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71.

UN Convention against Torture



Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 3452 (XXX) of
9 December 1975,

Recalling also its resolution 32/62 of 8 December 1977, in which it
requested the Commission on Human Rights to draw up a draft convention
against
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, in the
light of the principles embodied in the Declaration,

Recalling further that, in its resolution 38/119 of 16 December 1983, it
requested the Commission on Human Rights to complete, at its fortieth session,
as a matter of highest priority, the drafting of such a convention, with a
view to submitting a draft, including provisions for the effective
implementation of the future convention, to the General Assembly at its
thirty-ninth session,

Noting with satisfaction Commission on Human Rights resolution 1984/21 of
6 March 1984,by which the Commission decided to transmit the text of a draft
convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, contained in the annex to the report of the Working Group, to the
General Assembly for its consideration,

Desirous of achieving a more effective implementation of the existing
prohibition under international and national law of the practice of torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

1. Expresses its appreciation for the work achieved by the Commission
on Human Rights in preparing the text of a draft convention against torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;

2. Adopts and opens for signature, ratification and accession the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or
Punishment contained in the annex to the present resolution;

3. Calls upon all Governments to consider signing and ratifying the
Convention as a matter of priority.

ANNEX
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The States Parties to this Convention,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the
Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the equal and inalienable rights
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world,

Recognizing that those rights derive from the inherent dignity of the
human person,

Considering the obligation of States under the Charter, in particular
Article 55, to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms,

Having regard to article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
both of which provide that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

Having regard also to the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December
1975,

Desiring to make more effective the struggle against torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world,

Have agreed as follows:
PART I

Article 1
1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or
a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

2. This article is without prejudice to any international instrument or
national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider
application.

Article 2
1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under
its jurisdiction.

2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency,
may be invoked as a justification of torture.

3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be
invoked as a justification of torture.

Article 3
1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.

2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations
including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.

Article 4
1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences
under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture
and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in
torture.

2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate
penalties which take into account their grave nature.

Article 5
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in the
following cases:

(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its
jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;

(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;

(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers
it appropriate.

2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the
alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it
does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of the States mentioned in
paragraph 1 of this article.

3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised
in accordance with internal law.

Article 6

1. Upon being satisfied, after an examination of information available
to it, that the circumstances so warrant, any State Party in whose territory a
person alleged to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is
present shall take him into custody or take other legal measures to ensure his
presence. The custody and other legal measures shall be as provided in the
law of that State but may be continued only for such time as is necessary to
enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.

2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the
facts.

3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article shall
be assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate
representative of the State of which he is a national, or, if he is a
stateless person, with the representative of the State where he usually
resides.

4. When a State, pursuant to this article, has taken a person into
custody, it shall immediately notify the States referred to in article 5,
paragraph 1, of the fact that such person is in custody and of the
circumstances which warrant his detention. The State which makes the
preliminary inquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of this article shall promptly
report its findings to the said States and shall indicate whether it intends
to exercise jurisdiction.
Article 7
1. The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person
alleged to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found shall
in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit
the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.

2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in
the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that
State. In the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 2, the standards of
evidence required for prosecution and conviction shall in no way be less
stringent than those which apply in the cases referred to in article 5,
paragraph 1.

3. Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection with
any of the offences referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed fair
treatment at all stages of the proceedings.

Article 8
1. The offences referred to in article 4 shall be deemed to be included
as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between States
Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable
offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.

2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State
Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention
as the legal basis for extradition in respect of such offences. Extradition
shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested
State.

3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty shall recognize such offences as extraditable offences
between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the
requested State.

4. Such offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition
between States Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the place in
which they occurred but also in the territories of the States required to
establish their jurisdiction in accordance with article 5, paragraph 1.

Article 9
1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of any
of the offences referred to in article 4, including the supply of all evidence
at their disposal necessary for the proceedings.

2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph 1
of this article in conformity with any treaties on mutual judicial assistance
that may exist between them.

Article 10
1. Each State Party shall ensure that education and information
regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included in the training
of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public
officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation
or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or
imprisonment.

2. Each State Party shall include this prohibition in the rules or
instructions issued in regard to the duties and functions of any such persons.

Article 11
Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation rules,
instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for the custody
and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest, detention or
imprisonment in any territory under its jurisdiction, with a view to
preventing any cases of torture.

Article 12
Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a
prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to
believe that an act of torture has been committed in any territory under its
jurisdiction.
Article 13
Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he has been
subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has the right to
complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially examined by, its
competent authorities. Steps shall be taken to ensure that the complainant
and witnesses are protected against all ill-treatment or intimidation as a
consequence of his complaint or any evidence given.

Article 14
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of
an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and
adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as
possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of
torture, his dependants shall be entitled to compensation.

2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or
other persons to compensation which may exist under national law.

Article 15
Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to
have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any
proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the
statement was made.

Article 16
1. Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under
its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such
acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and
13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture of references
to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

2. The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the
provisions of any other international instrument or national law which
prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or which relates
to extradition or expulsion.
PART II

Article 17
1. There shall be established a Committee against Torture (hereinafter
referred to as the Committee) which shall carry out the functions hereinafter
provided. The Committee shall consist of ten experts of high moral standing
and recognized competence in the field of human rights, who shall serve in
their personal capacity. The experts shall be elected by the States Parties,
consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the
usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal experience.

2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from
a list of persons nominated by States Parties. Each State Party may nominate
one person from among its own nationals. States Parties shall bear in mind
the usefulness of nominating persons who are also members of the Human Rights
Committee established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and who are willing to serve on the Committee against Torture.

3. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at biennial
meetings of States Parties convened by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. At those meetings, for which two thirds of the States Parties shall
constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be those who
obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of
the representatives of States Parties present and voting.

4. The initial election shall be held no later than six months after
the date of the entry into force of this Convention. At least four months
before the date of each election, the Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting them to submit their
nominations within three months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list
in alphabetical order of all persons thus nominated, indicating the States
Parties which have nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties.

5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four
years. They shall be eligible for re-election if renominated. However, the
term of five of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the
end of two years; immediately after the first election the names of these five
members shall be chosen by lot by the chairman of the meeting referred to in
paragraph 3 of this article.

6. If a member of the Committee dies or resigns or for any other cause
can no longer perform his Committee duties, the State Party which nominated
him shall appoint another expert from among its nationals to serve for the
remainder of his term, subject to the approval of the majority of the States
Parties. The approval shall be considered given unless half or more of the
States Parties respond negatively within six weeks after having been informed
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the proposed appointment.

7. States Parties shall be responsible for the expenses of the members
of the Committee while they are in performance of Committee duties.

Article 18
1. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years.
They may be re-elected.

2. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure, but these
rules shall provide, inter alia, that:

(a) Six members shall constitute a quorum;

(b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by a majority vote of the
members present.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the
necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the functions
of the Committee under this Convention.

4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the
initial meeting of the Committee. After its initial meeting, the Committee
shall meet at such times as shall be provided in its rules of procedure.

5. The States Parties shall be responsible for expenses incurred in
connection with the holding of meetings of the States Parties and of the
Committee, including reimbursement to the United Nations for any expenses,
such as the cost of staff and facilities, incurred by the United Nations
pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article.

Article 19
1. The States Parties shall submit to the Committee, through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, reports on the measures they have
taken to give effect to their undertakings under this Convention, within one
year after the entry into force of the Convention for the State Party
concerned. Thereafter the States Parties shall submit supplementary reports
every four years on any new measures taken and such other reports as the
Committee may request.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the
reports to all States Parties.

3. Each report shall be considered by the Committee which may make such
general comments on the report as it may consider appropriate and shall
forward these to the State Party concerned. That State Party may respond with
any observations it chooses to the Committee.

4. The Committee may, at its discretion, decide to include any comments
made by it in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article, together with the
observations thereon received from the State Party concerned, in its annual
report made in accordance with article 24. If so requested by the State Party
concerned, the Committee may also include a copy of the report submitted
under
paragraph 1 of this article.
Article 20
1. If the Committee receives reliable information which appears to it
to contain well-founded indications that torture is being systematically
practised in the territory of a State Party, the Committee shall invite that
State Party to co-operate in the examination of the information and to this
end to submit observations with regard to the information concerned.

2. Taking into account any observations which may have been submitted
by the State Party concerned, as well as any other relevant information
available to it, the Committee may, if it decides that this is warranted,
designate one or more of its members to make a confidential inquiry and to
report to the Committee urgently.

3. If an inquiry is made in accordance with paragraph 2 of this
article, the Committee shall seek the co-operation of the State Party
concerned. In agreement with that State Party, such an inquiry may include a
visit to its territory.

4. After examining the findings of its member or members submitted in
accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, the Committee shall transmit
these findings to the State Party concerned together with any comments or
suggestions which seem appropriate in view of the situation.

5. All the proceedings of the Committee referred to in paragraphs 1
to 4 of this article shall be confidential, and at all stages of the
proceedings the co-operation of the State Party shall be sought. After such
proceedings have been completed with regard to an inquiry made in
accordance
with paragraph 2, the Committee may, after consultations with the State Party
concerned, decide to include a summary account of the results of the
proceedings in its annual report made in accordance with article 24.

Article 21
1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this
article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and
consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another
State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under this Convention. Such
communications may be received and considered according to the
procedures laid
down in this article only if submitted by a State Party which has made a
declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the Committee.
No communication shall be dealt with by the Committee under this article if it
concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration.
Communications
received under this article shall be dealt with in accordance with the
following procedure:

(a) If a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving
effect to the provisions of this Convention, it may, by written communication,
bring the matter to the attention of that State Party. Within three months
after the receipt of the communication the receiving State shall afford the
State which sent the communication an explanation or any other statement in
writing clarifying the matter, which should include, to the extent possible
and pertinent, reference to domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending
or
available in the matter;

(b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both States
Parties concerned within six months after the receipt by the receiving State
of the initial communication, either State shall have the right to refer the
matter to the Committee, by notice given to the Committee and to the other
State;

(c) The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it under this
article only after it has ascertained that all domestic remedies have been
invoked and exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the generally
recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the rule where
the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to
bring effective relief to the person who is the victim of the violation of
this Convention;

(d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining
communications under this article;

(e) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (c), the Committee shall
make available its good offices to the States Parties concerned with a view to
a friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect for the obligations
provided for in this Convention. For this purpose, the Committee may, when
appropriate, set up an ad hoc conciliation commission;

(f) In any matter referred to it under this article, the Committee may
call upon the States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), to
supply any relevant information;

(g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), shall
have the right to be represented when the matter is being considered by the
Committee and to make submissions orally and/or in writing;

(h) The Committee shall, within twelve months after the date of receipt
of notice under subparagraph (b), submit a report:

(i) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is reached, the
Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts
and of the solution reached;

(ii) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is not reached,
the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the
facts; the written submissions and record of the oral submissions
made by the States Parties concerned shall be attached to the
report.

In every matter, the report shall be communicated to the States Parties
concerned.

