DEFENDING MOLINISM: A PLAUSIBLE

RECONCILIATION OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE

AND HUMAN FREEDOM


DAVID C. STROBOLAKOS


heological discussion has long been rife with controversy. As
early as the first century, Christian thinkers disagreed on how
to conceptualize the intricacies of their faith. Gnostic disputes
gave way to disagreement over Christs ontology that gave way to
rhetorical jabs over the use of icons and so on. No less immune to
this theological clamor has been the captivating notion of Gods
sovereignty juxtaposed with the elusive idea of human freedom. Can
these two coexist? If so, how? In this paper, I will defend Molinism
a hypothesis that answers the previous questions in the affirmative. I
argue that Gods meticulous sovereignty and libertarian human
freedom can plausibly coexist in the real world.
1
That is, I think
Molinism provides a credible interpretation of the available evidence
related to Divine and human agency. I will make my case by first
articulating the core tenets of a Molinist position and suggesting their
plausibility. Then, I will defend Molinism against one of its primary
objections: the Grounding Objection. In so doing, I will show that
Molinism is a satisfactorily coherent and plausible reconciliation of
Gods providence with human freedom and that it (at minimum)
stands up against the Grounding Objection.

DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTARIAN HUMAN
FREEDOM
Developed by Luis de Molina in the 16
th
century, Molinism
represents an attempt to reconcile a strong view of Gods sovereignty
with a strong view of libertarian free will. Molina originally took up
this challenge in response to the Dominican monk Domingo Baez
who argued for a more traditional perspective on Divine sovereignty
and human freedom, giving deference to Gods sovereignty. In fact,
it was Molinas perceived dissent on this issue (i.e. the supremacy of
Gods sovereignty) that spawned much of the opposition he received.
Because Molina emphasized the reality of libertarian human freedom,

1
It is important to note here that I will be arguing only for
Molinisms inherent plausibility. Whether or not Molinism is probable is
another issue. Establishing Molinisms simple plausibility will be
epistemologically sufficient for my purposes.
T
2
Baez accused him of reducing the potency of Gods providence. So,
the question arises: what was Molinas perspective on Gods
sovereignty? Was it actually as anemic as Baez thought?
Contrary to Baezs allegations, Molina actually argues for a
strikingly robust understanding of Gods sovereign control. One
could even claim that he argued for a more sophisticated and
nuanced version of Gods providence than many theologians have
maintained since his time. Christians have traditionally believed that
God is the ultimate, providential ruler over all creation. This
providential reign can be understood in at least two different
categories. First, God exercises his providence by preserving creation.
This is reminiscent of Colossians 1:16-17 where Paul, speaking about
Christ, says, For in him all things were created: things in heaven and
on earth, visible and invisibleall things have been created through
him and for him. He is before all things, and in him all things hold
together. It takes Gods continuous preservation for creation to
remain in existence at all. Indeed, apart from Gods preserving action
the created order would cease to exist because it is not self-sustaining.
A second aspect of Gods providence is his governance. This
specifically refers to Gods ordering of human affairs to accomplish
Divine goals. As the sage reminds his reader in Proverbs 16:9, The
mind of man plans his way, but the Lord directs his step.
Undoubtedly, God has specific intentions that he wishes to bring
about in history and his providential governance assures that they will
obtain. For some theologians and philosophers, this aspect of Gods
providence poses a significant problem for free will. If God
providentially governs the affairs of the world to bring about his
divine plans, then how could a person genuinely retain free will?
Dont we all just become pawns in his hands as he executes the fiats
of his will? This is where a carefully parsed understanding of free will
becomes relevant. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find a
proponent of libertarian free will who argues that human creatures
are able to exercise their free will in every situation they find
themselves in. Instead, the majority of these philosophers propose
that human creatures are free in at least some situations.
2
For example,
the Christian theist, who happens to believe in libertarian free will,
might argue that human creatures are free in respect to their
salvation. They can choose to accept or deny Christ without being
coerced. However, perhaps they are not as free in other situations
such as choosing where they will live or what job they will work, etc.
Given this caveat, we can see how God is still capable of providential
governance even if human creatures have libertarian free will in some
decisions. He is still able to coerce a person towards different ends
(sans salvation) in their life if he so chooses. So, there is a very real

