Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The General Assembly,
Recalling the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 3452 (XXX) of 9 December 1975,
Recalling also its resolution 32/62 of 8 December 1977, in which it requested the Commission on Human Rights to draw up a draft convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, in the light of the principles embodied in the Declaration,
Recalling further that, in its resolution 38/119 of 16 December 1983, it requested the Commission on Human Rights to complete, at its fortieth session, as a matter of highest priority, the drafting of such a convention, with a view to submitting a draft, including provisions for the effective implementation of the future convention, to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session,
Noting with satisfaction Commission on Human Rights resolution 1984/21 of 6 March 1984,by which the Commission decided to transmit the text of a draft convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, contained in the annex to the report of the Working Group, to the General Assembly for its consideration,
Desirous of achieving a more effective implementation of the existing prohibition under international and national law of the practice of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
1. Expresses its appreciation for the work achieved by the Commission on Human Rights in preparing the text of a draft convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
2. Adopts and opens for signature, ratification and accession the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment contained in the annex to the present resolution;
3. Calls upon all Governments to consider signing and ratifying the Convention as a matter of priority.
ANNEX Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The States Parties to this Convention,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that those rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter, in particular Article 55, to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Having regard to article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which provide that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
Having regard also to the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1975,
Desiring to make more effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world,
Have agreed as follows: PART I
Article 1 1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
2. This article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider application.
Article 2 1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture.
Article 3 1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.
Article 4 1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture.
2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature.
Article 5 1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in the following cases:
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal law.
Article 6
1. Upon being satisfied, after an examination of information available to it, that the circumstances so warrant, any State Party in whose territory a person alleged to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is present shall take him into custody or take other legal measures to ensure his presence. The custody and other legal measures shall be as provided in the law of that State but may be continued only for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.
2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts.
3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article shall be assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of which he is a national, or, if he is a stateless person, with the representative of the State where he usually resides.
4. When a State, pursuant to this article, has taken a person into custody, it shall immediately notify the States referred to in article 5, paragraph 1, of the fact that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant his detention. The State which makes the preliminary inquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of this article shall promptly report its findings to the said States and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction. Article 7 1. The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State. In the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 2, the standards of evidence required for prosecution and conviction shall in no way be less stringent than those which apply in the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 1.
3. Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection with any of the offences referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings.
Article 8 1. The offences referred to in article 4 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.
2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of such offences. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize such offences as extraditable offences between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
4. Such offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also in the territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with article 5, paragraph 1.
Article 9 1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of any of the offences referred to in article 4, including the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings.
2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph 1 of this article in conformity with any treaties on mutual judicial assistance that may exist between them.
Article 10 1. Each State Party shall ensure that education and information regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment.
2. Each State Party shall include this prohibition in the rules or instructions issued in regard to the duties and functions of any such persons.
Article 11 Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment in any territory under its jurisdiction, with a view to preventing any cases of torture.
Article 12 Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction. Article 13 Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he has been subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has the right to complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially examined by, its competent authorities. Steps shall be taken to ensure that the complainant and witnesses are protected against all ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of his complaint or any evidence given.
Article 14 1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to compensation.
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other persons to compensation which may exist under national law.
Article 15 Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.
Article 16 1. Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture of references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
2. The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the provisions of any other international instrument or national law which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or which relates to extradition or expulsion. PART II
Article 17 1. There shall be established a Committee against Torture (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) which shall carry out the functions hereinafter provided. The Committee shall consist of ten experts of high moral standing and recognized competence in the field of human rights, who shall serve in their personal capacity. The experts shall be elected by the States Parties, consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal experience.
2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons nominated by States Parties. Each State Party may nominate one person from among its own nationals. States Parties shall bear in mind the usefulness of nominating persons who are also members of the Human Rights Committee established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and who are willing to serve on the Committee against Torture.
3. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at biennial meetings of States Parties convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. At those meetings, for which two thirds of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be those who obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of States Parties present and voting.
4. The initial election shall be held no later than six months after the date of the entry into force of this Convention. At least four months before the date of each election, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting them to submit their nominations within three months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all persons thus nominated, indicating the States Parties which have nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties.
5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four years. They shall be eligible for re-election if renominated. However, the term of five of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two years; immediately after the first election the names of these five members shall be chosen by lot by the chairman of the meeting referred to in paragraph 3 of this article.
6. If a member of the Committee dies or resigns or for any other cause can no longer perform his Committee duties, the State Party which nominated him shall appoint another expert from among its nationals to serve for the remainder of his term, subject to the approval of the majority of the States Parties. The approval shall be considered given unless half or more of the States Parties respond negatively within six weeks after having been informed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the proposed appointment.
7. States Parties shall be responsible for the expenses of the members of the Committee while they are in performance of Committee duties.
Article 18 1. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years. They may be re-elected.
2. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure, but these rules shall provide, inter alia, that:
(a) Six members shall constitute a quorum;
(b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by a majority vote of the members present.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee under this Convention.
4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the initial meeting of the Committee. After its initial meeting, the Committee shall meet at such times as shall be provided in its rules of procedure.
5. The States Parties shall be responsible for expenses incurred in connection with the holding of meetings of the States Parties and of the Committee, including reimbursement to the United Nations for any expenses, such as the cost of staff and facilities, incurred by the United Nations pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article.
Article 19 1. The States Parties shall submit to the Committee, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, reports on the measures they have taken to give effect to their undertakings under this Convention, within one year after the entry into force of the Convention for the State Party concerned. Thereafter the States Parties shall submit supplementary reports every four years on any new measures taken and such other reports as the Committee may request.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the reports to all States Parties.
3. Each report shall be considered by the Committee which may make such general comments on the report as it may consider appropriate and shall forward these to the State Party concerned. That State Party may respond with any observations it chooses to the Committee.
4. The Committee may, at its discretion, decide to include any comments made by it in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article, together with the observations thereon received from the State Party concerned, in its annual report made in accordance with article 24. If so requested by the State Party concerned, the Committee may also include a copy of the report submitted under paragraph 1 of this article. Article 20 1. If the Committee receives reliable information which appears to it to contain well-founded indications that torture is being systematically practised in the territory of a State Party, the Committee shall invite that State Party to co-operate in the examination of the information and to this end to submit observations with regard to the information concerned.
2. Taking into account any observations which may have been submitted by the State Party concerned, as well as any other relevant information available to it, the Committee may, if it decides that this is warranted, designate one or more of its members to make a confidential inquiry and to report to the Committee urgently.
3. If an inquiry is made in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, the Committee shall seek the co-operation of the State Party concerned. In agreement with that State Party, such an inquiry may include a visit to its territory.
4. After examining the findings of its member or members submitted in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, the Committee shall transmit these findings to the State Party concerned together with any comments or suggestions which seem appropriate in view of the situation.
5. All the proceedings of the Committee referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4 of this article shall be confidential, and at all stages of the proceedings the co-operation of the State Party shall be sought. After such proceedings have been completed with regard to an inquiry made in accordance with paragraph 2, the Committee may, after consultations with the State Party concerned, decide to include a summary account of the results of the proceedings in its annual report made in accordance with article 24.
Article 21 1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under this Convention. Such communications may be received and considered according to the procedures laid down in this article only if submitted by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be dealt with by the Committee under this article if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration. Communications received under this article shall be dealt with in accordance with the following procedure:
(a) If a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention, it may, by written communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State Party. Within three months after the receipt of the communication the receiving State shall afford the State which sent the communication an explanation or any other statement in writing clarifying the matter, which should include, to the extent possible and pertinent, reference to domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending or available in the matter;
(b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both States Parties concerned within six months after the receipt by the receiving State of the initial communication, either State shall have the right to refer the matter to the Committee, by notice given to the Committee and to the other State;
(c) The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it under this article only after it has ascertained that all domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief to the person who is the victim of the violation of this Convention;
(d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining communications under this article;
(e) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (c), the Committee shall make available its good offices to the States Parties concerned with a view to a friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect for the obligations provided for in this Convention. For this purpose, the Committee may, when appropriate, set up an ad hoc conciliation commission;
(f) In any matter referred to it under this article, the Committee may call upon the States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), to supply any relevant information;
(g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), shall have the right to be represented when the matter is being considered by the Committee and to make submissions orally and/or in writing;
(h) The Committee shall, within twelve months after the date of receipt of notice under subparagraph (b), submit a report:
(i) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is reached, the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached;
(ii) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is not reached, the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts; the written submissions and record of the oral submissions made by the States Parties concerned shall be attached to the report.
In every matter, the report shall be communicated to the States Parties concerned.
2. The provisions of this article shall come into force when five States Parties to this Convention have made declarations under paragraph 1 of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the States Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by notification to the Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter which is the subject of a communication already transmitted under this article; no further communication by any State Party shall be received under this article after the notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been received by the Secretary-General, unless the State Party concerned has made a new declaration.
Article 22 1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by a State Party of the provisions of the Convention. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration.