2. The provisions of this article shall come into force when five
States Parties to this Convention have made declarations under paragraph 1 of
this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the States Parties with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof
to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by
notification to the Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice
the consideration of any matter which is the subject of a communication
already transmitted under this article; no further communication by any State
Party shall be received under this article after the notification of
withdrawal of the declaration has been received by the Secretary-General,
unless the State Party concerned has made a new declaration.

Article 22
1. A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this
article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and
consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its
jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by a State Party of the
provisions of the Convention. No communication shall be received by the
Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration.

2. The Committee shall consider inadmissible any communication under
this article which is anonymous or which it considers to be an abuse of the
right of submission of such communications or to be incompatible with the
provisions of this Convention.

3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, the Committee shall bring
any communications submitted to it under this article to the attention of the
State Party to this Convention which has made a declaration under paragraph
1
and is alleged to be violating any provisions of the Convention. Within six
months, the receiving State shall submit to the Committee written explanations
or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been
taken by that State.

4. The Committee shall consider communications received under this
article in the light of all information made available to it by or on behalf
of the individual and by the State Party concerned.

5. The Committee shall not consider any communications from an
individual under this article unless it has ascertained that:

(a) The same matter has not been, and is not being, examined under
another procedure of international investigation or settlement;

(b) The individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies; this
shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably
prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief to the person who is the
victim of the violation of this Convention.

6. The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining
communications under this article.

7. The Committee shall forward its views to the State Party concerned
and to the individual.

8. The provisions of this article shall come into force when five
States Parties to this Convention have made declarations under paragraph 1 of
this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the States Parties with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof
to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by
notification to the Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice
the consideration of any matter which is the subject of a communication
already transmitted under this article; no further communication by or on
behalf of an individual shall be received under this article after the
notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been received by the
Secretary-General, unless the State Party has made a new declaration.

Article 23
The members of the Committee and of the ad hoc conciliation commissions
which may be appointed under article 21, paragraph 1 (e), shall be entitled to
the facilities, privileges and immunities of experts on mission for the United
Nations as laid down in the relevant sections of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

Article 24
The Committee shall submit an annual report on its activities under this
Convention to the States Parties and to the General Assembly of the United
Nations.
PART III

Article 25
1. This Convention is open for signature by all States.

2. This Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of
ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
Article 26
This Convention is open to accession by all States. Accession shall be
effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 27
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after
the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of
the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.

2. For each State ratifying this Convention or acceding to it after the
deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession, the
Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the
deposit of its own instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 28
1. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this
Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not recognize the
competence of the Committee provided for in article 20.

2. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with
paragraph 1 of this article may, at any time, withdraw this reservation by
notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 29
1. Any State Party to this Convention may propose an amendment and file
it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General
shall thereupon communicate the proposed amendment to the States Parties
with
a request that they notify him whether they favour a conference of States
Parties for the purpose of considering and voting upon the proposal. In the
event that within four months from the date of such communication at least one
third of the States Parties favours such a conference, the Secretary-General
shall convene the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any
amendment adopted by a majority of the States Parties present and voting at
the conference shall be submitted by the Secretary-General to all the States
Parties for acceptance.

2. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article
shall enter into force when two thirds of the States Parties to this
Convention have notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations that they
have accepted it in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

3. When amendments enter into force, they shall be binding on those
States Parties which have accepted them, other States Parties still being
bound by the provisions of this Convention and any earlier amendments which
they have accepted.

Article 30
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled
through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to
arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for
arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the
arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the
International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of
the Court.

2. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this
Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself
bound by paragraph 1 of this article. The other States Parties shall not be
bound by paragraph 1 of this article with respect to any State Party having
made such a reservation.

3. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with
paragraph 2 of this article may at any time withdraw this reservation by
notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 31
1. A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation becomes
effective one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the
Secretary-General.

2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the State
Party from its obligations under this Convention in regard to any act or
omission which occurs prior to the date at which the denunciation becomes
effective, nor shall denunciation prejudice in any way the continued
consideration of any matter which is already under consideration by the
Committee prior to the date at which the denunciation becomes effective.

3. Following the date at which the denunciation of a State Party
becomes effective, the Committee shall not commence consideration of any
new
matter regarding that State.

Article 32
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States
Members of the United Nations and all States which have signed this Convention
or acceded to it of the following:

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under articles 25 and 26;

(b) The date of entry into force of this Convention under article 27 and
the date of the entry into force of any amendments under article 29;

(c) Denunciations under article 31.

Article 33
1. This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the
Secretary- General of the United Nations.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified
copies of this Convention to all States.


