1

G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966 AFRICA vs. CALTEX (PIL.!
TE "P#$"E" %ERNA%E AFRICA a&' "#LE(A( C. AFRICA,
a&' )h* EIR" #F (#MINGA #NG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
CALTEX (PIL.!, INC., MATE# %#+$IREN a&' TE C#$RT
#F APPEAL", respondents-appellees.
This case is before us on a petition for review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed that of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing petitioners' second amended complaint against respondents.
The action is for damages under Articles !"# and !"$ of the old Civil
Code. It appears that in the afternoon of March %, !&% a fire bro'e out
at the Calte( service station at the corner of Antipolo street and )i*al
Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tan'
truc' into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving
tan' where the no**le of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and
burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and
effects inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued
respondents Calte( +,hil.-, Inc. and Mateo .o/uiren, the first as alleged
owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation.
0egligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the
fire.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to
prove negligence and that respondents had e(ercised due care in the
premises and with respect to the supervision of their emplo1ees.
The first /uestion before 2s refers to the admissibilit1 of certain reports
on the fire prepared b1 the Manila ,olice and Fire 3epartments and b1 a
certain Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the ,hilippines. ,ortions of
the first two reports are as follows4
. ,olice 3epartment report4 5
Investigation disclosed that at about &4"" ,.M. March %,
!&%, while 6eandro Flores was transferring gasoline from
a tan' truc', plate 0o. T-7#!# into the underground tan'
of the Calte( 8asoline 9tation located at the corner of
)i*al Avenue and Antipolo 9treet, this Cit1, an un'nown
Filipino lighted a cigarette and threw the burning match
stic' near the main valve of the said underground tan'.
3ue to the gasoline fumes, fire suddenl1 bla*ed. :uic'
action of 6eandro Flores in pulling off the gasoline hose
connecting the truc' with the underground tan' prevented
a terrific e(plosion. ;owever, the flames scattered due to
the hose from which the gasoline was spouting. It burned
the truc' and the following accessorias and residences.
#. The Fire 3epartment report4 5
In connection with their allegation that the premises was +sic-
subleased for the installation of a coca-cola and cigarette stand,
the complainants furnished this <ffice a cop1 of a photograph
ta'en during the fire and which is submitted herewith. it appears
in this picture that there are in the premises a coca-cola cooler and
a rac' which according to information gathered in the
neighborhood contained cigarettes and matches, installed between
the gasoline pumps and the underground tan's.
The report of Captain Tinio reproduced information given b1 a certain
.enito Morales regarding the histor1 of the gasoline station and what the
chief of the fire department had told him on the same sub=ect.
The foregoing reports were ruled out as >double hearsa1> b1 the Court of
Appeals and hence inadmissible. This ruling is now assigned as error. It
is contended4 first, that said reports were admitted b1 the trial court
without ob=ection on the part of respondents? secondl1, that with respect
to the police report +@(hibit A-Africa- which appears signed b1 a
3etective Bapanta allegedl1 >for 9alvador Capacillo,> the latter was
presented as witness but respondents waived their right to cross-e(amine
2
him although the1 had the opportunit1 to do so? and thirdl1, that in an1
event the said reports are admissible as an e(ception to the hearsa1 rule
under section $7 of )ule #$, now )ule $".
The first contention is not borne out b1 the record. The transcript of the
hearing of 9eptember C, !7$ +pp. DC-C"- shows that the reports in
/uestion, when offered as evidence, were ob=ected to b1 counsel for each
of respondents on the ground that the1 were hearsa1 and that the1 were
>irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent.> Indeed, in the court's resolution
onl1 @(hibits E, F, F-7 and G-D were admitted without objection? the
admission of the others, including the disputed ones, carried no such
e(planation.
<n the second point, although 3etective Capacillo did ta'e the witness
stand, he was not e(amined and he did not testif1 as to the facts
mentioned in his alleged report +signed b1 3etective Bapanta-. All he said
was that he was one of those who investigated >the location of the fire
and, if possible, gather witnesses as to the occurrence, and that he
brought the report with him. There was nothing, therefore, on which he
need be cross-e(amined? and the contents of the report, as to which he did
not testif1, did not thereb1 become competent evidence. And even if he
had testified, his testimon1 would still have been ob=ectionable as far as
information gathered b1 him from third persons was concerned.