2
See: Alfred Mele, Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009).
3
sense in which God can govern the flow of world history while
allowing human creatures the privilege of moderate free will. More
on this modest notion of free will below.
Now, Molina would happily agree with both of the previously
mentioned aspects of Gods providence (preservation and
governance). However, he takes the argument a step further and
offers a third component of Gods providence; namely, Gods
general concurrence. This is the claim that every created secondary
cause (i.e. a human being) is ultimately dependent upon the causal
contribution of God to accomplish their desired ends.
3
In other
words, regardless of my power of will, I cannot cause any states of
affairs to obtain apart from the cooperation of Gods concurrent
power.
This is not to say that God is ultimately the only particular
cause of any events. Rather, following the Aristotelian tradition of
causes, Molina argues that human creatures have real causal influence
on the world albeit as secondary causes. Furthermore, their causal
influence is necessary for certain events to obtain such that, if they
failed to act, those events would not obtain. For example, it really
matters that I practice the habit of patience. For if I do not, then I
will not become a patient person. While God may grant me sufficient
grace to act patiently in a certain circumstance, he will not mystically
transform my disposition de novo to be patient. I, as a secondary cause,
am important to actualizing that end. That being said, secondary
causes are on their own incapable of bringing events about. They
require Gods contemporaneous cooperation.
4
I cannot choose the
patient act to habituate purely on my own power. I am (qua created
being) inherently dependent upon the concurrent action of God for
the event to actualize.
At this point, a clear objection arises. Does this doctrine of
Divine concurrence somehow make God responsible for evil? If any
human creatures action is dependent upon Gods concurrence to
obtain, then doesnt it seem as if evil actions are dependent upon him
as well? Here Molina makes a helpful distinction between efficacious
and inefficacious concurrence. Insofar as a human creature produces
an effect in line with Gods intentions, then Gods concursus generalis is
said to be efficacious. Insofar as a human creature produces an effect
out of line with Gods intentions, then Gods concursus generalis is said
to be inefficacious. In the first, God also intends the effect along with
the secondary cause and in the second he merely allows the effect to
obtain.
5
What does this distinction accomplish? Ultimately, it

3
Alfred Freddoso, introduction to On Divine Foreknowledge by
Luis de Molina (Part IV of Concordia), trans. Alfred J. Freddoso
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 17.
4
Ibid., p. 18.
5
Ibid.
4
provides a reasonable understanding for how God maintains his
meticulous providence over creation while avoiding any direct, causal
connection between him and evil.
6
Additionally, it also allows space
for genuine human choice. Unlike the Baezian who claims that God
acts directly upon secondary causes to move them towards particular
effects, Molina carves out causal space for human beings to
meaningfully contribute to the world while giving God a pass on
responsibility for evil. It is to this idea of free, human contribution
that we now turn.
As previously stated, Molina adheres to a libertarian
perspective of human freedom wherein, at least in some situations,
human beings possess the ability to will however they desire. Molina
describes this phenomenon in the following way:

That agent is called free which, with all the prerequisites
for acting posited, is able to act and able not to act [freedom
of contradiction], or is able to do one thing in such a way that
is also able to do some contrary thing [freedom of
contrariety]. And by virtue of this sort of freedom the faculty
by which such an agent is able so to act is called free
7


As noted above, this is not a radical form of libertarian freedom
suggesting that human beings are free in all of their decisions. There
are in fact situations where human beings make certain choices out of
causal necessity. Nevertheless, Molina affirms that there are particular
situations that human creatures find themselves in that they are not
determined toward certain ends. Freddoso captures this well in the
following statement where (t) stands for a point in time, (P) stands
for the free agent, and (S) stands for the state of affairs:

At t P freely contributes causally to S only if (i) at t P
contributes causally to S and (ii) Ps contributing causally to S
does not obtain at t by a necessity of nature and (iii) the total
causal activity at t of causes other than P is compossible with
Ps not causally contributing at t to S.
8


This is essentially to say that P acts freely only to the extent that
natural causes do not require P to act at t and the total system of
present causes does not require P to act at t. For P to act freely
requires that she be able to transcend the current causal history of the

