SEMINARI

E CONVEGNI
33
Universals in
Ancient Philosophy
edited by
Riccardo Chiaradonna
Gabriele Galluzzo
2013 Scuola Normale Superiore Pisa
isbn 978-88-7642-484-7
Table of contents
Introduction
Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzzo 1
Universals before Universals: Some Remarks on Plato
in His Context
Mauro Bonazzi 23
Platos Conception of the Forms: Some Remarks
Francesco Ademollo 41
Platos Five Worlds Hypothesis (Ti. 55cd),
Mathematics and Universals
Marwan Rashed 87
Plato and the One-over-Many Principle
David Sedley 113
Universals, Particulars and Aristotles Criticism of Platos Forms
Laura M. Castelli 139
Universals in Aristotles Logical Works
Mauro Mariani 185
Universals in Aristotles Metaphysics
Gabriele Galluzzo 209
Epicureans and Stoics on Universals
Ada Bronowski 255
Alexander, Boethus and the Other Peripatetics: The Theory of
Universals in the Aristotelian Commentators
Riccardo Chiaradonna 299

One of a Kind: Plotinus and Porphyry on Unique Instantiation
Peter Adamson 329

Universals, Education, and Philosophical Methodology
in Later Neoplatonism
Michael Griffin 353
Universals in Ancient Medicine
Riccardo Chiaradonna 381

Universals in the Greek Church Fathers
Johannes Zachhuber 425
Bibliography 471
Index locorum 509
Index of names 537
Introduction
I. Although the so-called problem of universals may certainly be
regarded as one of the most important and enduring in the whole
history of philosophy, there is still no consensus as to what exactly
the problem consists in and hence as to what form its solution should
take. It is sometimes maintained, for instance, that there is no such a
thing as the problem of universals: what we are used to calling the
problem of universals is actually a bundle of diferent and yet re-
lated issues, which are rather diferently articulated and analysed in
diferent historical contexts. Tis possibly mistaken impression stems
from the undeniable fact that the problem embraces a large number of
philosophical areas, ranging from metaphysics to semantics and epis-
temology. According to one infuential tradition, for instance, which
reached its peak in early modern philosophy but may be traced back
at least as far as Boethius and Porphyry, the question of universality
concerns the nature of our general concepts. Agreed, we all possess
general concepts, such as the concept of a human being or of a white
thing, concepts, in other words, that indiferently represent a plurality
of particular things. But do we also need to posit in reality univer-
sal entities corresponding to our general concepts? Or is universality
just the product of our conceptual apparatus, of our natural capac-
ity to generalize over a plurality of particular things? Realists tend to
take the frst line, while nominalists deny that any special entities are
needed to account for our cognition of particular things and insist
that generality is just the product of our conceptual apparatus. It is
certainly this epistemological debate that John Locke wished to close
out by famously remarking: General and universal are creatures of
the understanding, and belong not to the real existence of things []
ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many
particular things: but universality belongs not to things themselves
1
.
1
Locke, EHU, III.2.2.
2 Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzo
In the Middle Ages, when the problem of universals was prominent
in the philosophical agenda, the epistemological side of the issue be-
came inextricably linked with a series of subtle semantic questions.
Many medieval realists, for instance, frmly believed that language is
a safe road to reality. In order to make their point, they pointed to the
phenomenon of general reference. On their view, general terms, such
as human being or white, primarily signify the common natures
or universal properties that a certain class of particulars share, and
can only derivatively be made to stand for the particulars that possess
these natures and properties. Tus, it is language itself that shows the
existence of universal entities in reality. Medieval nominalists ferce-
ly reacted to this strategy by insisting that general terms always and
invariably signify particular things and so that the phenomenon of
general reference can be accounted for without positing any universal
entities in reality, just as the phenomenon of general representation
can be accounted for without positing special entities corresponding
to our general concepts
2
.
On a widespread view, however, the problem of universals is frst
of all an ontological and metaphysical issue, even though it may have
and in fact does have important connections with a series of crucial
epistemological and semantic issues. According to this perspective,
the problem of universals concerns how many categories of things we
should introduce in our ontology: are there only particular things in
the world? Or do we need to include in our ontology universal entities
as well, i.e. entities that are shared or shareable by many particulars?
Moreover, if universal entities exist, the question immediately arises
as to their metaphysical status: do they belong to the same, concrete
realm as particular things or are they rather abstract entities, that is
entities existing outside the spatiotemporal boundaries we all live in? It
is a distinctive feature of the contemporary debate on universals to put
emphasis on the ontological and metaphysical side of the question
3
.
Contemporary philosophers are not unaware of the far-reaching rami-
fcations of the controversy over universals. Arguments for the exis-
tence of universals that centre on semantics or cognition are popular
2
For the connection between semantic debates in the Middle Ages and the problem
of universals, see Klima 1993; Klima 1999.
3
For an introduction to the problem of universals in contemporary metaphysics,
see Armstrong 1978a; Armstrong 1989; Loux 2006a; Loux 2007. See also Oliver
1996.
3 Introduction
in contemporary philosophy, as are nominalist accounts that explain
the phenomena of general reference and general representation with-
out introducing universal entities in the ontology. It may be argued,
however, that, although epistemological and semantic considerations
may certainly play a crucial role in solving the problem of universals,
the problem itself remains, at the bottom, an ontological and meta-
physical issue. Te way language and cognition work may be taken as
evidence in favour of or against the existence of universal entities, but
what we are interested in is ultimately whether or not universals exist
and, if they do, what they are like.