72.) REPUBLIC ACT N0. 9745
AN ACT PENALIZING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Ad shall be known as the "Anti-Torture Act of 2009".
Section 2. Statement of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State:
(a) To value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full respect for
human rights;
(b) To ensure that the human rights of all persons, including suspects, detainees
and prisoners are respected at all times; and that no person placed under
investigation or held in custody of any person in authority or, agent of a person
authority shall be subjected to physical, psychological or mental harm, force,
violence, threat or intimidation or any act that impairs his/her free wi11 or in any
manner demeans or degrades human dignity;
(c) To ensure that secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other
similar forms of detention, where torture may be carried out with impunity, are
prohibited; and
(d) To fully adhere to the principles and standards on the absolute
condemnation and prohibition of torture as provided for in the 1987 Philippine
Constitution; various international instruments to which the Philippines is a State
party such as, but not limited to, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDA W) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and all other relevant international
human rights instruments to which the Philippines is a signatory.
Section 3. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Torture" refers to an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him/her or a third person information or a confession; punishing him/her for
an act he/she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed; or intimidating or coercing him/her or a third person; or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
person in authority or agent of a person in authority. It does not include pain or
Buffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
(b) "Other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment" refers to a
deliberate and aggravated treatment or punishment not enumerated under
Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in
authority against a person under his/her custody, which attains a level of severity
causing suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter.
(c) "Victim" refers to the person subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment as defined above and any individual who
has suffered harm as a result of any act(s) of torture, or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment.
(d) "Order of Battle" refers to any document or determination made by the
military, police or any law enforcement agency of the government, listing the
names of persons and organizations that it perceives to be enemies of the State
and that it considers as legitimate targets as combatants that it could deal with,
through the use of means allowed by domestic and international law.
Section 4. Acts of Torture. - For purposes of this Act, torture shall include, but not
be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical torture is a form of treatment or punishment inflicted by a person in
authority or agent of a person in authority upon another in his/her custody that
causes severe pain, exhaustion, disability or dysfunction of one or more parts of
the body, such as:
(1) Systematic beating, headbanging, punching, kicking, striking with truncheon
or rifle butt or other similar objects, and jumping on the stomach;
(2) Food deprivation or forcible feeding with spoiled food, animal or human
excreta and other stuff or substances not normally eaten;
(3) Electric shock;
(4) Cigarette burning; burning by electrically heated rods, hot oil, acid; by the
rubbing of pepper or other chemical substances on mucous membranes, or
acids or spices directly on the wound(s);
(5) The submersion of the head in water or water polluted with excrement, urine,
vomit and/or blood until the brink of suffocation;
(6) Being tied or forced to assume fixed and stressful bodily position;
(7) Rape and sexual abuse, including the insertion of foreign objects into the sex
organ or rectum, or electrical torture of the genitals;
(8) Mutilation or amputation of the essential parts of the body such as the
genitalia, ear, tongue, etc.;
(9) Dental torture or the forced extraction of the teeth;
(10) Pulling out of fingernails;
(11) Harmful exposure to the elements such as sunlight and extreme cold;
(12) The use of plastic bag and other materials placed over the head to the
point of asphyxiation;
(13) The use of psychoactive drugs to change the perception, memory.
alertness or will of a person, such as:
(i) The administration or drugs to induce confession and/or reduce mental
competency; or
(ii) The use of drugs to induce extreme pain or certain symptoms of a disease;
and
(14) Other analogous acts of physical torture; and
(b) "Mental/Psychological Torture" refers to acts committed by a person in
authority or agent of a person in authority which are calculated to affect or
confuse the mind and/or undermine a person's dignity and morale, such as:
(1) Blindfolding;
(2) Threatening a person(s) or his/fher relative(s) with bodily harm, execution or
other wrongful acts;
(3) Confinement in solitary cells or secret detention places;
(4) Prolonged interrogation;
(5) Preparing a prisoner for a "show trial", public display or public humiliation of a
detainee or prisoner;
(6) Causing unscheduled transfer of a person deprived of liberty from one place
to another, creating the belief that he/she shall be summarily executed;
(7) Maltreating a member/s of a person's family;
(8) Causing the torture sessions to be witnessed by the person's family, relatives
or any third party;
(9) Denial of sleep/rest;
(10) Shame infliction such as stripping the person naked, parading him/her in
public places, shaving the victim's head or putting marks on his/her body
against his/her will;
(11) Deliberately prohibiting the victim to communicate with any member of
his/her family; and
(12) Other analogous acts of mental/psychological torture.
Section 5. Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. -
Other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment refers to a
deliberate and aggravated treatment or punishment not enumerated under
Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in
authority against another person in custody, which attains a level of severity
sufficient to cause suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter. The
assessment of the level of severity shall depend on all the circumstances of the
case, including the duration of the treatment or punishment, its physical and
mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, religion, age and state of health of
the victim.
Section 6. Freedom from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, An Absolute Bight. - Torture and other cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment as criminal acts shall apply to all
circumstances. A state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability, or
any other public emergency, or a document or any determination comprising
an "order of battle" shall not and can never be invoked as a justification for
torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.
Section 7. Prohibited Detention. - Secret detention places, solitary confinement,
incommunicado or other similar forms of detention, where torture may be
carried out with impunity. Are hereby prohibited.
In which case, the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and other law enforcement. agencies concerned shall make
an updated list of all detention centers and facilities under their respective
jurisdictions with the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees
incarcerated or detained therein such as, among others, names, date of arrest
and incarceration, and the crime or offense committed. This list shall be made
available to the public at all times, with a copy of the complete list available at
the respective national headquarters of the PNP and AFP. A copy of the
complete list shall likewise be submitted by the PNP, AFP and all other law
enforcement agencies to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), such list to be
periodically updated, by the same agencies, within the first five (5) days of every
month at the minimum. Every regional office of the PNP, AFP and other law
enforcement agencies shall also maintain a similar list far all detainees and
detention facilities within their respective areas, and shall make the same
available to the public at all times at their respective regional headquarters,
and submit a copy. updated in the same manner provided above, to the
respective regional offices of the CHR.
Section 8. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule; Exception. - Any confession,
admission or statement obtained as a result of torture shall be inadmissible in
evidence in any proceedings, except if the same is used as evidence against a
person or persons accused of committing torture.
Section 9. Institutional Protection of Torture Victims and Other Persons Involved. -
A victim of torture shall have the following rights in the institution of a criminal
complaint for torture:
(a) To have a prompt and an impartial investigation by the CHR and by
agencies of government concerned such as the Department of Justice (DOJ),
the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) and the AFP. A prompt investigation shall mean a maximum period of sixty
(60) working days from the time a complaint for torture is filed within which an
investigation report and/or resolution shall be completed and made available.
An appeal whenever available shall be resolved within the same period
prescribed herein,
(b) To have sufficient government protection against all forms of harassment;
threat and/or intimidation as a consequence of the filing of said complaint or
the presentation of evidence therefor. In which case, the State through its
appropriate agencies shall afford security in order to ensure his/her safety and
all other persons involved in the investigation and prosecution such as, but not
limited to, his/her lawyer, witnesses and relatives; and
(c) To be accorded sufficient protection in the manner by which he/she testifies
and presents evidence in any fora in order to avoid further trauma.
Section 10. Disposition of Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo and Habeas Data
Proceedings and Compliance with a Judicial 07'der. - A writ of habeas corpus or
writ of amparo or writ of habeas data proceeding, if any, filed on behalf of the
victim of torture or other cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment or
punishment shall be disposed of expeditiously and any order of release by virtue
thereof, or other appropriate order of a court relative thereto, shall be executed
or complied with immediately.
Section 11. Assistance in Filing a Complaint. - The CHR and the PAO shall render
legal assistance in the investigation and monitoring and/or filing of the
complaint for a person who suffers torture and other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment, or for any interested party thereto.
The victim or interested party may also seek legal assistance from the Barangay
Human Rights Action Center (BRRAC) nearest him/her as well as from human
rights nongovernment organizations (NGOs).
Section 12. Right to' Physical, Medical and Psychological Examination. - Before
and after interrogation, every person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall have the right to he informed of his/her right to demand
physical examination by an independent and competent doctor of his/her own
choice. If such person cannot afford the services of his/her own doctor, he/she
shall he provided by the State with a competent and independent doctor to
conduct physical examination. The State shall endeavor to provide the victim
with psychological evaluation if available under the circumstances. If the person
arrested is a female, she shall be attended to preferably by a female doctor.
Furthermore, any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation,
including his/her immediate family, shall have the right to immediate access to
proper and adequate medical treatment. The physical examination and/or
psychological evaluation of the victim shall be contained in a medical report,
duly signed by the attending physician, which shall include in detail his/her
medical history and findings, and which shall he attached to the custodial
investigation report. Such report shall be considered a public document.
Following applicable protocol agreed upon by agencies tasked to conduct
physical, psychological and mental examinations, the medical reports shall,
among others, include:
(a) The name, age and address of the patient or victim;
(b) The name and address of the nearest kin of the patient or victim;
(c) The name and address of the person who brought the patient or victim for
physical, psychological and mental examination, and/or medical treatment;
(d) The nature and probable cause of the patient or victim's injury, pain and
disease and/or trauma;
(e) The approximate time and date when the injury, pain, disease and/or
trauma was/were sustained;
(f) The place where the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were sustained;
(g) The time, date and nature of treatment necessary; and
(h) The diagnosis, the prognosis and/or disposition of the patient.
Any person who does not wish to avail of the rights under this pr<;lvision may
knowingly and voluntarily waive such rights in writing, executed in the presence
and assistance of his/her counsel.
Section 13. Who are Criminally Liable. - Any person who actually participated Or
induced another in the commission of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment or who cooperated in the execution of the
act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment
by previous or simultaneous acts shall be liable as principal
Any superior military, police or law enforcement officer or senior government
official who issued an order to any lower ranking personnel to commit torture for
whatever purpose shall be held equally liable as principals.
The immediate commanding officer of the unit concerned of the AFP or the
immediate senior public official of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies
shall be held liable as a principal to the crime of torture or other cruel or
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment for any act or omission, or
negligence committed by him/her that shall have led, assisted, abetted or
allowed, whether directly or indirectly, the commission thereof by his/her
subordinates. If he/she has knowledge of or, owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known that acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment shall be committed, is being committed, or
has been committed by his/her subordinates or by others within his/her area of
responsibility and, despite such knowledge, did not take preventive or
corrective action either before, during or immediately after its commission, when
he/she has the authority to prevent or investigate allegations of torture or other
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment but failed to prevent or
investigate allegations of such act, whether deliberately or due to negligence
shall also be liable as principals.
Any public officer or employee shall be liable as an accessory if he/she has
knowledge that torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment is being committed and without having participated therein, either
as principal or accomplice, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manner:
(a) By themselves profiting from or assisting the offender to profit from the effects
of the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment;
(b) By concealing the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment and/or destroying the effects or instruments thereof in
order to prevent its discovery; or(c) By harboring, concealing or assisting m the
escape of the principal/s in the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment: Provided, That the accessory acts are
done with the abuse of the official's public functions.
Section 14. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the perpetrators of the following acts:
(1) Torture resulting in the death of any person;
(2) Torture resulting in mutilation;
(3) Torture with rape;
(4) Torture with other forms of sexual abuse and, in consequence of torture, the
victim shall have become insane, imbecile, impotent, blind or maimed for life;
and
(5) Torture committed against children.
(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed on those who commit
any act of mental/psychological torture resulting in insanity, complete or partial
amnesia, fear of becoming insane or suicidal tendencies of the victim due to
guilt, worthlessness or shame.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed on those who commit
any act of torture resulting in psychological, mental and emotional harm other
than those described 1n paragraph (b) of this section. '
(d) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have lost the power of
speech or the power to hear or to smell; or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a
foot, an arm or a leg; or shall have lost the use of any such member; Or shall
have become permanently incapacitated for labor.
(e) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have become deformed
or shall have lost any part of his/her body other than those aforecited, or shall
have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for a
period of more than ninety (90) days.
(f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its minimum period shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim
shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for mare than thirty (30) days but
not more than ninety (90) days.
(g) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period shall
be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have been ill or
incapacitated for labor for thirty (30) days or less.
(h) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed for acts constituting cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as defined in Section 5 of this
Act.
(i) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon those who
establish, operate and maintain secret detention places and/or effect or cause
to effect solitary confinement, incommunicado or other similar forms of
prohibited detention as provided in Section 7 of this Act where torture may be
carried out with impunity.
(j) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon the responsible officers or
personnel of the AFP, the PNP and other law enforcement agencies for failure to
perform his/her duty to maintain, submit or make available to the public an
updated list of detention centers and facilities with the corresponding data on
the prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained therein, pursuant to Section
7 of this Act.
Section 15. Torture as a Separate and Independent Crime. - Torture as a crime
shall not absorb or shall not be absorbed by any other crime or felony
committed as a consequence, or as a means in the conduct or commission
thereof. In which case, torture shall be treated as a separate and independent
criminal act whose penalties shall be imposable without prejudice to any other
criminal liability provided for by domestic and international laws.
Section 16. Exclusion from the Coverage of Special Amnesty Law. - In order not
to depreciate the crime of torture, persons who have committed any act of
torture shall not benefit from any special amnesty law or similar measures that
will have the effect of exempting them from any criminal proceedings and
sanctions.
Section 17. Applicability of Refouler. - No person shall be expelled, returned or
extradited to another State where there are substantial grounds to believe that
such person shall be in danger of being subjected to torture. For the purposes of
determining whether such grounds exist, the Secretary of the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Secretary of the DOJ, in coordination with the
Chairperson of the CHR, shall take into account all relevant considerations
including, where applicable and not limited to, the existence in the requesting
State of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.
Section 18. Compensation to Victims of Torture. - Any person who has suffered
torture shall have the right to claim for compensation as provided for under
Republic Act No. 7309: Provided, That in no case shall compensation be any
lower than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00). Victims of torture shall also have the
right to claim for compensation from such other financial relief programs that
may be made available to him/her under existing law and rules and regulations.
Section 19. Formulation of a Rehabilitation Program. - Within one (1) year from
the effectivity of this Act, the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), the DOJ and the Department of Health (DOH) and such other
concerned government agencies, and human rights organizations shall
formulate a comprehensive rehabilitation program for victims of torture and
their families. The DSWD, the DOJ and thc DOH shall also call on human rights
nongovernment organizations duly recognized by the government to actively
participate in the formulation of such program that shall provide for the physical,
mental, social, psychological healing and development of victims of torture and
their families. Toward the attainment of restorative justice, a parallel
rehabilitation program for persons who have committed torture and other cruel,
inhuman and degrading punishment shall likewise be formulated by the same
agencies.
Section 20. Monitoring of Compliance with this Act. - An Oversight Committee is
hereby created to periodically oversee the implementation of this Act. The
Committee shall be headed by a Commissioner of the CRR, with the following as
members: the Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human
Rights, the respective Chairpersons of the House of Representatives' Committees
on Justice and Human Rights, and the Minority Leaders of both houses or their
respective representatives in the minority.
Section 21. Education and Information Campaign. - The CHR, the DOJ, the
Department of National Defense (DND), the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG) and such other concerned parties in both the public
and private sectors shall ensure that education and information regarding
prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
or punishment shall be fully included in the training of law enforcement
personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons
who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any
individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment. The
Department of Education (DepED) and the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED) shall also ensure the integration of human rights education courses in all
primary, secondary and tertiary level academic institutions nationwide.
Section 22. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions of the
Revised Penal Code insofar as they are applicable shall be suppletory to this
Act. Moreover, if the commission of any crime punishable under Title Eight
(Crimes Against Persons) and Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and
Security) of the Revised Penal Code is attended by any of the acts constituting
torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as
defined herein, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum period.
Section 23. Appropriations. - The amount of Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00) is
hereby appropriated to the CHR for the initial implementation of tills Act.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the continued implementation of
this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The DOJ and the CHR, with
the active participation of human rights nongovernmental organizations, shall
promulgate the rules and regulations for the effective implementation of tills Act.
They shall also ensure the full dissemination of such rules and regulations to all
officers and members of various law enforcement agencies.
Section 25. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected thereby shall continue to be in
full force and effect.
Section 26. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders or rules and
regulations contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 27. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
Approved,