6
For a compelling treatment of Gods relationship to evil and
the nature of human freedom see: Alvin Plantinga, Free Will
Defense in Philosophy in America, ed. Max Black (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1965).
7
Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, p. 24-25.
8
Freddoso, introduction to On Divine Foreknowledge, p. 27.
5
world and will an end of her own choosing. Again, this is not the case
in all situations, but must be the case in at least some. Its important
to make this distinction, because there are real ways in which we
human beings causally determined. No matter how hard I try to resist
it, my body is causally determined to stop when I run into a wall; in
virtue of my bodys subordination to natural laws it must stop. No
matter how hard I try to resist it, I will inevitably stop moving. Why?
Because I am physically determined to do so. In this way and in
others, human beings are not causally undetermined. We naturally
find ourselves caught up in a complex web of determining causes.
However, the mystery and wonder of human life is that we do not
have to remain in that web. It seems that on occasion we can
transcend it. This transcendence is free-will.
Now why would Molina (or any other Molinists for that
matter) want to defend something like free will? Christian thinkers
throughout history (such as John Calvin
9
and others) have been
satisfied positing such a high view of Gods providence that free will
becomes almost irrelevant. God, in his infinite wisdom, has
sovereignly determined the causal course of the world and events
play out exactly as he previously decided they would. Imagine
something like a scripted stage production where each actor or
actress delivers their lines and goes through their motions on stage
precisely as the writer envisioned it. With a model such as this, there
doesnt seem to be a need to defend anything like libertarian human
freedom. Maybe we are just pawns caught up in deterministic
physical processes. Unfortunately, I dont think this model of
humanity adequately accounts for several relevant bits of data that
pose themselves to the watchful eye.
First, upon introspection, a suspicious intuition comes to the
fore. To my immediate psychological awareness, it certainly seems as
if I have libertarian freedom. In fact, my decision-making is marked
by a confident belief that I can genuinely choose whether or not I
will have cheerios or oatmeal for breakfast. This is something not just
peculiar to my personal consciousness, but seems to be an intuition
in the folk tradition of all people. Thomas Reid makes note of this
when he says, The language of all mankind, and their ordinary
conduct in life, demonstrate, that they have a conviction of some
active power in themselves to produce certain motions in their own
and in other bodies, and to regulate and direct their own thoughts.
10

Now, we all may be blisteringly unaware that we are part of some
aliens science experiment designed to believe that we are free, but, for
a number of other reasons, that seems implausible as well. Granted,

9
See Calvins Institutes of the Christian Religion I.16-18 (Peabody,
Mass.: Hendrickson Publishing, 2008).
10
Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Power of the Human Mind
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969 [1788]), p. 269.
6
this is merely an intuition of human freedom, but given is cultural
ubiquity, its one that deserves recognition.
Second, it doesnt seem unreasonable to suggest that moral
culpability directly depends upon the ability to freely choose between
at least two options. It seems counterintuitive to hold someone
responsible for a wrong action if they were determined to so act. For
example, it is generally understood that someone is personally guilty
of first-degree murder because they intentionally set their will
towards the act of killing another human being. If someone does not
possess freedom to act in a different manner (i.e. they genuinely did
not have an alternative possibility of not killing the other person),
then it appears to be radically unjust to punish them for their
actions.
11
Their actions are merely a product of deterministic
processes impinging upon their hunk of matter at that time. Instead
of punishing them, it would be more appropriate to feel pity on
them.
Finally, from a biblical-theological standpoint, it seems
relatively clear that human beings are endowed with some level of
freedom especially when it comes to soteriological matters. St. Peter
writes, The Lord is not slow in keeping his promiseinstead he is
patient with you, not wanting anyone to perish, but everyone to come
to repentance (2 Peter 3:9). This passage seems to indicate that
Gods genuine desire is that all would be saved; that none would
eternally perish. However, other passages of Scripture suggest to us
that there are those who will ultimately reject Gods offer of eternal
life and will perish.
12
So how do these two ideas comport? I think the
most compelling suggestion here is that the choice for God must be a
free, uncoerced decision. If it wasnt, then it seems that God, due to
his character, would unequivocally draw all people to himself he
would save all of mankind. However, because this is not the reality
that Scripture sets before us, it must be the case that the human will
plays an important role. Therefore, it seems that certain human
persons do not receive Gods gift of eternal life, because they freely
choose to reject his offer.