,etitioners maintain, however, that the reports in themselves, that is,
without further testimonial evidence on their contents, fall within the
scope of section $7, )ule #$, which provides that >entries in official
records made in the performance of his dut1 b1 a public officer of the
,hilippines, or b1 a person in the performance of a dut1 speciall1
en=oined b1 law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.>
There are three re/uisites for admissibilit1 under the rule =ust mentioned4
+a- that the entr1 was made b1 a public officer, or b1 another person
speciall1 en=oined b1 law to do so? +b- that it was made b1 the public
officer in the performance of his duties, or b1 such other person in the
performance of a dut1 speciall1 en=oined b1 law? and +c- that the public
officer or other person had sufficient 'nowledge of the facts b1 him
stated, which must have been ac/uired b1 him personall1 or through
official information +Moran, Comments on the )ules of Court, Aol. $
H!7CI p. $!%-.
<f the three re/uisites =ust stated, onl1 the last need be considered here.
<bviousl1 the material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and
circumstances of the fire were not within the personal 'nowledge of the
officers who conducted the investigation. Jas 'nowledge of such facts,
however, ac/uired b1 them through official informationK As to some
facts the sources thereof are not even identified. <thers are attributed to
6eopoldo Medina, referred to as an emplo1ee at the gas station were the
fire occurred? to 6eandro Flores, driver of the tan' truc' from which
gasoline was being transferred at the time to the underground tan' of the
station? and to respondent Mateo .o/uiren, who could not, according to
@(hibit A-Africa, give an1 reason as to the origin of the fire. To /ualif1
their statements as >official information> ac/uired b1 the officers who
prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not onl1 must
have personal 'nowledge of the facts stated but must have the dut1 to
give such statements for record.

The reports in /uestion do not constitute an e(ception to the hearsa1 rule?

the facts stated therein were not ac/uired b1 the reporting officers
through official information, not having been given b1 the informants
pursuant to an1 dut1 to do so.
The ne(t /uestion is whether or not, without proof as to the cause and
origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should appl1 so as to
presume negligence on the part of appellees. .oth the trial court and the
appellate court refused to appl1 the doctrine in the instant case on the
grounds that >as to +its- applicabilit1 ... in the ,hilippines, there seems to
he nothing definite,> and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption
in appropriate cases, >in the case at bar, however, we find no practical use
for such doctrine.> The /uestion deserves more than such summar1
dismissal. The doctrine has actuall1 been applied in this =urisdiction, in
the case of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. +CA-8.).
3
0o. $#&"-), 9eptember #", !&!-, wherein the decision of the Court of
Appeals was penned b1 Mr. Eustice E...6. )e1es now a member of the
9upreme Court.
The facts of that case are stated in the decision as follows4
In the afternoon of Ma1 7, !&D, while the plaintiff-appellee and
other companions were loading grass between the municipalities
of .a1 and Calauan, in the province of 6aguna, with clear
weather and without an1 wind blowing, an electric transmission
wire, installed and maintained b1 the defendant ,hilippine ,ower
and 3evelopment Co., Inc. alongside the road, suddenl1 parted,
and one of the bro'en ends hit the head of the plaintiff as he was
about to board the truc'. As a result, plaintiff received the full
shoc' of &,&"" volts carried b1 the wire and was 'noc'ed
unconscious to the ground. The electric charge coursed through
his bod1 and caused e(tensive and serious multiple burns from
s'ull to legs, leaving the bone e(posed in some parts and causing
intense pain and wounds that were not completel1 healed when
the case was tried on Eune %, !&C, over one 1ear after the
mishap.
The defendant therein disclaimed liabilit1 on the ground that the plaintiff
had failed to show an1 specific act of negligence, but the appellate court
overruled the defense under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court
said4
The first point is directed against the sufficienc1 of plaintiff's
evidence to place appellant on its defense. Jhile it is the rule, as
contended b1 the appellant, that in case of noncontractual
negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to establish that the pro(imate cause of his in=ur1 was the
negligence of the defendant, it is also a recogni*ed principal that
>where the thing which caused in=ur1, without fault of the in=ured
person, is under the e(clusive control of the defendant and the
in=ur1 is such as in the ordinar1 course of things does not occur if
he having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of the e(planation, that the in=ur1 arose
from defendant's want of care.>
And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he
has observed due care and diligence. +9an Euan 6ight L Transit
Co. v. )e/uena, #&&, 2.9. %!, 7D 6. ed. D%".- This rule is 'nown
b1 the name of res ipsa loquitur +the transaction spea's for itself-,
and is peculiarl1 applicable to the case at bar, where it is
un/uestioned that the plaintiff had ever1 right to be on the
highwa1, and the electric wire was under the sole control of
defendant compan1. In the ordinar1 course of events, electric
wires do not part suddenl1 in fair weather and in=ure people,
unless the1 are sub=ected to unusual strain and stress or there are
defects in their installation, maintenance and supervision? =ust as
barrels do not ordinaril1 roll out of the warehouse windows to
in=ure passersb1, unless some one was negligent. +.1rne v.