73.
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Eighth Congress


Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING
AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled::
Section 1. Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity
of every human being and guarantee full respect for human rights.
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation;
Duties of Public Officers.
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at
all times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his
place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission
of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and
understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all
times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of
his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and
independent counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the
investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or
thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to
read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his
counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in
the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person,
otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect
whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person
in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid
waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and
sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him;
otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence
in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation,
shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his
counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall
be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate
family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him
or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any
national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the
Commission on Human Rights of by any international non-governmental
organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's
"immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fianc or fiance,
parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt,
nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing
an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting"
officer for any violation of law.
Section 3. Assisting Counsel. Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those
directly affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary
investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes.
The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the
following fees;
(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected
person is chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1alf
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected
person is chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;
(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected
person is chargeable with a capital offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality
where the custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the
municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such
municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal or City
Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of
assisting counsel before the province pays said fees.
In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted
and the suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in
accordance with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 4. Penalty Clause. (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any
investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six
thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight
(8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer
who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee,
or anyone acting upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place,
who fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the commission of
an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any
member of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister
chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining
and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of
the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years,
and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).lawphi1
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with
custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his
escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby
repealed. Other laws, presidential decrees, executive orders or rules and
regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or in any daily newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines.
Approved: April 27, 1992.
74. 74. Inquest Procedures (DOJ Circular No. 61, 1993)
Evidence Needed for an Inquest Proceedings
SECTION 1. Concept.
Inquest is an informal and summary investigation con-ducted by public
prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons arrested and detained without the
benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of deter-mining
whether or not said persons should remain under custody and correspondingly
be charged in court.
SEC. 2. Designation of Inquest Officers.
The City or Provincial Prosecutor shall designate the Prosecutors assigned to
inquest duties and shall furnish the Philippine National Police (PNP) a list of their
names and their schedule of assignments. If, however, there is only one
Prosecutor in the area, all inquest cases shall be referred to him for appropriate
action. Unless otherwise directed by the City or Provincial Prosecutor, those
assigned to inquest duties shall discharge their functions during the hours of their
designated assignments and only at the police stations/headquarters of the PNP
in order to expedite and facilitate the disposition of inquest cases.
SEC. 3. Commencement and Termination of Inquest.
The inquest proceedings shall be considered commenced upon receipt by the
Inquest Officer from the law enforcement authorities of the complaint/referral
documents which should include:
a. the affidavit of arrest;
b. the investigation report;
c. the statement of the complainant and witnesses;
d. other supporting evidence gathered by the police in the course of the
latters investigation of the criminal incident involving the arrested or
detained person. The inquest Officer shall, as far as practicable, cause the
affidavit of arrest and statements/affidavits of the complainant and the
witnesses to be subscribed and sworn to before him by the arresting
officer and the affiants. The inquest proceedings must be terminated
within the period prescribed under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. *
SEC. 4.Particular Documents Required in Specific Cases.
The submission, presentation of the documents listed herein below should as far
as practicable, be required in the following cases by the Inquest Officer.

Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612)
a. a list/inventory of the articles and items subject of the offense;
b. statement of their respective value
Illegal Possession of Explosives (PD 1866)
a. chemistry report duly signed by the forensic chemist
b. photograph of the explosives, if readily available.
Violation of the Fisheries Law (PD 704) (now RA 8550)
a. photograph of the confiscated fish, if readily available;
b. certification of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources;
Violation of the Forestry Law (PD 705)
a. scale sheets containing the volume and species of the forest products
confiscated, number of pieces and other important details such as
estimated value of the products confiscated;
b. certification of Department of Environment and Natural
Resources/Bureau of Forest Management;
c. seizure receipt. The submission of the foregoing documents shall no
absolutely be required if there are other forms of evidence submitted
which will sufficiently establish the facts sought to be proved by the
foregoing documents.
SEC. 5. Incomplete documents.
When the documents presented are not complete to establish probable cause,
the Inquest Officer shall direct the law enforcement agency to submit the
required evidence within the period prescribed under the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; otherwise, the Inquest Officer shall
order the release of the detained person and, where the inquest is conducted
outside of office hours, direct the law enforcement agency concerned to file
the case with the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
SEC. 6. Presence of the detained person.
The presence of the detained person who is under custody shall be ensured
during the proceedings. However, the production of the detained person
before the Inquest Officer may be dispensed with in the following cases:
a. if he is confined in a hospital;
b. if he is detained in a place under maximum security;
c. if production of the detained person involve security risks; ord. if the
presence of the detained person is not feasible by reason of age, health,
sex andother similar factors.The absence of the detained person by
reason of any of the foregoing factors must be noted bythe Inquest
Officer and reflected in the record of the case.
SEC. 7. Charges and counter-charges.
All charges and counter-charges arising from the same incident shall, as far as
practicable, be consolidated and inquested jointly to avoid contradictory or
inconsistent dispositions.
SEC. 8. Initial duty of the inquest officer.
The Inquest Officer must first deter-mine if the arrest of the detained person was
made in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and(b) of Section 5,
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provide
that arrests without a warrant may be effected:
a. when, in the presence of the arresting officer, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
b. when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting
officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. For this purpose, the Inquest Officer may
summarily examine the arresting officers on the circumstances surrounding
the arrest or apprehension of the detained per-son.
SEC. 9. Where arrest not properly effected.
Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was not made in accordance with
the Rules, he shall:
a. recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
b. note down the disposition of the referral document;
c. prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action
taken;
d. forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or
Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action. Where the recommendation
for the release of the detained person is approved by the City or
Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a
regular preliminary investigation, the order of release shall be served on
the officer having custody of said detainee and shall direct the said
officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary
investigation, together with the copies of the charge sheet or complaint,
affidavits or sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses and
other supporting evidence.
SEC. 10. Where the arrest property effected.
Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was properly effected, the
detained person should be asked if he desires to avail himself of a preliminary
investigation, if he does, he shall be made to execute a waiver of the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a
lawyer and, in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his
choice. The preliminary investigation may be conducted by the Inquest Officer
himself or by any other Assistant Prosecutor to whom the case may be assigned
by the City or Provincial Prosecutor, which investigation shall be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
SEC. 11. Inquest Proper .
Where the detained person does not opt for a preliminary investigation or
otherwise refuses to execute the required waiver, the Inquest Officer shall
proceed with the inquest by examining the sworn statements/affidavits of the
complainant and the witnesses and other supporting evidence submitted to
him. If necessary, the Inquest Officer may require the presence of the
complainant and witnesses and subject them to an informal and summary
investigation or examination for purposes of determining the existence of
probable cause.
SEC. 12. Meaning of probable cause.
Probable cause exists when the evidence submitted to the Inquest Officer
engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
arrested or detained person is probably guilty thereof.
SEC. 13. Presence of probable cause.
If the Inquest Officer finds that probable cause exists, he shall forthwith prepare
the corresponding complaint/information with the recommendation that the
same be filed in court. The complaint/information shall indicate the offense
committed and the amount of bail recommended, if bailable. Thereafter, the
record of the case, together with the prepared com-plaint/information, shall be
forwarded to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action. The
complaint/information may be filed by the Inquest Officer himself or by any
other Assistant Prosecutor to whom the case may be assigned by the City or
Provincial Prosecutor.
SEC. 14. Contents of information.
The information shall, among others, contain:
a. a certification by the filing Prosecutor that he is filing the same in
accordance with the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, in cases cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court;
b. the full name and alias, if any, and address of the accused;
c. the place where the accused is actually detained;
d. the full names and addresses of the complainant and witnesses;
e. a detailed description of the recovered item, if any;
f. the full name and address of the evidence custodian;
g. the age and date of birth of the complainant or the accused, if
eighteen (19)years of age or below; and
h. the full names and addresses of the parents, custodians or guardians of
the minor complainant or accused, as the case may be.
SEC. 15. Absence of probable cause.
If the Inquest Officer finds no probable cause, he shall:
a. recommend the release of the arrested or detained person;
b. note down his disposition on the referral document
c. prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action
taken;
d. forthwith forward the record of the case to the City or Provincial
Prosecutor for appropriate action. If the recommendation of the Inquest
Officer for the release of the arrested or detained person is approved, the
order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of the said
detainee. Should the City or Provincial Prosecutor disapprove the
recommendation of release, the arrested or detained person shall remain
under custody, and the corresponding complaint/information shall be
filed by the City or Provincial Prosecutor or by any Assistant Prosecutor to
whom the case may be assigned.
SEC. 16. Presence at the crime scene.
Whenever a dead body is found and there is reason to believe that the death
resulted from foul play, or from the unlawful acts or omissions of other persons
and such fact has been brought to his attention, the Inquest Officer shall:
a. forthwith proceed to the crime scene or place of discovery of the dead
person;
b. cause an immediate autopsy to be conducted by the appropriate
medico-legal officer in the locality or the PNP medico-legal division or the
NBI medico-legal office, as the case may be;
c. direct the police investigator to cause the taking of photographs of the
crime scene or place of discovery of the dead body;
d. supervise the investigation to be conducted by the police authorities as
well as the recovery of all articles and pieces of evidence found thereat
and see to it that the same are safeguarded and the chain of the
custody thereof properly recorded;
e. submit a written report of his finding to the City or Provincial Prosecutor
for appropriate action.
SEC. 17. Sandiganbayan cases.
Should any complaint cognizable by the Sandiganbayan be referred to an
Inquest Officer for investigation, the latter shall, after conducting the
corresponding inquest proceeding, forthwith forward the complete record to
the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.