It must be observed, for another thing, that language and cognition
are not the only areas that are appealed to in the solution of the prob-
lem of universals. Te ontological and metaphysical side of the prob-
lem, for instance, revolves around the issue of the so-called attribute
agreement. We commonly observe that things resemble each other in
many diferent ways and so agree in their attribute or properties: there
are many red things around, as well as many human beings and many
cows. Attribute agreement is an undeniable fact about the world. But
how to interpret it? Realists insist that the phenomenon of attribute
agreement is in need of an explanation and further maintain that such
an explanation can be provided only if we introduce universal entities
in our ontology. All red things are red, and all human beings are hu-
man beings, because there is something, the property redness and the
kind human being, respectively, that they literally have in common. Te
sense in which diferent particulars have some property in common or
belong to the same natural kind may difer depending on the form of
realism one chooses to endorse. All forms of realism, however, share a
common strategy. Te similarity among particular things is ultimately
grounded in some form of identity: things resemble each other and so
agree in their attributes because there is something they have in com-
mon. It is precisely this assumption that nominalists call into question.
For a nominalist, the phenomenon of attribute agreement calls for no
explanation. It is simply a fact about the world that things resemble
each other and there is not much more to say: similarity is primitive
and not grounded in some form of identity. In the case of nominalists
as well, philosophers may be at variance about how exactly the nomi-
nalist intuition should be feshed out. For some nominalists, there are
no universal properties simply because there are no properties, but
only particular objects. For others, by contrast, properties do exist, but
they are as particular as the objects of which they are the properties.
Both brands of nominalism, however, share the common view that the
4 Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzo
phenomenon of attribute agreement can be accounted for by having
recourse to a one-category ontology, in which only particulars exist.
Even though the multifaceted character of the problem of univer-
sals should not be underestimated, there is something to be said in
favour of the view that it is frst of all an ontological and metaphysical
issue, which has important consequences for our semantics and epis-
temology as well. At the end of the day, what distinguishes realists and
nominalists is that the former think there are more things in heaven
and earth than we usually dream of, while the latter are irresistibly at-
tracted by solitary and desert landscapes
4
.
II. Te present volume collects thirteen papers on the problem of
universals in ancient philosophy, from the Presocratics to Neopla-
tonism. Te volume has two main objectives. On the one hand, we
wish to highlight the contribution of ancient thought to the philo-
sophical problem of universals by reconstructing the diferent strate-
gies endorsed in Antiquity to deal with the problem, both in the real-
ist and in the nominalist camp. On the other hand, our objective is
to reconstruct the specifc conceptual and historical context in which
the debate over the nature of universals unfolded in Antiquity. To this
aim, we have aimed at some form of completeness by covering a large
chronological span and dealing with fgures and historical moments
that are not sufciently discussed in the contemporary literature on
the problem of universals in ancient philosophy.
Tat there was a debate about universals in Antiquity is testifed
by several Neoplatonic attempts to put some order in the debate and
sometimes to reconcile the diferent positions on the market. A rather
cursory remark by Porphyry in his Introduction to Aristotles logic
was destined to spark a debate that continued for over a thousand
years:
For example, about genera and species whether they subsist, whether they
actually depend on bare thoughts alone, whether if they actually subsist they
are bodies or incorporeal and whether they are separable or are in perceptible
items and subsist about them these matters I shall decline to discuss, such
a subject being very deep and demanding another and a larger investigation
(trans. Barnes 2003).
4
See Goodman, Quine 1947 for this general intuition.
5 Introduction
Rather surprisingly from our point of view, Porphyry declines to
deal with the problem of universals on the grounds that it is somehow
very deep. In his chapter, however, Michael Grifn explains why
Porphyry and other Neoplatonists following him (especially Iambli-
chus and Simplicius) regarded the problem as too deep and techni-
cally sophisticated for beginners. More particularly, Porphyry and
his followers postponement of the problem of universals is rooted
in a group of pedagogical and psychological doctrines that illuminate
the Neoplatonist position on the role of universals in knowledge ac-
quisition. Central in this context is the idea that ordinary language is
tailored for sensible things and hence lacks the resources to refer to
intelligible natures, which are the true referents of specifc and ge-
neric terms. Such intelligible natures will not be discovered through
the study of Aristotles Categories and so it would be of no use for
Neoplatonist philosophers to tackle the issue of the metaphysical sta-
tus of universals when providing an introduction to Aristotles most
celebrated writing.
Traditionally, Porphyrys remark on universals has been studied in
relation to its importance for the medieval discussion of universals.
Medieval commentaries on Porphyrys Introduction (which was made
available to the Latin world thanks to Boethiuss neat translation) brim
with extensive treatments of the metaphysical status of universals. It
should not escape our notice, however, that Porphyrys brief remark
also provides an interesting picture of the ancient debate. Porphyry in
fact seems to single out at least three diferent positions on universals:
a nominalist or conceptualist position, according to which species and
genera consist in our thoughts alone; a moderately realist position, ac-
cording to which species and genera do exist extra-mentally, but only
in their particular instances; a theory of transcendent universals, con-
ceived of as separate from their instances. If the identifcation of the
second and third views with, respectively, Aristotles and Platos po-
sitions is sufciently uncontroversial, Ada Bronowskis contribution
to this volume shows that Stoics and, possibly, Epicureans might be
the philosophers lying behind the frst of the positions singled out by
Porphyry.
An analogous threefold classifcation somehow emerges if we look
at a rather interesting piece of Neoplatonist doctrine, namely the so-
called doctrine of the three states of a universal. According to this
doctrine, which fnds a standard formulation in Ammonius, there
are diferent kinds of universal: the universal before the thing (ante
rem), the universal in the thing (in re), and the universal afer the thing
6 Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzo
(post rem)
5
. Universals before the thing are transcendent universals
and hence roughly correspond to Platonist Forms; universals in the
thing are Aristotle-style immanent universals; fnally, universals afer
the thing are concepts obtained through abstraction or otherwise from
particulars and hence meet the demands of more defationary views.