.oadle, # ; L Co. C##? 7! @ng. )eprint #!!, the leading case
that established that rule-. Conse/uentl1, in the absence of
contributor1 negligence +which is admittedl1 not present-, the fact
that the wire snapped suffices to raise a reasonable presumption of
negligence in its installation, care and maintenance. Thereafter, as
observed b1 Chief .aron ,olloc', >if there are an1 facts
inconsistent with negligence, it is for the defendant to prove.>
It is true of course that decisions of the Court of Appeals do not la1 down
doctrines binding on the 9upreme Court, but we do not consider this a
reason for not appl1ing the particular doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the
case at bar. 8asoline is a highl1 combustible material, in the storage and
sale of which e(treme care must be ta'en. <n the other hand, fire is not
considered a fortuitous event, as it arises almost invariabl1 from some act
of man. A case stri'ingl1 similar to the one before 2s is Eones vs. 9hell
,etroleum Corporation, et al., C 9o. &&C4
Arthur <. Eones is the owner of a building in the cit1 of ;ammon
which in the 1ear !$& was leased to the 9hell ,etroleum
4
Corporation for a gasoline filling station. <n <ctober %, !$&,
during the term of the lease, while gasoline was being transferred
from the tan' wagon, also operated b1 the 9hell ,etroleum
Corporation, to the underground tan' of the station, a fire started
with resulting damages to the building owned b1 Eones. Alleging
that the damages to his building amounted to M7D.!7, Eones sued
the 9hell ,etroleum Corporation for the recover1 of that amount.
The =udge of the district court, after hearing the testimon1,
concluded that plaintiff was entitled to a recover1 and rendered
=udgment in his favor for M&#C.%#. The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reversed this =udgment, on the ground the testimon1
failed to show with reasonable certaint1 an1 negligence on the
part of the 9hell ,etroleum Corporation or an1 of its agents or
emplo1ees. ,laintiff applied to this Court for a Jrit of )eview
which was granted, and the case is now before us for
decision.1wph1.t
In resolving the issue of negligence, the 9upreme Court of 6ouisiana
held4
,laintiff's petition contains two distinct charges of negligence 5
one relating to the cause of the fire and the other relating to the
spreading of the gasoline about the filling station.
<ther than an e(pert to assess the damages caused plaintiff's
building b1 the fire, no witnesses were placed on the stand b1 the
defendant.
Ta'ing up plaintiff's charge of negligence relating to the cause of
the fire, we find it established b1 the record that the filling station
and the tan' truc' were under the control of the defendant and
operated b1 its agents or emplo1ees. Je further find from the
uncontradicted testimon1 of plaintiff's witnesses that fire started
in the underground tan' attached to the filling station while it was
being filled from the tan' truc' and while both the tan' and the
truc' were in charge of and being operated b1 the agents or
emplo1ees of the defendant, e(tended to the hose and tan' truc',
and was communicated from the burning hose, tan' truc', and
escaping gasoline to the building owned b1 the plaintiff.
,redicated on these circumstances and the further circumstance of
defendant's failure to e(plain the cause of the fire or to show its
lac' of 'nowledge of the cause, plaintiff has evo'ed the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. There are man1 cases in which the doctrine
ma1 be successfull1 invo'ed and this, we thin', is one of them.
Jhere the thing which caused the in=ur1 complained of is shown
to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the
accident is such as in the ordinar1 course of things does not
happen if those who have its management or control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of e(planation b1
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. +&7 C.E.
NCD%, p. !$-.
This statement of the rule of res ipsa loquitur has been widel1
approved and adopted b1 the courts of last resort. 9ome of the
cases in this =urisdiction in which the doctrine has been applied
are the following, vi!.4 Maus v. .roderic', 7 6a. Ann. 7$, #7
9o. !CC? ;ebert v. 6a'e Charles Ice, etc., Co., 6a. 7##, $7 9o.
