CIRA BULLETINVol 15, No 1, April 1999

Myths and Facts in Iranian Historiography

Kamran M. Dadkhah
Department of Economics
Northeastern University
A few years ago at the annual picnic of Iranians in Boston, a friend of mine said, as
a matter of fact, that [lieutenant] colonel Mobasheri had written the famous song "Mara
Beboos" ("Kiss Me") for his daughter the night before his execution. When I told him this
was not true, he was surprised, and I do not think he believed me. Iranians who are about my
age and older remember that in 1955 the country's airwaves were taken over by perhaps the
most beautiful song ever written in Persian. I remember Tehran radio, which had a policy of
not repeating a song in the same day, bowing to the popular demand and playing "Kiss Me"
16 times in one day. The song came in the wake of the execution of 30 officers sentenced to
death in the military tribunal for their membership in the military branch of the Tudeh
(communist) party. Several factors gave rise to the widespread rumor that the song was
written by one of the condemned officers. First, the lyrics have a revolutionary message, "I
have to give up this bright morning because I have a blood pact with a brighter morning," and
"I have to start fires in the mountains." Second, due to some technical problem at one point
there was an extra word eshq (love), which gave rise to the speculation that the song had been
censored. Finally, the singer was an unknown glass merchant, Hassan Golnaraqi, who had
sung only one song before, and the songwriter, Heydar Reqabi had used his pen name, Haleh.
Despite the speculation, the fact is that Maj id Vafadar was the composer, Heydar Reqabi the
songwriter, and Hassan Golnaraqi the singerthree unpretentious men who created a
masterpiece.' The song has a sequel, a less famous song, in which it becomes clear that it is
the girl who is dying: "with her last glance, her innocent glance, she had written her last song."
Colonel Mobasheri was not known as a songwriter, so how could he, in the anxiety of the last
hours of his life, suddenly sit down and write one of the most beautiful songs ever written?
Indeed, among the executed officers, only major Ja' far Vakili, with his famous poem that
insults the Shah"If you 0 less than a man with the lash of silence ..."had any claim to
poetry. But the song was never attributed to him, nor did his wife who was alive (and may
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still be) after the revolution of 1979, ever claim so. Yet this myth will continue, because a
myth is much more powerful than reality.
Indeed, the power of myth in Iranian historiography and any analysis of Iran are so
pervasive as to have interfered with rational thought and logical inference. The aim of the
present essay is to outline a few instances in the modern history of Iran in which the blatant
ascendancy of myth over facts has resulted in false conclusions and misperception of what
has happened. But before presenting my case, lest there be misunderstanding, let me clarify
two points.
First, there is no doubt as to the importance of myths and legends in a nation's life.
Nor can one ignore the importance and value of myths in the analysis and understanding of
a people and their history. Myths are what a people would like to have happened or would
like to think happened. In contrast to the harsh reality of defeat or mismanagement, myth
perpetuates the feeling of bravery and heroism. Defeat was in the hands of a superior power
and the result of bad luck. In contrast to the ugliness and ambiguity of reality, a myth is
beautiful and definite. How could facts stand up to myth? How could any teenage girl (boy),
in the eyes of a high school boy (girl), compare to the glossy picture of a model or a movie
star? Perhaps there is not much harm in myth making in moderation. But Middle Easterners
and Iranians have gone too far. The problem is that these myths have gotten in the way of
understanding the Iranian society and economy. To the extent that social scientists "must
study the present in the light of the past for the purposes of the future," 2 there is a need for
a clear light from the past. History may not repeat itself and the past may not have any useful
lessons for the future. But history tells us where we are and how we got here. If we are
mistaken about our point of departure, finding our way in the path of the future will be quite
difficult.
Second, persons who have a political agenda often create myths. In this case, the aim
is to elevate a political group or its leaders to the position of heroes and to diminish the stature
and accomplishments of their opponents. For instance, as will be seen below, those who
promoted Ahmad Shah, the last Qajar king, to the position of a democratic, patriotic, and
brave man who stood up to the foreign powers did so to despise Reza Shah who deposed him
and founded the Pahlavi dynasty. Thus, whoever demolishes that myth and shows the true
nature of Ahmad Shah, is open to the accusation that he is siding with Reza Shah. Indeed, this
consideration has stood in the way of a serious study of Iranian history.
Ahmad Shah and the 1919 Agreement
In 1919, the British concluded an agreement with the Iranian premier, Hassan Vosuq
(Vosuq-o-dowleh) that, in effect, put Iran's military and financial affairs under the control
of Britain. Vosuq and two of his ministers were paid a hefty bribe for signing this agreement.
