l become soon u n s k i l l f u l - and t he pl ay w i l l become a bad
one. So t he damagogy w i l l become "t r ue", "unmask", e a s i e r t han any pl ays.
The r o l e can be pl ayed more be a ut i f ul l y i f U.S. t r oops c o l l e c t more v i c t o r i e s
every year , but t hey a r e beat en more heavi l y by our people year by year . So
t he demagogy i s unmasked more easy. Now, U.S. t r oops can not hi de anyt hi ng,
t hey have shown a l l bad ambition which belongs t o any aggr essi ve t r oops. I n
sweep oper at i ons, they l oot peopl e' s pr ope r t i e s , dest r oy ever yt hi ng, rape
women, t hey have shown t h e i r animal ambi t i on, t h e i r c i v i l i z a t i o n . I n Saigon
one American had put h i s peni s out s i de h i s pant s , and one d o l l a r was put on
i t , which he pai d t o a g i r l . U.S. t r oops pl ay g i r l s every publ i c ar eas :
beach, r oadsi de ... t hey do not car e about peopl e passi ng by. I n U.S. t roop
l oc a t i ons , t hey sear ch people t o get p i a s t e r , gol d r i ngs , wat ches, e a r r i ngs ,
t hey a r e so cunning t h a t they do not pi ck up f a l s e gold.
Due t o t h e i r gr e a t def eat s i n t he r ecent Spr i ng, t hey a r e l i k e wi l d wounded
ani mal , t he more t hey wr i ggl e, t he more bad act i ons a r e done - d e f i n i t e l y
inhuman doi ngs. They had dropped bombs a t random ont o populous ar eas and
c i t i e s such HUE, SAIGON, BEN TRE. They confirmed t h a t 90% of houses were
dest r oyed i n HUE Ci t y. Thousands of our people were k i l l e d or homeless.
Western newspapers and r adi o s t a t i o n s a l s o confirmed t h a t a l l t he damages of
houses i n South Vietnam c i t i e s came from American bombs and ammo because
U.S. has more f i r e power t han NLF t r oops. Br i t i s h newspapers s a i d Americans
Inclosure 2
bombed c i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y Sai gon Ci t y, i t would be condemned by opi ni on
it was t oo much when Americans di d t h a t . Japanese p u b l i c opi ni on s a i d :
America would be i s o l a t e d and l o s e a ppr e c i a t i on when t hey bomb Sout h Vi et -
namese c i t i e s . It would make an ant i -Ameri can wave i n t h e Sout h Vietnam,
unl e s s t h e worl d p u b l i c opi ni on pr ot e s t e d, and a l s o t h e r e was not a unani -
mi t y of Al l i e s . Americans s t i l l c l os e t h e i r eyes , s hut t h e i r e a r s t o per-
form t h e i r c r u e l a c t s .
A sweep oper at i on was conduct ed on 15 Mar 68 r e c e nt l y i n SON TINH. Crazy
American enemy used l i g h t machineguns and a l l ki nds of weapons t o k i l l
our i nnocent c i v i l i a n peopl e i n TINH KHE Vi l l a ge (SON MY ( V) ) . Most of
them were women, k i d s , t h e r e were some j u s t bor n babi es and pr egnant women.
They s hot ever yt hi ng t hey s a w, t hey k i l l e d a l l domest i c ani mal s , t hey burned
a l l peopl e' s houses. There were 26 f a mi l i e s k i l l e d compl et el y - no s ur vi vor s .
The f i e r c e d e v i l Americans dropped down t h e i r p r i e s t cover s t o become bar bar ous ,
and c r ue l .
American wolf f or got t h e i r good sheeps' appearance. They opened mouth t o eat,
dr i nk our peopl e bl ood wi t h a l l t h e i r ani mal b a r b a r i t y .
Our peopl e have onl y one way, i t is t o k i l l them s o t hey can not b i t e around
anymore .
Vietnam o f f i c e r s , s o l d i e r br ot he r s , i t is about t i m e t o know t h e t r u e f a c e of
Americans. There were s o many t i mes t hey f or got you when you were b i t t e n by
NLF's t r oops but t hey have never f i r e d any mor t ar round t o s uppor t you.
Even t hey a r e r i g h t bes i de you and t hey a l s o dropped bombs on puppet dead bodi es
t o s uppr es s and sometimes t hey mor t ar ed r i g h t on your f or mat i on.
The p o s i t i o n of puppet t r oops as t h e i r t a r g e t s are s o c l e a r . Any one s t i l l
doubt , j u s t l ook at: t h e 39t h Ranger Ba t t a l i on s t a t i o n e d i n IZl@ SANH a r e a . They
used t h e u n i t as an o b s t a c l e i n t h e f r o n t f o r American Mari nes, you al r eady
know t hey o f f e r e d t h i s b a t t a l i o n a s "ready t o di e " but it does n' t mean t h e
same as t h e meaning of "di e f o r f a t he r l a nds " as NLF s o l d i e r s , t hey s a i d
t h a t because t hey wanted t o p r o t e c t 6000 American t r oops t he r e .
So it is t he American c i v l l i z a t i o n i t i s t h e good of f r i e n d a s you s e e them -
a mur der er , k i l l e d your bl ood peopl e - made a vi et namese bl ood stream r unni ng
a s bl ood i n our own bodi es - a s an a l l i e d o r n o t ?
What are you wai t i ng f or ! Use r i g h t American guns t o s hoot r i g h t t h e i r heads
i n or de r t o avenge our peopl e, t o wash out i n s u l t t o our n a t i o n and s ave your
proud and your own l i f e .
Thi s t i me: more t han e ve r be f or e
American guns a r e i n your hands
Poi nt t o American heads and shoot !
A TRUE TRANSLATION TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, CHU LAI , REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
1JANUARY 19 70
10- 90 :l)iiiy M. STANBERI~Y
Lieutenant ~ol o) $l ,US Amy
Chapter II
SUPPRESSION AND WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION
A. I NTRODUCTI ON
One a s pe c t of t he Son My oper at i on most d i f f i c u l t t o compre-
hend i s t h a t t h e f a c t s remained hi dden f o r s o l ong. Wi t hi n t h e
America1 Di vi si on, a t every command l e v e l from company t o d i v i -
s i on, a c t i ons were t aken o r omi t t ed which t oget her e f f e c t i v e l y
conceal ed from hi gher headquar t er s t he event s which t r a ns pi r e d
i n TF Bar ker ' s oper at i on of 16-19 March 1968. Some of t he s e a c t s
and omi ssi ons were by desi gn, ot he r s perhaps by negl i gence, and
s t i l l ot he r s were t h e r e s u l t of p o l i c i e s and pr ocedur es. Out si de
t he Di vi si on, per sonnel i n t he Provi nce and Di s t r i c t and pos s i bl y
t h e 2d ARVN Di vi si on Advisory Teams a l s o cont r i but ed t o t he end
r e s u l t ,
The purpose of t h i s chapt er of t h e r e por t i s t o i d e n t i f y , i n-
s o f a r a s it i s pos s i bl e a t t h i s t i me, t hose a c t s and omi ssi ons
which ai ded i n t h e concealment from appr opr i at e a u t h o r i t i e s of
t h e t r u e f a c t s of t h e Son My oper at i on. I n t h i s connect i on, it
shoul d be not ed t h a t e f f o r t s t o wi t hhol d i nf or mat i on cont i nue t o
t h i s da t e . Si x o f f i c e r s who occupi ed key pos i t i ons dur i ng t h e
Son My oper at j on exer ci s ed t h e i r r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t bef or e
t h i s I nqui r y. There i s evi dence t h a t an even l a r g e r number of
wi t nesses e i t h e r wi t hhel d i nf or mat i on or gave f a l s e t est i mony,
and no t r a c e has been found i n US f i l e s of s e ve r a l contemporane-
ous documents bear i ng upon t he i nc i de nt . Despi t e such obs t a c l e s
t o . t h e complete development of t h e f a c t s , it seems c l e a r t h a t t he
f ol l owi ng a c t s and omi ssi ons c ons t i t ut e d o r cont r i but ed t o t h e
suppr essi on or wi t hhol di ng of i nf or mat i on concerni ng t he event s
which t ook pl ace i n Son My Vi l l age on 16 March 1968.
B. C COMPANY, 1ST BATTALION, 20TH INFANTRY
1. Fa i l ur e t o Report Act s of Murder and Ot her War Crimes
I t has been e s t a bl i s he d el sewhere i n t h i s r e por t t h a t
members of C/1-20 I nf di d not r e por t t h e cri mes perpe' rated by
t h a t u n i t i n Son My Vi l l age on 16 March 1968. While no expl ana-
t i o n .isneeded i n t he case' of t hos e members who a c t i ve l y pa r t i c -
i pa t e d i n cr i mi nal a c t s , C Company's c o l l e c t i v e f a i l u r e t o make
any r e por t s of cri mes committed on t he oper at i on probabl y r e-
s u l t e d from t h e l a r ge pr opor t i on of i t s members i mpl i cat ed i n
such a c t s and from t he appar ent s a nc t i on gi ven t o t h e e n t i r e op-
e r a t i o n by company o f f i c e r s . The s heer enormi t y of t h e a c t s
committed by some and observed by a l l on 16 March caused many of
t he men t o put t h e Son My oper at i on out of t h e i r minds and t o
avoi d t a l k i n g about iteven among t hemsel ves. Thi s c o l l e c t i v e
r el uct ance t o expose what had occur r ed was f a c i l i t a t e d by t h e
nat ur e of t h e ope r a t i on, which i s o l a t e d C/ 1- 20 I nf from ot he r
el ement s of TF Bar ker , by t he f a c t t h a t t h e company was det ached
from i t s pa r e nt b a t t a l i o n a t t h e t i me of t h e ope r a t i on and re-
mained s o f o r some weeks t h e r e a f t e r , and by t h e f a c t t h a t Son My
Vi l l age was l ocat ed i n a VC-controlled ar ea.
2. Fal se Report of 20-28 Noncombatant Cas ual t i es
I t i s c l e a r from t he t est i mony of per sons wha were wi t h
t he C/ 1-20 I nf command group on 16 March t h a t a f a r g r e a t e r num-
be r of noncombatant c a s u a l t i e s was observed by CPT Medina t han
t he 20-28 he r epor t ed. That CPT Medina r e por t e d any noncom-
ba t a nt c a s u a l t i e s a t a l l i s probabl y due t o t h e f a c t t h a t COL'
Henderson had- obser ved some bodi es of women and c hi l dr e n on t he .
ground and quest i oned LTC Barker about them, o r t o t h e circum-
s t ance t h a t a l a r ge group of bodi es ( l a r ge l ywomen and c hi l dr e n)
were l yi ng i n t he open on t he t r a i l l eadi ng sout h from My Lai ( 4 ) ,
i n p l a i n view of anyone f l y i n g overhead. I n any event , t h e r e s u l t
of CPT Medina' s admi ssi on t h a t some noncombatants had been k i l l e d ,
coupl ed wi t h t h e f a l s e a t t r i b u t i o n of such c a s u a l t i e s t o a r t i l l e r y
and gunshi ps, provi ded t he ba s i s subsequent l y used by COL Henderson
t o expl ai n and di smi ss t h e Thompson Report .
3. I ns t r uc t i ons Not t o Di scuss o r Report t h e Operat i on of
16 March
Upon t h e i r r e t ur n t o LZ Dot t i e on 18 March, t h e members
of C/1-20 I nf w e r e advi sed by CPT Medina t h a t t h e i nc i de nt s of 16
March w e r e t o be i nve s t i ga t e d and t h a t t hey w e r e n o t t o di s c us s
them except i n t he cour se of t h e i nve s t i ga t i on. Thi s a c t i on,
combined wi t h t h e n a t u r a l r el uct ance of many of t h e men t o di s -
cuss t he a c t s t hey had pa r t i c i pa t e d i n , proved an e f f e c t i v e means
of cont ai ni ng t h e s t o r y of Son My wi t hi n C Company. I n t h e same
sense, CPT Medina advi sed a member of C/1-20 I n f , wkio had i ndi -
cat ed an i n t e n t i o n t o w r i t e h i s Congressman concerni ng t h e opera-
t i o n , not t o do s o " u n t i l t he i nve s t i ga t i on was compl et e. "
C. B COMPANY, 4TH BATTALION, 3D INFANTRY
1. Report s of VC Ki l l e d
On 16 March, B/4-3 I nf r epor t ed a t o t a l of 38 VC k i l l e d i n
a c t i on ( KI A) a t My Khe - Testimony r e ve a l s t h a t , a t a mini-
mum, such r e por t s i ncl uded women and c hi l dr e n k i l l e d by B Com-
pany' s 1st Pl at oon. While t he r e i s no t est i mony t o i n d i c a t e
t h a t CPT ~ i c h l e s had knowledge of t h i s , t h e r e i s evi dence t h a t
1LT (now CPT) Willingham was aware t h a t t h e maj or i t y ( i f not a l l )
t h e per sons r epor t ed a s VC KI A were women and c hi l dr e n. On
t h e af t er noon of 16 March, i n response t o a r eques t f o r informa-
t i o n concerni ng t he number of women and c hi l dr e n who may have
been k i l l e d , CPT Michles submi t t ed a negat i ve r e por t t o TF Bar-
ker . I t i s not known whet her CPT Michles made t h i s r e por t
knowing it was f a l s e o'r i nnocent l y t r a ns mi t t e d a f a l s e r e por t
made t o him by ILT Willingham.
2. Fa i l ur e t o Report Acts of Murder and Ot her War Crimes
Testimony pr esent ed t o t h i s I nqui r y i n d i c a t e s t h a t a c t s
of murder and aggr avat ed a s s a u l t were committed by members
of B/4-3 I nf dur i ng t h e Son My oper at i on. None of t he s e
cr i mi nal a c t s was r epor t ed out s i de t h e company,, probabl y a s a
r e s u l t of f a c t o r s s i mi l a r t o some of t hos e mentioned above i n
connect i on wi t h C/1-20 I n f .
D. TASK FORCE BARKER AND l l T H BRIGADE
Some of t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t a c t s of suppr essi on and wi t h-
hol di ng of i nf or mat i on concerni ng t he Son My i nc i de nt i nvol ved
t h e commanders and c e r t a i n key s t a f f o f f i c e r s and o t h e r person-
n e l of TF Barker and t h e l l t h Bri gade. Due t o t h e f a c t t h a t
s e ve r a l of t he s e i ndi vi dua l s ( ot he r t han LTC Bar ker , who i s
dead) e i t h e r gave f a l s e t est i mony bef or e t h i s I nqui r y o r r ef used
t o gi ve f u r t h e r t est i mony, o r bot h, it has not been pos s i bl e t o
s o r t out a c t s of concealment t h a t may have been i n i t i a t e d by and
known onl y t o TF Barker from t hos e done o r approv=d by t h e l l t h
Bri gade a s w e l l . Fal s e and mi sl eadi ng t est i mony by COL Hender-
son; t he deat h of LTC Barker; t h e r e f u s a l t o - t e s t i f y f u r t h e r by
MAJ McKnight, MAJ Calhoun, and CPT Kotouc; and t h e pr of essed i n-
a b i l i t y of LTC Bl ackl edge, MSG Johnson, and o t h e r key per sonnel
t o r e c a l l any s i g n i f i c a n t i nf or mat i on have t oge t he r pr ecl uded a
r econs t r uct i on of e xa c t l y what t r a ns pi r e d between t h e two head-
qua r t e r s . For t h i s r eason, t h e r o l e s pl ayed by TF Barker and
t h e l l t h Bri gade i n t h e suppr essi on and wi t hhol di ng of informa-
t i o n a r e consi der ed j o i n t l y .
1. Fa i l ur e t o Report Ca s ua l t i e s I n f l i c t e d by C/1-20 I nf
Af t e r 0840 Hours
Unt i l 0840 hours on 16 March, C/ 1- 20 I nf had appar ent l y
been r e por t i ng t o TF Barker a s VC KI A a l l persons t hey had k i l l e d
i n My Lai ( 4 ) , al t hough few i f any of t h e vi ct i ms had a c t ua l l y
been i d e n t i f i e d a s VC. Af t e r 0840 hour s, no f u r t h e r r e por t s of
VC KI A by C Company were recorded by TF Barker and t he 11t h B r i -
gade, o r r epor t ed t o Di vi si on headquar t er s. - The di scont i nu-
ance of t he s e r e por t s concei vabl y was i n i t i a t e d by C Company even
though t h e r e i s some evi dence t h a t CPT Medina di d make f u r t h e r
r e por t s of VC KI A. More probabl y, r ecor di ng and r e por t i ng of
VC dead r epor t ed by C Company was ha l t e d by TF Barker e i t h e r i n
response t o t h e or der from COL Henderson t o s t op t h e "unnecessary
k i l l i n g , " o r t o avoi d a t t r a c t i n g undue a t t e n t i o n t o C Com-
pany' s oper at i ons i n My Lai ( 4 ) . I t i s e n t i r e l y pos s i bl e t h a t
such a c t i on was e i t h e r or der ed o r condoned by COL Henderson, . who
was pr e s e nt i n t h e TF Barker TOC between 0840 and 1 0 0 0 hours on
16 March.
2. Fa i l ur e t o Report Noncombatant Ca s ua l t i e s
I t i s c l e a r from t h e t est i mony of many wi t nesses t h a t any
o v e r f l i g h t of My Lai ( 4 ) on t h e morning of 16 March, a t an a l t i -
t ude of l e s s t han 1, 000 f e e t , would have per mi t t ed obser vat i on of
a l a r g e number of bodi es of noncombatants. According t o COL
Henderson' s t est i mony, he observed 6-8 such bodi es e a r l y on t h e
16t h and di s cus s ed t h i s mat t er wi t h MG Kost er about 0935 hours
a t LZ Dot t i e . Ot hers i n COL Henderson' s a i r c r a f t admi t t o
seei ng 15-20 bodi es. By noon, LTC Barker had been advi sed
of t h e Thompson Report by MAJ Watke, and dur i ng t h e af t er noon
hours LTC Barker and MAJ Calhoun were bot h aware of a r e por t
from CPT Medina t h a t 20-28 noncombatants had been k i l l e d .
A 1555 hours e nt r y i n t h e TF Barker J our nal r ecor ded t h a t "10-11
women and c hi l dr e n were k i l l e d " i n t h e C Company a r e a of opera-
t i ons . By e a r l y eveni ng, COL Henderson was admi t t edl y aware
t h a t a t l e a s t 20 noncombatants had been k i l l e d .
While some of t h i s i nf or mat i on may have been gi ven by COL
Henderson t o MG Kost er i n o r a l r epo- r t s, such r e por t s coul d not
have been consi der ed a s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e normal s pot r e por t r e-
qui r e d when any f r i e ndl y f or c e s , any enemy f or c e s , o r any c i v i l -
i a ns a r e known t o have been k i l l e d .
I n a ddi t i on t o t h e requi rement f o r an immediate s pot r e por t
concerni ng c a s u a l t i e s of any t ype , d i r e c t i v e s from MACV, USARV,
and I11 MAF i n e f f e c t a t t h e t i me c l e a r l y r equi r ed c i v i l i a n cas-
u a l t i e s t o be r epor t ed a s a s p e c i a l mat t er . Had such a r e -
p o r t been made a s r equi r ed, itmight wel l have gener at ed a t hor -
ough i nve s t i ga t i on of t h e Son My oper at i on.
3. Changes i n Report of 69 VC Ki l l e d by C Company
One of t h e most obvious e f f o r t s t o suppr ess i nf or mat i on
uncovered by t h i s I nqui r y concerns t h e mat t er of 69 VC pur por t -
e dl y k i l l e d by a r t i l l e r y . The s our ce of t h i s f a l s e r e por t has
not been e s t a bl i s he d, but it i s known t h a t by 0758 hours on 16
March C Company had r epor t ed 1 4 VC KI A i n t h e haml et of My Lai
( 4 ) and one VC K I A a t t h e LZ j us t w e s t of My Lai ( 4 ) . It i s
a l s o known t h a t LTC Barker, who was f l y i n g over My Lai ( 4 ) , re-
cei ved a r adi o message a t about 0830 hours advi s i ng him t h a t C
Company's VC body count had reached 84. Shor t l y a f t e r re-
c e i vi ng t h i s message, Barker advi sed t h e TOC t h a t he was coming
i n and would b r i n g them "up t o dat e. I' Ret urni ng t o t h e TOC a t
LZ Dot t i e, Barker m e t wi t h COL Henderson, LTC Luper, MAJ McKnight,
and MAJ Calhoun. An e n t r y was made i n t h e TF Barker J our nal as
of 0840 hours o f 69 VC K I A a t a l oc a t i on (by map coor di nat es ) i n
t h e haml et of My Lai ( 4 ) . I nexpl i cabl y, t h i s r e por t of 69 VC
K I A was not r epor t ed t o t h e l l t h Bri gade TOC f o r about an hour .
The del ay al one i s s us pi ci ous f o r s e ve r a l reasons. F i r s t , t h e r e
i s t h e ope r a t i ona l requi rement t o r e por t immediately i nf or mat i on
of t h i s type--a requi rement which TF Barker f u l f i l l e d i n t r a ns -
mi t t i ng a l l ot he r VC body count r e por t s on 16 March. Secondl y,
t h e na t ur a l r e a c t i on of a combat u n i t i n r e por t i ng such obvious
proof of s ucces s i s ha s t e , not an hour ' s del ay.
During t h i s per i od of al most one hour dur i ng which t h e r e por t
of 69 VC K I A was he l d a t t he TF Barker TOC, a de c i s i on was appar-
e n t l y made t o a t t r i b u t e t h e cause of deat h t o t h e a r t i l l e r y prep-
a r a t i on and t o s h i f t t h e l oc a t i on a t which t he VC w e r e r epor t ed
k i l l e d from i n s i d e t h e haml et t o a poi nt 600 meters out s i de t h e
haml et and gener al l y on t h e gun- t ar get l i n e from LZ Upt i ght t o
t h e C Company LZ. Thi s deci s i on was r e f l e c t e d i n an e nt r y a t
0930 hours i n t h e l l t h Bri gade Jour nal and i n a r e por t made by
t h e 11t h Bri gade a t t h e same t i m e t o Di vi si on. There was no
f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r a t t r i b u t i n g t h e k i l l i n g t o a r t i l l e r y , and t h e
change of map coor di nat es cannot reasonabl y be expl ai ned as re-
s u l t i n g from a t r a ns pos i t i on of numbers o r some ot he r i na dve r t e nt
e r r o r .
A r easonabl e i nf e r e nc e i s t h a t t he changes e f f e c t e d i n t he
o r i g i n a l r e por t of t h e 69 VC k i l l e d by C Company were made t o
l e s s e n t h e a t t e n t i o n which might have been a t t r a c t e d had t h e
o r i g i n a l r e por t reached Di vi si on headquar t er s. Such a r e por t
would have r e f l e c t e d a t o t a l of 83 VC k i l l e d by smal l arms f i r e
a t a s i n g l e l oc a t i on i n s i d e t h e haml et of My Lai ( 4 ) . Coup-
l e d wi t h t h e absence of any c a s u a l t i e s t o C Company per sonnel and
t h e few weapons capt ur ed, it might have prompted i n q u i r i e s t h a t
coul d not r e a di l y have been answered.
4. Fa i l ur e t o Report Al l egat i ons of War C r i m e s
A most s i g n i f i c a n t a c t of wi t hhol di ng i nf or mat i on i s t he
appar ent f a i l u r e of TF Barker t o r e por t t o l l t h Bri gade ( o r , a l -
t e r n a t i v e l y , t h e f a i l u r e of t h e Bri gade t o r e por t t o t h e Americal
Di vi si on) t h e a l l e ga t i ons of W01 Thompson, which were r epor t ed
by MAJ Watke t o LTC Barker s hor t l y a f t e r noon on 1 6 March.
There i s some t est i mony t h a t a f t e r MAJ Watke appr i sed LTC Barker
of t h e compl ai nt s of W01 Thompson, Barker l e f t LZ Dot t i e ost en-
s i b l y t o v i s i t C Company. There i s l i t t l e evi dence t o show
t h a t he made any r e a l e f f o r t t o i n v e s t i g a t e t he char ges; i n f a c t ,
t he I nqui r y has f a i l e d t o uncover a s i n g l e member of C Company
who r e c a l l s Barker l andi ng a t Son My a t any t i me dur i ng t h e oper-
at i on. There i s a s i mi l a r absence of any evi dence t h a t Barker
r epor t ed Thompsonl.s a l l e ga t i ons t o l l t h Bri gade. I f he d i d , h i s
r e por t was n e i t h e r recorded nor r el ayed t o Di vi si on by t h e l l t h
Bri gade.
5. Fa i l ur e t o Report Act s of Dest r uct i on of Pr i va t e Pr oper t y
During t h e cour se of t he Son My oper at i on, bot h B and C
Companies engaged i n ext ens i ve de s t r uc t i on of p r i v a t e dwel l i ngs
and s t r u c t u r e s t hrough demol i t i on and burni ng. There i s ample
t est i mony t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t such de s t r uc t i on had been or der ed by
LTC Barker - - and must have been observed by COL Henderson and
MAJ McKnight. Although such a c t s vi ol a t e d MACV d i r e c t i v e s
and t h e s t r ong pol i cy wi t hi n t h e Americal ~ i v i s i o n a ga i ns t t h e
burni ng and de s t r uc t i on of houses, no r e por t of t he s e vi ol a-
t i ons was made.
6. Change i n Report of 30-40 VC Depart i ng My Lai ( 4 )
A t about 0900 hours on 16 March, dur i ng t h e i nt e r r oga t i on
of a Vietnamese i nha bi t a nt of My Lai ( 4 ) , C/ 1- 20 I nf r ecei ved i n-
format i on t h a t 30-40 VC had depar t ed t he haml et p r i o r t o t he com-
b a t a s s a u l t . Thi s i nf or mat i on was appar ent l y t r ans mi t t ed
t o t h e TF Barker TOC where, f o r r easons unknown, it was not
recorded i n t h e u n i t j our nal . The r ecor ds a t 11t h
Bri gade, however, do r e f l e c t t h i s i nf or mat i on i n a j our nal e nt r y
made a t 0915 hour s. A t t h e America1 Di vi si on TOC, however,
it was r ecor ded t h a t t ne pr i s one r "so f a r has s a i d t h e i r ( s i c )
l o t s of VC i n v i c BS716788." The r eason f o r t h i s erroneous
e nt r y has n o t been expl ai ned. I t may have r e s u l t e d from a si mpl e
e r r o r i n t h e t r ansmi ssi on of i nf or mat i on, or from a d e l i b e r a t e l y
f a l s e r e por t made t o wi t hhol d from Di vi si on t h e f a c t t h a t t h e VC
had depar t ed t h e a r e a p r i o r t o t h e combat a s s a u l t and t o c r e a t e
t he i mpressi on t h a t C/ 1-20 I nf was i nvol ved i n a cont es t ed combat
act i on. Thi s mat t er i s di scussed i n more d e t a i l i n Chapt er 10.
7. TF Bar ker ' s Combat Act i on Report
Pe r i odi c a l l y, t h e America1 Di vi si on would d i r e c t subord-
i n a t e el ement s t o pr epar e s p e c i a l a f t e r - a c t i on r e por t s on opera-
t i o n s which appeared t o have been p a r t i c u l a r l y s uc c e s s f ul . The
Son My oper at i on was s e l e c t e d a s t h e s ubj e c t of such a r e por t ,
and on 28 March 1968, LTC Barker submi t t ed a Combat Act i on Report
(CAR) t o t h e 11t h Bri gade, cover i ng t h e per i od 0730-1800 hour s, 16
March 1968.
I n t h i s r e por t , LTC Barker made no mention of t h e many non-
combatants k i l l e d by C Company on 16 March, al t hough US and
claimed VC cas ~ a l t i e swere r epor t ed. He di si ngenuousl y expl ai ned
t he problem of "popul at i on c ont r ol and medi cal c a r e of t hos e ci -
v i l i a n s caught i n f i r e s of t h e opposi ng f or c e s , " but t h e r e was no
mention of t h e magnitude of t h e problems of t h a t t ype which TF
Barker a c t ua l l y encount ered on 16 March. I n an appar ent r e f e r -
ence t o WOl Thompson's aero-scout u n i t , he r epor t ed t h a t hel i cop-
ters a s s i s t e d c i v i l i a n s i n l e a vi ng t he a r e a , but agai n t he r e was
no i ndi c a t i on of t h e t r u e ci rcumst ances of t h i s as pect of t h e
oper at i on.
The r e por t cont ai ned a n a r r a t i v e de s c r i pt i on of t h e opera-
t i o n s of B and C Companies on 16 March t h a t was pure f a br i c a t i on.
It des cr i bed an a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on on t h e enzmy "combat pos t
pos i t i ons " which k i l l e d 68 VC. I t r epor t ed cont act wi t h "two l o-
c a l f or c e companies and two o r t h r e e g u e r r i l l a pl at oons " u n t i l
1630 hours when " s ur vi vi ng enemy el ement s had broken a l l c ont a c t . "
An appr eci at i on of t h e mi sl eadi ng and decept i ve na t ur e of
LTC Bar ker ' s r e por t can be gai ned from t h e f ol l owi ng e x t r a c t :
"Commander's Anal ysi s: Thi s oper at i on' was w e l l
pl anned, w e l l execut ed, and s ucces s f ul . Fr i endl y cas-
La l t i e s w e r e l i g h t and t h e enemy s uf f e r e d heavi l y. On
t h i s oper at i on t h e c i v i l i a n popul at i on s uppor t i ng t h e
VC i n t h e ar ea numbered approxi mat el y 200. Thi s cr ea-
t ed a problem i n popul at i on c ont r ol and medi cal Jc a r e
of t hose c i v i l i a n s caught i n f i r e s of t h e opposing
f or ces . However, t h e i nf a nt r y u n i t on t h e ground and
he l i c opt e r s were a bl e t o a s s i s t c i v i l i a n s i n l e a vi ng
t h e a r e a and i n c a r i ng f o r and/or evacuat i ng t h e
wounded. "
The Combat Act i on Report can onl y be consi der ed \an e f f o r t
by LTC Barker : del i ber at el y t o suppr ess t h e . t r ue f a c t s and t o
mi sl ead hi gher headquar t er s i n t o be l i e vi ng t h a t t h e r e had been
a combat , oper at i on i n Son My Vi l . l ageon 16 March i nvol vi ng a hot -
' l y cont est ed a c t i on wi t h a s i z a b l e enemy f or ce.
8. Wi t hhol di ng and Suppressi on of Knowledge and Evidence
of War C r i m e s by I nf or mat i on Of f i ce Per sonnel
On 16 March, a two-man team from t h e 31s t Publ i c Informat i on
Detachment, a p a r t of t h e l l t h Bri gade, accompanied C/1-20 I nf
on t h e combat a s s a ul t . These men, SGT (now Mr . ) Ronald Haeberl e,
phot ographer, and SP5 (now Mr . ) Jay Rober t s, j o u r n a l i s t , wi t ness-
ed numerous war cri mes committed by members of C/1-20 I nf i n My
Lai ( 4 ) . SGT Haeberl e t ook a s e r i e s of phot ographs usi ng
bot h per s onal and government owned cameras. He used t he c ol or
f i l m t o r ecor d scenes of a t r o c i t i e s and t h e bl ack and whi t e f o r
ot he r pi c t ur e s . Both men remained wi t h C/1-20 I nf u n t i l
approxi mat el y 1100 hour s, when t hey depar t ed f o r B/4-3 I nf . They
observed not hi ng unusual i n t he B Company ar ea.
Af t e r l eavi ng t h e oper at i ons a r e a , t hey di scussed what t hey
had seen and dur i ng t h e di s cus s i on, accor di ng t o SP5 Rober t s, SGT
Haeberl e mentioned t h a t he was cur i ous concerni ng "what t he pr e s s
would do wi t h phot os l i k e t h a t , " r e f e r r i n g t o t h e pi c t ur e s t aken
a t My Lai ( 4 ) .
La t e r t h a t eveni ng SP5 Robert s wrot e a s t o r y concerni ng t h e
i nc i de nt , making no mention of t h e a t r o c i t i e s he had seen and
l audi ng t h e e f f o r t s of TF Barker. H i s account was r el ayed t o
t h e Amer i cal ' Di vi si on I nf or mat i on Of f i ce and was t h e b a s i s f o r a
mi sl eadi ng a r t i c l e i n t h e l l t h Bri gade news s he e t . I ndi c a t i ve of
t he mi sl eadi ng na t ur e of t h e a r t i c l e wa s . t he st at ement t h a t a
s us pect had " t o l d an i n t e r p r e t e r t h a t 35 VC had moved i n t o khe
v i l l a g e [My Lai ( 4) 1two hours e a r l i e r , " when i n f a c t an . i nhabi -
t a n t of t h e haml et i nt e r r oga t e d by C/1-20 I nf t h a t morning had
s a i d t h a t a comparab.le s i z e f or c e had depar t ed My Lai ( 4 ) p r i o r
t o t h e combat a s s a u l t .
Nei t her SGT Haeberl e nor SP5 Robert s t ook any a c t i on t o re-
p o r t what t hey had seen, nor d i d SGT Haeberl e make a va i l a bl e t o
pr oper a ut hor i t y t h e phot ogr aphi c evi dence of war cri mes he had
obt ai ned. SGT Haeberl e r e t a i ne d t h e c ol or f i l m he had exposed
dur i ng t h e oper at i on a s per sonal pr oper t y and s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r
r ot a t e d t o t h e Uni t ed St a t e s f o r event ual di schar ge. . Lat e i n
1969, and a f t e r h i s . s e p a r a t i o n from t h e s e r vi c e , SGT Haeberl e
s ol d t h e phot ographs t o a publ i sher .
I t i s appar ent t h a t bot h t he s e i ndi vi dua l s had f i r s t ha nd
knowledge of t h e i nc i de nt , and t h a t ne i t he r t ook any a c t i on t o
r e por t it. To t h e cont r ar y, bot h a c t i ve l y cont r i but ed t o t h e
suppr essi on of i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h e i nc i de nt . It shoul d
be not ed a l s o t h a t n e i t h e r of t he s e men was under command of TF
Barker and, i n c ont r a s t t o t he ot he r e n l i s t e d per sonnel i n My
Lai ( 4 ) t h a t day, t hey we r e i n a pos i t i on t o r e por t what t hey
had seen wi t hout t h e same f e a r of r e t a l i a t i o n .