Clearly, Neoplatonists did not think that the three kinds of universal
were on a par. Transcendent universals, for instance, may be taken to
be the causes of immanent universals, which may in turn be thought
of as the ground for mental concepts. Alternatively, one could insist
that transcendent universals are the causes of both immanent univer-
sals and concepts. Be that as it may, it is signifcant that the doctrine
of the three states of a universal originated in the Porphyrian milieu,
which was particularly sensitive to the harmonizing of the philosophi-
cal tenets of the various ancient Schools (with particular reference to
Plato and Aristotle). It is not surprising, therefore, that the doctrine
comfortably accommodates the diferent tendencies about universals
that emerge from Antiquity. It is no chance, fnally, that no trace of
such a doctrine can be found in Plotinus, who shows no inclination for
the harmonizing tendency so typical of Porphyry and his followers. As
Peter Adamson shows, however, Plotinus unease runs very deep and
concerns the very notions of universal and particular. For Plotinus,
universality and particularity can be found in both the sensible and
the intelligible world. As a result, the opposition between particular
and universal turns out to be inadequate to characterize the relation
between the sensible and the intelligible world. Tis original view puts
Plotinus in strong opposition to the Platonism of his time as well as to
the subsequent history of Platonism with regard to universals.
III. According to a well-established classifcation, contemporary re-
alists about universals are divided between Aristotelians and Platon-
ists
6
. As Porphyrys remarks already show, the source of disagreement
between these two brands of realism is intuitively clear enough. Both
schools maintain that universals exist, but while Aristotelians believe
that universals exist in some sense in their instances, Platonists contend
that they exist separate from their instances. Tere are many diferent
5
Ammon., In Isag., 41, 10-42, 26 and 68, 25-69, 2 Busse.
6
For the standard Aristotelian position see Armstrong 1978b. For Platonism see
Russell 1912 and the more recent defence in van Inwagen 2004. See also Arm-
strong 1978a, pp. 64-77; Hoffman, Rosenkrantz 2005.
7 Introduction
ways, however, in which this general intuition may be feshed out. One
common idea is that Aristotelian universals are concrete, while Platon-
ist universals are abstract. As is ofen observed, it may be difcult to
draw a clear contrast along the lines of the concrete-abstract distinc-
tion, since the terms abstract and concrete have been understood
in so many diferent ways in the history of philosophy
7
. But certainly
many contemporary philosophers believe that concrete entities exist
in space and time, while abstract entities exist neither in space nor in
time. Tis general idea can be given some more content if we turn to
the relationships of dependence obtaining between universals and their
particular instances. According to Aristotelians, universals depend for
their existence on the existence of their particular instances: the uni-
versal redness, for instance, exist only if there are particular red things.
Aristotelians, in other words, accept the so-called Principle of Instan-
tiation: there are no uninstantiated universals. On this view, it seems
fairly reasonable to conclude that universals exist in space and time be-
cause they exist wherever and whenever their instances, which are spa-
tiotemporal entities, do. For Platonists, by contrast, universals do not
depend for their existence on the existence of their particular instanc-
es: the universal redness exists whether or not there are particular red
things around. Platonists, in other words, reject the Principle of Instan-
tiation: there can be, and there actually are, uninstantiated universals
8
.
On this conception, universals are better thought of as existing, at least
primarily, outside space and time. For some universals, i.e. uninstanti-
ated universals, clearly do not exist in space and time, since they do not
have any spatiotemporal instances. But if some universals exist outside
space and time, there seem to be good reasons to think that all do, and
hence also instantiated universals exist outside space and time. Indeed,
for Platonists the relation of instantiation should not be cashed out in
terms of parts or constituents: there is no sense in which universals
that are instantiated are parts or constituents of their instances; there
is no sense, in other words, in which the redness of red things is a part
or a constituent of them or even exists in them. For Platonists, par-
ticular things acquire their properties and characteristics by entering
into some special relation, by somehow participating in, entities en-
tirely distinct from them and belonging to an entirely diferent realm.
7
See Lewis D. 1986, pp. 81-6. See also Szab 2005.
8
On the Principle of Instantiation see Armstrong 1989, pp. 75-82; Loux 2007,
pp. 609-15.
8 Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzo
Tere are two other sources of disagreement between contemporary
Aristotelians and Platonists that are worth mentioning in this context.
Both concern in some sense the question of how many universals there
are. Platonists tend to read of universals from descriptive language. Of
course, not all meaningful predicates introduce universals, and Platon-
ists may be willing to put some restrictions on the number of univer-
sals that there are. But in general they are inclined to think that non-
synonymous predicates introduce distinct universals. Aristotelians, by
contrast, tend to posit as many universals as are required to account
for the characteristics of particular sensible objects. Tus, they tend to
eliminate all universals that make no contribution towards explaining
the sensible objects fundamental traits and typical behaviour, even in
cases in which we do have general terms corresponding to such puta-
tive universals. As a result, Platonist theories of universals tend to be
more abundant, while Aristotelian ones are generally more parsimoni-
ous or economical concerning the number of universals that there are.