C$, D& 6.).A. ", "" Am. 9t. )ep. 7"7? Jillis v. Aic'sburg,
etc., ). Co., 7 6a. D$, $% 9o. %!#? .ents v. ,age, 7 6a. 7D",
$! 9o. 7!!.
The principle enunciated in the afore/uoted case applies with e/ual force
here. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, e/uipment and
emplo1ees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein
and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who 'new
or could have 'nown how the fire started were appellees and their
emplo1ees, but the1 gave no e(planation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair
and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of
care.
5
In the report submitted b1 Captain 6eoncio Mariano of the Manila ,olice
3epartment +@(h. G- Africa- the following appears4
Investigation of the basic complaint disclosed that the Calte(
8asoline 9tation complained of occupies a lot appro(imatel1 "
m ( " m at the southwest corner of )i*al Avenue and Antipolo.
The location is within a ver1 bus1 business district near the
<brero Mar'et, a railroad crossing and ver1 thic'l1 populated
neighborhood where a great number of people mill around t
until
gasoline
tever be theJact=vities of these peopleor lighting a cigarette
cannot be e(cluded and this constitute a secondar1 ha*ard to its
operation which in turn endangers the entire neighborhood to
conflagration.
Furthermore, aside from precautions alread1 ta'en b1 its operator
the concrete walls south and west ad=oining the neighborhood are
onl1 #-O# meters high at most and cannot avoid the flames from
leaping over it in case of fire.
)ecords show that there have been two cases of fire which caused
not onl1 material damages but desperation and also panic in the
neighborhood.
Although the soft drin's stand had been eliminated, this gasoline
service station is also used b1 its operator as a garage and repair
shop for his fleet of ta(icabs numbering ten or more, adding
another ris' to the possible outbrea' of fire at this alread1 small
but crowded gasoline station.
The foregoing report, having been submitted b1 a police officer in the
performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal observation of
the facts reported, ma1 properl1 be considered as an e(ception to the
hearsa1 rule. These facts, descriptive of the location and ob=ective
circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in
/uestion, strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of
res ipsa lo/uitur, since on their face the1 called for more stringent
measures of caution than those which would satisf1 the standard of due
diligence under ordinar1 circumstances. There is no more elo/uent
demonstration of this than the statement of 6eandro Flores before the
police investigator. Flores was the driver of the gasoline tan' wagon who,
alone and without assistance, was transferring the contents thereof into
the underground storage when the fire bro'e out. ;e said4 >.efore
loading the underground tan' there were no people, but while the loading
was going on, there were people who went to drin' coca-cola +at the
coca-cola stand- which is about a meter from the hole leading to the
underground tan'.> ;e added that when the tan' was almost filled he
went to the tan' truc' to close the valve, and while he had his bac' turned
to the >manhole> he, heard someone shout >fire.>
@ven then the fire possibl1 would not have spread to the neighboring
houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of
defendants, namel1, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough
to prevent the flames from leaping over it. As it was the concrete wall
was onl1 #-O# meters high, and be1ond that height it consisted merel1 of
galvani*ed iron sheets, which would predictabl1 crumple and melt when
sub=ected to intense heat. 3efendants' negligence, therefore, was not onl1
with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread
thereof to the neighboring houses.
There is an admission on the part of .o/uiren in his amended answer to
the second amended complaint that >the fire was caused through the acts
of a stranger who, without authorit1, or permission of answering
defendant, passed through the gasoline station and negligentl1 threw a
lighted match in the premises.> 0o evidence on this point was adduced,
but assuming the allegation to be true 5 certainl1 an1 unfavorable
inference from the admission ma1 be ta'en against .o/uiren 5 it does
not e(tenuate his negligence. A decision of the 9upreme Court of Te(as,
6
upon facts analogous to those of the present case, states the rule which we
find acceptable here. >It is the rule that those who distribute a dangerous
article or agent, owe a degree of protection to the public proportionate to
and commensurate with a danger involved ... we thin' it is the generall1
accepted rule as applied to torts that 'if the effects of the actor's negligent
conduct activel1 and continuousl1 operate to bring about harm to another,
the fact that the active and substantiall1 simultaneous operation of the
effects of a third person's innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm, does not protect the actor
from liabilit1.' +)estatement of the 6aw of Torts, vol. #, p. %&, N&$!-.