MOMENTS IN GODS KNOWLEDGE
Having looked at Molinas robust account of Divine providence and
establishing the plausibility of libertarian human freedom, it remains
to explain how these two realities might coalesce. In some ways, it
appears that these are almost mutually exclusive. It seems a relevant
condition of Gods providence in preservation, governance, and
concurrence for him to have complete knowledge of all reality (i.e.
omniscience). However, if we grant him omniscience, then the

11
See Peter Van Inwagen, An Essay On Free Will (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), chap. 5.
12
See Romans 1; Revelation 14:17-20; 1 John 5:12
7
dreaded curse of determinism seems to lurk around the corner. For,
if God truly knows all things, as they will actually be (including the
future), then what room is there for secondary causes to meaningfully
contribute to real world states of affairs? Their actions seem
somehow predetermined by Gods foreknowledge of their reality.
Well, to avoid this conundrum, Molina introduces the doctrine of
Divine Middle Knowledge.
To the non-philosophical, serene mind, knowledge is
knowledge. There seems little more to be said about it. Certainly
there are different objects to be known, but the knowing process
seems to be standardized towards those objects. However, when
thinking about God, Molina (and others more susceptible to
philosophic ulcers) found it profitable to examine the idea of his
knowledge a little more closely. How exactly does God know things?
What characterizes his knowledge? In order to retain Gods
meticulous providence alongside of libertarian human freedom,
Molina suggested three separate moments to Gods knowledge. He
called these, Natural Knowledge (NK), Middle Knowledge (MK),
and Free Knowledge (FK). Its important to note that these are not
temporal categories in Gods knowledge. Its not as if he proceeds
from one type to the next in sequential, temporal order. Rather, these
are logical or conceptual moments for God.
Now, each of these moments in Gods knowledge provides
him with certain relative deliverances of knowledge. So, for example,
via NK, God knows all metaphysically necessary things. This includes
things such as mathematical truth, logical truths and, according to
Quentin Smith, perhaps even natural laws should be included in this
category.
13
Furthermore, Gods NK includes some less than obvious
contents; namely, contingent states of affairs (SOA). While this might
sound strange at first, it follows quite neatly from a consideration of
contingency and metaphysical modality. When a SOA is contingent,
it possesses a particular metaphysical modality: contingency. That
contingency is metaphysically necessary if the SOA is truly to be
considered contingent. So, if the SOA in question is metaphysically
contingent, then it is metaphysically necessary for that SOA to be
metaphysically contingent and knowledge of that SOA properly
resides in Gods NK.
Furthermore, Molina argues that metaphysical modality
pertains to the natures of things.
14
As Freddoso notes:

To know a things nature is, in technical terms, to comprehend
it, and to comprehend it is, as Molina puts it, to know all the
possible modes of the thing, that is, to know the exact range

13
Quentin Smith, The Metaphysical Necessity of Natural
Laws, Philosophica 67 (2001, 1), p. 31.
14
Freddoso, introduction to On Divine Foreknowledge, p. 12.
8
of its metaphysical possibilities. But this, it seems, is just to
know the metaphysical modality of each state of affairs that
involves it.
15


Interestingly, Gods NK then includes knowledge of the active and
passive causal powers that any creature posseses. For, to fully know
a things nature, is to fully know what its causal powers are, because
causal powers are found within a creatures nature. Therefore, given
his knowledge of all natures and the relevant spatio-temporal
arrangements of creatures, God then also knows which effects might
emanate from any such arrangement.
16
So, to say the least, the
deliverances of Gods NK are quite vast. However, though robust,
NK is lacking certain things necessary to preserve Gods meticulous
providence and libertarian human freedom. Lets turn now to
examination of Gods other types of knowledge for a more complete
picture.
Now, although Gods NK provides him with the panoply of
metaphysically necessary SOAs (including contingent varieties), it fails to
provide him with knowledge of what actually obtains in the real
world. This is where Gods FK steps up. Gods FK specifically
relates to the way the world actually is. This knowledge is post-volitional
which means that FK delivers knowledge of exactly what SOAs
actually do obtain given the world that God determines to bring
about. For example, the SOA that Dave Strobolakos is alive and
attends Talbot School of Theology is properly part of Gods FK.
There is no metaphysical necessity to my existence in the real world.
But, because of Gods choice to create a world in which it is the case
that I exist and attend Talbot School of Theology, then that
knowledge is properly part of his FK. Additionally, its important to
note that it is only by FK that God has knowledge of his own causal
contribution to the world.
17
Molina insists that the cognitive power
of one who [comprehends] and entity mustsurpass in perfection
by an infinite distance the entity in question.
18
Therefore, God
cannot comprehend his own nature and know the totality of what his
actions might be in any possible world, because he does not surpass
his own nature. So, knowledge of his personal causal contribution to
the created world must come post-volitionally.
Finally we arrive at the controversial notion of Gods Middle
Knowledge. As it might be assumed, Molina argues that MK falls
directly between Gods NK and his FK. This moment of Gods
knowledge captures all the SOAs that would obtain in any of the
infinite number of possible worlds that God could possibly create.

