prone relationship between Russia and the West will test the foundations of recent Turkish foreign policy. It will also test Ankaras cooperation with transatlantic partners. First, the current crisis underscores the return of hard security challenges on Turkeys borders. Second, the crisis in relations with Russia comes at a time of considerable unease in Turkeys relations with NATO partners, many of which are not on the same page when it comes to Syria and other questions of deep concern to Ankara. Third, and more positively, the Ukraine crisis is likely to drive NATO strategy and planning in directions Turkish strategists will prefer. Analysis Turkish Stakes in the Ukraine Crisis by Ian O. Lesser May 6, 2014 Washington, DC Berlin Paris Brussels Belgrade Ankara Bucharest Warsaw Tunis OF F I C E S Analysis Introduction It is emblematic of the complex Turkish calculus on Ukraine that while Ankara refuses to acknowl- edge Russian sovereignty in Crimea, Turkish Airlines still fies to Simfer- opol. Ankara has many reasons to prefer an arms-length approach to the crisis in Ukraine, and the even more consequential question of Russian- Western relations. Turkeys decade- long preference for a zero-problems approach in relations with neighbors has paid particular dividends in rela- tions with Russia. But this approach to policy across the Black Sea was starting to fray well before the crisis over Ukraine. Today, the approach may no longer be sustainable, as a series of competing domestic and external policy interests present Ankara with difcult choices. Over the longer-term, a more competitive and confict-prone relationship between Russia and the West will test the foundations of recent Turkish foreign policy. It will also test Ankaras cooperation with transat- lantic partners. Critical but Uncertain Relations with Moscow Turkeys economic relationship with Russia has been of vital importance to the countrys commercially driven external policy, and has helped fuel a dynamic economy over the last decade. Since the 1990s, Russia has been Turkeys leading individual trading partner, a reality driven largely by energy trade. Natural gas imports from Russia now account for some 60 percent of Turkish requirements. Recent Turkish energy investments in Northern Iraq, imports from Iran, and proposed new interconnectors could ofset this dependency over the coming years. So, too, might Turkish participation in the production of gas from new fnds in the Eastern Medi- terranean, although these are some years away under the most favorable estimates, and will depend critically on the resolution of disputes with Cyprus and Israel both far from obvious developments. Turkeys troubled EU candidacy also complicates Ankaras ability to contribute to and beneft from any EU-wide steps toward energy diversifcation. For the moment, Ankara has very limited means to escape from its substantial dependence on Russian gas exports, including tran- sits through Ukraine. In this respect, Turkey is in much the same position as some of its leading European partners. Analysis 2 Analysis Ankaras economic stakes go well beyond energy security. Turkish frms are signifcant providers of goods and services to Russia, notably in pharmaceuticals and construction, and there has been considerable cross investment in real estate. At a time of deepening concern over the stability and growth of the Turkish economy, Turkish businesses, including banks, are highly exposed to the consequences of economic sanctions against Moscow and economic insta- bility in Russia and Ukraine. As a matter of general prefer- ence, Turkey has been unenthusiastic about sanctions as an instrument of policy, whether toward Iraq in the 1990s or toward Iran. Indeed, Turkey itself has been the object of periodic U.S. and European sanctions, principally over the Cyprus dispute. In the toughening Western debate over economic as well as political sanctions on Moscow, Ankara is unlikely to be in the vanguard. Geopolitical competition between Russia and Turkey was an integral element in the European security equation for hundreds of years, and variations on the Eastern question played a considerable role in European afairs from the 18 th
century through World War I. But in contemporary terms, and even during the Cold War, relations have enjoyed a wary stability. In the post-Cold War period, Ankara and Moscow have largely avoided serious frictions, despite occasional diferences (e.g., the sale of Russian arms to Cyprus, and Russian suspicions of Turkish involvement with separatists in Chechnya). By most accounts, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan and President Vladimir Putin have had a very cordial relationship. Indeed, critics of Turkeys prime minister ofen accuse him of adopting Putins authoritarian style. Tat said, major diferences over Russias support for the Assad regime in Syria have cast a chill over the relationship. But for the degree of economic interdependence between the two countries, Syria would almost certainly be a much more prominent irritant in Turkish-Russian relations. In a more fundamental sense, relations between Turkey and Russia have benefted from some common characteristics. Te Soviet and Kemalist traditions, in particular, shared a high degree of sovereignty consciousness, a declared attach- ment to non-interference in the afairs of neighbors, a sensi- tivity regarding borders, and an essentially conservative approach to foreign policymaking. Both countries could be described as status quo powers in the Kissingerian sense of the term. Over the last decade, both Ankara and Moscow have moved quite far from this traditionally cautious, risk averse posture dramatically so in the case of Russian behavior in Georgia, and now in Crimea and Ukraine. From a Russian perspective, Turkish activism in the Middle East and Eurasia must also seem a departure from past practice, especially on Syria. For Turkey, the Ukraine crisis raises the troubling prospect of Russia as a rogue state, rather than a predictable if sometimes difcult geo-economic partner. If Turkey and Russia are, at base, long-term strategic competi- tors, this competition has very diferent implications when caution is no longer the order of the day in foreign policy. Domestic Politics and the Tatar Issue Under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) govern- ment, and with progressive changes in civil-military rela- tions, public opinion has become a signifcant factor in Turkish foreign policy. It is now an essential