9tated in another wa1, >The intention of an unforeseen and une(pected
cause, is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from conse/uences of
negligence, if such negligence directl1 and pro(imatel1 cooperates with
the independent cause in the resulting in=ur1.> +MacAfee, et al. vs.
Traver's 8as Corporation, 7$ 9.J. #nd &&#.-
The ne(t issue is whether Calte( should be held liable for the damages
caused to appellants. This issue depends on whether .o/uiren was an
independent contractor, as held b1 the Court of Appeals, or an agent of
Calte(. This /uestion, in the light of the facts not controverted, is one of
law and hence ma1 be passed upon b1 this Court. These facts are4 +-
.o/uiren made an admission that he was an agent of Calte(? +#- at the
time of the fire Calte( owned the gasoline station and all the e/uipment
therein? +$- Calte( e(ercised control over .o/uiren in the management of
the state? +&- the deliver1 truc' used in delivering gasoline to the station
had the name of CA6T@G painted on it? and +7- the license to store
gasoline at the station was in the name of Calte(, which paid the license
fees. +@(hibit T-Africa? @(hibit 2-Africa? @(hibit G-7 Africa? @(hibit G-
D Africa? @(hibit P-Africa-.
In .o/uiren's amended answer to the second amended complaint, he
denied that he directed one of his drivers to remove gasoline from the
truc' into the tan' and alleged that the >alleged driver, if one there was,
was not in his emplo1, the driver being an emplo1ee of the Calte( +,hil.-
Inc. andOor the owners of the gasoline station.> It is true that .o/uiren
later on amended his answer, and that among the changes was one to the
effect that he was not acting as agent of Calte(. .ut then again, in his
motion to dismiss appellants' second amended complaint the ground
alleged was that it stated no cause of action since under the allegations
thereof he was merel1 acting as agent of Calte(, such that he could not
have incurred personal liabilit1. A motion to dismiss on this ground is
deemed to be an admission of the facts alleged in the complaint.
Calte( admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the e/uipment
therein, but claims that the business conducted at the service station in
/uestion was owned and operated b1 .o/uiren. .ut Calte( did not
present an1 contract with .o/uiren that would reveal the nature of their
relationship at the time of the fire. There must have been one in e(istence
at that time. Instead, what was presented was a license agreement
manifestl1 tailored for purposes of this case, since it was entered into
shortl1 before the e(piration of the one-1ear period it was intended to
operate. This so-called license agreement +@(hibit 7-Calte(- was
e(ecuted on 0ovember #!, !&%, but made effective as of Eanuar1 ,
!&% so as to cover the date of the fire, namel1, March %, !&%. This
retroactivit1 provision is /uite significant, and gives rise to the
conclusion that it was designed precisel1 to free Calte( from an1
responsibilit1 with respect to the fire, as shown b1 the clause that Calte(
>shall not be liable for an1 in=ur1 to person or propert1 while in the
propert1 herein licensed, it being understood and agreed that 6IC@09@@
+.o/uiren- is not an emplo1ee, representative or agent of 6IC@09<)
+Calte(-.>
.ut even if the license agreement were to govern, .o/uiren can hardl1 be
considered an independent contractor. 2nder that agreement .o/uiren
would pa1 Calte( the purel1 nominal sum of ,."" for the use of the
premises and all the e/uipment therein. ;e could sell onl1 Calte(
,roducts. Maintenance of the station and its e/uipment was sub=ect to the
approval, in other words control, of Calte(. .o/uiren could not assign or
transfer his rights as licensee without the consent of Calte(. The license
agreement was supposed to be from Eanuar1 , !&% to 3ecember $,
!&%, and thereafter until terminated b1 Calte( upon two da1s prior
written notice. Calte( could at an1 time cancel and terminate the
7
agreement in case .o/uiren ceased to sell Calte( products, or did not
conduct the business with due diligence, in the =udgment of Calte(.
Termination of the contract was therefore a right granted onl1 to Calte(
but not to .o/uiren. These provisions of the contract show the e(tent of
the control of Calte( over .o/uiren. The control was such that the latter
was virtuall1 an emplo1ee of the former.