15
Ibid., p. 12.
16
Ibid., p. 24.
17
Ibid., p. 23.
18
Ibid., p. 52.
9
Similar to NK, this logical moment in Gods knowledge is pre-
volitional (meaning it comes before his decision to create), but unlike
NK it does not contain metaphysically necessary SOAs. Rather, it is
populated with contingent SOAs the nature of which lie outside of
Gods control (i.e. he has no causal power over what SOAs exist in
his MK). Similar to FK, the knowledge God has via MK is such that
the SOAs God knows in virtue of MK are merely possibilities they
are not necessary. Depending on what world God chooses to actualize,
certain SOAs known in Gods MK might never actually obtain in the
real world. . Therefore, what God knows through his middle
knowledge may vary from one possible world to another just as what
he knows through his free knowledge may vary from one possible
world to another.
19
However, unlike FK, which is limited to the way
the world actually is, MK seems to account for the infinite ways the
world could have been. To further understand how Molina thinks
about these contingent SOAs, it is important to understand a piece
of Molinas Aristotelian intellectual heritage.
As a medieval Aristotelian, Molina held to a particular causal
understanding of the created world. In his mind, God was the
paradigmatic indeterministic cause active in the universe, but other
secondary causes (human creatures) happily co-existed with him. As
secondary causes, human creatures were properly poised to freely
contribute to the causal history of the world. Obviously, for Molina,
all of this takes place under the providential care of a sovereign God,
but (as argued above) he was convinced that human creatures still
retained a level of indeterministic causal contribution that was
ordinate to their created position. Because of this causal power, the
SOAs that are actually able to obtain in the real world are dependent
upon the choices of free human creatures. For example:

1) If in world Q and situation S I freely choose A and not B
resulting in SOAs C, then, if God desires to actualize world
Q, God is limited to my choice of A.

But the converse also applies,

2) If in world Q
1
and situation S
1
I freely choose B and not A
resulting in SOAs C
1
, then, if God desires to actualize world
Q
1
, God is limited to my choice of B.

Again, this is not to say that secondary causes are competent on their
own to actualize these SOAs. Remember, Gods providential
concurrence is still necessary (see above). However, as these
propositions point out, human creatures are able to freely contribute
to the causal schema of the world as they so choose. These

19
Ibid., p. 47.
10
contingent SOAs that obtain from the actions of free secondary
causes are properly called: counterfactuals of creaturely freedom
(CCF).
As deliverances of MK, CCFs helpfully inform Gods
creative action. Because Gods MK is prevolitional, the CCFs he
knows via MK supplies him with certain parameters as he decides
what world to actualize. For example, via NK God knows Adams
nature. Because he fully comprehends Adam, he knows everything
that Adam might do in any given situation (i.e. possible worlds). Then,
God knows, via MK, all the possible worlds he might create that
include Adam. These possible worlds include an almost infinite
variety of SOAs. As God plays out those SOAs in his mind, he
knows how Adam will respond to each SOA and thus what events
would obtain in each possible world he could create containing
Adam. Remember, the way Adam freely responds to each SOA
actually limits the possible worlds God could potentially actualize
thus creating a smaller set of feasible worlds. Perhaps it was the case
that, given Adams free will, there was no possible world available to
God in which Adam didnt sin in the Garden of Eden. Therefore,
Adam excluded that possible world (in which he didnt sin) from the
scope of Gods creative act. This smaller set of worlds is called Gods
creation galaxy and it consists of only those worlds which God can
feasibly bring about. On the basis of his knowledge of these feasible
worlds, God then decides to actualize a specific world. Finally, by his
FK then he knows the details of what will happen in the feasible
world he actualized and he knows what his own causal contribution
will be to that world. Therefore, in virtue of this use of MK, Gods
absolute sovereignty and mans libertarian freedom are preserved and
we do not have to fear that Gods knowledge of future events
reintroduces the dreaded determinism.