part of the equation in policy toward Syria, Northern Iraq, and of course, Armenia and Cyprus. For some time, Turkey has had vocal lobbies engaged in debates over Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, and the defense of ethnic Turks abroad from Turkmen in Northern Iraq to Uyghurs in western China. Te force of populism, nationalism, and religious identity on the contemporary Turkish scene gives this Turkic factor a strong resonance in public and elite opinion. Te outlook for the Crimean Tatar community has already emerged as one of the drivers of Turkish interest in the Ukraine crisis. If the community comes under further pressure from the ethnic Russian majority in Crimea, the Erdoan govern- But for the degree of economic interdependence between the two countries, Syria would almost certainly be a much more prominent irritant in Turkish- Russian relations. Analysis 3 Analysis ment will fnd it hard to ignore their plight, especially with presidential and general elections on the horizon. A Pivot to Euroatlantic Security? Te crisis in Ukraine and the prospect of a fundamen- tally changed strategic relationship with Russia will have special implications for Turkey as a NATO ally confronting multiple sources of risk. First, the current crisis under- scores the return of hard security challenges on Turkeys borders. In some respects, Ukraine is simply the latest in a series of crises that have undermined Turkeys sof-power approach to its neighborhood. Long before the events in Kyiv, Ankara faced chaos in Syria, the spread of proxy wars in the Levant, the unresolved nuclear dispute with Iran, and a still simmering threat from PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) insurgency and terrorism. Now Turkey also faces an escalating security challenge in the Black Sea. But Ankara may have a hard time balancing its desire for reassurance and deterrence vis-a-vis an assertive Russia with its desire to avoid confrontation with Moscow. Second, the crisis in relations with Russia comes at a time of considerable unease in Turkeys relations with NATO partners, many of which are not on the same page when it comes to Syria and other questions of deep concern to Ankara. Te Turkish public and many elites remain highly suspicious of U.S. and European policy toward Turkey and its region. Te prime minister and key fgures in the ruling party have done little to dispel this climate of suspi- cion. Indeed, the rhetoric about interest rate lobbies and Western hands behind the recent corruption scandals has spurred transatlantic concern about Ankaras commitment to relations with Washington and Brussels. So, too, has the Turkish firtation with Eurasian (read Russian) alterna- tives, and the rather non-aligned tenor of the recent Turkish foreign policy discourse. Allied deployments of Patriot missile batteries to reinforce Turkeys air defenses on the Syrian border have garnered little praise in Turkey. Te possibility that Ankara may opt for a Chinese supplied air defense system in preference to U.S. and European and Russian suppliers has not been well received in NATO circles. Ultimately, Turkey has important stakes in the NATO security guarantee, but the Ukraine crisis makes clear that a good deal of maintenance is required in Turkeys strategic partnerships. Tird, and more positively, the Ukraine crisis is likely to drive NATO strategy and planning in directions Turkish strategists will prefer. Tere is already less pressure for further NATO enlargement, at least beyond the Balkans, and closer attention to the credibility of Article V commit- ments to existing members. As NATO heads toward a crit- ical summit in September, there is likely to be less interest in expeditionary missions and more interest in territorial defense, broadly defned. At base, Turkey takes a relatively traditional approach to NATO policy, and a Ukraine-driven posture will also serve the Turkish interest in addressing tangible security risks on its own borders. Tat said, Turkey is likely to be less enthusiastic about an expanded NATO naval presence in the Black Sea, where Turkish sovereignty concerns run deep, and where Ankara (with Moscow) has generally taken a dim view of external security manage- ment. Bridge or Barrier Redux Te crisis in Ukraine, and the prospect of a more confron- tational relationship with Russia confronts Turkey with a series of difcult choices in multiple policy arenas. Te issues, from energy security to sanctions, from defense posture to the interests of ethnic Turks abroad, are chal- lenging in their own right all the more so as they come at a time of economic and political stress for the country. To the extent that the ongoing crisis in relations with Russia Turkey is likely to be less enthusiastic about an expanded NATO naval presence in the Black Sea, where Turkish sovereignty concerns run deep, and where Ankara (with Moscow) has generally taken a dim view of external security management. Analysis 4 Analysis About the Author Ian Lesser is Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center, the Brus- sels ofce of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, where he also directs foreign and security policy programs across GMF. Te opinions expressed here are the authors and do not represent the views of GMF, its staf or directors. About GMF Te German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-proft organization through a gif from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has ofces in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Tunis. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm. About the On Turkey Series GMFs On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkeys current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular anal- ysis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers. To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www. gmfus.org/turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at http://database. gmfus.org/reaction. calls into question the European security order writ large, Turkey is very likely headed for a sharper debate about its own strategic position and role in transatlantic security arrangements. Is Turkey returning to its traditional role as a barrier in relation to this and other sources of risk? Over the last decade or more, Turkish strategy has aimed at avoiding these geopolitical conundrums by putting Turkey at the center of regional afairs. Te Ukraine crisis suggests that the window for this approach is closing rapidly.