75. People v. Galit
Facts:
Francisco Galit was picked up by the Montalban police on suspicion for the
killing of Mrs. Natividad Francisco, a widow. After he was taken by the
Montalban police, the case was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation
in view of the alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police station.
Accordingly, Galit was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team
headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. The following day, Galit voluntarily executed
a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime, also
implicating Juling and PablingDulay as his companions in its commission. As a
result, he was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide before the
Circuit Trial Court of Pasig. During trial, a witness stated that he overheard Galit
quarrelling with his wife about his intention to leave their residence immediately
because he and his two companions robbed and killed Natividad Fernando. On
the other hand, Galit denied participation in the commission of the crime and
also assailed the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession extracted from him
through torture, force and intimidation. He recounted that he was mauled and
tortured by the NBI officers by covering his face with a rag and pushing his face
into a toilet bowl full of human waste. He had no counsel when the confession
was extracted from him. He admitted what the investigating officers wantedhim
to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he
posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a re-
enactment. This notwithstanding, the trial court found Galit guilty and sentenced
him to suffer the death penalty.Issue: W/N Francisco Galit should be acquitted
on the ground that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible.Ruling: YES. The
evidence presented by the prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact,
the findings of thetrial court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are
not supported by competent evidence. There were noeyewitnesses, no
property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even
fingerprints of the accused atthe scene of the crime. The only evidence against
the accused is his alleged confession. The alleged confession and thepictures of
the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were
obtained in a manner contrary to law. Galit acquitted.
Issue: How is the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession shown?
Ruling: Through the statement itself. The first question was a very long Tagalog
question followed by a monosyllabic answer. It does not satisfy the requirements
of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and
our laws. Instead, there should be several short and clear questions and every
right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person
under investigation. The accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he
understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, the accused was not
permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his
sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for
investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed
the Salaysay
that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain
any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not
assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted
by the counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violation of his rights.
Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding
the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been
maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the
same must be rejected
76. People vs Ordoo
Facts: Ordoo and Medina were convicted of a crime of rape with homicide.
Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina as the
authors of the crime. Acting on this lead, the police thereupon invited the two
(2) suspects and brought them to the police station for questioning. However, for
lack of evidence then directly linking them to the crime, they were allowed to
go home.
On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina returned to
the police station one after another and acknowledged that they had indeed
committed the crime. Acting on their admission, the police immediately
conducted an investigation and put their confessions in writing. The investigators
however could not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the two (2)
accused in the course of the investigation because there were no practicing
lawyers in the Municipality of Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union.
Be that as it may, the statements of the two (2) accused where nevertheless
taken. But before doing so, both accused were apprised in their own dialect of
their constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent
counselof their choice. Upon their acquiescence and assurance that they
understood their rights and did not require the services of counsel, the
investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the
Chief of Police and other police officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to
listen to and witness the giving of the voluntary statements of the two (2)
suspects who admitted their participation in the crime.
The first to confess was Apolonio Medina who in addition to the Parish Priest, the
Mayor, the Chief of Police and the other police officers was also accompanied
by his wife and mother. After Medina said his piece, his wife and mother
suddenly burst into tears. He then affixed his signature on his statement and so
did his wife, followed by all the other witnesses who listened to his confession.
Ordoo affixed his thumb mark on his statement in lieu of his signature as he did
not know how to write.
Thereafter, Apolonio Medina and Pacito Ordoo were detained at the Santol
police station. News about the apprehension and detention of the culprits of the
rape-slay of Shirley Victore soon spread that Roland Almoite, leading radio
announcer of radio station DZNL, visited and interviewed them. In the interview
which was duly tape-recorded both accused admitted again their complicity in
the crime and narrated individually the events surrounding their commission
thereof. Upon conclusion of the interview, Roland Almoite immediately went to
radio station DZNL and played the taped interview on the air.
A couple of days later, the police brought the two (2) accused to the office of
the PAO lawyer in Balaoan, La Union, for assistance and counseling. In a closed-
door session, PAO lawyer Oscar B. Corpuz apprised each of the accused of his
constitutional rights and, even though their confessions were already written in
their dialect, explained to them each of the questions and answers taken during
the investigation. He likewise advised them to ponder the consequences of their
confessions, leading them to defer the affixing of their second signature/
thumbmark thereon.
After a week or so, the two (2) separately went back to Atty. Corpuz and
informed him of their willingness to affix their signatures and thumbmarks for the
second time in their respective confessions. Once again Atty. Corpuz apprised
the two (2) accused of their constitutional rights, explained the contents of their
respective statements, and finally, accompanied them to Judge Fabian M.
Bautista, MTC judge of Balaoan, La Union, who further apprised the two (2)
accused of their constitutional rights and asked them if they had been coerced
into signing their confessions. They assured Judge Bautista that their statements
had been given freely and voluntarily. Upon such assurance that they had not
been coerced into giving and signing their confessions, Judge Bautista finally
asked the accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina to affix their signatures/
thumbmarks on their respective confessions, and to subscribe the same before
him. Atty. Corpuz then signed their statements as their assisting counsel, followed
by a few members of the MTC staff who witnessed the signing.
On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the two (2) accused pleaded not
guilty.
Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions were valid
Ruling:
(1) No. In the instant case, custodial investigation began when the accused
Ordoo and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to confess and
the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit information and/or
confession from them. At such point, the right of the accused to counsel
automatically attached to them. Concededly, after informing the accused of
their rights the police sought to provide them with counsel. However, none
could be furnished them due to the non-availability of practicing lawyers in
Santol, La Union, and the remoteness of the town to the next adjoining town of
Balaoan, La Union, where practicing lawyers could be found. At that stage, the
police should have already desisted from continuing with the interrogation but
they persisted and gained the consent of the accused to proceed with the
investigation.
In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial confession the accused's
parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, municipal
judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by
the accused may be present, RA 7438 does not propose that they appear in the
alternative or as a substitute for counsel without any condition or clause. It is
explicitly stated therein that before the above-mentioned persons can appear
two (2) conditions must be met: (a) counsel of the accused must be absent,
and, (b) a valid waiver must be executed.
Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the
Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other
police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence.
The apparent consent of the two (2) accused in continuing with the
investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be effective must be made in
writing and with the assistance of counsel.
9
Consequently, any admission
obtained from the two (2) accused emanating from such uncounselled
interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8) days later does
not remedy this omission either. This aid and valuable advice given by counsel
still came several days too late. It could not cure the absence of counsel during
the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statements were being
taken.
10

The second affixation of the signatures/ thumbmarks of the accused on their
confessions a few days after their closed-door meeting with the PAO lawyer, in
the presence and with the signing of the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and other
witnesses, likewise did not make their admissions an informed one. Admissions
obtained during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel although
reduced into writing and later signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed
under the Constitution.
11
If the lawyer's role is diminished to being that of a mere
witness to the signing of a prepared document albeit an indication therein that
there was compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused, the requisite
standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12, par. (1), are not met.
(2) Yes. The taped interview revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted to
the rape-slay and even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the crime.
Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised
interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy,
statements made by herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be
held admissible. The interview was not in the nature of an investigation as the
response of the accused was made in answer to questions asked by the radio
reporter, not by the police or any other investigating officer.

77. People v Lugod
Facts: On October 10, 1997, an Information for rape with homicide was filed
against the Lugod for committing the same against 8 yr old girl Nairube.
During the trial, lower court rely heavily to the testimony of the officer who
arrested the accused and to whom he allegedly confessed the crime, and later
accompany him when he pinpoints the location of the dead body of the girl.
Issue: WON the admission by the accused admissible and his pinpointing the
location of the dead body admissible.
Held: No. At the time of the arrest of the accused, the apprehending officers
did not inform him and in fact acted in a blatant and wanton disregard of his
constitutional rights specified in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, which
provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of
this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their families.
Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his right to remain
silent and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice,
he would be provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that
he intended to waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in
order to be valid, the waiver must be made in writing and with the assistance of
counsel. Consequently, the accused-appellants act of confessing to SPO2
Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel
cannot be used against him for having transgressed accused-appellants rights
under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be
disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In
the same vein, the accused-appellants act in pointing out the location of the
body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the accused-appellants right to
remain silent. The same was an integral part of the uncounselled confession
and is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree.
Even if we were to assume that accused-appellant was not yet under
interrogation and thus not entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was
brought to the police station, the acts of accused-appellant subsequent to his
apprehension cannot be characterized as having been voluntarily made
considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. His confession
was elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if he
told the truth. Furthermore, when accused-appellant allegedly pointed out the
body of the victim, SPO2 Gallardo, the whole police force as well as nearly one
hundred (100) of the townspeople of Cavinti escorted him there. Ricardo Vida
stated that the townspeople were antagonistic towards accused-appellant and
wanted to hurt him.
[
The atmosphere from the time accused-appellant was
apprehended and taken to the police station up until the time he was alleged
to have pointed out the location of the body of the victim was highly
intimidating and was not conducive to a spontaneous response. Amidst such a
highly coercive atmosphere, accused-appellants claim that he was beaten up
and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the
voluntariness of his alleged confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when
he visited accused-appellant in the jail cell, he noticed that the accused-
appellant had bruises on his face, corroborated accused-appellants assertion
that he was maltreated.
78. PP VS EDRALIN TABOGA
FACTS:
At 2:00 in the early morning of April 1, 1998,
at Magsingal, Ilocos Sur, Barangay Councilman Cirilo Urayani woke up to the
sound of loud explosions. He thought people were lighting firecrackers in the
neighbouring barangay to celebrate their fiesta. He went out of the house to
fetch water, and he saw the house of Francisca Tubon on fire.
Barangay Captain William Pagao heard the shouts for help. He and
other barangay officials and residents helped in dousing out the fire using a
water pump. When they entered the burned house, they discovered the
charred remains of Francisca Tubon. They examined the body and found stab
wounds on the chest of the deceased.
The deceaseds former farm workers were rounded up, namely, Mario Ceria,
Edwin Ceria, Tante Dumadag and Edralin Taboga. Brgy. Capt. Pagao noticed
fresh blood stains on the short pants of Taboga. He confronted Taboga, and the
latter readily admitted that he killed Francisca Tubon and set the flue-cured
tobacco stored inside her house on fire, causing the whole house, including the
dead body of the old woman, to be burned.
Taboga was brought to the police station for further investigation.
Mr. Mario Contaoi, a radio announcer of DZNS, went to the Magsingal Municipal
Police Station to interview the
suspect, Edralin Taboga. Again, Taboga admitted killing the deceased and
setting her and her house on fire.
In the meantime, the Forensic Biologist of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), who examined the bloodstains on Tabogas shorts and on the kitchen
knife, found that the said specimens contained human blood Type O, the
blood type of the deceased.
On the other hand, the Municipal Health Officer of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur who
performed an autopsy on the victims charred remains, found several stab
wounds on the chest. According to him, the victim may have been stabbed to
death before she and her house were burned
Accused-appellant Edralin Taboga raised the defense of denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant further claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen
and forced to admit the crime. Regarding his admission to radio announcer
Mario Contaoi, he narrated that the interview was held inside the investigation
room of the police station where policemen were present. Thus, he had to
admit the crimes because he was afraid of the policemen. Moreover, relatives
of the deceased beat him up by kicking him, hitting him with a chair, slapping
him and punching him on the head and face.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, Branch 24, rendered
judgment finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the constitutional right of the accused-appellant was violated
by admitting as evidence the extrajudicial confession?
HELD:
There is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with
the police authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-
appellant. Neither is there anything on record which even remotely suggests
that the radio announcer was instructed by the police to extract information
from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the reporter even asked
permission from the officer-in-charge to interview accused-appellant. Nor was
the information obtained under duress. In fact, accused-appellant was very
much aware of what was going on.
Under Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial confession made
by an accused shall not be a sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. As defined, it means the body of
the crime and, in its primary sense, means a crime has actually been
committed. Applied to a particular offense, it is the actual commission by
someone of the particular crime charged. In the case at bar, the confession
made by accused-appellant was corroborated by several items found by the
authorities, to wit: the knife which was used to kill the victim and the charred
body of the victim.
The court a quo did not err in admitting in evidence accused-appellants taped
confession. Such confession did not form part of custodial investigation. It was
not given to police officers but to a media man in an apparent attempt to elicit
sympathy. The record even discloses that accused-appellant admitted to
the Barangay Captain that he clubbed and stabbed the victim even before the
police started investigating him at the police station.
Furthermore, accused-appellants confession is replete with details on the
manner in which the crimes were committed, thereby ruling out the probability
that it was involuntarily made. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred
from its language such that if, upon its face the confession exhibits no sign of
suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being
replete with details which could be supplied only by the accused reflecting
spontaneity and coherence which, psychologically, cannot be associated with
a mind to which violence and torture have been applied, it may be considered
voluntary. In the early case of U.S. v. De los Santos, we stated:
If a confession be free and voluntary the deliberate act of the accused with a
full comprehension of its significance, there is no impediment to its admission as
evidence, and it becomes evidence of a high order; since it is supported by the
presumption a very strong presumption that no person of normal mind will
deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be a perpetrator of a crime,
especially if it be a serious crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.