On another matter, at least some Aristotelians distinguish between
two diferent categories of universals, which may be called, in homage
to a millenarian tradition, substantial and accidental universals
9
. We
should distinguish, in other words, between universals that tell us what
things are, i.e. that express the essence or nature of particular things,
and universals that tells us only how things are, i.e. that express the
inessential properties of particular things. Te former universals are
ofen called kinds, while the latter are ofen described as proper-
ties in the strict sense of the term. Although there is nothing in Pla-
tonism as such that prevents one from drawing a distinction between
kinds and properties, Platonists have historically been less inclined to
do so. One reason might be the following. If particular things acquire
their characteristics by participating in some sort of abstract entities,
then there is a sense in which all the features of particular things are
possessed by them derivatively and contingently, and so the essential-
accidental distinction loses part of its meaning.
Te group of papers dealing with Plato and Aristotle touch upon
many of the issues that are at the centre of the debate between Platon-
ists and Aristotelians. Laura Castellis chapter deals with a somewhat
preliminary issue. Te way contemporary philosophers standardly
frame the contrast between Aristotelian and Platonic realism essen-
9
For an Aristotelian who accepts only properties and does away with kinds, see
Armstrong 1997.
9 Introduction
tially derives from Aristotles account, in the Metaphysics, of the difer-
ence between Platos conception of universals and his own. It is Aristo-
tle who claims, in a critical vein, that Plato conceived Forms as univer-
sals, but made universals separate from their particular instances. In
the same critical vein, Aristotle sometimes attributes to Forms a some-
what ambiguous metaphysical status, presenting them as both univer-
sals and particulars. Castelli reviews the complex issue of Aristotles
reconstruction and critique of Platos doctrine of Forms. Instead of
solving the problem in terms of the correctness or incorrectness of Ar-
istotles report, she tries to lead the controversy between Aristotle and
Plato back to their fundamental disagreement about what it means for
something to be one, as well as to their radically diferent conceptions
of the notions involved in the dispute, such as universality and par-
ticularity. In doing so, she also touches upon the question of whether
the separation of Forms from particulars can or cannot be understood
in terms of the Principle of Instantiation, i.e. in terms of the existen-
tial independence of Forms from their sensible instances. Francesco
Ademollos paper is entirely devoted to a textual and philosophical re-
construction of Platos theory of Forms. For one thing, he argues that
Platos Forms are universals and so explains away those passages in
the Dialogues that have led some scholars to conclude that Forms are
(or are also) perfect particulars. One line of argument to this efect is
particularly worth mentioning in this context. Tere is a typical claim
of Platos that seems to commit him to a paradoxical endorsement of
the Principle of Instantiation
10
. On the face of it, Plato maintains that
Forms are self-predicated: the Form of large, for instance, is large and
the Form of animal is animal. Now, if this claim is taken in the sense
that Forms are instances of themselves (e.g. the Form of large is a large
thing and the Form of animal is an animal), then for Plato there are
actually no uninstantiated universals simply because there is always
at least one instance of the relevant universal, i.e. the Form itself. Ad-
emollo argues against the view that Forms are instances of themselves
and contends that there are good reasons to think that self-predication
does not imply that predicates apply to Forms and to their instances
in the same sense. Furthermore, the paper deals with the issue of the
metaphysical status of Forms as universals, i.e. with the problem as to
what kind of universals they are. Ademollo lends further support to
the view that Platonist universals are in fact non-spatiotemporal enti-
10
See on this Loux 2007, p. 613 f.
10 Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzo
ties. He qualifes, by contrast, the sense in which Plato rejects the Prin-
ciple of Instantiation. Platos opinion is not that there are uninstanti-
ated universals but rather that there can be such universals both in
the sense that Forms existed uninstantiated before the creation of the
world and in sense that they are only contingently instantiated and so
could exist without having any actual instance.
As said, contemporary Platonists ofen go for an abundant theory of
universals. Tis is due to their endorsement of a language-based ver-
sion of the so called one-over-many principle: there is a universal cor-
responding to every, or at least to a high number of, non-synonymous
predicates. In his chapter, David Sedley calls into question the wide-
spread assumption that Plato subscribed to the claim that there is a
form corresponding to every general term. Sedley does not deny that
Forms are universals, i.e. entities capable of being multiply instantiated,
but challenges the view that Forms were postulated as the ontological
characterization of general terms or predicates. For one thing, the texts
that have traditionally been taken as evidence of Platos endorsement of
the one-over-many principle should be construed as making the more
familiar and less uncontroversial assumption that there is one and only
one Form for every plurality of things for which we have reasons to
postulate a Form. For another thing, the Plato of the middle dialogues
does not endorse an unrestricted version of the theory of Forms: there
are pluralities to which no Forms correspond. In particular, there seem
to be no Forms of natural kinds. On the basis of some passages from
Republic V and X, Sedley argues that, in the canonical version of the
theory of Forms, Plato seems to introduce Forms only for pairs of op-
posite properties and for artefacts. It is only in the later dialogues that
Plato broadens the range of Forms and hence comes close to endorsing
the one-over-many principle. But in these contexts, Sedley argues, it is
less clear that Plato is still talking about Forms conceived of as tran-
scendent entities that are ontologically prior to their sensible instances.
Another common assumption of the contemporary debate about
universals is that Aristotle was a realist about universals. Tis view,
however, has been questioned both in Antiquity (see Riccardo Chi-
aradonnas chapter on ancient commentators) and in contemporary
scholarship. Mauro Mariani and Gabriele Galluzzo try to give further
strength to the realist interpretation of Aristotle by analysing in some
detail Aristotles views on universals in the Organon and the Meta-
physics. More particularly, Mariani rejects the irrealist understandings
of Aristotles theory of predication in the Organon. According to one
view, for instance, Aristotles talk of universals should be understood
11 Introduction
without committing ourselves to entities other than the particulars of
which universals are predicated. Against this view, Mariani argues that
Aristotelian universals are distinct in terms of being and unity from
the particulars of which they are predicated. On another view, the uni-
versals of which Aristotle speaks in the Organon should be taken not as
extra-mental entities, but rather as concepts, i.e. conceptual contents.