E. COL HENDERSON' S REPORTS
Af t e r bei ng charged t o i nve s t i ga t e t h e a l l e ga t i ons made by
W 0 1 Thompson, and a f t e r hear i ng d i r e c t l y from Thompson and ot he r
a vi a t i on per sonnel account s of what t hey had observed on t h e
ground on 16 March, COL Henderson f a i l e d t o make any r e a l i nves-
t i g a t i o n of t h e mat t er . H i s subsequent o r a l r e por t s t o BG Young
and MG Kost er wi t h r e s pe c t t o t h e scope and f i ndi ngs of h i s so-
c a l l e d i nve s t i ga t i on were knowingly f a l s e and decept i ve.
COL Henderson' s decept i on of h i s commanders a s t o what he
had done t o i nve s t i ga t e t h e mat t er and a s t o t he f a c t s he had
l ear ned probabl y pl ayed a l a r g e r r o l e i n t h e suppr essi on of t h e
f a c t s of Son My t han any ot he r f a c t or . Whatever may be s a i d of
t he f a i l u r e of BG Young and MG Kost er t o s ubj e c t COL Henderson' s
r e por t s t o adequat e revi ew, t hey had t o r e l y upon t he ve r a c t i y
of what Henderson t o l d them. I n mi sr epr esent i ng t o h i s commanders
t h a t he had made a r e a l e f f o r t t o det ermi ne t h e f a c t s and t h a t
W 0 1 Thompson was t h e onl y i ndi vi dua l he coul d f i n d who had seen
anyt hi ng unusual on 16 March, COL Henderson e f f e c t i v e l y cl osed
of f t h e f u l l exposure of t h e f a c t s of t h e Son My i nc i de nt t h a t
would have r e s ul t e d from a r e a l i nve s t i ga t i on and a f a c t u a l
r e por t .
COL Henderson' s wr i t t e n "Report of I nve s t i ga t i on, " accor di ng
t o MG Kost er , was supposed t o have put i n wr i t i ng t he d e t a i l s of
h i s pr evi ous o r a l r e p o r t i n response t o W 0 1 Thompson's a l l e ga t i ons .
I n f a c t , however, it made no mention of Thompson's compl ai nt s and
i s addressed s o l e l y t o t h e a l l e ga t i ons from Vietnamese sour ces
(VC-propaganda and t h e Son Ti nh Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s l e t t e r of 11
Apr i l 1968) , I t di smi ssed t hes e a l l e ga t i ons a s ba s e l e s s propa-
ganda and r e s t a t e d t h e f i c t i o n t h a t 20 noncombatant c a s u a l t i e s
had been i na dve r t e nt l y k i l l e d on 16 March. There had been no f ur -
t h e r i nve s t i ga t i on, and t h e manner i n which t h e st at ement by CPT
Rodreguez was appended t o t he "Report of I nve s t i ga t i on" suggest s
t h a t t h e i n t e n t was t o imply a Vietnamese o r i g i n and concurrence
from t h a t sour ce i n Henderson' s f i ndi ngs .
F. COMPANY B, 123D AVI ATI ON BATTALION
here i s no evi dence t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t members of Company B,
123d Avn Bn de l i be r a t e l y s e t about t o wi t hhol d or suppr ess i nf or -
mat i on concerni ng t h e Son My i nc i de nt . There were, however, sev-
e r a l a c t s of omi ssi on and commission by t h i s u n i t which c ont r i but -
ed t o t hos e ends.
1, Fai . l ure t o Make a Spot-Report of Al l eged War Crimes
Upon r e c e i p t of t h e compl ai nt s of ~ 0 1 Thompson and ot he r
members of h i s u n i t i MAJ Wat ke' act ed onl y t o r e por t t h e mat t er t o
t he commander of t h e Task Force charged wi t h t he of f ens e.
Lat er i n t h e day, a f t e r bei ng advi sed by Barker t h a t he coul d f i n d
not hi ng t o s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e charges and de s pi t e t he f a c t t h a t he
" di dn' t be l i e ve Col onel Barker" Watke di d not hi ng f u r t h e r un-
til approxi mat el y 2200 hour s. The f a c t t h a t W01 Thompson's
compl ai nt di d not reach t h e Di vi si on Commander u n t i l al most 2 4
hours a f t e r .itwas r ecei ved by P.WJ Watke, and t h e f a c t t h a t
itnever reached t h e Di vi si on S t a f f , i s due i n l a r ge p a r t t o
Watke' s f a i l u r e t o make t he compl ai nt t h e s ubj e c t of a s pot - r epor t .
2. Fa i l ur e t o Report t h e Complete Fact s Concerning Al l ega-
t i o n s of War Crimes
The d i s p a r i t y between what W01 Thompson saw a t My Lai ( 4 )
and what MAJ Watke s t a t e d he r epor t ed t o BG Young was di scussed
i n d e t a i l i n Chapt er 1 0 . The f a c t t h a t t h e complete s t o r y di d
not r each BG Young and subsequent l y t h e Di vi si on Commander, i s
l a r ge l y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o MAJ Watke' s f a i l u r e t o conf i r m o r docu-
ment t h e compl ai nt s of W01 Thompson and ot he r s . I f MAJ Watke d i d
not ga i n a f u l l appr eci at i on of Thompson's compl ai nt on t h e ba s i s
of what Thompson t o l d him, a f u l l awareness of the na t ur e of t h e
i nc i de nt would have been obt ai ned t hrough any e f f o r t s t o confi rm
t h e a l l e ga t i ons , MAJ Watke had a va i l a bl e t o him ot he r p i l o t s and
crew members who had been over t he a r e a a s w e l l a s t h e compl et e
"aero-scout " team which coul d have been used f o r a e r i a l reconnai s-
sance.
3 . I ns t r uc t i ons t o Members of t h e Uni t t o Curb Di scussi on
of t h e Son My Operat i on
Testimony by former members of t h e u n i t r e ve a l s t h a t
f ol l owi ng t h e Son My-operat i on t he r e was consi der abl e di scus-
s i on among members of Company B concerni ng what had occur r ed i n
My Lai ( 4 ) . ' MAJ Watke has t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was aware of
t h i s gener al unr e s t and approxi mat el y two days a f t e r t he opera-
' t i o n , he spoke t o t h e assembled company and "asked them not t o
di s c us s t h e mat t er any f u r t h e r ( t h a t ) not hi ng good coul d come of
t h e i r di s cus s i on of ita nd. . . i t would be t aken c a r e of . " - A t
t h i s t i me MAJ Watke was aware t h a t COL Henderson was conduct i ng
an i nve s t i ga t i on and, accor di ng t o h i s t est i mony, he had no r ea-
son t o s us pect t h e i nve s t i ga t i on would not be t horough.
While MAJ Watke' s i n t e n t may have been t h e el i mi nat i on of rumors
and s t o r i e s whi l e t h e i nc i de nt was bei ng i nve s t i ga t e d, t h e e f -
f e c t was l a r g e l y t o s i l e n c e f u r t h e r di s cus s i on of t h e mat t er
wi t hi n t h e company.
4. Fa i l ur e t o Take Appropri at e Act i on When Convinced a
"Cover-Up" Was Taking Pl ace
MAJ Watke t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was convi nced a "cover-up"
was t aki ng pl a c e a f t e r he observed t h a t no s e r i ous e f f o r t was
t a ki ng pl ace a f t e r he observed t h a t no s e r i ous e f f o r t was bei ng
made t o i n t e r r o g a t e t h e members of h i s uni t . Thi s convi ct i on
r ei nf or ced h i s e a r l i e r i mpressi on t h a t LTC Barker was l yi ng when
Barker s a i d he coul d not s u b s t a n t i a t e W 0 1 Thompson's a l l e ga t i ons .
Having once come t o t h i s concl usi on, Watke was f aced wi t h
a d i f f i c u l t de c i s i on and e l e c t e d not t o pursue t h e mat t er f ur t he r .
MAJ Watke has t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was r e l u c t a n t t o go out s i de t h e
di vi s i on wi t h t h e char ge, and coul d not o f f e r an expl anat i on
f o r h i s f a i l u r e t o document Thompson's a l l e ga t i ons wi t h s t a t e -
ments from h i s p i l o t s and crewmen o r t o t a ke any ot he r s t e ps t o
make t he a l l e ga t i ons a mat t er of r ecor d.
5. Fa i l ur e t o Act on Report s of Ext ensi ve Ci vi l i a n Cas ual t i es
Sever al former members of Company B have t e s t i f i e d t h a t
t hey submi t t ed wr i t t e n r e por t s concerni ng t he event s of 16 March.
These r e por t s were submi t t ed t hrough t he Company Oper at i ons Sec-
t i o n and made r ef er ence t o a s many a s 150 c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s . .
There has been no s a t i s f a c t o r y expl anat i on concerni ng t h e di spo-
s i t i o n of t he s e r e por t s and no i ndi c a t i on t h a t any a c t i on was
i n i t i a t e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e i r submi ssi on. I t would appear t h a t
MAJ Watke consi der ed h i s obl i ga t i ons t o r e por t t h e i nc i de nt s a t -
i s f i e d once he de l i ve r e d h i s r e por t t o BG Young.
G. HEADQUARTERS, 123D AVI ATI ON BATTALION
The a c t i ons a t t h i s l e v e l i n t he chai n of command i n sup-
pr e s s i ng i nf or mat i on a r e s i mi l a r t o t hose t aken by B Company of
t he same uni t . Both LTC Holladay and MAJ Watke have t e s t i f i e d
t h a t t hey were i n agreement concerni ng two f a c t s : F i r s t , t h a t
t he a l l e ga t i ons made by W01 Thompson and ot he r s were t r u e ; and
second, t h a t t h e r e had been a "cover-up. " I n consi der i ng
t h e r e a c t i on of t he s e two o f f i c e r s t o t h e s i t u a t i o n , i t shoul d
be not ed t hey possessed t h e c a pa bi l i t y t o do much t h a t was not
done: t o obt ai n sworn st at ement s from t he many eyewi t nesses
wi t hi n t h e u n i t ; t o conduct a l ow-l evel a e r i a l r econnai ssance of
My Lai ( 4 ) ; and t o seek approval f o r employment of a smal l i n-
f a nt r y u n i t i n t o t he a r e a t o confi rm o r deny s us pi ci ons .
H. HEADQUARTERS, AMERICAL DI VI S I ON
On 16 March 1968, t he America1 Di vi si on was t he p r i n c i p a l
headquar t er s t 8 which i nf or mat i on and r e por t s concerni ng t h e Son
My oper at i on was di r e c t e d. Subsequent t o t h a t da t e , ot he r r e-
por t s a nd' a l l e ga t i ons concerni ng t h a t oper at i on, from bot h US
u n i t s and GVN sour ces, were channel ed t o t h a t headquar t er s. Ex-
c e pt f o r r out i ne ope r a t i ona l da t a forwarded on 1 6 March, none of
t he s e r e por t s and , a l l e ga t i ons were t r ans mi t t ed by t h e America1
Di vi si on t o hi gher headquar t er s, even though i nf or mat i on had
been r ecei ved by 17 March concerni ng t h e event s a t My Lai ( 4 )
t h a t war r ant ed a t horough i nve s t i ga t i on.
While iti s c l e a r t h a t i nf or mat i on which shoul d have been
r epor t ed was wi t hhel d by t h e Americal Di vi si on from I11 MAF and
MACV, t h e mat t er of mot i vat i on and i n t e n t i s d i f f i c u l t t o de t e r -
mine. There i s l i t t l e evi dence t o war r ant a concl usi on t h a t t h e
Americal Di vi si on headquar t er s a c t ua l l y had an awareness of t h e
f u l l dimension of what had t aken pl ace a t Son My. While such a
p o s s i b l i t y cannot be e n t i r e l y excl uded, t he r e i s no d i r e c t evi -
dence t o t h a t e f f e c t , and itappears much more l i k e l y t h a t ( a t
l e a s t p r i o r t o mi d-Apri l ) t he CG, ADC, and t h e Chief of St a f f
bel i eved t hey were de a l i ng wi t h t h e k i l l i n g of 20-28 noncombat-
a nt s by TF Barker. Although t h e r e por t s t hey r ecei ved t o t h a t
e f f e c t were f a l s e and t hey were negl i gent t o have bel i eved them,
t hey probabl y t hought t hey were wi t hhol di ng i nf or mat i on concern-
i ng a much l e s s s e r i ous i nc i de nt t han t he one which had a c t ua l l y
occur r ed.
I t i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t some i nf or mat i on r eachi ng t h e command
el ement of t h e di vi s i on i n Apr i l i ndi c a t e d t h a t a much more
s e r i ous event had t aken pl ace on 16 March. The command r e a c t i on
t o t he s e subsequent r e por t s was s o i nadequat e t o t h e s i t u a t i o n
and s o i nc ons i s t e nt wi t h what o r d i n a r i l y would be expect ed of
o f f i c e r s of t h e a b i l i t y and exper i ence of MG Kost er and BG Young,
t h a t itcan onl y be expl ai ned by a r e f u s a l o r an i n a b i l i t y t o
accept o r gi ve any credence t o evi dence o r r e por t s which were not
c ons i s t e nt wi t h t h e i r o r i g i n a l , and er r oneous, concl usi on.
The f ol l owi ng i s a summary of s p e c i f i c a c t s of omi ssi on o r
commission t aken a t t he Americal Di vi si on headquar t er s which
cont r i but ed t o t h e concealment of t h e t r u e f a c t s of t he i nc i de nt .
1. Fa i l ur e t o Report Informat i on Concerning Noncombatant
Ca s ua l t i e s
MG Kost er has t e s t i f i e d t h a t by 1600 hours on 16 March,
he was aware t h a t a t l e a s t 20 noncombatants had been k i l l e d by
el ement s of TF Barker. A s commander of a major combat u n i t ,
he was aware of t h e concern expr essed by COMUSMACV concerni ng
noncombatant c a s u a l t i e s and o f . t h e requi rement t h a t such mat t er s
be r epor t ed a s a s e r i ous i nc i de nt . No such r e p o r t was made
by t h e Ameri cal -Di vi si on. .
2. Fa i l ur e t o Report Al l egat i ons of Suspect ed War C r i m e s
While t h e r e i s some c o n f l i c t i n t est i mony concerni ng t h e
e xt e nt t o which MG Kost er , BG Young., and 'COL Parson w e r e appr i sed
of t h e f u l l cont ent s of t he Thompson Report , t he r e i s s u f f i c i e n t
t est i mony t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t he s e t h r e e i ndi vi dua l s had been ad-
vi s e d of t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t noncombatants had been i ndi s cr i mi -
na t e l y k i l l e d i n My Lai ( 4 ) . MACV d i r e c t i v e s i n e f f e c t a t t h a t
t i me c l e a r l y r equi r ed t h a t such a l l e ga t i ons be r epor t ed.
No such r e por t was made by t h e America1 Di vi si on.
3 , Fa i l ur e t o I nsur e a Thorough and I mpa r t i a l I nve s t i ga t i on
of Al l egat i ons of War Crimes
Upon r e c e i p t of t h e Thompson Report , MG Kost er d i r e c t e d
an i nve s t i ga t i on by t h e commander of t h e u n i t accused i n t h e a l -
l e ga t i on. Such an i nve s t i ga t i on, s ubj e c t t o a t horough and i m-
p a r i t a l revi ew, mi ght have bemi an accept abl e r esponse t o t h e a l -
l e ga t i ons , However, iti s c l e a r from t h e t est i mony of t h e pr i n-
c i p a l s concerned t h a t t he i nve s t i ga t i on was a pr et ens e and t h e
revi ew i nadequat e.
4 . Ef f o r t s by t h e Di vi si on Command Group t o L i m i t Informa-
t i o n Concerning Noncombatant Ca s ua l t i e s and Al l eged War
Crimes
From t h e t est i mony of MG Kost er , BG Young, and COL Par-
son, itappear s t h a t each i ndi vi dua l act ed t o r e s t r i c t knowledge
of mat t er s bei ng i nve s t i ga t e d by COL Henderson. Spe c i f i c ac-
t i o n s i ncl uded t h e f a i l u r e t o i ncl ude p e r t i n e n t i nf or mat i on i n
d a i l y s t a f f br i e f i ngs ; t h e f a i l u r e pr oper l y t o employ t he i nves-
t i g a t i v e r esour ces of t h e d i v i s i o n s t a f f ; t he f a i l u r e t o advi s e
key s t a f f members concerni ng t h e a l l e ga t i ons and i nve s t i ga t i ons ;
and t h e f a i l u r e t o advi s e t h e s t a f f of mat t er s which shoul d have
been r epor t ed t o hi gher headquar t er s. Testimony i ndi c a t e s t h a t
members of t h e General and Speci al St a f f s had b u t l i t t l e i nf or -
a t i o n concerni ng t h e i nc i de nt or of t he subsequent i nve s t i ga t i on
o r review.
5. Fa i l ur e of t h e Di vi si on Chapl ai n t o Report Al l egat i ons of
War Crimes
A s di scussed i n Chapt er 10, s hor t l y a f t e r 16 March 1968,
W01 Thompson went t o t h e Di vi si on Ar t i l l e r y Chapl ai n, CPT Car l
Cr eswel l , wi t h a r e por t of what he had seen a t My Lai ( 4 ) .
Chapl ai n C r e s w e l l i n t u r n , wi t hout r e por t i ng t h e mat t er t o h l s
commander, went t o t h e Di vi si on Chapl ai n, LTC Fr anci s Lewis, wi t h
t h e s t or y. As pr evi ousl y di s cus s ed, LTC L e wi s ' e f f o r t s a t
i nve s t i ga t i on were f u t i l e arid he al l owed t he mat t er t o pass wi t h-
o u t s ubs t a nt i ve e f f o r t t o br i ng itt o t h e a t t e n t i o n of h i s supe-
r i o r s .
I . ACTI ONS BY PERSONNEL OUTSIDE THE AMERICAL DIVISION
Among t h e Vietnamese o f f i c i a l s who came i n cont act wi t h i n-
format i on concerni ng pos s i bl e war cri mes i n Son My dur i ng t h e
' per i od 16-19 March, t he r e was a na t ur a l r el uct ance t o conf r ont
t h e i r American count er par t s wi t h such a s e r i ous a l l e ga t i on and t o
i n s i s t on i nqui r y i n t o t h e mat t er . Such i nf or mat i on a s di d r each
US advi sor y channel s was not forwarded t hrough advi sor y channel s
but r e f e r r e d onl y t o t he Americal Di vi si on and i t s l l t h Bri gade.
There i s evi dence t h a t a t l e a s t a t t he Quang Ngai Provi nce and
Son Tinh Di s t r i c t l e ve l s , and pos s i bl y a t t he 2d ARVN Di vi si on,
t he s e ni or US mi l i t a r y advi sor s ai ded i n suppr essi ng i nf or mat i on
concerni ng t h e i nc i de nt .
J. SUMMARY
I t i s e vi de nt t h a t e f f o r t s t o suppr ess and wi t hhol d informa-
t i o n concerni ng t he Son My i nc i de nt were made a t every l e v e l i n
t he Americal Di vi si on. These e f f o r t s , coupl ed wi t h t h e f a l s e and
mi sl eadi ng r e por t s by COL Henderson were s uc c e s s f ul i n cont ai n-
i ng t h e s t o r y of Son My wi t hi n t h e di vi s i on. I t i s evi dent t o
t h i s I nqui r y, a f t e r i nt er vi ewi ng most of t hos e who wi t nessed
t h e event s a t Son My, t h a t any s e r i ous at t empt t o i nt e r r oga t e
such i ndi vi dua l s immediately f ol l owi ng t h e i nc i de nt would have
r e s ul t e d i n f u l l di s c l os ur e of t h e event . Many t e s t i f i e d i n a
manner which showed an eager ness t o expr ess what had appar ent l y
caused them gr e a t concern. I f t h e r e had been r e a l concern i n t h e
chai n of command, i f anyone had t aken a c t i on t o ask que s t i ons ,
t hey would have had f u l l and complete answers.
One mat t er which c a s t s f u r t h e r s us pi ci on on t he Americal D i -
vi s i on i s t h e al most t o t a l absence of f i l e s and r ecor ds of doc-
uments r e l a t i n g t o t he Son My i nc i de nt and i t s subsequent i nves-
t i g a t i o n . With few except i ons t h e f i l e s have been purged of
t he s e documents and r ecor ds of t h e i r removal o r de s t r uc t i on have
not been mai nt ai ned. The s i n g l e not abl e except i on t o t h i s has
been t h e copy of COL Henderson' s 24 Apr i l r e p o r t , and t h i s docu-
ment was found i n t h e f i l e s of t h e l l t h Bde S2 where it would
not normal l y have been f i l e d . The f i l e s of US advi sor y teams
which hadoknowledge of t h e Son My i nc i de nt were s i mi l a r l y bar r en.
Another f a c t o r which may have cont r i but ed t o suppr essi on was
t he manner i n which i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h e Son My i nc i de nt
was handl ed i n ~ i e t n a me s e c i r c l e s . Such i nf or mat i on was apparen-
t l y not di scussed t o any e xt e nt i n GvN channel s a s wi t nessed by
t he number of US per sonnel who worked c l os e l y wi t h Pr ovi nce,
Di s t r i c t , and ,ARVN a u t h o r i t i e s and y e t had no, knowledge t h a t t h e
i nc i de nt had occur r ed. Even on t h e ~ i e t n a me s e c i v i l i a n s i d e , a
measure of s i l e n c e f e l l over t h e community. Without except i on,
Americans who worked and l i ve d c l os e l y wi t h Vietnamese i n bot h
o f f i c i a l and s o c i a l c i r c l e s i n Quang Ngai Pr ovi nce, s t a t e d t ha t ,
t hey had not obt ai ned an i nkl i ng. o, f t h e i nc i de nt .
Chapter'12
FI NDI NGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I. ON THE BASIS OF THE FOmGOING, THE FINDINGS OF THE I NQUI RY
ARE AS FOLLOWS:
A. Concerning Events Surrounding The Son My Operation of 16 -
19March 1968
(1) During t he per i od 16-19 March 1968, US Army t r oops
of TF Barker, l l t h Brigade, America1 Di vi si on, massacred a
l a r ge number of noncombatants i n two hamlets of Son My Vi l l age,
Quang Ngai Provi nce, Republic of Vietnam. The pr eci s e number
of Vietnamese k i l l e d cannot be determined but was a t l e a s t 175
and may exceed 400.
( 2 ) The massacre occurred i n conj unct i on wi t h a combat
oper at i on which was i nt ended t o ne ut r a l i z e Son My-Village a s
a l o g i s t i c a l support base and st agi ng ar ea, and t o dest r oy
elements of an enemy ba t t a l i on t hought t o be l ocat ed i n t he
Son My ar ea.
(3) The massacre r es ul t ed pr i mar i l y from t he nat ur e of t he
or der s i ssued by persons i n t he chai n of command wi t hi n T!F Barker.
(4) The t a s k f or ce commander's or der and t he associ at ed,
i nt e l l i ge nc e est i mat e i ssued pr i or t o t he oper at i on were em-
bel l i s hed a s t hey were di ssemi nat ed through each lower l e ve l of
command, and ul t i mat el y present ed t o t he i ndi vi dual s ol di e r a
f a l s e and mi sl eadi ng pi c t ur e of t he Son My ar ea a s an armed
enemy camp, l ar gel y devoid of c i v i l i a n i nhabi t ant s.
(5) Pr i or t o t h e i nci dent , t he r e had rdeveloped wi t hi n
c e r t a i n elements of t he l l t h Brigade a permi ssi ve a t t i t u d e
toward t he t r eat ment and safeguardi ng of noncombatants which
ccont ri but ed t o t he mi st reat ment of such persons duri ng t he
Son My Operation.
(61
The permi ssi ve a t t i t u d e i n t h e t reat ment of Vietnamese
was, on 16-19 March 1968, exempl i fi ed by an almost t o t a l di s r e-
gard f o r t he l i v e s and propert y of t he c i v i l i a n popul at i on of
Son My Vi l l age on t h e p a r t of commanders and key s t a f f of f i c e r s
of TF Barker.
(71 On 16 March, s ol di e r s a t t he squad and pl at oon l e ve l ,
wi t hi n some elements of TF Barker,murdered noncombatants whi l e
under t he super vi si on and cont r ol of t h e i r immediate super i or s.
C8) A p a r t of the crimes v i s i t e d on t h e i nha bi t a nt s of
Son My Vi l l a ge i ncl uded i ndi vi dua l and group a c t s of murder,
r ape, sodomy, malming, and a s s a u l t on noncombatants and t h e
mi st r eat ment and k i l l i n g of det ai nees. They f u r t h e r i ncl uded
t h e k i l l i n g of l i ve s t oc k, de s t r uc t i on of cr ops, cl os i ng of w e l l s ,
and t h e burni ng of dwel l i ngs wi t hi n s e ve r a l subhamlets.
( 9) Some at t empt s were made t o s t op t h e cr i mi nal a c t s
i n Son My Vi l l a ge on 16 March; but wi t h few except i ons, such
e f f o r t s w e r e t oo f e e bl e o r t oo l a t e .
C10) I nt e ns i ve i nt e r r oga t i on has developed no evi dence
t h a t any member of t he u n i t s engaged i n t he Son My oper at i on
was under t h e i nf l uence of mari j uana o r ot he r na r c ot i c s .
B. Concerning The Adequacy Of Report s, I nve s t i ga t i ons And
Reviews
C 1 1 ) The commanders 0-TF Barker and t h e l l t h Bri gade had
s ubs t a nt i a l knowledge a s t o t he e xt e nt of t h e k i l l i n g of non-
combat ant s but onl y a por t i on of t h e i r i nf or mat i on was ever
r epor t ed t o t h e Commanding General of t h e Americal Di vi si on.
(12) Based on h i s obser vat i ons, W 0 1 Thompson made a s p e c i f i c
compl ai nt t hrough h i s command channel s t h a t s e r i ous war cri mes
had been committed but t hrough a series of i nadequat e responses
a t each l e v e l of command, a c t i on on h i s compl ai nt was del ayed
and t h e s e ve r i t y of h i s charges consi der abl y d i l u t e d by t he
t i m e it r eached- t he Di vi si on Commander.
(13) Suf f i c i e nt i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h e hi ghl y i r r e g u l a r
nat ur e of t h e oper at i ons of TF Bar-ker on 16 darch 1968 reached
t h e Commanding General of t he Americal Di vi si on t o r e qui r e t h a t
a t horough i nve s t i ga t i on be conducted.
C14) An i nve s t i ga t i on by t h e Commander of t he l l t h Bri gade,
conducted a t t he di r e c t i on of t he Commanding General of t he
America1 Di vi si on, was l i t t l e more t han a pr et ens e and was sub-
sequent l y mi sr epr esent ed a s a thorough i nve s t i ga t i on t o t he CG,
Americal Di vi si on i n or de r t o conceal from him t he t r u e enormity
of t h e a t r o c i t i e s .
C15) Pa t e nt l y i nadequat e r e por t s of i nve s t i ga t i on sub-
mi t t ed by the commander of t he l l t h Bri gade were accept ed a t
f a c e val ue and wi t hout an e f f e c t i v e revi ew by t h e CG, Americal
Di vi si on.
C16). Report s of a l l e ge d war crimes, noncombatant casual -
t i es, and s e r i ous i nc i de nt s concerni ng t he Son My oper at i on of
16 March we r e r ecei ved a t t h e headquar t er s of t h e Americal
Di vi si on but w e r e n o t r epor t ed t o hi gher headquar t er s de s pi t e
t h e exi s t ence of d i r e c t i v e s r equi r i ng such action*
(17)
Report s of al l eged war cri mes r e l a t i n g t o t he Son My
oper at i on of 16 March reached Vietnamese government o f f i c i a l s ,
b u t t hose o f f i c i a l s di d not t ake e f f e c t i v e a c t i on t o a s c e r t a i n
tk t r u e f a c t s .
(181 Ef f o r t s of t h e ARVN/GVN o f f i c i a l s d i s c r e e t l y t o
i nform t h e US commanders of t h e magnitude of t h e war crimes
committed on 16 March 1968 m e t wi t h no a f f i r ma t i ve response.
C. Concerning At t empt s To Suppress Informat i on
(19) A t every command l e v e l wi t hi n t h e Americal Di vi si on,
a c t i ons were t aken, bot h wi t t i ngl y and unwi t t i ngl y, which
e f f e c t i ve l y suppresged i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h e war cri mes
committed a t Son My Vi l l age.
(20)
A t t h e company l e v e l t he r e was a f a i l u r e - t o r e por t
t h e war cri mes which had been committed. Thi s , combined wi t h
i ns t r uc t i ons t o members of one u n i t not t o di s c us s t h e event s
of 16 March, cont r i but ed s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o t he suppr essi on of
i nformat i on.
(21) The t a s k f or c e commander and a t l e a s t one, and pro-
babl y more, s t a f f o f f i c e r s of - TF Barker may have conspi r ed t o
suppr ess i nf or mat i on and t o mi sl ead hi gher headquart exs con-
cer ni ng t h e event s of 16 - 19 March 1968.
(22) A t t h e l l t h Bri gade l e ve l , t h e commander and a t l e a s t
one pr i nc i pa l s t a f f - o f f i c e r may have conspi r ed t o suppr ess
i nf or mat i on t o decei ve t h e di vi s i on commander concerni ng t he
t r u e f a c t s of t h e Son My oper at i on of 16-19 March.
(23) A r e por t e r and a phot ographer from t he l l t h Bri gade
observed many war cri mes committed by C/1-20 I nf on 16 March.
Both f a i l e d t o r e por t what t hey had seen; t h e r e por t e r sub-
mi t t ed a mi sl eadi ng account of t he oper at i on; and t h e photo-
gr apher wi t hhel d and suppressed (and wrongful l y mi sappr opr i at ed
upon h i s di schar ge from t he s e r vi c e ) phot ographi c evi dence of
such war crimes.
C24) Ef f or t s wi t hi n t h e l l t h Bri gade t o suppr ess i nf or mat i on
concerni ng t he Son My oper at i on were ai ded i n varyi ng degrees
by members of US Advisory teams working wi t h ARVN and GVN
o f f i c i a l s .
( 251 Within t h e Americal Di vi si on headquar t er s, a c t i ons
t aken t o suppr ess i nzormat i on concerni ng what was pur por t edl y
bel i eved t o be t h e i nadver t ent k i l l i n g of 20 t o 28 noncom-
ba t a nt s e f f e c t i v e l y s er ved- t o conceal . t he t r u e nat ur e and scope
of t he event s wFiich had t aken pl ace i n Son My Vi l l age on 16-19
March 68.
(261 Fa i l u r e . o f t h e Americal Di vi si on headquar t er s t o a c t
on r e por t s and i nf or mat i on r ecei ved from GVN/ARVN o. f f i c i a l s i n
mid-April ser ved e f f e c t i v e l y t o suppr ess t h e t r u e na t ur e and
scope of t he event s which had t aken pl ace i n Son My Vi l l age on
16-19 March 1968.
(271 Despi t e an exhaust i ve sear ch of t he f i l e s of t he
11t h Bri gade, Americal Di vi si on, GVN/ARVN advi sor y team f i l e s ,
and r ecor ds hol di ng c e nt e r s , wit.h few except i ons, none of t he
documents r e l a t i n g t o t he so- cal l ed i nve s t i ga t i on of t he event s
of 16-19 March were l ocat ed.
D. With Respect To I ndi vi dual s
(1) Dur i ng- t he per i od March-June 1968 a number of persons
assi gned t o t he America1 Di vi si on and t o US Advisory -el ement s
l ocat ed i n Quang Ngai Provi nce had i nf or mat i on a s t o ' t h e k i l l i n g
of noncombatants and ot he r s er i ous of f ens es committed by members
of TF Barker dur i ng t h e Son My oper at i on i n March 1968 and di d
one o r more of t h e fol l owi ng:
a. Fa i l e d t o make such o f f i c i a l r e por t t her eof a s
t h e i r dut y r equi r ed them t o make;
b. Suppressed i nformat i on concerni ng t h e occurrence
of such of f ens es act -i ng s i ngl y o r i n concer t wi t h ot he r s ;
c. Fa i l e d t o or der a thorough i nve s t i ga t i on and t o
i ns ur e t h a t such was madelor f a i l e d t o conduct an adequat e
i nve s t i ga t i on, o r f a i l e d t o submit an adequat e r e por t of i nve s t i -
gat i on, o r f a i l e d t o make an adequat e review of a r e por t of i n-
ve s t i ga t i on, a s appl i cabl e;
o r committed ot he r de r e l i c t i ons r e l a t e d t o t h e event s of t h e
Son My oper at i on, some c ons t i t ut i ng cr i mi nal of f enses.
(21 At t ached t o t h i s chapt er a t I ncl os ur e 1 i s a l i s t of
such persons and t h e omi ssi ons- an3 commissions of which t hey
a r e suspect ed and upon which t he above f i ndi ngs a r e based.
a. The o f f i c e r s named i n I ncl os ur e 1, t h e i r pos i t i on
i n 1968, and t h e i r c ur r e nt grade and s t a t u s , a r e l i s t e d below:
K o s t e r , Samuel W.
' Yo u n g , G e o r g e H.
H e n d e r s o n , O r a n K.
H u t t e r , De a n E.
L u p e r , R o b e r t B.
Parson, N e l s A.
B a r k e r , Frank A.
G a v i n , D a v i d C.
G u i n n , W i l l i a m D.
H a l l a d a y , John L.
L e w i s , Fr anci s R.
C a l h o u n , C h a r l e s C.
Mc Kn i g h t , R o b e r t W.
Watke, Frederic W.
Bo a t ma n , K e n n e t h W.
'GRADE
MG
BG
COL
COL
COL
COL
LTC
LTC
(t hen
'.MA J)
LTC
LTC
LTC
( Ch )
MAJ
MAJ
MAJ
CPT
'POS'I'TXON CURRENT STATUS
CG, America1 A c t i v e D u t y
D i v
ADC COPS) A c t i v e D u t y
A m e r i c a 1 D i v
CO, 11t h I nf A c t i v e D u t y
B d e
Seni or A d v i s o r A c t i v e D u t y
2 d ARVN D i v
COi 6 - 1 1 t h A c t i v e D u t y
A r t y
C h i e f of St af f A c t i v e D u t y
A m e r i c a l D i v
CO, TF B a r k e r
Seni or Di s -
t r i c t A d v i s o r ,
Son T i n h Di s -
t r i ct
D e p u t y Seni or
A d v i s o r , Qu a n g
N g a i P r o v i n c e
CO, 1 2 3 d Av n
Bn
D i v C h a p l a i n ,
A m e r i c a 1 D i v
XO/S3 ,~TF B a r -
, ker
S3, 11t h I nf
B d e
D e c e a s e d
A c t i v e D u t y
A c t i v e D u t y
.