2. The Committee shall consider inadmissible any communication under this article which is anonymous or which it considers to be an abuse of the right of submission of such communications or to be incompatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, the Committee shall bring any communications submitted to it under this article to the attention of the State Party to this Convention which has made a declaration under paragraph 1 and is alleged to be violating any provisions of the Convention. Within six months, the receiving State shall submit to the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State.
4. The Committee shall consider communications received under this article in the light of all information made available to it by or on behalf of the individual and by the State Party concerned.
5. The Committee shall not consider any communications from an individual under this article unless it has ascertained that:
(a) The same matter has not been, and is not being, examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement;
(b) The individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies; this shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief to the person who is the victim of the violation of this Convention.
6. The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining communications under this article.
7. The Committee shall forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual.
8. The provisions of this article shall come into force when five States Parties to this Convention have made declarations under paragraph 1 of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the States Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by notification to the Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter which is the subject of a communication already transmitted under this article; no further communication by or on behalf of an individual shall be received under this article after the notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been received by the Secretary-General, unless the State Party has made a new declaration.
Article 23 The members of the Committee and of the ad hoc conciliation commissions which may be appointed under article 21, paragraph 1 (e), shall be entitled to the facilities, privileges and immunities of experts on mission for the United Nations as laid down in the relevant sections of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
Article 24 The Committee shall submit an annual report on its activities under this Convention to the States Parties and to the General Assembly of the United Nations. PART III
Article 25 1. This Convention is open for signature by all States.
2. This Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Article 26 This Convention is open to accession by all States. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 27 1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying this Convention or acceding to it after the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 28 1. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not recognize the competence of the Committee provided for in article 20.
2. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article may, at any time, withdraw this reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 29 1. Any State Party to this Convention may propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall thereupon communicate the proposed amendment to the States Parties with a request that they notify him whether they favour a conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering and voting upon the proposal. In the event that within four months from the date of such communication at least one third of the States Parties favours such a conference, the Secretary-General shall convene the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a majority of the States Parties present and voting at the conference shall be submitted by the Secretary-General to all the States Parties for acceptance.
2. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article shall enter into force when two thirds of the States Parties to this Convention have notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations that they have accepted it in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
3. When amendments enter into force, they shall be binding on those States Parties which have accepted them, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions of this Convention and any earlier amendments which they have accepted.
Article 30 1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
2. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of this article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by paragraph 1 of this article with respect to any State Party having made such a reservation.
3. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article may at any time withdraw this reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 31 1. A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation becomes effective one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General.
2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the State Party from its obligations under this Convention in regard to any act or omission which occurs prior to the date at which the denunciation becomes effective, nor shall denunciation prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which is already under consideration by the Committee prior to the date at which the denunciation becomes effective.
3. Following the date at which the denunciation of a State Party becomes effective, the Committee shall not commence consideration of any new matter regarding that State.
Article 32 The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States Members of the United Nations and all States which have signed this Convention or acceded to it of the following:
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under articles 25 and 26;
(b) The date of entry into force of this Convention under article 27 and the date of the entry into force of any amendments under article 29;
(c) Denunciations under article 31.
Article 33 1. This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary- General of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of this Convention to all States.
72.) REPUBLIC ACT N0. 9745 AN ACT PENALIZING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: Section 1. Short Title. - This Ad shall be known as the "Anti-Torture Act of 2009". Section 2. Statement of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State: (a) To value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full respect for human rights; (b) To ensure that the human rights of all persons, including suspects, detainees and prisoners are respected at all times; and that no person placed under investigation or held in custody of any person in authority or, agent of a person authority shall be subjected to physical, psychological or mental harm, force, violence, threat or intimidation or any act that impairs his/her free wi11 or in any manner demeans or degrades human dignity; (c) To ensure that secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention, where torture may be carried out with impunity, are prohibited; and (d) To fully adhere to the principles and standards on the absolute condemnation and prohibition of torture as provided for in the 1987 Philippine Constitution; various international instruments to which the Philippines is a State party such as, but not limited to, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and all other relevant international human rights instruments to which the Philippines is a signatory. Section 3. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean: (a) "Torture" refers to an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person information or a confession; punishing him/her for an act he/she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or intimidating or coercing him/her or a third person; or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a person in authority or agent of a person in authority. It does not include pain or Buffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. (b) "Other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment" refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority against a person under his/her custody, which attains a level of severity causing suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter. (c) "Victim" refers to the person subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as defined above and any individual who has suffered harm as a result of any act(s) of torture, or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. (d) "Order of Battle" refers to any document or determination made by the military, police or any law enforcement agency of the government, listing the names of persons and organizations that it perceives to be enemies of the State and that it considers as legitimate targets as combatants that it could deal with, through the use of means allowed by domestic and international law. Section 4. Acts of Torture. - For purposes of this Act, torture shall include, but not be limited to, the following: (a) Physical torture is a form of treatment or punishment inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority upon another in his/her custody that causes severe pain, exhaustion, disability or dysfunction of one or more parts of the body, such as: (1) Systematic beating, headbanging, punching, kicking, striking with truncheon or rifle butt or other similar objects, and jumping on the stomach; (2) Food deprivation or forcible feeding with spoiled food, animal or human excreta and other stuff or substances not normally eaten; (3) Electric shock; (4) Cigarette burning; burning by electrically heated rods, hot oil, acid; by the rubbing of pepper or other chemical substances on mucous membranes, or acids or spices directly on the wound(s); (5) The submersion of the head in water or water polluted with excrement, urine, vomit and/or blood until the brink of suffocation; (6) Being tied or forced to assume fixed and stressful bodily position; (7) Rape and sexual abuse, including the insertion of foreign objects into the sex organ or rectum, or electrical torture of the genitals; (8) Mutilation or amputation of the essential parts of the body such as the genitalia, ear, tongue, etc.; (9) Dental torture or the forced extraction of the teeth; (10) Pulling out of fingernails; (11) Harmful exposure to the elements such as sunlight and extreme cold; (12) The use of plastic bag and other materials placed over the head to the point of asphyxiation; (13) The use of psychoactive drugs to change the perception, memory. alertness or will of a person, such as: (i) The administration or drugs to induce confession and/or reduce mental competency; or (ii) The use of drugs to induce extreme pain or certain symptoms of a disease; and (14) Other analogous acts of physical torture; and (b) "Mental/Psychological Torture" refers to acts committed by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority which are calculated to affect or confuse the mind and/or undermine a person's dignity and morale, such as: (1) Blindfolding; (2) Threatening a person(s) or his/fher relative(s) with bodily harm, execution or other wrongful acts; (3) Confinement in solitary cells or secret detention places; (4) Prolonged interrogation; (5) Preparing a prisoner for a "show trial", public display or public humiliation of a detainee or prisoner; (6) Causing unscheduled transfer of a person deprived of liberty from one place to another, creating the belief that he/she shall be summarily executed; (7) Maltreating a member/s of a person's family; (8) Causing the torture sessions to be witnessed by the person's family, relatives or any third party; (9) Denial of sleep/rest; (10) Shame infliction such as stripping the person naked, parading him/her in public places, shaving the victim's head or putting marks on his/her body against his/her will; (11) Deliberately prohibiting the victim to communicate with any member of his/her family; and (12) Other analogous acts of mental/psychological torture. Section 5. Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. - Other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority against another person in custody, which attains a level of severity sufficient to cause suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter. The assessment of the level of severity shall depend on all the circumstances of the case, including the duration of the treatment or punishment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, religion, age and state of health of the victim. Section 6. Freedom from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, An Absolute Bight. - Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as criminal acts shall apply to all circumstances. A state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency, or a document or any determination comprising an "order of battle" shall not and can never be invoked as a justification for torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. Section 7. Prohibited Detention. - Secret detention places, solitary confinement, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention, where torture may be carried out with impunity. Are hereby prohibited. In which case, the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and other law enforcement. agencies concerned shall make an updated list of all detention centers and facilities under their respective jurisdictions with the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained therein such as, among others, names, date of arrest and incarceration, and the crime or offense committed. This list shall be made available to the public at all times, with a copy of the complete list available at the respective national headquarters of the PNP and AFP. A copy of the complete list shall likewise be submitted by the PNP, AFP and all other law enforcement agencies to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), such list to be periodically updated, by the same agencies, within the first five (5) days of every month at the minimum. Every regional office of the PNP, AFP and other law enforcement agencies shall also maintain a similar list far all detainees and detention facilities within their respective areas, and shall make the same available to the public at all times at their respective regional headquarters, and submit a copy. updated in the same manner provided above, to the respective regional offices of the CHR. Section 8. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule; Exception. - Any confession, admission or statement obtained as a result of torture shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings, except if the same is used as evidence against a person or persons accused of committing torture. Section 9. Institutional Protection of Torture Victims and Other Persons Involved. - A victim of torture shall have the following rights in the institution of a criminal complaint for torture: (a) To have a prompt and an impartial investigation by the CHR and by agencies of government concerned such as the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the AFP. A prompt investigation shall mean a maximum period of sixty (60) working days from the time a complaint for torture is filed within which an investigation report and/or resolution shall be completed and made available. An appeal whenever available shall be resolved within the same period prescribed herein, (b) To have sufficient government protection against all forms of harassment; threat and/or intimidation as a consequence of the filing of said complaint or the presentation of evidence therefor. In which case, the State through its appropriate agencies shall afford security in order to ensure his/her safety and all other persons involved in the investigation and prosecution such as, but not limited to, his/her lawyer, witnesses and relatives; and (c) To be accorded sufficient protection in the manner by which he/she testifies and presents evidence in any fora in order to avoid further trauma. Section 10. Disposition of Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo and Habeas Data Proceedings and Compliance with a Judicial 07'der. - A writ of habeas corpus or writ of amparo or writ of habeas data proceeding, if any, filed on behalf of the victim of torture or other cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment or punishment shall be disposed of expeditiously and any order of release by virtue thereof, or other appropriate order of a court relative thereto, shall be executed or complied with immediately. Section 11. Assistance in Filing a Complaint. - The CHR and the PAO shall render legal assistance in the investigation and monitoring and/or filing of the complaint for a person who suffers torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, or for any interested party thereto. The victim or interested party may also seek legal assistance from the Barangay Human Rights Action Center (BRRAC) nearest him/her as well as from human rights nongovernment organizations (NGOs). Section 12. Right to' Physical, Medical and Psychological Examination. - Before and after interrogation, every person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall have the right to he informed of his/her right to demand physical examination by an independent and competent doctor of his/her own choice. If such person cannot afford the services of his/her own doctor, he/she shall he provided by the State with a competent and independent doctor to conduct physical examination. The State shall endeavor to provide the victim with psychological evaluation if available under the circumstances. If the person arrested is a female, she shall be attended to preferably by a female doctor. Furthermore, any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, including his/her immediate family, shall have the right to immediate access to proper and adequate medical treatment. The physical examination and/or psychological evaluation of the victim shall be contained in a medical report, duly signed by the attending physician, which shall include in detail his/her medical history and findings, and which shall he attached to the custodial investigation report. Such report shall be considered a public document. Following applicable protocol agreed upon by agencies tasked to conduct physical, psychological and mental examinations, the medical reports shall, among others, include: (a) The name, age and address of the patient or victim; (b) The name and address of the nearest kin of the patient or victim; (c) The name and address of the person who brought the patient or victim for physical, psychological and mental examination, and/or medical treatment; (d) The nature and probable cause of the patient or victim's injury, pain and disease and/or trauma; (e) The approximate time and date when the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were sustained; (f) The place where the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were sustained; (g) The time, date and nature of treatment necessary; and (h) The diagnosis, the prognosis and/or disposition of the patient. Any person who does not wish to avail of the rights under this pr<;lvision may knowingly and voluntarily waive such rights in writing, executed in the presence and assistance of his/her counsel. Section 13. Who are Criminally Liable. - Any person who actually participated Or induced another in the commission of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment or who cooperated in the execution of the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment by previous or simultaneous acts shall be liable as principal Any superior military, police or law enforcement officer or senior government official who issued an order to any lower ranking personnel to commit torture for whatever purpose shall be held equally liable as principals. The immediate commanding officer of the unit concerned of the AFP or the immediate senior public official of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies shall be held liable as a principal to the crime of torture or other cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment for any act or omission, or negligence committed by him/her that shall have led, assisted, abetted or allowed, whether directly or indirectly, the commission thereof by his/her subordinates. If he/she has knowledge of or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his/her subordinates or by others within his/her area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during or immediately after its commission, when he/she has the authority to prevent or investigate allegations of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment but failed to prevent or investigate allegations of such act, whether deliberately or due to negligence shall also be liable as principals. Any public officer or employee shall be liable as an accessory if he/she has knowledge that torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is being committed and without having participated therein, either as principal or accomplice, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner: (a) By themselves profiting from or assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; (b) By concealing the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and/or destroying the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; or(c) By harboring, concealing or assisting m the escape of the principal/s in the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment: Provided, That the accessory acts are done with the abuse of the official's public functions. Section 14. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the perpetrators of the following acts: (1) Torture resulting in the death of any person; (2) Torture resulting in mutilation; (3) Torture with rape; (4) Torture with other forms of sexual abuse and, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have become insane, imbecile, impotent, blind or maimed for life; and (5) Torture committed against children. (b) The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed on those who commit any act of mental/psychological torture resulting in insanity, complete or partial amnesia, fear of becoming insane or suicidal tendencies of the victim due to guilt, worthlessness or shame. (c) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed on those who commit any act of torture resulting in psychological, mental and emotional harm other than those described 1n paragraph (b) of this section. ' (d) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have lost the power of speech or the power to hear or to smell; or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg; or shall have lost the use of any such member; Or shall have become permanently incapacitated for labor. (e) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have become deformed or shall have lost any part of his/her body other than those aforecited, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for a period of more than ninety (90) days. (f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for mare than thirty (30) days but not more than ninety (90) days. (g) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for thirty (30) days or less. (h) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed for acts constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as defined in Section 5 of this Act. (i) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon those who establish, operate and maintain secret detention places and/or effect or cause to effect solitary confinement, incommunicado or other similar forms of prohibited detention as provided in Section 7 of this Act where torture may be carried out with impunity. (j) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon the responsible officers or personnel of the AFP, the PNP and other law enforcement agencies for failure to perform his/her duty to maintain, submit or make available to the public an updated list of detention centers and facilities with the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained therein, pursuant to Section 7 of this Act. Section 15. Torture as a Separate and Independent Crime. - Torture as a crime shall not absorb or shall not be absorbed by any other crime or felony committed as a consequence, or as a means in the conduct or commission thereof. In which case, torture shall be treated as a separate and independent criminal act whose penalties shall be imposable without prejudice to any other criminal liability provided for by domestic and international laws. Section 16. Exclusion from the Coverage of Special Amnesty Law. - In order not to depreciate the crime of torture, persons who have committed any act of torture shall not benefit from any special amnesty law or similar measures that will have the effect of exempting them from any criminal proceedings and sanctions. Section 17. Applicability of Refouler. - No person shall be expelled, returned or extradited to another State where there are substantial grounds to believe that such person shall be in danger of being subjected to torture. For the purposes of determining whether such grounds exist, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Secretary of the DOJ, in coordination with the Chairperson of the CHR, shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable and not limited to, the existence in the requesting State of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. Section 18. Compensation to Victims of Torture. - Any person who has suffered torture shall have the right to claim for compensation as provided for under Republic Act No. 7309: Provided, That in no case shall compensation be any lower than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00). Victims of torture shall also have the right to claim for compensation from such other financial relief programs that may be made available to him/her under existing law and rules and regulations. Section 19. Formulation of a Rehabilitation Program. - Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the DOJ and the Department of Health (DOH) and such other concerned government agencies, and human rights organizations shall formulate a comprehensive rehabilitation program for victims of torture and their families. The DSWD, the DOJ and thc DOH shall also call on human rights nongovernment organizations duly recognized by the government to actively participate in the formulation of such program that shall provide for the physical, mental, social, psychological healing and development of victims of torture and their families. Toward the attainment of restorative justice, a parallel rehabilitation program for persons who have committed torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment shall likewise be formulated by the same agencies. Section 20. Monitoring of Compliance with this Act. - An Oversight Committee is hereby created to periodically oversee the implementation of this Act. The Committee shall be headed by a Commissioner of the CRR, with the following as members: the Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, the respective Chairpersons of the House of Representatives' Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and the Minority Leaders of both houses or their respective representatives in the minority. Section 21. Education and Information Campaign. - The CHR, the DOJ, the Department of National Defense (DND), the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and such other concerned parties in both the public and private sectors shall ensure that education and information regarding prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment shall be fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment. The Department of Education (DepED) and the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) shall also ensure the integration of human rights education courses in all primary, secondary and tertiary level academic institutions nationwide. Section 22. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions of the Revised Penal Code insofar as they are applicable shall be suppletory to this Act. Moreover, if the commission of any crime punishable under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) and Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of the Revised Penal Code is attended by any of the acts constituting torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as defined herein, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum period. Section 23. Appropriations. - The amount of Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated to the CHR for the initial implementation of tills Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The DOJ and the CHR, with the active participation of human rights nongovernmental organizations, shall promulgate the rules and regulations for the effective implementation of tills Act. They shall also ensure the full dissemination of such rules and regulations to all officers and members of various law enforcement agencies. Section 25. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. Section 26. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 27. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. Approved,
73. Republic of the Philippines Congress of the Philippines Metro Manila Eighth Congress
Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992 AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every human being and guarantee full respect for human rights. Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. (a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. (b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1 (c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever. (d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding. (e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect. (f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fianc or fiance, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward. As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law. Section 3. Assisting Counsel. Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes. The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees; (a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1alf (b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with less grave or grave felonies; (c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with a capital offense. The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the province pays said fees. In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 4. Penalty Clause. (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense. The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel. (b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).lawphi1 The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape. Section 5. Repealing Clause. Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws, presidential decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly. Section 6. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. Approved: April 27, 1992. 74. 74. Inquest Procedures (DOJ Circular No. 61, 1993) Evidence Needed for an Inquest Proceedings SECTION 1. Concept. Inquest is an informal and summary investigation con-ducted by public prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of deter-mining whether or not said persons should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. SEC. 2. Designation of Inquest Officers. The City or Provincial Prosecutor shall designate the Prosecutors assigned to inquest duties and shall furnish the Philippine National Police (PNP) a list of their names and their schedule of assignments. If, however, there is only one Prosecutor in the area, all inquest cases shall be referred to him for appropriate action. Unless otherwise directed by the City or Provincial Prosecutor, those assigned to inquest duties shall discharge their functions during the hours of their designated assignments and only at the police stations/headquarters of the PNP in order to expedite and facilitate the disposition of inquest cases. SEC. 3. Commencement and Termination of Inquest. The inquest proceedings shall be considered commenced upon receipt by the Inquest Officer from the law enforcement authorities of the complaint/referral documents which should include: a. the affidavit of arrest; b. the investigation report; c. the statement of the complainant and witnesses; d. other supporting evidence gathered by the police in the course of the latters investigation of the criminal incident involving the arrested or detained person. The inquest Officer shall, as far as practicable, cause the affidavit of arrest and statements/affidavits of the complainant and the witnesses to be subscribed and sworn to before him by the arresting officer and the affiants. The inquest proceedings must be terminated within the period prescribed under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. * SEC. 4.Particular Documents Required in Specific Cases. The submission, presentation of the documents listed herein below should as far as practicable, be required in the following cases by the Inquest Officer.
Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612) a. a list/inventory of the articles and items subject of the offense; b. statement of their respective value Illegal Possession of Explosives (PD 1866) a. chemistry report duly signed by the forensic chemist b. photograph of the explosives, if readily available. Violation of the Fisheries Law (PD 704) (now RA 8550) a. photograph of the confiscated fish, if readily available; b. certification of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources; Violation of the Forestry Law (PD 705) a. scale sheets containing the volume and species of the forest products confiscated, number of pieces and other important details such as estimated value of the products confiscated; b. certification of Department of Environment and Natural Resources/Bureau of Forest Management; c. seizure receipt. The submission of the foregoing documents shall no absolutely be required if there are other forms of evidence submitted which will sufficiently establish the facts sought to be proved by the foregoing documents. SEC. 5. Incomplete documents. When the documents presented are not complete to establish probable cause, the Inquest Officer shall direct the law enforcement agency to submit the required evidence within the period prescribed under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; otherwise, the Inquest Officer shall order the release of the detained person and, where the inquest is conducted outside of office hours, direct the law enforcement agency concerned to file the case with the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action. SEC. 6. Presence of the detained person. The presence of the detained person who is under custody shall be ensured during the proceedings. However, the production of the detained person before the Inquest Officer may be dispensed with in the following cases: a. if he is confined in a hospital; b. if he is detained in a place under maximum security; c. if production of the detained person involve security risks; ord. if the presence of the detained person is not feasible by reason of age, health, sex andother similar factors.The absence of the detained person by reason of any of the foregoing factors must be noted bythe Inquest Officer and reflected in the record of the case. SEC. 7. Charges and counter-charges. All charges and counter-charges arising from the same incident shall, as far as practicable, be consolidated and inquested jointly to avoid contradictory or inconsistent dispositions. SEC. 8. Initial duty of the inquest officer. The Inquest Officer must first deter-mine if the arrest of the detained person was made in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and(b) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provide that arrests without a warrant may be effected: a. when, in the presence of the arresting officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; b. when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. For this purpose, the Inquest Officer may summarily examine the arresting officers on the circumstances surrounding the arrest or apprehension of the detained per-son. SEC. 9. Where arrest not properly effected. Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall: a. recommend the release of the person arrested or detained; b. note down the disposition of the referral document; c. prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; d. forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action. Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary investigation, the order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said detainee and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation, together with the copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavits or sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence. SEC. 10. Where the arrest property effected. Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was properly effected, the detained person should be asked if he desires to avail himself of a preliminary investigation, if he does, he shall be made to execute a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and, in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. The preliminary investigation may be conducted by the Inquest Officer himself or by any other Assistant Prosecutor to whom the case may be assigned by the City or Provincial Prosecutor, which investigation shall be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. SEC. 11. Inquest Proper . Where the detained person does not opt for a preliminary investigation or otherwise refuses to execute the required waiver, the Inquest Officer shall proceed with the inquest by examining the sworn statements/affidavits of the complainant and the witnesses and other supporting evidence submitted to him. If necessary, the Inquest Officer may require the presence of the complainant and witnesses and subject them to an informal and summary investigation or examination for purposes of determining the existence of probable cause. SEC. 12. Meaning of probable cause. Probable cause exists when the evidence submitted to the Inquest Officer engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the arrested or detained person is probably guilty thereof. SEC. 13. Presence of probable cause. If the Inquest Officer finds that probable cause exists, he shall forthwith prepare the corresponding complaint/information with the recommendation that the same be filed in court. The complaint/information shall indicate the offense committed and the amount of bail recommended, if bailable. Thereafter, the record of the case, together with the prepared com-plaint/information, shall be forwarded to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action. The complaint/information may be filed by the Inquest Officer himself or by any other Assistant Prosecutor to whom the case may be assigned by the City or Provincial Prosecutor. SEC. 14. Contents of information. The information shall, among others, contain: a. a certification by the filing Prosecutor that he is filing the same in accordance with the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, in cases cognizable by the Regional Trial Court; b. the full name and alias, if any, and address of the accused; c. the place where the accused is actually detained; d. the full names and addresses of the complainant and witnesses; e. a detailed description of the recovered item, if any; f. the full name and address of the evidence custodian; g. the age and date of birth of the complainant or the accused, if eighteen (19)years of age or below; and h. the full names and addresses of the parents, custodians or guardians of the minor complainant or accused, as the case may be. SEC. 15. Absence of probable cause. If the Inquest Officer finds no probable cause, he shall: a. recommend the release of the arrested or detained person; b. note down his disposition on the referral document c. prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; d. forthwith forward the record of the case to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action. If the recommendation of the Inquest Officer for the release of the arrested or detained person is approved, the order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of the said detainee. Should the City or Provincial Prosecutor disapprove the recommendation of release, the arrested or detained person shall remain under custody, and the corresponding complaint/information shall be filed by the City or Provincial Prosecutor or by any Assistant Prosecutor to whom the case may be assigned. SEC. 16. Presence at the crime scene. Whenever a dead body is found and there is reason to believe that the death resulted from foul play, or from the unlawful acts or omissions of other persons and such fact has been brought to his attention, the Inquest Officer shall: a. forthwith proceed to the crime scene or place of discovery of the dead person; b. cause an immediate autopsy to be conducted by the appropriate medico-legal officer in the locality or the PNP medico-legal division or the NBI medico-legal office, as the case may be; c. direct the police investigator to cause the taking of photographs of the crime scene or place of discovery of the dead body; d. supervise the investigation to be conducted by the police authorities as well as the recovery of all articles and pieces of evidence found thereat and see to it that the same are safeguarded and the chain of the custody thereof properly recorded; e. submit a written report of his finding to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action. SEC. 17. Sandiganbayan cases. Should any complaint cognizable by the Sandiganbayan be referred to an Inquest Officer for investigation, the latter shall, after conducting the corresponding inquest proceeding, forthwith forward the complete record to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
75. People v. Galit Facts: Francisco Galit was picked up by the Montalban police on suspicion for the killing of Mrs. Natividad Francisco, a widow. After he was taken by the Montalban police, the case was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, Galit was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. The following day, Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime, also implicating Juling and PablingDulay as his companions in its commission. As a result, he was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide before the Circuit Trial Court of Pasig. During trial, a witness stated that he overheard Galit quarrelling with his wife about his intention to leave their residence immediately because he and his two companions robbed and killed Natividad Fernando. On the other hand, Galit denied participation in the commission of the crime and also assailed the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession extracted from him through torture, force and intimidation. He recounted that he was mauled and tortured by the NBI officers by covering his face with a rag and pushing his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. He had no counsel when the confession was extracted from him. He admitted what the investigating officers wantedhim to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a re- enactment. This notwithstanding, the trial court found Galit guilty and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty.Issue: W/N Francisco Galit should be acquitted on the ground that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible.Ruling: YES. The evidence presented by the prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of thetrial court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by competent evidence. There were noeyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused atthe scene of the crime. The only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. The alleged confession and thepictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law. Galit acquitted. Issue: How is the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession shown? Ruling: Through the statement itself. The first question was a very long Tagalog question followed by a monosyllabic answer. It does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead, there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. The accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, the accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by the counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violation of his rights. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected 76. People vs Ordoo Facts: Ordoo and Medina were convicted of a crime of rape with homicide. Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina as the authors of the crime. Acting on this lead, the police thereupon invited the two (2) suspects and brought them to the police station for questioning. However, for lack of evidence then directly linking them to the crime, they were allowed to go home. On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina returned to the police station one after another and acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime. Acting on their admission, the police immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions in writing. The investigators however could not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the two (2) accused in the course of the investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality of Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union. Be that as it may, the statements of the two (2) accused where nevertheless taken. But before doing so, both accused were apprised in their own dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent counselof their choice. Upon their acquiescence and assurance that they understood their rights and did not require the services of counsel, the investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other police officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving of the voluntary statements of the two (2) suspects who admitted their participation in the crime. The first to confess was Apolonio Medina who in addition to the Parish Priest, the Mayor, the Chief of Police and the other police officers was also accompanied by his wife and mother. After Medina said his piece, his wife and mother suddenly burst into tears. He then affixed his signature on his statement and so did his wife, followed by all the other witnesses who listened to his confession. Ordoo affixed his thumb mark on his statement in lieu of his signature as he did not know how to write. Thereafter, Apolonio Medina and Pacito Ordoo were detained at the Santol police station. News about the apprehension and detention of the culprits of the rape-slay of Shirley Victore soon spread that Roland Almoite, leading radio announcer of radio station DZNL, visited and interviewed them. In the interview which was duly tape-recorded both accused admitted again their complicity in the crime and narrated individually the events surrounding their commission thereof. Upon conclusion of the interview, Roland Almoite immediately went to radio station DZNL and played the taped interview on the air. A couple of days later, the police brought the two (2) accused to the office of the PAO lawyer in Balaoan, La Union, for assistance and counseling. In a closed- door session, PAO lawyer Oscar B. Corpuz apprised each of the accused of his constitutional rights and, even though their confessions were already written in their dialect, explained to them each of the questions and answers taken during the investigation. He likewise advised them to ponder the consequences of their confessions, leading them to defer the affixing of their second signature/ thumbmark thereon. After a week or so, the two (2) separately went back to Atty. Corpuz and informed him of their willingness to affix their signatures and thumbmarks for the second time in their respective confessions. Once again Atty. Corpuz apprised the two (2) accused of their constitutional rights, explained the contents of their respective statements, and finally, accompanied them to Judge Fabian M. Bautista, MTC judge of Balaoan, La Union, who further apprised the two (2) accused of their constitutional rights and asked them if they had been coerced into signing their confessions. They assured Judge Bautista that their statements had been given freely and voluntarily. Upon such assurance that they had not been coerced into giving and signing their confessions, Judge Bautista finally asked the accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina to affix their signatures/ thumbmarks on their respective confessions, and to subscribe the same before him. Atty. Corpuz then signed their statements as their assisting counsel, followed by a few members of the MTC staff who witnessed the signing. On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the two (2) accused pleaded not guilty. Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions were valid Ruling: (1) No. In the instant case, custodial investigation began when the accused Ordoo and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to confess and the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit information and/or confession from them. At such point, the right of the accused to counsel automatically attached to them. Concededly, after informing the accused of their rights the police sought to provide them with counsel. However, none could be furnished them due to the non-availability of practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the remoteness of the town to the next adjoining town of Balaoan, La Union, where practicing lawyers could be found. At that stage, the police should have already desisted from continuing with the interrogation but they persisted and gained the consent of the accused to proceed with the investigation. In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial confession the accused's parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by the accused may be present, RA 7438 does not propose that they appear in the alternative or as a substitute for counsel without any condition or clause. It is explicitly stated therein that before the above-mentioned persons can appear two (2) conditions must be met: (a) counsel of the accused must be absent, and, (b) a valid waiver must be executed. Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the two (2) accused in continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. 9 Consequently, any admission obtained from the two (2) accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8) days later does not remedy this omission either. This aid and valuable advice given by counsel still came several days too late. It could not cure the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statements were being taken. 10
The second affixation of the signatures/ thumbmarks of the accused on their confessions a few days after their closed-door meeting with the PAO lawyer, in the presence and with the signing of the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and other witnesses, likewise did not make their admissions an informed one. Admissions obtained during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel although reduced into writing and later signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. 11 If the lawyer's role is diminished to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a prepared document albeit an indication therein that there was compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused, the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12, par. (1), are not met. (2) Yes. The taped interview revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the crime. Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements made by herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview was not in the nature of an investigation as the response of the accused was made in answer to questions asked by the radio reporter, not by the police or any other investigating officer.
77. People v Lugod Facts: On October 10, 1997, an Information for rape with homicide was filed against the Lugod for committing the same against 8 yr old girl Nairube. During the trial, lower court rely heavily to the testimony of the officer who arrested the accused and to whom he allegedly confessed the crime, and later accompany him when he pinpoints the location of the dead body of the girl. Issue: WON the admission by the accused admissible and his pinpointing the location of the dead body admissible. Held: No. At the time of the arrest of the accused, the apprehending officers did not inform him and in fact acted in a blatant and wanton disregard of his constitutional rights specified in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, which provides: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, the accused-appellants act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed accused-appellants rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the same vein, the accused-appellants act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the accused-appellants right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the uncounselled confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. Even if we were to assume that accused-appellant was not yet under interrogation and thus not entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the police station, the acts of accused-appellant subsequent to his apprehension cannot be characterized as having been voluntarily made considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. His confession was elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if he told the truth. Furthermore, when accused-appellant allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2 Gallardo, the whole police force as well as nearly one hundred (100) of the townspeople of Cavinti escorted him there. Ricardo Vida stated that the townspeople were antagonistic towards accused-appellant and wanted to hurt him. [ The atmosphere from the time accused-appellant was apprehended and taken to the police station up until the time he was alleged to have pointed out the location of the body of the victim was highly intimidating and was not conducive to a spontaneous response. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere, accused-appellants claim that he was beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he visited accused-appellant in the jail cell, he noticed that the accused- appellant had bruises on his face, corroborated accused-appellants assertion that he was maltreated. 78. PP VS EDRALIN TABOGA FACTS: At 2:00 in the early morning of April 1, 1998, at Magsingal, Ilocos Sur, Barangay Councilman Cirilo Urayani woke up to the sound of loud explosions. He thought people were lighting firecrackers in the neighbouring barangay to celebrate their fiesta. He went out of the house to fetch water, and he saw the house of Francisca Tubon on fire. Barangay Captain William Pagao heard the shouts for help. He and other barangay officials and residents helped in dousing out the fire using a water pump. When they entered the burned house, they discovered the charred remains of Francisca Tubon. They examined the body and found stab wounds on the chest of the deceased. The deceaseds former farm workers were rounded up, namely, Mario Ceria, Edwin Ceria, Tante Dumadag and Edralin Taboga. Brgy. Capt. Pagao noticed fresh blood stains on the short pants of Taboga. He confronted Taboga, and the latter readily admitted that he killed Francisca Tubon and set the flue-cured tobacco stored inside her house on fire, causing the whole house, including the dead body of the old woman, to be burned. Taboga was brought to the police station for further investigation. Mr. Mario Contaoi, a radio announcer of DZNS, went to the Magsingal Municipal Police Station to interview the suspect, Edralin Taboga. Again, Taboga admitted killing the deceased and setting her and her house on fire. In the meantime, the Forensic Biologist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who examined the bloodstains on Tabogas shorts and on the kitchen knife, found that the said specimens contained human blood Type O, the blood type of the deceased. On the other hand, the Municipal Health Officer of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur who performed an autopsy on the victims charred remains, found several stab wounds on the chest. According to him, the victim may have been stabbed to death before she and her house were burned Accused-appellant Edralin Taboga raised the defense of denial and alibi. Accused-appellant further claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen and forced to admit the crime. Regarding his admission to radio announcer Mario Contaoi, he narrated that the interview was held inside the investigation room of the police station where policemen were present. Thus, he had to admit the crimes because he was afraid of the policemen. Moreover, relatives of the deceased beat him up by kicking him, hitting him with a chair, slapping him and punching him on the head and face. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, Branch 24, rendered judgment finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. ISSUE: Whether or Not the constitutional right of the accused-appellant was violated by admitting as evidence the extrajudicial confession? HELD: There is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the police authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused- appellant. Neither is there anything on record which even remotely suggests that the radio announcer was instructed by the police to extract information from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the reporter even asked permission from the officer-in-charge to interview accused-appellant. Nor was the information obtained under duress. In fact, accused-appellant was very much aware of what was going on. Under Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be a sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. As defined, it means the body of the crime and, in its primary sense, means a crime has actually been committed. Applied to a particular offense, it is the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. In the case at bar, the confession made by accused-appellant was corroborated by several items found by the authorities, to wit: the knife which was used to kill the victim and the charred body of the victim. The court a quo did not err in admitting in evidence accused-appellants taped confession. Such confession did not form part of custodial investigation. It was not given to police officers but to a media man in an apparent attempt to elicit sympathy. The record even discloses that accused-appellant admitted to the Barangay Captain that he clubbed and stabbed the victim even before the police started investigating him at the police station. Furthermore, accused-appellants confession is replete with details on the manner in which the crimes were committed, thereby ruling out the probability that it was involuntarily made. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could be supplied only by the accused reflecting spontaneity and coherence which, psychologically, cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and torture have been applied, it may be considered voluntary. In the early case of U.S. v. De los Santos, we stated: If a confession be free and voluntary the deliberate act of the accused with a full comprehension of its significance, there is no impediment to its admission as evidence, and it becomes evidence of a high order; since it is supported by the presumption a very strong presumption that no person of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be a perpetrator of a crime, especially if it be a serious crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.