Public protest forced Vosuq out of office and the agreement was left un-ratified by the
parliament, Majlis. During October and November of the same year, Ahmad Shah visited
England. In early 1921, the Cossack Division under the command of Reza Khan (the later
Reza Shah) and political tutelage of Seyyed Ziaeddin Tabatabai staged a coup d'etat. For the
next four years, Reza Khan consolidated his power and in 1925 deposed the Qajar King who
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had left the country and refused to return, and declared himself the shah. Since the foundation
of the Pahlavi dynasty, members of the Qajar family, particularly Ahmad Shah's uncles
together with opponents of Reza Shah, have circulated a myth about this event. They alleged
that in the receptions given in his honor by King George V and Lord Curzon, Ahmad Shah
refused to endorse the 1919 agreement. This, according to the mythmakers, angered the
British who engineered Ahmad Shah's downfall.
This story is the backbone of the first three volumes of Makki's The Twenty Y ear
History oflran and his A Brief Political Biography ofAhmad Shah. Many Iranian statesmen
have repeated this story on many occasions, and some have further embellished it. For
instance, Ali Akbar Dehkhoda said about this event: "Ahmad Shah, son of Mohammad Ali
Shah, was invited to London when he was young and had many hopes for the future. For three
days he was entertained and the lord who was his host insisted that in the formal reception
where the King and Queen [of England] and perhaps the diplomatic corps would be present,
he should endorse the Vosuq-odowleh's agreement, else his crown and throne would be in
danger. Every time Ahmad Shah replied that my crown and throne do not measure up to the
independence of my country. I am only one individual who will reign for a few days and
cannot deliver a nation into bondage for the sake of my crown and throne."' Dehkhoda spoke
as if he had witnessed the event. It did not occur to him and others to check what indeed
Ahmad Shah had said during the formal reception. In 1989 Mohammad Javad Sheikholeslami 4
published a book exposing the true nature of Ahmad Shah, a greedy man who did not care
for Iran and Iranians. For those who are still in doubt, here is the conclusion of his majesty
Ahmad Shah Qajar's speech in the reception given in his honor by Lord Curzon. "I am
delighted to take this opportunity to tell your excellency how glad I am for the conclusion of
the recent agreement between Iran and England because this agreement is to strengthen the
traditional long lasting friendship between the two countries."'
Reza Shah's Alliance with Hitler6
After the ascendance of Reza Shah to the throne in 1925, the country embarked on
a program of development that included building the Trans-Iranian railroad, factories, roads,
schools, and Tehran University. Since the country needed technical expertise, a large number
of foreigners, particularly Germans were employed. On the other hand, because Iran needed
foreign exchange, trade with other countries had to expand. Trade with Germany, in
particular, flourished because it was based on barter that suited Iran. When the war started,
German spies engaged in a misinformation campaign claiming that Germans considered
Iranians to be of the Aryan, that is, of the German race. Some Iranians believed this, and
indeed the story was a good complement to the secular nationalist ideology of Reza Shah's
regime.
After the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany, British and Russian legations
in Tehran made representations to the Iranian government asking for the expulsion of the
German nationals The Iranian government stalled. On August 25, 1941, British and Russian
forces invaded Iran. Within hours of the invasion, the Iranian army collapsed. For 20 years
Reza Shah had touted the army as his great accomplishment. Yet the army could not resist
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the assault of invaders for even a day or two. Many high ranking officers showed cowardice,
fleeing their commands and leaving the area in total chaos. Some units left behind their
weapons, which ended up in the hands of tribes whom Reza Shah had brought under central
government control at the expense of many lives.
Here another myth was born. Reza Shah had a secret alliance with Hitler, and
therefore, Allies invaded Iran. British spies in the government and military caused the defeat
of the army by sending the wrong ammunitions to the combat units.
There is no question that many generals showed cowardice and incompetence. What
else could be expected of an army built under a dictator? But the fact of the matter is that Reza
Shah had no secret alliance with Hitler, and the Iranian army could not have possibly stood
up to one of the invading forces let alone a simultaneous assault from north and south. The
burden of proof is on those who claim that there was an alliance, and no evidence to support
this claim has ever been offered. Furthermore, all the way to the summer of 1941 Germany
had an alliance with the Soviet Union. The Iranian government was fearful that, in case of
a German victory, the Soviet Union would be given a free hand in Iran, a concern that they
shared with the British legation on several occasions' When Germany invaded Russia and
drove to the heart of Caucuses, Iranians were faced with a dilemma. If they allied themselves
with Britain and the Soviet Union, Iran would be in trouble if Germany broke through the
Soviet defenses and entered Iran. If they sided with Germany, the allied forces could occupy
the country as an enemy. Hence they stalled, claiming neutrality in the war. But Allies did
not have time for such tactics.
The Iranian army was basically a domestic security force. In terms of equipment,
personnel, and preparedness it could not engage in a war with modern armies of the day. The
Iranian navy consisted of two outdated battleships that were sunk by the British navy in the
first hours of invasion. The Iranian air force too was not much to speak of despite the moral
of the younger officers as it manifested itself in the Quixotic uprising of Qal' eh Morqi.g
Perhaps now that Iranians have shown superhuman bravery in the war with Iraq, they
should come to terms with the undignified history of the army during World War II.