A c t i v e Du t y
A c t i v e D u t y
A c t i v e D u t y
A c t i v e D u t y
CO, Co B, 1 2 3 d A c t i v e D u t y
Av n Bn
F o r w a r d Ob s e r - A c t i v e D u t y
(then 1LT) ver , Command
Gr o u p , B/ 4- 3
- .
. . . . , ... . . . . , . . . . , , . . . . . . . . , . . . .
%FADE
~ f w P T O N 'CURRENT'STATUS
Cr e s we l l , C a r l E. CPT Di v Ar t y Chap- Ci c v l l i a n
( Ch) l a i n Ame r i c a 1
D i v
J o h n s o n , De n n i s H. CPT [then Mzl i t ar y Xnt e l ~ Ac t g v e Dut y
1LT) l i gence off 2cer
i n s u p p o r t of TP
Ba r k e r
Kot ouc , Euge ne M. CPT s 2 , TF Ba r k e r Ac t i v e Dut y
Me di na , E r n e s t L. CPT CO, C/1-20 I n f Ac t i v e Dut y
Michles, E a r l A. CPT CO, ~ / 4 - 3 rnf De c e a s e d
Vazquez, , De n n i s R. CPT A r t i L l e r y LSa i - CZ v i l i a n
son of f l cer in
s u p p o r t of TP
Ba r k e r
Wi l l i n g h a m, Thomas K. CPT Cthen P l t Ld r , 1st Ac t i v e Dut y
l LT1 P l t , 6/ 4- 3 Inf
C a l l e y , W i l l i a m L. , Jr. 1LT Cthen P l t Ld r , 1st Ac t i v e Du t y
2LTZ P l t , (71-20 Xnf
Al a u x , Ro g e r L. , Jr . 2LT Ar t y For wa r d Obs- Civilian
erver a t t a c h e d t o
C/1-20 I nf
Br o o k s , S t e v e n K.
P l t Ld r , 2 d
De c e a s e d
P l t , C/1*20
La Cr o s s , J e f f r e y U. 2LT
P l t Ld r , 3d
C i v i l i a n
P l t , C/1-20
Le wi s , Michael L.
P l t Ld r , 2d
De c e a s e d
P l t , B/4-3
Mundy, J o h n E. 2LT E x e c u t i v e
C i v i l i a n
Of f i c e r , B/4-3
I
b. The f ol l owi ng e n l i s t e d members 05 t he Army
oper at i ng i n suppor t of TF Barker, on 16 March 1968 and now
c i v i l i a n s , by reason of t h e i r mi l i t a r y t r a i ni ng and assi gn-
ment, and having a p a r t i c u l a r dut y t o r e por t any knowledge
of suspect ed o r appar ent war crimes which came t o t h e i r
a t t e n t i o n , f a i l e d t o perform t h i s dut y:
NAME GRADE POSITION
Haeberl e, Ronald L. SGT Phot ographer, I nf o
Of f i ce, l l t h I nf Bde
( 31s t PI D)
Robert s, Jay A. -SP5 Seni or Correspondent ,
I nf o Of f i ce, l l t h
I nf Bde ( 31st P I D )
(3) Evidence adduced i n t h i s I nqui r y a l s o i ndi c a t e s t h a t '
numerous s e r i ous of f ens es i n vi ol a t i on of t h e Uniform Code of
Mi l i t a r y J u s t i c e and t he law of war may have been committed
by mi l i t a r y per sonnel who pa r t i c i pa t e d i n t h e TI? Barker
oper at i on i n Son My dur i ng- t he per i od 16 - 19 March 1968.
Evidence of t he s e suspect ed of f ens es has been f ur ni shed t o
r e pr e s e nt a t i ve s of t h e Pr ovost Marshal General of t he Army f o r
f u r t h e r i nve s t i ga t i on.
( 4 ) Some of t h e o f f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d men concerned f ul -
f i l l e d t h e i r minimum obl i ga t i on t o r e por t t h e i r knowledge of
cri mes committed dur i ng t h e Son My oper at i on t o t h e i r commanding
o f f i c e r s . However, had t hey exhi bi t ed de,eper concern f o r t h e i r
u n i t s , t h e United ~ t a t e s ' ~ r m y and t h e Nat i on by t aki ng act i on
beyond t h a t which was t e c hni c a l l y r equi r ed, it i s probabl e t h a t
t h e d e t a i l s of t h e Son My i nc i de nt would have come t o l i g h t
promptly. Those who f a i l e d t o do s o have cont r i but ed t o a s e r -
i ous obst ruct . i on of j us t i c e .
E. Concerning The Adequacy of Cer t ai n Pol i c i e s , Di r e c t i ve s ,
And Tr ai ni ng
(1) I n 1968, t he t hen e xi s t i ng p o l i c i e s and d i r e c t i v e s a t
ever y l e v e l of command expressed a c l e a r i n t e n t r egar di ng t h e
pr oper t-reatment and safeguardi ng of noncombatants, t he humane
handl i ng of pr i s oner s of war, and minimizing t he de s t r uc t i on 6f
p r i v a t e pr oper t y.
( 2) Di r ect i ves pr es cr i bi ng t h e procedures f o r t he r epor t -
i ng of war crimes were not c l e a r a s t o t he a c t i on which shoul d
be t aken by subor di nat es when t h e i r u n i t commander pa r t i c i pa t e d
i n o r sanct i oned a war cri me. Di r ect i ves pr escr i bed onl y t h a t
war cri mes would te r epor t ed t o t h e commanding o f f i c e r .
( 3) Many s o l d i e r s i n t he 11t h Brigade were not adequat el y
t r a i ne d as t o:
a . Thei r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s r egar di ng obedi ence t o
or der s r ecei ved from t h e i r super i or s which t hey consi dered
pal pabl y i l l e g a l .
b. Thei r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s concerni ng t h e procedures
f o r t he r epor t i ng of war cri mes.
c. The pr ovi si ons of t h e Geneva Convent i ons, t he han-
dl i ng and t r eat ment of pr i s one r s of war, and the t r eat ment and
saf eguar di ng of noncombatants.
F. Per i pher al I s s ue s
Fi ndi ngs r egar di ng pe r i phe r a l i s s ue s a r e di scussed i n
Annex B.
11. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT :
A. YOU t a ke cognizance of t he f i ndi ngs s e t f o r t h above.
B. The names of t h e members of t h e Army l i s t e d i n para-
graph D ( 2) a , above, t oget her wi t h i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h e i r
omi ssi ons and commissions, be r e f e r r e d t o t h e i r r e s pe c t i ve gen-
e r a l cour t - mar t i al convening a u t h o r i t i e s f o r pos s i bl e di s ci p-
l i na r y o r admi ni s t r at i ve act i on.
C. cons i der at i on be gi ven t o t h e modi f i cat i on of appl i cabl e
pol i c i e s , di . r e c t i ve s , and t r a i ni ng st andar ds i n pr de r t o c or r e c t
t h e . appar ent de f i c i e nc i e s not ed i n paragraph IE above.
OMISSIONS AND COMMISSIONS BY INDIVIDUALS
Following i s a l i s t i n g of i ndi vi dual s and t h e omi ssi ons
and commissions of which t hey a r e suspect ed pe r t a i ni ng t o
t h e pl anni ng, conduct; r e por t i ng, and i nve s t i ga t i on of t h e
oper at i on by TF Barker i n t he Son My a r e a and t h e r e l a t e d
i nci dent s . The t e r m s omi ssi ops and commissions a r e used
her e t o- de not e , r e s pe c t i ve l y, i ns t ances i n which an i ndi vi -
dua l may have f a i l e d t o perform h i s dut y o r may have
performed h i s dut y i mproperl y, measured i n t erms of t hose
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s which w e r e reasonabl y h i s under t he-
a t t e nda nt circumiitances, I t i s recogni zed t h a t some of t he
omi ssi ons and commissions may i nvol ve cr i mi nal of f ens es .
1. MG SAMUEL W. KOSTER
a. H e di d not insure t h a t t h e pl an f o r t h e Son My
oper at i on i ncl uded pr ovi si ons f o r t h e handl i ng, scr eeni ng,
and t r eat ment of t h e noncombatant i nha bi t a nt s of t he ar ea.
b. About-midmorning of 16 March 68 when informed by
COL Henderson t h a t he had observed 6 t o 8 dead c i v i l i a n s ,
he (MG Kost er) d i d n o t t ake p o s i t i v e a c t i on t o i ns ur e t h a t
such c a s ua l t i e s were r epor t ed through t h e proper chai n of
command nor is ' t her e any i ndi c a t i on t h a t he t ook any
s t r ong pos i t i ve a c t i on t o pr event any f ur t he r k i l l i n g o r
t o ot herwi se minimize noncombatant c a s ua l t i e s .
c. On t he af t er noon of 16 March 68, he countermanded an
or der which had been i s s ued by a subor di nat e commander,
COL Henderson, d i r e c t i n g t h a t C/1-20 I nf r e t ur n t o My Lai
( 4 ) t o det ermi ne t h e number of c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s , ol d
men, women, and chi l dr en; and appar ent l y a t nb-t i me di d he'
obt ai n COL Henderson' s r easons f o r di r e c t i ng C Company t o
r e t ur n t o make t he count of c i v i l i a n c a s ua l t i e s nor i s t he r e
any evi dence t h a t he di scussed t h i s mat t er wi t h COL Henderson
a t any l a t e r t i m e .
Inclosure I
d. By t he eveni ng of 16 March 68, he knew t h a t a t l e a s t
20 c i v i l i a n s had been k i l l e d i n o r around My Lai (44,
pur por t edl y a s a r e s u l t of a r t i l l e r y , gunshi p, and smal l
arms f i r e . However,, he di d not :
(1) Provi de such i nf or mat i on t o ot he r command and s t a f f
el ement s of t h e Di vi si on headquar t er s wi t h t he r e s u l t t h a t
such i nf or mat i on was not ent er ed i n t o t he oper at i ons l og of
t he di vi s i on nor r epor t ed t o hi gher headquar t er s i n t h e
~ i v i s i o n SITREP and/or INTSUM.
( 2) I n i t i a t e a Ser i ous I nci dent Report. (SIR) t o be sub-
mi t t ed t o hi gher headquar t er s i n accordance wi t h r e gul a t i ons .
( 3) Di rec, t t h e i n i t i a t i o n of an a r t i l l e r y i nc i de nt
r e por t a s r equi r ed by r egul at i ons even though some of t h e
c i v i l i a n c a s ua l t i e s w e r e r epor t ed a s havi ng r e s ul t e d from
a r t i l l e r y f i r e .
e. A t o r about noontime on 17 March 68, BG Young, an
ADC, informed him of t h e d e t a i l s of W01 Thompson's r e por t
which had been r el ayed t hrough LTC Holladay and MAJ Watke.
According t o MG Kost er , t he essence of t he' r e por t was t h a t
t he r e had been i ndi s cr i mi nat e f i r i n g , t h a t ext ens i ve f i r e -
power had been di r e c t e d a t c i v i l i a n s t her eby causi ng casual -
t i e s and t h a t a conf r ont at i on had t aken pl a c e between el ement s
of t he 123d Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on and el ement s of TF Barker.
Although he di r e c t e d t h a t an i nve s t i ga t i on be made i n response
t o t h i s i nf or mat i on, he f a i l e d t o:
(1) I s s ue pr oper i ns t r uc t i ons t o i ns ur e t h a t a thorough
i nve s t i ga t i on would be conducted.
(2) 1nsur e t h a t t h e i nf or mat i on was forwarded t o CG
I11 MAF and pos s i bl y COMUSMACV.
( 3 ) Inform appr opr i at e el ement s of t h e command and s t a f f
of t h e Thompson Report , o r advi se thein t h a t he had di r e c t e d an
i nve s t i ga t i on.
( 4 )
Pr oper l y u t i l i z e t h e i nve s t i ga t i ve el ement s of t he
Di vi si on s t a f f t o i ns ur e t h a t an appr opr i at e i nve s t i ga t i on
would be conducted.
f. On o r about 20 ~ a r c h . 6 8 , he accept ed an o r a l r e por t of
i nvest i gat i ' on pr esent ed by COL Henderson and di d not :
(1) Ascer t ai n t h a t an appr opr i at e i n dept h i nve s t i ga t i on
had been conducted.
( 2) Requi re t h a t a r e por t of i nve s t i ga t i on be submi t t ed
i n wr i t i ng al ong wi t h necessar y documentation.
( 3) Not i fy appr opr i at e elements of t h e Di vi si on command
and s t a f f t h a t he had r ecei ved and accept ed t he o r a l r e por t of
COL Henderson which i ndi cat ed t h a t t h e compl ai nt s r e gi s t e r e d by
W 0 1 Thompson were i nva l i d.
( 4 ) Inform t h e commander of t he 123d Avi at i on Bat t al i on
o f . t h e submi ssi on of COL Henderson' s o r a l r e por t nor i n any
ot he r way i nf or m W01 Thompson t h a t , h i s compl ai nt s were not
support ed.
g. About mid-April 68, he r ecei ved i nf or mat i on t h a t
t h e Chi ef, Son Tinh Di s t r i c t , had submi t t ed a r e por t t o
t h e Chi ef, Quang Ngai Provi nce, a l l e gi ng t h a t American
f or c e s had k i l l e d approxi mat el y 500 c i v i l i a n s ' i n Tu Cung
and Co Luy haml et s of Son My Vi l l age on 16 March 68. He
a l s o r ecei ved i nf or mat i on t h a t VC propaganda br oadcast s
were s t r e s s i n g t h a t American f or ces had k i l l e d a l a r ge
number of noncombatants (some br oadcast s i ndi cat ed 500)
i n Son My Vi l l age on o r about 16 March. Having r ecei ved
t h i s i nf or mat i on, he f a i l e d t o:
(1) I n i t i a t e a s t a f f a na l ys i s of t he s e items of
i nf or mat i on i n combination wi t h COL Henderson' s r e por t
and t h e ope r a t i ona l da t a r e s u l t i n g from TF Barker-
oper at i ons on 16 March 68.
( 2) Inform hi gher headquar t er s of t he a l l e ga t i ons
cont ai ned i n t h e Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s r e por t t o t he provi nce
Chief o r t hose made i n t h e VC propaganda.
( 3) Have or der s pr epar ed appoi nt i ng an i nve s t i ga t i ng
o f f i c e r al ong wi t h appr opr i at e CI D suppor t , as r equi r ed by
MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4 t o i ns ur e t h a t t he a l l e ga t i ons were
pr oper l y i nve s t i ga t e d by an i ndependent , d i s i n t e r e s t e d par t y.
( 4 ) Di r ect h i s G2 t o i n i t i a t e an aggr essi ve i nt e l l i ge nc e
c ol l e c t i on e f f o r t t o obt ai n a ddi t i ona l i nf or mat i on concern-
i ng what might have t aken pl ace i n Son My on 16 March 68.
h. H e i ndi c a t e s t h a t he consi dered COL Henderson' s
so- cal l ed r e por t of i nve s t i ga t i on of 24 Apr i l t o be an i nade-
quat e r e por t . However, he f a i l e d t o:
(1) I nsur e t h a t COL Henderson had conducted an adequat e
i nve s t i ga t i on.
(2) Require i nf or mat i on as t o who had prepared t h e s t a t e -
ment a t I ncl os ur e 1 and t h e r easons t he r e f or .
(3) Give pr oper consi der at i on t o t h e r e por t s c i t e d i n
I ncl osur e 1, s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Chi ef ' s r e por t
and t he Son My Vi l l age Chi ef ' s r e por t .
( 4 ) Inform a u t h o r i t i e s i n I Corps, i . e . , CG 111MAF
and LTG Lam, CG I CTZ, concerni ng t h e a c t i ons he. had
t aken wi t h r es pect t o . t h e a l l e ga t i ons and t h e i nve s t i ga t i on.
i. As not ed i n paragraph h above, when he found COL
Henderson' s r e por t of 24 Apr i l t o be i nadequat e, he s t a t e d
i n t est i mony t h a t he di r e c t e d t h a t a formal i nve s t i ga t i on be
conducted. However, t he r e i s no r ecor d of an i nve s t i ga t i ng
o f f i c e r havi ng been appoi nt ed nor i s t he r e any r ecor d i n t he
di vi s i on of a r e por t of t he i nve s t i ga t i on havi ng been
prepared o r submi t t ed.
j. Besi des t he commissions and omi ssi ons c i t e d above,
t he r e i s no t est i mony t o i ndi c a t e t h a t a t any t i m e he took
any a ddi t i ona l pos i t i ve o r aggr essi ve command a c t i on t o
det ermi ne t he t r u e f a c t s surroundi ng t h e oper at i on of
TF Barker on 16 'March 68.
k. By r e t a i ni ng unt o hi msel f i nf or mat i on t h a t a t l e a s t
20 c i v i l i a n s had been k i l l e d and by not r e por t i ng such f a c t s ,
he e f f e c t i ve l y suppressed i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h e Son My
i nc i de nt bot h wi t hi n and out s i de t he Di vi si on.
1. I n r e s t r i c t i n g knowledge of t h e i nc i de nt , t h e i nves-
t i ga t i ons , r e por t s , and reviews t o a group c ons i s t i ng of BG
Young, COL Parson, and hi msel f , he may have i n i t i a t e d a
conspi racy t o wi t hhol d t h e . f a c t s concerni ng t h e a c t i ons of
el ement s of TF Barker on 16 March 1968.
m. H e may have f a l s e l y t e s t i f i e d on s e ve r a l mat t er s
bef or e t h i s I nqui r y. For example, he s t a t e d t h a t he always
kept BG Young and COL Parson compl et el y informed, whereas
bot h of them i ndi cat ed t h a t t hey had onl y a minimum of
knowledge concerni ng h i s act i ons . H e a l s o i ndi c a t e d t h a t
he di r e c t e d a formal i nve s t i ga t i on and t h a t he had r ecei ved
a r e por t of s a i d i nve s t i ga t i on from COL Henderson. Thi s
I nqui r y di d not l oc a t e such a formal r e por t of i nve s t i ga t i on
nor i s t he r e aany i ndi c a t i on ot he r t han from MG Kost er and
COL Henderson t h a t such a r e por t was ever pr epar ed o r
submi t t ed.
2. BG GEORGE H. YOUNG
a . Having r ecei ved a r e por t from LTC Holladay and MAJ
Watke t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t W01 Thompson and ot he r members of
t h e 123d Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on had observed a l a r ge number of
c i v i l i a n noncombatants. who had been k i l l e d unnecessar i l y
dur i ng TF ~ a r k e r ' s oper at i on of 16 March 68, and t h a t
t he r e had been a conf r ont at i on between ai r el ement s of t h e
123d Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on and t he ground el ement s of TF
Barker, .he f a i l e d :
(1) To convey t h i s same i nf or mat i on 0.r t h e s e ve r i t y of
t h e i nc i de nt t o t he Commanding General , accor di ng t o h i s
own and MG ~ o s t e r ' s t est i mony.
( 2) Ei t he r t o d i r e c t o r t o recommend t o t he CG t h a t
t h e Commanding Of f i c e r of t he 123d Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on
obt ai n s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s and wr i t t e n st at ement s from t h e
p i l o t s and ot he r c r e w members who pa r t i c i pa t e d i n suppor t i ng
t h e oper at i on of TF ~ a r k e r on 16 March.
( 3) To recommend t o t he CG t h a t I11 MAF, MACV, and
USARV be n o t i f i e d immediately and t h a t a SIR shoul d be
rendered o r an i nve s t i ga t i on of an a r t i l l e r y i nc i de nt be
i n i t i a t e d .
b. Having r ecei ved i n s t r u c t i o n s from t he CG a t about
1200 hours on 17 March t o i n i t i a t e an immediate i nve s t i ga t i on,
he :
(1) Vi s i t e d TF Barker a t LZ Dot t i e e a r l y on t h e
af t er noon of - 17 March and was br i e f e d by t he TF - 53 but t ook no
a c t i on t o employ a ground el ement , e i t h e r by l and movement
o r by combat a i r a s s a u l t , o r an a e r i a l reconnai ssance el ement
t o a s c e r t a i n t h e f a c t s r e l a t i v e t o noncombatant c a s ua l t i e s
i n My Lai ( 4 ) on t he pr evi ous day.
( 2) Delayed al most 24 hours bef or e i s s ui ng such i ns t r uc -
t i ons al t hough he had ample oppor t uni t y t o do s o e a r l y on
t h e af t er noon of 17 March.
c. On t he morning of 18 March, he m e t wi t h COL Henderson
and t hr e e ot he r s i n LTC Bar ker ' s van a t LZ Dot t i e t o di s cus s
t h e i nci dent . But i f h i s t est i mony i s accur at e, he di d not
i s s ue appr opr i at e i ns t r uc t i ons t o COL Henderson t o i ns ur e t h a t
a pr oper i nve s t i ga t i on would-be conducted.
d. He had knowledge of t h e burni ng of dwel l i ngs and
s h e l t e r s i n t h e a r e a of Son My Vi l l age and knew t h i s t o be
cont r ar y t o r egul at i ons and pol i cy, but t ook no a c t i on t o
have it o f f i c i a l l y r epor t ed o r i nves t i gat ed.
e. Without as s ur i ng hi msel f t h a t a pr oper i nve s t i ga t i on
had been conducted by COL Henderson, he r epor t ed i t s pr ogr ess
and s t a t u s t o t h e CG. I n doi ng s o, he may have cont r i but ed
t o t h e i mpressi on t h a t a proper i nve s t i ga t i on had been
' conducted and t her eby i nf l uenced t he accept ance by t he CG
of COL Henderson' s r epor t of i nve s t i ga t i on.
f . Having knowledge of t h e accept ance of COL Henderson' s
o r a l r epor t by MG Kost er, he di d not i nform LTC ~ o i l a d a yo r
MAJ Watke of t h e r e s u l t s of COL Henderson' s i nve s t i ga t i on or
i t s accept ance by t he CG.
g. Having been advi sed by LTC Guinn, Deputy PSA Quang
Ngai Provi nce, concerni ng t he Son My Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s r e pa r t
t o t h e Provi nce Chief of t h e k i l l i n g of l a r ge numbers of
c i v i l i a n s by Americans i n Son My Vi l l age, he f a i l e d:
(1)To t a ke pos i t i ve a c t i on t o obt a i n a copy of t he
r epor t .
( 2 ) To di s c us s t h e r e por t i n dept h wi t h t h e Provi nce
Chief and/or ot he r GVN o f f i c i a l s .
( 3 ) To seek out a ddi t i ona l i nf or mat i on concerni ng t he
da t a i ncl uded i n t h e r epor t . l t
h. Having knowledge of (1) t he i nf or mat i on cont ai ned
i n t h e Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s r epor t , ( 2 ) t h e pr evi ousl y r epor t ed
a c t i v i t i e s of TF Barker, ( 3 ) t he i nf or mat i on provi ded through
W01 Thompson's r e por t , and ( 4 ) COL Henderson' s o r a l r e por t
of i nve s t i ga t i on, he f a i l e d t o c o r r e l a t e t he af or es ai d
i nf or mat i on and t o advi se MG Kost er t h a t t h e i nf or mat i on
i ndi cat ed an a l l e ga t i on of major war crimes.
i. Toget her wi t h t h e CG, he f ai . l ed t o i nform t h e Di vi si on
s t a f f of t h e compl ai nt s and a l l e ga t i ons which had been made
and t h e a c t i ons which had been t aken, t he r e by cont r i but i ng t o
t h e suppr essi on of i nf or mat i on concerni ng t he a c t i v i t i e s of
TF Barker on 16 March.
j. Although he v i r t u a l l y di s a s s oc i a t e d hi msel f from
event s f ol l owi ng COL Henderson' s o r a l r e por t of i nve s t i ga t i on
on about 20 March; t h e evi dence suggest s t h a t he was wel l
informed wi t h r e s pe c t t o t h e i s s ue s i nvol ved and may have
cont r i but ed t o a conspi racy t o suppr ess i nf or mat i on of t he
i nc i de nt .
k. There were s e ve r a l i ns t a nc e s i n h i s t est i mony bef or e
t h i s I nqui r y where he may have t e s t i f i e d f a l s e l y concerni ng
t h a t which was t o l d t o him by LTC Holladay and MAJ Watke and
what he r epor t ed t o t he CG. He r epeat edl y i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e
c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s were t he r e s u l t of havi ng been caught i n
a "cross-f i r e " y e t t h e r e was no evi dence of t he ground t r oops
i nvol ved havi ng r ecei ved any opposi t i on.
3. COL ORAN K. HENDERSON
a. When br i e f e d on t he concept of t h e oper at i on of
TF Barker i n t o t he Son My a r e a , he di d not i ns ur e t h a t t he
pl an i ncl uded pr ovi si ons f o r handl i ng, scr eeni ng, and t r e a t -
ment of noncombatants and r ef ugees.
b. Af t er obser vi ng t he bodi es of noncombatnats i n and
around My Lai ( 4 ) dur i ng t h e morning of 16 March, and
de s pi t e h i s knowledge c ha t C Company had not encount ered
r e s i s t a nc e , he f a i l e d t o t ake e f f e c t i v e a c t i on t o pr event
f u r t h e r k i l l i n g of noncombatants by C Company.
c. H e f a i l e d t o t ake any a c t i on t o i ns ur e t h a t medi cal
t r eat ment was provi ded t o noncombatants i n t he Son My a r e a
on 16 March.
d. Af t er C Company had r epor t ed k i l l i n g 84 VC i n My
Lai ( 4 ) by 0840 hours on 16 March, he e i t h e r p a r t i c i -
pat ed i n o r condoned t he making of f i c t i t i o u s r e por t s t o
hi gher headquar t er s and f a l s e e n t r i e s i n o f f i c i a l r ecor ds
t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t 69 VC had been k i l l e d by a r t i l l e r y a t
a l oc a t i on nor t h of My Lai ( 4 ) .
e. Having observed on 16 March t h a t many of t he
dwel l i ngs and ot he r s t r u c t u r e s i n My Lai . ( 4 ) were bei ng
burned i n vi ol a t i on of di vi s i on pol i cy and t he pr ovi si ons
of pe r t i ne nt d i r e c t i v e s , he f a i l e d t o t a ke any e f f e c t i v e
a c t i on t o:
(1) St op such de s t r uc t i on.
( 2) Report t h e f a c t s t o hi gher headquar t er s.
f . Having observed t he bodi es of women and c hi l dr e n i n
and around My Lai ( 4 ) on 16 March, and a f t e r r ecei vi ng
subsequent r e por t s and i nf or mat i on on t he same day i ndi c a t i ng
t h a t many a ddi t i ona l noncombatants may have been k i l l e d by
a r t i l l e r y o r gunshi p, he f a i l e d ta. i n i t i a t e :
(1) An immediate i nve s t i ga t i on t o det ermi ne t h e e xt e nt
and t he causes of t h e c a s ua l t i e s .
( 2) An i nve s t i ga t i on of an a r t i l l e r y i nc i de nt , o r t o
recommend t h a t such an i nve s t i ga t i on be i n i t i a t e d , a s r equi r ed
by USARV and America1 Di vi si on di r e c t i ve s .
( 3) A SI R as r equi r ed by r egul at i ons .
g. Having been di r e c t e d t o i nve s t i ga t e and r e por t t o
h i s commanding o f f i c e r concerni ng t he Thompson Report and
a f t e r per s onal l y hear i ng from W01 Thompson, CWO Culverhouse,
and SP Colburn account s of t h e i r obser vat i ons of t h e event s
i n Son My Vi l l age, he f a i l e d t o make an appr opr i at e i nve s t i -
gat i on t o det ermi ne t he t r u t h of such r e por t s .
12-15
h. Having been di r e c t e d t o i nve s t i ga t e and r e por t t o
h i s commanding o f f i c e r concerni ng t h e r e por t of W 0 1 Thompson;
havi ng per sonal l y i nt e r r oga t e d Thompson, Culverhouse, and
Colburn; and havi ng f a i l e d t o make a genuine i nve s t i ga t i on
of t heLr r e por t s , he:
(1)Made a s e r i e s of f a l s e and mi sl eadi ng r epor t s t o h i s
commanding o f f i c e r t o t he e f f e c t t h a t :
-
(a) H e had made a thorough i nve s t i ga t i on of t h e
Thompson Report .
(b) He had i nt er r ogat ed a l l of t he commanders and
many of t he s o l d i e r s and avi at i on personne.1 i nvol ved.
( c ) W01 Thompson was t h e onl y person he had found who
had seen anyt hi ng unusual on 16 March.
( d) There was no subst ance t o Thompson's a l l e ga t i ons .
( 2) Concealed t h e e xi s t e nc e of war cri mes.
i. About mid-April 1968, havi ng r ecei ved i nf or mat i on
t h a t (1)t h e Son Tinh D i s t r i c t Chief had submi t t ed a r epor t
t o t h e Quang Ngai Provi nce Chief a l l e gi ng t h a t US f or c e s
had k i l l e d approxi mat el y 500 noncombatants i n Tu Cung and
Co Luy haml et s of Son My Vi l l age on 16 March 1968, and
(2) VC propaganda br oadcast s were s t r e s s i n g t h a t US f or ces
had k i l l e d a l a r ge number of noncombatants i n t h e Son My
Vi l l age on 16 March 1968, he:
(-1) Fai l ed t o conduct any i nve s t i ga t i on of t he a l l e -
gat i ons of t h e d i s t r i c t Chi ef.
(2) Fal s el y informed t h e CG, 2d ARVN Di-vision, and
t he Provi nce Chief t h a t he had pr evi ousl y i nve s t i ga t e d
s i mi l a r a l l e ga t i ons r es pect i ng t h e 16 March oper at i on
and had found them t o be e n t i r e l y wi t hout subst ance.
j. Having been subsequent l y di r e c t e d t o i nve s t i ga t e t he
a l l e ga t i ons of t h e D i s t r i c t Chief and t h e VC propaganda, and
t o submit a wr i t t e n r e por t i ncor por at i ng t he evi dence he
claimed t o have c ol l e c t e d i n response t o t he Thompson Report,
and havi ng made no i nve s t i ga t i on of such a l l e ga t i ons , he
submi t t ed t o h i s commanding o f f i c e r a wr i t t e n Report of
I nve s t i ga t i on, dat ed 24 Apr i l 1968, which was f a l s e and mis-
l eadi ng i n t h e f ol l owi ng p a r t i c u l a r s :
(1) While t h e document pur por t ed t o be a "Report of
I nve s t i ga t i on" and i mpl i ed t h a t he had made an i nve s t i ga t i on
i n response t o t h e a l l e ga t i ons of t h e Di s t r i c t Chi ef , no
proper i nve s t i ga t i on was ever conducted.
( 2) It avoided any r ef er ence t o t h e Thompson Report .
( 3) I t . f a l s e l y s t a t e d t h a t h i s i nt er vi ews wi t h t h e TF
Barker S3 and t h e commanders i nvol ved r eveal ed t h a t a t no
t i m e were c i v i l i a n s gat her ed t oget her and k i l l e d by US
s ol di e r s .
( 4 ) It f a l s e l y s t a t e d t h a t 20 noncombatants w e r e
i nadver t ent l y k i l l e d by pr epar at or y f i r e s and i n t he c r os s
f i r e s of US and VC f or c e s on 16 March 1968.
k. I t appears t h a t i n conj unct i on wi t h one o r more
members of h i s command, and possi bl y of t he Provi nce Advisory
Team, he conspi r ed t o wi t hhol d and suppr ess f a c t s concerni ng
t h e act i ons of el ement s of TF Barker on 16 March and
i nf or mat i on r egar di ng t h e o r i g i n of and ba s i s f o r a st at ement
dat ed 14 Apr i l 1968 pr epar ed by CPT Rodriguez.
1. He gave f a l s e t est i mony bef or e t he I nqui r y i n a
manner c a l c ul a t e d t o mi sl ead t h i s I nqui r y i n many p a r t i c u l a r s .
For example, he t e s t i f i e d t h a t :
(1) On 16 March 1968 he observed t he bodi es of onl y 6-8
women and chi l dr en i n and around My Lai ( - 4) .
( 2) H e di r e c t e d LTC Luper t o i nve s t i ga t e whet her any
a r t i l l e r y rounds l anded on My Lai ( 4 ) and t h a t LTC Luper
t h e r e a f t e r r epor t ed t o him t h a t an i nve s t i ga t i on had been
made and had di s cl os ed t h a t no a r t i l l e r y had s t r uc k t h e
vi l l a ge .
( 3 ) W01 Thompson was t he onl y i ndi vi dua l he spoke wi t h
who had observed anyt hi ng unusual on 16 March.
( 4 ) H e had not been di r e c t e d t o submit h i s wr i t t e n
Report of I nve s t i ga t i on, dat ed 24 Apr i l 1968, and t h a t t he
Report was prepared and submi t t ed i n or der t o br i ng t o MG
Kos t er ' s a t t e n t i o n r e por t s and propagarida r ecei ved from
Vietnamese sour ces.
( 5) I n May 1968, MG Kost er di r e c t e d a formal i nve s t i -
gat i on be conducted and t h a t he (COL Henderson) di r e c t e d LTC
Barker t o conduct such an i nve s t i ga t i on.
( 6) I n May 1968, LTC Barker conducted an i nve s t i ga t i on
and prepared a formal r e por t of i nve s t i ga t i on, i ncl udi ng
15-20 wr i t t e n st at ement s of wi t nesses, which he (COL Hender-
son) t hen t r ans mi t t ed t o Di vi si on.
4. COL DEAN E . HUTTER
a. He may have t e s t i f i e d f a l s e l y bef or e t h i s I nqui r y
i n a manner c a l c ul a t e d t o be mi sl eadi ng when he s t a t e d he
had no knowledge of any r e por t s of c i v i l i a n s bei ng k i l l e d by
Americans i n Son My Vi l l age on 16 March 1968, and t h a t he had
not at t ended any meet'ing wherei n such a s ubj e c t was di scussed.
b. Having i nf or mat i on a va i l a bl e t o him of pos s i bl e
war crimes and not a s c e r t a i ni ng a l l of t h e f a c t s Oer t ai ni ng
t o t h e i nc i de nt and r epor t i ng them t hrough h i s chai n of
command, DSA I CTZ, he may haver cont r i but ed t o t h e suppres-
s i on of i nf or mat i on r e l a t i n g t o t h e i nc i de nt i n Son My
Vi l l age on 16 March.. 1968.