79. People v Baloloy
FACTS:
At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the
eveningof August 3, 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn
Camacho was found. Autopsyreports found that Genelyn was raped before she
was drowned. The one who caused itsdiscovery was accused-appellant Juanito
Baloloy himself, who claimed that he had caught sightof it while he was
catching frogs in a nearby creek. While in the wake of Genelyn,
Juanitoconfessed to the Barangay Captain that he only wanted to frighten the
girl but ended up rapingand throwing her body in the ravine. While in the
custody of the authorities, he was askedincriminating questions by Judge Dicon
who justified his actions saying that Juanito was not yet incustodial investigation.
Based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with
circumstantialevidence, the trial court found Juanito guilty of rape
with homicide and sentenced him to death.On appeal, Juanito maintains that
the trial court violated Section 12(1) of Article III of theConstitution when
it admitted in evidence his alleged extrajudicial
confession to BarangayCaptain Ceniza and Judge Dicon. According to him, the
two failed to inform him of hisconstitutional rights before they took it upon
themselves to elicit from him the incriminatoryinformation. It is of no moment that
Ceniza and Dicon are not police investigators, for as publicofficials it was
incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of the
Constitution. Whilethese rights may be waived, the prosecution failed to show
that he effectively waived his rightsthrough a written waiver executed in the
presence of counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicialconfession is
inadmissible in evidence.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the barangay captai
n wasadmissible.
(2)Whether or not Juanitos extrajudicial confession before the judge
was admissible.
HELD:
(1) YES. As to his confession with the Baragay Captain Ceniza, it has been
held that theconstitutional provision on custodial investigation does not
apply to a spontaneous statement, notelicited through questioning by the
authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby
thesuspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply
to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission
of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution
bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. In
the instant case, Juanito voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped
GENELYNand thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was
a spontaneous answer, freelyand voluntarily given in an ordinary
manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for
investigation in connection with the commission of the offense. Moreover,
Juanito didnot offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the
part of Ceniza, which could havecompelled her to testify falsely
against him.

(2) NO. However, there is merit in Juanitos claim that his constitutional rights
duringcustodial investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the latt
er propounded to himincriminating questions without informing him of his
constitutional rights. It is settled that at themoment the accused voluntarily
surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the
custodialinvestigation is deemed
to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about hiscomplicit
y in the offense without the assistance of counsel. Judge Dicon's claim
that no complainthas yet been filed and that neither was he conducting
a preliminary investigation deserves scantconsideration. The fact remains
that at that time Juanito was already under the custody of thepolice
authorities, who had already taken the statement of the witnesses who
were then beforeJudge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on
their statements.

80. Govt of the USA vs Purganan
Facts: pursuant to the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United
States, the latter requested the extradition to respondent. Respondent asked the
court hearing the petition for his extradition to allow him to be released on bail.
Issue: WON respondent can apply for bail
Ruling: No. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional
provision on bail applies only when a person has been arrested and detained
for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction
or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from presumption of
innocence in favour of every accused. The constitutional provision on bail does
not apply to extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not in issue.
81. Narciso v sta. romana
Facts: The accused, Joselito Mendoza, was charged for parricide for the murder
of his wife. After the conduct of Preliminary Investigation, the fiscal found out
that there is a probable cause in the case filed and thereafter filed it to the RTC
for judicial determination.
The accused filed an Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused
Joselito Narciso to Post Bail. The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and
said motion was granted on the same day, allowing accused to post bail
at P150,000.00
The private prosecutor representing private complainant Flor Marie Sta.
Romana-Cruz, a sister of accuseds deceased wife, filed an "Urgent Motion to
Lift Order Allowing Accused To Post Bail.
The RTC fails to hear the said motion because of the postponement of the
hearing thus private complainant filed petition for certiorari before CA of which
it was granted.
The accused question the decision of CA, contending that it erroneously
decided questions of substance, in a manner not in accord with law, the Rules
of Court and applicable jurisprudence, when it reversed and set aside the order
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted the petitioner his
constitutional right to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence or proof
of his guilt, and more especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct
control of the proceedings and after assessment of the evidence, have
themselves recommended the grant of bail.
Issue: WON the accused should be granted bail considering the crime charged
is a capital offense.
Held: NO. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required." Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: "No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage
of the criminal prosecution.
The Court of Appeals is correct in its decision that there was no basis for such
finding, since no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail --
summary or otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten minutes had
elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order
granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial
court to receive and evaluate any evidence.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the
required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with
a capital offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a
basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume
that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the
case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of
exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is
strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition
for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion
has never been reposed upon the prosecutor
Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the
judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate
the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence
will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail.
82. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS VASQUEZ
FACTS:
Information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail
for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail
bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the
petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000.
Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail
bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The
Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order
against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that she would
be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard. In the instant motion
she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is impaired.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the petitioners right to bail was impaired?

HELD:
It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally
valid and complete despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing
thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbefore
enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the aforecited doctrine
in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her
bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of
the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the
pendency of the case. This was the ruling we handed down in Manotoc, Jr. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 32 to the effect that:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and
given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law, that he will appear
before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the
bail bond or recognizance.
Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden
of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as
much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper
officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call
of the court and do what the law may require of him.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his
right to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935):
. . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the
accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court,
was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines,
because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch
as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond
that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said
jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

83. Agullo vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Agulo was charged of malversation of funds. The prosecution did not present
any witness and rely on the presumption of malversation in which:
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal uses.. Agullo insisted that she did not use the funds for
personal use and that she lost it when she suffered stroke while she is on the
street with the funds.
Sandiganbayan find her guilty.
Issue: WON presumption of innocence be over thrown by prima facie evidence
established by law against her.
Held:
No. To coupled with the other peculiarities attendant in the instant case and
further considering the palpable failure of the prosecution to adduce other
evidence to clearly establish conversion suffice to make the mind uneasy as
to Agullos guilt, notwithstanding the prima facie evidence established by law
against herein petitioner, which by no means dispenses with the need of proving
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. After all, mere absence of funds is not sufficient
proof of conversion. Neither is the mere failure of the accused to turn over the
funds at any given time sufficient to make even a prima facie case. Conversion
must be affirmatively proved, either by direct evidence or by the production of
facts from which conversion necessarily follows.
Truly, these serve as strong considerations that seriously impair the basis upon
which is founded the legal presumption of personal misappropriation of money
or property of accountable officers who fail to have forthcoming, such money
or property when so demanded by a duly authorized official. Verily, a finding
of prima facie evidence of accountability does not shatter the presumptive
innocence the accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises,
certain facts [have still to be] proved; the trial court cannot depend alone on
such an evidence, because precisely, it is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy
that the accused is guiltybeyond reasonable doubtof the offense
charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may adduce.

84. People vs Bato
Facts: The brothers surnamed Bato were charged for the murder of Ernesto
Flores, Sr. The prosecution presented Ernesto Flores, Jr., son of the victim, who
testified as follows: On May 9, 1988 at about three oclock in the afternoon,
Ernesto Flores, Jr. together with his father Ernesto Flores, Sr., were going home
from Barangay Tingib, Pastrana, Leyte to San Agustin, Jaro, Leyte. While passing
by Barangay Hibucawan, they were called by the two appellants, Abraham
and Sergio, both surnamed Bato, to join them in a drinking spree in the house of
Paran Lescabo, which Ernesto, Sr. accepted. Ernesto, Jr. sat about two (2)
meters away from his father while the latter joined appellants for two hours
drinking tuba. When his father was already drunk, appellants tied him (father)
with his hands placed at the back. Later, he saw appellants bring his father to
somewhere else. Seeing his father being held, he ran away, as he was afraid he
would also be taken by appellants. It was only the following morning that they
found his father already dead at the Binaha-an River, five kilometers away from
the place where he last saw him in the previous afternoon. He immediately
reported the incident to the Barangay Captain of Barangay Tingib. The latter
informed the police department about the incident.
The witness established only the following circumstances surrounding the crime:
(1) that the Bato brothers invited the victim and his son for a drink; (2) after two
hours of drinking, said brothers suddenly tied the hands of the older Flores and
took him away; (3) the following day, the body of the victim, which sustained
several hack and stab wounds, was recovered at the Binaha-an River, about
five kilometers away from where he was last seen by the witness.

Issue: WON the prosecution established accuseds guilt beyond reasonable
doubt based on circumstantial evidence
Ruling:
No. In the absence of an eyewitness, the guilt of an accused may be
established by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence, however, must still pass
the test of moral certainty. When inadequate and uncorroborated,
circumstantial evidence cannot sustain a conviction. Specifically, where the
states evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading beyond
reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused, the constitutional presumption of
innocence prevails and the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
Ernesto Jr. admitted that there was no enmity or bad blood between his father
and the accused. He further asserted that there was no altercation during the
drinking spree. Likewise, he made no statement that any of the Bato brothers,
at the time, carried any bladed weapon which could have been used in his
fathers murder. Moreover, he did not see where the appellants brought his
father after they had tied his hands. More significantly, he failed to testify on
how his father was killed, who killed him, or even when he was killed. These
lacunae in the prosecution account necessarily spawn doubts in the mind of a
reasonable person. Because the appellants tied the victims hands, can it be
inferred that they also intended to kill him, and actually killed him? Where did
the accused take him? What happened between the time the accused tied
the victim and the following morning when his lifeless body was found? There is
absolutely no evidence of what transpired during that interval. The prosecution,
in effect, asked the courts merely to guess or to surmise that the accused must
have killed the victim during such interregnum. But conjectures, surmises and
suspicions cannot take the place of evidence, particularly where as in this
case contrary suspicions, surmises and queries can also be floated and
believed.
It is also noteworthy that Ernesto Jr. did not attempt to attract the attention of
other people who were nearby at the time, or to seek their aid. Instead, he ran
home and related the events to his mother. Oddly, he and his mother reacted
not by reporting the matter to the police, or even just to their barangay
chairman, their council members or their neighbors. They simply slept the night
away.
Notwithstanding the presence of other who were nearby when the appellants
tied the hands of the victim, the prosecution failed to present any other
witnesses to corroborate Ernesto Jr.s testimony. As it was, his testimony was
grossly insufficient and sorely in need of corroboration. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence which has not been adequately established, much less
corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of conviction.
[30]


85. People v Ronaldo de Guzman
Facts: On June 10, 2003, a confidential informant reported De Guzmans drug
pushing activities to Alcala, Pangasinans Chief of Police, Sotero Soriano, Jr.
Soriano immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation.
During such operation, the confidential informant introduced appellant to Senior
Police Officer (SPO)1 Daniel Llanillo, who was designated as poseur-buyer.
Llanillo tried to buy P200 worth of shabu. He handed two marked P100 bills to De
Guzman, and the latter, in turn, gave him two heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets containing what was suspected as shabu. Thereafter, Llanillo gave the
prearranged signal to the rest of the team. Appellant was arrested and frisked.
The team recovered from De Guzman two packs of empty transparent sachets,
three disposable lighters, and P3,380.00 in cash, which included the marked
money paid by SPO1 Llanillo. The team then brought De Guzman to the police
station in Alcala, Pangasinan.
At the police station, De Guzman and the items seized during the buy-bust
operation were turned over to the police investigator, SPO3 Eduardo Yadao.
SPO3 Yadao entered the incident in the police blotter. He then placed his initials
on the packets of suspected shabu, which were later submitted to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Urdaneta City.Confirmatory tests
revealed that the substance in the packets that appellant handed to SPO1
Llanillo was indeed shabu.
Issue: WON items seized during the buy- bust operation admissible?
Held: NO. The Constitution mandates that an accused in a criminal case shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution is laden with the burden to overcome such presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required.
Consequently, courts are required to put the prosecution evidence through the
crucible of a severe testing, and the constitutional right to presumption of
innocence requires them to take a more than casual consideration of every
circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused.
When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case,
one of which is consistent with innocence and the other is compatible with guilt,
the presumption of innocence must prevail, and the court must acquit.
The duty to prove the guilt of an accused is reposed in the State. Law
enforcers and public officers have the duty to preserve the chain of custody
over the seized drugs. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used
against an accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
Since in this case, the items seized were only marked at the police station
and not at the place right after the buy-bust operation, the chain of custody is
broken thus the items seized were inadmissible.
86. PP VS MAGSI

FACTS:
Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was
scheduled before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case
was actually set and rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1,
1970. On that date, despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as
de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was re-set to September 8, 1970 on
motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of accused
desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty.
Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favourably acted on
by the court on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8,
1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a
second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and the court
appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the
third hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court,
so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment
purposes only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it
with the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused
Eloy Magsi and the other co-accused. Appellant was found guilty of murder
and made to suffer the death penalty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the accused.