ON THE GROUNDING OBJECTION
Prima facie this reconciliation of Divine providence and libertarian
human freedom via Gods MK seems satisfying. However, when
prodded, a troubling philosophical conundrum arises. Obviously,
Molina depends heavily upon the CCFs of Gods MK for his theory
to work. But what if the existence of these CCFs is not as neatly
established as first thought? Presumably, there are a number of these
CCFs existing in Gods MK that will never actualize in the real
world. So, in virtue of what are these CCFs true? What grounds their
truth? While it seems that statements about factual occurrences are
true in virtue of the actual events they report,
20
what makes
counterfactual statements about secondary causes true? William Lane

20
William Hasker, The (Non-) Existence of Molinist
Counterfactuals, in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate ed. by Ken Perszyk
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 26.
11
Craig captures the nature of this infamous Grounding Objection
well when he says:

[The Grounding Objection] is the claim that there are no true
counterfactuals concerning what creatures would freely do
under certain specified circumstancesthe propositions
expressed by such counterfactual sentences are said either to
have no truth value or to be uniformly false, since there is
nothing to make these counterfactuals true. Because they are
contrarytofact conditionals and are supposed to be true
logically prior to God's creative decree, there is no ground of
the truth of such counterfactual propositions. Thus, they
cannot be known by God.
21


Originally reintroduced to the contemporary discussion in the 1970s
by Robert Merrihew Adams in his essay Middle Knowledge and the
Problem of Evil,
22
this Grounding Objection (GO) has been advanced
by contemporary philosophers such as William Hasker. Even though
the current debate over the GO has come to a bit of equilibrium, it
seems prudent here to provide a plausible response to the grounding
objection for purposes of intellectual rigor.
To begin, its important to note that the GO is generally built
off of a correspondence theory of the relationship between truth and
reality.
23
On this theory, a proposition is true if and only if that
proposition properly corresponds to the entity (i.e. concrete object) it
is about. For example, the truth of the proposition, I am currently
wearing a green shirt, depends upon whether or not I am actually
wearing a green shirt. It is in virtue of the fact that I am currently
wearing a green shirt (i.e. a concrete object in the real world) that my
proposition is true. If I were wearing a red shirt at the time I made
my statement, my statement would be false. These entities (or
concrete objects) in virtue of which a proposition is true are called truth-
makers.
Now, its easy to misstep here and assume that these truth-
makers cause their correlative propositions to be true. However, that
is not the case. The state of affairs where I am wearing a green shirt
does not cause the statement, I am currently wearing a green shirt,
to be true. This is especially evident when considering negative
statements about reality. As Craig notes:

21
William Lane Craig, "Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers,
and the Grounding Objection." Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001): 337-52.
22
Robert Merrihew Adams, Middle Knowledge and the
Problem of Evil, American Philosophical Quarterly, 14 (1997), pp. 109-
117.
23
Craig, Midle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the
Grounding Objection.
12

That the relation between the truth-maker and truth-bearer
(i.e. proposition) is not causal is especially evident if we
require truth-makers for negative existential statements like
Baal does not existObviously, a fact like Baals non-
existence, which is sufficient for the truth that Baal does not
exist, is not a cause of anything.
24


