Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
d 2 l 2l11 .
Proof. From Proposition 4.1, we can simply consider the situation where c51.
Substituting this into the population of consumers, N, gives prot level
1 1
] ] p 5 l 1 2v 1 1 2l h 2v v l 1 2v 1v 1 2l h 2v s d s d s d s d s d s d F GF G
A B A A B B
h h
Taking rst-order conditions with regards to critical values, note that if the optimal
v is equal to 0 (i.e., the optimal price to type-B consumers is zero) then
B
p/ v ,0. This implies that
B
1 1
] ] 2 v l 1 2v 1v 1 2l h 2v 1 l 1 2v 1 1 2l h 2v s d s d s d s d s d s d F G F G
A A B B A B
h h
3 h 22v ,0 f g
B
Noting that it can only be optimal to set a zero price for members of group B if
members of group A face a positive price and some type-A customers buy the
S.P. King, R. Lampe / Information Economics and Policy 15 (2003) 271290 285
Table 1
Critical value of h under price discrimination
c
l 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
h 0.026 0.055 0.086 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.30
c
product, it can be seen that p/ v ,0 is only consistent with p/ v 50 if
B A
h 22v , 1 22v . Substituting in v 50 gives h ,1 22v . s d s d
B A B A
Substituting v 50 into the rst-order condition for v , solving for v and noting
B A A
that the optimal value of v must lie strictly between zero and unity, we nd that
A
]]]
2
s d h ,1/ 3l l 22 12 l 2l 11 as required. h
For a given value of l we can dene the critical value of h, denoted h , by
c
]]]
2