5. COL ( t hen LTC) ROBERT B. LUPER
a. Af t er obser vi ng t he bodi es' of noncombatants i n and
around My Lai ( 4 ) dur i ng . t h e morning of 16 March 1968, and
de s pi t e h i s knowledge t h a t C Company had not encount ered
r e s i s t a nc e , he f a i l e d t o t a ke any act i on.
b. Having observed on 16 March t h a t many of t h e
dwel l i ngs and ot he r s t r u c t u r e s i n My Lai ( 4 ) w e r e bei ng
burned i n y i o l a t i o n of di vi s i on pol i cy and t h e pr ovi si ons of
pe r t i ne nt d i r e c t i v e s , he f a i l e d t o t a ke any a c t i on o r t o
i ns ur e t h a t t h e f a c t s were r epor t ed t o hi gher headquar t er s.
c. H e f a i l e d t o r e por t t he k i l l i n g s i n and around My
Lai ( 4 ) a s a, pos s i bl e w a r crime i n accordance wi t h MACV
Di r ect i ve 20-4.
d. Having r ecei ved a r e por t t h a t noncombatants had
been k i l l e d by a r t i l l e r y , he f a i l e d ' t o advi se t h e Di vi si on
Ar t i l l e r y Commander, and he f a i l e d e i t h e r t o i n i t i a t e an
i nve s t i ga t i on of an a r t i l l e r y i nc i de nt o r t o recommend t h a t
such an i nve s t i ga t i on be i - ni t i a t e d.
6. COL NELS A. PARSON
a. Having r ecei ved i nf or mat i on r e l a t i n g t o t h e Son
My i nci dent I i he f a i l e d t o:
(1) I nsur e t h a t such i nf or mat i on was made a va i l a bl e t o
pr oper el ement s of t h e Di vi si on s t a f f , e s pe c i a l l y t h e St a f f
Judge Advocate and t he I ns pect or General .
( 2) Take s t e ps t o i ns ur e t h a t a pr oper i nve s t i ga t i on was
conducted.
( 3) Requi re t h a t a r e por t o.f suspect ed war crimes
and/or SIR be submi t t ed t o I11 MAF, MACV, and USARV.
( 4 ) I n i t i a t e a c t i on t hrough t he Di vi si on Ar t i l l e r y
Commander f o r t h e i nve s t i gxt i on of an-a r t i l l e r y i nc i de nt .
b. H e f a i l e d o f f i c i a l l y t o i nform LTC Holladay of COL
Henderson ' s o r a l r e por i of i nve s t i ga t i on or i t s accept ance
by t he CG.
c. I n response t o an i nf or mal i nqui r y from CH &ewis
concerni ng t he i nc i de nt , COL Parson:
(1) Cont r i but ed t o t h e suppr essi on of i nf or mat i on
concerni ng t h e a c t i v i t i e s of TF Barker on 16.March 1968 by
t e l l i n g CH Lewis t h a t an i nve s t i ga t i on was bei ng conducted
and t h a t he shoul d not di s c us s it.
( 2 ) Took no a c t i on t o i ns ur e t h a t su.ch a pr oper i n-
vest i g a t i o n was . bei ng conducted.
( 3) Took no a c t i on t o i ns ur e t h a t t h e i nf or mat i on
he had gi ven CH Lewis was c or r e c t .
d. Having knowledge t h a t (1) some c i v i l i a n s had been
k i l l e d i n TF Bar ker ' s oper at i on on 16 March 1968, ( 2) GEN
Young had elated W01 Thompson's compl ai nt t o t he CG, ( 3)
COL Henderson had conducted a so- cal l ed i nve s t i ga t i on, and
( 4 ) MG Kost er had r ecei ved and accept ed t h e r e s u l t s of t h e
so- cal l ed i nve s t i ga t i on, COL Parson may have pa r t i c i pa t e d
i n o r cont r i but ed t o a conspi racy t o suppr ess i nf or mat i on
of t he Son My i nc i de nt .
e. Knowing t h a t t h e 24 Apr i l 1968 Report of I nve s t i -
gat i on was i nadequat e, he di d not i ns ur e t h a t a pr oper i . n-
ve s t i ga t i on was conducted by i s s ui ng or der s des i gnat i ng a
di s i nt e r e s t e d i nve s t i ga t i ng o f f i c e r i n accordance wi t h ap-
pr opr i a t e r egul at i ons .
f . H e f a i l e d t o as s ur e t he proper c ont r ol and r e t e nt i on
of documents ( wi t h t he except i on of t hose c l a s s i f i e d SECRET
o r hi gher ) such a s t hose r e l a t i n g Lo t h e i nve s t i ga t i on of
t he Son My i nc i de nt .
g. ~ a v i n g knowledge of (1) t h e " cl os e hol d" manner i n
which i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h e i nci dent was bei ng handl ed,
( 2 ) t he f ace t h a t t he CG had not informed t he di vi s i on s t a f f
of h i s a c t i ons i n t h i s mat t er , and ( 3 ) LTC Hol l aday' s
suspi ci ons of a cover-up expressed upon bei ng shown t he 24
Apr i l r e por t , COL Parson shoul d have been aware t h a t e f f o r t s
were bei ng made t o suppr ess i nf or mat i on concerni ng t he i n c i -
dent . I f he i n f a c t had such a suspi ci on, h i s f a i l u r e t o
i n i t i a t e act i on t o conduct an adequat e i nve s t i ga t i on c ont r i -
but ed t o t h e suppr essi on of i nf or mat i on r egar di ng athe i n c i -
dent .
7. LTC FRANK A. BARKER (DECEASED)
a. He pl anned, or der ed, and a c t i ve l y di ' r ect ed t he
execut i on of an unl awful oper at i on aga' i nst i nhabi t ed haml et s
which i ncl uded de s t r uc t i on of houses by burni ng, k i l l i n g of '
l i ves t ock, and de s t r uc t i on of cr ops and ot her f oods t uf f s ,
and pos s i bl y t h e c l os i ng of wel l s . Moreover, he knew t he r e were
noncombatants l i v i n g i n Son My Vi l l a ge and, whi l e he di d not
d i r e c t l y or der t h e k i l l i n g s of such per sons, he may have
cr eat ed a b e l i e f i n t he minds of some of t he u n i t commanders
t h a t t hey were aut hor i zed t o k i l l any persons found t her e.
b. He planned an a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on on an i nhabi t ed
vi l l a ge wi t h di s r e ga r d f o r t he l i v e s of t he i nha bi t a nt s , i n
vi ol a t i on of t h e i n t e n t of MACV and 111 MAF r egul at i ons .
c. He f a i l e d , i n pr epar i ng t h e pl ans f o r t he Son My
oper at i on, t o pr ovi de f o r t he evacuat i on and saf ekeepi ng of
t h e noncombatants r e s i di ng i n t h e obj e c t i ve ar eas.
d. H e i nt e nt i ona l l y o r negl i gent l y provi ded t o t he TF
Barker company commanders f a l s e i nt e l l i ge nc e t h a t c i v i l i a n s
would be o u t of t h e haml et s i n t h e Son My Vi l l age ar ea by
0700 hour s, 16 March 1968, and i ndi cat ed t h a t onl y VC and VC
sympat hi zers would be i n t he v i l l a g e , t her eby cont r i but i ng
t o t h e k i l l i n g of numerous noncombatants on t h a t dat e.
e. Having become aware e a r l y on t he morning of 16 March
t h a t many noncombatant r e s i de nt s of Son My were bei ng
k i l l e d by C/1-20 I n f , he probabl y conspi r ed wi t h MAJ Calhoun
and ot he r s t o:
(1) Conceal t h e number of c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s i n f l i c t e d
by C/1-20 I nf i n My Lai ( 4 ) .
(2) Make a f a l s e r e por t t h a t 69 VC were k i l l e d by
a r t i l l e r y f i r e dur i ng t he a s s a ul t on My Lai ( 4 ) .
f . He probabl y conspi red wi t h MAJ Calhoun and ot her s
t o suppr ess i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h e war cri mes committed
dur i ng t h e Son My oper at i on.
g. He f a i l e d t o r epor t t h e suspect ed war cri mes commit-
t e d i n My Lai ( 4 ) a s r equi r ed by MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4.
h. H e f a i l e d t o r e por t t h a t dwel l i ngs w e r e burned i n .
My Lai ( 4 ) and ot he r haml et s by C/1-20 I nf and B/4-3 I nf i n
vi ol a t i on of di vi s i on pol i cy and t h e pr ovi si ons of pe r t i ne nt
di r e c t i ve s .
i. He f a i l e d t o i ncl ude i n oper at i onal r e por t s t o
hi gher headquar t er s t h ~ 20-30 noncombatant c a s ua l t i e s of
which he had knowledge.
j. He pr epar ed and submi t t ed a de l i be r a t e l y f a l s e and
mi sl eadi ng combat a f t e r a c t i on r e por t cover i ng t h e 16 March
1968 oper at i on i n Son My Vi l l age.
k. As t he r es pons i bl e commander, he f a i l e d t o i nve s t i -
ga t e i ndi c a t i ons of war cri mes a s r epor t ed t o him by MAJ
Watke .
8. LTC ( t hen MAJ ) DAVID C. GAVIN
a. Having knowledge t h a t h i s Di s t r i c t Advisory Team
had r ecei ved (1) i nf or mat i on from t h e Son Tinh Di s t r i c t
Chief r egar di ng a l l e ga t i ons t h a t American f or ces had k i l l e d
approxi mat el y 500 c i v i l i a n s a t Tu Cung and Co Luy Hamlets
of Son My Vi l l age on 16 March 1968; ( 2 ) i nf or mat i on t h a t t h e
Di s t r i c t Chief had r epor t ed t h i s t o t h e Quang Ngai Provi nce
Chi ef; and ( 3) a r eques t from t h e Provi nce Advisory Team
f o r f ur t he r i nf or mat i on r egar di ng t hes e a l l e ga t i ons , he:
(1) Did not t ake t he necessary s t e ps t o f a mi l i a r i z e
hi msel f wi t h t he avai l abl e- i nf or mat i on o r t o s e e t h a t a
pr oper i nve s t i ga t i on was made t hrough r esour ces a va i l a bl e
t o him.
( 2) May not have f u l l y informed hi msel f a s t o t h e
conduct of h i s command i n h i s absence but , i n a l l event s,
f a i l e d t o as s ur e hi msel f t h a t t hose mat t er s d e a l t wi t h i n
h i s absence were adequat el y handl ed.
( 3 ) Fai l ed t o r e por t t o hi gher headquar t er s t h e a l -
l eght i ons of a s e r i ous war c r i m e a s r equi r ed by MACV D i -
r e c t i v e 20-4.
b. By r e t a i ni ng unt o hi msel f i nf or mat i on pos s i bl y r e-
cei ved from t he Son Tinh D i s t r i c t Chi ef , he may have e f e c t -
i ve l y suppressed i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h e Son My i nc i de nt .
c. By a c t i on wi t hi n h i s D i s t r i c t Advisory Team and i n
conj unct i on wi t h t he Provi nce Advisory Team and TF Barker,
he may have pa r t i c i pa t e d i n a conspi r acy t o wi t hol d f a c t s con-
cer ni ng t he act i ons of el ement s of TF Barker on 16 March 1968.
1
d. He may have f a l s e l y t e s t i f i e d bef or e t h i s I n q u i r y -
i n a manner c a l c ul a t e d t o be mi sl eadi ng when he a s s e r t e d t h a t
he had no knowledge of t he a l l e ga t i ons t h a t American f or ces
had k i l l e d a s ubs t a nt i a l number of c i v i l i a n s i n Son My V i l -
l age on 16 March 1968.
9. LTC WILLIAM D. GUI NN, J R .
a. Having r ecei ved (1) i nf or mat i on through Census
Grievance Channels r e g a r d i n ~ t h e k i l l i n g ' o f a l a r ge number
of- c i v i l i a n s Zh Tu Cung Hamlet by an American u n i t ; ( 2) a
copy of t h e Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Chi e f ' s r e por t t o t he Quang
Ngai Provi nce Chief a l l e gi ng t h a t US f or ces had k i l l e d ap-
proxi mat el y 500 noncombatants i n Tu Cung and Co Luy Hamlets
of Son My Vi l l age on 16 March 1968; ( 3 ) i nf or mat i on from
t h e Quang Ngai Provi nce Chief concerni ng t h e i nc i de nt ; and
( 4 ) i nf or mat i on t h a t VC propaganda br oadcast s were s t r e s s i n g
t h a t US f or ces had k i l l e d a l a r ge number of noncombatants
i n Son My Vi l l age on 16 March 1968, he:
(1) Fai l ed t o r e por t t o h i s s uper i or s and hi gher head-
qua r t e r s t h e a l l e ga t i ons of a s e r i ous war crime a s r equi r ed
by MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4.
( 2 ) - Fa i l e d t o have such i nf or mat i on i ncl uded i n t he
r egul ar monthly r e por t of t h e Quang Ngai Provi nce Advisory
Team.
b. By h i s handl i ng of i nf or mat i on which he r ecei ved
r egar di ng. t he a l l e ga t i ons of a massacre by el ement s of TF
Barker on o r about 16 March 1968, he e f f e c t i v e l y s uwr e s s e d
t h a t i nf or mat i on.
c. Having provi ded c e r t a i n documents t o t h e CO,
11t h ~ r i g a d e , and i n conj unct i on wi t h members of t h e 11t h .
~ r i g a d e ,he pos s i bl y pa r t i c i pa t e d i n a conspi r acy t o:
(1) Withhold t he t r u e f a c t s concerni ng t h e a c t i ons
of el ement s of TF Barker on 16 March 1968.
( 2) Suppress i nf or mat i on r egar di ng t h e o r i g i n of and -
ba s i s f o r t h e st at ement dat ed 1 4 Apr i l 1968 pr epar ed by CPT
Rodriguez.
d. H e probabl y gave f a l s e t est i mony bef or e t h i s I nqui r y
i n a manner c a l c ul a t e d t o be mi sl eadi ng when he:
(1) Assert ed he had onl y a l i mi t e d knowledge r egar di ng
t he r e por t s and i nve s t i ga t i ons i n Apr i l 1968 r e l a t i n g t o t he
12-22
a c t i ons of el ement s of TF Barker i n Son My Vi l l age on o r
about 16 March 1968.
(2) Gave cont r adi ct or y t est i mony wi t h t h a t pr evi ous l y
gi ven by him t o a r e pr e s e nt a t i ve of t h e Of f i ce of t h e In-
s pect or General .
10. LTC JOHN L. HOLLADAY
a. Having r ecei ved i nf or mat i on t h a t pos s i bl e war crimes
had been committed, he f a i l e d t o i nt er vi ew o r obt a i n s t a t e -
ments from any i ndi vi dua l wi t nesses p r i o r t o o r immediately
f ol l owi ng h i s o r a l r e por t t o BG Young.
b. He f a i l e d t o fol l ow up on h i s r e por t t o BG Young
t o det ermi ne i f a r e por t of i nve s t i ga t i on had been submi t t ed
and reviewed and, a s a consequence, f a i l e d t o pr ovi de i n-
format i on concerni ng t h e r e s u l t s of t he i nve s t i ga t i on t o
t h e o f f i c e r s and men of h i s b a t t a l i o n who had wi t nessed t he
event s a t Son My.
c. Bel i evi ng t h a t i nf or mat i on pe r t a i ni ng t o a pos s i bl e
war crime was bei ng suppr essed, he f a i l e d t o br i ng t h i s t o
t h e a t t e n t i o n of hi gher headquar t er s.
11. CHAPLAIN (LTC) FRANCIS R. LEWIS
a. Having r ecei ved from CH C r e s w e l l an account of W01
Thompson's s e r i ous a l l e ga t i ons of improper conduct by ele-
ments of TF Barker, he f a i l e d t o make a t i mel y and pr oper
r e por t of t h e mat t er and t o as s ur e t h a t t he r e was an adequat e
i nve s t i ga t i on conducted. H e l i mi t e d h i s act i on a t t h e di -
vi s i on headquar t er s t o i nf or mal di s cus s i ons wi t h var i ous
s t a f f o f f i c e r s .
b. Having accept ed t he a s s e r t i on t h a t an i nve s t i ga t i on
was bei ng conducted, and whi l e di s r egar di ng any admonition
not t o t a l k about t he mat t er , he s t i l l avoided a s c e r t a i ni ng
t h e r e s u l t s of such i nve s t i ga t i on and made no r e por t back t o
CH C r e s w e l l concerni ng t he r e s u l t s of t he i nve s t i ga t i on.
12. MAJ CHARLES C. CALHOUN
a . Pa r t i c i pa t e d i n t h e pl anni ng of and a s s i s t e d i n t h e
di r e c t i on o f - an unl awful oper at i on by TF Barker a ga i ns t i n-
habi t ed haml et s which i ncl uded de s t r uc t i on of houses by burn-
i ng, k i l l i n g l i ve s t oc k, de s t r uc t i on of crops and f oods t uf f s
and possi bl y t he c l os i ng of wel l s . Moreover, knowing t h a t
t he r e were noncombatants l i v i n g i n t he haml et s, and by i ndi -
c a t i ng t h a t onl y VC and VC sympat hi zers were l i v i n g t he r e ,
he may have cont r i but ed t o t he k i l l i n g of noncombatants.
b. H e pa r t i c i pa t e d i n pl anni ng an a r t i l l e r y pr epar at i on
on an i nhabi t ed v i l l a g e wi t h di s r egar d f o r t he l i v e s of t he
i nha bi t a nt s i n vi ol a t i on of t h e i n t e n t of MACV and. 111 MAF
r egul at i ons .
c. As TI? Barker S3, he f a i l e d i n pr epar i ng t h e pl ans
f o r t he Son My oper at i on t o provi de f o r t he' evacuat i on and
saf ekeepi ng of t he noncombatants r e s i di ng i n t he obj e c t i ve
ar eas .
d. Having become aware e a r l y on t he morning of 16 March
1968 t h a t many noncombatant r e s i de nt s of Son My were bei ng
k i l l e d by C/1-20 I n f , he may have conspi r ed wi t h LTC Barker
and probabl y ot he r s t o :
(1) Conceal t h e number of c i v i l i a n c a s ua l t i e s i n f l i c t e d
by C/1-20 I nf i n My Lai ( 4 ) .
( 2) Make a f a l s e r e por t t h a t 69 VC were k i l l e d by
a r t i l l e r y f i r e dur i ng t he a s s a u l t on My Lai ( 4 ) .
e. He may have conspi r ed wi t h LTC Barker and probabl y
ot he r s t o suppress i nf or mat i on concerni ng t he war cri mes com-
mi t t e d. dur i ng t he Son My oper at i on.
f . H e f a i l e d t o r e por t t h a t dwel l i ngs were burned i n
My Lai ( 4 ) and ot he r haml et s by C/1-20 I nf and B/4-3 I nf i n
vi ol a t i on of di r e c t i ve s .
g. He f a i l e d t o i ncl ude i n ope r a t i ona l r e por t s t o
hi gher headquar t er s t he 20-30 noncombatant c a s ua l t i e s of
which he had knowledge.
h. He f a i l e d t o r e por t t he suspect ed war cri mes com-
mi t t ed i n My Lai ( 4 ) a s r equi r ed by ~ C Di r ect i ve 20-4. V
i. H e probabl y gave f a l s e t est i mony bef or e t h i s I nqui r y
i n a manner c a l c ul a t e d t o be mi sl eadi ng when he s t a t e d t h a t :
(1) The company commanders were not t o l d t o burn t h e
vi l l a ge s and dest r oy l i ve s t oc k.
( 2) COL Henderson' s i nve s t i ga t i on concerned onl y t he
k i l l i n g of one c i v i l i a n .
( 3)
H e r e c a l l e d not hi ng unusual about t he r a di o t r a ns -
mi ssi ons monitored i n t he TF Barker TOC on t he morning of
16 March 1968.
( 4 ) To h i s knowledge, t h e onl y rumor of s us pi ci ous
a c t i v i t y at My Lai ( 4 ) was t h a t a p i l o t had seen an American
shoot one Vietnamese.
(5) There was an' a c t ua l count of 128 VC KI A dur i ng
t h e f i r s t day of t h e Son My oper at i on, v e r i f i e d by someone
i n TF Barker a c t ua l l y s e e i ng o r t ouchi ng each body.
( 6) He never heard of ~ o ~ f r o n t a t i o n a between a h e l i -
copt er c r e w and members of C/1-20 I n f .
13. MAJ ROBERT W. MC KNIGHT
a. He di d not t a ke a c t i on t o i ns ur e t h a t t he pl an
f o r t h e Son My oper at i on i ncl uded pr ovi si ons f o r t he hand-
l i n g , scr eeni ng, and t r eat ment of noncombatants and r ef u-
gees.
b. Af t er obser vi ng t he bodi es of noncombatants i n and
around My Lai ( 4 ) dur i ng t h e morni ng of 16 March 1968, and
de s pi t e h i s knowledge t h a t C Company had not encount ered
r e s i s t a nc e , he f a i l e d t o t ake any act i on.
c. Having observed on 16 March t h a t many of t h e
dwel l i ngs and ot he r s t r u c t u r e s i n My Lai ( 4 ) w e r e bei ng
burned i n vi ol a t i on of di vi s i on pol i cy and t he pr ovi s i ons
of pe r t i ne nt d i r e c t i v e s , he f a i l e d t o t a ke any e f f e c t i v e
a c t i on t o:
(1) St op t h e de s t r uc t i on.
( 2 ) Recommend t o h i s commander t h a t t he bur ni ng shoul d
be st opped.
( 3) Report t h e f a c t s t o hi gher headquar t er s.
d. H e f a i l e d tt t a ke any a c t i on t o i ns ur e t h a t medi cal
t r eat ment wa s provi ded t o noncombatants i n t h e Son My a r e a
on 16 March.
e. Af t er C Company had r epor t ed k i l l i n g 84 VC i n My
Lai ( 4 ) by 0840 hours on 16 March, he e i t h e r p a r t i c i -
pat ea i n o r condoned t h e making of f i c t i t i o u s r e por t s t o
hi gher headquar t er s and f a l s e e n t r i e s i n o f f i c i a l r ecor ds
t o t he e f f e c t t h a t 69 VC had been k i l l e d by a r t i l l e r y a t a
l oc a t i on nor t h of My Lai ( 4 ) .
f . Having r ecei ved a r e por t t h a t noncombatants had been
k i l l e d by a r t i l l e r y , he f a i l e d t o recommend t o h i s commander
t h a t an i nve s t i ga t i on of an a r t i l l e r y i nc i de nt be i n i t i a t e d
, a s r equi r ed by USARV and America1 Di vi si on di r e c t i ve s .
g. He f a i l e d t o r e por t t he k i l l i n g s of noncombatants
i n and around My Lai ( 4 ) a s a pos s i bl e war cri me a s r equi r ed
by MACV Directive 20-4.
h e I n conj unct i on wi t h COL Henderson and pos s i bl y mem-
ber s of t he Provi nce Advisory Team, he may have conspi r ed t o
wi t hhol d and suppress f a c t s concerni ng t h e a c t i ons of el ement s
of TF Barker on 16 March 1968 and i nf or mat i on r egar di ng t h e
or i gi n of and ba s i s f o r a- st at ement dat ed 1 4 Apr i l 1968 pre-
pared by CPT Rodriguez.
i. He 'may have gi ven f a l s e t est i mony bef or e t he I nqui r y
i n a manner c a l c ul a t e d t o be mi sl eadi ng when he t e s t i f i e d
t h a t :
(1) On 16 March 1968 he observed onl y 5 bodi es i n and
around My Lai ( 4 ) .
( 2) H e had no knowledge concerni ng war crimes and vi o-
l a t i o n s of r egul at i ons committed by TF Barker on 16 March 1968.
( 3) H e had never hear d any r e por t of 69 VC bei ng
k i l l e d by a r t i l l e r y .
( 4 )
H e d i d not know who had pr epar ed I ncl os ur e 1t o
Exhi bi t R-1.
14. MAJ FREDERIC W. WATKE
a. H e gave mi sl eadi ng t est i mony bef or e t h e I nqui r y i n
t h a t he wi t hhel d d e t a i l s and provi ded i nf or mat i on t h a t was
not compl et el y accur at e o r f a c t ua l .
b. Having r ecei ved r e l i a b l e i nf or mat i on of t he pos s i bl e
commission of war cri mes on 16 March 1968 and, by h i s own
t est i mony, bei ng of t h e be l i e f t h a t t he ground commander con-
cerned (LTC Barker) had not t aken adequat e a c t i on, he f a i l e d
t o pursue t he mat t er b y ' e i t h e r a e r i a l reconnai ssance of t he
a r e a o r by obt ai ni ng a ddi t i ona l evi dence from t hos e me mb e r s
of h i s u n i t who had observed t h e pos s i bl e war c r i m e s .
c. Having been appr i sed of pos s i bl e war cri mes by mein-
be r s of h i s command and havi ng r epor t ed t h i s through t he
chai n of command, he f a i l e d t o fol l ow t hrough t o keep hi msel f
and t h e members of h i s u n i t informed a s t o t he pr ogr ess and
r e s u l t s of t he subsequent i nve s t i ga t i on.
d. Bel i evi ng t h a t i nf or mat i on pe r t a i ni ng t o a pos s i bl e
war c r i m e was bei ng suppressed he f a i l e d t o br i ng t h i s mat-
t er t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of hi gher headquar t er s.
15. CPT ( t hen ILT) KENNETH W. BOATMAN
a. Having wi t nessed, accor di ng t o h i s own t est i mony,
t he k i l l i n g s of 8 VC s us pect s by RVN Nat i onal Pol i ce on 16
March 1968 and r ecogni zi ng t h a t it was a vi ol a t i on of t h e
law of war, he di d not at t empt t o s t op t he k i l l i n g s and di d
not r e por t them t o h i s commanding o f f i c e r a s r equi r ed by
MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4.
b. H e observed t h e bur ni ng of subhamlets Co Lay (1),
Co Lay ( 2) , and Co Lay ( 3) by B/4-3 I nf on 17 March 1968
but f a i l e d t o r e por t t h i s de s t r uc t i on of p r i v a t e pr oper t y
t o h i s commanding o f f i c e r .
16. REV. ( t hen CPT , CH) CARL E . CRESWELL
a . Having r ecei ved from W01 Thompson ser i ous. a l l e ga t i ons
of improper conduct by el ement s of TF Barker, he f a i l e d t o
r e por t t he mat t er t o h i s commanding o f f i c e r ( Di vi si on A r t i l -
l e r y Commander) o r t o t h e SJ A, o r t h e I G .
b. Af t er he r epor t ed t he mat t er t o CH Lewis and r e-
cei ved no s a t i s f a c t o r y r esponse, he t ook no e f f e c t i v e a c t i on
t o i ns ur e t h a t a pr oper i nve s t i ga t i on would be conducted.
17. CPT ( t hen 1LT) DENNIS H. JOHNSON
a. During t h e morning of 16 March 1968, he observed
numerous k i l l i n g s i n and around My Lai ( 4 ) and, even though
a s an i nt e l l i ge nc e o f f i c e r he was s p e c i f i c a l l y charged by
MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4 t o r e por t such cri mes, he f a i l e d t o re-
por t them t o anyone i n a ut hor i t y.
b. H e w a s asked by h i s i n t e r p r e t e r , SSG Minh (ARVN) ,
t o i nt er cede wi t h CPT Medina concerni ng t h e k i l l i n g of women
and chi l dr en and, subsequent l y, t o r e por t t he war crimes
which t hey had observed t o h i s commanding o f f i c e r , CPT
Labr i ol a, but f a i l e d t o do so.
z
Despi t e h i s pos i t i on a s an i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r ,
he a i l e d t o t ake pos i t i ve a c t i on t o s t o p t h e k i l l i n g of
domen, c hi l dr e n, and ot he r noncombatants.
d. Having knowledge t h a t 4 o r 5 VC s us pect s had been
k i l l e d by t he RVN Nat i onal Pol i ce i n t he ni ght def ensi ve
pos i t i on of Companies B and C, he di d not r e por t such i n-
format i on t o any of h i s s uper i or s .
e. On t he af t er noon o r e a r l y eveni ng of 16 March 1968,
he may , have l e f t t h e f i e l d wi t hout a ut hor i t y by depar t i ng
from t he ni ght def ensi ve positio-n of B and C Companies and
r et ur ni ng t o LZ Dot t i e wi t h h i s i n t e r p r e t e r .
f . H e may have gi ven f a l s e t est i mony t o t h e I nqui r y
i n a manner c a l c ul a t e d t o be mi sl eadi ng when he s t a t e d t h a t :
( 1) . H e provi ded i nf or mat i on of t h e a c t i v i t i e s of 16
March 1968 t o h i s commanding o f f i c e r , CPT Labr i ol a.
( 2 ) SSG Minh and he r et ur ned t o Duc Pho t h e eveni ng
of 16 March 1968.
18. CPT EUGENE M. KOTOUC
a. Par t ' i ci pat ed i n t h e pl anni ng of and t h e i ssuance
of or der s f o r an unl awful oper at i on by TF Barker a ga i ns t i n-
habi t ed v i l l a g e s which i ncl uded de s t r uc t i on of houses by burni ng,
k i l l i n g of l i ve s t oc k, de s t r uc t i on o f cr ops ana Foo~st uTFs,
and pos s i bl y t h e cl-osing of w e l l s . Moreover knowing t h a t
t he r e w e r e noncombatants l i v i n g i n t h e haml et s, and i n d i c a t i n c
t h a t onl y VC and VC sympat hi zers were l i v i n g t he r e , he may
have cont r i but ed t o t he k i l l i n g of noncombatants.
b. H e i nt e nt i ona l l y o r negl i gent l y provi ded t o t he TF
Barker company commanders f a l s e i n t e l l i g e n c e t h a t c i v i l i a n s
would be out of t he haml et s i n t he Son My Vi l l age a r e a by 0700
hour s, 16 March 1968, t hereby c ont r i but i ng t o t h e k i l l i n g
of numerous noncombatants on t h a t da t e .
c. H e became aware e a r l y on t h e morning of 16 March
t h a t many noncombatant Vietnamese r e s i de nt s of My Lai ( 4 )
were bei ng k i l l e d by C/1-20 I nf . H e may have conspi r ed wi t h
LTC Barker and probabl y ot he r s t o :
(1) Conceal t he number of noncombatants k i l l e d by C/1-20
I nf i n My Lai ( 4 ) .
( 2) Make a f a l s e r e por t t h a t 69 VC w e r e k i l l e d by a r t -
i l l e r y f i r e dur i ng t h e a s s a u l t on My Lai ( 4 ) .
d. H e may have conspi r ed wi t h LTC Barker and probabl y ot h-
ers t o suppress i nf or mat i on concerni ng t he k i l l i n g of noncom-
ba t a nt s dur i ng t h e Son My oper at i on.
e. H e f a i l e d t o r e por t t h e k i l l i n g s of noncombatants
i n and around My Lai ( 4 ) a s a pos s i bl e war crime a s r equi r ed
by MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4.
f . H e aut hor i zed t h e k i l l i n g of a t l e a s t one VC sus-
pe c t by members of t h e RVN Nat i onal pol i c e i n vi ol a t i on of
MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4.
H e committed an aggravat ed a s s a u l t by r epeat edl y
g:
s t r i k l n g a VC suspect on t h e back of t he hand wi t h t h e d u l l
edge of a kni f e.
h. H e committed t h e of f ens e of maiming by c u t t i n g of f
t h e f i nge r of a VC s us pect wi t h a kni f e dur i ng t h e s us pe c t ' s
i nt e r r oga t i ons .
i. H e may have gi ven f a l s e t est i mony bef or e t h i s In-
qui r y i n a manner c a l c ul a t e d t o be mi sl eadi ng when he s t a t e d
t h a t :
(1) The i nha bi t a nt s of t h e obj e c t i ve a r e a had been
t o l d t o. l eave t he a r e a and go t o Quang Ngai.
( 2) The pl an of t he Son My oper at i on c a l l e d f o r mov-
i ng t he c i v i l i a n s found i n t he a r e a t o Quang Ngai.
( 3 ) The RVN Nat i onal Pol i ce whi l e i n suppor t of TF
Barker on 17 March 1968 we r e not under US c ont r ol .
19. CPT ERNEST L. MEDINA
a. He informed t h e men of C/1-20 I nf t h a t near l y a l l
t h e c i v i l i a n r e s i de nt s of t he haml et s i n Son My Vi l l age would
be gone t o market by 0700, 16 March 1968, and t h a t any who
remained would be VC o r VC sympat hi zers. Thi s caused many
of t he men i n C/1-20 I nf t o be l i e ve t h a t t hey would f i n d onl y
armed enemy i n t he haml et s and d i r e c t l y cont r i but ed t o t h e
k i l l i n g of noncombatants which fol l owed.
b. H e pl anned, or der ed, and super vi sed t h e execut i on
by h i s company of an unl awful oper at i on a ga i ns t i nhabi t ed
haml et s i n Son My. Village which i ncl uded t h e de s t r uc t i on
of houses by b u r n h g , k i l l i n g of l i ve s t oc k, and t h e de s t r uc t -
i on of cr ops and ot he r f oods t uf f s , and t h e c l os i ng of w e l l s ;
and i rnpl i edl y di r e c t e d t h e k i l l i n g of any persons found t he r e .
c. There i s evi dence t h a t he pos s i bl y k i l l e d a s many
a s t hr e e noncombatants i n My Lai ( 4 ) .
d. He probabl y conspi r ed wi t h LTC Barker and ot he r s
t o suppress i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h e k i l l i n g of noncom-
ba t a nt s dur i ng t h e Son My oper at i on.
e. H e a c t i ve l y suppressed i nf or mat i on concerni ng t h e
k i l l i n g of noncombatants i n Son My Vi l l age on 16 March 1968 by:
(1)
Te l l i ng t h e men of C/ 1-20 I nf not t o t a l k about
what happened i n Son My Vi l l age on 16 March.
( 2) Advi si ng a t l e a s t one member of h i s company not
t o w r i t e t o h i s Congressman.