The brute fact of Baals non-existence is an abstract entity. It has no
causal power. However, while not causing it, it does logically entail
the positive proposition: Baal does not exist. So, a better way of
understanding truth-makers is something like: An entity a makes a
proposition p true if and only if that a exists entails that p.
25
This
preserves the logically entailed nature of the relationship between
the two and removes any causal confusion.
Having sketched the idea of what a truth-maker is, one
version of the GO becomes a little clearer. Presumably, no truth-
makers exist in virtue of which CCFs are true. If this is the case, then at
best all CCFs have no truth-value or at worst they are all false. In
either case, they fail to fulfill the nature of a CCF as Molina proposed
(i.e. a true state of affairs that would be the case) and are therefore
unavailable for Gods pre-volitional use. If these CCFs fail, then
Molinas whole project is severely jeopardized. But does Molinas
theory of CCFs actually fail that quickly? I think not, for several
reasons.
First, its not entirely clear that you always need something in
virtue of which a statement is true. For example, one might find Alfred
Tarskis semantic theory of truth to be persuasive.
26
In that case, truth
is a semantic property of a sentence, not referential quality. Even
Craig notes the fact that, many truth-maker theorists themselves
deny reject the doctrine of truth-maker maximalism the doctrine
that every true statement has a truth-maker.
27
If it is possible that
some true statements do not have truth-makers, then it seems
completely plausible to me that CCFs could reasonably fit into this
category of true statements.
Second, even if we do require CCFs to have truth-makers, it
doesnt seem to me that Molinism is without resources. As previously
shown with the Baal example, some truth-makers are not concrete
objects, but rather abstract objects. Similarly, the nature or essence

24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Alfred Tarski, The Semantic Conception of
Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4:3 (1944), 341-
376.
27
Craig, Midle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the
Grounding Objection.
13
of each human being is considered to be an abstract object. If this is
the case, then it seems that Gods knowledge of every human
persons nature could itself be the grounds for true CCFs. If God
comprehensively knows the nature of a person, including their
possible causal contributions to the world, then of course he knows
the truth of how someone would act in any hypothetical situation.
This knowledge is a deliverance of his super-comprehension. So, the
ideas in Gods mind could serves as truth-makers for CCFs.
Or, if the previous solution plays a little too cavalier with
Gods knowledge of human essences, we might follow Freddoso and
claim that in order for propositions about thefuture to be true
now, it is not required that any agent now be causing them to be true.
Rather, it is sufficient that some agentwill cause the corresponding
present-tense propositions to be true.
28
So, for example, the claim
that, If I wake up tomorrow morning, then I would get out of bed,
is true in virtue of the fact that if I wake up tomorrow morning, then I
would get out of bed. For in the same way that there are tensed
facts about the past and future which now exist, even though the
objects and events they are about do not, so there are counterfactuals
which actually exist, even thought the objects and events they are
about do not.
29

As shown with these three responses, there are reasonable
Molinist rejoinders to the GO. So, while it needs to be addressed, it
does not prove to be an undercutting defeater of Molinism at large.
In fact, the proponent of the GO has a lot of work to do in order to
establish the claim that CCFs need truth-makers for viability and,
even if they do, theyll have to answer why ideas in Gods mind (i.e.
abstract objects) or tensed facts about the future arent sufficient.
Until that happens, the Molinist can rest assured that the doctrine of
Divine Middle Knowledge plausibly lives another day.

CONCLUSION
This paper has argued for the plausibility of a Molinist account of
Divine providence and libertarian human freedom. I began by setting
forward Molinas understanding of Gods providential actions of
preservation, governance, and general concurrence and argued that
his account is actually more robust than Baez credited him with. I
then examined several reasons for adhering to a version of libertarian
free will. Given general intuition, desire to retain moral culpability,
and biblical evidence, I determined that it is most plausible to believe
that libertarian free will is true in at least some situations. With these
two realities established, I then explored how they might coalesce.
Even though, prima facie, a robust account of both of these seems

28
Fredosso, introduction to On Divine Foreknowledge, p. 72.
29
Craig, Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the
Grounding Objection.
14
mutually exclusive, I determined that, via Gods Middle Knowledge,
they can in fact coexist. Finally, I defended Middle Knowledge
against the Grounding Objection by arguing that the Grounding
Objection fails to answer several possible Molinist rebuttals (i.e. no
need for truth-makers, abstract objects, and future tensed facts).
Having argued this way, I have concluded that Middle Knowledge is
in fact a plausible reconciliation of the difficult doctrines of Gods
providence and human freedom. It should, therefore, be considered a
viable option when thinking through these issues.



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