Ta'ing into consideration the fact that the operator owed his
position to the compan1 and the latter could remove him or
terminate his services at will? that the service station belonged to
the compan1 and bore its tradename and the operator sold onl1
the products of the compan1? that the e/uipment used b1 the
operator belonged to the compan1 and were =ust loaned to the
operator and the compan1 too' charge of their repair and
maintenance? that an emplo1ee of the compan1 supervised the
operator and conducted periodic inspection of the compan1's
gasoline and service station? that the price of the products sold b1
the operator was fi(ed b1 the compan1 and not b1 the operator?
and that the receipts signed b1 the operator indicated that he was a
mere agent, the finding of the Court of Appeals that the operator
was an agent of the compan1 and not an independent contractor
should not be disturbed.
To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are not
bound to rel1 upon the name or title given it b1 the contracting
parties, should thereb1 a controvers1 as to what the1 reall1 had
intended to enter into, but the wa1 the contracting parties do or
perform their respective obligations stipulated or agreed upon
ma1 be shown and in/uired into, and should such performance
conflict with the name or title given the contract b1 the parties,
the former must prevail over the latter. +9hell Compan1 of the
,hilippines, 6td. vs. Firemens' Insurance Compan1 of 0ewar',
0ew Eerse1, "" ,hil. C7C-.
The written contract was apparentl1 drawn for the purpose of
creating the apparent relationship of emplo1er and independent
contractor, and of avoiding liabilit1 for the negligence of the
emplo1ees about the station? but the compan1 was not satisfied to
allow such relationship to e(ist. The evidence shows that it
immediatel1 assumed control, and proceeded to direct the method
b1 which the wor' contracted for should be performed. .1
reserving the right to terminate the contract at will, it retained the
means of compelling submission to its orders. ;aving elected to
assume control and to direct the means and methods b1 which the
wor' has to be performed, it must be held liable for the
negligence of those performing service under its direction. Je
thin' the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict of the =ur1.
+8ulf )efining Compan1 v. )ogers, 7C 9.J. #d, %$-.
Calte( further argues that the gasoline stored in the station belonged to
.o/uiren. .ut no cash invoices were presented to show that .o/uiren had
bought said gasoline from Calte(. 0either was there a sales contract to
prove the same.
As found b1 the trial court the Africas sustained a loss of ,!,""7.%", after
deducting the amount of ,#,"""."" collected b1 them on the insurance of
the house. The deduction is now challenged as erroneous on the ground
that Article ##"C of the 0ew Civil Code, which provides for the
subrogation of the insurer to the rights of the insured, was not 1et in
effect when the loss too' place. ;owever, regardless of the silence of the
law on this point at that time, the amount that should be recovered be
measured b1 the damages actuall1 suffered, otherwise the principle
prohibiting un=ust enrichment would be violated. Jith respect to the
claim of the heirs of <ng ,C,7""."" was ad=udged b1 the lower court on
the basis of the assessed value of the propert1 destro1ed, namel1,
,,7""."", disregarding the testimon1 of one of the <ng children that
said propert1 was worth ,&,"""."". Je agree that the court erred, since it
is of common 'nowledge that the assessment for ta(ation purposes is not
an accurate gauge of fair mar'et value, and in this case should not prevail
over positive evidence of such value. The heirs of <ng are therefore
entitled to ,","""."".
8
Jherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and respondents-
appellees are held liable solidaril1 to appellants, and ordered to pa1 them
the aforesaid sum of ,!,""7.%" and ,","""."", respectivel1, with
interest from the filing of the complaint, and costs.
"en#!on$ C.%.$ "autista &n#elo$ Concepcion$ 'e(es$ %.".).$ "arrera$
'e#ala$ "en#!on$ %.P.$ *aldivar and +anche!$ %%.$ concur.
Di!on$ %.$ too, no part.
Foo)&o)*s

Thus, for instance, the record of a =ustice of the peace of marriage

certificates transmitted to him b1 the corresponding priest is
admissible. The =ustice of the peace has no personal 'nowledge of
the marriage, but it was reported to him b1 a priest whose dut1 it
was, under the law, to ma'e the report for record purposes.
9imilarl1, the ta( records of a provincial assessor are admissible
even if the assessments were made b1 subordinates. 9o also are
entries of marriages made b1 a municipal treasurer in his official
record, because he ac/uires 'nowledge thereof b1 virtue of a
statutor1 dut1 on the part of those authori*ed to solemni*e
marriages to send a cop1 of each marriage contract solemni*ed b1
them to the local civil registrar. +9ee Moran, Comments on the
)ules of Court, Aol. $ H!7CI pp. $%!-$!7.-