HELD:
YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at
the sacrifice of the basic rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55
SCRA 243-244): the trial courts should exercise solicitous care before sentencing
the accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital offenses by first insuring that
the accused fully understands the gravity of the offense, the severity of the
consequences attached thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his
plea of guilty; and that the prudent and proper thing to do in capital cases is to
take testimony, to assure the court that the accused has not misunderstood the
nature and effect of his plea of guilty. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio
counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of
hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was
conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he
understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient
compliance
87. People vs Rivera
Facts:
Rolando Rivera was charged of raped of Erlanie Rivera his 12 years old
daughter. Rolando was found guilty by the trial court. On this appeal, Rolando
content that he was denied of due process for the following reasons (1) his
counsel was not allowed to question the witness Erlanie regarding the previous
acts of lasciviousness that she stated in her affidavit during the cross
examination. According to the defense such question if answered could have
discredit the testimony of Erlanie because there is discrepancy in her direct
testimony and her affidavit. However it was not allowed by the court. (2) it was a
counsel de officio and not his council who crossed examine the doctor who
took the medical examination when the allege rape was reported. He contend
that the counsel de officio was not familiar with the case and not in the position
to cross examine the witness. (2) the judge questions propounded to him during
his cross-examination as an indication of the latters partiality for the
prosecution.

Issue: Was Rolando denied of due process?
Held NO. Procedural due process simply means that a person must be heard
before he is condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a persons
basic rights, not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily. Considering both the evidence and the law applicable to this
case, we hold that Rolando has been accorded his right to due process.
1. The witness testified only on the rape case. She did not testify anything
about acts of lasciviousness committed upon her person. She may not
therefore be questioned on this matter because it is not connected with
her direct testimony or has any bearing upon the issue. To allow adverse
party to cross-examine the witness on the acts of lasciviousness which is
pending trial in another court and which the witness did not testify is
improper. Questions concerning acts of lasciviousness will not in any way
test the accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or
the reverse. On the contrary such questions, if allowed, will unduly burden
the court with immaterial testimonies.

2. While the Constitution recognizes the accuseds right to competent and
independent counsel of his own choice, his option to secure the services
of a private counsel is not absolute. For considering the States and the
offended partys right to speedy and adequate justice, the court may
restrict the accuseds option to retain a private counsel if the accused
insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or if the chosen counsel is not a
member of the bar, or if the attorney declines to represent the accused
for a valid reason
The trial court appointed Atty. Bansil a counsel de oficio to represent
accused-appellant because his regular counsel, Atty. Anselmo
Mangalindan, was absent without any explanation. Atty. Mangalindan
had previously been granted several postponements.
3. We find no merit in this contention. Where the trial court is judge both of
the law and of the facts, it is oftentimes necessary in the due and faithful
administration of justice for the presiding judge to re-examine a witness so
that his judgment, when rendered, may rest upon a full and clear
understanding of the facts. Our reading of the transcript of stenographic
notes in this case shows that the trial judge merely wanted to clarify
certain points relating to the defense of accused-appellant and not to
establish his guilt. It is a judges prerogative to ask questions to ferret out
the truth. It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds
reveals certain truths which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one
party

88. People vs. Alcanzado
Facts: Accused was found guilty by the lower court of murder. He appealed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the SC assailing the decision.
The records show that appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment
on July 30, 1998. Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case
on October 13, 1998. Upon motion of appellant, the RTC issued an Order
dated November 10, 1998 allowing appellant to file a demurrer to
evidence. On November 19, 1998, appellant filed his Demurrer to
Evidence which was opposed by the prosecution. On April 22, 1999, the RTC
promulgated herein assailed decision convicting appellant.
Issue: WON the accused was denied the opportunity to be heard
Ruling:
Yes. The RTC committed a very serious error in promulgating a decision after
denying the demurrer to evidence filed by appellant upon prior leave of court,
without first giving appellant the opportunity to present his evidence.
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution has rested its case,
the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence:
(1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be
heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the accused filed such motion to dismiss
without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence
and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.
Contrary to the RTCs assertion in its decision that the demurrer to evidence was
denied,

the records of the case do not reveal that there was any prior order
denying appellants demurrer to evidence before the rendition of the assailed
judgment. Evidently, the trial court violated the aforequoted provisions of
Section 15, Rule 119. Appellant had filed a motion for leave to file a demurrer to
evidence which was granted by the RTC and therefore upon denial of his
demurrer, if indeed it was denied, the trial court should have given appellant
the opportunity to present his evidence. Equally astonishing is the fact that
appellants counsel did not raise said irregularity as an issue in the RTC or in this
Court. In effect, appellant has not been accorded due process.
Due to the procedural unfairness and complete miscarriage of justice in the
handling of the proceedings in the RTC, a remand of the case for reception of
defense evidence is warranted. The constitutional right of the accused to be
heard on his defense has been violated.

89. People v Bayya
FACTS:
Some time in 1994, when victim was still 12 years old, her father, the accused,
forced her at the point of a knife to have sexual intercourse with him. He
repeated the bestial act in their house about twice a week afterwards, and
then later used her four (4) times a month, the last she remembered being on
July 5, 1995.
During the trial, appellant unhesitatingly admitted having carnal knowledge of
his daughter twice but theorized that he was "out of his mind" when he
committed the incestous rape. In view of the facts established, the trial court
rendered judgment of conviction, sentencing appellant to suffer the ultimate
penalty of death.
Upon appeal, appellant questioned thepenalty imposed under R.A. 7659,
considering that the Information filed against him was silent about the
applicability of the same. He alleged denial of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a transgression of appellant's right to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against him
HELD:
A careful perusal of the Information indicting the appellant reveals a crucial
omission in its averments of the minority of the victim. The objectives of the
defendant's right to be informed are: (1) to furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make the defense;
(2) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further
prosecution for the same cause; and (3) to inform the court of the facts alleged,
so that it may decide whether the are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if
one should be had.
The Information does not allege the minority of the victim although the same
was proven during trial as borne by the records. It matters not how conclusive
and convincing evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be
convicted of any offense not charged in the Complaint or Information on which
he is tried or therein necessarily included.
The Information charges nothing more than simple rape as absent are the
special qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority which had the
capacity of increasing the penalty by degrees.
90.
91.
92. Teves vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Petitioner, the municipal mayor, and his co-petitioner, where charged
with violation of Section 3 (d) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by
causing the issuance of a license to operate a cockpit in the municipality, which
they owned. They were convicted instead of violating the second part of the
provision, which penalized possession of financial or pecuniary interest in any
business in which one is prohibited by law from having any interest. The
Sandiganbayan convicted them. Petitioner and co-petitioner argued that by
convicting them for another offense, the Sandiganbayan violated their right to
be informed.
Issue: WON there was a violation of the petitioners right to be informed
Ruling: No.The essential elements of the offense proved form part of those
constituting the offense charged, thereby warranting the conviction of
petitioner.

93. Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Tenth Congress


Republic Act No. 8493 February 12, 1998
AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled::
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998."
Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. - In all cases cognizable by the
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after
arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of Facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.
Section 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or entered
into during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and signed by
the accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used in evidence
against the accused. The agreements in relation to matters referred to in Section
2 hereof is subject to the approval of the court: Provided, That the agreement
on the plea of the accused to a lesser offense may only be revised, modified, or
annulled by the court when the same is contrary to law, public morals, or public
policy.
Section 4. Nonappearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - Where counsel for the
accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and
does not offer an acceptable excuse for his/her lack of cooperation, the pre-
trial justice or judge may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
Section 5. Pre-Trial Order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an
order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked.
Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and
control the course of action during the trial, unless modified by the court to
prevent manifest injustice.
Section 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal cases involving persons charged of a
crime, except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a
fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor
and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or
other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure
speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty
(180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and
Between Arraignment and Trial.- The arraignment of an accused shall be held
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the
accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is
pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is
entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial.
Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the
court.
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state
whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative
defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial
and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing
evidence.
Section 8. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial. - If the accused is to be
tried again following an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall commence
within thirty (30) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final,
except that the court retrying the case may extend such period but in any case
shall not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the order for a
new trial becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other factors resulting
from passage of time shall make trial within thirty (30) days impractical.
Section 9. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of
this Act, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the
time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by Section
7 of this Act shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-
month period the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the
third twelve-month period the time limit with respect to the period from
arraignment to trial shall be eighty (80) days.
Section 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the
accused, including but not limited to the following:
(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused, and
hearing on his/her mental competency, or physical incapacity;
(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges against the
accused;
(3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals;
(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions: Provided, That
the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days,
(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating
to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;
(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid
prejudicial question; and
(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty
(30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is
actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the
accused or an essential witness.
For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential witness
shall be considered absent when his/her whereabouts are unknown and,
in addition, he/she is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or
his/her whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. An
accused or an essential witness shall be considered unavailable
whenever his/her whereabouts are known but his/her presence for trial
cannot be obtained by due diligence or he/she resists appearing at or
being returned for trial.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is
mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and
thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, or
any offense required to be joined with that offense, any period of delay
from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation
would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no
previous charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with
a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as to
whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been
granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any
justice or judge motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her
counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or judge
granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings that the ends of
justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the
public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay
resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with
this subparagraph shall be excludable under this section unless the court
sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for
finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such
continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the accused in
a speedy trial.
Section 11. Factors for Granting Continuance. - The factors, among others, which
a justice or judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance
under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 of this Act are as follows:
(a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding
would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or
result in a miscarriage of justice.
(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and so
complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution
or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation
within the periods of time established by this Act.
No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 shall be granted because
of general congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or
failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor.
Section 12. Public Attorney's Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned. - If the public
attorney knows that a person charged of a crime is preventively detained,
either because he/she is charged of a bailable crime and has no means to post
bail, or is charged of a non-bailable crime, or is serving a term of imprisonment in
any penal institution, the public attorney shall promptly:
(a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a
notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner
mandating such person to so advise the prisoner of his/her right to
demand trial.
(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the prisoner
shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of his/her right to
demand trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner informs the person
having custody that he/she demands trial, such person shall cause notice
to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.
(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to
obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.
(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the
public attorney a properly supported request for temporary custody of the
prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made available to that public
attorney.
Section 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the Time Limit. -
If an accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 7 of
this Act as extended by Section 9, the information shall be dismissed on motion
of the accused. The accused shall have the burden of proof of supporting such
motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the
evidence in connection with the exclusion of time under Section 10 of this Act.
In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court
shall consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the facts and
circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal, and the impact of a
reprosecution on the implementation of this Act and on the administration of
justice. Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea
of guilty shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.
Section 14. Sanctions. - In any case in which counsel for the accused, the public
prosecution or public attorney:
(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact
that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;
(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she knows is
totally frivolous and without merit;
(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which
he/she knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a
continuance; or
(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent
with the provisions of this Act, the court may, without prejudice to any
appropriate criminal and/or administrative charges to be instituted by the
proper party against the erring counsel if and when warranted, punish
any such counsel or attorney, as follows:
(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with
the defense of an accused, by imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty
percent (50%) of the compensation to which he/she is entitled in
connection with his/her defense of the accused;
(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or public
prosecutor a fine not exceeding Ten thousand pesos (10,000.00);
and
(3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to
practice before the court considering the case for a period not
exceeding thirty (30) days.
The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be in addition to
any other authority or power available to the court. The court shall follow
the procedures established in the Rules of Court in punishing any counsel
or public prosecutor pursuant to this section.
Section 15. Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules,
regulations, administrative orders and circulars which shall seek to accelerate
the disposition of criminal cases. The rules, regulations, administrative orders and
circulars formulated shall provide sanctions against justices and judges who
willfully fail to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of
this Act.
Section 16. Funding. - For the effective implementation of the rules, regulations,
administrative orders and circulars promulgated under this Act, the amount of
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) annually shall be appropriated from the
allocation of the Supreme Court under the General Appropriations Act.
Thereafter, such additional amounts as may be necessary for its continued
implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 17. Act Not a Bar to Speedy Trial Claim Under the Constitution. - No
provision of this Act shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of
speedy trial as required by Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 18. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders,
rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 19. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in effect.
Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following
its publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation:
Provided, That Section 7 of this Act shall become effective after the expiration of
the aforementioned third-calendar-month period provided in Section 9 of this
Act.
Approved: February 12, 1998
94. ESTRADA VS DESIERTO
FACTS:
The court looked at the events that occurred prior and immediately after the
oath-taking of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (to be referred to in the
rest of the digest as GMA) as president of the Republic of the Philippines (RP).