79. People v Baloloy FACTS: At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the eveningof August 3, 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho was found. Autopsyreports found that Genelyn was raped before she was drowned. The one who caused itsdiscovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself, who claimed that he had caught sightof it while he was catching frogs in a nearby creek. While in the wake of Genelyn, Juanitoconfessed to the Barangay Captain that he only wanted to frighten the girl but ended up rapingand throwing her body in the ravine. While in the custody of the authorities, he was askedincriminating questions by Judge Dicon who justified his actions saying that Juanito was not yet incustodial investigation. Based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with circumstantialevidence, the trial court found Juanito guilty of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death.On appeal, Juanito maintains that the trial court violated Section 12(1) of Article III of theConstitution when it admitted in evidence his alleged extrajudicial confession to BarangayCaptain Ceniza and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two failed to inform him of hisconstitutional rights before they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the incriminatoryinformation. It is of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police investigators, for as publicofficials it was incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution. Whilethese rights may be waived, the prosecution failed to show that he effectively waived his rightsthrough a written waiver executed in the presence of counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicialconfession is inadmissible in evidence. ISSUES: (1)Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the barangay captai n wasadmissible. (2)Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the judge was admissible. HELD: (1) YES. As to his confession with the Baragay Captain Ceniza, it has been held that theconstitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, notelicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby thesuspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. In the instant case, Juanito voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYNand thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freelyand voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection with the commission of the offense. Moreover, Juanito didnot offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza, which could havecompelled her to testify falsely against him.
(2) NO. However, there is merit in Juanitos claim that his constitutional rights duringcustodial investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the latt er propounded to himincriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at themoment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodialinvestigation is deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about hiscomplicit y in the offense without the assistance of counsel. Judge Dicon's claim that no complainthas yet been filed and that neither was he conducting a preliminary investigation deserves scantconsideration. The fact remains that at that time Juanito was already under the custody of thepolice authorities, who had already taken the statement of the witnesses who were then beforeJudge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their statements.
80. Govt of the USA vs Purganan Facts: pursuant to the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States, the latter requested the extradition to respondent. Respondent asked the court hearing the petition for his extradition to allow him to be released on bail. Issue: WON respondent can apply for bail Ruling: No. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from presumption of innocence in favour of every accused. The constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not in issue. 81. Narciso v sta. romana Facts: The accused, Joselito Mendoza, was charged for parricide for the murder of his wife. After the conduct of Preliminary Investigation, the fiscal found out that there is a probable cause in the case filed and thereafter filed it to the RTC for judicial determination. The accused filed an Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused Joselito Narciso to Post Bail. The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted on the same day, allowing accused to post bail at P150,000.00 The private prosecutor representing private complainant Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, a sister of accuseds deceased wife, filed an "Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused To Post Bail. The RTC fails to hear the said motion because of the postponement of the hearing thus private complainant filed petition for certiorari before CA of which it was granted. The accused question the decision of CA, contending that it erroneously decided questions of substance, in a manner not in accord with law, the Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence, when it reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted the petitioner his constitutional right to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of the proceedings and after assessment of the evidence, have themselves recommended the grant of bail. Issue: WON the accused should be granted bail considering the crime charged is a capital offense. Held: NO. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. The Court of Appeals is correct in its decision that there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail. 82. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS VASQUEZ FACTS: Information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is impaired.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the petitioners right to bail was impaired?
HELD: It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and complete despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. This was the ruling we handed down in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 32 to the effect that: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935): . . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
83. Agullo vs Sandiganbayan Facts: Agulo was charged of malversation of funds. The prosecution did not present any witness and rely on the presumption of malversation in which: The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.. Agullo insisted that she did not use the funds for personal use and that she lost it when she suffered stroke while she is on the street with the funds. Sandiganbayan find her guilty. Issue: WON presumption of innocence be over thrown by prima facie evidence established by law against her. Held: No. To coupled with the other peculiarities attendant in the instant case and further considering the palpable failure of the prosecution to adduce other evidence to clearly establish conversion suffice to make the mind uneasy as to Agullos guilt, notwithstanding the prima facie evidence established by law against herein petitioner, which by no means dispenses with the need of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. After all, mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of conversion. Neither is the mere failure of the accused to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to make even a prima facie case. Conversion must be affirmatively proved, either by direct evidence or by the production of facts from which conversion necessarily follows. Truly, these serve as strong considerations that seriously impair the basis upon which is founded the legal presumption of personal misappropriation of money or property of accountable officers who fail to have forthcoming, such money or property when so demanded by a duly authorized official. Verily, a finding of prima facie evidence of accountability does not shatter the presumptive innocence the accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises, certain facts [have still to be] proved; the trial court cannot depend alone on such an evidence, because precisely, it is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guiltybeyond reasonable doubtof the offense charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may adduce.
84. People vs Bato Facts: The brothers surnamed Bato were charged for the murder of Ernesto Flores, Sr. The prosecution presented Ernesto Flores, Jr., son of the victim, who testified as follows: On May 9, 1988 at about three oclock in the afternoon, Ernesto Flores, Jr. together with his father Ernesto Flores, Sr., were going home from Barangay Tingib, Pastrana, Leyte to San Agustin, Jaro, Leyte. While passing by Barangay Hibucawan, they were called by the two appellants, Abraham and Sergio, both surnamed Bato, to join them in a drinking spree in the house of Paran Lescabo, which Ernesto, Sr. accepted. Ernesto, Jr. sat about two (2) meters away from his father while the latter joined appellants for two hours drinking tuba. When his father was already drunk, appellants tied him (father) with his hands placed at the back. Later, he saw appellants bring his father to somewhere else. Seeing his father being held, he ran away, as he was afraid he would also be taken by appellants. It was only the following morning that they found his father already dead at the Binaha-an River, five kilometers away from the place where he last saw him in the previous afternoon. He immediately reported the incident to the Barangay Captain of Barangay Tingib. The latter informed the police department about the incident. The witness established only the following circumstances surrounding the crime: (1) that the Bato brothers invited the victim and his son for a drink; (2) after two hours of drinking, said brothers suddenly tied the hands of the older Flores and took him away; (3) the following day, the body of the victim, which sustained several hack and stab wounds, was recovered at the Binaha-an River, about five kilometers away from where he was last seen by the witness.
Issue: WON the prosecution established accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence Ruling: No. In the absence of an eyewitness, the guilt of an accused may be established by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence, however, must still pass the test of moral certainty. When inadequate and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot sustain a conviction. Specifically, where the states evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails and the accused is entitled to an acquittal. Ernesto Jr. admitted that there was no enmity or bad blood between his father and the accused. He further asserted that there was no altercation during the drinking spree. Likewise, he made no statement that any of the Bato brothers, at the time, carried any bladed weapon which could have been used in his fathers murder. Moreover, he did not see where the appellants brought his father after they had tied his hands. More significantly, he failed to testify on how his father was killed, who killed him, or even when he was killed. These lacunae in the prosecution account necessarily spawn doubts in the mind of a reasonable person. Because the appellants tied the victims hands, can it be inferred that they also intended to kill him, and actually killed him? Where did the accused take him? What happened between the time the accused tied the victim and the following morning when his lifeless body was found? There is absolutely no evidence of what transpired during that interval. The prosecution, in effect, asked the courts merely to guess or to surmise that the accused must have killed the victim during such interregnum. But conjectures, surmises and suspicions cannot take the place of evidence, particularly where as in this case contrary suspicions, surmises and queries can also be floated and believed. It is also noteworthy that Ernesto Jr. did not attempt to attract the attention of other people who were nearby at the time, or to seek their aid. Instead, he ran home and related the events to his mother. Oddly, he and his mother reacted not by reporting the matter to the police, or even just to their barangay chairman, their council members or their neighbors. They simply slept the night away. Notwithstanding the presence of other who were nearby when the appellants tied the hands of the victim, the prosecution failed to present any other witnesses to corroborate Ernesto Jr.s testimony. As it was, his testimony was grossly insufficient and sorely in need of corroboration. It has been held that circumstantial evidence which has not been adequately established, much less corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of conviction. [30]
85. People v Ronaldo de Guzman Facts: On June 10, 2003, a confidential informant reported De Guzmans drug pushing activities to Alcala, Pangasinans Chief of Police, Sotero Soriano, Jr. Soriano immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. During such operation, the confidential informant introduced appellant to Senior Police Officer (SPO)1 Daniel Llanillo, who was designated as poseur-buyer. Llanillo tried to buy P200 worth of shabu. He handed two marked P100 bills to De Guzman, and the latter, in turn, gave him two heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing what was suspected as shabu. Thereafter, Llanillo gave the prearranged signal to the rest of the team. Appellant was arrested and frisked. The team recovered from De Guzman two packs of empty transparent sachets, three disposable lighters, and P3,380.00 in cash, which included the marked money paid by SPO1 Llanillo. The team then brought De Guzman to the police station in Alcala, Pangasinan. At the police station, De Guzman and the items seized during the buy-bust operation were turned over to the police investigator, SPO3 Eduardo Yadao. SPO3 Yadao entered the incident in the police blotter. He then placed his initials on the packets of suspected shabu, which were later submitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Urdaneta City.Confirmatory tests revealed that the substance in the packets that appellant handed to SPO1 Llanillo was indeed shabu. Issue: WON items seized during the buy- bust operation admissible? Held: NO. The Constitution mandates that an accused in a criminal case shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is laden with the burden to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. Consequently, courts are required to put the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe testing, and the constitutional right to presumption of innocence requires them to take a more than casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused. When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail, and the court must acquit. The duty to prove the guilt of an accused is reposed in the State. Law enforcers and public officers have the duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights. Since in this case, the items seized were only marked at the police station and not at the place right after the buy-bust operation, the chain of custody is broken thus the items seized were inadmissible. 86. PP VS MAGSI
FACTS: Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that date, despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favourably acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other co-accused. Appellant was found guilty of murder and made to suffer the death penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the accused.