( 3 ) Gi vi ng f a l s e r e por t s a s t o t he number of noncom-
ba t a nt s k i l l e d by t he men of C/1-20 I nf and t he cause of deat h.
f . H e f a i l e d t o r e por t t he k i l l i n g s i n and around My
Lai ( 4 ) as a pos s i bl e war c r i m e a s r equi r ed by MACV Di r ect i ve
20- 4.
g. I f he i n f a c t bel i eved t h a t 20-28 c i v i l i a n s had been
k i l l e d i n My Lai ( 4 ) by a r t i l l e r y o r gunship f i r e , he f a i l e d
t o r eques t an a r t i l l e r y i nc i de nt i nve s t i ga t i on.
h. . H e obs t r uct ed an i nqui r y i n t o t h e k i l l i n g of c i v i l i a n s
i n My Lai ( 4) by obj ect i ng t o or der s t o r e t ur n C/1-20 I nf t o
t h e hamlet f o r t h a t purpose.
i. He f a i l e d t o pr event t he k i l l i n g of VC s us pect s by
t he RVN Nat i onal Pol i ce on 16 March 1968 and subsequent l y
f a i l e d t o r e por t t he s e k i l l i n g s a s r equi r ed i n MACV Di r ect i ve
20- 4.
j.
H e per s onal l y mi s t r eat ed a VC s us pect dur i ng an i n-
t e r r oga t i on on 17 March 1968 by s t r i k i n g him on t h e head and
r epeat edl y f i r i n g an M-16 cl os e t o t he pr i s one r ' s head t o
i nduce him t o t a l k .
k. H e f a i l e d t o det ermi ne t he cause of deat h of t h e
20-24 peopl e whose bodi es he admi t t ed s eei ng on t h e t r a i l
l eadi ng sout h from My Lai ( 4 ) .
1. H e gave f a l s e t est i mony bef or e t h i s I nqui r y i n a
manner c a l c ul a t e d t o be mi sl eadi ng when he s t a t e d t h a t :
(1) He di d not s e e any bodi es o r wounded a s he moved
wi t hi n My Lai ( 4 ) .
( 2) Only 20 t o 28 c i v i l i a n s were k i l l e d by C/1-20 I nf
i n and around My Lai ( 4 ) on 16 March 19 6 8 .
( 3) H e quest i oned h i s pl at oon l eader s about k i l l i n g
of c i v i l i a n s i n My Lai ( 4 ) .
20. CPT EARL R. MICHLES (DECEASED)
a. During t he af t er noon of 16 March 1968, he made a
f a l s e r e por t t h a t t h e r e w e r e no women and chi l dr en i ncl uded
i n t he previ ous r e por t s of 38 VC KI A.
b. Possi bl y havi ng knowledge of war cri mes committed
i n My Khe ( 4 ) on 16 March 1968, he f a i l e d t o r e por t them a s
r equi r ed by MACV Directive 20-4.
c. H e f a i l e d t o pr event t he k i l l i n g of VC s us pect s by
t h e RVN Nat i onal Pol i ce on 16 March 1968 and f a i l e d t o r e por t
t hes e ki bl i ngs a s r equi r ed by MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4.
d. On 17 March 1968, he or der ed t he de s t r uc t i on of t he
subhaml et s Co Lay (1), Co Lay ( 2 ) , and Co Lay ( 3 ) i n vi ol a t i on
of r egul at i ons .
e. During t h e morning of 19 March 1968, he per mi t t ed
VC suspect s t o be s ever el y beat en and s, ubj ect ed t o e l e c t r i c a l
shocks admi ni st er ed t o t h e i r bodi es.
21. MR. ( t hen CPT) DENNIS R. VAZQUEZ
a. While s e r vi ng a s a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n o f f i c e r wi t h TF
Barker on 16 March 1968, he i ndi s cr i mi nat el y adj us t ed an ar -
t i l l e r y concent rat i , on ont o t he popul at ed hamlet of My Lai ( 4 ) .
b. Although he f e l t t he r e por t of 69 VC KI A by a r t i l -
l e r y might have been t he r e s u l t of t he rounds f a l l i n g i n My
Lai ( 4 ) , he:
(1) Made no at t empt t o det ermi ne whether o r not ci v-
i l i a n s had been k i l l e d .
( 2 ) Fa i l e d t o i n i t i a t e an a r t i l l e r y i nc i de nt i nves t -
i ga t i on i n accordance wi t h USARV and America1 Di vi si on A r t i l -
l e r y Regul at i ons.
c. H e may have gi ven f a l s e t est i mony bef or e t h i s In-
qui r y i n a manner c a l c ul a t e d t o be mi sl eadi ng when he s t a t e d
t h a t he r ecei ved t he r e por t from LT Roger Alaux of 69 casu-
a l t i e s by a r t i l l e r y f i r e which t h e l a t t e r deni ed.
22. CPT ( t hen 1LT) THOMAS K. WILLINGHAM
a. During t h e morning of 16 March 1968, he di r e c t e d
t h e pl aci ng of i ndi s cr i mi nat e f i r e i n t o t h e i nhabf t ed sub-
haml et of My Khe ( 4 ) .
b. He per mi t t ed h i s men t o f i r e i ndi s cr i mi nat el y i n t o
and det onat e expl osi ves i n dwel l i ngs and s h e l t e r s a t My Khe ( 4 )
r e s u l t i n g i n t he deat h of a t l e a s t 15 t o 20 women and chi l d-
r en.
c. Having knowledge dur i ng t h e morning of 16 March 1968
t h a t t he maj or i t y of t hose k i l l e d were noncombatants (women
and c hi l dr e n) , appar ent l y he submi t t ed t hr e e subsequent r e-
por t s t o h i s company commander i ndi c a t i ng t h a t 12, 18 and 8
VC r e s pe c t i ve l y had been k i l l e d .
d. He f a i l e d t o r e por t t h e k i l l i n g s of noncombatants
i n and around My Khe ( 4 ) a s pos s i bl e war cri mes a s r equi r ed
by MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4.
e. H e gave f a l s e t est i mony bef or e a r e pr e s e nt a t i ve of
t he I ns pect or Gener al ' s o f f i c e i n a manner c a l c ul a t e d t o be
mi sl eadi ng pe r t a i ni ng t o t h e number of Vietnmese c a s ua l t i e s
counted i n My Khe ( 4 ) on 16 March 68, and t h e e xt e nt of t he
enemy r e s i s t a nc e encount ered dur i ng t h e oper at i on.
23. 1LT ( t hen 2LT) WILLIAM L. CALLEY
a. H e or der ed t h e execut i on by h i s pl at oon of an un-
l awf ul oper at i on a ga i ns t i nhabi t ed haml et s i n Son My Vi l l age,
which i ncl uded t h e de s t r uc t i on of houses by burni ng, k i l l i n g
of l i ve s t oc k, t h e de s t r uc t i on of crops and' ot her f oods t uf f s ,
and t he c l os i ng of w e l l s ; and expr essl y or der ed t h e k i l l i n g
of per sons found t he r e .
b. He di r e c t e d and super vi sed t h e men of h i s pl at oon
i n t h e s ys t emat i c k i l l i n g of many noncombatants i n and a-
round My Lai ( 4 ) ,.
c. H e per s onal l y pa r t i c i pa t e d i n t he k i l l i n g of some
noncombatants i n and around My Lai ( 4 ) .
d. H e f a i l e d t o r e por t t h e k i l l i n g s of noncombatants
i n and around My Lai (4) as a pos s i bl e war c r i m e a s r equi r ed
by MACV Directive 20-4.
24. MR. ( t hen 1LT) ROGER L. ALAUX, J R.
a. Having knowledge of war cri mes committed i n and
around My Lai ( 4 ) , 'he f a i l e d t o r e por t them 3s r equi r ed by
MACV Di rect i ve 20-4.
b. Having wi t nessed t h e k i l l i n g s of 4 o r 5 VC s us pect s
by RVN Nat i onal Pol i c e on 16 March 1968 and r ecogni zi ng t h a t
it w a s a vi ol a t i on of t he law of war, he di d not at t empt t o
s t op t h e k i l l i n g s and. di d not r e por t them t o h i s commanding
o f f i c e r a s r equi r ed by MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4.
25. 2LT STETEN K. BROOKS (DECEASED)
a. H e or der ed t h e execut i on by h i s pl at oon of an un-
l awf ul oper at i on a ga i ns t i nhabi t ed haml et s i n Son My Vi l l age,
which i ncl uded t h e de s t r uc t i on of houses by burni ng, k i l l i n g
of l i ves t ock, and t h e de s t r uc t i on of cr ops and ot he r food-
s t u f f , and t he c l os i ng of t h e w e l l s ; and expr essl y o r i mpl i -
edl y ordered t he k i l l i n g of persons found t her e.
b. He di r e c t e d and super vi sed t he men of h i s pl at oon
i n t h e syst emat i c k i l l i n g of a t l e a s t 60-70 noncombatants i n
t h e subhamlets of My Lai ( 4 ) and Binh Tay.
c. Although he knew t h a t a number of h i s men ha bi t ua l l y
raped Vietnamese women i n v i l l a g e s dur i ng oper at i ons , on 16
March 1968, he obseryed, d i d not pr event , and f a i l e d t o r e por t
s e ve r a l r apes by members of h i s pl at oon whi l e i n My Lai ( 4 )
and Binh Tay on 16 March.
d. H e f a i l e d t o r e por t t he k i l l i n g s of noncombatants
i n and around My Lai ( 4 ) a s a pos s i bl e war crime a s r equi r ed
by MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4.
26. MR. ( t hen 2LT) JEFFREY U. LA CROSS
a. H e or der ed t h e execut i on by h i s pl at oon of an un-
l awf ul oper at i on a ga i ns t i nhabi t ed haml et s i n Son My Vi l l age,
which i ncl uded khe de s t r uc t i on of houses by burni ng, k i l l i n g
of l i ves t ock, and t h e de s t r uc t i on of crops and ot he r f oods t uf f s ,
and t h e c l os i ng of t h e w e l l s ; and expr essl y o r i mpl i edl y or-
der ed t he k i l l i n g of per sons found t he r e .
b. H e di r e c t e d and super vi sed t h e men of h i s pl at oon
i n t he syst emat i c k i l l i n g of many noncombatants i n and around
My Lai ( 4 ) .
c. It i s pos s i bl e t h a t he k i l l e d a t l e a s t one noncom-
ba t a nt female near My Lai ( 4 ) dur i ng t h e Son My oper at i on.
d. H e f a i l e d t o r e por t t h a t a VC suspect had been beat en
and maimed dur i ng h i s i nt e r r oga t i on i n vi ol a t i on of MACV D i r -
e c t i v e 20-4.
e. He f a i l e d t o r e por t t h e k i l l i n g s of noncombatants i n
and around My Lai ( 4 ) a s a. pos s i bl ewar crime a s r equi r ed by
MAC V, - Di r e c t i v e 20-4.
. 27. 2LT MICHAEL L. LEWIS (DECEASED)
Having wi t nessed t he de s t r uc t i on of t he subhaml et s Co
Lay ( 4 ) , Co Lay ( 2) , and Co Lay ( 3 ) dur i ng t h e af t er noon of
17 March 1.968, he f a i l e d t o r e por t t h e , d e s t r u c t i o n of p r i v a t e
pr oper t y i n vi ol a t i on of di vi s i on pol i cy and t h e pr ovi si ons of
pe r t i ne nt di r e c t i ve s .
28. MR. ( t hen 1LT) JOHN E. MUNDY
Having wi t nessed t h e de s t r uc t i on of t h e subhaml et s Co
Lay ( I ) , Co Lay ( 2 ) , and Co Lay ( 3) dur i ng t h e af t er noon of
17 March 1968, he f a i l e d t o r e por t t h e de s t r uc t i on of p r i v a t e
pr oper t y i n vi ol a t i on of di vi s i on pol i cy and t h e pr ovi si ons
of pe r t i ne nt d i r e c t i v e s .
29. .MR. ( t henSGT) RONALD L. HAEBERLE
a. H e made no at t empt t o s t o p any of t h e a c t s he w i t -
nessed on 16 March 1968 de s pi t e t h e f a c t t h a t such a c t s vi ol a t e d
t he law of wa r .
b. H e f a i l e d t o r e por t t he k i l l i n g s of noncombatants
i n and around My Lai ( 4) a s r equi r ed by MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4.
c. H e wi t hhel d and suppressed . phot ographi c evi dence
of war crimes i n vi ol a t i on of MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4.
d. H e f a i l e d t o r e por t t he cri mes he had wi t nessed t o
CPT Medina; t h e TF Commander, LTC Frank A. Barker; o r t o h i s
s uper i or s , LT John W. Moody, LT Art hur J. Dunn, Jr., o r SGT
John St oni ch.
e. H e may have wrongful l y appr opr i at ed and di sposed of photo-
graphs t aken a s an Army phot ographer on an assi gned oper at i on-
a l mi ssi on i n suppor t of a combat u n i t .
30. MR. ( t hen SP5) J AY ROBERTS
a. As s t a t e d bef or e t h i s I nqui r y, dur i ng t h e morning
of 16 March 1968 whi l e i n suppor t of C/1-20 I n f , he:
(1) Made no at t empt t o s t op any of t h e a c t s he w i t -
nessed de s pi t e t h e f a c t t h a t he r e a l i z e d t h a t such a c t s vi o-
l a t e d t h e law of va r .
( 2 ) Fa i l e d t o r e por t t h e k i l l i n g s of noncombatants
i n and around My Lai ( 4 ) a s r equi r ed by MACV Di r ect i ve 20-4.
( 3) Fa i l e d t o r e por t t he cri mes he had wi t nessed t o
CPT Medina; t h e TF Commander, LTC Frank A. Barker; o r t o h i s
s upe r i or s , LT John W. Moody, LT Art hur J. Dunn, o r SGT John
S t oni ch.
b. He subsequent l y pr epar ed an a r t i c l e f o r t h e br i gade
newspapers which omi t t ed a l l mention of t h e war cri mes he had
observed and gave a f a l s e and mi sl eadi ng account of t he Task
Force Barker oper at i on.
Annex A
PEERS INQUIRY ORGANIZATION AND PROC EDU RES
1. EXECUTIVE DIRECTION
As i ndi cat ed i n Chapter 1, t h e Secr et ar y of t h e Army and t h e
Chief of St a f f of t he Army on 26 November 1969 di r e c t e d Lieu-
t e na nt General Wi l l i am R. Peer s, Chi ef , Of f i ce of Reserve Com-
ponent s, Headquart ers, Department of t h e Army, t o conduct t h e
I nqui r y which i s t h e s ubj e c t of t h i s r e por t ( I ncl os ur e 1, chap 1).
Mr . Bland West, As s i s t a nt General Counsel, Department of t h e Army,
was desi gnat ed a s General Peer s' deput y by t h e same d i r e c t i v e .
LTC James H. Breen, Of f i ce, Deputy Chief of St a f f f o r M i l i -
t a r y Operat i ons was s e l e c t e d t o s er ve a s t he execut i ve o f f i c e r
and t o be r es pons i bl e f o r t h e r equi r ed admi ni s t r at i ve and l ogi s -
t i c a l suppor t , and COL Joseph R. ~ r a n k l i nwas s e l e c t e d t o super-
vi s e t he ope r a t i ona l f unct i ons of t h e I nqui r y.
By a message dat ed 9 December 1969, t h e Chief of St a f f r e-
quest ed a l l agenci es of t h e Department of t h e Army t o pr ovi de
a s s i s t a nc e t o General Peers and members of h i s team a s r equi r ed
( I ncl os ur e 5 ) . I n t h i s same message, i t w i l l be not ed, t he
I nqui r y was gi ven t h e formal t i t l e , "The Department of t h e Army
Review of t h e Pr el i mi nar y I nve s t i ga t i ons I n t o t he My Lai I nc i -
dent " and t h e s hor t t i t l e of "Peers I nqui r y".
2. SPECIAL CIVILIAN COUNSEL
On 30 November 1969, General Peers addressed a memorandum t o
t he Secr et ar y of t h e Army and t he Chief of St a f f of t he Army
r eques t i ng t h a t a " di s t i ngui s hed j u r i s t of impeccable i n t e g r i t y "
be desi gnat ed t o ser ve a s h i s l e g a l counsel ( I ncl os ur e 4 , chap 1).
I n response, t h e Secr et ar y of t h e Army obt ai ned t he s e r vi c e s of
two di s t i ngui s hed at t or neys engaged i n p r i v a t e pr a c t i c e i n t h e
Ci t y of New York, Mr . Robert MacCrate and M r . Jerome K . Walsh, Jr . ,
t o s er ve a s General Peer s ' Speci al Counsel and Associ at e Speci al
Counsel r e s pe c t i ve l y. Both ser ved i n t h a t capaci t y t hroughout
t h e I nqui r y, p a r t i c i p a t i n g f u l l y i n a l l major a c t i v i t i e s , i n-
cl udi ng t he t r i p t o Vietnam.
3. ORGANIZATION AND RULES OF PROCEDURE
Of f i ce space f o r t h e I nqui r y was made a va i l a bl e i n t h e Army
Operat i ons Cent er (AOC) , Pentagon, and t h e i n i t i a l meet i ng of
t h e i nve s t i ga t i ng team was hel d on 28 November 1969. The f ol -
lowing key deci s i ons w e r e made :
a. AR 15-6 would be used a s a gener al gui de f o r t h e pro-
ceedi ngs of t he I nqui r y, wi t h t h e underst andi ng t h a t t h e nat ur e
of t h e mi ssi on would r e qui r e l i b e r a l except i ons t o itspr ovi -
s i ons .
b. Wi t nesses would be c a l l e d t o Washington f o r i nt er r oga-
t i o n t o t h e e xt e nt pos s i bl e .
c. I nt e r r oga t i on of wi t nesses i n Washington would b'egin on
2 December 1969.
d. A t r i p t o Vietnam would be an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of t h e
I nqui r y.
e. The r e por t submi t t ed by General Peer s would be c l a s s i -
f i e d " conf i dent i al . " Wi t nesses would be t o l d t h a t t h e i r t e s -
timony would be s o c l a s s i f i e d , but t h a t i t was pos s i bl e t h a t i t
would be r el eas ed t o t h e publ i c a t a l a t e r dat e.
f . The I nqui r y would be conducted a s s peedi l y a s pos s i bl e
consi s t e n t wi t h t horoughness.
Tasks were assi gned and performed on an -- i n i - ad hoc ba s i s
t i a l l y . When t h e f u l l scope of t h e I nqui r y became appar ent , a
formal or gani zat i on wa s e s t a bl i s he d ( I ncl os ur e 1)and t h e
s t a f f s ubs t a nt i a l l y augmented.
Addi t i onal d e t a i l s a s t o t h e or gani zat i on of t h e I nqui r y
are provi ded i n subsequent paragraphs des cr i bi ng var i ous func-
t i ons .
4. PERSONNEL
The o r i g i n a l members of t h e team we r e :
LTG William R. Peer s
Mr . Bland West, OGC, Deputy
LTC James H. Breen, ODCSOPS, Execut i ve Of f i c e r
COL W. V. Wilson, OTI G
COL R. W. M i l l e r , OTJAG
MAJ E. F. Zychowski, OTPMG
Mr . R. E. Montgomery, Jr. , OGC
Mr . James S. St okes, 111, OGC, r epl aced Mr . Montgomery on
29 November 1969 and ser ved b r i e f l y dur i ng t h e e a r l y s t a ge s of
t he I nqui r y.
Mr . MacCrate and Mr . Walsh j oi ned t h e team on 5 December
1969.
As t he oper at i ons and f unct i ons of t h e team pr ogr essed,
a ddi t i ona l per sonnel requi rement s r a pi dl y developed u n t i l t h e
team reached i t s maximum s t r e ngt h of 32 o f f i c e r s , 44 e n l i s t e d
men, and 10 c i v i l i a n s ( I ncl osur e 2 , r o s t e r ; I ncl os ur es 3 and
4 , phot ogr aphs) .
The o f f i c e r s s er vi ng wi t h t he Reers I nqui r y were, f o r t h e
most p a r t , s e l e c t e d from agenci es and commands i n t h e Washing-
t o n ar ea. Due t o t he unusual per sonnel requi rement s of t h e
I nqui r y ( e. g. , many c our t r e por t e r s and Magnetic Tape/ Sel ect r i c
Typewri t er (MTST) oper at or s ) , itwas necessary t o l evy upon
agenci es out s i de t he Washington a r e a f o r a consi der abl e number
of e n l i s t e d s p e c i a l i s t s .
5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
A l l admi ni s t r at i ve f unct i ons ( per sonnel , s e c ur i t y, f i l i n g ,
correspondence, e t c . ) and l ogi s t i c f unct i ons ( of i ce space and
s uppl i es , t r a ns por t a t i on, and housi ng of wi t nesses, e t c . ) w e r e
super vi sed and coor di nat ed by t h e Execut i ve Of f i c e r and a s t a f f
of f our a s s i s t a n t s . With r es pect t o s e c ur i t y, MAJ Edward F.
Zychowski conducted necessary i ns pect i ons and i nt e r r oga t i ons .
The Excut i ve Of f i c e r a l s o super vi sed t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e re-
por t e r s and t a pe oper at or s .
Ear l y i n t he I nqui r y t he Son My Army St a f f Monitor Group
was e s t a bl i s he d i n t he Of f i ce of t h e Secr et ar y of t h e General
St a f f and a major por t i on of t h e I nqui r y' s r out i ne admi ni st r a-
t i o n and s t a f f i n g was t h e r e a f t e r handl ed by t h a t o f f i c e .
The I nqui r y was phys i cal l y l ocat ed i n a s u i t e of o f f i c e s
i n t he AOC, i n a r e s t r i c t e d a r e a of t he Pentagon. Thi s s i m-
p l i f i e d t h e admi ni s t r at i on of s e c ur i t y measures and provi ded
ready access t o optimum communications, gr aphi cs, and reproduc-
t i o n f a c i l i t i e s . However, l i mi t e d space wi t hi n t h a t f a c i l i t y
r equi r ed t h a t many f unct i ons of t h e I nqui r y be performed i n t e n
o f f i c e s out s i de of t h e AOC.
The admi ni s t r at i ve and l o g i s t i c s f unct i ons of t h e ~ n q u i r y
w e r e performed by t he f ol l owi ng per sons:
LTC James H. Breen, Execut i ve Of f i c e r
SP6 John R. St r emi ki s, Stenographer/Administrative NCO
PFC Thomas R. Broderi ck, Cl erk Typi s t
PV2 William H. Wanlund, Cl erk Typi s t
M r s . Ri t a Col l i ns , St enographer
M r s . Maureen Mar shal l , -St enographer
Mrs. Dorothy St ar on, St enographer
M i s s June Roth, St enographer
6. PRODUCTION OF TESTIMONXAL EVIDENCE
a. I nt e r r oga t i on Teams. I n j t i a l l y t h e I nqui r y f unct i oned
wi t h one i nt e r r oga t i on team chai r ed by General Peer s. The
i nt e r r oga t i ons w e r e cont i nued whi l e General Peer s and ot he r mem-
be r s of t h e I nqui r y were i n Vietnam (26 Dec 1969 - 8 Jan 1970)
by a panel headed by Mr . W e s t which heard onl y t est i mony con-
cer ni ng t h e a c t i v i t i e s of Company C, 1stBa t t a l i on, 20t h Infan-
t r y ( C/ l - 20 I nf ) dur i ng t h e Son My oper at i on. Two i nt e r r oga t i on
teams f unct i oned i n Vietnam, one headed by General Peer s and t h e
ot he r by Mr . Walsh (seepar a 9 bel ow).
Upon t he r e t ur n of t h e pa r t y from Vietnam, t h r e e i nt er r oga-
t i o n teams were formed. Team A, headed by General Peer s and
wi t h Mr . MacCrate a s a pr i nc i pa l , had gener al coverage, but
pr i mar i l y took t est i mony bear i ng upon t h e adequacy o f t he pr e-
l i mi nar y i nve s t i ga t i ons i n t o t he Son My i nc i de nt and whet her
t he r e had been a "cover-up. " Team B , headed by Mr . W e s t and
wi t h COL Fr ankl i n and LTC Pat t er s on a s pr i nc i pa l s t ook a ddi t i ona l
t est i mony on t h e a c t i v i t i e s of C/1-20 I nf dur i ng t h e Son My
oper at i on and a l s o i nt e r r oga t e d p i l o t s and crews of suppor t i ng
he l i c opt e r s . Team C, headed by COL Wilson and wi t h M r . Walsh
a s a pr i nc i pa l , focused on t h e a c t i v i t i e s of Company B, 4t h
Ba t t a l i on, 3d I nf a nt r y (B/4-3 I n f ) dur i ng t h e oper at i on. During
t h e l a t t e r p a r t of February and e a r l y March 1970, a f our t h team
was formed t o examlne wi t nesses from,Company A, 3d Ba t t a l i on,
1st I nf a nt r y (A/3-1 I n f j . Team D, headed by COL John W.
Armstrong, heard 16 wi t nesses and t er mi nat ed i t s i nt e r r oga t i ons
a f t e r f i ndi ng no ba s i s f o r concl udi ng t h a t A/3-1 I n had k i l l e d
any noncombatants dur i ng t h e Son My oper at i on.
The o f f i c e r s l i s t e d below ser ved a s r equi r ed on any of t h e
i nt e r r oga t i on teams:
Col onel s John W . Ar ms t r ong, Joseph R. Fr ankl i n, Robert
E. M i l l e r , and W i l l i a m V. Wilson.
Li eut enant Col onel s Charl es J. Bauer, Leo M. Brandt , Fred
K. Mahaffey, Wallace W. Nol l , James H. Pat t er s on, and John E ,
Rogers, Major Edward F. Zychowski and MAJ Joseph I. Api ci .
Ma~y suppl ement al i nt e r r oga t i ons , i n which wi t nesses marked
on v e r t i c a l a e r i a l phot ographs t h e l oc a t i ons of t hi ngs t hey had
seen and t h e r out es which t hey and t h e i r u n i t s had t aken t hrough
t he Son My oper at i onal a r e a , were conducted by COL Wi l l i am V.
Wilson, LTC James H. Pat t er s on, and MAJ Edward F. Zychowski.
The f ol l owi ng o f f i c e r s ser ved a s Recorders f o r t h e i nt e r r o-
gat i on teams :
Majors Clyde D. Lynn (Team A) , Harold L. Coop (Teams B and
D) and Joe C. Thomas (Team C) .
b. Conduct of t h e I nve s t i ga t i ons . Each wi t ness was gi ven
an expl anat i on of t he nat ur e and purpose of t h e I nqui r y ( s ee
e xhi bi t M-57 f o r a sample expl anat i on) . I f t h e wi t ness was
suspect ed of an of f ense r e l e va nt t o t h e I nqui r y, he would be
advi sed of h i s t e s t i moni a l r i g h t s and r i g h t t o counsel by COL
Robert E. M i l l e r , JAGC, who a l s o arranged f o r counsel f o r t h e
wi t ness i f des i r ed.
A l l wi t nesses w e r e sworn p r i o r t o gi vi ng t est i mony. Thei r
t est i mony wa s e l i c i t e d by i nt e r r oga t i on and ques t i ons and ans-
w e r s recorded by a r e por t e r and by t ape r ecor der . Exhi bi t s con-
s i s t i n g of documents, phot ographs, maps and ot he r phys i cal evi -
dence were i nt r oduced dur i ng t est i mony and made a p a r t of t h e
record.
c. Wi t ness. A t t h e o u t s e t , COL Wilson was r es pons i bl e f o r
i de nt i f yi ng and schedul i ng wi t nesses and t h e Execut i ve
Of f i cer , ai ded by MAJ Coop and SP5 Machusick, f o r l oc a t i ng and
making arrangement s t o br i ng them t o t h e Pentagon t o appear
bef or e an i nt e r r oga t i on team. Wi t nesses i nt e r r oga t e d i n Vi et -
anm ( s ee par a 9 below) were arranged f o r on an -- ad hoc ba s i s .
As t h e r a t e of i nt e r r oga t i on i ncr eas ed, it became necessar y
t o e s t a b l i s h a wi t ness s e c t i on, headed by MAJ Joseph I . Api ci ,
t o l oc a t e wi t nesses and make a l l necessar y arrangement s f o r
t h e i r t r a v e l t o t h e Pentagon and r e t ur n. I n a ddi t i on, MAJ
St anl ey Kraus s pent about 3 weeks wi t h t h e I nqui r y i de nt i f yi ng
and l oc a t i ng he l i c opt e r p i l o t s and c r e w s who had pa r t i c i pa t e d
i n t he Son My oper at i on.
Mi l i t a r y wi t nesses coul d be or der ed t o appear bef or e t he
I nqui r y. As General Peers l acked subpoena power, c i v i l i a n
wi t nesses coul d not be r equi r ed t o appear. Never t hel ess, MAJ
Api ci and h i s pr i nc i pa l a s s i s t a n t s , SP5 Richard F. Machusick
and SP5 Gregory A. Bent l ey, were al most uni forml y s ucces s f ul
i n persuadi ng c i v i l i a n wi t nesses t o make t h e t r i p t o Washington,
many coming from t housands of m i l e s away.
MAJ Api c i ' s s e c t i on a l s o i ncl uded s e ve r a l a s s i s t a n t s who
manned a wai t i ng room f o r wi t nesses and ser ved a s t h e i r e s c or t s
t o and from t he i nt e r r oga t i on rooms l ocat ed i n r e s t r i c t e d ar eas .
These a s s i s t a n t s were:
SP5 Pe t e r D. Hal l ock, SP5 Robert M. Hamilton, SP4 Paul D.
Se a r l e , and PV2 Paul L. Hul l .
d. Repor t er s. The I nqui r y u t i l i z e d members of t h e Army
t r a i ne d i n r e por t i ng cour t - mar t i al t r i a l s a s r e por t e r s . The ma-
j o r i t y used t he stenomachine syst em; t h e bal ance were st enot ype
oper at or s. I n i t i a l l y , f our r e por t e r s were assi gned, but t h e num-
be r w a s augmented s u b s t a n t i a l l y a s t h e hours s pent i n t a ki ng t e s -
timony i ncr eas ed, pr i ma r i l y t hrough si mul t aneous oper at i on of more
t han one i nt e r r oga t i on team. The names of t h e r e por t e r s fol l ow:
SP7 Lee B. Edmonds (Chi ef Report er) S ' P ~Al l an A. rockm man
SP7 Mi l t on J. Brown SP4 Gary E. France
SP7 Kenneth Bet t er i dge SP4 James. L. Th i l l
SP6 Art hur B. Rei d, Jr. PFC Dennis G. Bul l
SP5 Richard Tj osvol d PFC James Chr i s t i a n
SP5 James V. Link PFC James L. Holland
SP5 Vi ol a L. Pa r r i s h ( a l s o PFC Joseph Lavi er i
a s s i s t e d i n pr epar at i on of
r e por t )
e . Pr ocessi ng gf Tr ans cr i pt s . COL Robert E . M i l l e r , J AGC,
i n addi t i on t o s e r vi ng a s t h e l e g a l member of t h e i nt e r r oga t i on
teams, was r es pons i bl e f o r t h e pr ocessi ng of a l l t r a n s c r i p t s of
t est i mony, an oper at i on which r equi r ed more per sonnel t han any
ot he r f unct i on of t h e I nqui r y.
Uncorrect ed r e por t e r t r a n s c r i p t s were convert ed t o f i n a l
copy t hrough a s e r i e s of e d i t s , revi ews, and r et ypi ngs desi gn-
ed t o i ns ur e f a c t u a l , format , s pe l l i ng, and punct uat i on accuracy
i ns of a r a s pr a c t i c a bl e .
A team of f our o f f i c e r e d i t o r s r ead each t r a n s c r i p t i n i t s
e n t i r e t y . a n d made f or mat , s p e l l i n g , and punct uat i on c or r e c t i ons .
They a l s o s pent many hundreds of hours comparing r e por t e r d r a f t s
wi t h t ape rec. ordings and making c or r e c t i ons t o as s ur e subs t an-
t i v e accuracy.
Each e di t e d d r a f t t r a n s c r i p t was t hen reviewed by a s e ni or
o f f i c e r o r c i v i l i a n niember of t h e I nqui r y, us ual l y one who had
pa r t i c i pa t e d i n t h e ques t i oni ng of t he wi t ness whose t est i mony
was bei ng reviewed. Thi s was pr i mar i l y a s ubs t ant i ve review f o r
t h e purpose of f u r t h e r as s ur i ng t h e accuracy of t h e t r a n s c r i p t .
The next s t e p was pr oduct i on oE- a MTST t yped ' dr a f t . I n t h i s
pr ocess t he t est i mony was recorded on MTST t a pe s , which f a c i l i -
t a t e d ma t e r i a l l y t he f ur t he r c or r e c t i on of d r a f t s and pr oduct i on
of f i n a l copy. A t peak s t r e ngt h 19 MTST oper at or s were oper at -
i n g 5 machines 24 hours a day and 2 machines 1 6 hours a day.
Sever al of t hes e oper at or s had never oper at ed an MTST bef or e and
on-the-job t r a i n i n g was r equi r ed.
Four a ddi t i ona l o f f i c e r e d i t o r s reviewed each MTST d r a f t f o r
s ubs t ant i ve, format , s p e l l i n g and punct uat i on e r r o r s , and t h e
cor r ect ed d r a f t was r et ur ned t o t h e MTST oper at or s f o r a cl ean
d r a f t . Thi s pr ocess was r epeat ed a s many t i mes a s necessar y t o
produce accept abl e f i n a l copy.
Four 3udge Advocate Gener al ' s Corps ( JAGC) c a pt a i ns s pent
approxi mat el y one month a s e d i t o r s and i n becoming f ami l ar wi t h
t he evi dence. They devel oped a format f o r summarizing t est i mony
and begi nni ng i n e a r l y January devot ed t h e i r f u l l t i me t o pr e-
par at i on of summaries of t est i mony, wi t h cr oss- r ef er ences t o
t r a n s c r i p t pages. They were a s s i s t e d by one WAC st enogr apher
who di d v i r t u a l l y a l l of t h e i r d r a f t and f i n a l summaries.
General Peer s and h i s pr i nc i pa l a s s i s t a n t s had a cont i nui ng
and immediate need f o r t est i mony a s background f o r i nt er r oga-
t i ons . Sever al copi es of t he f i r s t r e por t e r d r a f t were prepar-
ed and d i s t r i b u t e d f o r t h i s purpose. Ext ensi ve and de t a i l e d
c ont r ol s w e r e r equi r ed t o i ns ur e t h a t a l l t r a n s c r i p t s i n a l l
s t a ge s of pr ocessi ng w e r e account ed f o r , w e r e bei ng worked on,
and were a va i l a bl e . Two e n l i s t e d a s s i s t a n t s mai nt ai ned a l l work
s t a t u s and flow c ha r t s , pr epar ed copi es of and d i s t r i b u t e d t r a n-
s c r i p t s , and mai nt ai ned account abi l i t y r ecor ds.