On 11 May 1998, petitioner Joseph E. Estrada (will subsequently be referred to as
Erap) was elected as President of RP with GMA as his vice-President. By the late
2000, word spread of Eraps alleged involvement in jueteng and his receiving
jueteng money as Jose Pidal. Erap quickly loses popularity among different
social groups and public officials, even high ranking members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), started
defecting from his agendas. And because of the jueteng scandal, an
impeachment proceeding started on 7 December 2000. Upon its resumption in
January, however, a vote of 11-10 against the opening of the second envelope
which allegedly contained evidence showing Erap as Jose Velarde with
P3.3billion in secret bank account cut short the impeachment trial as
prosecutors walked out and joined the rallying of people in the streets of Manila.

Amidst the pressure, Erap proposed snap elections, which he is not to run as
candidate, to regain stability in the country but such a move did little to quell
the wave against him. Two rounds of negotiations were held between Eraps
camp and that of GMA in the early hours of 20 January 2001 and at 12nn of the
same day, GMA took her oath as RP president. Both houses of Congress
acknowledged her presidency, as well as the international community. Erap, on
the other hand, left Malacanang and is now faced with legal action against him
by the Office of the Ombudsman among other things.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners prosecution should be enjoined on the ground of
prejudicial publicity
HELD:
No. As for a prejudicial publicity, this would not apply to the present case. Case
law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible.
Theyre essentially unrelated. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury
system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot
be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that petitioner did
not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has
influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the
Court said that the cases against petitioner were still undergoing preliminary
investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent
effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with
justice and less with prosecution.
94-A Re: Petition for radio and television coverage of the multiple murder cases
against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan,
Facts: On the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of
trial court judges, the Court found that prejudicial publicity insofar as it
undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test,
applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an
accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity
is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there
must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a
bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to
actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
95. Cariaga vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: Jonathan Cariaga, petitioner, was charged with qualified theft, being
then an employee of Davao Light & Power Co. Inc., Davao City, and as such
has access to the said companys electrical equipment, supplies and
materialsone of the basis for his conviction was the extrajudicial confession of
his cousin, Ricardo Cariaga, who acted as his fence. The prosecution was
unable to present Ricardo as its witness as the subpoena could not be
personally served upon him as according to his wife, Antonieta Cariaga, he was
in Sultan Kudarat and the date of his return to Davao City was not certain.
Issue: WON the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn
statement of Ricardo Cariaga without him taking the witness stand since it
violates the fundamental right of the accused to meet the witnesses
against him face to face. Hence, Ricardo Cariagas sworn statement is
not admissible under Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court for
failure of the prosecution to comply with the strict requirements of said
rule, to wit:
a] Ricardo Cariaga did not orally testify in the labor case;
b] Inability to testify must be for a grave cause almost amounting to
death and the prosecution must exhaust all available remedies to
secure the presence of its witnesses at the trial;
c] That the former proceeding must also be criminal in nature.
Ruling: YES. petitioner argues that the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga
who was not presented in court is inadmissible. The prosecution presented in
evidence Ricardo Cariagas sworn statement which was attached as Annex 8-
A to DLPCs position paper in the labor case filed by Jonathan Cariaga against
the latter for illegal dismissal. The trial court admitted the same in evidence
despite the timely objection of the defense counsel.
A relevant rule is Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of Court in respect of the
admissibility in evidence in a criminal case of the previous testimony of
unavailable witnesses which reads:
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be entitled:
f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the
trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness
who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the
Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case
or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, the adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-
examine him;
In Tan vs. Court of Appeals,
[8]
it was ruled that unable to testify or for that
matter unavailability, does not cover the case of witnesses who were
subpoenaed but did not appear. It may refer to inability proceeding from a
grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost
the power of speech. It does not refer to tampering of witnesses.
The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was subpoenaed only once
and did not appear to testify in the criminal case against
petitioner. Concededly, this witness was not deceased or out of the
Philippines. In fact, the private prosecutor informed the court that he is in Sultan
Kudarat,
[9]
and previously, his wife informed the sheriff that he was in Sultan
Kudarat which is in Cotabato, a mere four hours drive from Davao City.
It must be emphasized that this rule is strictly complied with in criminal cases,
hence, mere sending of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to
prove inability to testify. The Court must exercise its coercive power to
arrest.
[10]
In the instant case, no efforts were exerted to have the witness
arrested which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances
where witnesses who are duly subpoenaed fail to appear.
96. People v Ong
Facts: Two Chinese nationals were charged for the violation of Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The prosecution sought to establish that the accused were arrested via a buy
bust operation conducted through a confidential informant who perfected the
sale of illegal drugs. However, the prosecution failed to present as witness the
said informant for security and protection purposes. The only person that the
prosecution managed to present is the police officer who is with the confidential
informant during the exchange.
The defense then contended that the testimony of the police officer with
regards of the sale that transpire between the accused and the confidential
informant is a mere hearsay, for such police officer is never present when the
contract of sale was perfected, or when the deal was closed and there is an
agreement to sell shabu.
Issue: WON the testimony of the police officer is enough to convict the accused
Held: No. The prosecutions testimony is not admissible as he was not privy to the
sale transaction that transpired between the CI and appellant William Ong, the
alleged pusher. It is beyond contention that a contract of sale is perfected
upon a meeting of the minds of the parties on the object and its price. It is
abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, albeit only
through the telephone, with the pusher. The CI was likewise the one who closed
the deal with appellant Ong as to the quantity of shabu to be purchased and its
price. He also set the venue and time of the meeting when the sale would take
place.
Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the
acceptance of the offer and the consideration for the offer, we hold that SPO1
Gonzales is, in effect, not the poseur-buyer but merely the deliveryman. His
testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and
standing alone cannot be the basis of the conviction of the appellants.
97. . PP VS BOHOL
FACTS:
An informant of the PNP has a tip that a certain Ricardo Bohol is involved in a
drug trade. The PNP respond to the information and by verifying the information
and subsequently formed a six-man team to conduct a buy-bust operation. PO2
Estrada acted as the buyer.
The operation was successful, apprehending Bohol. The buy-bust money was
recovered from Bohol. Thus he was charged violation of RA 9165.
Bohol contends that there was no valid arrest because there was no warrant
and there was violation of his rights to face the informant.
ISSUE:
WON there was a violation of his constitutional right?
HELD:
There was no violation of the right to meet the witness face to face. Bohol
cannot insist on the presentation of the informant. During trial, the informants
presence is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases. The appellate court
held that police authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality
with which they surround their poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness
will be over the moment they are presented in court. Further, what is material to
the prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti. Both requirements were sufficiently proven in this case. The
police officers were able to testify positively and categorically that the
transaction or sale actually took place. The subject shabu was likewise positively
identified by the prosecution when presented in court.

98. People vs Chua
Facts: On or about Oct 29, Accused Alicia Chua recruit and promised
employment/job placement abroad to 8 persons and collected Php 15,000.00
each but she failed to do so. The Recruits checked from POEA about the
records of Chua and they found out that she is not licensed. Accused was
found guilty of 8 counts of estafa.
On appeal, her defense was the approval of her application for a license to
recruit on April 13, 1993, which, according to her, rendered her a genuine holder
of authority. She also claimed that she was denied her constitutional right to
compulsory process.
Issue: WON Chua was denied of due process?
Held: No. Appellant interposes the defense that the approval of her application
for a service contractors authority on April 13, 1993 should be given a
retroactive effect as to make all her previous recruitment activities
valid. However, this issue was not raised in the trial court. She cannot now be
allowed to raise it for the first time on appeal without offending basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process.
As to her claim of denial of the constitutional right to compulsory process, we
find the same to be without merit.
The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expanded the right to compulsory process
which now includes the right to secure the production of evidence in ones
behalf. By analogy, U.S. vs. Ramirez which laid down the requisites for
compelling the attendance of witnesses, may be applied to this expanded
concept. Thus, the movant must show: (a) that the evidence is really material;
(b) that he is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the production of such
evidence; (c) that the evidence will be available at the time desired; and (d)
that no similar evidence could be obtained.
In the case at bar, the trial court correctly denied appellants motion for the
production of the records which were the basis in issuing the POEA Certification
dated February 3, 1994, as the same would not in any way alter the undisputed
fact that appellant was not issued a license until then.

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