HELD: YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the basic rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55 SCRA 243-244): the trial courts should exercise solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital offenses by first insuring that the accused fully understands the gravity of the offense, the severity of the consequences attached thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his plea of guilty; and that the prudent and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take testimony, to assure the court that the accused has not misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance 87. People vs Rivera Facts: Rolando Rivera was charged of raped of Erlanie Rivera his 12 years old daughter. Rolando was found guilty by the trial court. On this appeal, Rolando content that he was denied of due process for the following reasons (1) his counsel was not allowed to question the witness Erlanie regarding the previous acts of lasciviousness that she stated in her affidavit during the cross examination. According to the defense such question if answered could have discredit the testimony of Erlanie because there is discrepancy in her direct testimony and her affidavit. However it was not allowed by the court. (2) it was a counsel de officio and not his council who crossed examine the doctor who took the medical examination when the allege rape was reported. He contend that the counsel de officio was not familiar with the case and not in the position to cross examine the witness. (2) the judge questions propounded to him during his cross-examination as an indication of the latters partiality for the prosecution.
Issue: Was Rolando denied of due process? Held NO. Procedural due process simply means that a person must be heard before he is condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a persons basic rights, not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. Considering both the evidence and the law applicable to this case, we hold that Rolando has been accorded his right to due process. 1. The witness testified only on the rape case. She did not testify anything about acts of lasciviousness committed upon her person. She may not therefore be questioned on this matter because it is not connected with her direct testimony or has any bearing upon the issue. To allow adverse party to cross-examine the witness on the acts of lasciviousness which is pending trial in another court and which the witness did not testify is improper. Questions concerning acts of lasciviousness will not in any way test the accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or the reverse. On the contrary such questions, if allowed, will unduly burden the court with immaterial testimonies.
2. While the Constitution recognizes the accuseds right to competent and independent counsel of his own choice, his option to secure the services of a private counsel is not absolute. For considering the States and the offended partys right to speedy and adequate justice, the court may restrict the accuseds option to retain a private counsel if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or if the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or if the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason The trial court appointed Atty. Bansil a counsel de oficio to represent accused-appellant because his regular counsel, Atty. Anselmo Mangalindan, was absent without any explanation. Atty. Mangalindan had previously been granted several postponements. 3. We find no merit in this contention. Where the trial court is judge both of the law and of the facts, it is oftentimes necessary in the due and faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge to re-examine a witness so that his judgment, when rendered, may rest upon a full and clear understanding of the facts. Our reading of the transcript of stenographic notes in this case shows that the trial judge merely wanted to clarify certain points relating to the defense of accused-appellant and not to establish his guilt. It is a judges prerogative to ask questions to ferret out the truth. It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveals certain truths which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party
88. People vs. Alcanzado Facts: Accused was found guilty by the lower court of murder. He appealed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the SC assailing the decision. The records show that appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on July 30, 1998. Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case on October 13, 1998. Upon motion of appellant, the RTC issued an Order dated November 10, 1998 allowing appellant to file a demurrer to evidence. On November 19, 1998, appellant filed his Demurrer to Evidence which was opposed by the prosecution. On April 22, 1999, the RTC promulgated herein assailed decision convicting appellant. Issue: WON the accused was denied the opportunity to be heard Ruling: Yes. The RTC committed a very serious error in promulgating a decision after denying the demurrer to evidence filed by appellant upon prior leave of court, without first giving appellant the opportunity to present his evidence. Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court. If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused filed such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. Contrary to the RTCs assertion in its decision that the demurrer to evidence was denied,
the records of the case do not reveal that there was any prior order denying appellants demurrer to evidence before the rendition of the assailed judgment. Evidently, the trial court violated the aforequoted provisions of Section 15, Rule 119. Appellant had filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted by the RTC and therefore upon denial of his demurrer, if indeed it was denied, the trial court should have given appellant the opportunity to present his evidence. Equally astonishing is the fact that appellants counsel did not raise said irregularity as an issue in the RTC or in this Court. In effect, appellant has not been accorded due process. Due to the procedural unfairness and complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings in the RTC, a remand of the case for reception of defense evidence is warranted. The constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense has been violated.
89. People v Bayya FACTS: Some time in 1994, when victim was still 12 years old, her father, the accused, forced her at the point of a knife to have sexual intercourse with him. He repeated the bestial act in their house about twice a week afterwards, and then later used her four (4) times a month, the last she remembered being on July 5, 1995. During the trial, appellant unhesitatingly admitted having carnal knowledge of his daughter twice but theorized that he was "out of his mind" when he committed the incestous rape. In view of the facts established, the trial court rendered judgment of conviction, sentencing appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of death. Upon appeal, appellant questioned thepenalty imposed under R.A. 7659, considering that the Information filed against him was silent about the applicability of the same. He alleged denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a transgression of appellant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him HELD: A careful perusal of the Information indicting the appellant reveals a crucial omission in its averments of the minority of the victim. The objectives of the defendant's right to be informed are: (1) to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make the defense; (2) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further prosecution for the same cause; and (3) to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether the are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. The Information does not allege the minority of the victim although the same was proven during trial as borne by the records. It matters not how conclusive and convincing evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense not charged in the Complaint or Information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. The Information charges nothing more than simple rape as absent are the special qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority which had the capacity of increasing the penalty by degrees. 90. 91. 92. Teves vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: Petitioner, the municipal mayor, and his co-petitioner, where charged with violation of Section 3 (d) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by causing the issuance of a license to operate a cockpit in the municipality, which they owned. They were convicted instead of violating the second part of the provision, which penalized possession of financial or pecuniary interest in any business in which one is prohibited by law from having any interest. The Sandiganbayan convicted them. Petitioner and co-petitioner argued that by convicting them for another offense, the Sandiganbayan violated their right to be informed. Issue: WON there was a violation of the petitioners right to be informed Ruling: No.The essential elements of the offense proved form part of those constituting the offense charged, thereby warranting the conviction of petitioner.
93. Republic of the Philippines Congress of the Philippines Metro Manila Tenth Congress
Republic Act No. 8493 February 12, 1998 AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998." Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. - In all cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following: (a) Plea bargaining; (b) Stipulation of Facts; (c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties; (d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and (e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. Section 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or entered into during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used in evidence against the accused. The agreements in relation to matters referred to in Section 2 hereof is subject to the approval of the court: Provided, That the agreement on the plea of the accused to a lesser offense may only be revised, modified, or annulled by the court when the same is contrary to law, public morals, or public policy. Section 4. Nonappearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - Where counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his/her lack of cooperation, the pre- trial justice or judge may impose proper sanctions or penalties. Section 5. Pre-Trial Order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice. Section 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial.- The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the court. If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence. Section 8. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial. - If the accused is to be tried again following an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final, except that the court retrying the case may extend such period but in any case shall not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other factors resulting from passage of time shall make trial within thirty (30) days impractical. Section 9. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Act, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by Section 7 of this Act shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve- month period the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial shall be eighty (80) days. Section 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence: (a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following: (1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused, and hearing on his/her mental competency, or physical incapacity; (2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges against the accused; (3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals; (4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions: Provided, That the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days, (5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts; (6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial question; and (7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement. (b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the accused or an essential witness. For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential witness shall be considered absent when his/her whereabouts are unknown and, in addition, he/she is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his/her whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. An accused or an essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his/her whereabouts are known but his/her presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he/she resists appearing at or being returned for trial. (c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial. (d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, or any offense required to be joined with that offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge. (e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted. (f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or judge motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or judge granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this subparagraph shall be excludable under this section unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial. Section 11. Factors for Granting Continuance. - The factors, among others, which a justice or judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 of this Act are as follows: (a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice. (b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and so complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established by this Act. No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 shall be granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor. Section 12. Public Attorney's Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned. - If the public attorney knows that a person charged of a crime is preventively detained, either because he/she is charged of a bailable crime and has no means to post bail, or is charged of a non-bailable crime, or is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution, the public attorney shall promptly: (a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner mandating such person to so advise the prisoner of his/her right to demand trial. (b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of his/her right to demand trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner informs the person having custody that he/she demands trial, such person shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney. (c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial. (d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly supported request for temporary custody of the prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made available to that public attorney. Section 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the Time Limit. - If an accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 7 of this Act as extended by Section 9, the information shall be dismissed on motion of the accused. The accused shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with the exclusion of time under Section 10 of this Act. In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal, and the impact of a reprosecution on the implementation of this Act and on the administration of justice. Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section. Section 14. Sanctions. - In any case in which counsel for the accused, the public prosecution or public attorney: (a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial; (b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she knows is totally frivolous and without merit; (c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he/she knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or (d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of this Act, the court may, without prejudice to any appropriate criminal and/or administrative charges to be instituted by the proper party against the erring counsel if and when warranted, punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows: (1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an accused, by imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty percent (50%) of the compensation to which he/she is entitled in connection with his/her defense of the accused; (2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or public prosecutor a fine not exceeding Ten thousand pesos (10,000.00); and (3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to practice before the court considering the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to the court. The court shall follow the procedures established in the Rules of Court in punishing any counsel or public prosecutor pursuant to this section. Section 15. Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars which shall seek to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases. The rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars formulated shall provide sanctions against justices and judges who willfully fail to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of this Act. Section 16. Funding. - For the effective implementation of the rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars promulgated under this Act, the amount of Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) annually shall be appropriated from the allocation of the Supreme Court under the General Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such additional amounts as may be necessary for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. Section 17. Act Not a Bar to Speedy Trial Claim Under the Constitution. - No provision of this Act shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 18. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 19. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in effect. Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation: Provided, That Section 7 of this Act shall become effective after the expiration of the aforementioned third-calendar-month period provided in Section 9 of this Act. Approved: February 12, 1998 94. ESTRADA VS DESIERTO FACTS: The court looked at the events that occurred prior and immediately after the oath-taking of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (to be referred to in the rest of the digest as GMA) as president of the Republic of the Philippines (RP).