The f ol l owi ng persons ~. ccompl i shedt h e t a s ks descr i bed a-
bove :
Chief COL Robert E. M i l l e r
Chief Cl erk PFC Alan L. But l er
A s s t Chief Cl erk SP4 Edward P. Nalevanko
Ed i t o r i a l Super vi sor CPT Michael H. Cl ark
Edi t or s MTST Operat ors
MAJ Jon A. Kosty SGT Kenneth B. Crenshaw
CPT Gary Ei f r i e d SGT Char l es E. Olson
CPT Lloyd L. Chest er SP5 Rodney H. Pearce
SP5 St ephen A. Wright
MTST Dr af t Edi t or s SP4 Loren B. Havekost
SP4 Dennis P. McCoy
MAJ John G. Connor SP5 Thomas W. Pe t e r s i k
MAJ Howard C. Jacobson SP4 John R. Somers
CPT William R. Por t e r SP4 David F. St one
1LT Robert L. Bruer PFC Ronald L. Bl akel y
PFC Donald P. Boudreaux
Summarizers PFC Joseph S. W. Brasher
PFC L e s l i e W. Dyson
CPT James F. Cl ark PFC Dennis A. Gibbs
CPT Thomas M. Jackson PFC Cr ai g H i l l
CPT Alex B. Shi pl ey, Jr. PFC Joseph N. Hollerith
CPT Frank B. St a hl , Jr. PFC Roger F. Pr e s ne l l
St enographer PFC Thomas J. Zakovitch
PV2 Alan J. Towson
SP5 Vi ol a L. Pa r r i s h
7. PRODUCTION OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
a. Organi zat i on. COL Thomas F. Whalen i n i t i a l l y was made
r es pons i bl e f o r t h e pr oduct i on of phys i cal evi dence f o r t he In-
qui r y. When he w a s di spat ched t o Vietnam i n mid-December t o
e s t a b l i s h t he Sai gon o f f i c e (see par a 1 0 , below) , LTC James H.
Pat t er s on assumed o v e r a l l r e s pons i bi l i t y f o r pr oduct i on of phy-
s i c a l evi dence. Col onel Whalen' s dut i e s i n Vietnam i ncl uded re-
s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e c ol l e c t i on of t est ament ar y a s we l l as phy-
s i c a l evi dence. As not ed el sewher e, he was a s s i s t e d i n Vietnam
by LTC Leo M. Brandt .
SP6 James R. Thomas a s s i s t e d LTC Pat t er s on i n t h e Pentagon
of i c e of t h e I nqui r y.
b. I de nt i f i c a t i on. Pr i o r t o t he begi nni ng of t h e col l ec-
t i o n pr ocess, a l i s t of documents of an evi dent i ar y nat ur e was
pr epar ed, r epr es ent i ng t hos e t h a t we r e r equi r ed by r e gul a t i on t o
be i n i t i a t e d and mai nt ai ned by a l l u n i t s as s oci at ed wi t h t h e Son
My i nc i de nt . Added t o t h i s l i s t w e r e ot he r documents and re-
cor ds t h a t coul d have been i n i t i a t e d and mai nt ai ned, al t hough
not r equi r ed. Thi s l i s t i n g was cont i nual l y r evi s ed dur i ng t h e
I nqui r y t o i ns ur e t h a t a l l pos s i bl e documentary evi dence was
i de nt i f i e d. Ot her t ypes of phys i cal evi dence w e r e a l s o consi -
der ed and l i s t e d , i ncl udi ng p i c t o r i a l and t opographi c mat er i al .
c. Col l ect i on Procedures. Af t er t he i d e n t i f i c a t i o n proce-
dur e, t h e c ol l e c t i on pr ocess began. I t i ncl uded t h e t r a c i n g of
documents from sour ce t o s t or age.
(1)Method. The c ol l e c t i on pr ocess was decent r al i zed. In-
di vi dua l s and agenci es w e r e t asked t o pr ovi de a phys i cal on- s i t e
sear ch and c o l l e c t i o n e f f o r t . Team members of t h e I nqui r y su-
per vi sed t h e c o l l e c t i o n a t t he var i ous headquar t er s and agen-
c i e s . Oversea members of t h e I nqui r y were i nvol ved i n t h i s ef -
f o r t a s wel l a s Cont i nent al Uni t ed St a t e s (CONUS) per sonnel , but
t h e di r e c t i on of t h e e n t i r e e f f o r t was r e t a i ne d i n Washington,
DC .
( 2 ) Searches. The c ol l e c t i on of a l l t ypes of evi dence was
i n i t i a t e d a t Department of t h e Army l e ve l . A s ear ch was conduct-
ed wi t hi n t h e headquar t er s t o i ncl ude a l l s t a f f s e c t i ons f o r t he
a v a i l a b i l i t y of any l i s t e d e vi de nt i a r y ma t e r i a l . Subsequent
sear ches a t subor di nat e headquar t er s were conducted. The obj e c t
of t he sear ches was t o pr ocur e t h e pl anni ng, pol i cy, and gui dance
d i r e c t i v e s a ppl i c a bl e t o Task Force (TF) Barker, t h e 11t h B r i -
gade and t h e America1 Di vi si on dur i ng March 1968.
The s t or age r ecor ds c e nt e r s , t o i ncl ude i nt er medi at e r ecor d
hol di ng ar eas , were phys i cal l y sear ched by members of t h e In-
qui r y, and pe r t i ne nt r ecor ds, documents and/or r e c e i pt s procured.
The f a c i l i t i e s sear ched i ncl uded t he Nat i onal Records Cent er ,
Sui t l and, Maryland; US Army-Records Holding Area, Okinawa; and
t he Vietnam Records Holding Area a t Long Binh, Vietnam. Searches
were a l s o conducted i n Japan and Hawaii, as w e l l a s i n Vietnam.
( 3 ) Witn.esses. The c ol l e c t i on of documents and phys i cal
evi dence was a cont i nui ng pr ocess. Wi t nesses appear i ng bef or e
t he I nqui r y were quer i ed i n an e f f o r t t o pr ocur e anyr physi cal
evi dence' i n t h e i r possessi on. Sever al had e vi de nt i a r y mat t er
such as l e t t e r s and photographs which t hey f ur ni shed wi l l i ngl y t o
t he I nqui r y.
d. Ce r t i f i c a t e s of Search. Upon compl et i on of t he s ear ch
a t each of t h e var i ous u n i t s and agenci es, a c e r t i f i c a t e was ob-
t a i ne d t o i ndi c a t e t he e xt e nt of t h e sear ch. A r ecor d of t h e
documents obt ai ned and t he s p e c i f i c l oc a t i on of each was pr epar -
ed t o accompany t he sear ch c e r t i f i c a t e . I n some cases I nqui r y
personnel execut ed t he sear ch c e r t i f i c a t e s , whi l e i n t he l a r ge r
headquar t er s t h e c e r t i f i c a t e s were pr epar ed by r esponsi bl e com-
manders. These c e r t i f i c a t e s were made a permanent p a r t of t h e
r ecor d of t h e I nqui r y.
e . Pr ocessi ng. Pr ocessi ng t h e documents and phys i cal evi -
dence was accomplished a s t hey were r ecei ved. Locat or car ds and
f i l e s were e s t a bl i s he d t o provi de ready a c c e s s i b i l i t y and r e f e r -
ence, and each i t e m was c a r e f ul l y anal yzed f o r per t i nency. Each
document was r ead by General Peer s o r h i s deput y, Mr . West. I n
l i k e manner, ot he r forms of evi dence were s t udi ed. Based on
General Peer s' gui dance, a l l documents w e r e hi ghl i ght ed o r ex-
t r a c t e d, d i s t r i b u t e d f o r i nf or mat i on t o a l l i nt e r r oga t or s , and a
det er mi nat i on made a s t o whet her t hey would be gi ven e x h i b i t s t a -
t u s . Reproduction was necessar y i n most cas es , wi t h o r i g i n a l
copi es r e t a i ne d i n f i l e f o r t he f i n a l r e por t . Cont r ol of a l l
documentary evi dence was admi ni st er ed c e n t r a l l y t o i ns ur e t h e
necessary s e c u r i t y and c or r e l a t i on wi t h ot he r requi rement s.
f . Types of Physi cal Evidence. The t ypes of phys i cal evi -
dence c ol l e c t e d were a s var i ed a s t h e sour ces. Regul at i ons,
d i r e c t i v e s , or der s , pl ans , r e por t s , messages, l e t t e r s , and photo-
graphs a r e r e pr e s e nt a t i ve of t h e ba s i c evi dence c ol l e c t e d. I n
a ddi t i on, t he sear ch and c ol l e c t i on e f f o r t s uncovered d i a r i e s ,
t a pe r ecor di ngst di agrams, news a r t i c l e s , propaganda l e a f l e t s ,
and maps, t o a few of t h e nonst andard t ypes of d a t a obt ai ned and
used. The volume of documentary and phys i cal evi dence i de nt i -
f i e d , c ol l e c t e d, pr ocessed, anal yzed, c or r e l a t e d, and di ssemi nat -
ed amounted t o approxi mat el y 30 l i n e a r f e e t .
8. SUPPORT BY OTHER OFFICES AND AGENCIES
a. Speci al Support .
(1) Of f i ce of t h e General Counsel (OGC) . The General Coun-
s e l of t he Department of t h e Army, Mr . Robert E. Jor dan, 111; t h e
Deputy General Counsel , M r . R. Kenly Webster; andmr . Robert E.
Montgomery, Jr. , As s i s t a nt t o t h e General Counsel, provi ded spe-
c i a l suppor t t o t h e I nqui r y on a va r i e t y of l e g a l and ot he r mat-
ters, i ncl udi ng pol i c y gui dance a s t o t h e r e l e a s e of i nf or mat i on
t o Congressi onal committees, t h e news media, and ot he r s .
( 2 ) O f f i c e of t h e Chief of Informat i on (OCINFO). Because of
t he ext r aor di nar y i n t e r e s t i n t he a c t i v i t i e s of t h e I nqui r y di s -
pl ayed by t he news media, BG Winant Si dl e , CINFO, assi gned LTC
Dani el R. Zenk, an experi enced s e ni or i nf or mat i on o f f i c e r , t o
s er ve a s t he I nqui r y' s publ i c r e l a t i o n s o f f i c e r . MAJ J e f f r e y
Scr i bner ser ved b r i e f l y i n t h i s capaci t y dur i ng t h e e a r l y days of
t h e I nqui r y. MAJ Wi l l i am F. Gabel l a was t h e i nf or mat i on o f f i c e r
on t he Vietnam t r i p .
( 3 ) Of f i ce of t h e Chief of St a f f of t h e Army (OCSA). Re-
s pons i bi l i t y f o r pr ovi di ng whatever suppor t was needed f o r e f -
f e c t i v e f unct i oni ng of t h e I nqui r y was assumed by OCSA. MAJ L.
Di l wort h, OCSA, provi ded major admi ni s t r at i ve and l o g i s t i c a l sup-
por t t o t he I nqui r y. As i ndi c a t e d, t h e Son My Army St a f f Monitor
Group, e s t a bl i s he d i n t h e Of f i ce of t h e Secr et ar y of t h e General
St a f f (SGS) and headed by COL G. W. Eve r e t t , was most he l pf ul i n
coor di nat i ng t h e I nqui r y' s requi rement s wi t hi n t h e Army St a f f and
i n obt ai ni ng a s s i s t a nc e from e xt e r na l agenci es.
( 4 ) Of f i ce of t h e Pr ovost Marshal General of t h e Army
(OPMG). Si nce OPMG was charged i n August 1969 wi t h i nve s t i ga t i ng
t he cr i mi nal as pect s of t h e Son My i nc i de nt , t he r e was a subst an-
t i a l community of i n t e r e s t between OPMG and t h e I nqui r y. MAJ
Edward F. Zychowski, an experi enced member of OPMG' s Cri mi nal
I nve s t i ga t i on Di vi si on ( CI D) , was made a va i l a bl e by OPMG t o s er ve
as a f u l l member of t he I nqui r y s t a f f . One of h i s pr i nc i pa l du-
t i e s was t o mai nt ai n c l os e l i a i s o n wi t h t h e headquar t er s of t h e
Army CI D Agency i n Washington t o ar r ange f o r t h e mutual exchange
of i nf or mat i on on t h e Son My i nc i de nt .
b. General Support .
(1) Ot her Ser vi ce Support . The Uni t ed St a t e s Navy, t h e
United St a t e s Marine Corps, and t h e United St a t e s A i r Force were
very cooper at i ve i n ar r angi ng t h e appearance bef or e t h e I nqui r y
of wi t nesses assi gned t o t hose s e r vi c e s .
( 2 ) Of f i ce of t h e Deputy Chief of St a f f f o r Mi l i t a r y
Oper at i ons (ODCSOPS). ODCSOPS pr ovi ded e x c e l l e n t s uppor t i n t h e
pr epar at i on of background paper s and f a c t s he e t s necessar y t o t h e
r econs t r uct i on of r e l e va nt mi l i t a r y oper at i ons i n Vietnam i n 1968
f o r background pur poses. I n addi t i on, t h e AOC pr ovi ded extreme-
l y e f f e c t i v e s uppor t i n t h e ar eas of communications, gr aphi cs and
r epr oduct i on f a c i l i t i e s , i n a ddi t i on t o housi ng t h e bul k of t h e
I nqui r y or gani zat i on.
( 3 ) Of f i ce of t he Deputy Chief of St a f f f o r Per sonnel
(DCSPER); Of f i ce of Per sonnel Oper at i ons (OPO) . Under t h e pol i cy
gui dance of ODCSPER, per sonnel r equi r ement s of t h e I nqui r y were
f i l l e d on an immediate p r i o r i t y by t h e Of f i ce of Per sonnel Op-
e r a t i o n s wi t h per sonnel of ext remel y hi gh c a l i b r e . Thi s f i n e re-
sponse was a major f a c t o r i n t h e s ucces s f ul f unct i oni ng of t h e
I nqui r y.
( 4 ) Of f i ce of t h e Adj ut ant General ( TAG) . TAG s uppor t i n
t he a r e a s of per sonnel l oc a t i on, r ecor ds cons ol i dat i on and s t a -
t i s t i c a l i nf or mat i on was of c r i t i c a l i mport ance t o t h e I nqui r y.
A l l r equi r ement s were m e t i n a most t i mel y and e f f e c t i v e manner.
( 5) Corps of Engi neer s. Over 500 photographs of hi gh pro-
f e s s i ona l q u a l i t y we r e reproduced expedi t i ous l y f o r t h e I nqui r y
by t h e Corps of Engi neer s.
( 6 ) Ot her o f f i c e s of t h e Department of t h e Army which pro-
vi ded immediate and he l pf ul suppor t we r e :
(a) Of f i ce, Chief of Mi l i t a r y Hi s t or y (OCMH)
( b) Of f i ce of t h e Pr ovost Marshal General
(c) Of f i ce of t h e Judge Advocate General ( J AG)
( d) Of f i ce of t h e As s i s t a nt Chief of St a f f f o r I n t e l l i g e n c e
(e) Of f i ce of t h e I ns pect or General
( f ) Army Phot ogr aphi c Agency
( g) Defense Pr i n t i n g Of i ce
9. SAIGON OFFICE
a. Or gani zat i on. COL Thomas F. Whalen and LTC Leo M. Brandt
proceeded t o Vietnam on 13 December 1969." Thei r pri mary mi ssi on
was t o coor di nat e t h e c o l l e c t i o n of p e r t i n e n t documents and ot he r
evi dence from Mi l i t a r y As s i s t ance Command, Vietnam (MACV) s t a f f
agenci es and s ubor di nat e commands and t o conduct a d e t a i l e d phy-
s i c a l s ear ch of r ecor ds and f i l e s of var i ous u n i t s and agenci es
i n Vietnam.
b. Of f i ce Es t abl i s hed. Upon a r r i v a l , t h e team e s t a bl i s he d a
l i a i s o n o f f i c e i n MACV headquar t er s, near Sai gon. The MACV I n-
s pect or Genera-l ( I G) ser ved a s t h e sponsor i ng s t a f f - agency and
pr ovi ded admi ni s t r at i ve s uppor t . The team from Washington was
supplemented wi t h t he s e r vi c e s of s e ve r a l commissioned J AG, I G
and Combined I n t e l l i g e n c e Cent er , Vietnam ( CI CV) per sonnel .
c. Li ai son Arrangements. Each MACV s t a f f agency desi gnat ed
a poi nt of cont act . Li ai son v i s i t s were conducted wi t h represen-
t a t i v e s from t h e MACV s t a f f , Hq USARV, I11 MAE', Hq America1 Divi-
s i on, t he 11t h LIB, t h e Seni or Provi nce Advi sor, t h e 2d ARVN Div
Advi sor, and t he D i s t r i c t Advisory Team. The cr i mi nal I nvest i ga-
t i o n ( CI D) team chi ef from t h e Of f i ce of t h e Pr ovost Marshal Gen-
e r a l of t h e Army was cont act ed and arrangement s made f o r exchange
of i nf or mat i on a s w e l l a s coor di nat i on of f ut ur e c o l l e c t i o n ef -
f o r t s .
d. Review of Requirements. Upon completion of t h e i n i t i a l
coor di nat i on, a revi ew of t h e ma t e r i a l pr evi ousl y c ol l e c t e d by
t h e MACV I G was conducted. Responsi bl e or gani zat i on and s t a f f
poi nt s of cont act were n o t i f i e d of a ddi t i ona l requi rement s t h a t
were developed. Thi s became a cont i nui ng pr ocess.
e. Home Of f i ce Guidance. Dai l y t el econs wi t h I nqui r y per-
sonnel i n' washi ngt on f a c i l i t a t e d t h e pr oper channel i ng of , and
f i x i n g of p r i o r i t i e s f o r , t h e c ol l e c t i on e f f o r t i n Vietnam, a s
w e l l a s pr ovi di ng t i mel y i nf or mat i on t o suppor t t he ongoing i n-
.,-
t e r r oga t i on of wi t nesses. Requirements based on testimony were
i d e n t i f i e d and e f f o r t s di r e c t e d toward l oc a t i on and recovery of
key documentation.
f . Re-Inspect i ons and Followup Searches.
(1)Upon compl et i on of i n i t i a l sear ches conducted by as-
si gned u n i t pe.rsonne1, t h e i n-count ry per sonnel of t h e I nqui r y
conducted a fol l owup sear ch of r ecor ds. Augmented by a ddi t ona l -
members of t he I nqui r y, who a r r i ve d i n Vietnam on 28 December
1969, t h e e f f o r t was i n t e n s i f i e d . Thi s sear ch encompassed t h e
a va i l a bl e f i l e s of a l l u n i t s engaged i n , or i n suppor t of , t he
oper at i ons of TF Barker i n mid-March 1968, a s we l l a s t he f i l e s
of a l l s t a f f s e c t i ons of immediate and i nt er medi at e headquar t er s.
( 2 ) Based on i nf or mat i on r ecei ved dur i ng t est i mony i n
Washington, a number of f a c i l i t i e s and s t a f f r ecor ds were r ei n-
spect ed t o as s ur e t h a t no pe r t i ne nt document had been overl ooked.
Personnel conduct i ng t h e sear ch were i nt er changed t o i ncr eas e t he
t horoughness and p o s s i b i l i t y f o r recovery. Ef f o r t was concent r at -
ed i n t hose ar eas i d e n t i f i e d a s t h e most l ogi c a l de pos i t or i e s , i n
t he judgment of persons wi t h admi ni s t r at i ve exper i ence i n t he u n i t .
h. Assi st ance by Vietnamese Aut hor i t i es . Vietnamese o f f i -
c i a l s who a s s i s t e d t h e i n-count ry c ol l e c t i on e f f o r t i ncl ude t h e
I Corps and 2d ARVN Di vi si on Commanders, and t h e Quang Ngai Pro-
vi nce and Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Chi ef s. I n addi t i on, many Vietnamese
c i v i l i a n wi t nesses were l ocat ed and made a va i l a bl e by th, e GVN t o
f a c i l i t a t e t he i nve s t i ga t i on. The cooper at i on by GVN/ARVN o f f i -
c i a l s was out st andi ng.
i. Searches i n Okinawa and Hawaii. To i ns ur e complete
coverage, a sear ch was made t hrough f i l e s of t h e Records Hold-
i ng Area i n Okinawa, as wel l a s t hose of t he Overseas Record
Cent er a t Kapalama, Hawaii. I n a ddi t i on, t h e r ecor ds of
USARHAW and USARPAC were screened.
1 0 . VIETNAM TRIP
(1) Pl anni ng f o r a v i s i t t o Vietnam began i n mid-December
when General Peers desi gnat ed t h e team members t o accompany him.
Necessary coor di nat i on f o r i n-count ry cl ear ance, s p e c i a l a i r
mi ssi on a i r c r a f t and pr epar at i on f o r over sea movement of t h e
members of t he team was accomplished. An advance pa r t y a r r i ve d
i n Vietnam on 15 December 1969, and i n conj unct i on wi t h t h e
appoi nt ed pr oj e c t o f f i c e r from t h e MACV I ns pect or Gener al ' s
o f f i c e , t he necessar y arrangements were made f o r t h e v i s i t of
General Peer s and team t o a r r i v e i n-count ry on 28 December 1969.
( 2 ) General Peers was accompanied by:
M r . Robert MacCrate, Ci vi l i a n Counsel
Mr . Jerome K. Walsh, Jr. , Ci vi l i a n Counsel
LTC John E. Rogers, I nt e r r oga t i on Team
MAJ David D. Dant zscher, I n t e r p r e t e r
MAJ Wi l l i am F. Gabel l a, Informat i on Of f i cer
MAJ Clyde D. Lynn, Recorder
SP7 Mi l t on J. Brown, Report er
SP6 James R. Thomas, St enographer
SP5 Robert F. Fromme, Phot ographer
PVT James C. Hol l and, Report er
I n a ddi t i on, per sonnel were r equest ed and provi ded from MACV a s
fol l ows:
LTC Bi l l y J . St anber r y, I n t e r p r e t e r
CMDR Wi l l i am J. Davi s, J AG Repr esent at i ve
CPT Werner Unzelmann, I nt e l l i ge nc e
CW4 Andre C. Feher, CI D Repr esent at i ve
( 3 ) Upon a r r i v a l i n Vietnam, t h e o f f i c i a l pa r t y organi zed
i n t o t w o i nt e r r oga t i on teams, a document c ol l e c t i on team and an
admi ni s t r at i on team. The f i r s t i nt e r r oga t i on team cons i s t ed of
General Peer s, Mr . MacCrate, LTC St anber r y and PVT Holland.
The second i nt e r r oga t i on team cons i s t ed of Mr . Walsh, MAJ
Dant zscher, and SP7.Brown. The document c ol l e c t i on team cons i s t -
ed of MAJ Lynn and SP6 Thomas.
b. V i s i t s . General Peer s, M r . MacCrate, M r . Walsh and
s e l e c t e d team members v i s i t e d t h e f ol l owi ng of f i c e s whi l e i n
Vietnam:
(1) Mi l i t a r y and Advisory Uni t s
( a) USMACV HQ
( b) USARV HQ
(c) 111MAFHQ
( d) America1 Di vi si on HQ
(e) 11t h I nf ant r y Bri gade
( f ) Quang Ngai Provi nce Advisory St a f f
( g) 123d Avi at i on Ba t t a l i on HQ
(h) Son Tinh D i s t r i c t Advisory St a f f
( 2) ARVN and GVN Aut hor i t i es/ Uni t s
( a ) MG Hoang Xuan Lam, CG I Corps
( b) BG Nguyen Van Toan, CG 2d ARVN Di vi si on
( c ) COL Nguyen Van Binh, QuangNgai Provi nce Chief
( d) COL Ton That Khien, former QuangNgai Provi nce
Chief t o 31 December 1969
(e) LTC Ha Thuc Ung, Deputy Sect or Commander Quang
Ngai
(f) CPT Tran Ngoc Tan, former Son Tinh D i s t r i c t Chief
( g ) Mr . Nguyen Duc Te, Census Grievance Chief
( 3) US Embassy. General Peer s and M r . MacCrate v i s i t e d
Ambassador El l swor t h Bunker, Deputy Ambassador Samuel D. Berger
and ot he r o f f i c i a l s i n t h e US Embassy.
c. Reconnaissance of Area.
(1) On-si t e i ns pect i on. On 3 January 1970, General Peer s,
Mr . MacCrate and Mr . Walsh conducted a ground survey of t h e sub-
haml et of Thuan Yen [My Lai ( 4 ) l . Thi s i ns pect i on ser ved t o
f a mi l i a r i z e t he members of t h e I nqui r y wi t h Thuan Yen, t o i den-
t i f y and l oc a t e key s t r u c t u r e s and t e r r a i n f e a t ur e s , and t o
a s s i s t i n r es ol vi ng c o n f l i c t s i n t est i mony gi ven by wi t nesses
( s ee e xhi bi t M- 1 1 1 ) .
( 2) Ae r i a l i ns pect i on. On 1 January 1970 General Peer s and
W01 Thompson made a l ow-l evel r econnai ssance of t h e Thuan Yen
subhamlet i n a l i g h t obser vat i on he l i c opt e r pi l ot e d by CPT Gary
E. Hickman. The reconnai ssance was conducted a t a l t i t u d e s of
30-100 f e e t and on occasi on a s low a s 5 t o 10 f e e t . A l l s i t e s
w e r e l ocat ed on an a e r i a l phot o and subsequent l y r e pl ot t e d and
i d e n t i f i e d on an a e r i a l phot o ( s e e e x h i b i t M- 1 1 0 ) . W01 Thompson
made anot her l ow-l evel reconnai ssance on 3 January 1970 f o r t h e
purpose of r echecki ng t h e l oc a t i on of t h e di t c h.
d. I nt e r r oga t i on. Formal i nt e r r oga t i on t r a ns c r i pt s , we r e
prepared on 31Vietnamese and 9 American wi t nesses. Mr . Walsh' s
team conducted i nt e r r oga t i ons of Vietnamese c i v i l i a n s a t Quang
Ngai dur i ng t h e per i od 31 December 1969 t o 5 January 1970. The
i nt e r r oga t i on teams i nt er vi ewed s e ve r a l Vietnamese peopl e f o r
which a formal t r a n s c r i p t was not prepared. These i nt er vi ews
provi ded background and f a mi l i a r i z a t i on t ype i nf or mat i on.
e. Col l ect i on of Documents. The -document c ol l e c t i on team
s e l e c t i ve l y reviewed t he f i l e s of headquar t er s, USMACV, USARV,
and I11 MAF. These o f f i c e s had pr evi ousl y sear ched t h e i r f i l e s
f or a l l pe r i ne nt i nf or mat i on. While t he t e a m had s p e c i f i c i n-
s t r uc t i ons t o look f o r key documents, an exhaust i ve sear ch a l s o
wa s made f o r a l l pe r t i ne nt - ma t e r i a l . The team was a bl e t o i n-
s pe c t t horoughl y t he f i l e s of t h e America1 ~ i v i s i o n : 11t h Infan-
t r y Bri gade, and advi sor y s t af f s : . Documents c ol l e c t e d dur i ng t he
i ns pect i on were t ur ned over t o t h e I ns pect or Gener al ' s represen-
t a t i v e accompanying t he team. Thi s r e pr e s e nt a t i ve pr epar ed l ogs
and super vi sed t h e r epr oduct i on and r e c e i pt i ng f o r each document.
General Peers and Mr . MacCrate were s ucces s f ul i n havi ng many of
t he ARVN f i l e s made a va i l a bl e t o them dur i ng t h e i r vi s i t s , r e-
s u l t i n g i n t h e c ol l e c t i on of many key documents. Approximately
6 l i n e a r f e e t of documents were brought back wi t h t h e team and
an equal quant i t y. i d e n t i f i e d f o r ef er ence.
f . Admi ni st r at i on. Of f i ce space was a l l oc a t e d f o r t h e ad-
vance pa r t y and f o r General Peer s ' v i s i t by COMUSMACV i n t h e
Headquart ers bui l di ng. The America1 Di vi si on provi ded an o f f i c e
and c our t room bui l di ng f o r t h e use of t he i nt e r r oga t i on and
admi ni s t r at i ve teams. The admi ni s t r at i ve team accompanied t h e
members of t h e I nqui r y whi l e i n RVN and provi ded t h e necessary
o f f i c e suppor t .
11. PREPARATION OF REPORT
a. Or gani zat i on. Pr el i mi nar y pl anni ng f o r t h e r e por t of t he
i nve s t i ga t i ng o f f i c e r began dur i ng t he f i r s t week of t h e I nqui r y
wi t h a deci s i on t o pr epar e s u i t a b l e background chapt er s a s e a r l y
a s pos s i bl e and t o fol l ow on wi t h t he . s ubs t ant i ve chapt er s a s
r api dl y a s pr ogr ess of t he I nqui r y per mi t t ed. Augmentation of
t he s t a f f began on 8 December 1969. COL Joseph Fr ankl i n was
assi gned o v e r a l l r e s pons i bi l i t y f o r pr epar at i on of a d r a f t
r e por t f o r t he i nves t i gat i ng. o f f i c e r . D r . Wal t er G. Hermes,
Of f i ce of t h e Chief of Mi l i t a r y Hi st or y, was made a va i l a bl e a s
a f ul l - t i me member of t he I nqui r y t o s er ve a s an advi s or and
wr i t e r . A number of o f f i c e r s wi t h combat exper i ence i n Vietnam
and recogni zed wr i t i ng a b i l i t y w e r e t hen assi gned t o t h e s t a f f a s
w r i t e r s , namely, Li eut enant Col onel s Char l es J. Bauer, Fred K.
Mahaffey, John- E. Rogers, James H. Pat t er s on and Wallace W. Nol l .
Also assi gned t o t h e s t a f f a s ope r a t i ona l a na l ys t s were MAJ
George K. Garner and CPT Thomas Kennan.
SGM John W. Griney provi ded r equi r ed admi ni s t r at i ve suppor t
f o r t he r e por t e f f o r t , a s s i s t e d by SP5 Don A. Evans and PV2
William H. Wanlund. M r s . Mary R. Boothe and M r s . Mary H. Conroy
ser ved a s copy e d i t o r s .
Members of t he wr i t i ng group a l s o were desi gnat ed on an ad
-
hoc ba s i s t o a s s i s t i n t h e i nt e r r oga t i on of wi t nesses, and were
asked t o make recommendations f o r t he gat her i ng of evi dence and
t o review phys i cal evi dence c ol l e c t e d by t h e I nqui r y.
b. Wr i t i ng Phase. Af t er an i n i t i a l per i od of or i e nt a t i on
by t he writers and a na l ys t s , a t e n t a t i v e out l i ne of t h e r e por t
w a s approved by General Peer s and s p e c i f i c s ubj e c t a r e a s were
assi gned t o members of t he wr i t i ng group. The wr i t e r s progres-
s i v e l y scr eened and anal yzed t he st at ement s, d i r e c t i v e s , r e por t s
and ot he r evi dence t h a t w a s bei ng gat her ed by t h e i nt e r r oga t i on
and document teams f o r s ubs t ant i ve f a c t s and dr a f t e d t h e back-
ground and e a r l y por t i ons of t he r e por t . Aer i al photographs
annot at ed by t he wi t nesses, sket ches, and i nf or mat i on r ecei ved
from t he a e r i a l and ground r econnai ssance made i n RVN cont r i but ed
t o t he r econs t r uct i on of event s t h a t t ook pl ace i n t h e subhaml et s
of Thuan Yen and My Hoi on 16 March 1968.
By t he t i me t he I nqui r y neared t he end of i t s i nt e r r oga t i ons ,
t he wr i t e r s had pr epar ed d r a f t s of s e ve r a l of t he pl anned chap-
ters of t he r e por t . These formed t he ba s i s of a pr el i mi nar y
r e por t prepared by General Peer s and forwarded t o t h e Secr et ar y
of t he Army and t he Chief of St a f f of t h e Army. Subsequent l y,
t he remai ni ng chapt er d r a f t s were completed and a l l were reviewed
by t he pr i nc i pa l members of t h e I nqui r y and General Peers and
r e wr i t t e n u n t i l each chapt er was ready f o r f i n a l e d i t i n g , t ypi ng,
and pr i nt i ng.
c. Pr i nt i ng Phase. Concurrent wi t h t h e wr i t i ng phase,
cons i der at i on was bei ng gi ven t o t h e e d i t i n g and p r i n t i n g of t h e
r e por t , t o i ncl ude t h e t est i mony and documentary , evi dence. M r .
Ralph A. Rol l i ns , Of f i ce of t he Adj ut ant General of t h e Army,
j oi ned t he s t a f f a s an a dvi s e r on publ i cat i on mat t er s e a r l y i n
t he I nqui r y. Mr . James Breedl ove, gr aphi c i l l u s t r a t o r from
OTAG, provi ded Car t ogr aphi c a s s i s t a nc e and pr epar ed f i n a l artwork
f o r t he sket ches i n t h e r e por t . MAJ Clyde D. Lynn j oi ned t he
r e por t s t a f f a s t h e i nt e r r oga t i ons neared compl et i on t o expedi t e
pr epar at i on of t h e f i n a l r e por t manuscri pt f o r pr i nt i ng.
The e d i t i n g was performed si mul t aneousl y wi t h t h e wr i t i ng
phase t o t he e xt e nt pos s i bl e , s o t h a t each phase would merge
i n t o t he f i n a l i z a t i o n and pr i nt i ng of t he r e por t . Necessary
arrangements were made wi t h t he Army Phot ographi ? Agency f or
t he r epr oduct i on of phot ographs, t h e Army Topographic Command
f o r t he r epr oduct i on of maps and a e r i a l phot ographs, and t h e
Defense Pr i nt i ng Of f i ce f o r p r i n t i n g and bi ndi ng of t h e f i n a l
r e por t . Due t o t he mass of ma t e r i a l c ol l e c t e d dur i ng t h e I nqui r y
and t he gr e a t volume of t est i mony, it was deci ded t o p r i n t t h e
f i n a l r e por t i n volumes a s f ol l ows:
( a) Volume I - The na r r a t i ve r e por t wi t h f i ndi ngs and
recommendations, at t endant sket ches, t a b l e s of cont ent s and ot he r
mat er i al .
( b) Volume I1 - Testimony and summaries of t est i mony, sub-
di vi ded i n t o books of 300 pages.