Dr. Mossadeq's Economic Miracle 9
In early 1951 the Iranian parliament passed the oil nationalization law and elected
Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq to implement it. Dr. Mossadeq ordered the takeover of the assets
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and declared that he was ready to negotiate with the
company for compensation. For the next two and a half years the Oil Company and the British
government on one side and the Iranian government on the other were engaged in a struggle.
The British boycotted Iran and prevented it from selling oil in the international market. At
the same time they took their case to the United Nations and the International Court in the
Hague and lost in both places. On another front they tried to enlist the help of the United States
in ousting Dr. Mossadeq.
On his part, Mossadeq faced deteriorating economic conditions. He had counted on
the world being dependent on Iranian oil. He expected buyers to line up at Iranian ports or
else there would be a pressure on Britain to come to terms with his government. He did not
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have a strategy for a prolonged struggle during which Iran would be deprived of its main
source of income. As the dispute continued, Mossadeq's opponents got bolder and he lost his
allies. After two years the economy was in shambles, and Dr. Mossadeq who had consistently
advocated democracy was governing with martial law in effect. On August 19, 1953, a coup
backed by the British and American governments toppled Dr. Mossadeq. One may infer with
some justification that if the economy were not in such a dire situation, the nationalist
government would not have been overthrown so easily. Yet a mythology has been developed
that credits Dr. Mossadeq with balancing exports and imports, and effecting many social and
economic reforms. The desperate economic condition of Iran under Mossadeq can be
discerned from the letter he wrote on May 28, 1953, to President Dwight Eisenhower: "The
Iranian nation hopes that with the help and assistance of the American Government the
obstacles placed in the way of the sale of Iranian oil can be removed, and that if the American
Government is not able to effect a removal of such obstacles, it can render effective economic
assistance to enable Iran to utilize her other resources. This country has natural resources
other than oil. The exploitation of these resources would solve the present difficulties of the
country. This, however, is impossible without economic aid."'
The fact is that at the time the economy was suffering from inflation and recession,
while the government had trouble meeting its obligations. The oil industry that prior to
nationalization provided foreign exchange to the economy and revenues for the government
had turned into a burden on the treasury. The government had to pay the salary of idle oil
workers and provide funds for the upkeep of the facilities. Despite great sacrifices by the
people and the sincerity of most leaders, faulty expectations and wrong calculations doomed
the movement. Not only did Iranians lose the battle but also they had to endure 25 years of
dictatorship.
Concluding Remarks
The above are only examples of myths in circulation among Iranians; there are many
more. To the extent that such false perceptions affect government policies and tendencies of
the general populace, they pose a danger to the well being of Iran. Rational thinking demands
a dispassionate and scientific look at the recent past. Rational thinking, in turn, is a
prerequisite of a civil society.
Endnotes
See the obituary of Hassan Golnaraqi, Adineh, nos. 84-85, Aban 1372 (1993), p.5 and Simin
Behbahani, "In the Silk Bed of Dreams," Adineh, no. 88, Bahman 1732 (1994), pp.26-28.
2.John Maynard Keynes, "Alfred Marshall," in Essays in Biography: The Collected Writings
of John Maynard Keynes, vol. 10, Macmillan Press, London and Basingstoke, 1972,
pp.173-174. Keynes was referring to economists' work.
3. "Interview with Dehkhoda, the Great Scholar," in Motplat Dehkhoda (Dehkjhoda's
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Essays), vol. 2, edited by Mohammad Dabir Siaqi, Tirajeh, Tehran, 1986, p.288. The
interview originally appeared in the newspaper Bakhtar Emrouz, July 14, 1953.
4 . Mohammad Javad Sheikholeslami, Simay-e Ahmad Shah (A Portrait of Ahmad Shah), vol.
1, Nashre Goftar, Tehran, 1989.
5 . Ibid., pp.444-445.
6 . On this myth see, Abdolreza Hooshang Mandavi, "The Myth of Alliance Between Reza
Shah and Hitler," Tarikh Moasser Iran, vol. 5, 1995, pp.11-26.
7
F. Eshraghi, "Anglo-Soviet Occupation of Iran in August 1941," Middle Eastern Studies,
vol. 20, 1984, pp.27-52.
8.For a brief report of this uprising see Fereydoun Sanjar, Hassel Chehel Sal Khedmat (The
Results of Forty Years Service), Entesharat Parvin, Tehran, 1991, pp.79-86.
9. On the Iranian economy during the Mossadeq era see Kamran Dadkhah, "The Oil
Nationalization Movement, The British Boycott, and the Iranian Economy, 1951-
1953," Essays on the Economic History of the Middle East, edited by Elie Kedourie and
Sylvia G. Haim, Frank Cass, London, 1988, pp.104-131.
10
. Quoted in Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, Updated Through 1978, University of
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1979, p.215.
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