On 11 May 1998, petitioner Joseph E. Estrada (will subsequently be referred to as Erap) was elected as President of RP with GMA as his vice-President. By the late 2000, word spread of Eraps alleged involvement in jueteng and his receiving jueteng money as Jose Pidal. Erap quickly loses popularity among different social groups and public officials, even high ranking members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), started defecting from his agendas. And because of the jueteng scandal, an impeachment proceeding started on 7 December 2000. Upon its resumption in January, however, a vote of 11-10 against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing Erap as Jose Velarde with P3.3billion in secret bank account cut short the impeachment trial as prosecutors walked out and joined the rallying of people in the streets of Manila.
Amidst the pressure, Erap proposed snap elections, which he is not to run as candidate, to regain stability in the country but such a move did little to quell the wave against him. Two rounds of negotiations were held between Eraps camp and that of GMA in the early hours of 20 January 2001 and at 12nn of the same day, GMA took her oath as RP president. Both houses of Congress acknowledged her presidency, as well as the international community. Erap, on the other hand, left Malacanang and is now faced with legal action against him by the Office of the Ombudsman among other things. ISSUE: Whether petitioners prosecution should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity HELD: No. As for a prejudicial publicity, this would not apply to the present case. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Theyre essentially unrelated. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that petitioner did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against petitioner were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution. 94-A Re: Petition for radio and television coverage of the multiple murder cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, Facts: On the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, the Court found that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. 95. Cariaga vs. Court of Appeals Facts: Jonathan Cariaga, petitioner, was charged with qualified theft, being then an employee of Davao Light & Power Co. Inc., Davao City, and as such has access to the said companys electrical equipment, supplies and materialsone of the basis for his conviction was the extrajudicial confession of his cousin, Ricardo Cariaga, who acted as his fence. The prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as its witness as the subpoena could not be personally served upon him as according to his wife, Antonieta Cariaga, he was in Sultan Kudarat and the date of his return to Davao City was not certain. Issue: WON the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga without him taking the witness stand since it violates the fundamental right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face. Hence, Ricardo Cariagas sworn statement is not admissible under Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court for failure of the prosecution to comply with the strict requirements of said rule, to wit: a] Ricardo Cariaga did not orally testify in the labor case; b] Inability to testify must be for a grave cause almost amounting to death and the prosecution must exhaust all available remedies to secure the presence of its witnesses at the trial; c] That the former proceeding must also be criminal in nature. Ruling: YES. petitioner argues that the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who was not presented in court is inadmissible. The prosecution presented in evidence Ricardo Cariagas sworn statement which was attached as Annex 8- A to DLPCs position paper in the labor case filed by Jonathan Cariaga against the latter for illegal dismissal. The trial court admitted the same in evidence despite the timely objection of the defense counsel. A relevant rule is Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of Court in respect of the admissibility in evidence in a criminal case of the previous testimony of unavailable witnesses which reads: Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled: f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had the opportunity to cross- examine him; In Tan vs. Court of Appeals, [8] it was ruled that unable to testify or for that matter unavailability, does not cover the case of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not appear. It may refer to inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech. It does not refer to tampering of witnesses. The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was subpoenaed only once and did not appear to testify in the criminal case against petitioner. Concededly, this witness was not deceased or out of the Philippines. In fact, the private prosecutor informed the court that he is in Sultan Kudarat, [9] and previously, his wife informed the sheriff that he was in Sultan Kudarat which is in Cotabato, a mere four hours drive from Davao City. It must be emphasized that this rule is strictly complied with in criminal cases, hence, mere sending of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove inability to testify. The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest. [10] In the instant case, no efforts were exerted to have the witness arrested which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances where witnesses who are duly subpoenaed fail to appear. 96. People v Ong Facts: Two Chinese nationals were charged for the violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The prosecution sought to establish that the accused were arrested via a buy bust operation conducted through a confidential informant who perfected the sale of illegal drugs. However, the prosecution failed to present as witness the said informant for security and protection purposes. The only person that the prosecution managed to present is the police officer who is with the confidential informant during the exchange. The defense then contended that the testimony of the police officer with regards of the sale that transpire between the accused and the confidential informant is a mere hearsay, for such police officer is never present when the contract of sale was perfected, or when the deal was closed and there is an agreement to sell shabu. Issue: WON the testimony of the police officer is enough to convict the accused Held: No. The prosecutions testimony is not admissible as he was not privy to the sale transaction that transpired between the CI and appellant William Ong, the alleged pusher. It is beyond contention that a contract of sale is perfected upon a meeting of the minds of the parties on the object and its price. It is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, albeit only through the telephone, with the pusher. The CI was likewise the one who closed the deal with appellant Ong as to the quantity of shabu to be purchased and its price. He also set the venue and time of the meeting when the sale would take place. Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the acceptance of the offer and the consideration for the offer, we hold that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the poseur-buyer but merely the deliveryman. His testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and standing alone cannot be the basis of the conviction of the appellants. 97. . PP VS BOHOL FACTS: An informant of the PNP has a tip that a certain Ricardo Bohol is involved in a drug trade. The PNP respond to the information and by verifying the information and subsequently formed a six-man team to conduct a buy-bust operation. PO2 Estrada acted as the buyer. The operation was successful, apprehending Bohol. The buy-bust money was recovered from Bohol. Thus he was charged violation of RA 9165. Bohol contends that there was no valid arrest because there was no warrant and there was violation of his rights to face the informant. ISSUE: WON there was a violation of his constitutional right? HELD: There was no violation of the right to meet the witness face to face. Bohol cannot insist on the presentation of the informant. During trial, the informants presence is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases. The appellate court held that police authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in court. Further, what is material to the prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Both requirements were sufficiently proven in this case. The police officers were able to testify positively and categorically that the transaction or sale actually took place. The subject shabu was likewise positively identified by the prosecution when presented in court.
98. People vs Chua Facts: On or about Oct 29, Accused Alicia Chua recruit and promised employment/job placement abroad to 8 persons and collected Php 15,000.00 each but she failed to do so. The Recruits checked from POEA about the records of Chua and they found out that she is not licensed. Accused was found guilty of 8 counts of estafa. On appeal, her defense was the approval of her application for a license to recruit on April 13, 1993, which, according to her, rendered her a genuine holder of authority. She also claimed that she was denied her constitutional right to compulsory process. Issue: WON Chua was denied of due process? Held: No. Appellant interposes the defense that the approval of her application for a service contractors authority on April 13, 1993 should be given a retroactive effect as to make all her previous recruitment activities valid. However, this issue was not raised in the trial court. She cannot now be allowed to raise it for the first time on appeal without offending basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. As to her claim of denial of the constitutional right to compulsory process, we find the same to be without merit. The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expanded the right to compulsory process which now includes the right to secure the production of evidence in ones behalf. By analogy, U.S. vs. Ramirez which laid down the requisites for compelling the attendance of witnesses, may be applied to this expanded concept. Thus, the movant must show: (a) that the evidence is really material; (b) that he is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the production of such evidence; (c) that the evidence will be available at the time desired; and (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained. In the case at bar, the trial court correctly denied appellants motion for the production of the records which were the basis in issuing the POEA Certification dated February 3, 1994, as the same would not in any way alter the undisputed fact that appellant was not issued a license until then.