( c ) Volume I11 - Evi dent i ar y ma t e r i a l ent er ed a s e xhi bi t s ,
a l s o subdi vi ded i n t o books. Oversi ze e xhi bi t s were photographed
and reduced o r f ol ded s o t h a t t he l onges t book would not exceed
16 i nches by 20 i nches.
(dl Volume I V - St at ement s made by i ndi vi dual s t o t h e CI D
Agency, bound i n one book.
d. Publ i cat i on i n Book Form. Publ i cat i on of t he r e por t i n
book form was expl ored. I t was aeci ded, however, t h a t t h i s was a
mat t er f o r subsequent consi der at i on and deci s i on by t h e Secr et ar y
and t he Chief of St a f f of t he Army.
PEERS INQUERY- PERSONNEL
LTG W. R. P e e r s
Mr . R o b e r t Ma c C r a t e
Mr . B l a n d West
Mr . J e r o m e K. Walsh, Jr.
COL John W. A r ms t r o n g
COL Joseph R. F r a n k l i n
COL R o b e r t E. M i l l e r
COL Wi l l i a m V. Wilson
COL Th o ma s F. Whalen
LTC C h a r l e s J. B a u e r
LTC L e o M. B r a n d t
LTC J. H. B r e e n
LTC Fred K. Ma h a f f e y
LTC Wallace W. No 1 1
LTC J. H. P a t t e r s o n
LTC John E. R o g e r s
MAJ Joseph I. A p i c i
MAJ John G. C o n n o r
MAJ G e o r g e K. G a r n e r
MAJ Ho wa r d C. Jacobson
MAJ Jon A. K o s t y
MAJ C l y d e D. L y n n
MAJ Joe C. Th o ma s
MAJ E d wa r d F. Z y c h o ws k i
MAJ H a r o l d L. C o o p
MAJ D a v i d D. D a n t z s c h e r
MAJ Wi l l i a m F. G a b e l l a
CVN T r i p 1
C'VN T r i p )
MAJ St anl ey Kraus (Special Du t y )
CPT L l o y d L. C h e s t e r
CPT James F. C l a r k
CPT Mi c h a e l H. C l a r k
CPT G a r y Ei f r i ed
CPT Th o ma s M. Jackson
CPT Th o ma s Ke n n a n
CPT Wi l l i a m R. P o r t e r
CPT Alex B. Shi pl ey, Jr.
CPT Frank B. St ahl , Jr.
1 LT R o b e r t L. B r u e r
I ncl osur e 2
SGM John W. G r i n e y
S P 7 M i l t o n J. Br o wn
S P 7 L e e B. Ed mo n d s
S P 7 K e n n e t h B e t t e r i d g e
SP6 A r t h u r B. R e i d , Jr.
S P 6 John R. S t r e m i k i s
S P 6 J a me s R. Th o ma s
S P 5 G r e g o r y A. B e n t l e y
SGT K e n n e t h B. C r e n s h a w
S P 5 Don A. E v a n s
S P 5 P e t e r D. H a l l o c k
S P 5 R o b e r t H a m i l t o n
S P 5 J a m e s V. L i n k
S P 5 R i c h a r d F. Machusick
SGT C h a r l e s O l s o n
S P 5 V i o l a P a r r i s h
S P 5 Ro d n e y H. P e a r c e
S P 5 R i c h a r d T j o s v o l d
S P 5 St ephen A. Wright
S P 5 R o b e r t F. Fr or nme (VN T r i p )
S P 4 A l l a n A. Br o c k ma n n
S P 4 G a r y E. France
S P 4 L o r e n B. H a v e k o s t
S P 4 D e n n i s P . M c Co y
S P ~ E d wa r d P . N a l e v a n k o
S P 4 Th o ma s W. P e t e r s i k
S P 4 P a u l Searle
S P 4 John S o me r s
S P 4 D a v i d F. S t o n e
S P 4 James L. T h i l l
PFC R o n a l d L . B l a k e l y
PFC D o n a l d B o u d r e a u x
PFC Joseph S . W. B r a s h i e r
PFC Th o ma s R. B r o d e r i c k
D r . Walter G. He r me s
M r . Ralph A. Rol l i ns
M r . James Br eedl ove
M r s . R i t a F. Col l i ns
M r s . Maureen Mar shal l ,
M i s s Dorothy A. St ar on
M i s s June Roth
M r s . Mary R. Boothe
M r s . Mary H. Conroy
PFC Dennis G . Bul l
PFC A 1 But l e r
PFC James Chr i s t i a n
PFC Le s l i e W. Dyson
PFC Dennis A. Gi bbs
PFC James L. Hol l and
PFC Cr ai g H i l l
PFC Joseph N. Hollerith
PFC Joseph La vi e r i
PFC Roger F. Pr e s n e l l
PFC Thomas J. Zakovi t ch
PV2 Alan J. Towson
PV2 W i l l i a m H. Wanlund
PV2 Paul L. Hul l
L T G P E E R S
MR. WE S T MR. MACCRATE MR. WALSH
A- 2 1
FRONT ROW (LEFT TO RIGHT)
SECOND ROW (LEFT TO RIGHT)
CPT CLARK. CPT SHIPLEY, CPT STAHL, MAJ LYNN. CPT JACKSON, MAJ KOSTY, MAJ JACOBSON.
MAJ CONNOR, MAJ API CI . MAJ ZYCHOWSKI, LTC NOLL. CPT CLARK. MAJ GARNER. MAJ THOMAS.
CPT PORTER. I LT BRUER, SPSPARRISH. CPT EI FRI ED.
P
I
tu THIRD ROW (LEFT TO RIGHT)
W
BACK ROW (LEFT TO ROW)
Inclosure 4 - Group Photograph of Peers inquiry
Annex B
PERIPHERAL I SSUES
During t he conduct of t h i s i nve s t i ga t i on, s e ve r a l mat t er s ,
not wi t hi n t h e s pe c i f i e d scope of t he i nve s t i ga t i on, were i dent -
i f i e d . Some of them appear t o war r ant f ol l ow up a c t i on by
r es pons i bl e s t a f f agenci es of t he Department of t h e Army.
The f ol l owi ng i s a br i e f summary of t hes e pe r i phe r a l i s s ue s f o r
a c t i on a s deemed appr opr i at e.
1. RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSITION
a. I n r econs t r uct i ng t h e event s of Son My, much r e l i a nc e
had t o be pl aced on o f f i c i a l r ecor ds of a c t i v i t i e s dur i ng
t h a t per i od. Consequent l y, exhaust i ve sear ches were made of
a l l a va i l a bl e f i l e s a t a l l headquar t er s and r ecor ds hol di ng
ar eas . The r ecor ds of i n t e r e s t dat ed back over 18 months, but
t hose found i n t h e f i l e s o r logged i n were i n most cases mini-
mal , gener al l y uns a t i s f a c t or y. Examples of de f i c i e nc i e s not ed
i ncl ude :
(1) Incomplete permanent r ecor ds f i l e s . Many of t h e perm-
anent r ecor d f i l e s cont ai ned documents. which were not necessar -
i l y of a permanent nat ur e whi l e documents which shoul d have
been r e t a i ne d, such a s r e por t s of i nve s t i ga t i ons , were mi ssi ng.
Dai l y s t a f f j our nal s w e r e found t o be poor l y prepared and i n-
complete i n most cases.
( 2 ) Dest r uct i on of r ecor ds. There appears t o be a t en-
dency among u n i t s t o dest r oy r ecor ds r a t h e r t han t o r e t i r e
them i n accordance wi t h e s t a bl i s he d procedures. I n some cases
"probabl y dest r oyed p r i o r t o t he l a s t I G [ I nspect or General ] i n-
spect i on" was c i t e d a s t h e pos s i bl e reason f o r documents m i s -
s i ng from t h e f i l e s . I n one case, t h e Son Tinh Di s t r i c t Ad-
vi s or y Team f i - l e s , a headquar t er s c r i t i c a l t o t h i s i nve s t i ga t i on,
had been "cl eaned out " i n pr epar at i on f o r t h e I G I nspect i on
schedul ed f o r August 1969. If r ecor ds a r e a r b i t r a r i l y dest r oyed
a t t h e u n i t l e v e l , t h e Army's h i s t o r i c a l r ecor ds obvi ousl y w i l l
never be complete. Act i on appears t o be r equi r ed t hroughout
t h e Army t o emphasize t h e i mport ance of pe r i odi c scr eeni ng of
r ecor ds t o i ns ur e t h a t documents of h i s t o r i c a l s i gni f i c a nc e
a r e r e t i r e d and not dest r oyed.
( 3 ) Accounting f o r s e n s i t i v e correspondence. There i s no
system e s t a bl i s he d t o account f o r i m~ o r t a n t c or r e s ~onde nc e
except f o r documents c l a s s i f i e d s e c r e t o r hi gher . *whi l e
s i mi l a r c ont r ol s may be e s t a bl i s he d f or s pe c i a l correspondence
on a l oc a l l e v e l , t h i s pr a c t i c e appears t o be t h e except i on.
Thus, wi t h t h e passage of t i me, recovery of a s p e c i f i c document
becomes i ncr eas i ngl y d i f f i c u l t unl ess t h e correspondence has
been af f or ded a s e c ur i t y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n r equi r i ng c ont r ol .
Adoption of a uniform system f o r t h e c ont r ol of s e n s i t i v e o r
i mport ant documents of an unc l a s s i f i e d nat ur e would be pa r t i c -
ul a r l y us e f ul i n u n i t s and ar eas where per sonnel t ur bul ence
i s experi enced.
(4) Ret i r ed r ecor ds. Fi l e s t r a ns f e r r e d t o r e c ~ r d s hol d-
i ng ar eas w e r e poor l y s e l e c t e d, poor l y organi zed and, i n some
cases, i naccur at el y i d e n t i f i e d , t hus making it d i f f i c u l t t o
l oc a t e any s p e c i f i c document wi t hout a de t a i l e d, document-by-
document sear ch of Sll r ecor ds appl i cabl e t o a gi ven per i od.
The s e l e c t i on of documents f o r r et i r ement a t u n i t l e v e l ap-
pear s weak and r e qui r e s i ncr eased a t t e nt i on. I n t h e r ecor ds
hol di ng a r e a s , f i l e s appear t o have been consol i dat ed i n boxes
wi t hout cons i der at i on a s t o headquar t er s, t i me, o r s ubj e c t
mat t er ; t he r e was no i ndex system o r c r os s r ef er enci ng a va i l a bl e
t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e r api d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and l oc a t i on of docu-
ments. I n t h e r et i r ement pr ocess, gener al l ack of super vi si on
was obvi ous, e s pe c i a l l y a t t h e u n i t l e ve l , where appar ent l y
each u n i t wr ot e i t s own r ul e s . Thi s appears t o be an a r e a ap-
pr opr i a t e f o r s pe c i a l emphasis dur i ng f ut ur e Annual General
I nspect i ons.
b. Based on t he gener al l y poor condi t i ons found by t he
I nqui r y, it appears t h a t t h e e n t i r e r ecor ds maintenance and
r et i r ement pr ocess shoul d be reviewed t o i ns ur e t h a t e xi s t i ng
d i r e c t i v s a r e adequat e and a ddi t i ona l emphasis pl aced on
s t r i c t adherence t o t he s e d e t a i l s .
2. AVI ATI ON RECORCS
a . TM 38-750, Army Equipment Record Procedures, pr e s c r i be s
a vi a t i on maintenance r ecor ds which w i l l be mai nt ai ned. While
t h i s system pr ovi des f o r "complete" r ecor ds from a maintenance
poi nt of view, it does not neces s ar i l y meet a l l requi rement s
f o r a vi a t i on r ecor ds and does not r e qui r e t he r e t e nt i on of a l l
r ecor ds on a permanent bas i s . The Army Avi at i on Fl i ght Record,
f o r example (DA Form 2408-12), t h e onl y r ecor d which i d e n t i f i e s
t he crew assi gned t o t he a i r c r a f t each day, i s mai nt ai ned f o r
onl y t hr e e months. No ot he r r ecor ds r equi r ed by TM 38-750 r e-
f l e c t crew o r oper at i onal dat a. However, some u n i t s do main-
t a i n i nf or mal "Mission Sheet s" which provi de de t a i l e d ope r a t i ona l
d a t a a s t o t h e exact t a s ks accomplished by each a i r c r a f t
d a i l y . Si nce t he s e a r e not r equi r ed, t hey a r e of t e n dest r oyed
wi t h changes i n per sonnel o r a f t e r a per i od of t hr e e t o s i x
months. Such a document appears t o pr ovi de us e f ul i nf or mat i on
not a va i l a bl e t hrough ot he r r ecor ds.
b. Consi der at i on shoul d be gi ven t o e s t a bl i s hi ng a formal
procedure f o r mai nt ai ni ng d a i l y a i r c r a f t and u n i t ope r a t i ona l
da t a i n a ddi t i on t o t h e c ur r e nt l y r equi r ed a vi a t i on maintenance
r ecor ds. A r ecor d of t h e oper at i onal da t a shoul d be kept on
f i l e i n t he u n i t , probabl y f o r a per i od of one year and t hen
r e t i r e d , not dest r oyed.
3 . USE OF PERSONAL CAMERAS BY ARMY PHOTOGRAPHERS
a . There appears t o be no c l e a r pol i cy r egar di ng t h e own-
e r s hi p and r e l e a s e ( US Army ver sus i ndi vi dual ) of f i l m exposed
by Army phot ographers usi ng per sonal cameras whi l e on o f f i c i a l
mi ssi ons. The pi c t ur e s r e l a t e d t o t he Son My i nc i de nt which
were r el eas ed t o Li f e magazine by a former Army phot ographer
were made under such condi t i ons. According t o t he t est i mony
of per sonnel from t h e America1 Di vi si on Publ i c Informat i on Of-
f i c e (PIO), t he r e was no e s t a bl i s he d pol i cy i n March 1968 r e-
gar di ng t h e use of per sonal cameras. Because of t h e l ack of
u n i t cameras, t he use of p r i v a t e cameras by phot ographers was
encouraged. Likewise, t he 11t h Brigade had no e s t a bl i s he d
pol i cy, but accordi ng t o some t est i mony, t he r e was an un-
wr i t t e n underst andi ng t h a t negat i ves t aken on o f f i c i a l m i s -
s i ons w e r e not t o be removed from t he P I 0 of f i c e . While t h e
use of per sonal cameras by phot ographers i s appar ent l y de-
s i r a b l e and cont i nues a s a common pr a c t i c e , review of appl i cabl e
r egul at i ons and di r e c t i ve s i ndi c a t e s t h a t t he r e i s s t i l l no
e s t a bl i s he d pol i cy e i t h e r wi t h r e s pe c t t o t he use of t h e cameras
o r t he f ut ur e ownership of any pi c t ur e s t aken.
b. I t t he r e f or e appears t h a t a pol i cy shoul d be est ab-
l i s he d c l a r i f yi ng t h e ownership and r e l e a s e a ut hor i t y of f i l m
exposed by Army phot ographers usi ng t h e i r per sonal cameras
whi l e on o f f i c i a l mi ssi ons t o pr ecl ude t h e unaut hori zed r e -
l e a s e of Army phot ographs i n t he f ut ur e. Such pol i cy must be
e f f e c t i v e t hroughout t h e Army and not s ubj e c t t o l o c a l i n t e r -
pr e t a t i on. I t i s underst ood t h a t ACSC-E i s t aki ng a c t i on t o
i s s ue appr opr i at e gui dance t o a l l commanders.
4. USE OF SMOKE GRENADES
a . While not an i s s u e i n t he Son My i nc i de nt , t he random
use of col or ed smoke by a vi a t or s and ground t r oops t o maxk bot h
enemy and f r i e ndl y l ocat i ons coul d e a s i l y cause confusi on.
Thi s i s an a r e a where pos i t i ve underst andi ng by a l l p a r t i e s
a s t o t h e meaning o r purpose of a s p e c i f i c c ol or of smoke i s
e s s e n t i a l i n or der t o pr event f a l s e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . For ex-
ample, i f t h e ground t r oops used r ed smoke t o mark a no- f i r e
ar ea, and t h e gunshi ps f l yi ng overhead assumed t h a t r ed smoke
marked an enemy l oc a t i on, t h e r e s u l t coul d prove di s a s t r ous .
Many u n i t s i n Vietnam have recogni zed t h i s problem and rou-
t i n e l y publ i sh wi t hi n t h e i r Si gnal Operat i ng I ns t r uc t i ons
(SOI), o r by ot he r means, t h e purpose f o r which s p e c i f i c c ol or s
of smoke w i l l be used dur i ng a gi ven per i od.
b. I n view of t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r mi sunderst andi ng i n t h i s
r egar d, a review of t h e use of smoke grenades from a doc-
t r i n a l poi nt of view appears warrant ed. Fur t her , it appears
de s i r a bl e t h a t an Army-wide pol i cy be e s t a bl i s he d r equi r i ng
t h a t a l l u n i t s , probabl y a t di vi s i on l e v e l , announce i n t h e
SOP o r SO1 procedures f o r t he use of var i ous c ol or s of smoke
f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n purposes. Although t h e impetus f o r such a
pol i cy shoul d come from t he t op echel on, i t s implementation
must be del egat ed t o t h e l owest l e v e l wherein employment w i l l
depend on t h e weat her, t e r r a i n , enemy, 3nd s e ve r a l ot he r
f a c t or s .
5. SELECTION AND TRAI NI NG OF LIAISON OFFICERS
Some of t h e o f f i c e r s i nt er vi ewed by t h e I nqui r y who had
f i l l e d l i a i s o n o f f i c e r pos i t i ons di d not appear p a r t i c u l a r l y
w e l l qua l i f i e d, nor were t he r e any i ndi c a t i ons t h a t t hey had
r ecei ved s p e c i a l gui dance o r t r a i n i n g f o r t h e job. I n view
of t h e i mpor t ant f unct i on performed by l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s , es-
pe c i a l l y i n Vietnam, it appears t h a t t h e c r i t e r i a fol l owed f o r
t he s e l e c t i on of l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s and t he t r a i n i n g conducted
t o pr epar e o f f i c e r s f o r l i a i s o n dut y a r e a r e a s which r e qui r e
a ddi t i ona l emphasis wi t hi n t h e Army school system.
6 . PERSONNEL TURBULENCE
One of t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t problems f aced by t h e America1
Di vi si on, and probabl y by ot he r u n i t s i n Vietnam, was t h e per -
sonnel t ur bul ence cr eat ed by t he one-year r o t a t i o n a l pol i cy,
the rest and r ecuper at i on ( R&R) program, t h e pol i cy of r o t a t i n g
commanders and s t a f f o f f i c e r s normal l y a f t e r s i x months on t he
job, and t h e i nf us i on program. While t he s e a r e a l l e xc e l l e nt
programs and each ser ved a most us e f ul and v a l i d purpose, t h i s
I nqui r y found t h a t t he r e s ul t i ng l ack of c ont i nui t y and t he
problems c r e a t e d wi t hi n t h e per sonnel repl acement pr ocess were
det r i ment al t o u n i t ef f ect i venes s . No change i s suggest ed;
however, it does appear t h a t a thorough review shoul d be under-
t aken t o det ermi ne i f t h e i mpact of t he s e , o r s i mi l a r programs,
on combat r eadi ness can be reduced i n t h e f ut ur e .
7 . UTI LI ZATI ON OF FIRST SERGEANTS
a . While t h e use made of a f i r s t s er geant i s t h e preroga-
t i v e of t h e u n i t commander, t h e gener al l y accept ed pol i cy i s
t h a t a r i f l e company f i r s t s er geant i s most e f f e c t i v e l y em-
pl oyed i n t h e f i e l d wi t h h i s company. I t i s perhaps s i g n i f i -
c a nt t h a t none of t h e f i r s t s er geant s of TF Barker were i n
t h e f i e l d f o r ot he r t han s h o r t v i s i t s dur i ng t he Son My opera-
t i o n ; t hey had a l l remained behi nd a t t h e i r u n i t ' s base camp.
Had t hey been i n t h e f i e l d f ol l owi ng t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e i r
companies, s e t t i n g t h e example and i nf l uenci ng t he a c t i ons of
ot he r NC Ot s and e n l i s t e d men, t h e r e s u l t s of t he oper at i on
might have been d i f f e r e n t .
b. I t i s suggest ed t h a t a ddi t i ona l emphasis be pl aced upon
t he pos i t i on of t h e f i r s t s er geant and t h e r o l e he shoul d pl ay
i n t h e admi ni s t r at i on and, p a r t i c u l a r l y , t he oper s t i ons of h i s
u n i t i n the f i e l d . Thi s coul d be accomplished t hrough t h e
Army school syst em, t he Command Ser geant s Major program and
command emphasis.
Annex C
GLOSSARY
AB-143....................... DesignationforMACVCombinedCam-
paignPlan,1968
AC...........................Aircraftcommander. Aviatorin
chargeofpilotingthehelicopter.
ADC..........................AssistantDivisionCommander.
Aero-Scouts..................Seeaircraftnames.
AfterAction.................SeeCombatActionReport.
Report
AG...........................AdjutantGeneral. Theadjutantof
aunitauthorizedaGeneralStaff.
SeeStaff.
AircraftNames
Aero-Scouts.............HelicoptersfromCoB,123AvnBn.
"Bubble"................. NicknameforOH-6,OH-13,orOH-23
helicopter.
"Dolphins1' ..............Liftship,174thAssaultHelicopter
Company
"Firebirds".............Gunship,71stAvnCo.
"Gunship"............... UH-1helicopterarmedwithminiguns,
rockets,40millimetergrenade
launchers,oranycombinationthereof.
"Hel i x" .................FAC, l i g h t f i xed winga i r c r a f t
"Hook" .................. CH-47 he l i c opt e r . Used f o r heavy
cargo and t r oop t r a ns por t .
"Huey".. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . e U H - l he l i c opt e r .
" Li f t s hi p" .............. Hel i copt er used t o t r a ns por t t r oops
dur i ng a combat a s s a ul t .
LOH.....................Li ght obser vat i on he l i c opt e r .
"Minute men"............ L i f t s hi ps f o r 176t h Assaul t Helicop-
t e r Company.
"Medevac" ...............Medical evacuat i on he l i c opt e r .
"Muskets" ............... Gunships f o r 176t h Assaul t Hel i copt er
Company.
"PRIMO" .................11t h Bde C&C he l i c opt e r .
"Puff t h e Magic.........AC-47 a i r c r a f t armed wi t h mul t i bar r el ed,
Dragon" 7.62 mi l l i met er , ext remel y hi gh r a t e
of f i r e weapon. Also c a l l e d "Spooky".
" Ra t t l e r s " .............. Li f t s hi ps 71st Assaul t Hel i copt er
Company.
"Scorpi ons" .............Old name f o r 123d Avn Bn gunshi ps.
"Sharks" ................ Gunship 174t hAssaul t Hel i copt er
Company.
"Skeet er " ...............LOH, CO B , 123d Avn Bn.
" Sl i ckf ' ................. UH- 1 he l i c opt e r used f o r cargo and
t r oop t r a ns por t . May o r may not
have door gunners armed wi t h M-60
machineguns.
"Spooky" ................ AC-47 a i r c r a f t armed wi t h mul t i -
ba r r e l e d, 7.62 mi l l i met er , ext remel y
r api d f i r e weapon. Also c a l l e d "Puff
t he Magic Dragon".
"War Lords".............Gunship Co B, 123Avn Bn
AI T. .........................Advanced I ndi vi dual Tr ai ni ng.
ALO. .........................A i r Li ai son Of f i cer . A t a c t i c a l
A i r Force Of f i c e r at t ached t o a
ground f or ce a s a i r advi sor .
Ammo. ........................Ammunition
"Animals".................... Nickname f o r i nfant rymen of Co B,
123d Avn Bn.
Ant i personnel mine. . ......... A mine desi gned t o cause c a s ua l t i e s
t o per sonnel .
A0 ........................... Area of Operat i ons. An a r e a where
US/FWMAF conduct oper at i ons duri ng
a s p e c i f i c per i od of t i me. An A0
i s assi gned normally f o r a s p e c i f i c
oper at i on which may be wi t hi n o r
out s i de of a TAOR.
APC. .........................Armored per sonnel c a r r i e r .
Art y .........................Ar t i l l e r y
ARVN.........................Army of t h e Republ i c of Vietnam;
Vietnamese s o l d i e r .
ATP ..........................Army Tr ai ci ng Program.
ATT..........................Army Tr ai ni ng Test .
Avn ..........................Avi at i on.
Bde ..........................Bri gade.
BG...........................Br i gadi er General .
"Blow away"..................To k i l l . (GI s l a ng) .
Blown i n pl ace...............Dest r uct i on by demol i t i on wit-hout
removing the obj e c t t o anot her l ocat i on.
Bn.. .........................Ba t t a l i on.
Body Count................... Procedure whereby enemy bodi es a r e
counted t o provi de a s t a t i s t i c f o r
measuring degree of success of an
oper at i on and t o be used i n develop-
i ng da t a concerni ng enemy or der of
b a t t l e .
Boobytrap .................... Usual l y an expl osi ve charge which
i s exploded when an unsuspect i ng
person di s t ur bs an appar ent l y
harml ess obj e c t o r performs a
presumably s a f e a c t . Can a l s o
be a spear t r a p o r s i mi l a r mechani cal
devi ce which does not employ an
expl osi ve charge.
"Bought i t " ..................Ki l l ed. (GI s l a ng) .
Bounding mine................ Type of ant i per s onnel mine, us ual l y
bur i ed j u s t below t h e s ur f ace of t h e
ground. I t h a s a smal l charge which
throws t he case up,i n t o t he a i r ; t h i s
expl odes a t a hei ght of 3 o r 4 f e e t ,
throwing shr apnel o r fragment s i n a l l
di r e c t i ons .
Break........................ Radio procedure s i gni f yi ng a break
hetween one conver sat i on o r i dea
and anot her .
"Bubble" .....................See a i r c r a f t names.
Bunker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... A f o r t i f i e d s t r u c t u r e f o r t h e pro-
t e c t i on of per sonnel , defended gun
pos i t i on o r a def ensi ve pos i t i on.
CA. .......................... Combat a s s a ul t . Usual l y used i n
r ef er ence t o an a s s a u l t u t i l i z i n g
he l i c opt e r s t o t r a ns por t t he t r oops.
Cal ..........................Cal i ber .
"C&C"........................Command and c ont r ol . Used i n r ef er ence
"C&C s hi p ( or h e l i c o p t e r ) ' t o t he he l i c opt e r u t i l i z e d by t he t ac-
t i c a l commander dur i ng a t a c t i c a l
oper at i on.
CD........................... Ci v i l defendant . Persons who a r e
suspect ed of bei ng s p i e s , s abot eur s ,
t e r r o r i s t s , o r cr i mi nal s and who do
not qua l i f y a s pr i s oner s of war.
Census Gri evance. ............GVN agency which accept s and pr ocesses
Committee compl ai nt s from c i t i z e n s .
CG.......................... .Commanding General .
CH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ch a pl a i n.
"Char l i e Bifd" ............... Command and c ont r ol he l i c opt e r .
See C&C.
"Char l i e Char l i e"............ Command and c ont r ol he l i c opt e r .
See C&C.
CHICOM.......................Chinese Communist.
Chieu Hoi....................
Vietnamese program whereby Vi et
Cong o r North Vietnamese who
sur r ender vol unt a r i l y a r e gi ven
amnesty. Means "open arms".
C I D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cr i mi na l I nve s t i ga t i on Divksion
(Provost Mar shal ' s Of f i c e ) .
CI DG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ci vi l i a n I r r e gul a r Defense Group
(RVN). Vietnamese i r r e g u l a r s , of t e n
advi sed by U.S. Speci al Forces.
"Claymore". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M- 18 mine s e r i e s . A t ype of a n t i -
per sonnel mine developed by t he Army,
which pr opel s p e l l e t s i n t he
di r e c t i on employed. The VC and
CHICOM have devi sed s i mi l a r mi nes,
which a r e a l s o r e f e r r e d t o as-
"cl aymores".
"Cl i ck". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ki l omet er .
CO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Commandi n g Of f i c e r ,
Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cor n pany.
COL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Col onel .
"Cold". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . Not r ecei vi ng f i r e , i . e. , a "col d
LZ. "
Combat Act i on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R e por t d e t a i l i n g pl an and conduct of
Report (CAR) t a c t i c a l oper at i on and i t s r e s u l t s .
Command and Cont r ol .......... An arrangement of per sonnel and
f a c i l i t i e s , employed by a commander
i n pl anni ng, di r e c t i ng, and cont r ol -
l i n g oper at i ons . Al so used i n r ef er ence
t o t he commander's he l i c opt e r .
Commanddetonatedmine,...... Aminewhichisdetonatedelectrically
utilizingwiresandadetonating
generator-blastingmachine)ora
battery.
Commandnet.................. Acommunicationsnetworkwhich
connectsanechelonofcommandwith
someorallofitssubordinate
echelonsforthepurposeofcommand
control.
CommandPost................. Incombat,theecheloninwhichthe
commanderislot-ated. Frequently
thefieldcommanderislocatedin
aCCChelicopter;thusthehelicopter
becomesthecommandpost.
COMUSMACV....................Commander,UnitedStatesMilitary
AssistanceCommandVietnam.
Console...................... Agroupingofradiosinahelicopter
whichenablestheusertohaveamul-
tiplefrequencyradiocapability.
CORDS........................ CivilOperationsRevolutionary
DevelopmentSupport. USAgency
whichchannelsfundsandmaterials
forcivilworks.
"Coyote".....................Seeradiocallsigns,
CP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . , . C o m mandPost.
CPT..........................Captain.
CRations.................... Specialtyperationdesignedfor
troopsundercombatconditions
CSCC.. .....................,.CombatSupportCoordinationCenter.
TheCSCCisafacilitywithinwhich
aregroupedrepresentativesof
artillery,air,navalgunfire,and
otheragenciesdeemednecessaryby
thecommanderCsl .
CSM..........................CommandSergeantMajor.
CSWC........................ Crewservedweaponscaptured.
CTZ ..........................Corps Ta c t i c a l Zone. Mi l i t a r y
subdi vi si on i n Vietnam, provi di ng
ar eas of r e s pons i bi l i t y t o ARVN corps
and US Fi e l d Force headquar t er s.
Di,vided i n t o 4 zones, i.e . ,I CTZ,
I1CTZ, I11 CTZ, I V CTZ.
CWO. . . . . .....................Chief Warrant Of f i cer .
CYA. ......................... G I s l ang expr essi on, usual l y used
among s t a f f per sonnel when r e f e r -
r i ng t o a paper o r a c t i on prepared
a s a def ense a ga i ns t some f ut ur e charge.
Means "Cover Your Act i on. "
DAO ..........................Di vi si on a vi a t i on o f f i c e r .
DEROS ........................ Date e l i g i b l e f o r r e t ur n from over-
s eas .
Det ai nees.................... Vietnamese who have been det ai ned but
whose f i n a l s t a t u s , i . e . , i nnocent
c i vi l i . a n, r et ur nee, c i v i l defendant
o r pr i s oner of war, has not y e t been
det ermi ned.
"Di Di ". .....................Vietnamese words meaning " t o run".
"Di Di-ing" ..................Running
"Dink". ......................Vietnamese person ( GI s l a ng) .
DIOCC ........................ Di s t r i c t I nt e l l i ge nc e and Operat i ons
Coordi nat i ng Cent er.
Di r ect Support (DSZ .........Mi ssi on i n which a f i e l d a r t i l l e r y
u n i t i s pr i mar i l y r esponsi ve t o
f i r e mi ssi ons i n suppor t of a p a r t i -
c ul a r ground f or ce.
Di s t r i c t ..................... P o l i t i c a l subdi vi si on i n RVN, roughl y
equi val ent t o a count y.
Di s t r i c t Chi ef . .............. GVN o f f i c i a l governi ng a d i s t r i c t
cont ai ni ng s e ve r a l v i l l a g e s , us ual l y
a mi l i t a r y o f f i c e r .
Di vi si on Support Command..... An or gani c di vi s i ona l u n i t respon-
s i b l e f o r provi di ng di vi s i on l e v e l
suppl y, t r a ns por t a t i on, mai nt enance,
medi cal , and mi scel l aneous s er vi ces
f o r a l l el ement s of t he di vi s i on.
"Dolphin".................... See r a di o c a l l s i gns ; a i r c r a f t
names.
DS A. . , . , . . . , . . . . . , . . . . . . . . ... Di s t r i c t Seni or Advi sor. Seni or US
advi sor t o t h e Di s t r i c t Chi ef .
Dud,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.,...,.,.,.,.Exp10sive muni t i on which has f a i l e d
t o expl ode a f t e r bei ng armed; an
i ndi vi dual who does not perform
pr oper l y.
"Dung LaiW..........,.,...,,.Vietnamese words meaning " ha l t " .
Dust Of f . , . , . , . , ............Te r m used f o r medi cal evacuat i on
he l i c opt e r s . Also used r e f e r r i n g
t o bei ng evacuat ed from t he b a t t l e -
f i e l d because of wounds.
EOD,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,...,. ,.,.,Explosive Ordnance Di sposal uni t .
Personnel wi t h s pe c i a l t r a i ni ng and
equipment who r ender expl osi ve
ordnance s a f e (such a s bombs, mines,
p r o j e c t i l e s and boobyt r aps) , make
i nt e l l i ge nc e r e por t s on such ordnance
and super vi se t h e s a f e removal t her eof .
Ext r act ed....................To be removed by he l i c opt e r .
FAC. . , . . , . . . , . , ..............Forward A i r Cont r ol l er . An o f f i c e r
@i r Force Pi l o t ) member of t h e t ac-
t i c a l a i r c ont r ol pa r t y who c ont r ol s
a i r c r a f t engaged i n c l os e a i r sup-
p o r t of ground t r oops. I n Vietnam
t he FAC c ont r ol s a i r s t r i k e s from
a l i g h t fixed-wing a i r c r a f t such a s
t he 0- 1 ( Pi per Cub).
FDC, . . . . , . , . . . . ............ . pi reDi r ect i on Cent er.
That. element
of a command pos t by means of which
t he ~or nma~der exer ci s es f i r e di r ec-
t i o n and/or f i r e cont r ol .
FDO ......................... F i r e Di r ect i on Of f i cer .
Fi r e f o r e f f e c t . . . ........... Fi r e which i s del i ver ed a f t e r t h e
bur s t i s wi t hi n t h e de s i r e d di s -
t ance of t he t a r g e t ; term i n a
f i r e message t o i ndi c a t e t he ad-
j ust ment i s s a t i s f a c t o r y and f i r e
f o r e f f e c t i s des i r ed.