Tis interpretation, however, fnds no support in Aristotles texts. In so
far as the Metaphysics is concerned, Galluzzo denies that Aristotelian
forms should be construed as particulars, and gathers arguments in
favour of the view that they are rather common or universal entities
which are identical in all the things they exist in and are made particu-
lar by the diferent chunks of matter they happen to be combined with.
Jointly, however, the two papers also show that Aristotles realism
is much more complex than it is ofen thought to be and undergoes
considerable transformation from the Organon to the Metaphysics. As
Mariani shows, for instance, one difculty in providing a unifed ac-
count of Aristotles theory of universals in the Organon is that along-
side substantial universals Aristotle introduces accidental universals,
i.e. universals belonging to categories other than substance. Now, acci-
dental universals complicate the picture because, even though at times
Aristotle expresses himself as if accidental universals were instantiated
by pluralities of individual substances, he also seems to believe that
they are at the same time instantiated by particular and unrepeatable
property instances, something analogous to the contemporary notion
of a trope. In the Metaphysics, by contrast, accidental universals seem
to leave the scene and Aristotles interest chiefy, if not exclusively,
focuses on substantial universals. Te Organon and the Metaphysics
difer, however, in a more radical sense. While the Organon displays
a logical approach to universals, according to which universals are the
ontological counterparts of the predicates that can truly be applied to
sensible objects, the Metaphysics tends to take a more physical and
biological approach, according to which the entities that are universal
are rather constituents or principles of sensible objects
11
. As a result, in
the Metaphysics Aristotle comes to endorse the radical view that some
of the entities that he regarded as universals in the logical works, i.e.
species and genera, either do not exist at all or are radically derivative
entities. In the new picture, the only universals that are admissible are
the forms of particular sensible objects.
11
For a contemporary revival of Aristotles constituent approach, see Loux 2006b.
12 Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzo
IV. Just like realism, nominalism too comes in diferent forms
12
. As
we have seen, all forms of nominalism share the common assump-
tion that there are no universal entities and hence that all things are
particular. Nominalists also share a common strategy against real-
ists. Universals, realists maintain, need to be postulated to explain a
vast range of metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic phenom-
ena. Tings agree in their attributes because there are properties that
they all instantiate. Predicates apply to a plurality of things because all
members of the plurality will instantiate the properties corresponding
to the given predicates. Finally, things will fall under the same concept
because they all instantiate the properties which that concept repre-
sents. Te nominalists challenge is to show that we do not need to
postulate universals to explain these phenomena and so that particu-
lars can play the theoretical roles that universals are commonly taken
to play. And nominalists insist ontological economy tells us that we
should not postulate entities that are unnecessary and, consequently,
that we should do away with universals altogether. Attribute agree-
ment, for instance, can be explained without postulating that similar
things instantiate the same property. Likewise, general reference and
conceptual representation can be accounted for without introducing
universal entities in the world, for instance by providing a good theory
of conceptual and semantic generalization.
Teir common strategy aside, nominalists are at variance about how
exactly nominalism should be construed. One important pole of con-
troversy is worth mentioning in this context. A particularly austere
form of nominalism maintains that there are no properties, but only
particular objects
13
. It is certainly true that concepts represent and pred-
icates apply to pluralities of objects: many things fall under the concept
red and as many are rightly associated with the predicate red. Tis,
however, obtains not in virtue of some properties, be they universal or
particular, that objects possess, but rather in virtue of features of our
conceptual and linguistic apparatus. Admittedly, to explain how con-
cepts represent things and how predicates apply to them may turn out
to be a rather difcult task. Tis task, however, has nothing to do with
ontology, but rather with epistemology and semantics: once concept-
formation and predicate-application are clarifed, the problem of uni-
versals is simply dissolved. Other, less radical nominalists maintain, by
12
For a survey see Armstrong 1978a, pp. 11-57; Loux 2006a, pp. 46-83.
13
See Quine 1948.
13 Introduction
contrast, that there are properties, but also insist that they are as par-
ticular as the objects of which they are the properties: thus the red of a
particular pen is itself particular and numerically distinct from the red
of all the other objects in that it is the red of one particular object and
not of another. Tus, there are no universal entities, but things are pro-
vided with an array of unrepeatable and unsharable property instanc-
es, which are ofen labelled by contemporary philosophers tropes
14
.
It may be useful to see how the two varieties of nominalism difer in
terms of metaphysical explanation. Take the phenomenon of attribute
agreement: why are all red things red? Generally, nominalists appeal to
resemblance or similarity: it is simply a fact about the world a primi-
tive fact that cannot further be explained that things resemble each
other and so can be grouped together in accordance with their resem-
blance relationships. It is important to realize, however, that diferent
things enter into resemblance relationships depending on the form of
nominalism one chooses to endorse. For austere nominalists, it is the
objects themselves that resemble each other. Te world is populated by
collections (or classes, if one believes in them) of similar objects. Te
property red, therefore, either does not exist at all or is just a collection
of similar things. For trope-theorists, by contrast, resemblance rela-
tions obtain, strictly speaking and primarily, among tropes, i.e. among
particular properties. Tus, on this view, the property red is a collec-
tion of similar tropes, i.e. a collection of all the tropes of red. Certainly,
objects too are similar in virtue of possessing similar tropes, but it is
primarily among tropes that the similarity relationship obtains.