Firepower .................... The amount of f i r e which may be
del i ver ed by a pos i t i on, u n i t , o r
weapons system; a b i l i t y t o de l i ve r
f i r e on an o v e r a l l ba s i s .
"Fl ap" .......................A s i t u a t i o n of confusi on o r chaos.
FO........................... Forward Observer. A f r o n t l i n e
obser ver t r a i ne d t o a dj us t ground
o r naval gunf i r e and pass back
b a t t l e f i e l d i nf or mat i on.
Fo r t i f i e d Vi l l age............A haml et which has been f o r t i f i e d
o r Hamlet wi t h bunkers, f i ght i ng pos i t i ons ,
communications t r enches , i n t e r -
connect i ng t unnel net works, hi di ng
pl aces , e t c .
"Fox Mike"...................Frequency modulated IFM) r adi o.
Freq .........................Radio frequency.
FSB.......................... Fi r e Support Base. Base of
oper at i ons from which f i r e sup-
por t may be del i ver ed.
FWMAF........................ Fr ee World Mi l i t a r y Assi st ance
Forces.
Garbl e ....................... h e r r o r i n t r ansmi ssi on o r recep-
t i o n which r ender s a message o r
por t i on t her eof i nc or r e c t o r
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e .
"Gook" .......................Vietnamese person. ( GI sl ang)
"Grunt s" .....................Nickname f o r i nfant rymen.
GT Li ne ...................... Gun-target l i n e . An imaginary
s t r a i g h t l i n e from t h e gun t o t he
t a r g e t .
"Gunnie". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Avi a t or who f l i e s a gunshi p.
GVN..,.,...............,.....Government of Sout hVietnam
G1, G2, G3, e t c . .............See St a f f
Hamlet....................... The p o l i t i c a l subdi vi si on i n t h e
RVN governmental s t r u c t u r e immediate-
l y below v i l l a g e l e ve l .
Hamlet Chief.................GW o f f i c i a l governi ng a haml et ,
us ual l y a c i v i l i a n .
u H&I " ........................ Harassi ng and i nt er di ' ct i on f 2r e .
Fi r e desi gned t o d2st ur b t h e rest
of t he enemy t r oops , t o c u r t a i l
movement, and, by t h r e a t of l os s e s ,
t o lower moral e. F i r e pl aced on
an a r e a o r poi nt t o pr event t h e
enemy from usi ng t b a r e a o r poi nt .
"Hard cor e".................."Hard cor e V i e t Congu a r e t hos e who
a r e compl et el y i ndoct r i nat ed toward
and dedi cat ed t o t he V i e t Cong.
HE ...........................High expl osi ve &r o j e c t i k e ~ .
HES .........................Hamlet Eval uat i on System. US program
which eval uat es GVN c ont r ol over ham-
l et s.
"Higher"....................SIigher headquar t er s o r hi gher a ut hor i t y.
wHighgun" .....,...,.........U H- 1 armed he l i c opt e r i n Co B, 123d
Avn Bn, which was t he c ont r ol l i ng
commander's a i r c r a f t . Itwas s o
named because itf l ew hi gher t han
t h e r e s t of t h e aero-scout team.
"Hi t t h e LZ" ................Land i n t he l andi ng zone.
"Hook".......................Se e a i r c r a f t names.
"Hootch" .....................T erm used f o r hut o r s t r u c t u r e made
of r i c e st r aw and bamboo o r s i mi l a r
mat er i al . ( GI s l ang) .
"Hot" .......................Receiving h o s t i l e f i r e ( i . e . , a "hot
LZ") .
"Huey" ...................... See a i r c r a f t names.
Hust l e .......................To move r api dl y.
I G ...........................I nspect or General .
A Speci al
St a f f o f f i c e r who examines and
r e por t s on every phase of a c t i v i t y
t h a t a f f e c t s a command, i n s t a l l a t i o n ,
o r a c t i v i t y . See s t a f f .
I G I nspect i on ................ I nspect or General I nspect i on. An
exami nat i on by an i ns pect or gener al
i n t o t he performance of a mi ssi on
and--t hes t a t e of d i s c i p l i n e ,
e f f i c i e nc y, and economy of a command,
i n s t a l l a t i o n , o r a c t i v i t y of t h e
Department of t he Army.
I11MAF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Thi rd Marine Amphibious Force.
Incom Receiving h o s t i l e f i r e .
In-count ry ...................Physi cal l y l ocat ed wi t hi n t he count ry.
I nf ..........................I nf a nt r y.
I nf o. . . . . . . ..................Informat i on.
I nf r a s t r uc t ur e . .............. The ba s i c economical, s o c i a l , o r
mi l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s and i n s t a l l a t i o n s
of a community, s t a t e , e t c . See
V i e t Cong I nf r a s t r uc t ur e .
Innocent Ci vi l i a ns . .......... Members of t h e c i v i l i a n popul at i on
of Son My v i l l a g e , who were unarmed .
and committing no h o s t i l e a c t s . ( Al -
s o c a l l e d noncombatants. )
INTSUM....................... I nt e l l i ge nc e summary. A s p e c i f i c
r e por t pr ovi di ng a summary of i t ems
of ' i nt e l l i ge nc e i nf or mat i on, us ual l y
a t 6 hour i n t e r v a l s .
IWC. .........................I ndi vi dual weapons capt ur ed.
JAG ..........................Judge Advocate General . See St a f f .
Jour nal ...................... A r ecor d of s i g n i f i c a n t event s, s ee
l og.
J1,J2, J3, e t c . . . ...........See St a f f .
"KHA.........................Ki l l e d due t o h o s t i l e a c t i on.
KI A ..........................Ki l l e d i n act i on.
Laager ....................... South Af r i can term used dur i ng t h e
Boer War. Used t o mean a def ensi ve
pos i t i on.
" ~ a i dgy" .................... Vietnamese words meaning "come
her e. I'
LAW..........................See weapons.
"Lead" ....................... The l eader of a f l i g h t . See c a l l
s i gns .
LF........................... Local Force. VC mi l i t a r y u n i t s
which a r e d i r e c t l y subor di nat e t o
a pr ovi nc i a l o r d i s t r i c t pa r t y
committee and normal l y oper at e onl y
wi t hi n a s p e c i f i c VC provi nce o r
d i s t r i c t .
L i f t ......................... A f l i g h t of t r oop- car r yi ng h e l i -
copt er s .
" Li f t Shi p"..................See a i r c r a f t names.
"Lima Zulu"..................Landing zone.
LNO ..........................Li ai son o f f i c e r .
LO...........................Li ai son of f i cer ,
Log ..........................A r e c or s of s i g n i f i c a n t event s. See
J our nal .
Logged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E nt er ed I n t o a Log o r J our nal .
Logging T i me .................Keeping a r ecor d of hours of f l i g h t ,
LOH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L i ght
obser vat i on he l i c opt e r .
"Low Gun". ................... UH-1 armed he l i c opt e r f l y i n g a t a
low a l t i t u d e wi t h mi ssi on of F:ro-
t e c t i ng t h e l i g h t obser vat i on he l i -
copt er .
LRRP. ........................Long
Range Reconnaissance Pa t r ol .
LTC. .........................Li eut enant Col onel .
LTL. . . . . . ....................Li en t i nh- l o. Vietnamese desi gnat i on
f o r an i nt e r pr ovi nc i a l highway o r
r out e.
LZ ...........................L andi ng Zone.
MACV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . Mi l i t a r y Assi st ance Command, Vietnam.
MAJ. ...,.......,...,.,.,.....M a j o r .
"Mama San"............,......An ol d woman.
CGS: sl ang]
MEDCAP....................... Medical Ci vi c Act i on Program. A m i l -
i t a r y oper at i on dur i ng which a hamlet
i s secured by a ml l i t a r y f or ce, and
medi cal c a r e , medi ci ne, food, and
cl ot hi ng a r e di spensed t o t he v i l l a g e r s .
MEDEVAC.. .................... Medical evacuat i on. Removed from t h e
b a t t l e f i e l d because of wounds. Al so
term used t o i d e n t i f y a he l i c opt e r
used i n t h e medi cal evacuat i on.
Medic ........................ A member of t he Army Medical Corps,
e s pe c i a l l y one who gi ve s f i r s t a i d
i n combat.
MG ...........................Major General .
M I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . Mi l i t a r y I nt e l l i ge nc e branch.
"Mike Mike"..................Mi l l i met er , i . e. 60 Mike Mike mor t ar .
Mine,......................... An expl osi ve desi gned t o des t r oy o r
damage ve hi c l e s , boat s , o r a i r c r a f t
o r desi gned t o k i l l o r i nc a pa c i t a t e
per sonnel . It may be det onat ed by
t h e a c t i on of i t s vi ct i m, by t h e pass-
age of t i m e , o r by c ont r ol l e d means.
Mine sweeper................. A devi ce which de t e c t s me t a l l i c ob-
j e c t s ; used t o d e t e c t mines.
"Minigun" .................... A ext remel y r a pi d f i r i n g machinegun
usi ng mul t i pl e b a r r e l s , 5. 56 m i l l i -
met ers.
"Misprison of a f el ony" ...... The of f ens e of conceal i ng knowledge
of a f el ony by one who has not pa r t -
i c i pa t e d o r a s s i s t e d i n it.
mm ...........................Millimeter,.i.e,60mm mortar.
Monitoring...................Theactoflisteningto,reviewing
and/or recordingenemyorfriendly
communicationforthepurposeof
maintainingstandards,improving
communications,orforreference.
M-1,M-16,M-60,etc.........See weapons.
NCO..........................Noncommissionedofficer. Ranks
CorporalthroughSergeantMajor.
NCS.......................... NetControlStation, Astation
designatedtocontroltrafficand
enforcecircuitdisciplinewithin
agivennet.
Net.......................... Anorganizatic~n of Cradiolstations
capableofdirectcommunicationson
acommonchannelorfrequency.
NLF..........................NationalLiberationFront. Politichl
armoftheVietCong.
Noncombatant.................Membersofthecivilianpopulation
ofSonMyVillage,whowereunarmed
andcommittingnohostileacts.
mlsocalled"innocen*civilians." 2
"NUOCman"...................Vietnamesefishsauce.
NVA........................,.NorthVietnameseArmy,
OB......................... ,.Order ofBattle. Theidentification,
strenytFi,commandstructure,anddis-
positionofthepersonnel,units,and
equipmentofanymilitaryforce.
OBJ..........................Objective. Adefinitetacticalfea-
ture,theseizureand/orholdingof
whichisessential.
OJT..........................On theJobTraining. Atraining
processwherebystudentsortrainees
acquireknowledgeandskillthrough
actualperformanceofduties.
OPCON........................ OperationalControl. Theauthority
grantedtoacommandertodirect
forcesassignedsothatthecommander
mayaccomplishspecificmissions,or
taskswhichareusuallylimitedby
function,time,orlocation.
OPREP........................OperationsReport.
Or bi t i ng .....................Fl yi ng i n c i r c l e s over an ar ea.
"Out" ........................ Radio procedure s i gni f yi ng end of
t r ansmi ssi on.
"Over" ....................... Radio procedure s i gni f yi ng a r epl y
t o t he precedi ng t r ansmi ssi on i s
a nt i c i pa t e d.
Paddy. . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . Ri c e f i e l d .
"Papa San"...................An ol d man. (GI s l ang)
Pax........................... Pas s enger t s ) .
PD........................... Poi nt det onat i ng f uze f o r an a r t i l l -
e r y p r o j e c t i l e . Located i n t he nose
of a p r o j e c t i l e , which i s i n i t i a t e d
upon impact.
uPe t e r Pi l o t " . ............... P i l o t of a he l i c opt e r , a s d i f f e r e n t i -
a t e d from t he a i r c r a f t commander.
PFC. ..............,.%.......... Pr i va t e F i r s t Cl ass.
PHOENIX Program.............. .Coordinated e f f o r t t o a t t a c k t he Vi et
Cong i n f r a s t r u c t u r e on a nat i onwi de
bas i s .
Phonet i c Alphabet............ A l i s t of st andar d words used t o i d-
e n t i f y l e t t e r s i n a message t r ans -
mi t t ed by r a di o o r t el ephone:
A.....Alpha N.....November
B. . . . . Bravo O. . . . . Os c a r
C. . . . . Char l i e P. . ...Papa
D. ....Del t a &. . . . . Quebec
E. . . . . Echo R. . ...Romeo
F. . . . . Foxt r ot S.....Si e r r a
G. . . . . Golf T. . . . . Tango
H. . ...Hot el U.....Uniform
I. . ...I ndi a V. . . . . Vi ct or
J . . . . . J u l i e t W. ....Whiskey
K. . . . . Ki l o X.....Xray
L. . ...Lima Y.....Yankee
M. . ...Mike Z. . . . . Zul u
PIC..........................Provi nce I nt e r r oga t i on Cent er.
" Pi nkvi l l e" . .................Nickname f o r My Lai (1).
PIOCC........................Provi nce I nt e l l i ge nc e and Operat i ons
Coordi nat i ng Cent er ,
C- 15
P l t ..........................Pl at oon.
POL.......................... Pet r ol em, , O i l s , and Lubr i cant s.
"Pop Smoke1' .................. To employ a smoke grenade i n or der
t o i de nt i f y a l ocat i on.
POR.......................... Pr epar at i on of Replacement f o r over-
s ea movement.
"Pot " ........................Mari j uana. A ha l l uc i na t or y drug.
POW..........................Pr i soner of war. Cor r ect term i s
IIPW".
Prep ......................... Short ened t erm fox pr epar at i on o r
pr epar at or y f i r e . A heavy volume
of prearranged ground o r a i r c r a f t
f i r e del i ver ed t o de s t r oy, d i s r u p t ,
di sor gani ze, and ne ut r a l i z e t h e
enemy and t o demoral i ze and dest r oy
t he defendi ng f or c e s p r i o r t o t he
i n i t i a t i o n of t he a t t a c k. Fi r e de-
l i ve r e d on a t a r g e t pr epar at or y t o
an a s s a ul t .
"Pr i ck 9 " . ...................AN/PRC 9 p o r t a b l e , man-carri ed r adi o.
" pr i ck 25" ...................AN/PRC 25 por t a bl e , man-carried r adi o.
Provi nce ..................... P o l i t i c a l di vi s i on i n RVN, roughl y
equi val ent t o a s t a t e
Provi nce Chi ef . . ............. GVN o f f i c i a l governi ng a Provi nce,
us ual l y a mi l i t a r y o f f i c e r , roughl y
equi val ent t o a governor.
Pr ovost Marshal. ............. St a f f o f f i c e r who super vi ses a l l a c t -
i v i t i e s of mi l i t a r y pol i c e of a comm-
and and who advi ses t he commander on
mi l i t a r y pol i c e mat t er s , pr i s oner s
of war, mi l i t a r y pr i s one r s , and ot he r
mat t er s of concern t o t h e commander.
PSA.......................... Pr o~r i nce Seni or Advisor. Seni or US
advi sor t o t he Provi nce Chi ef.
PSYOPS ....................... Psychol ogi cal Operat i ons. These oper-
a t i ons i ncl ude psychol ogi cal war f ar e,
and i n a ddi t i on, encompass t hos e pol -
i t i c a l , mi l i t a r y , economic, and i deol -
ogi c a l a c t i ons planned and conducted
C-16
t o c r e a t e i n ne ut r a l o r f r i e ndl y
f or ei gn groups t he emot i ons, a t t i -
t udes, o r behavi or t o support t he
achievement of na t i ona l obj ect i ves .
"Puff t he Magic Dragon"......See a i r c r a f t names.
"Push".......................Term used t o mean a r a di o frequency.
PVT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . Pr i va t e .
PW...........................Pr i soner of war. ( I ncor r ect l y c a l l e d
tlPOW I' )
PZ...........................Pickup zone.
QL...........................Quoc-lo. Vietnamese desi gnat i on f o r
a na t i ona l highway o r r out e.
Radio Ca l l Si gn............,.A group of l e t t e r s , numeral s, o r a
combination of bot h which i d e n t i f i e s
a r a di o s t a t i o n .
"Coyote" ................TF Barker.
"Coyote 3"..............MAJ Calhoun.
"Coyote 6".. ............LTC Barker.
"Coyote 23".............Pickup zone cont r ol , LZ Dot t i e.
"Coyote 65". ............Net c ont r ol St a t i on, MSG Johnson.
"Coyote Alpha 6" ........A Company Commander, CPT Riggs.
"Coyote Bravo 6" . .......B Company Commander, CPT Mi chl es.
"Coyote Char l i e 6". . . . . . C Company Commander, CPT Medina.
"Coyote Char l i e 8 l U . . . ..81mm Mort ar FDC, l ocat ed a t LZ Up-
t i g h t .
"Dolphin" ...............Li f t s hi ps , 174t h Avn Co.
"Dolphin Leadu. . .,......Leader of l i f t s h i p s , 174t h Avn Co.
"Dolphin 2., 3 , 4 , 5". . . . Indi vi duaL l i f t s h i p s , 174t h Avn Co.
N D ~ s t Offu. , . . . . . . . . . . . . Medevac he l i c opt e r .
"Hel i x 32". .............FAC.
"Hel i x 22". . ............FAC.
"Lobo 65". . .............N e t Cont rol St a t i on, 4t h Bn, 3d I nf .
"Newsboy I ndi a Two
Zero". . ................US Navy "Swi f t Boat . , "
"Rawhide" ...............11t h Bde.
"Rawhide 6". . . ..........COL Henderson, Bde CO.
"Rawhide 3 " . ............MAJ McKnight, 11t h Bde S3.
"Saber".................America1 Di vi si on.
"Saber 6".. .............MG Kost er , CG America1 Di vi si on.
"Sane Drank Del t a Mike
(Same Drink)I t . ..........US Navy "Swi ft Boat.."
"Shark1'.................Gunships, 174t hAvn Co.
''Shark 6". .............. Gunship pl at oon commander,. 174t h Avn
Co.
"Skeet er " ............... OH-23 he l i c opt e r , Aero-Scout team,
Co B, 123d Avn Bn (flown by W01
Thompson on 16 Mar 68).
"War Lord"..............Gunships, Co B, 123d Avn Bn.
"War Lord Alpha Leadn. . . Aero Scout team l e a de r , Co B, 123d
Avn Bn.
R&R. .......................... Rest and Recuperat i on. The wi t h-
drawal of i ndi vi dual s from combat
o r arduous dut y f o r s h o r t per i ods
of rest and r ecuper at i on.
"Rawhide"....................See r adi o c a l l s i gns .
RD. .......................... Revol ut i onary Development. The f or -
mal i zed GVN program i n s pe c i f i e d
haml et s l ocat ed gener al l y wi t h RD
campaign ar eas . It i ncl udes t he
l oc a l s e c ur i t y f o r t hose haml et s and
t he p o l i t i c a l , economic, and s o c i a l
a c t i v i t i e s a t t h a t l e ve l .
RD Cadre. . ..................Revol ut i onary Development Cadre.
Vietnamese team which implements
t he Revol ut i onary Development program
wi t hi n t h e community.
C-18
Reconnaissance..,............A mi ssi on undert aken t o obt ai n, by
vi s ua l obser vat i on o r ot he r de t e c t i on
methods, i nf or mat i on about t h e a c t i v-
i t i es and r esour ces of an enemy o r
p o t e n t i a l enemy; -or t o secur e da t a
concerni ng t he met eor ol ogi cal , hydro-
gr a pi c , o r geographi c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
of a p a r t i c u l a r ar ea.
Reconnaissance by f i r e....... Employment of a r t i l l e r y , mor t ar , a i r -
c r a f t , o r smal l arms f i r e t o cause
t h e enemy t o di s c l os e h i s pos i t i on.
Reconnaissance i n Force. . ....A l i mi t ed obj e c t i ve oper at i on by a
consi der abl e f or c e t o di scover and
t est t h e enemy' s di s pos i t i ons and
s t r e ngt hs , o r t o devel op ot he r i n-
t e l l i ge nc e .
Report of ~ n v e s t i ~ a t i o n a l l ......An o f f i c i a l wr i t t e n r ecor d of
- pe r t i ne nt i nf or mat i on obt ai ned i n an
i nqui r y concerni ng a cri me, of f ens e,
acci dent , o r a l l e ga t i on.
RF/PF........................Regional Forces/ Popul ar Forces; GVN
Par ami l i t ar y uni t s .
"Roger ......................... Radio procedure meaning "Iunder-
st and".
republicof Korea.
Round ........................ A l l t h e p a r t s t h a t make up t h e ammun-
i t i o n necessar y i n f i r i n g one s hot ;
One s hot f i r e d by a weapon.
RTO.......................... Radio-telephone ope r a t or , The man
who c a r r i e d t he r a di o o r whose job
i s t o oper at e t h e r adi o.
"Ruff Puf f " ..................Regi onal Forces/ Popul ar Forces.
RVN..........................Republic of Vietnam.
RVNAF........................Republ i c of Vietnam Armed Forces,
"Saber" .......................See r a di o c a l l s i gns .
Safe-haven haml et . . . ......... A haml et under V i e t Cong domi nat i on,
which pr ovi des t h e VC wi t h a i d and
C- 19
comfort , and i n which t h e VC f e e l
s a f e from Al l i ed a t t a c k.
"S L C". . . . ..................See Search and Cl ear .
"S & D" . . . . . . . . ..............See Search and Dest roy.
Sapper ....................... VC/NVA s ol di e r s who i n f i l t r a t e
f r i e ndl y pos i t i ons i n or de r t o em-
pl oy expl osi ves.
Sat chel charge............... A number of bl ocks of expl osi ve
t aped t o a board f i t t e d wi t h a rope
o r w i r e l oop f o r car r yi ng and at t ach-
i ng.
"Scarf up"...................To s e i z e o r capt ur e.
Search and c l e a r ............. Cl ear i ng oper at i ons. Mi l i t a r y oper-
a t i o n t o c l e a r an a r e a permanently
of organi zed VC/NVA main f or c e s ,
i ncl udi ng t h e pr ovi nc i a l b a t t a l i o n s ,
i n or der t o el i mi nat e t he immediate
enemy t h r e a t .
Sear ch and dest r oy........... Mi l i t a r y oper at i on conducted f o r t h e
purpose of seeki ng out and dest r oyi ng
enemy f or c e s , i n s t a l l a t i o n s , r esour ces,
and base a r e a s . Thi s t erm i s no long-
er used.
Sect or .......................Provi nce mi l i t a r y s t r uc t ur e .
SFC. .........................Ser geant F i r s t Cl ass.
SGM. .........................Ser geant Major.
SGT..........................Ser geant .
"Shark" . r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Se e a i r c r a f t names; c a l l s i gns .
SHELREP......................Shel l i ng r e por t . A r e por t of enemy
s he l l i ng cont ai ni ng i nf or mat i on on '
c a l i b e r , di r e c t i on, t i m e , de ns i t y,
and a r e a s he l l e d.
SIR........................... Ser i ous I nci dent Report . Report of
any i nc i de nt which may r e s u l t i n
damaging publ i c confi dence i n t h e US
Armed Forces and cause cont i nued o r
wi despread adver se publ i c i t y.
SITREP..,..........,.........Situation r e por t . A r e por t gi vi ng
t he s i t uat - i oni n t h e a r e a of a re-
por t i ng u n i t o r format i on.
SIW..........................Se l f - i nf l i c t e d wound.
"Six"..........,.,...........Radio c a l l s i gn normal l y assi gned t o
a u n i t commander.
SJ A. .........................St a f f Judge Advocate. See St a f f .
" Ske e t e r " . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . ....See Radio c a l l s i gns ; a i r c r a f t names.
"Sl i ckt 1......................See a i r c r a f t names.
"Sl ope". .....................Vietnamese person. (GI s l ang)
Small arms. . . . . .............. A l l arms, i ncl udi ng aut omat i c weapons,
up t o and i ncl udi ng . 60 c a l i b e r and
shot guns.
S o l a t iurn..................... Payment a s compensation f o r l o s s o r
i nj ur y.
SOP ..........................St andi ng oper at i ng procedure.
Sor t i e . . . . ...................An ope r a t i ona l f l i g h t by one a i r c r a f t .
SP...........................Spe c i a l i s t .
"Spooky" .....................See a i r c r a f t names.
Spot Report . .................. A conci se na r r a t i ve r e por t of e s s e n t i a l
i nf or mat i on coveri ng event s o r condi -
t i ons t h a t may have an immediate and
s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on c ur r e nt pl anni ng
and oper at i ons.
Sqd..........................Squad.
SSG.... ......................St a f f Sergeant .
St a f f . ....................... Of f i cer s who a r e s p e c i f i c a l l y or der ed
o r de t a i l e d t o a s s i s t t h e commander i n
h i s e xe r c i s e of command.
General St a f f (GSI. ..... A group of o f f i c e r s i n t h e headquar t er s
of Army di vi s i ons o r s i mi l a r o r l a r ge r
u n i t s which a s s i s t t h e i r oommanders i n
pl anni ng, coor di nat i ng, and super vi si ng
C-2 1
oper at i ons. Consi st s of f our o r more
pr i nc i pa l f unct i onal syst ems: per s-
onnel (G-11, mi l i t a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e
(G-2), oper at i ons and t r a i n i n g (G-3),
l o g i s t i c s (G-41, c i v i l a f f a i r s (G-5).
G-2 A i r and G-3 A i r a r e Army o f f i c e r s
assi gned t o G-2 o r G-3 who a s s i s t i n
pl anni ng and coor di nat i ng j o i n t oper-
a t i ons o r ground and a i r u n i t s .
J o i n t St a f f ............. The s t a f f of a commander of a uni f -
i e d command (such a s MACV) which i n-
cl udes members f o r t he s e r vi c e s com-
pr i s i ng t h e f or ce. A j o i n t s t a f f may
be desi gnat ed J-1, J-2, J-3, e t c . J-5
i s Pl ans and Pol i cy.
Per sonal St a f f . . ........ Such s t a f f o f f i c e r s a s t he commander
e l e c t s t o coor di nat e and admi ni st er
d i r e c t l y , i ns t e a d of t hrough t h e
chi ef of s t a f f . The commander's a i de s
a r e members of h i s per s onal s t a f f .
Speci al St a f f ........... A l l s t a f f members havi ng d u t i e s a t a
headquar t er s and not i ncl uded i n t he
ge ne r a l s t a f f group o r i n t h e per sonal
s t a f f group. Speci al s t a f f i ncl udes
a vi a t i on o f f i c e r , s t a f f judge advocat e
(SJA o r J AG) , chapl ai n, I nspect or Gen-
e r a l ( I G) ,pr ovost mar shal , a dj ut a nt
gener al (AG) ,e t c .
Uni t St a f f . . . . . ........... I n br i gades and smal l er u n i t s , s t a f f
s e c t i ons a r e desi gnat ed S1, S2, S3,
et c. , wi t h dut i e s correspondi ng t o
t hose of t he gener al s t a f f .
"St and Down"..... ............. Assume a lower l e ve l of r eadi nes s ,
a s t o "st and down" from an a l e r t .
"STRAC" ...................... An expr essi on meaning "shar p" o r on
t op of t h e s i t ua t i on. Formerly
" St r a t e gi c Army Corps".
Subhamlet ....................Subdi vi si on of a haml et .
Subsect or ....................Di s t r i c t mi l i t a r y s t r u c t u r e .
Support Command..............See Di vi si on Support Command.
Suppressi ve f i r e .............Firepower del i ver ed upon a t a r g e t t o
di scour age o r pr ecl ude t he enemy from
C- 22
"Swi ft Boat"..................Vessel employed by t he Navy t o
scr een r i v e r banks and c oa s t l i n e s .
S1, S2 , S3, e t c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Se e St a f f .
TAOI ......................... Ta c t i c a l a r e a of i n t e r e s t . An a r e a
i ncl udi ng, but not he c e s s a r i l y l i m -
i t e d t o , t h e TAOR i n which t h e des-
i gnat ed US/FWMAF commander i s know-
l edgeabl e of t he l oc a t i on, a c t i v i t -
i e s , and oper at i ons of a l l GVN f or c e s
and i n s t a l l a t i o n s , CI DG camps, and RD
ar eas . The TAOI d i f f e r s from t he
TAOR i n t h a t US/FWMAF commanders a r e
not charged wi t h primary t a c t i c a l res-
p o n s i b i l i t y i n t h e TAOI .
TAOR tactical a r e a of r e s pons i bi l i t y. An
a r e a assi gned t o a commander who i s
r esponsi bl e f o r i n s t a l l a t i o n s , t he
c ont r ol of movement, and t h e conduct
of t a c t i c a l oper at i ons wi t h t r oops
under h i s c ont r ol . A l l f i r e and man-
euver conducted wit.hin t he TAOR must
be coor di nat ed wi t h t he commander.
Task Force. .................. A temporary groupi ng of u n i t s under
one commander, formed f o r t he purpose
of car r yi ng out a s p e c i f i c oper at i on
o r mi ssi on.
TF. ..........................Task Force.
"That ' s af f i r m" . ......; . . . . . . Af f i r mat i ve.
The 5 S1 s ..:.................Procedures f o r handl i ng pr i s oner s of
war, i . e. , "Search, Si l e nc e , Segreg-
a t e , Speed, Safeguard".
TL. ..........................Ti nh-l o. Vietnamese desi gnat i on f o r
a pr ovi nc i a l highway o r r out e.
TOC ........................... Ta c t i c a l oper at i ons c e nt e r , A phys i cal
groupment of t hos e el ement s of an Army
gener al and s pe c i a l s t a f f concerned
wi t h c ur r e nt oper at i ons and t he t ac-
t i c a l suppor t t her eof .
Track. .......................T racked ve hi c l e s , i . e. t anks, ' AP C1 s ' .
UHF..........................Ul t r a hi gh frequency r adi o.
C- 23
USARPAC...... ................Uni t ed St a t e s Army, Pa c i f i c .
USARV. .......................United St a t e s Amy, Vietnam.
VC.....;.....................V i e t Cong.
VCI . . . . . .....................V i e t Cong I nf r a s t r uc t ur e .
VCS... ....................... V i e t Cong s us pect o r V i e t Cong
sympat hi zer.
VHF ..........................Very hi gh frequency r adi o.
Vi et Cong, ...................Vietnamese words meaning Vietnamese
Communist.
Vi e t Cong I nf r a s t r uqt ur e ..... The p o l i t i c a l and admi ni s t r at i ve
or gani zat i on t hrough which t h e V i e t
Cong c ont r ol o r seek t o c ont r ol t h e
South Vietnamese peopl e.
Vi l l a ge ...................... P o l i t i c a l subdi vi si on below d i s t r i c t
l e ve l , c ons i s t s of s e ve r a l haml et s,
roughl y equi val ent t o a met r opol i t an
ar ea.
Vi l l age Chief................. GVN o f f i c i a l governi ng a number of
hamlet.s, us ual l y a c i v i l i a n .
VI P .......................... Vol unt ary Informant Program. Proqram
whereby Vietnamese a r e pai d f o r i nf or -
mat i on l eadi ng t o t he capt ur e of weapons,
ammunition, equipment, o r Vi et Cong
per sonnel .
VR. ..........................Vi sual reconnai ssance.
VR Ai r c r a f t . . . ...........'.... Ai r c r a f t u t i l i z e d t o conduct a vi s -
u a l reconnai ssance.
VT. .......................... Var i abl e t i me fuz-e. A f uze desi gned
ko det onat e a p r o j e c t i l e when a c t i -
vat ed by e xt e r na l i nf l uence ot her
t han cont act i n t h e c l os e v i c i n i t y
of a t a r g e t .
"War Lor d". . . . . ..............See r a di o c a l l s i gns ; a i r c r a f t names.
"Waste1' .. ....................Ter m meaning t o shoot o r t o k i l l
(GI s l ang) .
Web gear .....................Mi l i t a r y equipment c ons i s t i ng of a
b e l t and har ness made of webbing,
C-24
desi gned t o c a r r y pack, cant een,
ammunition pouches, e t c .
Weapons
AK 47.. .................Communist-made aut omat i c r i f l e .
C-4.....................Plastic expl osi ve. More powerful
t han an equi val ent wei ght of TNT.
LAW.....................Li ght a nt i t a nk weapon. Li ght wei ght
weapon c a r r i e d by an i ndi vi dua l . sol -
d i e r which de l i ve r s a hi gh expl osi ve
p r o j e c t i l e a ga i ns t a t a r ge t .
Minigun .................5.56 mi l l i met er , mul t i - bar r el ed, ex-
t remel y hi gh r a t e of f i r e weapon.
M-1. .................... US r i f l e , c a l i b e r . 30, M- 1 , semiauto-
mat i c. World War I1 vi nt age weapon,
no l onger i s s ued t o US uni t s .
M-16... .................US r i f l e , 5.56 mi l l i met er , M-16,
aut omat i c o r semi aut omat i c. Also
known as AR-15.
M-18.... ................US mine, M-18 s e r i e s . Also known
a s "claymore".
M-60.... ................US Machinegun, 7.62 m i l l i m e t e r ,
M-60. Also known a s "60".
M-79. ...................US grenade l auncher , M-79, pr opel s
a 40 mi l l i met er grenade.
SKS. ....................Communist-made car bi ne.
"8 i nch". . ..............8 i nch howi t zer.
"16" ....................See M-16.
"45". . . . . ...............US p i s t o l ( aut omat i c) , c a l i b e r .45.
"5OU. . . . . . ..............US heavy machinegun, c a l i b e r .50.
"60n. . . . . . ..............See M-60.
"60mm".................. 60 m i l l i m e t e r mort ar.
"81mrn".......... ........81 mi l l i met er mort ar.
"105". ' . . . . . . . ...........105 m i l l i m e t e r howi t zer .
"155" ...................155 m i l l i m e t e r howi t zer .
..................175 m i l l i m e t e r gun.
g117512-
"Wi l l y Pe t e r " ................ White phosphorus a r t i l l e r y pr oj e c t -
i l e .
W 0 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fi r s t Warrant Of f i c e r rank.
"8 i nch". ....................See weapons.
"16". ........................Se e weapons.
"45". . . ......................See weapons.
"50". ......... .'.............. See weapons.
"60" .........................See weapons.
"60mm"... ....................See weapons.
"79".. .......................See weapons.
"81mrn" .......................See weapons.
"105". . . . ....................See weapons.
, "155". . ......................See weapons.
i
. "175I 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S ee weapons.
C-26
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OF F I CE :1974 0563-668

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