What is ancient nominalism like? Generally speaking, the view that
there are simply no properties is not a particularly appealing one for
many ancient philosophers. But there are some interesting excep-
tions or partial exceptions. Mauro Bonazzi, for instance, presents an
extreme form of nominalism, which can be aptly labelled particular-
ism and is characteristic of the Sophists. Although the Sophists do
not represent a sufciently homogeneous movement and difer from
one another on a number of crucial issues, they all seem to share a cer-
tain view about reality: the world in itself is a cluster of unconnected
and ever-changing particulars and so there is no structure of reality
or intrinsic unity independently of the perceiving subject. Protagoras
seems to have interpreted this general assumption in a rather relativ-
14
For the notion of a trope see the classical Williams 1953. See also Campbell
1990; Simons 1994.
14 Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzo
istic way. Since reality is never objective or absolute, but is always the
result of the interaction between objects and individual subjects, each
individual subject ends up inhabiting a world of her own, distinct in
principle from that of all the other perceiving subjects. Similar claims
were defended by Gorgias: reality is just an unconnected multiplicity
of particulars, beref of any intrinsic unity or structure; it is only lan-
guage that imposes unity and structure on reality. Trough language,
in other words, we try to carve reality at its joints, but the carving is
not the result of some structural isomorphism between predicates and
reality. On this perspective, language has no descriptive function, but
rather serves pragmatic purposes in orienting and facilitating the in-
dividual and social life of human beings. Bonazzis reconstruction also
has interesting consequences from a historical point of view: rather
than a development of Socrates thoughts about universals, Platos
theory of Forms would thus be a conscious response to the views held
by the Sophists.
Another interesting example is best understood if we make use,
once again, of Aristotles distinction between substantial universals
(or kinds) and accidental universals (or properties in the strict sense).
Chiaradonna reconstructs the debate between two Aristotelian com-
mentators, Boethus of Sidon and Alexander of Aphrodisias, on the
status of substantial universals, i.e. species and genera. For Alexander,
cospecifc and cogeneric particulars are grouped together on the basis
of a common essence, that is an immanent universal that is common
to all individuals of the same species or genus. Boethus, by contrast,
denies that there are any common essences or natures, and maintains
that species and genera are just collections of individuals. It is Boethus
view that is of interest to us. From what we know, it is unlikely that
Boethus extended his irrealist position to accidental properties as well.
Tus, Socrates particular paleness or particular height should be as
real as Socrates himself. But certainly Boethus believed that there are
no natural kinds in reality and provided an extensional and reductive
account of kinds in terms of collections of particulars. Presumably,
Boethus collections are nothing over above their members and so can
hardly be understood as classes in the modern sense. What matters,
however, is that on Boethus view the fact that a certain group of par-
ticulars belong to a natural kind is grounded on primitive facts of simi-
larity among the particulars in the group and not on some universals
the particulars in question somehow share.
Unlike austere nominalists, many ancient philosophers believe that
there are particular properties and it is on the basis of particular prop-
15 Introduction
erties that they account for general concepts and terms. Does this im-
ply that a good number of ancient nominalists were trope-theorists
ante litteram? Not quite. In order to clarify matters it may be useful
to distinguish between the belief in trope-like entities such as particu-
lar properties and the endorsement of a full-fedged trope-theory. Te
reason for the distinction is that most, albeit not all, trope-theorists
combine a nominalist stance on the traditional problem of univer-
sals with a certain view about the metaphysical structure of material
objects, according to which these are nothing but bundles of tropes.
Tus, for many trope-theorists, particular properties hang together
without inhering in any particular substance or even any material
substratum. Now, this view on the structure of material objects is not
popular among ancient philosophers who believe in particular prop-
erties. Aristotle, for instance, is a good example of the distinction we
are trying to make. According to the traditional interpretation (see
Marianis paper), Aristotle admits, at least in the Categories, particu-
lar and unsharable property instances: Socrates paleness is peculiar
to Socrates and is numerically distinct from, say, Platos. But Aristotle
hardly counts as a trope-theorist. For one thing, he also accepts uni-
versal properties alongside property instances: so there is a universal
paleness of which both the particular paleness of Socrates and the par-
ticular paleness of Plato are instances. For another, property instances
for Aristotle clearly need a substratum to inhere in; what is more, they
need an independently identifable substance to inhere in.
Tis being said, the bundle theory is not uninstantiated, as it were,
in ancient thought. Bronowskis contribution shows that Epicurus, be-
sides endorsing a nominalist position on the problem of universals, al-
so provided an account of the structure of material objects that closely
resembles a bundle theory. Indeed, Epicurus advances two distinct yet
compatible accounts of material objects, a physical account in terms
of material constitution and a metaphysical account in terms of par-
ticular properties. On the physical account, objects, i.e. bodies, are just
aggregates of atoms or aggregates of aggregates of atoms. Te physical
perspective, however, does not tell the whole story. For a material ob-
ject can also be regarded, from a metaphysical perspective, as a whole
made up of its properties or at least of all properties that accompany a
particular object as long as it exists. Epicurus insistence that proper-
ties do not need a substratum to hold together, as well as his use of
mereological terminology (whole) to characterize bodies in general
make his intuition very close to the claim that material objects are bun-
dles of their particular properties.
16 Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzo
As said, Epicurus took a nominalist position on the problem of
universals, which is best understood as a variety of conceptualism or
concept nominalism. Conceptualism seems to have been the favourite
view among ancient nominalists. For the Stoics too defend a form of
conceptualism about universals. On this view, everything in the world
is particular and generality is just a product of our conceptual appa-
ratus, i.e. of the capacity of our mind to generalize over a plurality of
particular objects or property instances. Epicurus, for example, pro-
vides us with a detailed and naturalistic account of how our percep-
tions of particular objects progressively give rise to general concepts.
Tere is a crucial diference, however, between the Epicurean and the
Stoic forms of conceptualism, which Bronoswki illustrates in her con-
tribution. Epicurus does not distinguish between the concept taken as
a mental act and a property of the (material) mind and the concept in
the sense of the content of a mental act. Te distinction, by contrast,
is explicitly introduced by the Stoics, who identifed universals with
the contents of mental acts. Te motivation behind the distinction is
that for the Stoics mental acts are as real as any other corporeal en-
tity: since concepts are modifcations of the mind, which is corporeal,
they must be corporeal just like all other individual properties. Te
contents of mental acts, by contrast, are radically mind-dependent
entities, products of the mind devoid of any signifcant ontological
status. Te Stoics did not go as far as to say that conceptual contents
are absolutely nothing. Afer all, we have a plurality of conceptu-
al contents and there is no plurality of things that are nothing. But
their characterization of conceptual contents as non-somethings is
intended to mark their status as radically dependent and derivative
entities. Interestingly, as Adamson shows, a mild form of conceptual-
ism looked attractive to some Neoplatonists as well, at least in so far as
the sensible world is concerned. Porphyry, for instance, seems to have
firted with the view that, since true natures are intelligible natures
and hence sensible objects possess no natures of their own, there is no
need to posit Aristotle-style immanent universals. Te characteristics
of sensible objects can be explained by having exclusive recourse to
the relationship between material substrata and intelligible natures.
Why not conclude, therefore, that in the sensible world universals are
just concepts in the mind?
V. Traditional disputes about the status of universals are not the only
areas where the question of generality is crucial for the development
of ancient thought. It is one of the objectives of the present volume to
17 Introduction
show that the signifcance of the problem of universals extends much
beyond the boundaries of standard ontological controversies.
We have seen that Platonist universals are usually thought of as ab-
stract entities and that we have good reasons to believe that this was
actually the view held by the historical Plato. Tere is however another
sense in which Platonism is involved with abstract entities. Contem-
porary philosophers ofen use the expression abstract entities to re-
fer to a broad class of things which are usually taken to exist outside
space and time, if they indeed do exist: numbers, geometrical entities,
sets and propositions are standard examples of things belonging to the
class of abstract entities. Te issue of abstract entities is so prominent
in contemporary metaphysics that one infuential tradition (wrongly)
equates the problem of universals and the issue of abstract entities
15
. In
his paper, Marwan Rashed provides a detailed analysis of Platos math-
ematical ontology in the Timaeus. He shows that Plato actually intro-
duced mathematical and geometrical entities as intermediate between
sensible objects and Forms a view Aristotle repeatedly credits Plato
with. What is more, Plato posited diferent classes of intermediate and
hierarchically ordered entities, from the objects of pure arithmetic
(mathematical ratios) to those of stereometry (mathematical solids).
On Rasheds view, the metaphysical function of intermediate objects is
that of solving a crucial problem lef open by Platos Parmenides: how
can Forms, which are unique and undivided, be participated in by a
plurality of particular objects, which are many and divided one from
another? Mathematical entities solve the problem of participation in
that they share in the nature of both Forms and sensible objects and
so literally mediate between them: like Forms, mathematical entities
are intelligible, eternal and stable; like sensible objects, they are non-
unique and multiplied. On this view, therefore, participation consists
in some sort of mathematical and geometrical ordering of the sensi-
ble world. Platos solution is made easier by his late view that Forms
themselves should be conceived as numbers, i.e. ideal Numbers that,
unlike mathematical entities, are unique and unmultiplied. Tus, in
being mathematically ordered the sensible world actually becomes just
like the Forms.
Peter Adamson and Riccardo Chiaradonna show how considerations
about the relationship between universals and particulars play a cru-
cial role in two areas that seem, at a frst glance, rather unrelated to the
15
See the entry Class vs. Property in Quine 1987.
18 Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzo
problem of universals, i.e. metaphysical cosmology and medicine. Ad-
amson takes up a particularly difcult problem for ancient metaphys-
ics, i.e. unique instantiations: cases, in other words, in which a univer-
sal has only one instance. Te trouble with unique instantiation is that
universals are ofen postulated to explain how it is possible for many
things to agree in their fundamental attributes. Tis general principle
may make it look otiose or useless to postulate universals in the case of
particulars that are literally one of a kind. Te problem is made even
more acute by the fact that, for ancient philosophers, the only genuine
examples of unique instantiations the sun, the moon, the heavenly
bodies in general, and the universe as a whole are things that are
necessarily unique: for ancient philosophers, in other words, it is im-
possible, both physically and metaphysically, that there be more than
one sun or moon etc. Adamson highlights two diferent approaches to
unique instantiation. Aristotle and Alexander take multiple instantia-
tion to be the normative case and hence are mainly concerned with
preserving the distinction between universal and particular even in the
case of unique instances. Aristotle, for example, argues that a defni-
tion is always in principle applicable to a plurality of objects, even if it
should be applied in fact to just one. Tus, we can distinguish between
the kind sun, which is captured by the defnition, and the individual
sun, which is the unique instance of the kind sun. Plotinus and Por-
phyry, by contrast, somehow reverse the picture and go out of their
way to prove that it is unique instantiation that represents the norma-
tive case. Tey both argue, on diferent grounds and with diferent nu-
ances, that, since heavenly bodies as well as the universe that contains
them are divine particulars and thus the best possible sensible objects,
there is no need for their species to be multiplied into a plurality of in-
stances. On this view, therefore, the multiple instantiation that is char-
acteristic of the species of sublunary objects is a mark of imperfection:
ideally, universals should not be instantiated more than once.
Ancient medicine is another battlefeld where the question of gen-
erality becomes pivotal. Te theoretical problem with understanding
the status of medicine can be phrased in the following terms. Medical
practice deals with individuals: it is individual patients that a doctor
tries to heal. But is there any knowledge of individuals? And if not,
i.e. if knowledge is always of universals and kinds, what is the use of
medical knowledge in medical practice? Famously, Aristotle maintains
that individuals as such are unknowable: we always know the kinds to
which individuals belong and not individuals as such. Medical knowl-
edge too, therefore, is about general and universal features and not
19 Introduction
about individuals: at best, a doctor will be able to know certain kinds of
disease and certain kinds of bodily constitution, and to provide reme-
dies on the basis of the regular connection between them. Admittedly,
Aristotle also believes that experience and medical practice can help
doctors to apply universal knowledge to individual cases. Te fact re-
mains, however, that Aristotles view threatens to split medicine into
a body of knowledge devoid of applicability and a medical practice
without any theoretical status. Against the background of Aristotles
position, Chiaradonna reconstructs the Hellenistic and post-Hellen-
istic debate over the status of medicine. Tere are basically three solu-
tions to Aristotles dilemma: (i) to marginalize the role of experience
at the expenses of medical theorizing and conjecturing (the Rational-
ist School); (ii) to abandon all talk of hidden causes and general con-
nections in favour of an entirely experiential approach (the Empiricist
School); (iii) to break the traditional connection between knowledge
and universality and argue that individuals are knowable, afer all
(Galen). Position (iii), i.e. Galens position, is particularly noteworthy
from a theoretical point of view. Galen holds that, through the use of
the method of division and defnition, a doctor could at least in prin-
ciple know the individual nature of the patient and put such a knowl-
edge to full use in her medical practice. Galen, therefore, bridges the
gap between medical knowledge and medical practice by insisting that,
at least in ideal conditions, medical practice should be guided by the
knowledge of individual features and not only of universal ones. For
another thing, Galens talk of individual natures as well as his assimi-
lation of an individuals properties to specifc diferentiae prefgure a
quasi-Leibnizian view of individuals, according to which concepts are
able, at least in principle, to grasp not only the kind an individual be-
longs to, but also the individual as such.
As Joahnnes Zachhubers chapter plainly shows, the problem of uni-
versals plays a major role in the theological thinking of the Church
Fathers. Even though Church Fathers did not intend to expressly deal
with the problem of universals, various accounts of the relationship
between universals and particulars were advanced in an attempt to
defend and elucidate both Trinitarian and Christological issues. Za-
chhuber presents an unprecedented survey of the Christian Fathers
views on universals, from the beginnings of Christian theology to John
of Damascus (eighth century). One particular incident in Zachubers
narrative is particularly worth recalling in this context. In his attempt
to explain and defend the consubstantiality between the Father and
the Son established in the Nicene Creed (325 CE), Gregory of Nyssa
20 Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzo
elaborated a robustly realist theory of universals, which progressively
became the standard view among Church Fathers. According to this
theory, the nature corresponding to a certain species is numerically
one in all the individuals of the species: all human beings for instance
share literally one human nature and are distinct from one another on
account of accidental properties that fall outside their common nature.
Moreover, although it is true that a nature needs individuals to exist, it
remains undivided in the individuals. Te result is that individuals are
not particular substances in addition to their common nature, since
the latter expresses their whole substance. Tis model can easily be ap-
plied to the case of the Trinity. Te divine nature is literally one in all
the three persons or hypostases, which are distinct on the basis of their
personal properties. Moreover, although the divine nature only exists
in the hypostases, it remains undivided with the result that the Fa-
ther, the Son and the Holy Spirit are just one God and not three Gods,
since the divine nature expresses the whole substance of the individual
hypostases. Zachhuber shows how this standard view on universals,
which was devised to account for the issue of consubstantiality, proved
to be less adequate to explain the Chalcedonian dogma (451 CE) ac-
cording to which in Christ there are two natures in one hypostasis. As
the opponents of the Chalcedonian dogma immediately pointed out,
the standard doctrine seemed to have two unwelcome consequences:
that Incarnation concerns the whole Trinity and not only the Son; that
the Son assumed the entire human nature. Te debate between op-
ponents and advocates of Chalcedonian Christology led to a substan-
tial revision and adaptation of the Christian Fathers standard view on
universals.
***
Tis volume is part of a large scholarly and editorial project on the
problem of universals in the history of philosophy, conceived and
coordinated by Francesco Del Punta. First of all, we wish to warmly
thank Francesco for his constant and unceasing support in all phases
of the project. Without him, the volume could not have been brought
to completion.
Although this book has been thought of right from the start as an
independent study of the problem of universals in ancient philosophy,
provisional versions of the chapters were discussed in Pisa in Septem-
ber 2010 on the occasion of a workshop jointly organized by the Scuola
Normale Superiore and the University of Roma 3. We are very grate-
21 Introduction
ful to both institutions for their fnancial support, which has made it
possible to substantially improve early versions of the contributions.
In particular, this volume has been prepared within the framework
of the PRIN MIUR Projects La costruzione delle tradizioni flosofche.
Platonismo e Aristotelismo in et post-ellenistica (2007) and Le flosofe
post-ellenistiche da Antioco a Plotino (2009).
Te volume was submitted to the Edizioni della Scuola Normale
in June 2012 and subsequently peer-reviewed. We wish to thank the
Edizioni for their interest in our project as well as for their help and
assistance. Finally, our gratefulness also goes to Sergio Knipe, who has
revised the English of non-native speakers and given precious advice
on the editorial aspects of the volume.
Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzzo