Portuguese Counterinsurgency Campaigning

in Africa - 1961-1974: A Military Analysis

John Pearce Cann, III

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of War Studies King's College, London University of London February 1996

CtL

ABSTRACT PortugueseCounterinsurgencyCampaigningin Africa - 1961-1974: A Military Analysis

This thesis makes a comparative analysis of the counterinsurgencycampaign fought by the Portuguesegovernment in its African colonies from the time of the Angola uprisings in 1961 until the military coup in 1974. It describeshow Portugal defined and analysed its insurgency problem in light of the available knowledge on counterinsurgency, how it developed its military policies and doctrines in this context, and how it applied them in the African colonial environment. The study comparesand contrasts this effort with the in insurgencies governments similar other and thus seeks to determine of experiences whether there was a particular Portugueseapproach to counterinsurgency warfare. In begins Portuguese the counterinsurgency campaigning, study with the analysing development of Portuguese doctrine and proceeds to focus on its application to the impact doctrinal Portuguese It the on command structure, organisation relates conflict. home in forces, the colonies, military and social recruiting at and the armed of logistics facets in It to the the these the progress of war. and views each of operations, Portuguese Africa, the perspective of comparable contemporary of context in Africa conditions at the time of the conflict, and resources counterinsurgencies, in home both the colonies, all conditions that led to Portugal's adopting and at available This to distinct thesis aims to make an assessment counterinsurgency.. of the approach a Portuguese the of weaknesses approach from the military perspective. and strengths

TABLE'OF CONTENTS Abstract Acknowledgements Chapter I Chapter II Introduction Commitment to the Ultramar 2 4 5 45

ChapterIII

PortugueseCounterinsurgencyDoctrine

0 Exercito na GuerraSubversiva:

on the Eve of War

Chapter IV PortugueseOrganisation, Education and Training for Counterinsurgency PortugueseAfricanisation of Counterinsurgency PortugueseIntelligence Network in Counterinsurgency PortugueseApproach to Mobility in Counterinsurgency
Portuguese Social Operations

90

129

Chapter V ' Chapter VI

174

217

Chapter VII

247

Chapter VIII

and Aldeamentos Chapter IX SelectedAspects of Logistical Operations The PortugueseWay

271

314 344

Chapter X

Biblography

360

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank my two supervisors,Professor Patrick Chabaland Dr. Martin Navias, for their guidance and support. Dr. Navias also went to great trouble to secure me funding without which this researchcould not have been undertaken. I am most grateful for the assistanceand hospitality offered in Portugal by General Joaquim Chito Rodrigues, Director of the Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares (IAEM), and his entire staff, who spent many hours helping me. Particular thanks are due to Colonel FernandoJosePinto Simes, the Director of the Library at the IAEM, who along with his staff gave so generously of their time. Brigadeiro Renato Fernando Marques Pinto and Colonel Lufs Alberto SantiagoInocentesdeservespecialthanks for their tireless help in explaining the African political and military environment, for introducing me to the appropriate experts on various unique aspectsof the wars, and for reading earlier drafts of this thesis. GeneralPedro Alexandre Gomes Cardoso, Presidenciado Conselho de Ministros, and his staff, General Jorge Brochado de Miranda, former Chief of Staff his Force, Air Portuguese the and staff at the Arquivo Histrico da Forca Aerea of Portuguesa,Colonel Luis Valenta Pinto, Commandantof the Escola Prtica Engenharia, and his staff, Colonel Antonio Rosas Leito, Instructor at the Academia Militar, and Lieutenant Colonel Aniceto Afonso, Director of the Arquivo Hist6rico Militar, and his staff, deserveparticular thanks for their helpful support. I acknowledgepermission from the Trusteesof the Liddell Hart Centre to quote from documentslocated in its collection. Funding for the researchwas received from the Department of War Studiesand from the OverseasResearchStudentsAwards Scheme as administered by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom.
I wish to dedicate this thesis to the memory of my uncle, Mr. Langbourne M. Williams, whose wise counsel, timely encouragement, and enthusiastic support were key ingredients in its completion.

I Introduction

This thesisis a thematic military analysis of the counterinsurgencyeffort madeby the Portuguesegovernment in its African colonies from the time of the Angola uprisings on 4 February and 15 March 1961 until the military coup in Lisbon on 25 April 1974. It describeshow Portugal defined and analysedits insurgency problem, how it developed its own particular military policies and doctrines, and how it applied them in the African colonial environment.

Portugal's Counterinsurgency Challenges Between 1961 and 1974, Portugal faced the extremely ambitious task of conducting three simultaneouscounterinsurgency campaigns in Guine, Angola, and Mozambique. It was at the time neither a rich nor a well developed country. In fact, as a Western European nation, it was the least wealthy among its neighbours by most standardsof economic measure. Thus, for Portugal in 1961 to have mobilized an army, transported it many thousandsof kilometres to its African colonies, establishedlarge logistical bases at key locations there to support it, equipped it with special weapons and mat6riel, and trained it for a very specialized type of warfare was a remarkable achievement. It is made even more noteworthy by the fact that these tasks were accomplished without any in doctrine, field demonstrated the or competence of either power experience, or previous instructors benefit thus the counterinsurgency of any or warfare and without projection in in last To these this put statement competent specialities. perspective, other who were

than periodic colonial pacification efforts, Portugal had not fired a shot in anger since World War I, when Germany invaded northern Mozambique and southern Angola.

The object of this thesis is to show how Portugal's national strategy to husbandand preserve its meagre resourceswas translated into policies and practises at the campaign

and tacticallevel, and how this strategywas effectivein permittingPortugalto conduct in threedistantcolonies. In following both broadand a sustained and lengthycampaign
narrow campaign strategies, Portugal attempted to disrupt the organisation of the nationalist movementsthrough the operationsof agentsand to counter their armed action force appropriate and diplomatic pressure. Concurrently, it sought to with -military protect its people from insurgent contact and to win their loyalty by elevating their standard of living and redressing their grievances. These elements, their particular combination, and their style of execution reflect what may be termed a Portugueseway of war. This thesis seeksto analyse each of thesefactors, to examine their coordinated and synergistic application, to compare them to other contemporary counterinsurgency experiences, and to emphasisetheir uniqueness.

The immediate and largest obstacle to conducting the campaignswas the geographic distancethat separatedLisbon from its battlefields. Angola, the sceneof the initial action in 1961, is located on the southwest coast of Africa. Luanda, its principal city and

resupply point, is approximately 7,300 kilometres by air from Lisbon. Guine, the scene

insurgency from January1963,is locatedon the westcoastof Africa about the of second
3,400 air kilometres south of Portugal. Mozambique was the scene of the third

in September 1964,andits principalresupplyairfield of Beirais some10,300 insurgency

6

kilometres from Lisbon.

These distances compounded the problem of logistics and

produced an associatedstrain on transportation resources.

The British were forced to fight in Malaya and Kenya, which from London were about 9,300 and 5,700 kilometres distant respectively. French Indochina was 10,600

kilometresfrom Paris,andVietnamwashalf-wayaroundthe world from the U. S. Only

Algeria was a close 800 kilometres from southern France. Except for Algeria, all of these insurgencieswere far from the home of the defending power. Regarding multiple fronts, only Britain had to face three separateinsurgencies simultaneously in Malaya (1948-1960), Kenya (1952-1956),and Cyprus (1954-1983),and in the latter instanceshad ' for difficulty troops the mustering adequate conflicts. France and the U. S. did severe not have a multi-fronted conflict and the associated strain on resources that such a situation would impose. When France had been faced with this problem in 1956 while fighting in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco were being granted independence. This developmentremoved the problem of multiple fronts for which it did not have sufficient manpower.2

Not only were these colonies distant from Portugal, but they were also distant from one another. This separation added another dimension to the conduct of the African campaigns and exacerbateddifficulties in the logistical support of Portuguese forces.

'Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer M. Taw, Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1991), 6-7 and 38. 2Alf Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgencyin Algeria (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 158. Even with the single front of Algeria France was forced to rely on conscription. 7

While Bissau (Guine) is 3,400 kilometres south of Lisbon, Luanda (Angola) is an additional 4,000 kilometres south of Bissau, and Lourenco Marques (Mozambique) a further 3,000 kilometres southeast of Luanda. For the most modem intertheatretransport aircraft in the Portuguese fleet of the time, these distancesrepresenteda hard several days work for both aircrew and machine.

Not only were these territories distant from Lisbon and each other, but Angola and Mozambique were vast by any standard, further complicating their defense. Angola covers 1,246,314 square kilometres, an area which is about fourteen times the size of Portugal or as large as the combined areasof Spain, France, and Italy. Its land frontier with its neighbours of the Belgian Congo (Zaire), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), and South West Africa (Namibia) extends 4,837 kilometres.3 Mozambique, the second largest territory, covers an area of 784,961 squarekilometres or about nine times the size of Portugal. Its land border of 4,330 kilometres is shared with Tanganyika (Tanzania) in the north, Malawi, Northern Rhodesia(Zambia), SouthernRhodesia(Zimbabwe), the Republic of South Africa, and finally Swaziland in the extreme south." Guin6, the

smallest of the three, is a tiny tropical enclave about the size of Switzerland. It covers an estimated36,125 squarekilometres, but becauseof tidal action that affects 20% of the ' high 28,000 kilometres the tide only country about mean mark. square remain above This tidal delta and its characteristics further complicated its defense. Its land frontier

3Estado-Maior do Exercito (EME), ResenhaHistrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974) [Historical-Military Report of the African Campaigns (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1988), Vol. II, 27. 4Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. IV, SResenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. III, 17-18. 8

is about 680 kilometres, of which 300 comprise the northern border with Senegal, and 380 the easternand southernborders with the Republic of Guinea, both former French colonies.

By contrast only Algeria was larger with 2,204,860 squarekilometres, about 200,000 ' of which were economically usable. French Indochina was only 750,874, Malaya

333,403, and South Vietnam 174,289 square kilometres. With the exception of the French in Algeria, no other counterinsurgency campaign was waged over such vast territories as the Portuguesehad to addressin Angola, Mozambique, and Guine together, and this factor had a significant bearing on the Portuguese way of conducting counterinsurgency.

Distance was not the only obstacle. Terrain featuresposedunusualproblems as well. Topographically Angola is bordered on the west by the Atlantic Ocean, where a coastal belt runs the length of the approximately .1,650 kilometre shoreline, rising to a central highland 50 to 200 kilometres inland that covers about sixty percent of the country. Further inland there is a plateau rising as high as 1,600 meters. The climate is tropical. Particularly important was the vulnerable frontier betweenAngola and the Belgian Congo to the north. It was immensely long and consistedof over 2,000 kilometres of mountain, swamp, jungle, and elephant grass. The Congo River, which comprised part of the border, remains full of thickly wooded islands which provided excellent cover for

'Robert Aron, Francois Lavagne, Janine Feller, and Yevette Garnier-Rizet, Les Origins de la Guerre D'Algerie (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1962), 176. 9

' Crossings be guerrillas. could made undetectedat virtually any point. In this area the Portuguesesecurity forces faced approximately 25,000 guerrillas scatteredthroughout an area the size of the Iberian Peninsula. The terrain from the border southward was also covered with dense jungle, thick elephant grass eight to ten feet tall, swamp, and mountain. The few roads were beaten earth and were little better than tracks in a

limitless ocean for guerrillasand a difficult one of elephant grass,an ideal environment for securityforces!

Guine also had a difficult topography that presentedits own set of problems. It can be roughly divided into two distinct geographical areas. The western area is

characterizedby a forbidding stretch of mangroveand swamp forests covering the coastal inlets and deltas of half a dozen rivers. Tidal action floods these deltas twice daily, submergingland and creating vast tracts of impenetrable swamp. The thousandsof miles of rivers and tributaries are obscured from the air by mangroves and thick foliage, making clandestine guerrilla movement simple and its interdiction a difficult military problem. These rivers are navigable deep into the country, providing vital lines of

communication. The coast also has many small islands, the most important of which form the Bijagos Islets. The land rises in the northern and easterninterior areas of the country, where the coastalforests gradually disappearas the terrain changesinto the subSahara savanna plain of grasslands and scattered scrawny trees. Elevation does not

7Ronald Waring, "The Case for Portugal, " in Angola: A Symposium, Views of a Revolt, ed. Philip Mason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 41.

'"Report on Angola," IntelligenceDigest (November1961): 16.

10

9 300 exceed meters.

Mozambique presentedyet a third and different topography. Physically it is largely a 1,000 kilometre-long coastalbelt, rising in the north and northwest to forested areas. The vast, open and sparselypopulated northern areasare difficult to police, particularly

in the northernregionswherethe wide ranging,often nomadic,and isolatedpopulation was vulnerableto insurgentintimidation and difficult to protect. It sharesa tropical
climate with Angola.

The population diversity posed yet another obstacle. Angola's population according to the 1960 censuswas 4,830,283, or about 4 people per square kilometre, which was 95.2 % black, 3.5 % white, and 1.1% mestico or mixed, and 0.2 % others.1 The black population consisted of 94 distinct tribes divided into nine primary ethno-linguistic " its degree loyalty Portugal. The population was had to groups, each of which own of concentratedin the coastal west and central plateau of Angola. The and eastern desert and steamy northern jungle were only sparselypopulated. It was in these remote areas that the guerrillas operatedand posed a severemilitary challenge.

Guine had a population in 1960 of 525,437 or an average of 15 people per square kilometre. " However, because of a concentration of the population in the western

9Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. III, 18. 'oResenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. II, 27. "Resenha Hist6rico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. II, 29. 12Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. III, 26. 11

coastaldelta, the figure there rose to 100 people per squarekilometre. This situation left the and easternhalf quite remote with about 1 person per squarekilometre, and it was here that guerrilla infiltration occurred with the least opposition. Ninety-nine percent of the population was black, and this division too was fragmented into two primary groupings covering 28 ethno-linguistic groups, eachexhibiting various degreesof loyalty

" to Portugal.

Mozambique's population in 1960 was 6,603,653 or about 8 people per square kilometre, 97 percent of which was black. This segment was fragmented into

approximately 86 distinct tribes in ten ethno-linguistic groupings, each with its own conviction of loyalty to Portugal.1' The north and northwestern regions of open, sparsely populated bush country next to Tanganyika (Tanzania) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) were the most vulnerable to guerrilla infiltration. Here the isolated and sparse population was vulnerable to insurgent intimidation from these sanctuary countries.

The mosaics representedin thesepopulations were at once a problem and a source of strength to Portugal becauseof their varying loyalties both to Portugal and to each other. Portugal was able to exploit thesedifferencesto its advantagein that the guerrillas were often from a group that had little in common with other groups. The reverse of this to adjust its psychosocialprogram to eachgroup coin was that Portugal found it necessary and to tailor its appeal to various and different cultures.

13Resenha Hist6rico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. III, 27. '4Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. IV, 27-28. 12

The French faced a similar situation in Algeria, where the 1966 census showed 11,833,000 people concentrated along the northern coast of its 2,332,164 square kilometres, leaving the mountainsand the and desert sparselypopulated. The guerrillas

in both the urbanandrural areasto the extentthat therewasa population to be operated

won. Territory beyond the coast was forbidding and remote and was used mostly for

The guerrillaswerepart of the local Arab populationandwere transitandconcealment.

as difficult to identify as those in PortugueseAfrica.

In Malaya the 10,500,000 population was concentrated in and around the cities, principally Singapore, as the 333,403 squarekilometre area was largely jungle. British security efforts were concentratedat the jungle margins where the Chinese guerrillas could make contact with the Chinesesquatterpopulation. The guerrillas were exclusively Chinese, and once the squatter population was removed to and isolated in the New Villages, identifying the Chinesecommunistswas simplified, as Malays and Chineseare distinctly different in appearance. The guerrillas were confined almost exclusively to jungle concealment, and the military was forced to pursue them in this forbidding and difficult medium. Of all recent counterinsurgencies this environment most parallels that of the Portuguesein Guine and northern Angola.

Indochina represented a similar concentration of people where the small rural populations of Laos (3,000,000 estimated) and Cambodia (7,000,000 estimated) were

236,800 over scattered evenly and 181,035 square kilometres respectively. This
dispersion yielded a low 38 people per squarekilometre for Laos and 12 for Cambodia.

The bulk of Indochina's population was concentrated along the coast with North
13

Vietnam's 21,150,000 (1970) population in the eastern portion of its 158,750 square kilometres, and South Vietnam's 17,400,000 (1971) also living in the southerndelta and easterncoastalregions of its 174,289 squarekilometres. In the Mekong Delta population densities ranged from 750 to 2,000 people per square kilometre. This situation was a constantproblem in that with thesehigh densitiesindiscriminate use of firepower by any

the populationand consequently the government's securityforce wasboundto endanger

cause. The war was for both the French and the U. S. concentratedalong the coast of Vietnam, where the guerrillas tendedto blend easily with the population and represented a difficult problem in separatingthe two.

Each of these counterinsurgency sites had its own characteristics, some similar to those of Portugal and others not. The difficulties that each security force faced varied considerably, but in no case did a force face an enemy scattered over three widely separatedand distant fronts in such difficult terrain with a population of such varied demographics,a situation largely unique to the Portugueseconflict and one that imposed enormous demandson its defensemachinery.

The Military Balance On 15 March 1961 approximately 5,000 poorly armed men crossed the northern border of Angola at numerous sites along a 300 kilometre strip and proceededto create mayhem. This number is thought to have been increasedto as much as 25,000 through forced recruiting. " These incursions and attacks were instigated by Holden Roberto,

"Willem S. van der Waals, Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974 (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing (Pty) Limited, 1993), 64. 14

who had founded the nationalist movement of the UPA (Unio das Populaces de Angola, or Union of Angolan Peoples) in the mid-1950s based on the trans-border Bakongo population and the premise that Angola should be fully independent. He had been influenced by events in the Belgian Congo, where violence against the whites had delivered independence,had held the view that a militant approachwas required with the Portuguese, and had acted accordingly. The death toll in the first week was estimated

at 300 whites and 6,000 blacks, and this figure is thoughtto have risen to about500
whites and perhaps 20,000 blacks by the time that it was checked by local militias of farmers and loyal blacks."

Portugueseforces in Angola at the time numbered6,500 troops, of which 1,500 were European and 5,000 locally recruited. They were spread across Angola in various training roles and unpreparedto repel a full-scale invasion. Equally unpreparedwas the Portuguese war machine which was unable to bring troops to the area in appreciable numbers until 1 May 1961, and it took until 13 June to reoccupy the first small administrative post of Lucunga.17

The Portuguese Armed Forces at the time numbered 79,000, of which the Army accountedfor 58,000, the Navy 8,500, and the Air Force 12,500, with a defensebudget

"Rend P61issier,La Colonie du Minotaure, Nationalismes et R9voltes en Angola (1926-1961) (Orgeval: Editions Pelissier, 1978), 657-660; and van der Waals, 58-61.

17 deAfrica (1961-1974), Histrico-Militar das Campanhas Resenha Vol. I; 109and 126.

15

'8 $93 of million.

Compared to others who had fought or were fighting

counterinsurgencies, Portugal's armed force was physically small and underfunded. Britain had an armed force of 593,000 and a defensebudget of $4,466 million. " With

conscriptsFrance had an armed force of 1,026,000,the greater part of which was

fighting in Algeria, and a defensebudget of $3,311 million 20 The U. S. had an armed . force of 2,489,000 and a defensebudget of $41,000 million 21 Alongside these powers Portugal had meagreresources. Britain's manpowerwas 7.5 times that of Portugal, and its defensebudget 48 times. France was about the samemultiples, and the U. S. was 32 times in manpower and 441 times greater in funding. In summary, Portugal's armed force was dwarfed by those who had -fought or were fighting counterinsurgencies.

Portugal's commitment at the time was to NATO and the majority of its forces were in Europe. By the end of 1961 it had moved 40,422 of its European troops to the three colonies, a figure that representedabout half of its armed force. At the end of the conflict in 1974 Portugal had an armed force of 217,000, of which 149,000or 69 % were n Its defensebudget had grown to $523 million, located in the three African theatres. almost six times the earlier figure, but it remained meagre in comparison to these three

"Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1960), 11-12. "The Military Balance, 12.

20 TheMilitary Balance, 10.

11 The Military Balance, 13. 22Institute for Strategic Studies, TheMilitary Balance (London: Institute for Strategic Histrico-Militar das Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974), Studies, 1974), 25; and Resenha Vol. I, 261. 16

other powers.

Portugal faced an intimidating array of insurgent organisations. These forces were in the beginning quite fragmented, but to the extent that they could mend their relationships with one another, they presenteda solid and formidable front. In Angola in three nationalist the the the centred of primary opposition was at commencement war movements. The first was the Frente Nacional de Libertaco de Angola (FNLA), or the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, which was frequently referred to by its old initials of UPA and had an active force of about 6,200 men based in the Belgian Congo.' This number remained largely unchangedthroughout the war. The second

was the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), or the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. The MPLA operated from various sites until 1963, when it settled in Congo (Brazzaville), the former Middle Congo of French Equatorial Africa. The bulk of its effective force moved to Lusaka in Zambia in 1966 to open an eastern front and is estimated to have been about 4,700 strong from that time until 1974.24 Finally, the UPA/FNLA breakaway movementof Unio Nacionalpara a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), National Union for the Total Independenceof Angola, was formed in 1966 with only about 500 fighters25

In Guine the only credible movement was the Partido African da Independenciada Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), African Party for the Independenceof Guine and Cape

23Nei1 Bruce, "Portugal's African Wars, " Conflict Studies (March 1973): 19.
24Bruce, 22.

uBruce, 22.
17

Verde, which beganto field a force in 1962 and built it to about 5,000 regular troops and

1,500 popular militia by 1973.26 In Mozambiquethe Frente de Libertaco de

Mocambique (FRELIMO), Mozambique Liberation Front, began with a disorganised

force of uncertainstrength had an active force of 7,200 regulars and by the early 1970s
27 2,400 and popular militia.

The internal struggles within these movements frustrated their effectiveness throughout the campaignsin all of the theatres. Leadership in the MPLA changedhands three times in its early years and blunted its capability to wage war until 1966, when it found an opportunity to open an easternfront from the sanctuary of Zambia. Splitting the headquartersbetweenLusaka and Brazzaville also hamperedits direction. While the UPA/FNLA continued under Holden Roberto, his "foreign minister, " Jonas Savimbi, broke away to form UNITA, creating a disruptive cross current in its momentum. Also Roberto married into the family of his host nation's president and becamemore attracted to a comfortable life in Leopoldville than the rigours of aggressively leading a nationalist in 1969,and movement. Eduardo Mondlane, the founder of FRELIMO, was assassinated in 1972, both in part becauseof internal PAIGC founder Amilcar Cabral was assassinated power struggles that were fostered by the activities of the Portuguese secret police. These leadership changes altered the posture of both movements. In these cases polarisation against the Portuguesewas the result of each successor'sstrategy to reduce internal party friction.

Z6Bruce, 22. 71Bruce,22. 18

,.

Despite these shortcomings, 27,000 insurgents spread over the three theatres was a problem for Portugal in that it was difficult to prevent their entry, and once acrossthe border, it was difficult to locate them. Their ability to cross the long unpatrolled borders in the remote areas of Africa and to make contact with the population representeda dangerous threat. In no other modem insurgency was there such a multiplicity of

nationalmovements acrosssucha wide front in threetheatres.

In contrast, Britain's security forces at the height of the 1948-1960 Malayan emergencynumbered300,000 police and British and locally recruited troops in 1952,and faced Chinese communist guerrillas numbering 8,000, giving a numerical superiority of 37.5 to one.28 In Kenya from 1952 to 1960 British security forces numbering 56,000 faced 12,000 Mau Mau terrorists, a ratio of 4.6 to one.29 In Cyprus from 1955 to 1959 British security forces of 24,911 faced 1,000 EKOA guerrillas, a ratio of 25 to one 30 The nearly 400,000 French troops in Algeria faced 8,000 FLN guerrillas at the close of 1956, a ratio of 50 to one.31 The U. S. in its Vietnam experience held a ratio of 4 to 32 in it 8.75 1964, 1968 had to to to one prior one. Portuguese security and elevated forces of about 149,000 faced 27,000 guerrillas at the close of the war in 1974, giving

"Hoffman and Taw, 38. 29Hoffmanand Taw, 38. "Hoffman and Taw, 38. "Alistair Home, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 113 and 382; and Heggoy, 157. 32FrankN. Trager, "Military Requirementsfor a U. S. Victory in Vietnam, " in NetNam: History, Documents, and Opinions on a Major World Crisis, ed. Marvin E. Gettleman (Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1965), 347. 19

a nominal superiority of about 6 to one, although this ratio was increased somewhat through local militias. Nevertheless, few contemporary insurgencies went against such odds. That Portugal believed it could overcome the numerical shortcoming through its own particular strategies and undertook to do so with military success makes this counterinsurgencyunique.

The Economic Equation The fact that Portugal was prepared to initiate and sustain a comparatively large military campaign was impressive in that it appearedto have few national resourcesfor such a venture. By European standardsPortugal did not have a powerful economic engine that could readily support a large and-distant military venture. Compared to its Southern Europeanpeers both on the eve of the war and a decadelater, Portugal showed its in its failed displace but to peer neighbours strong economic growth, nevertheless, group rankings. The most helpful comparison is seenin the per capita gross domestic " 1960-1970 (GDP) period. products of these countries and their changesover the Per Capita GDP in U. S. Dollars Country Greece Spain Yugoslavia Portugal 1960/61 364 274 246 270 1970 1,090 1,020 650 660 Percent Change 199% 272% 164% 144%

None of these countries were, however, undertaking major counterinsurgency S. U. Alongside these France, Britain, Members the this and of club were campaigns. "Richard Robinson, ContemporaryPortugal (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1979), 140 and 144. 20

counterinsurgencycampaignersPortugal's economywas truly anaemicand raised serious doubts about its ability to mount any such military enterprise. Portugal's GDP on the eve of the war in 1960 was $2.5 billion. Britain's at $71.0 billion was 28 times Portugal's. France's at $61.0 billion was 24 fold greater. The U. S. economy at $509.0 billion was 203 times greater than Portugal's. ' When these numbers are reduced to per capita

GDP, which is an indicator of the ability of wealth to be generatedand taxed to support a war, Portugal's relative economic weaknessis so apparent as to call into question its ability to mount and wage any war.

Given the statistical short-fall in resources that Portugal faced in conducting its counterinsurgency, it would have to adopt different strategiesfrom those of the British, French, and U. S. It would have to addresstheseseriouslimitations by devising ways to work around them and to avoid their full impact on its ability to wage war. There were two key elements that underpinned Portugal's effort in this sphere. The first was to spreadthe burden of the war as widely as possible, and the secondwas to keep the tempo of the conflict low enough so that the expenditure of resources would itself remain affordable. The counterinsurgencypractisesthat Portugal adoptedand that reflected these two national policies in conducting the campaignscan be termed the Portugueseway of war.

In the first instance the burden would be spreadto the colonies. Portugal's capacity to support a distant military campaign perforce must include the large and dynamic

'United Nations,Statistical Yearbook (New York: United Nations, 1972),602 and 605.
21

economiesof Angola and Mozambique. These additions, which are not reflected in the figures above, are important in that they supplied a significant share of the military budget and manpower for the wars. At the beginning of the conflict in 1962 European Portugal's GDP was $2.88 billion 35 To this figure must be added the $803.7 million GDP of Angola, a similar $835.5 million for Mozambique, and $85.1 million for Guine.36 This fuller picture reveals a nation with a GDP of $4.6 billion and alters the equation of wealth significantly. commitment to its colonies. It also reveals why Portugal had such a strong

Also during the 1961-1974period both the economiesof Angola and Mozambique were growing rapidly at 11% and 9% respectively. The following data compiled from 37 traces the various official sources overall expansion: GDP (Millions of U. S. Dollars)
Colony 1962 1965 1,099.0 1,213.4 97.6 1970 1,888.5 1,872.0 125.8

Per Capita GDP (U. S. Dollars)

1962 161 121 166 1965 210 165 194 1970 333 228 258

Angola 803.7 Mozambique 835.5 Guin6 85.1

With the exception of Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, per capita GDP in PortugueseAfrica during the wars exceededthat of all other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 38

"United Nations, Statistical Yearbook (New York: United Nations, 1971), 577. 36Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PortugueseAfrica, An Introduction (Lisbon: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973), 76.
37PortugueseAfrica, An Introduction, 76.

"Portuguese Africa, An Introduction, 76. 22

In 1965, some four years into the war, the defense budget amounted to 48% of European Portugal's national budget. Comparatively this allocation was greater than any other European nation, Canada, or the U. S. The next highest was the U. S. at 42%, followed by the United Kingdom at 34%. 39 However, observerstended to overlook the contribution that the colonies made to their own defense. The addition of colonial resourcesenabledPortugal not only to reach an apparently high level of expenditurebut also to sustain it over a lengthy thirteen years. The three colonies contributed

approximately 16% of the defense budget over the term of the conflict 40 This contribution along with the inclusion of the colonial economies in the broader consideration meant that Portugal was-spending only about 28% on the average of its national budget on defenseand reached a peak of 34% in 1968.41 These percentages expenditureand place it proportionately equal to similar reflect a more readily sustainable national defense budgets. It should also be noted that a great portion of the defense budget was allocated to social programs that benefitted the population in the areas of health, education, and agriculture, and contributed directly to the planned economic expansionin PortugueseAfrica. Thus while the fiscal resourceswere seemingly modest from a traditional perspective, in fact they were adequate for the low-technology campaign Portugal envisioned.

If the colonies were thought to contribute relatively modestly to the defensebudget,

39David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels, Portuguese Africa, A Handbook (London: Pall Mall PressLtd., 1969), 350.
40Joaquim da Luz Cunha, et al, Africa, A Vitoria Trafda [Africa, Betrayed Victory] (Lisbon: Editorial Intervenco Lda., 1977), 58.

"Luz Cunha, 61. 23

they conversely shoulderedan increasingly important manpower burden that gradually replaced metropolitan Portugal's soldiers with African ones. The population of

continental Portugal in 1960 was 8,889,392, and that of the three African colonies was aggregately 11,959,373.42The potential of the African population to supply troops was thus about a third greater than that of European Portugal.

Local recruitment beganat modestlevels in 1961, where it represented14.9 % of the forces in Angola, 26.8% in Mozambique, and 21.1% in Guine.43 By the end of the wars in 1974 and with the expansion of the security forces into militia and other paramilitary organisations,Africans representedfully 50% of the force in Angola, 50% in Guine, and 70% in Mozambique.' This shift acceleratedfollowing 1968, for after

sevenyears Portugal had exhaustedits European manpowerpool and increasingly sought recruits from the larger colonial pool. While there were problems inherent in this shift, such as the low educationallevel of the recruits, theseshortcomingswere addressedwith enough successto mould an effective fighting force. Officially the troop level exceeded 149,000 men in the three theatres of operations; however, with the consideration of paramilitary forces, the level approachedtwice that number. Official records of these forces were difficult to maintain at the time and following the conflict were largely lost 45 destroyed. Thus, only approximations can be made. Nevertheless, the impact of or

42Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 214. 43Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 261. "Luz Cunha, 130 and 159; and General Kalza de Arriaga, interview by the author, 8 November 1994, Lisbon. 45GeneralJose Manuel de Bethencourt Rodrigues, interview by the author, 9 November 1994, Lisbon. 24

using this broader manpower pool for recruiting enabled the PortugueseArmed Forces to maintain adequateforce levels almost indefinitely. This unique capability was critical in extending the conflict for thirteen years, and is developedin Chapter V.

The Portuguese Way of War The Portuguesehad had the benefit of earlier British, French, and U. S. experiences in the twentieth century prior to 1961 and proceeded to develop their military policies accordingly. Their early adaption of the counterinsurgency principles was relatively straightforward, and this point will be developed fully in Chapter III. Portuguese

uniquenesscame in their understandingof the struggle and adaptation to it at the theatre level and in successfully converting national strategy to battlefield tactics. With

comparatively few resources and no army trained in this type of fighting initially, Portugal had to improvise. While it anticipated employing the standard types of

counterinsurgencyoperational practices, it also sought innovations that were able to play upon the unique terrain and demographiccharacteristicsin eachof its three theatres. The concept might be borrowed from others and modified so extensively as to be nearly unique, or it might be purely Lusitanian. Some of the broader challengesand solutions characterising the Portugueseway of counterinsurgency warfare were: " The complete reorientation. of the entire Portuguese Armed Forces from a conventional force to one for counterinsurgency, thus focusing this resource on a single campaign; The realignment in recruiting for this force to the indigenous colonial manpowerpool to a degree not seen in modern times, thus allowing the colonies to shoulder a substantialportion of this burden; The shift to small unit tactics and associatedtraining basedon experiencein the wars, thus matching Portugal's force with that of the insurgents and keeping the tempo of fighting low and cost effective;

"

"

25

"

The implementation of an economic and social developmentprogram that raised the standard of living of Portuguese Africans and in doing so, largely preempted insurgent argumentsand raised the ability of the colonies to shoulder part of the war burden; and The extensive psychological operations that rationalised the Portuguesepresencein Africa to the population.

"

Despite the retarded state of Portugal's economy, the enormousgeographical challenges, armedforce, Portugalfelt confidentthat it understood andan unprepared the
job at hand and could overcome these difficulties. Out of this national self-confidence Portugal developedits own style of counterinsurgencywarfare through a synthesisof the experience of similar conflicts and of its own experience in Africa since the fifteenth century. The application of this systematicthinking to the threat posedby the nationalist movementswas madewith both a view to the national strategy of containing the cost and spreading the burden, and addressingthe battlefield situation. The object of this thesis is thematically to examinethe Portuguesemilitary's understandingof theseproblems and its search for solutions to them. It will be argued that the Portuguesedeveloped their own unique way of fighting in executing their national strategy and the practises that followed from it the Portugueseway of war. In order to highlight this Portugueseway, it will be comparedon a thematic basiswith other contemporary counterinsurgencies, and this categorical silhouetting will emphasisethe uniqueness. The fact that Portugal lost the war becauseit failed to find a political solution to the conflict does not negate its military achievementsand the fact that they may still hold lessons for others in future conflicts.

26

Literature on Portuguese Counterinsurgency There is a very limited amount of literature that addressesthe object of this thesis. The reasonsfor this dearth stem from three factors of the time: Portugal's attempt to run its involvement by in Vietnam, the low-profile U. S. the and overshadowing a war Portugueserevolution of 1974 and the new government's negative view of Portugal's

intimidationof thoseinvolvedin the conflict. involvement in Africa, andthe subsequent

This section reviews the existing literature as it relates to the thesisand thesefactors, and describesthe new material identified.

During the period of Portuguesecolonial conflict, Vietnam dominated the headlines. Little world attention was paid to theseAfrican wars. In 1977 Thomas Henriksen made the observation that "Portugal's thirteen years of counterinsurgency operations on the African continent have received little comparative analysis.""' In 1988 William Minter argued: Even in Portuguesethe written material available for a more careful judgment is sketchy. The gaps in the history of the Angolan conflict are larger than the is for information This true the preor systematic analysis. reliable patches of 1975 war against Portuguese colonialism and even more so for the complex 47 strife. postindependence "' Today Portugueseand U. S. defenseofficials continue to confirm the void in this area.

"Thomas H. Henriksen, "Portugal in " Orbis (Summer 1977): 395. Counterinsurgency,

Africa:

Comparative Notes on

47William Minter, ed., Operation Timber: Pagesfrom the Savimbi Dossier (Trenton, New Jersey: African World Press, Inc., 1988), 2. "Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,Inc., 1992), 145. On 23 September 1993, the newly appointed United States Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Frank G. Wisner, in conversations with the author stated, "The Portuguese known, is little documented, badly in Africa poorly and understood." military record 27

This situation was reinforced during the early years of the war by Portugal's imposition of strict control and censorship over any media that were permitted in its war zones49 During and after the war accessto its archives were and continue to be restricted for 50 1961-1974 In the revolution of 1974, many the purposes of researching period. 5' decolonisation destroyed in Africa and on records were many more were abandoned Becauseof thesevoids analysisof Portugal's counterinsurgencyplanning and particularly the developmentof its own brand of counterinsurgencywarfare are lacking.

A broad review of literature in English pertaining to the entire 1961-1974 period reveals that, as a general rule, virtually all of the known work represents historical

Mr. Wisner is a veteran of the U. S. effort to negotiate Cuban withdrawal from Angola, having worked as the assistant to Ambassador-at-largeGeneral Walters, who led the mission, and to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker. 49Rene Pelissier, "Private War, " The Geographical Magazine (November 1971): 78; for Africa (Cape Town: John and Al J. Venter, Portugal's Guerrilla War. " The Campaign Malherbe Pty Ltd, 1973), 30. Al Venter, a South African journalist, also commented that "the reticence on the part of the Portugueseto allow newsmento cover the conflict" had existed until 1971, and even then it took months to obtain a visa to any of the war zones. 5'Lieutenant Colonel Aniceto Afonso, Portuguese Army, Director of the Arquivo Histrico Militar, Lisbon, interview by the author 21 February 1994, Lisbon. Lieutenant Colonel Afonso indicated that the political stance and acts that political and military figures took during the African colonial wars are not necessarily those that would be popular in Portugal today. Consequently, those portions of the archives associatedwith the conflict will not be openeduntil there is considerably more distancebetweenthe wars and the individuals involved, a distance that perhaps only their death will bring. 51Jos6 Manuel de Bethencourt Rodrigues, General, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 9 November 1994, Lisbon, and Renato F. Marques Pinto, Brigadeiro, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 30 March 1995. General Bethencourt Rodrigues statedthat the Commission for the Study of the African Campaigns (1961-1974) had borrowed his personal papers as well as those of others in an attempt to reconstruct certain events because of destroyed records. Brigadeiro Marques Pinto described instructions to him as the Portuguese Military Attache in London to destroy certain records and volumes on the PortugueseArmed Forces. 28

accountsof events during this period or of general studies of the Portugueseempire in Africa with summaries of the modern colonial wars. In none of this material is there more than a token treatment of military operations or counterinsurgency. For instance, Malyn Newitt in Portugal in Africa, The Last Hundred Years devotes fourteen pagesin 247 to the eventsof the wars.52 The most recent and thorough book devoted exclusively to the war in Angola, Willem van der Waals' Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974, accords eight pages of text in 277 to counterinsurgency action and the balance to historical narrative."

The literature pertinent tothis thesis can be divided into for'broad- categories: (1) relevant publications, documents, and papers of the Portuguese government and its various arms (primary), semi-official papers written for discussion of war-related issues (primary), and interviews with participants in the conflict (primary); (2) general background information on Portugal and its colonies (secondary); (3) specific literature on the African wars in the 1961-1974 period (secondary); and (4) writings on counterinsurgencywarfare and specific campaigns (secondary).

The first category contains Portuguese official and semi-official publications, documents and papers. These represent the key primary literature and thus the main pillar on which this thesis will develop and judge the Portugueseway of fighting these has be by They to yet a mined either also source of material which wars. -represent

52MalynNewitt, Portugal in Africa, The Last Hundred Years (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981), 228-242. "Willem van der Waals, Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974 (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing (Pty) Limited, 1993), 109-112 and 114-121. 29

Portugueseor English scholars.

The number of publications by the Portuguese government on the wars and

has beenrelatively few. This modestproductivity particularly on counterinsurgency

possibly stems from the fact that the political stancethat people took and the things that they did during the wars are not perceived as acts or positions that they would want aired in Portugal today.' Domestic interest in the African Campaignsof 1961-1974has been

officially dampenedsince 1974. The abandoningor destructionof many records occurred in the closing months of the conflict and was apparently motivated not so much to shield past activities but rather to foreclose any reappraisal of the revolutionary government's African policy. This policy advocated the precipitous granting of independenceat the expense of practical considerations that would limit the chaos following an abrupt Portuguesewithdrawal.

The most recent publication is a series of volumes written in the 1988-1989period by the Commission for the Study of the African Campaigns(1961-1974), a special body establishedby the Army General Staff in 1980. The work is titled ResenhaHistricoMilitar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), [Historical-Military Report of the African Campaigns (1961-1974)], establishesthe backgroundand general framework of the wars in the first volume, and gives the order of battle and its rationale over the various

M, Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Director, Institute for Strategic and International Studies, Lisbon, interview by the author, 23 February 1994, Lisbon. 30

" in the campaigns subsequentvolumes.

It provides an historical account of the

disposition of forces throughout the wars with a broad description of the operations, representing the Portuguese Army's official view of events. But most importantly it provides information from depositions that detail the problems faced in the field and the solutions taken within the limitations of resourcesavailable, and as such is particularly valuable in showing how Portugal worked within its limitations.

The official Portuguesedoctrine on counterinsurgencyis contained in its Ministry of the Army publication of five volumes, 0 Ezercito na Guerra Subversiva, [The Army in Subversive War], (1963).56 It is the basic foundation for the conduct of the war and the nature of insurgency, small unit tactics, the Army's psychosocialprogram, addresses psychological operations, and logistics. This doctrine was produced and refined

following two years of experience fighting in northern Angola and drew heavily on French and British thinking. From the beginning of the wars in 1961 until it was

formally published in its five volume form in 1963 sectionswere releasedas guides for conducting the war. It articulates the proceduresand rationale for Portugal's fighting a low-technology, limited, small unit, infantry action. It is the tactical doctrine that

implements the Portuguesepolicy of maintaining a low tempo, subduedconflict, as when the tempo escalates, so follows the cost in both money and casualties. This volume describes the methods used to implement this Portuguesephilosophy and embodiesthe

55Estado-Maiordo Exercito (EME), ResenhaHistorico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974) [Historical-Military Report of the African Campaigns (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1988). 56Minist6riodo Exdreito, 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva[The Army in Subversive War] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1963). 31

Portugueseprinciple of applying resourcesto the conflict to provide the greatestyield in achieving the goal of militarily defeating the insurgents.

In the early phasesof the war the Guia para Emprego Tdctico das PequenasUnidades na Contra Guerrilha, [Guide to the Tactical Employment of Small Units in CounterGuerrilla Operations], which was at the time in developmentas the chapter on small unit

doctrine, was publishedin 1961 and rushedinto the tacticsin the counterinsurgency
field. ' It is a sound manual for the soldier and reflects much of the thinking that was to follow in 1963 in the more elaborate five-volume series for broader consumption, as describedabove. This book becamethe soldier's bible in the early years of the conflict and reflected the Portugueseway of fighting initially. It was subsequentlyrefined with

the issue of the formal doctrine in 1963 and later revised again in 1966.

The book, Subsfdiospara o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), [Aid to the Study of Doctrine Applicable in the African Campaigns(19611974)], was published in 1990 by the Army General Staff and is used in staff college s$ fora. The work traces the development of Portuguese courses and other similar doctrine for the African Campaigns of 1961-1974 (or Campaigns) and comments on a number of problems encounteredand their solutions in its implementation. It is a very key book written by those who played a part in initially formulating the doctrine as staff

57Ministerio do Exercito, Guia para Emprego Tdctico das Pequenas Unidades na Contra Guerrilha, [Guide to the Tactical Employment of Small Units in Counter-Guerrilla Operations] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1963). S8Estado-Maior do Exercito (EME), Substdiospara o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada Africa de in (1961-1974), [Aid Study Doctrine Applicable Campanhas to the the of nas African Campaigns(1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exdreito, 1990). 32

officers and later wrestling with its imperfections. While it tends to skirt the sensitive topics, such as Africanisation of the conflict, it provides insights into Portuguesepolicy developmentand implementation in the area of applying Portuguesestrengthsagainstthe weaknesses of the enemy and Portugal's relationship with the population, including the

ethicalbehaviourof its armedforces.

In additionto the foregoingthereare some32 lesserofficial publications in garnered

interviews, copied from the library at the Institute for Higher Military Studies (IAEM), discovered through antique and used book dealers specialising in PortugueseAfrica, or purchased from the Portuguese government's obsolete publication office in Lisbon. There are also 22 semi-official academic studies copied from the Institute's collection. Together this material provides extended detail on the problems of applying limited resources in seeking solutions to large problems. To the extent that there remained unclear or unexplainedissuesin this literature, thesevoids were clarified through a series of interviews with officers who had personal knowledge of that particular aspect of the campaign.

The secondaryliterature cited in the secondcategoryprovides supporting background information on the problems facing the Portugueseand helps to establishthe rationale for certain decisions and practises that were unique to Portugal's way of fighting in Africa. The most prominent is James Duffy's Portuguese Africa, published in 1959.59 This work is certainly not definitive; however, for English readers it is a very sound effort.

Duffy is Newitt's Portugal in Africa, TheLast Hundred Years(1981), Complementing

"James Duffy, PortugueseAfrica (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). 33

a seemingly reasonedand balanced account of the modern colonial period.60 Gervase Clarence-Smith's The Third Portuguese Empire 1825-1975: A Study in Economic 61 Two Imperialism is a similar work that parallels Newitt in scholarly achievement. specific volumes on the principal colonies are Wheeler and Pelissier's Angola (1971) and Henriksen's Mozambique (1978).62 Both of these tend to give cursory treatment to the

developments, earlierperiodsandto concentrate on themodern particularlythenationalist

uprisings and the colonial wars, and for this perspective they are particularly useful as a source of examples of wartime practises and insurgent dynamics centred on the population, an important aspectin the object of this thesis. Gerald Bender in his Angola under the Portuguese, The Myth and the Reality (1978) contributes by detailing population resettlementpractises during the wars, a controversial program to shield the 63 insurgents from its living John Marcum's The the to population and raise standardof Angolan Revolution, Volume I: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962) is the most comprehensivedescription of the genesisof the war in Angola from the insurgent side." Vail and White's Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique:A Study of the Quelimane

6QMalyn Newitt, Portugal in Africa, The Last Hundred Years (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981). 61Gervase Clarence-Smith, The Third Portuguese Empire 1825-1975: A Study in Economic Imperialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985). 62Douglas L. Wheeler and Rene P6lissier, Angola (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971); and Thomas H. Henriksen, Mozambique: A History (London: Rex Collins Ltd., 1978). 63Gerald J. Bender, Angola under the Portuguese, The Myth and the Reality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 6'JohnA. Marcum, TheAngolan Revolution, VolumeI: TheAnatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962) (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1969). 34

District (1980) is a complementaryvolume on Mozambique.65

The secondaryliterature cited in the third category servesas a sourceof examplesof Portuguese doctrine in action, planning the effective application of resources in the conflict. These examples represent failed as well as successfulpractises and support

either the change or continuation of Portuguesepolicy. As a key part of Portuguese in to strategy was createconfusion the enemy camps, literature on the insurgentsshowing the results of thesepolicies is an important facet.of this thesis. John Marcum's second volume on Angola: The Angolan Revolution: Volume 2, Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976) is most valuable in this regard, as it describes the effort of the " difficulties. details Portuguese defeat the their to and guerrillas It further describes

how the Portuguesehad since their early presencein Africa been adept at playing the various ethno-linguistic groups against one another, an important facet of their way of war. Le Naufrage des Caravelles [The Shipwreck of the Caravels] (1979) is the third 67 It provides Africa. Portuguese Rend Pelissier's volume of collection of articles on editorial and historical comment on certain statistical figures for the 1961-1975period, and as such, is a most useful reference in explaining or supporting Portuguesepolicy. The most recent history on the wars in English is Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974, which appearedin 1993 by Willem van der Waals, and while much of it is a recasting

65LeroyVail and LandegWhite, Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique:A Study of the QuelimaneDistrict (London: Heinemann Educational Books Limited, 1980). 66John A. Marcum, TheAngolan Revolution, VolumeII: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976) (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1978). 67RenePelissier, Le Naufrage des Caravelles, Etudes sur la Fin de L'Empire Portugais (1961-1975) [The Shipwreck of the Caravels, Studies on the End of the PortugueseEmpire] (Orgeval: Editions Pelissier, 1979). 35

from secondary sources, it introduces new material from the South African military archives that provides insight into Portugal's military problems in Angola and their " solutions.

The thesis cites insurgent views whenever possible as a counterpoise to Portuguese

activity. These citationsreflectthe success or failure of Portuguese policies,andas such,

support the thesis in examining Portuguese reaction to insurgent activity. For

Mozambique these sources are Henriksen's Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence(1983), and in the caseof Guin6, Chabal's Amflcar Cabral (1983) and Basil Davidson's TheLiberation of Guine (1969)-.'- Basic texts from the insurgents themselves are Mondlane's The Struggle for Mozambique (1969) and Amlcar Cabral's Revolution in Guine (1969).'0

Again, a source of examples of Portuguese policies and operational practices are journalistic writings. Al Venter, a journalist close to the South African DefenseForce, has made valuable contributions in his The Terror Fighters (1969), Portugal's War in

"'Willem S. van der Waals, Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974 (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing (Pty) Limited, 1993). 69Thomas H. Henrikson, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1974 (London: Greenwood Press, 1978); Patrick Chabal, Amflcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Basil Davidson, The Liberation of Guine (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969). "Eduardo Mondlane, TheStrugglefor Mozambique(Harmondsworth: PenguinBooks Ltd., 1969); and Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guine: An African People's Struggle (London: Stage 1,1969). 36

Guine-Bissau (1973), and The Zambesi Salient (1974).71 Each of these volumes is a report of his visits with Portugueseforces in the respectivewar theatres. Consequently, their primary limitation is a Portuguesebias. His views and reporting is not seenthrough the eyes of a military expert, and thus his views are frequently moulded by his Portuguese contacts. These books contain many examples of Portuguese

doctrineandtraining in effectandare usedto highlightthe success counterinsurgency or

failure of such activity

Similar journalistic reflections on the war in Mozambique in Portugueseare Maier's Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambiqueand Rocha's Guerra em Mocambique, [War in Mozambique]. 72 Both serve as good sources of illustrative examples of numerous counterinsurgency operations. Helio Felgas's Guerra em Angola, [War in Angola], 73 It is a (1968) provides a further survey of the Angola front in Portuguese. considerably more scholarly work and balancesthejournalistic approachwell. Additional Portuguese books are Artur Maciel's Angola Herica [Heroic Angola], Horcio Caio's Angola, Os Dias do Desespero[Angola, The Days of Desperation], and Amndio Cesar's Guine 1965: Contra-Attaque [Guin6 1965: Counterattack], which give emotional

"Al J. Venter, The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in SouthernAfrica (CapeTown: Purnell and Sons(S.A. ) (Pty.) Ltd., 1969); Portugal's War in Guine-Bissau (Pasadena:California Institute of Technology, 1973); and TheZambesi Salient (London: Robert Hale & Company, 1975). F. X. Maier, Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique (New York: American African Affairs Association, 1974); and Nuno Rocha, Guerra em Mocambique [War in Mozambique] (Lisbon: Editora Ulisseia Limitada, 1969). 73Hdlio Felgas, Guerra em Angola [War in Angola] (Lisbon: Livraria Clssica Editora, 1961). 37

descriptions of the opening months of the conflict 74 They are valuable in following theseearly developments. The PortugueseAnswer (1973), published by General Kalza de Arriaga privately in England, is an account of the Portuguesereaction to the guerrillas in Mozambique.'' He reviews the underlying Portugueseview of the communist grand

strategy and follows this with his personal game plan for reform and guerrilla

Portuguese ForcesMozambique. containment as Commander-in-Chief

GeneralLuz Cunha, GeneralKalza de Arriaga, GeneralBethencourtRodrigues, and General Silverio Marques, all former commanders-in-chiefin one of the three theatres, jointly wrote Africa, a Yt6ria Tratda, [Africa, the Betrayed Victory], (1977) in which they describe the situation in 1974 and provide a rationale for continuing the wars to a 76 insurgents. This than the to the satisfactory conclusion rather abandoning colonies book suggestshow their country might capitalise on this foundation of military success and social development,key aspectsof the entire campaign. Two additional memoirs of equal importance are Marcello Caetano'sDepoimento, [Deposition], and Silva Cunha's 0 Ultramar, a Naco eo "25 de April, " [The OverseasProvinces, the Nation and the

'Artur Maciel, Angola Herica: 120 Dias com os NossasSoldados [Heroic Angola: 120 Days with Our Soldiers] (Amadora: Livaria Bertrand, 1963); Horcio Caio, Angola, Os Dias do Desespero[Angola, The Days of Desperation] (Lisbon: Edition of the author, 1966); and Amndio C6sar, Guine 1965: Contra-Attaque [Guind 1965: Counterattack] (Braga: Livraria Editoria Pax, 1965). 75Kalzade Arriaga, The PortugueseAnswer (London: Tom Stacy Ltd, 1973). 76Joaquim da Luz Cunha, Kalza de Arriaga, JoseManuel de BethencourtRodrigues, Africa: Vtria [Africa: Tratda The Betrayed Victory] Marques, A Silvino Silverio and (Lisbon: Editorial Intervenro, Lda., 1977). 38

"25th of April"]. "

Dr. Caetano became Portugal's Prime Minister following Dr.

Salazar's stroke in 1968, and his reflections are particularly important, for they show his obstructionist posture to any political solution, bringing greater pressure for a military solution. Professor Silva Cunha was initially Dr. Caetano's Minister of Overseas

Territories before becoming Minister of Defenseprior to the 1974 coup. The portion of the book addressingdefenseissuesdescribesthe problems facing the military engine and the methodology employed to reach solutions. The description of this thought process at the highest levels is an important facet in the development of the Portugueseway of counterinsurgency.

From the final category the writings on counterinsurgency warfare and modem campaigns represent a comprehensive body of thought covering the theory of important is in that literature before 1961 both This and afterwards. counterinsurgency it is key to making an appraisal of the Portugueseunderstandingof counterinsurgency 78 it in the wars. warfare and the extent to which was embraced the conduct of

"Marcello Caetano,Depoimento [Deposition] (Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record, 1974); and J. M. da Silva Cunha, 0 Ultramar, a Nacoo eo "25 de April " [The Overseas Provinces, The Nation and the "25 of April"] (Coimbra: Atlntida Editora, 1977). 78Thissecondaryliterature on small wars and insurgenciesis well establishedand has its origins in Lord Wolseley's 1886 edition of his Soldier's Pocket Book. The term "small wars" describes operations conducted between a highly trained, armed, and organized force and, broadly speaking, irregulars. The orientation of the term is toward counterinsurgency, although today the U. S. government in its study of this form of war has grouped all of the aspectsof small wars under the term "low-intensity conflict. " This term includes insurgent warfare, wars of national liberation, revolutionary warfare, and all of the guerrilla warfare, and makesno distinction betweenthem. It also encompasses elements used to counter these threats. The classic volume on the counterinsurgent aspectsof small wars is Colonel C. E. for Imperial Soldiers published in 1896. This Callwell's Small Wars, A Tactical Textbook in its field definitive World II, War after when parts of it until considered volume was 39

The aim of this thesis is to show how Portugal with its meagre resources developed a national strategy to husbandand preserve them that was translated into policies and practises at the campaignand tactical level. Portugal's deployment of its resourceswas in such sympathywith the dynamicsof the conflict that it was able to conduct a sustained and lengthy campaign in three distant colonies. The thesis also examines the successes

in response andfailuresof these policy implementation measures astheywereintroduced in the theatres to developments their appropriateness througha comparison andanalyses
to other contemporarycounterinsurgencies.Becauseof a lack of literature addressingthis topic, it is necessaryto make this examination and analysis from the facts and situations describedlargely in Portuguesemilitary documentsand publications and to comparethem to and test them against similar contemporary counterinsurgencyexperiences.

Methodology As Portugal's war to retain its colonies endedin failure, there is a national shameand embarrassment about this outcome. The mood in Portugal today is one of putting Africa

were overcome simply by the fact that prevailing conditions had changedalmost beyond recognition. The political awarenessof opponents, the introduction of the press with its high technology news reporting capability, the addition of the helicopter to the logistical equation, and advent of air power itself combined to outmode many parts of the book. In a similar vein, the U. S. Marine Corps published its Small Wars Manual in 1940. It sets forth a military strategy and tactics for small wars, including counterinsurgency, based on its experiences in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Vera Cruz, and other policing expeditions of the late 1800sand early 1900s. Following World War II, insurgencies became the vehicle of choice for proxy few between As Western the and powers. published materials often communist warfare, from begin Their Portuguese had thinking was the to scratch. nearly were available, developed primarily from a series of case studies conducted by the PortugueseArmy's Institute of Higher Military Studies, and the Army's General Staff. It was the thinking developed from this effort that provided the basis for Portuguese counterinsurgency theory. 40

behind it and looking to a future with the European Union 71 Becauseof this semi. official "non-interest" in the topic of the wars, there is little literature openly available as secondary sources in either Portuguese or English that performs any analysis of Portugal's military operationsin Africa. Except for a very few official publications, little has been written since 1974. Consequently, it was necessaryto rely on Portuguese

information. for the primary research military sources

The interview process yielded the largest amount of information on the thesis topic in that not only was the oral history and insight useful in developing research, but it led to other sources. Over 40 individuals were interviewed, including many of the key military figures, and a list of those contributing is detailed in the bibliography. During the interview process many private and personal papers were made available by the interviewees, including unpublished memoirs and other documents describing the situations in which they were involved. They also contacted their friends and

acquaintances and sought answersto questionsin the form either of further interviews or of accessto additional material. Archival material was irregularly limited becauseof secrecy. The PortugueseArmy was quite protective in certain arbitrary areasof original documents and depositions; however, outside of these sensitive areas all services were forthcoming in disclosing their wartime activities and releasing what documents were available.

A most lucrative source proved to be the library files and the faculty at the IAEM,

in 1960-1963 doctrine Portuguese the and counterinsurgency was conceived written where
79Colonel Antnio RosasLeito, interview by the author, 16 November 1994, Lisbon. 41

issues in library The the conduct analyses significant raised period. contained of most faculty The the these available. and copies of papers made was free to of wars, were answer questionsand arrange interviews with those who had participated directly in the issues under examination. Taken together this material provides a firm basis to assess and develop an analysis of Portugal's counterinsurgencycampaign.

Chapter Organisation This thesis is organized around Portugal's development of its counterinsurgency doctrine and its implementation, beginning with an explanatory background to the wars and then expanding on the various thematic aspectsof the Portugueseway of fighting in Africa.

Chapter II sets the stage for an analysis of Portugal's war effort by showing why Portugal was ready to fight a long and arduous campaign. It explains the economic, political, and emotional importance of the colonies to Portugal, the development of the government's posture toward Africa in contrast to that of the other colonial powers at the time, and the commitment that this policy entailed. It concludeswith a summary of the events of 1961 that with each sequentialone hardenedPortugal's pursuit of its colonial policy and produced an intransigence that led to an irrevocable commitment to the conflict.

Chapter III tracesthe Portugueseanalysis of its insurgency problem and examinesthe development of its counterinsurgencydoctrine in the period just prior to and during the doctrine It the this the and of effort analyses the origins reviews wars. opening phasesof 42

in terms of its relevance and applicability to the colonial situation. It considers their understanding of the problem, how their philosophy differed from or was similar to established British, French, and U. S. thinking, and how it was refined through experience.

Chapter IV examines the changesin the command structure and organisation of the

Portuguese Armed Forces to addressthe requirementof mobilising, training, and

directing a revamped army in Africa. It further identifies the problems encounteredin this processand the adjustmentsmade to produce the desired results. These efforts are compared and contrasted with- armies fighting similar, contemporaneous wars.

Chapter V examinesthe dynamics of the recruiting problem in metropolitan Portugal and how it led to a pragmatic shift to local recruiting in the theatres of operations. It examines the unique Portuguese aspectsof this Africanisation and concludes with an analysis that places it in the context of other similar contemporary struggles.

Chapter VI describes the organisation and development of Portugal's systematic intelligence effort and examines its effective link in denying the insurgents initiative. It addressesthe problems encounteredwith these operations in selectedareasand follows the solutions adopted, comparing and contrasting them with other similar ones in contemporary counterinsurgenciesto highlight the Portuguesestrengthsand weaknesses.

Chapter VII examines helicopter operations and the impact that they had on

Portuguese wererelativelynew in this warfare. Helicopteroperations counterinsurgency

43

period, having been introduced in counterinsurgencyoperations for the first time by the British in Malaya, and thus their use was still in the exploratory stages. The chapter traces the developmentof Portuguesehelicopter tactics, their effect on operations, and their integration into Portuguesetactical doctrine, highlighting this effort with those in comparable situations.

initiatedto raise Chapter VIII examines thepsychosocial programthatthePortuguese

the standardof living of the local population, to protect them from the guerrillas, and to persuadethem that thesebenefits far exceededanything that the insurgents might offer. It contrasts theseaspectswith other similar efforts in contemporary counterinsurgencies to highlight the Portuguesestrengthsand weaknesses.

Chapter IX examines the logistics problem that Portugal faced in procuring the necessarymateriel and in distributing it to the forces in the field on three fronts. It discussesthe building of infrastructure, particularly the extensive airfield network and road systems,the operation of the logistical pipeline, and the impact of medical support. It contraststheseproblems and their solutions with other similar efforts in contemporary counterinsurgenciesto highlight the Portuguesestrengthsand weaknesses.

Chapter X synthesises the broad themesof the thesis. It seeksto underline the major factors that comprise the uniqueness of the Portugueseway of fighting counterinsurgency its flexible fronts limited its to that thinking show and resources and multiple very with insurgents. lessons key the to the to staying ahead of absorb were and readiness

44

II Commitment to the Ultramar

Portugal's commitment to the defenseof its colonies, or the ultramar, had its origins in their economic promise and in Dr. Ant6nio Salazar's emotional African policy of Lusotropicalism.' Portugal had been in Africa since 1497, which on the eve of the wars far by longer four half than any other colonial power. to centuries, amounted over and a With the progressive decline of its trading position in the Indian Ocean beginning in 1578, the loss of its colony of Brazil in 1822, and the missed opportunity of a coast-tocoast possessionin austral Africa in 1890, Portugal's colonial empire was left with only the potential of the large but incompletely developed colonies of Angola and Mozambique. These colonies in Portuguese minds held the promise of a renewed

for been Portuguese having heritage Further so the of with prosperity and greatness. long their ownership was to be defended at all costs? For this small European nation, the importance of the colonies was captured in an editorial by Dr. Marcello Caetanoin O Mundo Portugues [PortugueseWorld] that appearedin 1935, "Africa is for us a moral justification and a raison d'etre as a power. Without it we would be a small nation; with it, we are a great country. n3 Expanding on this concept was Dr. Salazar's notion of

'James Duffy, Portugal in Africa (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1962), 150151. See also James Duffy, PortugueseAfrica (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 271-272. 2JohnMarcum, TheAngolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (19621976) (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1978), 125-126.

3Dr. Marcello Caetano,"Editorial," 0 Mundo Portugues[Portuguese World] (II1935):218.

45

Lusotropicalism, which was an attempt to combine colonial ownership with Portuguese 4 in heritage, their pride culture, and civilising responsibility. Dr. Salazar believed that this emotional formula would bind the colonies to the nation and help to maintain Portugal's position as the third largest colonial empire after those of Britain and France. With this concept of empire Dr. Salazarsought to dispel the world image of Portugal as

an extension of Portugalwere morefor a small country. Also the coloniesin becoming

Dr. Salazar than a sentimentalbond:-' in India are equally with our provinces Angola, Mozambique, and our possessions of Minho or Beira under the same single authority of the State. We are one juridical and political unit, and we desire to advancetowards an economic unity as complete and perfect as possible by developing production and by extending our trade in raw materials in food and manufacturedarticles between the various parts of this "whole. "6 The growth of revolutionary climate in the ultramar clashedwith this philosophy and the Dr. Salazarand country's refusal to break the colonial bond and to decolonisein 19617 .

'JamesDuffy, PortugueseAfrica (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 271. 5Duffy, 271. The author quotes from an article on Dr. Salazar's colonial view by Antonio Leite de Magalhes, "Na Estrada do Imperio" [On the Road of Imperialism], which appearedin 0 Mundo Portuguesin 1937. He notes that the translation did not do justice to the original work: "Empire and Liberty were incompatible concepts. Empire means Authority - and there is no Authority where Power is divided and diluted. It is the duty of the New State to reestablishthe force of Power. With it will be revived all the power-conceptsof the Past. One of thesepower-conceptswas the unity of territory and of the Grail, . as though there were no seas or races separating the constituent elements of the national Whole. " 6Antnio de Oliveira Salazar, trans. Robert Edgar Broughton, Doctrine and Action: Internal and Foreign Policy of the New Portugal 1928-1939 (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1939), 175-176. 'Gervase Clarence-Smith, The Third Portuguese Empire 1825-1975, A Study in Economic Imperialism (Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press, 1985), 185-186. See also John Marcum, TheAngolan Revolution: TheAnatomy of and Explosion (1950-1962) (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1969), 120; and Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), 17-19. By the end of the 1950s grievances in the colonies had reached dangerouslevels. The creole elite were 46

European and Muslim challengesto their new monopoly and proceeded to establish a systematic arc of enclaves strategically ringing the Indian Ocean. These bases

commanded both the sources of trade as well as the sea routes themselves. As the Portuguesesecuredtheir dominancein this area, so profits from their localized trade as ' increased its Portugal Cape height of power and the accordingly. reached as route well influence during the first half of the sixteenth century. Its decline can be marked from June 1578 and its disastrousNorth African campaign in which King Sebastioand his 10 by forces destroyed in four hours The Moroccan E1-Ksar army were at el-Kebir. might of Portugal was wasted with this disaster, and the next year Portugal's great epic poet and inspirer of nationalistic sentiment, Luis Vaz de Cames, wrote to a friend from his deathbed in Lisbon, "All will see that so dear to me was my country that I was content to die not only in but with it. ""

While leaving an indelible imprint on the European perspective of the world, the Portuguese had exhaustedthemselvesin the process. They were never able to regain their sixteenth century stature, and from that period until 1961 Portugal experiencedan irregular path of decline with episodesof partial recovery. As a nation, the Portuguese have historically looked back on this time, which they call 0 S9culo Maravilhoso [The

9C. R. Boxer, ThePortugueseSeaborneEmpire, 1415-1825 (London: Hutchinsonand Co. Ltd., 1969), 39-64.
"William C. Atkinson, "Introduction" to Luis Vaz de Cames, The Lusiads, trans. William C. Atkinson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1952), 19-20. King Sebastio's force totalled some 15,000 foot and 1,500 horse with 9,000 camp-followers. Five hundred vessels were required to transport the force. Eight thousand were killed, 15,000 were taken prisoner and sold into slavery, and perhaps one hundred eventually reached the safety of Portugal.

11Atlnson,20. 48

Marvellous Century], and longed to regain the former height of glory and greatness. Although this first empire was short-lived, it createda permanent nostalgia that gave Dr. Salazara "vibrant chord of imperial grandeur" around which to rally colonial support.12 In the period between 1497 and 1578 the Portuguesehad establisheda new concept of empire based on a mastery of the ocean routes. Trade, not territory, was the prime objective. Portugal was unable to sustain such a grand enterprise with its very limited resources, particularly in manpower, and when Spain annexed it in its depleted state between 1580 and 1640, this trade dominance was effectively lost. When Portugal

it it in 1640, its independence that retrieved so much of its a wonder was recovered overseasholdings as well, particularly Brazil. As spiceswere the single most lucrative in Brazilian them the seventeenth the so sugar replaced century, sixteenth commodity of century. When West Indian sugar production threatenedto supplant that of Brazil, Gold discovered. 1728 diamonds in The 1694. In discovered there were also revenue was from this colonial wealth maintainedthe continuity of Portugueseprosperity, until Brazil declared its independencein 1822.13 It was the memory of Brazil and the wealth that it had provided that generateda twentieth century hope for a similar prosperity from the African colonies. This Brazilian model, where "Portugueselanguage and culture were firmly entrenched" became a far more influential guide for the development of Angola

1. The author arguesthat while politicians and colonial ideologues 12Clarence-Smith, imperial throughout this the grandeur chord of on vibrant to strongly play were able history of the Third PortugueseEmpire (1825-1975) by recalling the great days of the discoveries and Asian conquests, the Portuguese citizens themselves were never it Portuguese Asia, hollow in toward their many and saw as a attitudes unanimous in it impotent its left defense drained the of resources and that country against triumph Spain. "Perry Anderson, "Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism, " New Left Review (May-June 1992): 94. 49
r,. L, `^rn

14 0 Seculo Maravilhoso. These two colonies were seen on the Mozambique than and eve of the wars potentially as modem-day Brazils and the prized keys to renewed both This part of a strong nationalism that had view was prosperity and greatness. forces loyal to Dr. Salazar and an class and political cementeda peculiar alliance of increasing component of Portugal's expanding post-World War II economy." In the

1950sthe colonial economies exhibitedsteadygrowth and were no longer a financial

burden on the metrpole. This colonial expansionand economic momentum, as viewed in 1961, supportedthe case for their retention."

Elusive domestic prosperity also reinforced the commitment-to the African colonies from Portugal Metropolitan the earliest times remained their economic promise. and dependent and was economically underdeveloped -on overseascommerce and colonial in living. first Lisbon half the than subsistence standard of to a of more wealth maintain the sixteenth century was a spectacularly opulent city, yet Portugal as a whole did not its had be feed the time, to to at and staples clothe population and produce enoughgoods ' purchased abroad. Slaves were imported from the Guinean Coast to supply labour

''Clarence-Smith, 2. The author arguesthat Brazil was a far different enterprisethan it had in that Asian provided raw materials and in turn Portugal had experience the earlier had been It also a colony of settlement rather than one where supplied manufactures. "immigrants died of tropical diseasesand melted into the local population. "
"Clarence-Smith, 15-16. The author argues that empire played a dual role in the Portugal of Salazar. The ideological role was a vital component of Lusotropicalism and in its fantasy imperial The remote greatness. economic of overtones assumed extreme domestic its by to the adjunct economy, and utility governed was supporting a was role "the most thorough and authoritarian methods" in modern Portuguese history.

17. 16Clarence-Smith, 93. 17Anderson, 50

while rural Portuguese emigrated to Western Spain in search of employment.'8 The wealth of Lisbon seemeduseless to the population at large. As Portugal had never developeda domestic economy of any consequence during the years of plenty, there was no alternative to the stagnation at home when the wealth from abroad evaporated. levels, and becauseit was so weak, it failed Portugal's economypersisted at subsistence to participate significantly in the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century. This increasingly important. failure Africa the promise of made signal

Portugal began the nineteenthcentury with such an anaemic domestic economy that it could not convert the raw materialsof its colonies into manufacturedgoods to the same degree that its European trading partners could. With the loss of Brazil and accessto its readily saleable commodities, Portugal was left to survive on its weak economic capability. Portugal's trade patterns during this period give insight on its problem.

Portugal's share of trade with its main European partners was a mere 1.20 percent in 1820 and experienced a steady erosion through the century to 0.78 percent in 1899. Portugal's relatively small share of world trade declined from 0.88 percent in 1820 to 0.53 percent in 1899. While world trade was expanding ten fold during this span, that fold from is base. instructive It Portugal to note that a small very six expanded only of the greatest relative increasein world-wide trade during the nineteenth century occurred in 1850-1860 decade. Portugal lagged 80 the the averages the expansion percent with its European 60 trading partners were beating the while performance, percent with a

'BDavid M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels, Portuguese Africa: A Handbook (London: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1969), 93-94. The authors observe that African in Portugal the mid-sixteenth century comprised a tenth throughout and slaves were sold in Algarve. 1961 By few the Lisbon's there a majority and population were pureof blooded Africans in Portugal, as the former slaveshad been absorbedinto the population.
51

19 increase during Because Portugal was not 100 the period. percent average with a developing its economic engine, it was unable to employ the resourcesof its colonies on in international trading to exploit any relative advantage scale and any appreciable commerce.

The colonies may have had potential, but Portugal was unable to capitalise in betterment its traditional to the the their mercantilist sense promise of on significantly overall economy. Clarence-Smith explains that through poor colonial policies "the in important (between 1910 less became the to terms metropolis economic and colonies 1926), and colonial decline contributed to the downfall of the (republican) regime" in 20 Salazar. Dr. In Portuguese eyes they, 1926 and the subsequent emergence of for hold in the to their potential ultimate prosperity nevertheless, continued in delivered Dr. Salazar 8 1936 To June this a speech end on state. underdeveloped Colonial Empire his belief Conference "by Economic the that of the explained opening Country Mother have ties, the the the and colonies as their political and moral of virtue basis of their economy a community of interests and a natural bond of union. " Their "economic regimes...are established in harmony with the requirements of their development...and the legitimate needs of the Mother Country and the Portuguese Colonial Empire. "2' And while the long-held hope of regeneration had never

"Michael G. Mulhall, The Dictionary of Statistics, 4th ed. (London: George Routledge and Sons, Limited, 1909). 116. The late 1910sto the mid-1920s are noteworthy in that it is 20Clarence-Smith, 1950s during 1890s between the the and which the eleven-year running the only period its fallen decline. had It trade Portugal's with proportional empire showed a of means from about 15% under the monarchy to about 10% under the republic. 21 Salazar, 300-301.

52

it in Salazar Dr. this policy. sought materialised,

He moved decisively to reinforce

economic links between the ultramar and the metrpole, and on the eve of the wars the African colonies appeared finally to be realising their true promise.' in its believed African colonial potential. deeply Portugal that point It was at this

Dr. Salazar and the Colonies Dr. Salazarsaw the colonies as an important part of Portugal's ability to emergefrom 23 fiscal the the previous republican government. If Portugal was to rediscover chaos of itself, then it would have to reestablishits identity. Dr. Salazar thus sought to promote in be born It ignorance imperial not an atmosphere could of consciousness. and a new disinterest. Consequently,it was basedon the Portugueseideology of imperial greatness familiar. with which everyone was This mentality was defined in terms of three The first element was supported by the

' heroism, trade. and elements: geography,

flew flag Portuguese the that over vast territories spreadingover three continents notion largest in lay The European the third colonial state power. second a small and making during 0 SeculoMaravilhoso, and by Portugal's discoveries sailors and epic warriors the Portuguese had hardships in focused that the the people endured third on carving the the

'Clarence-Smith, 146. The author argues that Dr. Salazar during World War II to it links, led this that to the colonial and was groundwork the economic colonial reforged in expansion the post-war period. 'Duffy, 268-269. The author argues that Portugal's economic plight in the 1930s but legislation little developing theorising the colonial and colonies, cost and precluded interest. Most declining this colonial of action was a synthetic to a awaken served home bolster designed to confidence at and prestige abroad. creation 24James Duffy, Portugal in Africa (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1962), 150inspiration found in Cames's Lusfadas, as quoted by Nationalistic 151. sentiment Professor Duffy, "... the symbol of the moral unity of the Empire, whose discovery and imperishable lines... it " for sings with civilisation conquest

53

hidden riches from remote lands and establishingcentres of production and profit there. Dr. Salazar articulated these ideas on the moral unity of the empire in his 8 June 1936 speech: It is only right that the efforts of the Portuguese should be given the place of honour, for they discovered, evangelised, and colonised the most distant and inhospitable regions.... While other people... leave their settlements..., the Portuguese, are even today obstinately rooted to their morsel of soil.... with heroic obstinacy, they relinquish neither the possessionsnor the occupation of their corner of the earth, because,above all, and even with the prejudice to their most legitimate interests, Portugal is there. ' He viewed the colonies as a vehicle to give Portugal stature in a world where the had removed all such standing with the number and government republican preceding 26 its In Lusotropicalism he administrations. attempted to create a colonial of volatility drawing by Portuguese the people on the sense of achievementin 0 within mentality Seculo Maravilhoso and relating it to the present colonial ownership. Dr. Salazar's Lusotropical vision embodied a senseof unity between the ultramar and the metrpole that had genuine foundations in national heritage and psychology and past colonial 27 policy.

The modern-day origin of this psychology can be traced to the British Ultimatum of

25Salazar, 306. "Duffy, 150. The author writes that Angola and Mozambique were simultaneously live exhibits in a museum of memories and a direct challenge to Salazar's new demonstrate determined it Portugal to that was was capable of recreating government. the glories of its African past and showing that the Portuguesecolonial tradition was a in development force Africa. the of vital and successful 27James Duffy, PortugueseAfrica (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 271. The author argues that this Portuguesefeeling of solidarity was an amorphous sentiment insular its the provincial personality and celebrated sense population's that grew out of best The bind Brazil to the ties that remains example close sentimental saudade. of Portugal.

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1890. In the last two decadesof the nineteenthcentury with the industrial machinery of the Europeaneconomicpowerhouses running competitively at full throttle, there occurred a spontaneous"scramble for Africa, " a frantic rush to establish colonial claims. This "scramble" was prompted by an increasing awarenessin Europe about Africa coupled with a speculative search for new opportunities by Europe's more prosperous powers. Approximately 80 percent of the territorial acquisitions in Africa during this time were industrialized by three the nations of Europe: Britain, France, and Germany. most made Despite Portugal's long-standing presencethere, it was squeezedin the competitive race for its in its to economic developmentcrisis. Its confrontation with a solution search and Britain over its coast-to-coastcolonial ambitions--injoining Angola and Mozambique through austral Africa potentially to form a secondBrazil becamea face-off that was to basis for Portuguese the Salazar appeal to and serve as a significant national will seal defend and retain the colonies in 1961.28 28Clarence-Smith,83-85. See also H. V. Livermore, A New History of Portugal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 305-306; "Great Britain's Policy in Africa" by an African Explorer, The Times (London), 22 August 1888,8; and Eric for Africa 1875-1891 (Johannesburg:Witwatersrand Axelson, Portugal and the Scramble University Press, 1967), 211-213. Portugal had launched expeditions by Serpa Pinto, Capelo, Roberto Ivens, and Henrique de Carvalho between 1877 and 1885 to explore its from in Africa de facto Central thus the territory and perspective viewed itself claimed land. Consequently, following in Germany this the treaties of possession with as already from Berlin Conference 1885 France the of on the ownership of Africa, resulting and Portugal published the "Rose-colouredMap" (Mapa Cor de Rosa), which showedAngola in Britain Mozambique took strong exception, and a coast-to-coast colony. united and in June 1887 Lord Salisbury stated that the British would "not recognize Portuguese forces in to maintain order. " Portugal territories occupied sufficient not with sovereignty its On 11 January 1890 Salisbury demanded expansion plans. colonial with proceeded Portugal's immediate withdrawal from the questionedarea and backed the demand with the threat of force. Portugal withdrew accordingly in great humiliation. This action became known as the "Ultimatum, " and its consequences were to make Mozambique a hinterland British landlocked territory and no with colony with no outlet to the coastal from Angola by between 500 700 kilometres, Mozambique separated and remained sea. depth The Portugal's a grand, of coast-to-coast ambition colony unrealized. of this and humiliation cannot be overemphasized. Colonialism was the centre of national discourse

55

On assumingpower in 1933, Dr. Salazar had initially put the colonies on hold until he could get control of the national budget and navigate the country through the depression. By 1937 he had establishedthe colonial developmentfund which would be financedprimarily through colonial budget surplusesand other colonial monopoly profits. These measures enabled Portugal and its colonies to participate in the economic 1930s depression from the the and expansionassociatedwith World War of emergence II. These programs were designed largely to improve colonial infrastructure and were in step with Dr. Salazar'sneo-mercantilistic view of the empire. His theoretical aim was to construct a form of autarchy that allowed Portugal to develop its economy without the use of foreign investment, thus reducing--the potential for any foreign obligation or intrusion. " Dr. Salazar was provincial in character and temperament despite his

foreigners fact, he In so suspicious of was education. and resistant to sophisticated following S. he U. Marshall Plan World War H. The the that aid under refused change 30 he himself. judgment held in He that the view that so apparent reversed was error foreign sourcesof funding could dwarf Portugal's investmentat home and in its colonies

for almost a century following, and the country as a whole developed the notion that had Portugal long-established territory trading was sacred. of national every portion interests in the area questionedand felt totally cheated. If one views the territory that imperial its from developer Rhodes Britain lost to and a twentieth century was hinterland is it that the to wealth of the Rhodesiasand the easy understand perspective, Belgian Congo, when connected to the Atlantic and Pacific outlets of Angola and Mozambique, would have given Portugal a secondBrazil. The magnitude of this loss became a Portuguesepreoccupation and- steeled its national attitude in the absolute its remaining territories abroad. of sacredness
29Malyn Newitt, Portugal in Africa, The Last Hundred Years (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 1981), 190.

Alvaro de Vasconcelos, and Joaquim Ramos Silva, 30Jos6 Calvet de Magalhes, Portugal: ParadoxoAtldntico [Portugal: Atlantic Paradox] (Lisbon: Institute for Strategic 1990), 54. Studies, International and

56

and that any such change, even for the sake of progress, would threaten both the economic and political status quo. This isolationist doctrine of self-reliance was

interdependence increasing between states;however, in a system of post-war unrealistic Dr. Salazar saw any change as a potential threat to the forces that kept him in power. With economic freedom would come the desire for political freedom.

The initial rigidity of Dr. Salazar's position softenedas he gained an understanding impact foreign that the capital could make on Portugal's domestic and overseas of development but belated This allowed a significant softening of colonial economies. industries. Expertise and supporting funds came from established firms for any Belgian (diamond

3' significant or complicated undertaking, particularly mining.

investments S. dominated U. (oil (railroads), British and exploration) and were mining), largely exempt from exchangecontrols. They strengthenedand stabilised the colonial economiesin the years between 1945and 1961, deepeningPortugal's economic reliance defend 1961 foreign its In investment to them. the private commitment and colonies on fixed formation in for 15 the ultramar and had of gross capital about percent accounted grown to almost 25 percent in 1966.2 By 1961 the colonies had finally become an importance Basil Davidson described the of this possession. worthy economically it began (of Angola) deliver for "... Now first that the to the colony was goal: colonial

"Clarence-Smith, 171. The author cites an example in the unthreateningBelgian feature Angola, the of colonies, particularly as a notable of the penetration commercial Belgium, II lesser War the a small neutral years. power, was seen as of pre-World its foreign in admitting capital with unofficial agreementnot to challengethe several evils Portuguesetrading community.
32L. H. Gann, "Portugal, Africa, and the Future, " Journal of Modern African Studies (March 1975): 2-3.

57

time on any scale....its exports began to play a critical part in saving from deficit the general Portuguesebalanceof paymentswith the rest of the world; as with Mozambique, this becameAngola's principal 'national role. ""'

By 1961 Portugal's economy had shifted from a partial autarchy under orthodox industrialised fledgling but to rapidly growing a one. The shift away economic practices from an agriculturally basedeconomyin the metrpole and the ultramar meant that there was a decreasing dependenceon peasant labour and its attendant policies. As the

metrpole developed in this direction, so the first moves were made to foster complementary development in the colonies. Mining, oil exploration and refining,
textiles, and cashew processing were in place by 1961, and other basic industries were in the planning stages. ` These activities reflected a break with the past and a new Education received renewed and expanded

Salazar policy fuelled by colonial promise.

attention, as literate workers with skills were in increasing demand. The paranoia of foreign investment had evaporated, and French, German, U. S., and South African 35 in The gathering momentum of the colonial the economy was welcomed participation economies continued to accelerate well past 1961 and became a welcome support for the political element in the counterinsurgency campaigns. The colonies were thus developing into substantial economic engines in their own right, and not only were their citizens beginning to benefit individually but Portugal itself was also reaping substantial rewards

"Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), 124. 34Newitt, 220-221. 35Newitt, 220-221.

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from this growing prosperity. Their historic potential was being realised, a fact that importance long-time to Portugal and Dr. Salazar's commitment of the their reinforced nation to their defense.

Colonial Resistance to Dr. Salazar'sVision

At the time when Portugal's colonial commitment was being strengthened,local increasing. its African population was resistance within During this period the

in step democratisedEuropeanpowers in Africa were freeing their colonial possessions increasing development War II This trend. the put pressure on Dr. post-World with Salazarto move in line with the Western Europeanforms of governmentand to allow the
Portuguese colonies to do so as well. Revolts and the war enabled Dr. Salazar to exploit in fervour his Portuguese the tide status preserving quo and nationalist personal of a regime. Consequently, the nationalist resistance and its challenge to Dr. Salazar's

had Portugal's the effect of reinforcing commitment rather than the vision colonial important, deemed Dr. Salazar's personal position of While the economy was opposite. " authority was overriding. Further Dr. Salazar's hatred and mistrust of communism

impotence important He Western the to contain mindful was of powers' role. an played "' In a speech to army but bankrupt the economically politically ascendant communism. 6 1936 Salazar described "systems ideals Dr. July as communism of on officers and naval

"Clarence-Smith, 193. Internal and external pressuresto democratisePortugal and increased had Western Europe World War II, Salazar's in it since and rule with step put had become tenuousin the late 1950s.
37Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal (London: Eyre and Spottswoode, 1970), 69 and 133. The author argues that even in England communism had become "the instincts had done "by the and of our age" so power of revolutionary of rallying cry by bluff, largely by " It the the perhaps voluptuousness sheer of contrast. was words, it. "evangelism" Salazar that of communist made so suspicious success of

59

which are literally systemsof crime" and was so convinced of the threat of this ideology that he believed "Western civilisation is at stake."" His worst fears were realised when Daniel SemenovichSolod, the "brilliant organiser and expert in the tactics of infiltration and subversion" was assignedto Guinea in 1960.39Ambassador Solod had established an impressive reputation for increasing Soviet influence in the Middle East and North Africa and now began to work on the Portuguesecolonies and to nurture their longstanding dissident undercurrent of nationalism.

The nationalist movements and their military wings of guerrillas that challenged Portugal's ownership of its colonies had their origins in the 1930s. The emergenceof modern-dayblack opposition to Portugueserule beganwith the repressivepractisesof the Estado Novo towards any form of dissent, particularly political. This attitude extended from the metrpole to the colonies. Resistancebegan slowly, as there was a practical barrier to any such opposition in the ethnic and social fragmentation of the overseasnon"' white community. Without strong leadership there would be no nationalist movement able to gain the necessarymomentum in reconciling these divergent viewpoints and crystallising resistance to the Salazar regime. Local African grievances were

longstandingand had come to the fore during the early twentieth century with the influx of white settlers and abusive labour practises. This indigenousresentmentwas publicly independent in 1932 Mozambican newspaper, 0 Brado African an when evident (The

38Dr. Salazarquoted in Kay, 133. 39Kay,238. 4ODouglas L. Wheeler and Rene Pelissier, Angola (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd., 1971), 160-161.

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African Cry] slipped through Salazar'scensorshipand published a scathingeditorial titled "Enough.""' Thereafter this feeling was never far below the surface, and the apparent calm was illusory.

Following World War II, nationalist sentiments grew among the mesticos(mixed race peoples) and assimilados (mostly mesticos who were legally assimilated to Portuguese culture). However, these groups were largely urban and thus did not represent the
greater population. As they were located in cities, they were in a hostile environment

for two reasons:the majority of their opponents,the white population, lived in cities, and the PIDE (Polfcia Internacional de Defesado Estado, or International Police for Defense Consequently, State) there. they were either short-lived the effectively most operated of 42 Communist Marxists Angolan By 1956 Party contributed dormant. the the of young or to the formation of the MPLA. The MPLA developedroots among Luanda's urban and largely radical intellectuals, among its slum dwellers, and to a lesser extent, eastward from the capital among the Mbundu, Angola's secondlargest ethno-linguistic group, and the Chokwe people43 These urban roots were composed largely of mesticos, who had in little The the movement common with the rural peasants party. of the controlled little devotion. In Angola December to their true effort gain of and made south eastand 1956 the initial MPLA manifesto was openly published in a direct frontal assaulton the

41Duffy, 305-306. Professor Duffy selectively quotes in translation the long 27 February 1932 editorial.
42JohnMarcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of and Explosion (1950-1962) (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1969), 347-351. Marcum lists some fifty-nine groups beginning in 1940s Angola the alone and either merging with one another or affecting by 1962. vanishing 43Newitt, 227. See also Marcum, 13-48.

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government. Predictably the PIDE reacted adversely, and a number of the MPLA leaderswere forced to flee into exile. From 1957onward PIDE action was so successful "that the nationalists were not able to maintain more than the most rudimentary organisation inside the colonies and could not communicate with those cells that did exist. "' The parties were forced to conduct their affairs from neighbouring statesand

foreign by influenced deeply their connections. were

The presidential election in May 1958 gave all of Portugal some opportunity to expressits dissatisfactionwith the status quo. Elections under the Salazar regime as a foreseeable colourless, cosmetic with perfunctory, results. In 1958, -affairswere rule however, Humberto Delgado's high profile and emotionally charged challenge to Salazar's candidate, Admiral Americo Tomas, excited all of Portugal.45 This taste of dissatisfaction awakened within the mestipos and assimilados, and a suffrage partial formed in Angola, only to be shatteredthrough arrestsin were of small parties number March, May, and July of 1959.46 As the PIDE systematically wrecked the MPLA isolated from its it leadership became that was weaker and progressively organization, it in deteriorating February 1961that In this position supported an uprising now abroad. It doomed be for it lasting in to transient, success. was occurred of a chance no stood

44Newitt,226. 41Marcum,32. Delgado won approximately 18,000 of 92,000 colonial votes cast.
46Willem van der Waals, Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974 (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing Limited, 1993), 51. See also Marcum, 33-37. Beginning on Easter Sunday, 29 March 1959 PIDE apprehended 52 individuals, including Dr. Agostino Neto and Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, the brother of Mario de Andrade. At the subsequent "trial of the fifty" (1960) long terms of imprisonment were given. Holden Roberto was tried and sentenced in absentia.

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Luanda, centre of Portuguese police and military strength, and the MPLA had no constituency or baseselsewhereamong the rural population.

The MPLA in exile establisheditself initially in Leopoldville and aligned itself not but independent African their and socialist philosophy also with nations only with other 47 French Italian The including block, the communist parties. and the communist leadership was consequently familiar with the communist theory in wars of national liberation and organiseditself accordingly. The MPLA found that it was in competition for UPA, Angolan the time, the at the nationalist group acceptance prominent other with 1962 formed its Angolan In MPLA leading the the of people. the representative as de de for Libertacdo Angola, Popular Army Popular (Exercito EPLA or military wing influence into its Angola. Angola) to Liberation project the of This nascent force

300 had in 250 between training men who undergone and young military numbered Ghana and Morocco."' The EPLA sought to expand the conflict with this force across Angola's northern border and penetrate the entire country, publicising the MPLA 49 be difficult because Recruiting to of ethnic rivalries, and military proved manifesto. its UPA. influence The UPA by through the thwarted competing with the action was Congo leadership forced the MPLA to leave Leopoldville in 1963 and reestablishitself

47H61ioFelgas, Os Movimentos Terroristas [The Terrorist Movements] (Lisbon: Edition of the author, 1966), 9. 48John Marcum, TheAngolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (19621976) (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1978), 29-30. See also van der Waals, 102. Marcum states that the EPLA had been left adrift to operate as an uncoordinated "separate body" beyond political control. Neto consequently at the First National Conference in January 1963 placed it under the command and political control of Manuel Political-Military Committee it the to of the MPLA. Lima and made answerable 49vander Waals, 103.

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in Brazzaville, from which it was difficult to conduct a campaign in Angola. As a result northern Angola proved to be barren, and it was not until 1966 with the opening of the second front from Zambia that some successwould come to the MPLA. The most

consequentialdevelopmentfrom the Portugueseperspectivewas the capture in July 1963 of various 35mm films which described the MPLA's military doctrine of revolutionary 5 It parallelled the Maoist creed by reiterating that the movement was a warfare. " be that the struggle would protracted. people's war and The first priority would be

indoctrination and organisation of the masses,and next the establishmentof rural bases S2 and resistanceareas. This doctrine would serve the MPLA until 1974, and as we shall see in future chapters, the Portuguesecorrectly anticipated this -guerrilla approach.

The UPA was formed in the mid-1950s from a number of small groups with conflicting goals by Barros Nekaka, who in 1958passedleadership to his nephewHolden Roberto. UPA strength rested in the rural populations of the Bakongo ethno-linguistic border between These Angola. the the Belgian Congo and straddled people of region Angola and extendedinto Cabinda and the French Congo, the boundaries of the ancient Kongo kingdom. Roberto unequivocally held the view that not just the Bakongo kingdom

50van der Waals, 103. 51van der Waals, 103. Dr. Neto is quoted: "If the enemy presently possesses more forces than we do, and this is so, then it is correct that we should prepare for a The be that misconception we should war. able to execute a war of rapid protracted decisions should be removed once and for all. "
52Regido Militar de Angola, Supintrep N219: Guerra Revolucionkria [Supplemental Intelligence Report N4 19: Revolutionary War], July 1963, Luanda, quoted in van der Waals, 103.
64

53 be freed but An Angola of must ardent anti-colonialist, all entity other some or . Roberto had been born in Angola but had lived his adult life in the Belgian Congo. He had been educated in the Baptist Church missionaries and employed in the Belgian 1941 1949.1 between Northern Angola and was also as an accountant economy colonial in 1950s become had the through white settlement, aware that more politically an area Baptist missionary influence, and an easy accessto the developing political activities of the Belgian Congo. He thus felt a close kinship with the peoples immediately acrossthe border. The UPA was able to develop a following there becauseof the relatively open frontier, and this loyal cadre became the basis for the uprising in March 1961 ss Portuguesepresencein this area took the form of chefes do posto (heads of posts) and it PIDE, these that to and officials were so sparse was administrators, as opposed but for the impossible to them most casualcontrol over their anything maintain physically districts.56

While Roberto was relatively well educated,he was a member of the Bakongo ethno-

"van der Waals, 50. 54John Marcum, TheAngolan Revolution: TheAnatomy of and Explosion (1950-1962) 65. 1969), Roberto was born in 1923 and graduated Press, M. I. T. The (Cambridge: from the Baptist Missionary School (BMS) in Leopoldville in 1940. He also attendedthe BMS in his Angolan birthplace of Sao Salvador 1940-1941to perfect his Portugueseand his roots. rediscover "Marcum, 64-70. 56Wheeler and Pelissier, 167. The authors cite as an example the Congo district in 1960. For its 37,000 square miles it had fourteen concelhos (basic urban or semi-urban (basic division) or circunscricOes rural administrative unit) and thirty-seven administrative 725 division. This miles per administrative square presence of posts, or an average in frontier, be dozens be hardly the controlling a effective as posts would of miles would did Large cross undetected. could and of people numbers apart.

65

linguistic group, was not a mestico, and consequentlydid not sharetheir more European cultural perspective. He was also tribally oriented in contrast to the non-tribal Consequently, the personality and leadership philosophy of

declarations of the MPLA.

the UPA contrasted clearly with the MPLA and its sophisticated mestico leadership, ' intellectual, Portuguese. left-wing, Funding and acculturally and support which was linked being Eastern block. MPLA The the the actually with contrasted, also glaringly UPA received financial support from the American Committee on Africa and from various diverse African governments, preponderantly that of Leopoldville. S8

Accordingly they were never able to resolve their differences andjoin forces effectively.

When the Belgian Congo becameindependenton 30 June 1960, its governmentbegan to give Roberto practical assistance,including permission to establisha radio station and its important borders. This facet of UPA training sanctuary camp within was an a had in its long Roberto the witnessed early years. series of Congolesecrises operations that had begun with the violent political rioting on 4 January 1959 and had led to the independence Congo in Belgian toward self-government and push eighteen accelerated just 1960 he believed December Belgians had By that the as quickly grown months. it initiated. Portuguese He consequently the when so was conflict, would armed weary of border for Congo his the to the common and porous sanctuary set stage an end to used

'Wheeler and Pelissier, 170. See also van der Waals, 50. 58HelioFelgas, "Angola ea Evolugdo Politica dos Territ6rios Vizinhos" [Angola and the Political Evolution of the Neighbouring Territories], Revista Militar (December 1965): 706.

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59 for Portugal. tranquillity relative colonial

The UPA formed its military wing, the ELNA (Ex rcito de Libertaco Nacional de Angola, or Army of National Liberation of Angola), in June 1961 after the March attacks did not achieve a Portuguesewithdrawal. Roberto was its commander-in-chief and its its deserters, Marcos Xavier Kassanga, Army Portuguese leaders two chief were other its in Joao Batista, Angola in Leopoldville, commander and operational with staff of headquartersnear Bembe.60 This leadership was ineffective. Roberto was so autocratic that he would acceptlittle more than arms and money. Without training the ELNA "set incompetence indiscipline. "" The South demoralising and of politico-military example a African Defense Force Vice-Consul in Luanda noted that the ELNA "involved itself in but in Portuguese the the sense.. avoided contact narrowest with military activities . far X62 The despite forces training that the expansion as possible. was so poor as security 6,200 deportment in Kinkuzu ELNA troops their the to such the at camps about as of "' for Congo was cause alarm. Andreas Shipango, South West Africa Peoples

59John Marcum, TheAngolan Revolution: TheAnatomy of and Explosion (1950-1962) (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1969), 123-135. 60vander Waals, 63-64. See also Marcum, 157. 61vander Waals, 96. 62van der Waals, 97. The author arguesthat Portuguesepropagandaand social work in displaced Angola into these to most of the persuaded people move refugees among deprived development This ELNA ELNA of popular support. settlements. controlled had concentrated on military action in a human desert and on preventing MPLA infiltration. It had neglected to indoctrinate, organise and win recruits among refugees Portuguese Angola thus to to and missed an opportunity undermine authority. returning Consequently no ELNA internal political infrastructure was established in Angola. Portugal gained the upper hand and maintained superior momentum until 1974. 63NeilBruce, "Portugal's African Wars, " Conflict Studies (March 1973): 22.

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Organisation representativein Leopoldville, madean appraisal during a 1963visit: "With representativesfrom a number of other liberation movements,I visited Holden Roberto's training camps near the Angolan border with a view to sending our young men there. But the atmosphere in Roberto's training camps was very bad, and I could not "" course. such a recommend This lack of direction caused great rifts in the UPA

leadership. Despite the UPA reorganisationin March 1962 to include additional groups, to rename itself FNLA, and to establish a government in exile named GRAE (Governo da Republica de Angola no Exflio, or Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile), little of substancewas accomplished. A frustrated Jonas Savimbi, Roberto's "foreign in 1964 formally broke UPA/FNLA July " the with and eventually formed the minister, third nationalist movementin Angola, UNITA. The next year Alexandre Taty, "minister in Roberto defected " to the an challenging unsuccessful coup after of armaments, Portuguese in Cabinda with a substantial number of his followers. 65 John Marcum described the situation as it existed in 1963: "Whether by the inaction or heavy hand of lost, leadership, after another was one opportunity one potential source of shortsighted "66 alienated. another was after support The political crosscurrents within the

UPA/FNLA, the lack of training for ELNA cadres, and major competition from MPLA force UPA/FNLA the to UNITA a spent reduced within two years of activities and initiating the conflict.

6`SueArmstrong, In Search of Freedom (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing, 1989), 71. 65John Marcum, TheAngolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (19621976) (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1978), 148 and 150. Seealso van der Waals, 99100; and Joaquim Miguel de Mattos Fernandes Duarte Silva, Lourenco [Lawrence] (Lisbon: Edition of the author, 1974).
"Marcum, 113.

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Roberto followed no sophisticatedguerrilla creed other than the initiation of violence in the hope that the Portuguesewould becomeweary with it and capitulate. This strategy was reflected in a statement by a 32-year-old ELNA commander named Antonio Muandazi, who was interviewed by the New York Timesreporter Lloyd Garrison in 1963 in the Serra de Canda of Angola: "The war here is like Algeria. We can't beat the

Portuguesein the field but we can wear them down until the politicians are ready to talk. This is a war of the will. It took the Algerians seven years before the French gave in. There was only a weak military program unsupported There was no talk of winning the population to the

We are just as determined."' by political indoctrination.

UPA/FNLA point of view, -which was simply -that Angola should be an independent ineffective The head Roberto approach was amateurish of state. and as country with its founder, Cabral. Amilcar PAIGC the that of and work of alongside

Aside from Angola, there were also nationalist movementsassociatedwith Guin6 and Mozambique that prior to the events of 1961 were hoping to negotiate concessions with the Portugueseon self-determination. In Guine efforts by local nationalists to organize began in the early 1950s. The PAIGC was founded in September 1956 by local initial Verdians. Its Cape political organisation prompted an assimilados and educated 3 1959, in August disaster dock on which ended a strike violent workers when aggrieved it was broken with excessivemilitary force. Fifty workers were killed, and the incident " PAIGC leadership quickly realised that becameknown as the "Pidjiguiti dock massacre.

67Lloyd Garrison, "Revolt in Angola, " Army (February 1964): 58.

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68 its independence. self-rule achieve objective of and not peaceful protest would Accordingly, it shifted its strategy to one of clandestinelyorganising the rural population for an insurgency.69 PAIGC had learned hard lessonsin 1959 well aheadof the MPLA its had 1961, UPA/FNLA and shifted approach accordingly. It was of experiences and 1963, in January Guine begin to when all of the elements until guerrilla war not prepared for successwere in place, including firm sanctuariesin adjacent countries.70

The driving force behind the PAIGC was Amffcar Cabral, who was born in Guin6 of Cape Verdian parents. Cabral was an agronomist by profession, having been educated in Lisbon, served the Portugueseadministration in Guine (1952-1955); and worked for in (1955-1959) institutions the metrpole with research trips to various agricultural Angola. His political awarenesscame at an early age and matured during his academic time in Lisbon." In June of 1960 Cabral published in English an article titled "The

Facts about Portugal's African Colonies." The work was featured in a limited circulation brochure of the Union of Democratic Control and carried a preface by Basil Davidson. It was essentially a PAIGC manifesto and concluded:

68PatrickChabal, Amtlcar Cabral (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 56-57.

69Chabal, 57. The author describes a secret meeting held on 19 September 1959, in leadership key decisions PAIGC Cabral the Amlcar the made of shifting the with which focus of party effort from urban to rural mobilisation, of transferring the party headquarters to the neighbouring sanctuary country of Guinea, and of preparing to liberate Guine by all means necessary, including war. The decision to mobilise the rural Pidjiguiti The PAIGC the clash. move after could achieve a practical was population little in the urban environment where the PIDE operated but stood a realistic chance of implementing its strategy in the countryside.

70Chabal,58. 71 Chabal, 30-31. 70

We demandthat Portugal follow the exampleof England, France and Belgium and The recognise the right of the people to self-determination and independence .... African colonial organisations of the Portuguesecolonies, which represent the legitimate aspirations of its people, seek to reestablish the human dignity of the Africans, their freedom, and the right to decide their future. The African organisationsthat fight against Portuguesecolonialism believe in the existenceof peaceful methodsto gain independence. However, we have no illusions, and the instant that Portugal intends to use violence to defend its interests, we are obliged to respond with violence72 While influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideasof the time, Cabral was primarily a nationalist both its PAIGC his developed the of political message and own variant associated and military dimension. In his own words: It is good (for all nationalist movements) to remember...that regardless of how similar are their strugglesand their enemiesto one another, national liberation and be They local the exported. are... cannot products of revolution and -social national forces. While somewhatinfluenced by external factors, they are largely determined and temperedby the particular culture of a country's people and its " local characteristics. unique It was in this context that Cabral began to prepare the political landscapefor guerrilla warfare.

72AmilcarCabral, Unidade e Luta [Unity and Struggle] (Lisbon: SearaNova, 1978), 65. "Exigimos que Portugal siga o exemplo de Inglaterra, da Franca e da Belgica e doming independencia.... dos direito As povos que autodeterminagdo e o reconheca das col6nias portuguesas, que representam as anticolonialistas africanas organizag6es dos dignidade legftimas humana dos seus povos, querem restabelecer a aspirag6es direito de decidirem futuro.... liberdade do As organizaces eo seu sua a africanos, lutam de o colonialismo portugues acreditam contra na existencia meios que africanas da independencia. No ilusoes, temos entanao, ndo a conquista e, uma vez para pacfficos interesses, defender Portugal pars os a violencia seus somosobrigados quer utilizar que a responder com a violencia. 73Amilcar Cabral, Guine-Bissau - Nacdo African Forjada na Luta [Guin6-Bissau African Nation Forged in Struggle] (Lisbon: Publicag6es Nova Auora, 1974), 39. Tricontinental Conference, Havana, January 1966. "E bom lembrar-se... que por grande dos identidade dos inimigos, casos em presenca ea similitude nossos a a seja que libertaco nacional ea revoluco social no sdomercadoriasde exportaco; sdoo produto duma elaboraco local, nacional, mais ou menos influenciadas por factores externos favorveis e desfavorveis mas essencialmente determinadas e condicionadas pela de histrica cadapovo, e consolidadaspela vitria ou pela solugdocorrecta das realidade diversas internas " as categorias entre que caracterizam realidade. esta contradices

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Following his experiencein the Pidjiguiti dock demonstration,Cabral realised that the Portuguesewould not negotiate and that an armed struggle was the only way to achieve PAIGC ends. Cabral had received no known military training and had little interest in such affairs prior to 1959. It is possible that he had some such exposureduring his visit to China in 1960, and certainly Chineseinfluence was seenin the training of his guerrilla 74 It was known that elements of PAIGC also underwent courses in guerrilla army. 'S in Russia, Czechoslovakia. Algeria, Not-withstanding this and warfare and subversion lack of military experience, the mantle of undisputedcommanderand tactician fitted him 76 imagination flexibility in his his the and evident and were conduct well, of campaign.

He becamequite attuned to the requirement for population indoctrination and keenly between intellectual bridge the the the to gap urban of need and the traditional aware Guinean. His two year preparation of the political battlefield was classic in its effort to draw the population together in a common ideology that would transcendtribal and ethnic divisions. His investigation into local grievances was the most thorough of any of the nationalist movements. Cabral faced a difficult task in convincing the population that they were being oppressed. The land, for instance, already belonged to the peasants and was generally village property. Guine had no concentration of foreign settlers that were In Cabral's the exploiting population. own words: seemingly We were not able to mobilise the people by telling them: "The land to him that here land is it. " Because not lacking. There is all the land that is needed. works

74Chabal,98. 75He1ioFelgas, Os Movimentos Terroristas [The Terrorist Movements] (Lisbon: Edition of the author, 1966), 57. 76Chabal,98.

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It was then necessary to find appropriate ways to mobilise our countrymen, instead of utilising terms that our folk were still not able to understand. We were basis the to on a of the struggle against colonialism. people never able mobilise This yielded nothing. To speak of the struggle against imperialism yielded having find his This between the necessity of each proved peasant us... nothing " fight for formula the to mobilise own in terms that would addressthe daily He thus sought to couch his revolutionary message

concernsof the rural population:

Remember always that the people do not fight for ideas, for things that only exist in the heads of individuals. The people fight and they accept the necessary it in live do in But to to they advantages, order gain material peace sacrifices. be improve lives, to to their to progress, and able to guaranteea experience and future to their children.79 This approach was far more fruitful than comparableactivities in Angola.

Cabral met and worked closely with MPLA leaders and established his exile headquartersin Conakry, the capital of the ex-French Republic of Guinea. From here he conducted his campaign against the Portuguese. The other prominent nationalist de Independencia da (Frente Luta Guine, in FLING Guine Front pela or was movement for the Struggle for the Independenceof Guind). Led by Benjamin Bull, J. Fernandes, it H. Labery, was an amalgamation of a number of smaller movements and was and

"Amlcar Cabral, Textos Politicos [Political Texts] (Porto: Edices Afrontamento, dizendo-lhes:A terra deve pertencer 1974), 19-20. "Ndo podiamosmobilizar as pessoas falta. H de Porque toda terra terra trabalha. a aqui a ndo que se precisa. a quern a Era pois necessrioencontrar formas apro priadas para mobilizar os nossascamponeses, Nunca de termos gente no podia ainda compreender. que a nossa utilizar vez em luta base Isso dava contra o colonialismo. corn na ndo as pessoas nada. mobilizmos Falar da luta contra o imperialismo no dava nada entre ns... Isto prova a necessidade formula de de luta. " a sua prpria se mobilizar tern encontrar pars a povo cada que 78AmflcarCabral, Palavras de Ordern Gerais [Speeches on Overall Methods] (Bissau: PAIGC/Secretariado Geral, 1976), 34. "Lembrar-se semprede que o povo ndo luta por ideias, por coisas que estdo na cabecados homens. 0 povo luta e aceita os sacriffcios luta, maspars obter vantagensmateriais para poder viver em paz e melhor, exigidos pela futuro dos filhos. " garantir e pars o seus progredir vida sua para.ver a

73

border. Guine's in Senegal northern on given sanctuary

Again as in Angola, the

disparate little leaders that there these two the so movements were was of philosophies of Cabral for although cooperation, worked hard to and agreement common ground 79 compromise.

Following the unsuccessfulemployment of autonomousguerrilla groups in the first in 1964 Cassac Congress February held Cabral to reorganise the the conflict, year of the war effort and establish a national army in the FARP (Forpas Armadas Revoluciondrias de Povo, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People).80 His in future Portuguese the that, chapters, shall see as we so effective organisation was had Portuguese that they Because in 1968. it the shown were not going to copied field. in He thoughtfully Cabral's the to assembledand win was only option negotiate, implemented the proper elements of guerrilla warfare, particularly that of political indoctrination, to achieve PAIGC ends.

In Mozambique there were a number of exile, very small, nationalist organizations dampen Portuguese The to the 1961. made every effort spirit of government to prior half however, formative its time there in at any one were perhaps a stages; nationalism in the ten Mozambicans of working population neighbouring percent or about million

79Chabal,84. 80Chabal, 99. The author explains that Cabral created the FARP to consolidateand independently in bands Guine. The the guerrilla operating autonomous of gain control Congress by Cassac the issue the abuse military was gross of power a number at main Cabral that to sought and ensure military strategy would commanders, the guerrilla of henceforth be governed by political goals and that the FARP would be subordinatedto the political leaders of the party.
74

" countries. This group was exposedto new political ideas and in the period 1958-1960 began to organize themselvesinto associationswith the goals of social contact, self-help, and ultimately national politics. The first true nationalist organization was UDENAMO (Unio Democrdtica Nacional de Mocambique, or the National Democratic Union of

in Southern in October1960,movingto DarRhodesia Mozambique) andwasestablished in February 1961. Two additionalgroups of note appeared es-Salaam at the time,
MANU or UNAM (Unio Nacional African Mocambique, or Mozambican African

National Union), depending on the English or Portugueseconformation, and UNAMI (Unio Nacional do Mocambique Independente, or National Union of Independent Mozambique). Both MANU and UDENAMO set aside their differences and attendedthe
1961 conference in Casablanca, where the nationalist movements in the Portuguese " front become to their a coalition. colonies consolidated 1962 elements of MANU, UNAMI, and UDENAMO Subsequently in September (Frente

were united in FRELIMO

de Libertaco de Mocambique, or Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) at the urging it leader, important Tanganyikan Nyerere, the Julius the strongest making and most of

81John Marcum, TheAngolan Revolution: TheAnatomy of and Explosion (1950-1962) (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1969), 195. The author quotesDr. Eduardo Mondlane's destruction dos PIDE Associapao Naturais de the the of mid-1950s on words Mocambique, an autonomist, pre-nationalist association, "One might venture the European Portuguese the that people, a white group, will regret the prediction for its demise this organisation, with as a multi-racial nucleus may have of emasculation Mozambique. " hopes tolerant a of radically all gone "The CONCP (Conferencia Nacionalistas das Colnias Portuguesas) met in Casablanca on 18-20 April 1961 in a meeting convoked by the MPLA. The UPA declined to attend. Other groups in attendancewere the PAIGC, UNTA (Unio Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola), UDENAMO, MANU, CLSTP (Comite de Libertacdo de Sao Tome e Principe), MLGC (Movimento de Libertapo da Guine e Cabo Verde), and four groups from PortugueseGoa. 75

83 its leadership. Eduardo Mondlane Dr. He too absorbed the assumed movement. lessons of 1961 and was not prepared to launch a guerrilla war until some three years later in September 1964, after his small army was trained. Mondlane in coming late to the nationalist movements against Portugal was very much influenced by the trend in Angola and Guin6. His organisation initially developed similarly to the PAIGC and in the subordinating military operations to political of problems same sort experienced leadership. His doctrine parallelled that of the MPLA and particularly of the PAIGC indoctrination, it its on political and was along these lines that he sought emphasis with " his to conduct military campaign. Mozambicans had already tried peaceful

demonstrationswith the sameconsequences as occurred in Angola and Guind. At Mueda in 1960 reputedly about 500 Africans were killed in a demonstration. FRELIMO felt that Portugal the as would not grant self-determination and answer, only was struggle armed " for freedom. demonstrated destroy those political who would

Political expressionboth in the ultramar and the metrpole was forbidden except in the narrow context of the Portuguesestaged elections every four years. The airing of

83Helio Felgas, Os Movimentos Terroristas de Angola Guin6 Mocambique [The Terrorist Movements of Angola Guin6 Mozambique] (Lisbon: Ediro do autor, 1966), 68. See also Colonel Donald H. Humphries, The East African Liberation Movement, Adelphi Paper Number Sixteen (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), 4. Other liberation but the to continued groups were only partially successful, various efforts unite intense leaders between the traditionally the were and reflected ethnic rivalries as interparty difficult As to consequence, were subdue. a violence and animosities which intimidation dissipated nationalist energies to such an extent that the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African States(OAS) was continually striving to heal the breach. 84Chabal,203. Professor Chabal observes that FRELIMO instituted a system of had done. PAIGC the the guerrillas much as over political control

"EduardoMondlane,TheStruggle for Mozambique (London:ZedPress,1969),125. 76

grievances or liberal political views attracted a heavy hand from the authorities. In the case of the 1959 strike by the Pidjiguiti dock workers, the PAIGC had hoped that it would lead to negotiations with the authorities and a redress of grievances. When this traditional procedure failed, Cabral had no choice but to seek an alternative in guerrilla warfare with the goal of opening negotiations or ultimately of gaining control of the 8' The same can be said for the MPLA and its earlier flight from Angola in country. 1956 and 1957.

Peasantpopulations are not normally a revolutionary force, and such was the casein Portuguese Africa. " They are conservativeby nature and find security and comfort in the routine of their lives and the socioeconomicinstitutions that govern them. Change is resisted and outsiders are viewed with suspicion. The guerrillas of the various in Africa Portuguese movements representedchangethat the populations were nationalist not prepared to acceptreadily. Thus, despitethe justified grievancesof Portugal's black African citizens, overall they appearedto be loyal to Portugal and to suspectthe activities of the nationalists. This apparent support reinforced Portugal's commitment to the As Portugal 1961, its internal their people. entered and colonies confidence in its position was as strong as ever. There occurred, moreover, a seriesof events that had the but this of attitude effect not only reinforcing of hardening it into an cumulative irreversible courseof war. Theseeventsbeganwith the affront of the attacks in the north Dr. Salazar in Angola with attempted continued an coup against and an attempt to of

"Cabral, 9-12. "Gerald J. Bender, "The Limits of Counterinsurgency: An African Case," Comparative Politics (April 1972): 357. 77

demands toward the the of the nationalist movements. This position country's moderate from the UN served to silence moderatevoices. The final failure alongside the message blow was the debacleof Goa, which made any further loss unthinkable. Each of these is below. in its Portugal to examined war moving and role

Angola Uprisings of 1961

The Angola uprisings and the immediate events servedas a warning of things to come 88 defending its Portugal think to more clearly about colonies. Sporadic and prompted 1960 had Portugal began the time throughout to at when occurred and unrest agitation Mozambique. Angola Yet European troop and of the --potentialeconomic rich realisein 1958, 1,000 in Angola early and was reinforced only to about under numbered strength 3,000 by mid-1960.$' Overall strength was 8,000, of which at least 5,000 were African troops.90 These forces, while scatteredthroughout Angola, were confined to the larger 91 to administering subjective rule. This modest order of towns and accustomedmerely

88John Marcum, TheAngolan Revolution: TheAnatomy of and Explosion (1962-1976) (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1969), 125-126. The author observed that in a 12 August 1963 addressto the nation Dr. Salazarreaffirmed his government's commitment faith keep He imperial its with Portugal's "sacred heritage," defend would mission. to "integral interests, the West's ultramar as true and maintain parts of the Portuguese the fight its limit human duty Portugal's to the " It to of and material resources was nation. to keep them so. "Douglas L. Wheeler, "The PortugueseArmy in Angola, " Modern African Studies, 1969): 43Q. 3 (October 7, no. vol. 90DouglasL. Wheeler, "African Elements in Portugal's Armies in Africa, " Armed Forces and Society, vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1976): 237. 91Estado-Maiordo Exdreito, ResenhaHistrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa, Volume II, Dispositivo das Nossas Forcas Angola [Historical-Military Report on the African Campaigns, Volume II, Disposition of Our Angolan Forces] (Lisbon: EstadoMaior do Exercito, 1989), 63-65. 78

battle was hardly adequateto face the uprisings in early 1961.

The opening challenge was made by the MPLA in Luanda on 4 February 1961 by a truly aggrieved group armed only with clubs and knives and driven by a frustration with their treatment.. They entered the capital and attacked a number of police installations, fifty-two in have to the an political prisoners released. attempt station radio a prison, and Seven policemen and forty of the group were killed. During the funeral for the

policemen, shotswere fired on the mourners, and whites attackedblacks in a display that incensed Portugal. The prison was suicidally attacked again on 10 February.

Government forces overreacted in quelling the -disturbance because of the strong in Several hundred Luanda. killed had Africans feelings that accumulated were emotional indiscriminately, their bodies being left to rot in the streetsas a warning sign to aspiring international firmly Portugal The attention and put events gained on the revolutionaries. 92 Race relations remained polarized in Luanda and would take years to UN agenda. little instigated MPLA The the action mob with planning or considerationof the rebuild. 93 its Picking troop the and secret police concentration was capital with consequences. inside destroyed MPLA Angola. the quickly and was choice, an unfortunate

These events were a prelude as well as a warning of further trouble. On 15 March

92Ren6 Pelissier, La Colonie du Minotaure, Nationalismes et Revoltes en Angola (1926-1961) [The Colony of the Minotaur, Nationalist Movements and Revolts in Angola (1926-1961)] (Orgeval: Editions Pelissier, 1978), 335-392. See also John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: TheAnatomy of and Explosion (1950-1962) (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1969), 126-130; and van der Waals, 56-58. 93H61ioFelgas, Guerra em Angola [War in Angola] (Lisbon: Livraria Clssica Editoria, 1961), 55.

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1961 shortly after the MPLA episode, the UPA seized on the confusion and launcheda 94 flood in Angola 4,000 5,000 to a of northern with attack armed men. multi-pronged Approximately 700 European farms plus additional trading settlementsand government 95 laid This in to their path and mob waste whatever overwhelmed. was were posts

killed men,women,black, white, young,andold. It wasa senseless act of violencewith political aim rather than a military campaignwith a political goal. only an amorphous
Roberto did not understandthe difference." All of Portugal was shockedat the horror.

This savage foray occurred in an area demarcated by the Congolese frontier, the Cuango river, the Malange-Luanda railroad and the Atlantic Ocean. The attackers faced in leaders Military Luanda. to situation a which: pushed nearly in districts Angola 100 three towns, and posts of northern administrative over ... from the Congo border to within 30 miles of Luanda, the capital, had been either by African taken, nationalist groups; over 1,000 or paralysed out, wiped Europeanswere dead, and an unknown number of Africans; the economy of north Angola was crippled; communications were largely cut or damaged; and thousandsof Portugueserefugeeswere camped in Luanda, or on their way back to Portugal. The internal situation in Angola was rapidly and sensationally international large to audience over several months? a projected

For a month Portugal and Angola seemedparalysed and unable to act. Equally, the insurgents were incapable of sustainedmilitary engagement. Civil militia were formed,

'Marcum,

130-147. See also P61issier,495-526; and van der Waals, 58.

95Ren6Pelissier, Le Naufrage des Caravelles: Etudes sur la Fin de L'Empire Portugals (1961-1975) [The Shipwreck of the Caravels: Studies on the End of the Portuguese Empire (1961-1975)] (Orgeval: Editions Pelissier, 1979), 147. "John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1978), 129.
97Wheeler, 431.

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and loyal Africans armed. It was this patchwork of civil-military defenseand its frenetic activity that brought UPA momentum to a halt. Formal military reoccupation began on 13 May and was intensified as troops arrived from the metrpole. During the JulyAugust period approximately 20,000 reinforcements landed in Angola. 98 These troops behaved emotionally as they bombed and strafed areas that had not been affected by the indiscriminate did damage Portuguese This to terror enormous credibility and uprising. to race relations and drove over 150,000 refugees into the Congo over the next nine " months. On 7 October, General Deslandes, the Governor-General, announced that

reoccupation was complete and that mop-up policing would begin. It has been estimated that 500 Europeansand about 20,000 local people died in this jacquerie. 11 This series its hardened Portugal deeply and colonial commitment and the of shockedall of events in Angola. of order restoration To the Portuguese it was unthinkable that such

lawlessnessshould be tolerated, and a strong uncompromising reaction to the nationalist behaviour was widely supported. These events with their horror also diverted domestic from Salazar's Dr. political vulnerability. attention

The Coup of 1961 Dr. Salazar's vulnerability had been revealed in the Delgado challenge of 1958 and its strong message that it was time for Portugal to move toward democracy. The colonies liability in by that their. ownership under the current arrangement as a many were seen

98vander Waals, 62. "Rene Pelissier, La Colonie du Minotaure, Nationalismes et R9voltes en Angola (1926-1961) [The Colony of the Minotaur, Nationalist Movements and Revolts in Angola (1926-1961)] (Orgeval: Editions Pelissier, 1978), 658. i0Pelissier, 657-660; and van der Waals, 58-61.

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in joining Portugal's the European Economic Community obstacle a major represented "' in World Third trading nations. with and The strength of this view was manifested

in the coup of 13 April 1961, which was probably the closest that Salazarcame to being 102 in 1960 debacle The the Belgian Congo prompted heated debate in the removed.

PortugueseSupremeCouncil for National Defense (Conselho Superior de Defesa Nacionan aboutthe securityof its overseas territories. Colonel Kalzade Arriaga was
notably vociferous in saying that the ultramar forces should be augmented,particularly in Angola. He was opposedby General Botelho Moniz and by fellow Colonels Almeida Fernandes and Costa Gomes, who advocated a dose of the "winds of change" for the 103 colonial situation. The uprisings themselvesacted to bring the differing opinions into focus. Virtually the entire defense staff decided that a motion of no confidence in Dr. Salazar should be made at the approaching meeting of the Council on 8 April. Dr.

Salazar, tipped to the plans by Colonel Arriaga, did not attend the meeting. As an had the asked President Tomas to dismiss Dr. Salazar. Tomas plotters alternative indicated that he would not dismiss the "greatest statesman of the century after Churchill. " By then Dr. Salazarhad identified the plotters, and on 13 April the relevant inevitable in detained. The Salazar Dr. reshuffle ensued which assumed were participants

11Clarence-Smith, 193. The author arguesthat by 1968 the Portugueseeconomy was turning decisively from the colonies towards Europe. Portugal in the course of the 1960s industrialised booming became "newly 1970s a and aggressive country" and and early " "Taiwan Europe. described of southern a as was 102Richard Robinson, Contemporary Portugal (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), 77-78. "Douglas Porch, The PortugueseArmed Forces and the Revolution (Stanford: The Hoover Institution Press, 1977), 38. 82

the defenseportfolio, and no changein policy was brooked.104

Dr. Salazar had managedover the years of his rule to control and manipulate the 105 "divide X Military pay was through a strategy of cooption and and rule. military

in to poor, and advance pay and promotionambitiousofficers were removedfrom the immediatemilitary environmentby posting them to lucrative and prestigiousspecial
high in levels both the metrpole and Normally these at were of government positions. the ultramar and it was these postings, promotions, and pay which Dr. Salazar controlled. Allegiances were ambivalent. Colonel Arriaga's allegiance was to Dr.

Salazarand not to his chain of command. This undermining of traditional military bonds fear forces his Salazar Dr. the to to mistrust and within armed create advantage. enabled Until 1974 when "no one chickened out, " the Salazar regime would be safe from a its despite enormous reservations and latent moral indignation, the and military coup, forced honour his be forces fight his to to the to commitment would colonies and armed 106 it became With in Africa. this evident that the purpose of colonial policy event war Salazar The been had the to regime. alternative colonial preserve options now was destruction These to through the reinforced commitment war and of coup. neutralised international increasing isolation. Portugal's events accented

104van der Waals, 68-69.

"Douglas L. Wheeler, "The Military and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1926-1974: 'The Honor of the Army', " in Contemporary Portugal, ed. Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 199.

106Porch, 26.

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UN Reversal of 1961 Portugal's international isolation had been growing ever since it had joined the UN in 1955 following a number of vetoes by the Soviet Union. There had been pressure building from the members of that body for it to grant self-rule to its colonies. This

independent joining fed by been had the the UN andby the writings newly states agitation in human highlighting the abuses Lisbon'spolicy towardthe colonies, of severalauthors
Galvo, Captain Henrique Chief Inspector of Colonial Galvo the report. most notably Administration, wrote a report in 1947 describing the labour conditions in Angola and '07 had in Dr. Salazar banned 1952 the their continuance. and report warning against 108 incident international This Galvo, Captain treason charges. gained onarrested its Portugal technical to the submit periodic reports on colonies, also refused attention. 109 for While by UN territories. the other colonial the non-self-governing as required facts in disclosing about their colonies, they complied. Portugal powers were unhappy its in refusal. attention additional attracted

In 1955 a group of nations advocating colonial independencewith the support of the Soviet Union orchestrated the passage of a resolution condemning colonialism as a UN Charter. In it Portugal had human the that and response claimed rights of violation its overseas provinces were part of a single state with one all of as no colonies, in UN had it It that the this no competence also claimed matter as was an constitution.

107Captain Henrique Galvo, Report on Native Problems in the Portuguese Colonies (Lisbon: Ministry of the Colonies, 1947). '08Duffy, 327. The author adds that in 1958 the Portuguesegovernment sentenced Captain Galvo to sixteen years imprisonment for alleged political crimes. 19Duffy,341. 84

internal affair. The issue was debatedfor four years, and finally on 15 December 1960 the UN General Assembly, again pushed by this group and the Soviets, ruled against Portugal. Portugal saw itself as victimized and refused to accept the resolution. The NATO alliance became Portugal's ally before the UN in preventing a catastrophe; however, this support began to fray in 1961.110 Following the uprising, the UN

in May and June to discussamongother agenda items the Security Council convened
its in U. S. The Angola. under new PresidentJohn F. Kennedy reversed support events in this forum and sided with the Soviet Union in condemning Portugal's African policy. This event was an enormousblow to Dr. Salazar, who criticized the U. S. for voting with the Soviet -Union in the face of historical opposition to Soviet diplomatic and military destined become Portugal to thus a semi-pariah state, politically isolated was activity. along with its colonial neighbours, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and was forced to fight the ensuing war hobbled by this isolation. It felt beleagueredand viewed its position as neither understood nor appreciated. This ostracism served to harden its believed it its Portugal that to was acting properly and responsibly colonies. commitment "' be had to ashamed. nothing of which and interests. territory and sovereign It proceeded accordingly to defend its

The Collapse of Goa This beleagueredcolonial position was reinforced by the actual loss of the Indian in Portugal that an act of war was was powerless to prevent. The events what colonies

110Joaquim Moreira da Silva Cunha, 0 Ultramar, a Naco eo "25 de AM' [The Overseas Provinces, the Nation and the "25th of April"] (Coimbra: Atlntida Editora, 1977), 13-14. "'Abshire and Samuels, 381. Seealso van der Waals, 81.

85

in Goa 1961 again hardenedPortugal's position by providing Dr. Salazar surrounding with a nationally distressing event to coalesce the population for war. 112 While Portuguese Indian territory was relatively small at 4,194 square kilometres, the Indian government's seizure was a blatant act of aggressionagainst another state. Portugal had three trading enclaves there: Goa, Damao, and Diu. The fledgling Indian government had threatenedto take theseproperties in the late 1940s,as it consideredthem an affront. Britain's Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, along with the U. S. forcefully intervened to moderate Indian ambitions. Later President Nehru emboldened by the outbreak of in "' demands Angola Portuguese. the some very made peremptory of armed revolt When it became clear that Dr. Salazar did not intend to relinquish- the territory and 30,000 India by troops, tanks, aircraft, and to massed supported negotiate, refused warships, on the borders of the three territories. Governor-GeneralVassaloe Silva could defend his territory with only about 3,000 ill-equipped troops without air cover or air defense, 900 Goan police, and an old frigate."" On 11 December Dr. Salazar

invoke Anglo-Portuguese Treaty the to without success. Great Britain had attempted 600 help, had 1954 to that the saying refused year-old alliance clear limitations, since ' 15 Commonwealth involved. Britain no longer the a of was particularly since member its for Portugal Portuguese transit to the colonies, and ports no longer neededthe needed dwindling British New had NATO, the navy. alliance structures, of such as protection

12van der Waals, 84-86. "'Robinson, 103. Nehru announced that India was "not prepared to tolerate the in Goa, if Portuguese the the Goans want them to be there." even of presence 114Robinson, 104.
"'Robinson, 104.

86

clearly replaced the Anglo-PortugueseTreaty in both intent and practice.

Dr. Salazar gave instructions that resistancemust last at least eight days to mobilize international support. Should that not be forthcoming, then "total sacrifice" must be made to save Portuguese honour. Indian forces invaded in the morning of the

in Silva Vassalo the pointless struggle on the nineteenth, capitulated and e seventeenth, far short of eight days and total sacrifice. Vassaloe Silva together with the other officers involved were dismissedfrom the Army in 1963in what appearedto be an effort to shift blame for the loss of PortugueseIndia to the military and to set an example for officers in similar future situations, such as the approaching colonial wars. The military at large in in for civilian the and making soldiers the scapegoats unjust punishment was resentful mistakes. The armed forces carried into the African campaignsthis "ominous message that the government was prepared to manipulate and sacrifice them in hopelessmissions and to court-martial virtually all survivors. ""' General Ant6nio de Spfnola, who was

to be the Commander-in-Chief of PortugueseForces in Guine (1968-1972), the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (1972-1974), and the first President of the new government following the revolution in 1974, described the anxiety permeating the entire Portuguese military on the eve of the African wars: India is a clear example of what we fear. Never was its inevitable loss believed happened, And the tragedy the Nation's attention was yet when possible. immediately focused on the narrow aspect of military conduct. The Armed Forces were accusedof not having defendedIndia heroically; when, in reality, no its defense, ' 17 how India have fallen in days. effective would only a matter of matter

"Porch, 36. "'Antonio de Spfnola, Portugal eo Futuro [Portugal and the Future] (Lisbon: Editoria Arcadia, 1974), 235. "0 exemplo da India 6 um precedentebem vivo do porvir Nunca se acreditou que sucedesseo que, afinal, era inevitvel; no receamos. que

87

The punishment for the leaders of the Indian garrison carried the broad messagethat there would be no turning back from the government's decision to defend the colonies. Dr. Salazar's commitment to preserving his regime was unswerving in its purpose, and the events in Goa served to push Portugal further down the road to war. "s

Portugal's commitment to the defenseof the ultramar had its origins in a searchfor the renewed greatnessof an earlier era as espousedby the Salazar government's vision of Lusotropicalism. The modem-day African colonies had largely been an irregular burden World War II had the the until eve of wars, and until after and political economic held only a promise of any substantial economic benefit. This tentative position was in Lusotropicalism. Dr. Salazar by the colonial mystique of opening emotional reinforced the first Imperial Conference on 13 June 1933 provided this political identity for the participants: The work for succeedinggenerations,and for the flower of our youth, is before us and claims our intelligence and a strong arm.... It would be a glorious but heavy burden and capable of breaking the strongest shoulders and crushing the stoutesthearts, were it not that through a kind of historical predestinationwe have been accustomed for centuries to serve and toil and suffer in the realms of discovery and spreadthe blessingsof civilisation. With that unruffled regularity which characterisesour policy; with a conscienceawake to our duties, as might be expectedin a country with a long past, we will advance,on the one hand, by increasing, widening, and raising our work of colonisation, and, on the other hand by contributing to the peaceand progress of the world. 119 becamemore refined to serveDr. Salazar's political causes Lusotropicalism subsequently

foi logo desviada da deu-se; NaCo tragedia a e atenco para o campo a entanto, Forcas de da Armadas batido terem militar, acusando-se as conduta nao se circunstancial heroicamente; quando, na realidade, qualquer que fosse a eficcia da defesa, o colapso de dias. " questo seria sempre 118Marcum, 224. 119Salazar, 177-178.

88

that required a feeling of solidarity betweenthe ultramar and'the metrpole. Statements on this senseof unity had genuine foundations in past colonial policy and in national 120 by Portuguese Antonio Leite the people. psychology, and were apparently embraced de Magalhdeswriting in 0 Mundo Portugues, describesthe glue that held the Portuguese people together and thus the colonies to the metrpole, "One state, one Race, one Faith, 121 " Dr. Salazar exploited these emotions to his own ends. Civilisation. and one Political opposition to him was tolerated neither at home nor in the ultramar. The

longstanding abuses of Portugal's African populations thus created widespread dissatisfaction with no outlet. Between the intransigent Salazarand an aggrieved African inevitable. in it happened 1961, the eventsin Angola When was population an explosion in isolation the UN, and the seizing of Goa pushed Dr Salazar the the coup, along with to solidify the commitment of the Portuguesepeople to defend the colonies and preserve his regime. This national commitment was a reflection of his own personal commitment from brook his to no opposition, seemingly upstart nationalist particularly propensity and his military. of movements and elements So strong was this feeling that it defied any

forces in full Portugal's treasure thus armed and were pledged as the of reason. voice in Dr. Salazar's to this the of promise make colonial system work manifestation ultimate Lusotropicalism. of concept

120Duffy,271. 12'Ant6nioLeite de Magalhes, "Rafzes de Portugal" [PortugueseRoots], 0 Mundo Portugues [PortugueseWorld] (IV-1937): 363.

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III

O Exercito na Guerra Subversiva: Portuguese CounterinsurgencyDoctrine on the Eve of War

Army GeneralStaff (Estado-Maiordo In anticipationof the wars the Portuguese

Exercito) beganto write its counterinsurgencydoctrine, 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva [The Army in Subversive War], in 1960. This chapter will review the origins and in doctrine its terms the this of and analyse of effort relevance and methodology faced in Portuguese 1958 1963 that the the to to the situation colonial period. applicability The-process and its result are also compared to similar contemporary thinking by the British, French, and U. S.

Origins of Portuguese Doctrine Dr. Salazar was particularly sensitive to the vulnerability of the Portuguesecolonies in Africa to nationalist movementsand had been so since the end of World War II. ' He had witnessed the British experiencesbeginning in 1946 with Palestine and extending to Malaya, Borneo, Kenya, Cyprus, and a host of smaller ones. He was acutely aware of the French experience in Indochina and the war that was then being fought in Algeria. And finally, the liberating of much of Africa from its former colonial mastersheld grave ' for Portugal. warning signals

'Colonel Luis Alberto SantiagoInocentes, Staff Corps, PortugueseArmy (Retired), interview by the author, 18 March 1994, London. 2JoaquimMoreira da Silva Cunha, 0 Ultramar, a Napo eo "25 de Abril" [The Overseas Provinces, the Nation and the "25th of April"] (Coimbra: Atlntida Editora, 1977), 19-22.

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This sensitivity was reinforced by a very deep and ingrained anti-communist Cold War stanceby Portugal. Dr. Salazar had sent a volunteer force in 1938 to fight on the anti-communist side of GeneralissimoFranco in the Spanish Civil War, and was of the following World War II that with the German bulwark dismantled an common view ' Europe. Soviet Union would engulf unchecked Portugal's place was alongside the

democratic nationsthat had won the war, and a collectivesecurityarrangement was the
" This defenseposition prompted the intense study logical to the threat. way contain only insurgent Soviet that of sponsoring particularly proxy wars, both by the general policy, of in the senior staff officer courses in Lisbon at the armed services and various staffs of
the Institute of Higher Military Studies (IAEM) 5 This institute remains the premier

forum for the study of defenseissuesin Portugal. By the late 1950sFidel Castro's rise in Cuba along with the British and French insurgency experiences,among others, were included in the IAEM curriculum. '

The IAEM was founded in 1911 as the Central School for Officers (Escola Central de Oficiais, or ECO) with the purpose of preparing officers to be promoted to captain, installed it in 1927 In Palcio Real de Caxias the was colonel. and outside of major

3Neil Bruce, Portugal: TheLast Empire (London: David and Charles Ltd., 1975), 91. 'Jose Calvet de Magalhes, Alvaro de Vasconcelos, and Joaquim Ramos Silva, Portugal: ParadoxoAtlntico [Portugal: Atlantic Paradox] (Lisbon: Institute for Strategic 1990), 54. Studies, International and 5Estado-Maior do Exercito, Subsfdios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Africa (1961-1974) [Aid to the Study of Doctrine Applied in the de Campanhas Campaignsof Africa (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1990), 28. 6GeneralJoaquim Chito Rodrigues, Portuguese Army, Director of the Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, interview by the author, 23 November 1994, Lisbon.

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Lisbon, and its curriculum was expanded to prepare officers for staff duties and for promotion to general officer. At the same time it also assumed the related task of

doctrine by its for the of military acting unification as a centre study. In 1937 supporting defense the the the of metrpole and ultramar establishments,the namewas merging with de it Altos Estudos Militares, Instituto to the and was assignedthe mission of changed

General Course (Curso de Staff Estado Maior, or through the officers preparing staff
CEM), senior officers through the Course for the Promotion to Senior Officer (Curso de Promocdo a Oficial Superior, or CPOS), and general officers through the Course for High Command (Curso de Altos Comandos, or CAC) for their portending duties. In 1958 the -IAEM was moved to new, expandedheadquartersin Pedroucos;a suburb west ' Lisbon. of

The creation of modem doctrine in the Portuguesemilitary followed the merging of the metrpole and ultramar defenseorganisationsand their further reorganisation, which included the creation of the PortugueseAir Force in 1952. These changeswere begun in 1937 and required more than two decadesto effect with their completion in 1960. Prior to 1950 the management of military affairs relating to national defense was

in affairs. coordinated the political spherethroughthe routine conductof government

There was no elaboratedefensehierarchy to overseeand plan military force structure and in accordance with an establishednational policy. activities Beginning in 1950 joint

forces Chief Staff the through the armed of was channelled activity of of the operational Armed Forces and the various Commanders-in-Chief, and after 1956 the Prime Minister 7Staff of the Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 0 Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares [The Institute of Higher Military Studies] (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1987), 8-11.

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and the Minister for National Defensewere supported by a defensehierarchy, including ministers for the various service arms!

Until this reorganisation was completed, defense policy and force structure were promulgated in the form of decrees. Doctrine on the other hand was developedby the General Staff of the Army, or of the headquartersof the military region of each colony. There was a single navy, and later, one airforce, so a single doctrine for these forces for 28 520 1938, In Decree example, ordered a study of the service-wide. extended in in in its 1939 On its the colonies. completion and accordance mission with military 686 fixed forces in 29 Decree the time of composition of colonial recommendations, in forces 1953.9 Prior to that time the colonial until effect were the and remained peace Minister Colonies the the the of of each colony and governor and not the of province 10 in hierarchy the metr6pole. These colonial armies were led by officers and command from largely the troops their metrpole, and were recruited and trained assigned sergeants locally. It had been important at one point to have separatearmies for each colony and its defense; however, with the advent of improved communications and command and it forces World War II, These cumbersome. after proved unnecessarily control practises joining doctrine Portugal's NATO major changes their underwent on and guiding and followed the U. S./NATO conventional war doctrine. This doctrine addressed the

8Kalza de Arriaga, "PortugueseNational Defense during the Last 40 Years and in the Future, " Lecture delivered on 20 October 1966, Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, Lisbon. 9Estado-Maior do Exercito, ResenhaHistrico-Militar das Campanhas de frica (1961-1974) [Historical-Military Report of the Campaigns of Africa (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1988), Vol. 1,176.

de Africa (1961-1974), 10Resenha Vol. 1,176. Histrico-Militar das Campanhas

93

it. Portugal's It did not to and contribution war conventional-force-defense-of-Europe " addresssubversive war.

Portuguesedoctrine was basically an authoritative, approved description of how to

institutes, in Service developed task several ways. suchastheIAEM, and was perform a Angola, Military Region Headquarters, the of andprofessional suchas certaincommands,
journals, such asRevistaMilitar (Military Review), Boletim Militar do Exercito (Military Bulletin of the Army), Boletim do Estado-Maior (Bulletin of the General Staff), Jornal do Ezercito (Journal of the Army), Revista da Armada (Naval Review), and Revista do Ar (Air Review), all -contributed both formally and informally to the production and dissemination of doctrine." The doctrine itself was written by the General Staff of the Army, Navy, or Air Force, as appropriate, and promulgatedby that body. The institutes important, doctrinal they the as stewards of memory were particularly were and schools doing things to the officer corps that passedthrough the of approved way and presented their instruction as students. The propagation of doctrine depended on cycling the in institutes the that the through abstract concepts presented manuals were so officers field, in the making them a part of accepted procedure and understood and practised " thinking. In the event of war and the actual employment of doctrine under combat

for doctrine institutes based this the adjusting served as an agent on conditions, in Military thus theoretically a corrective modification result reversals would experience.

"Kalza de Arriaga, Guerra e Polirica [War and Policy] (Lisbon: Edices Refrendo, Lda., 1987), 119.

12Arriaga, 119-120.
13Arriaga, 119-120.

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to doctrine. '4

The IAEM had concentratedits efforts prior to 1961 on doctrine for conventional war in accordancewith Portugal's role in NATO and the feared conflict in Europe." This traditional focus, however, had not been to the exclusion of insurgency and

for had beenaccumulated substantial amount of a material counterinsurgency warfare,

for had The Armed Forces Portuguese topics. the a number of years studied the on development of subversivewar as simply a form of popular revolt that was sporadic and isolated but not in the mainstream of worthy security topics.16 Following World War II, the number and severity of insurgenciesincreasedto the point that it becamethe most " in form the of conflict world. prevalent As nuclear war was an unlikely event in

Portugueseeyes and one in which it would have only an indirect participation, it seemed appropriate for Portugal to prepare for the reality of a subversive war that would most likely require the mobilisation of large numbers of its troops and other national 18 resources.

'4Arriaga, 119-120. 15Regulamento de Campanha[Principles of Campaigning] (series), Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1954. 16Arriaga, 119. '7Colin M. Beer, On Revolutionary War (Bromley, Great Britain: Galago Publishing Ltd., 1990), 7; and John Laffin, War Annual 1 (London: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1986), vii.

18Arriaga, 119-120.

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Groundwork for Subversive War The Portuguese Army took a number of initiatives in the 1950s that laid the in in for formulating its doctrine. The first the and preparing conflict groundwork occurred in 1953, when the IAEM conducteda course of 8 weeks for 53 officers known as the Curso de Estado-Malor de Pequenas Unidades (Staff Course for Small Units).

" from the word secco This coursewasalso known by the nickname of "Cursodos SS,
designed being " It "section to prepare officers small a of section. a unit a was or section, for staff functions at the battalion and regimental level. The course was remarkable at the time for its innovation within the PortugueseArmy and had its roots in the composite had in U. S. Army the United States of officers who primarily attended schools experience or visited U. S. Army units in West Germany. With the initiation of this course, the PortugueseArmy began to build small, well-prepared staffs to support the battalion and 19 regimental commanders. From that year onward the preparation for small unit staffs for CPOS incorporated the the as course at as well promotion to captain, which was was given at the various practical schools of the PortugueseArmy20 While the Curso dos SS was not especially designed for subversive warfare, it proved to be very important after 1961 and throughout the African Campaignsof 1961-197421

During 1958 and 1959 the Portuguese Army sent five officers to the Intelligence Centre of the British Army at Maresfield Park Camp, Uckfield, Sussex, to attend

19BrigadeiroRenato F. Marques Pinto, PortugueseArmy, correspondencewith the 1995, Oeiras. 6 September author, 20PracticalSchools of the Army: Infantry - Mafra; Engineers - Tancos; Artillery Vendas Novas; Cavalry - Torres Novas and Santarem.

21Marques 6 September 1995. Pinto correspondence,

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intelligence courses at the School of Military Intelligence."

These courses contained

a strong componentof subversivewarfare, as the British were heavily influenced by their

in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus. On their return two of thesefive officers, experiences
Captains Pedro Cardoso and RenatoMarques Pinto, were appointedas instructors at the IAEM. Captain Cardoso brought with him from England a manual, Keeping the Peace

(Duties in Supportof the Civil Power), which was rapidly translatedby him and his
21 The volume generally treated fellow CaptainsMarques Pinto and Remigio dos Santos. insurgency as a communist inspired problem progressing from subversionto a seizureof base areas, and incorporated the lessonsfrom the British experiencein Malaya. It did not acknowledge that nationalist movementsmight be motivated by a simpler and more independence, for lack desire the and of this aspect reinforced the straightforward Portuguesetheory of a communist conspiracy. With the completion of this translation which served as a text, the problems of subversive warfare and the support of civilian introduced into 1958-1959. While there had been the staff courses of were authorities Soviet theory the subversive warfare as part of of study policy curriculum, this earlier initiative marked the beginning of practical instruction in the problems of subversive large from the the to the nearly exclusive at officer corps and shifted course warfare

24 focus on conventional warfare.

22PedroCardoso, As InformafOes em Portugal [Intelligence in Portugal] (Lisbon: Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 1980), 106. 'Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957). This manual was originally published in 1949and was obsolete from the start, although the War Office did not see fit to revise it until 1957.

24Marques 6 September 1995. Pinto correspondence,

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In 1959 a mission of six officers under Major Joaquim Franco Pinheiro was sent to Algeria. These officers spent 15 days at the Centre d'Instruction de Pacification et

Contre-Guerrilla at Arzew in Oran province, where they took a stageof instruction with in 200 1956, the Centre ran an arduous twelve-day French Founded officers. some program, normally accommodating250 reserve officers who had been recalled to active duty, and attempted to prepare them for their command positions in Algeria. 25 Following this instruction, they were sent two to eachof the three French corps stationed throughout Algeria for one month. On their return to Portugal, they produced a

insurgency in their experiences and observations of report of or subversive voluminous in Portuguese The Army must this that the message account was overwhelming warfare. 26 insurgency. fight to an make the most urgent preparations

This senseof urgency was reinforced on 6 December 1960, when the "Congress of 81" communist countries concluded its three weeks of deliberations in Moscow. The followed by those with a vested interest in the and closely publicised meeting was widely last had in The been held 1957 and had developing such meeting nations. politics of hostedonly 13 countries. The proceedingsof this latest meeting were published in NATO News (Nouvellesde 1'OTAN) and later extracted in an analysis in the May 1961 issue of Revue Militaire Generale. Subsequently French Army General Jean Valluy made a detailed study of the meeting declarations, which likewise appearedin the October 1961 issue of Revue Militaire Generale. The implications of these declarations were known

25A1f Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgencyin Algeria (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 176. 26Marques Pinto correspondence,6 September 1995.

98

to the Portuguesein December 1960, and worrisomely they announcedthe targeting of its foremost for Portugal and colonies subversive activities. were countries of a number 27 Portugal's dictatorship 1ist. They to the that the change was to disturb way asserted on the colonial situation, and presenteda plan to topple the authoritarian government of Dr. Salazar and to separatePortugal from its colonies. This plan was to be implemented African the nationalist organizations advocating the of support with simultaneously independenceof the Portuguesecolonies and by the infiltration of Portugueseuniversities independence this of colonial and espousing the notion with elements supporting 28 for independence far doctrine. As the colonial strategy went, the newly as communist independent-nations being created from the former colonies of Belgium; Britain; and France were to be subverted and used to encircle and isolate Portugal's colonies, thus denying them friendly borders and local support."' This formula was designed to

for both Portugal, liberate debilitating the a war which war would colonial a produce colonies and topple the anti-communist regime.

'lean Valluy, "Au Sujet du Manifeste des 81, " RevueMilitaire Generale (October 1961): 282. 28Jean Valluy, "Acerca do Manifesto de Guerra Fria, " [About the Manifesto of the Cold War], trans. and ed. E. Q. Magalhes,Boletim Militar (Regio Militar de Angola) (15 February 1963): 27; and Arslan Humbaraci and Nicole Muchnick, Portugal's African Wars (New York: The Third Press, 1974), 40-41: The authors quote Amilcar Cabral's Staff Psychological 15 General Section Forces No. Armed the of report citation of an dated September1971 and showing the results of the Soviet policy: "The proliferation of leads that they the to an unsuitable create and agitation organizations anti-government by affecting the activities of students, affects the country, climate which, psychological its does do lead back know to to to the right troubled children not and what which seems little interest in the to the In the continues show population generally, metropolis path... ignores forces. being by The the the efforts armed and made student overseas war " to propaganda. pacifist vulnerable massesremain 29Valluy, 26-27.

99

With respect to the other arm of Soviet strategy, they believed that Portugal could cope with the military situation initially, but as the wars expanded, its armed forces junior large temporary to additional numbers of officers (milicianos) recruit would need from the universities. Thus, the appropriately indoctrinated university graduateswould in the meantimebe entering government and particularly the military service and making

their new views felt.3 The plan then called for theseforces to combineto createan
31 in installation Lisbon. for The ultimate the of a communist government opportunity Salazar had the to refused even to establish diplomatic regime, which replace was aim ties with the Soviet Union, with a government friendly to the communist sphere. While the Portuguese authorities were largely concerned about the nationalist movements associated with their African possessionsand the threat that they represented, this declaration of support for them and the direct threat to the Portuguesegovernment and its policies were sourcesof concern even in its reemphasisof known Soviet intentions. The normal passivity of this forum had been replaced with an aggressiveposture.32 As Portugal was sensitive about its colonial situation, this noisy and threatening display, by disturbing Nikita Khrushchev "wars included had speech on a of national which liberation, " was seenas a direct challenge.

At the same time Lieutenant Colonel Artur Henrique Nunes da Silva, who was

30Humbaraci and Muchnick, 40-41. 31lnocentes interview, 2 September 1994. General unrest at the universities began in 1960 and by the fall of 1961 there were open demonstrationsagainst military activity in Angola. The Soviet aim was to achieve optimally a negative attitude in the student population and minimally a passive attitude. 32Valluy, 294.

100

Staff General Army in Operations Branch the the and was also an instructor of working for the CEM, had read the report on Algeria and the French documentsthat accompanied it. 33 This developmentwas propitious, as Lieutenant Colonel Nunes da Silva had been a student of the two-year "Cours Superieurde Guerre" at the Ecole Superteurede Guerre in Paris from 1958 to 1960. In his final year there he had a cycle of "Guerre Subversive." When he returned to Portugal in the summer of 1960 as a major, he was
duties had both doctrine French the assumed new as an and with well acquainted instructor at the IAEM and as a staff officer on the General Staff of the Army 34 He . took these materials to the IAEM immediately following the 6 December 1960 meeting 1961-1962-CEM 30 Working the class of about officers with countries. of communist and using current additional information and documents, principally from the

Headquarters, Military Region of Angola, he produced the publication Apontamentos para Subversiva Guerra [Notes Militares Employment das Forcas the Emprego em on of o Military Forces in Subversive War]. 35

Lieutenant Colonel Nunes da Silva had the support of the IAEM, where traditionally the best minds in the Portuguese Armed Forces were sought as instructors. The

instructors were mobilised with the approval of the Army Staff Headquartersto support the development of the new counterinsurgencydoctrine and to supervise and coordinate

"Marques Pinto correspondence,6 September1995. 'Marques Pinto correspondence,13 November 1995, Oeiras. Major Nunes da Silva in 1960. Colonel November Lieutenant to was promoted 35MarquesPinto correspondence,6 September 1995; and Inocentes interview, 18 March 1994. Colonel Inocenteswas enrolled in the CEM from 1959 to 1962and worked doctrine. the subversive warfare on

101

the staff work performed by the coopted students.. Virtually all of these instructors had served in the colonial armies and consequentlyrepresenteda wealth of experience in Africa. Each also representeda speciality of warfare that would be required there: The experience and skill of these

intelligence, tactics, engineering, and logistics.

instructorswasto give the doctrinea full orientationtowardthe ultramar andthe special fought for likely be that there. Many of the instructors the would wars requirements
figures become later through their contributions to Portugal's military to noteworthy were 36 its in colonies. On completion of this work, Lieutenant Colonel Nunes da Silva effort frenetic General Staff, Army to the the where activity accompaniedthe project moved for doctrine. The doctrinal manual 0 a specialised and comprehensive need now urgent Exercito na Guerra Subversiva [The Army in Subversive War] was produced by the Army General Staff with support from the IAEM in stages until its completion in 1963.37

Development of 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva Lieutenant Colonel Nunes da Silva and the staff assignedto assist him in writing 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversivabeganwith the information that had been assembledfrom " in 1958-1960 included This the the essentialelements period. material various sources doctrines in French British Malaya, Kenya, their the and renditions of experiences and of Indochina, and Algeria, and a modest amount of U. S. material.

36lnocentes interview, 5 September1994, London. 37Marques Pinto correspondence,6 September 1995. 38Estado-Maiordo Exercito, 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva [The Army in Subversive War], 5 vols. (Lisbon: Ministeno do Exercito, 1963; revised, 1966).

102

Between 1945 and 1960 Britain had conducted campaigns in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus. Except for Palestine, these post-World War II campaigns were 39 successful. The conduct of these operations had not been based on formal doctrine but rather certain principles of English common law and policing experience: 1. Disorders were suppressed with a minimum of force; 2. Successfulcounterinsurgency had dependedon a close cooperation between all branchesof the civil governmentand the military, and this coordination had been the responsibility of a single individual; 3. Successfulcounterinsurgencyhad depended on good intelligence, and its gathering and collation had been coordinated under a single authority; and 4. Successfulcounterinsurgencyhad called for the adoption of highly decentralised, ao irregulars. defeat tactics to small unit Eventually these principles were brought together in a comprehensivestrategy in 1960, 41 into formal incorporated doctrine But until that time doctrine was a when all were individually crafted for eachcampaignafter a lengthy apprenticeship. Drs. Hoffman and Taw argue in their study on British counterinsurgency doctrine that the two primary factors in British experiencethat expandedthe cost of insurgenciessignificantly were (1) the belated identification or recognition of hostilities and the opportunity that this delay in foothold insurgents developing the to their momentum, gaining an unopposed and gave and (2) handicapping government counterinsurgency troops through a lack of proper

39Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960 (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), 12. 40BruceHoffman and Jennifer M. Taw, Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict., The Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s (SantaBarbara: Rand Corporation, 1991), vi and vii; and Mockaitis, 13-14. 41Arny Field Manual (Series), British Army General Staff, (Year). 103

42 The Portuguese too saw these lessons in the "small wars" training and equipment British experiencesand sought to avoid these pitfalls in part by developing a written doctrine aheadof their anticipated conflict.

When CaptainsPedro Cardoso and Renato Marques Pinto took the staff intelligence in Camp Park Maresfield at course 1958-1959, the British experiences in

just beginning to be part of the curriculum in the various service were counterinsurgency 43 schools. After over a decade of counterinsurgenciesthe British Army had finally formulated doctrine had be to that to and taught. Given the unsettled realise come in situation PortugueseAfrica, theseofficers were attentive to the British experiencesand keenly. Portuguese Army General Staff knew its lessons The that Portugal had absorbed little time before it must fight a campaign to retain its overseaspossessions,and that it from if its first it fight the correctly very shot, war were to succeedand contain the must cost in doing so. If Portugal were forced to fight without a doctrine to guide its forces, from develop had to scratch the necessarytactics that capitalised on the advantages and in it face from then the situations each colony, specific would a more difficult accruing The British of success. chances provided guidance, and its reduced struggle with influence on Portuguese thinking was apparent in the development of 0 Exercito na 4 The British theatre doctrine for Malaya (1952) and Kenya (1954) Guerra Subversiva.

42Hoffmanand Taw, vii. 43Mockaitis, 184-185. 44Estado-Maior do Exercito, 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva [The Army in Subversive War], 5 vols. (Lisbon: Ministeno do Exercito, 1963; revised, 1966). 104

were key references for the Portuguese Army General Staff.45 These doctrines embodied the principles of minimum force, civil-military cooperation, intelligence

coordination, and small unit operations that had proved so successfulin British imperial policing. These principles fit the PortugueseArmy's desire to develop an effective and inexpensive approachto counterinsurgencythat was appropriate both to its meansand to the circumstancesin its colonies. This reasoninggreatly influenced the development of the Portuguese way of war, in which a cost effective and sustainable approach was its African Campaigns. to adapted

The French like the British had had a successfulhistory of pacification prior to World War II, but since then counterinsurgencydoctrine had been built on lessons of defeat. Following France's debaclein Indochina (1946-1954), the concept of revolutionary war formulated by was a group of officers whose experiencesthere revolutionnaire guerre or led them to seek methods of countering anticolonial wars. This list included the

in General Lionel-Max Chassin, Colonel staff and senior officers commanders prominent Lacheroy, and GeneralNemo, and noteworthyjunior officers in Messrs. Hogard, Poirier, 46 These officers wrote prolifically on the topic, and their theories were Souyris. and in but French debated the accepted readily staffs or service schools that wrote not widely doctrine. taught and

45TheConduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Federation of Malaysia, 1952); and A Handbook of Anti-Mau Mau Operations (Nairobi: Government 1954). Kenya, of a6Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfarefrom Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis Doctrine Military (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 7. Political and of a
105

The central theme of guerre revolutionnaire theory lay in the argument that an inferior force could defeat a conventional army, if it could gain the tacit support of the had These in theorists the also witnessed the strength that a area. contested population truly unified politico-military command gave to the enemy Viet-Minh insurgents and in force. These counterinsurgent a this assertions exist that also must structure argued in Indochina. by their civil-military with responsibilities own experiences were reinforced These officers had also felt the impact of psychological warfare and had become be ideological dimension to the this that could exploited reinforce cohesionof convinced 47 ideology forces The French to the counter enemy's and military civil and government doctrine also addressedintelligence coordination and small unit operations, but omitted the British principle of minimum force. Although the French too had limited resources, the cost sensitivity of the British was not a conscious part of the doctrine's thinking. With this concept of guerre revolutionnaire, modern counterinsurgencyreverted to the his Marshall Lyautey had d'huile that and contemporaries successfully principle tache 48 difference The half that the was only earlier. political a century over applied techniques and military solutions to the problem of civil-military cooperation had been doctrine From the this for the times. theoretical mid-1950s provided modern revised framework for France's effort to retain Algeria.

By the time that Major Franco Pinheiro and his five colleagues visited Algeria in 1959, guerre revolutionnaire was the French defacto doctrine, although it had not at that in document. They saw parallels between Algeria and been an official promulgated time

47Paret,7. 48Paret,103-106. 106

Portuguese Africa and assiduouslyrecorded the French problems and solutions in the Maghreb. They were particularly intrigued by French psychological operationsand saw an immediate benefit in its application to PortugueseAfrica. 49 Guerre revoluxionnaire

to counterinsurgency, a sense of urgencyin its approach espoused andit was this sense
his immediacy Pinheiro Major that associatestransmitted on their return to and of Lisbon. 5

The U. S. contributed little to Portuguese counterinsurgency thinking and the development of 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva. Despite the attempts of the U. S. Army to establish staffs to overseethis doctrinal need in the years following World War II, their fragmented lives resulted in a loss of continuant thinking on counterinsurgency. The irregularity of this work was reflected in the subsidiary manualson counter-guerrilla operations prior to 1960, which were FM 31-20 Operations against Guerrilla Forces, 31-15 Operations in 1951, FM against Airborne Attack, Guerrilla Action and published and Infiltration, published in 1953, and were both flawed in that they discussed

" framework in the of conventional war. These doctrines were never counterinsurgency based that the counterinsurgency to operations principle were on protecting reconcile able

"General JoseLuis Almiro Canelhas,interview by the author, 3 April 1995, Lisbon. General Canelhas went to Algeria in the second group of observers of the 1959-1960 period. 50Charles Lacheroy, Colonel of Colonial Infantry, French Army, "Action Viet-Minh de 'Guerre Lecon Indochine Revolutionnaire', " Paper Communiste ou une en presented et in de War Indochina, Institut Defense Nationale, Conference the Paris, July the on at 1954,1. s'Department of the Army, Operations against Guerrilla Forces, FM 31-20 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951); and Department of the Army, Operations against Airborne Attack, Guerrilla Action and Infiltration, FM 31-15 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953).
107

the population, and this premise went against the massive application of firepower in a conventional war. While they are listed as references in 0 Fxercito na Guerra

Subversiva, they contributed little useful thinking on the PortugueseArmy's anticipated problems in Africa. U. S. doctrinal literature during the 1950s was slow to materialise, and when it did so, tended to consider counterinsurgencyas an adjunct to conventional 52 in Kennedy's President this position, but it caused some modification advent war. in U. S. Army's difficult the to stance. change effect any proved

Coincident with the activities of Lieutenant Colonel Nunes da Silva, the Centre for Instruction in Special Operations(Centro de Instruco de OperacesEspeciais, or CIOE) 16 Lamego by Army April Portuguese the at on was established 1960 to teach

its Both (counter-subversion) to tactics the CIOE and the personnel. counterinsurgency IAEM becameforums for exploring and developing the strategiesand tactics that would be most effective against an insurgency in the Portuguesecolonies.S3 Another valuable Guerra the time on subversive the private publication of war, most prominent work and Revolucionkria [Revolutionary War], also appearedthrough Army sponsorship,explained the modem basis for subversivewar from the Portugueseperspective, and provided the ' foundation for writing 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva. Its title and content were

52AndrewF. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 39.

Africa da Campanhas 53Subs(dios de Estudo Doutrina Aplicada (1961nas para o 1974), 138-139.
54ColonelHermes de Arajo Oliveira, Guerra Revoluciondria [Revolutionary War] (Lisbon: Edition of the author, 1960). The author visited Algeria alone prior to the 1959 duties Pinheiro Professor Geography Franco Major to the and returned as of mission of Academia Militar, he 5 lectures History Military the where gave at on revolutionary and lectures These this edited and were published as volume under the patronageof the war. 108

heavily influenced by the French guerre revolutionnaire theory.

As the doctrine was being developed, it was also being taught and refined. Each of the five sectionswere first releasedin a preliminary version and applied experimentally in Angola. " The preliminary sections were also taught in the Practical Schools of

Arms, particularly that of the Infantry. It was here that small unit tactics were developed identified. Their contribution to the elementsof the the combat equipment proper and doctrine were important not only as lessonslearned from experiments and teaching but also from the experience of veterans returning as instructors from combat in Angola. The Military Region of Angola (RMA) also offered the experienceof its officers and the intelligence that it had gathered to the General Staff of the Army. From the opening

had information RMA the the gathered valuable conflict of on the behaviour of months the guerrillas, their order of battle, and Portugueseinfantry tactics that had proved most integrated This into them. the doctrine but also experience was not only against effective for being for duty the those the at practical schools curriculum mobilised of made part in the colonies.56 Throughout this process the Portuguese Army was attempting to develop to time the a counterinsurgencydoctrine, a processthat required usual compress from fighting of a experience varied sourcesover many normally represented refinement document. Consequently, It it urgently at war and needed such a now was years.

Ministry of the Army. Africa da 55Subsfdios Estudo Doutrina Aplicada Campanhas de (1961o para nas 1974), 138. Africa da 56Subsfdios Doutrina Estudo Aplicada Campanhas de (1961para o nas 1974), 138. 109

worked feverishly to generatethis valuable guidances'

The original product, 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva, began with the national policy and rationale for the deploymentand use of the PortugueseArmed Forces to attain the political objective of maintaining the integrity of its empire: It was so clear that the politico-strategic philosophy of the Portuguesenation was islands, Atlantic Africa, Portuguese territories the the of to of of always consider Asia, and of Oceanus,as territories indissoluble from old Lusitania, in spite of following World War II, had spread doctrines and which, practices contrary 58 everywhere. This statementreflects the purpose of the national policy as being one of survival and endurance. These goals were also reinforced with the use of such phrases as

"sovereignty," "national unity, " "national integrity, " and "economic patrimony, " which in appear Portuguese writings and propaganda and mirrored Dr. Salazar's

Lusotropicalism.19 The Portugueseempire was seen as a heritage and a promise of a fragmentation betray but In Portuguese future. the any would not only eyes past richer This European to the modest country. potential catastrophewas a empire would reduce in National be policy also step with the campaign strategy was to avoided at all costs. inexpensive, Portugal low key that keeping the so and could sustainthe war conflict of for a long period and outlast the guerrillas.

Africa da Campanhas de Estudo Doutrina (196157Subsfdios Aplicada nas para o 1974), 138. Africa da Campanhas de 58Subsfdios Estudo Doutrina (1961Aplicada nas para o 1974), 34. "Fica assim claro que a filosofia politico-estrategica da NagdoPortuguesafoi, Africa, Asia ilhas das da da da territrios portugueses atlnticas, os e considerar sempre, Oceania, como territrios indissociveis da velha Lusitnia, apesardas doutrinas e das da II Guerra Mundial, " toda se espalharam a partir por a que, parte. contrrias prticas "Douglas L. Wheeler, "The Portuguese Army in Angola, " Journal of Modern African Studies (October 1969): 426. 110

Portugal's counter-subversivegrand strategy evolved from this policy of maintaining the empire with all of its promise and considered the operational, social, administrative (logistical), and technological dimensionsof war in fashioning its three-prongedeffort: 1. Military action would maintain order in the colonies and defeat the insurgent in combat (operational); 2. Diplomatic efforts would seek to nullify the activities of Portugal's adversaries, forge its ties and new alliances, and while not acceptingthe allies, with strengthen legitimacy of the terrorist organisations,seekto open a dialogue with them toward a peaceful solution that did not compromise Portuguesesovereignty; and 3. Socio-economic development within the colonies would improve the lot of the 60 feel it (social) Portugal a of greater part colonial population and make From the foregoing it is clear that the Portuguese saw the military and social aspects dominating among these four dimensionsof war. The administrative (logistics) would its long Army lines Portuguese the to with of communication; present a severechallenge however, the ability to support Portuguesetroops on the battlefield and to maintain their be insurmountable flexibility to never anticipated an was problem. consequentoperational As guerrillas fight a low technology war, the PortugueseArmy saw the technology aspect in it doctrine. factor, 0 Fxercito treated the consequently, was not and minor a only as is level, Subversiva this the tactical Guerra a of grand strategy at reflection and the na in following five its in the are analysed treated volumes sections according to the topics broader dimensions of war.

O Exercito na Guerra Subversivais a tactical doctrine with portions of military and instruction bridging being doctrine to to the gaps provide understanding given. operational This structure provides at times a panoramic view of counterinsurgency to support its

60SilvaCunha, 31-32.
111

more specific aspectsand illustrates that the PortugueseArmy understoodand possessed the tools to implement the elementsof textbook counterinsurgencydoctrine. The volume from the soldier's perspectivein that it openswith a statement follows a logical sequence insurgency (subversive the the of the and principles war) and proceeds war of purpose of to explain the field techniques required to defeat the guerrillas and help the soldier is is key he Portuguese that the to winning the The told emphatically soldier survive. in its Portugal Equally that the over of guerrillas. confidence as gaining and population important and following from the psychological theme, the soldier is told of the need for in his for loyalty this the the to and aspect of war role authorities civil support military is below dominating doctrine The to the according examined military, the population. of dimensions to logistical counterinsurgency. as applied of war and social

Nature of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva begins with a description of the principles of them to the and unique considerationsof war, relates counter-subversive and subversive the ultramar. Insurgency or subversive war representedto the Portuguese soldier an

different type of conflict, one which required a nearly complete and new entirely forces. didactic designed Hence Portugal's the opening was not armed reorientation of in but This a convenient war also as reference. entire subversive only as an orientation be based Guerra the to publication on earlier referenced appears section 61 Revoluciondria. It also reflected adjustmentsto accommodatethe particular situation in Portuguese Africa. In their subversive war the Portuguese saw no promise of

61ColonelHermes de Arajo Oliveira, Guerra Revoluciondria [Revolutionary War] 1960). Edition the author, of (Lisbon:
112

compromise in an enemy that sought a total displacementof authority. 62

Prior to the beginning of the PortugueseAfrican Campaigns, insurgenciesgenerally followed the prescriptions developedby Mao Tse-tung in China and expandedby General Vo-Nguyen Giap in Vietnam.63 This insurgency warfare doctrine and its execution were studied and analysed by the Centre for Political and Social Studies in Lisbon and subsequently became available as a publication in 1963 titled, Subverso e Counter" This document described this Third Subverso[Subversion and Counter-Subversion]. ` World phenomenonas evolving in five phases: Insurgency/SubversiveWar I II III Preparatory phase or preparation of subversion; Agitation phase or the creation of a subversive environment; Terrorism and guerrilla action phase or the consolidation of the subversive organisation; Subversivestatephase, correspondingto the creation of bases,a rebel government, and pseudo-regularforces;

IV

`Jose Manuel de Bethencourt Rodrigues, General, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 9 November 1994, Pedroucos (Lisbon). 63MaoTse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, II (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961), and Vo-Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962). 64JoaquimAntonio Franco Pinheiro, Hermes de Arajo Oliveira, and Jaime de [Subversionand Counter-Subversion], Oliveira Leandro, Subversdoe Counter-Subverso Estudos de Ciencias Politicas e Sociais No. 62, Junta de Investigag6esdo Ultramar (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Politicos e Sociais, 1963) 65Joaquim Antonio FrancoPinheiro, Lieutenant Colonel, PortugueseArmy, "Natureza da Guerra Subversiva" [The Nature Fundamentos and Fundamentals of Subversive e [Subversion and Counter-Subversion],Estudosde War], Subversoe Counter-Subversao Ciencias Poi ticas e Sociais No. 62, Junta de Investigag6esdo Ultramar (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Politicos e Sociais,- 1963), 24-25.
113

Final phase or general insurrection and regular war.

The study also provided the caveat that subversive campaigns develop along widely divergent lines, and that the phasesmay overlap one another and blend together. There was rarely a clear break between phases.

Becauseof this overlapping of one phasewith another, the PortugueseArmy departed from traditional thinking on the topic, as describedabove, and lumped the various phases into insurgency two larger phases, the pre-insurrection and the insurrection of an "' phase: PortugueseArmed Forces I Pre-insurrectional phase: Insurrectional phase: I II III IV V Traditional View Preparatory phase Agitation phase Terrorism and guerrilla action phase Subversive state phase Final phase

II

As the differences between the traditional PhasesI and II are more theoretical than real, the Portuguese Army elected to combine them into a single, clandestine, preinsurrectional phase. For the samereasonthe overt activity of the traditional PhasesIII, IV, and V were combined into a single, insurrectional phase. This simplification was designed to make the soldier's understandingof insurgency or subversive war an easier has in from This that treatment the government's enormous approach merit process. by is but by the academic altered classification not rather ruled practicalities. viewpoint The clandestine organisation of an insurgency could easily be part of the normal

660 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva, Vol. I, Chapter I, 11-15.

114

is directly dissention as such and not within any society a military of undercurrent is injected, however, it becomes Once the of use violence somethingvery responsibility. different. This stark contrast as opposed to a blend is reflected in the Portuguese

its the and accordingly application of solutions. Its problem military's recognition of

five but linked is the to of phases each ratherconcentrates counter-action not necessarily
in is Counter-subversion broader the two. the pre-insurrectional period centred on on insurrectional in the the on reclaiming period population and and measures, preventive destroying the insurgent infrastructure. In the secondphasePortuguesedoctrine calls for fronts. political the social, and military, psychological, activities on

The soldier's relations with the population that he is protecting is stressedconstantly in document, this opening section. While this emphasis the and particularly throughout is not uniquely Portuguese, it is not generally highlighted to this degree in writings on counterinsurgency theory and practice. The Portuguese soldier is encouraged "to

influence (the population) through his presence, calming the population and acting as a is X67 He he is the told that of growth subversion. also against part preventive measure I in his (acco psicossocial) which military and civilian skills operation of a psychosocial forces help "The have the to thus be military population. an used voluntarily should important role to play despite acting uniquely in preventing subversion and in remaining X68 This bands Portuguese the emphasis or attacking guerrillas. on to armed alert

670 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva, Vol. I, Chapter II, 19. "Actuar pela sua tranquilizando a populagdo e servindo como prevenco contra o presenca, " desenvolvimento da subverso. 680 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva, Vol. I, Chapter II, 19. "As forcas militares importante desempenhar, a a pensarde se tratar nicamentede tero, portanto, um papel de haver bandos " e ndo ainda armados ou a combater. subversdo guerrilhas a evitar
115

soldier's having a calming effect on the population reinforced the national strategy of keeping the conflict low key, and indeed calm, and thus inexpensive. His presencewas designedprimarily to gain the confidence of the local population and follows the British principle of minimum force in counterinsurgency. It contrasts with the initial French

" practisecalled ratissageor "raking over," which terrorisedthe Algerian population.

It also contrastedwith the U. S. practise of conducting counterinsurgencyas a subsetof 7 The massed firepower that had served the U. S. Army well in conventional war. winning World War II and Korea was both expensiveand inappropriate for a conflict in both became the the targets with conventional war enemy mixed with people and which firepower indiscriminate The of use endangeredthe population and terrorised practises. the very audiencethat the governmentwas trying to win. Both of thesestylesalso tended to remove the soldier from meaningful contact with the population and thus reduced his effectivenessin gaining its confidenceand in winning its loyalty. The Portuguesesought to win militarily and to do so in a subdued, low tempo, affordable way.

The Military Dimension The military dimension is the most detailed portion of the doctrine and is aimed for light infantry, small unit the at providing a guide conduct exclusively of almost Guia is It the of a para o Emprego Tctico das Pequenas Unidadesna revision patrols. Contra Guerrilha [Guide for the Tactical Employment of Small Units in Counter

"'Alistair Home, A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 104; and Paret, 37.

7OKrepinevich, 39.
116

" Guerrilla Warfare] issued as a trial in 1961.

The "Guide" is a detailed tactical

doctrine that was one of the earlier pilot sectionstested in the field. It was rushed into service following the uprisings of 1961and reflected the very thorough groundwork done by the Portuguese Army General Staff to prepare Portugal's troops for a "form of irregular in warriors excel and in which regular troops are almost warfare which most invariably seenat their worst. "'

The military dimension is tactical, which provides the main body of doctrinal instruction and furnishes a common foundation on which to base plans. Such doctrine in form the of training and field manuals and is widely disseminated normally appears forces. It supports the tactical level of war, which is the world of the armed within is focused defeating the enemy at a particular time and place. This work on and combat builds on the comprehensive treatment given the methods of the insurgent and the his to threat. The topic is addressedin two phases. used counter of warfare principles The first is a compilation of the most important elementsof tactical doctrine relating to the preparation and execution of the more typical operations of small units in counterdetails The in these the simplest terms, an important second operations war. subversive factor in communicating with the soldier.

"Estado-Maior do Exercito, Guia para o Emprego Tdctico das Pequenas Unidades for [Guide Guerrilha Tactical Employment Small Contra the Units in Counter of na Guerrilla Warfare], Part 1,0 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva [The Army in Subversive War] (Lisbon: Ministeno do Exercito, 1961).

72CharlesE. Callwell, Colonel, Royal Artillery, British Army, Small Wars: A for Imperial Soldiers (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1896; Tactical Textbook Leventhal Lionel Limited, 1990), London: 125. reprint,
117

The entire focus of this military dimension centres on the uniquenessof counterinsurgency. While the armed forces must be prepared to fight with professional skill and dedication, it must do so in a non-traditional and innovative manner, one that avoids the conventional tactics likely to harm and thus alienate the population surrounded by the

is neithereasynor simplein that it requiresconventionally fighting. This requirement

trained troops to modify their tactical practice in ways that run counter to much of their training. This product is the result of the early pilot programs at the CIOE and the doctrinal research done by the IAEM and the RMA and fully addressesthis dilemma. It equally aims at keeping the tone of the conflict low key to avoid frightening the is The to subdueviolent activity and to provide security contribution military population. so that the political processof winning the population can occur. Their organisation and training will have to be tailored to the unique task of counterinsurgency,and specialised 73 troops employed as necessary. "So, a total adaption must be made, not only in in but the structuring of suitable tactical units - organisation, also methods operational in be instruction the that time the so we can at opportune poised area or and equipment "' location the enemy. of actual

The instruction is related well to the strategic objectives in that it explains how the

73Jaime de Oliveira Leandro, First Lieutenant, PortugueseArmy, "As Acces ContraRevoluciondrias ea suaTecnica" [Counter-Revolutionary Operationsand its Technique], Revista Militar (January 1963): 54-55. 74Hermes de Arajo Oliveira, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff, PortugueseArmy, "A Reposta A Guerra Subversiva" [The Response to Subversive War], Subversdo e Counter-Subverso, Estudos de Ciencias Poi ticas e Sociais No. 62, Junta de Investigaces do Ultramar (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Politicos e Sociais, 1963), 55. "H, pois, que fazer uma adaptagdototal, ndo s6 nos metodosde acgdo, mas tambem na instrugao das unidades orgnica, equipamento e pr6prias estruturaco - para podermos Area local inimigo. de do " tempo oportuno em na ou no actuaco presentes estar
118

soldier through his tactical actions fits into the campaign goals of protecting the population and reducing the insurgent's accessto it. It further explains how the guerrilla operatesand stressesthe importance of why he must be denied accessto the population. Guerrilla contact with the population was to be prevented at all costs, and the Portuguese initiatives 75 to the sensitive and soldiers were very guerrilla commanders with people. It also reflects the national strategyof keeping the operations subduedand low tempo not only for the cost containmentbut to avoid terrorising the population.

The Social Dimension As the military dimension talked about the nature of the war and told the soldier how to kill guerrillas and stay alive, so the social dimension talked about his relationship with the population and civil government and the messagesthat were being carried to the in Portuguese Africa and the neighbouring countries. This dimension is both people important both tactically and strategically and accordingly receives considerable treatment, as it is a prime consideration in all aspectsof counterinsurgency.

When faced with an insurgency a government must respond as promptly and as Its to particularly redress grievances. as possible, responseshould addressthe positively insurgency by the a clear with supported of plan a range of social, economic, causes root in addition to military activity. The words of General legal, and administrative measures Sir Frank Kitson remind us that "insurgency is not primarily a military activity, " and thus

75BrigadeiroRenato F. Marques Pinto, interview by the author, 30 March 1995, Oeiras.

119

the Portuguese government's response could not be exclusively military. 76 The Portugueseauthorities identified the social dimension as the key to retaining Africa and consequentlyoriented their doctrine and the soldier's duties in this direction. "National mobilisation must not then rely exclusively on the armed forces, but absolutely on a

hygiene teaching and health,public works and education, and country'severy resource: industry medicine, and mining...eachand agronomyand veterinary communications,
force intervene in be, to the the struggle military, a mobilised as with one must every "' needed. and where when Writers of the Portuguese doctrine divided the social

dimension into two parts, the Army's support of civil efforts and the promotion of these activities through a program of psychological operations.

The support for civic action was initially limited and focused on "providing intelligence, reinforcing police operations or acting in cooperation with them in maintaining order, guaranteeingcontrol of the population, and assuring the maintenance initial "'$ The thrust was to use the military to necessary. when of essential services, doctrine its law the order, and consequently stresses and as central theme the maintain

76FrankKitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1977), 282. "Hermes de Arajo Oliveira, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff, PortugueseArmy, "Guerra Subversiva: Subsidios para uma Estrategia de Reacgdo" [Subversive War: Information for a Strategy of Response], Revista Militar (November 1964): 672. "A deve, forcas pois, recair nao apenas sobre as nacional armadas, mas sim mobilizaco da do higiene todos actividade sectores pals: ensino e educarcaao, os e sade,obras sobre industrial agricultura e veterinria, e minas... tudo e tudos comunicag6es, pblicas e devem ser, como o militar, forcas mobilizveis, a fazer intervir na luta, quando e onde " indispensvel. tome se 780 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva, Vol. IV, v. "prestando-lhes informaces, da Policia da ou actuando em cooperaco com ela na a acgdo manutengio reforcando da controle o populagdo e assegurandoa manutengdodos servicos garantindo ordern, " necessrio. quando essenciais,
120

support of and coordination with all of the elementsof the Portuguesecivil arms, which were initially identified as police forces but later expandedto cover all civil authority79 As insurgenciesare primarily wars for the people's loyalty, there were aspectsbesidethe suppression of violence that demanded attention. The military was to effect a new psychosocial program, a program in which Portuguesesoldiers provided not only local protection from insurgent intimidation but the manpower to build schools, teach in the initiate basic medical, health, and sanitation services. This effort drill wells, and schools, required coordination not only across common civil-military disciplines, such as the 80 level but between dichotomy. This also every within services, such a medical coordination was a particularly foreign conceptand practise for the normal soldier, who regarded his duties primarily in the conventionalwar context of killing the enemy. It was thus vital for the doctrine to explain these aspectsof counterinsurgency to him, as his in civil-military measureswas the key to victory within of and participation awareness the population. The originators of the French guerre revolutionnaire theory had

in insurgents Indochinese felt the the that civil-military coordination strong and witnessed it must be matchedfrom the counterinsurgencyside as well. The PortugueseArmy had seen the benefits of this strong civil-military coordination on its visits to Algeria and its in revolutionnaire of guerre principles operation. observation In its doctrine the

Portuguese Army adapted theseFrench principles to its operation and reflected them in its doctrine.

Colonel Carlos da Costa Gomes Bessa commented on reorienting the Portuguese

790 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva, Vol. IV, Annex A, 1-5. 800 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva, Vol. IV, Chapter I, 1.
121

soldier to civil support based on his later experience in implementing the doctrine as a staff officer responsible for civil-military coordination, "for the various organs which constituted the counter-subversive structure there were civil and military principals levels. "" their at respective responsible Colonel Bessaalso stressedthe importance of

but having interlocking having a positive, cohesive one: also relationship an not only With respect to civil-military collaboration, which is indispensableto the proper functioning of a counter-subversion structure, more than the organisation, all dependson the attitude and training of the people for the task of their respective functions, and is the reason for which their selection is the most important determinant factor.82 Colonel Bessadescribedthe problem-solving process in this relationship as being one in which no problem was considered too difficult to solve and that it was the preferred it level, lowest decisions the to as at possible was here that people would method make be immediately affected and benefit most.83 Elevating the decision-making to those interest immediate might evoke the wrong solution. Indeed the processshould an without begin at the level of the local commissions(comisseslocais) that had direct contact with the population, as they were "in a better position to understand,capture and transmit the

"Carlos da Costa GomesBessa,Colonel, General Staff, PortugueseArmy, "Angola: A Luta Contra a Subversdoea ColaboragdoCivil-Militar" [Angola: The Fight Against Subversion and the Civil-Military Collaboration], Revista Militar (August-September 1972): 421. "Dos vrios rgos da estrutura da contra-subverso fazem parte os civis e militares existentesao nivel respectivo." principais responsveis 82GomesBessa, 424. "No que respeita colaboraco civil-militar, que 6 indispensvelpara o bom funcionamento de uma estrutura de contra-subverso,mais do depende da das da todo mentalidade e orgnica, preparaco pessoas para o exerc%io que das respectivas funces, pelo que a sua escolha e orientaco assume importncia a " o restante. sobrelevar "Colonel Carlos da Costa GomesBessa,interview by the author, 18 November 1995, Lisbon.
122

" the true concerns and aspirations" of people.

These commissions proved a valuable

tool as a local level vehicle for political participation in countering the insurgent's include doctrine Through to this the the following broad was expanded process promises. programs in the Army's psychosocialoperations: " Social:

in husbandry development agriculture and cattle -Economic infrastructure improvements -Local

-Education -Sanitaryassistance

"
"

Communications
Self-defenseof localities and villages."

The processin civil-military coordination was initially focusedon augmentingthe various law The functions, later the were primary concerns. as and order perspective was police include from to an extensiverange of social programs and the concerns security widened need for a plan with a single point of responsibility and effective coordination at every level to achieve a unity of effort. Portugal in making dramatic changesin the treatment in instructed his duties his in its African the the and soldier explained population, role of social dimension.

The secondaspect of the social dimension was Portuguesepsychological operations (PSYOP, or in Portuguese,APSIC officially, or Psico unofficially), which were designed to promote the Portuguese socio-political efforts to the target audience of the African its in Africa The Portuguese Portuguese and states. neighbouring also saw population

"Gomes Bessa, 427. "... em melhores condicespara as compreender, captandoe " transmitindo superiormenteos seus verdadeiros anseiose aspiraces. $SGomes Bessa, 435.
123

PSYOP as an important tool of warfare in that if an opponent's attitude can be influenced favourably, then his physical resistancewill diminish. With this effect in combination with other military, diplomatic, or social operations, PSYOP acts as a "force multiplier" by enhancing the result of those operations on the target.86 The nationalist movements PSYOP. Portuguese The Portuguesealso designed key targets their of soldiers were and PSYOP to support the other elementsof their counter-subversive strategy and became accomplishedin this science.

At the outbreak of hostilities several PSYOP dynamics were apparent. First, prior to 1961 there was only a small PSYOP departmentin the PortugueseArmy. In the 19581959 period the missions to Algeria observedthe French application of PSYOP and saw immediate application to the ultramar. The reports of theseofficers and their experience in d'Information (SAPI) d'Action Psychologique Algeria were thus Service the et with 87 in field. SAPI had been established Portuguese beginning this the the competence of by Colonel Lacheroy in April 1956 and was a powerful agency for spreading the guerre

" doctrine. revolutionnaire

The French position was that "proper psychological measures could create and

"Glenn Curtis, An Overview of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) (Hurlburt Field, Florida: USAF Special Operations Command, 1990), 2. PSYOP is the generally for NATO is APSIC the community within psychological operations. acronym accepted the official Portuguese acronym, and Psico is the unofficial Portuguese nickname for acco psicolgica.
87Estado-Maior do Exercito, Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974) [Historical Military Report on the African Campaigns (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1988), Vol. I, 397.

SBParet, 55.
124

fighters ideological and their civilian supporters.n89 The cohesion among maintain Portuguese also believed this premise valid and elected to begin with its soldiers and him. The in through targeting to the the most effective medium population appeal expand the African people was the Portuguese soldier who was in daily contact with the population. The Army was to be during the wars "a psychological 'weapon' of Accordingly, PSYOP doctrine

"' defensively both and offensively. overwhelming value

instruction from in his included The the the earliest stages of war. were and principles its PSYOP to the successfulapplication, and process was vital of soldier's understanding his continuing awareness was emphasised through reports and writings that were in all of the military zones. circulated regularly

The Logistical

(Administrative)

Dimension

This dimension of administrative and logistic support is the preponderantfactor in the Colonel P. forces in As D. Foxton, British Army campaign. a any military of efficiency logistician reminds us: It is logistics which moves armies to where they can fight. It is logistics which keeps weapon systems firing and maintained. Indeed, so important is logistics that it features as a principal factor in almost every soldier's appreciation of the 91 is finally in facing him, that the plan made. task and Within NATO, logistics is defined as the science of planning the movement and

89Paret, 7. 900 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva, Vol. III, vi. "uma armapsicolgica de valor defensiva da " tanto sua aplicaco como ofensiva. e preponderante 91P.D. Foxton, Colonel, British Army (Retired), Powering War: Modern Land Force Logistics (London: Brassey's (UK) Ltd., 1994), 2.
125

92 forces. lumped These are essentially unglamorous activities of generally maintenance together by most armies under a catch-all title of "administration" or "administration and logistics. " They comprise such functions as transportation, supply, medical evacuation In logistics hospitalisation, services. grand wars smaller are the limiting and other and factor to any campaign. In low-intensity conflict they are not normally as vital, causing Major General Julian Thompson, Royal Marines, to observe, "(Low-intensity operations) important in logistics few their success,or played an part examples where provided otherwise."" In this campaign, however, they were vital to Portugal in fighting a

from home. kilometres far 10,300 as as counterinsurgency

Portugal believed that in subversive war this support was doubly important for two reasons: " Morale of the troops assumesa much more elevated role in this functioning fickle is the thus to more of support, and environment and The level of this morale affects troop relations with the population ' thus, the psychosocial program. and vice-versa, and

"

Consequently, the characteristics of subversive war in Portugal's case confer special factor logistics in the conduct of as a of and success relevance on administration is is devoted The that topic to examining complex a subsequent chapter so operations. the unique aspectsof this support.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Services, 1989), 253. 93Julian Thompson, Major General, Royal Marines (Retired), The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict (London: Brassey's (UK) Ltd., 1991), xiv. 940 Ezercito na Guerra Subversiva, Vol. V, v.
126

Timeliness and Importance of 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva The PortugueseArmy's developmentof its counterinsurgencydoctrine is a reflection its its in their to Portugal's to colonies and vulnerability and role sensitivity overall of their defense. The advent of wars of national liberation with their Cold War undercurrent heightened this Army responsibility. The embroilment of France and Britain in Algeria 16

(1952-1960), Cyprus Kenya (1955-1960) (1948-1960), in Malaya (1954-1962) and and

further served as strong warning signals. Accordingly, the PortugueseArmy began its in just in 1960 during this the to the months effort prior accelerated and and work earnest opening of the Campaigns.

The PortugueseArmy had had a long history of and experiencein African operations had It knew the terrain the studied the theory and and populations well. of vagaries and decade for better French the the part of a and sought war and of subversive principles British perspectives on this type of conflict to refine its own understanding. As it it for drew heavily its doctrine the the coming wars, to on experiences write proceeded and theories of these two colonial allies.

In neither of the foregoing caseswas there a formal counterinsurgency doctrine on its Army Portuguese the could projected work. model which Although the British

for Kenya (1954), Malaya (1952) doctrines and and thesevolumes were theatre published issue formal War Office did Portuguese, the the to not a counterinsurgency valuable doctrine until 1960. In France there was a substantial amount of material written on its Algeria, but French to Ministry of the the and application revolutionnaire guerre

127

Armies also did not issue an official written doctrine until 1960.95

The Portuguese Army assiduously gathered material from those militaries fighting counterinsurgencies,sifted through the information for its application to the portending doctrine for in Africa, Portuguese timely the Portuguesesoldier. created a and conflict The concepts and practises in the preliminary doctrine were tested in the beginning months of the conflict in Angola and earlier at the CIOE in Lamego. Refinement and formal publication occurred in 1963, less than three years after the process had begun. The Portuguese Army through this methodology sought to avoid the lengthy and faced in had Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus in which British that the expensive problem troops sent to fight an insurgency arrived "not knowing what it was all about" and had 96 It had devoted considerableand thorough researchinto the doctrine them. to guide no type and style of counterinsurgencyoperationsappropriate to PortugueseAfrica, always appreciating the value of and need for effective and inexpensive tactics. As a result, 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversivais a counterinsurgencydoctrine that was appropriate both to Portugal's meansand to the circumstancesin Africa that it faced and was delivered in time for the conflict. The basic tenets of this pre-war doctrine and thinking remained Campaigns, influenced these the throughout and as we shall see, principles valid and Portuguese the war effort. entire guided

95TimothyLlewellyn Jones, The Development of British CounterinsurgencyPolicies 1945-1952 (London: Ph. D. Thesis, King's College, London, 1992), 373Doctrine, and 375. "Hoffman and Taw, 1 and 20. 128

IV

PortugueseOrganisation, Education and Training for

Counterinsurgency

In 1960 the Portuguese Army along with the entire defense establishment had in begun 1937 designed to modernise its structure. The and a reorganisation completed had been defense lengthy to the this unify organisation and place the evolution purpose of Portuguese Armed Forces on a conventional war footing with its NATO partners.' Portugal was now faced with a new and different type of war that required immediate it if were to prevail over the nationalist movementsand their military arms adjustments, of guerrillas. The luxury of a two decadeleisurely reorganisation could not be afforded. Portugal would have to restructure its military forces, and train and educate them in force become immediate to that time the an effective counterinsurgency could meet record liberation. " "war national a of of challenge This chapter selectively describes this

for in implementing the these wholesale changes. It solutions search reorganisation and fighting that to this of other armies adjustment contemporary countercompares insurgencies as a measureof the Portugueseachievement.

Militarily

Unprepared Ultramar

Prior to 1950 Portugal had in effect two distinct armies. The primary force was

'Kalza de Arriaga, "PortugueseNational Defense during the Last 40 Years and in delivered 20 October 1966, Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, " Lecture Future, on the Lisbon, 12. 129

stationedin the metr6pole and was the one on which the country dependedfor its defense and which was the responsibility of the Ministry of War. The other consistedof forces stationed in the ultramar and was the portfolio of the Ministry of the Colonies. In 1950 the responsibility for the entire armed forces was unified under the Ministry of National Defense, and the Ministry of War becamethe Ministry of the Army on an equal standing ' its Naval Air Force counterparts. This change and subsequentones occurred and with as a result of Portugal's post World War II integration into NATO and the influence that the Alliance had on its military thinking. The move at this level also began in 1953 from the "Tipo Portugues" methods to those of the "Tipo American" This shift in .3 organisational philosophy was reflected in a reshapedarmy, and as 1961 approached,it grew to look very much like the U. S. force structure, a conventional army trained and equipped to fight Soviet forces in Europe.

These reorganisations and expansions had had the effect of modernising the Portuguese Armed Forces within the limits of its national resources and had laid the foundation for the further expansionrequired to conduct the African Campaignsof 1961-

2NationalAssembly (Ministry of War), Portugal, Decree-Law N237 542 (2 September 1949); Decree-Law N4 39 541 (16 February 1954); Decree-Law NQ41 559 (15 March 1958); Decree-Law N241577 (2 April 1958); Decree-Law N241578 (2 April 1958); and Joaquim Moreira da Silva Cunha, 0 Ultramar, a Nacdo eo "25 de Abril " [The Overseas Provinces, the Nation and the "25th of April"] (Coimbra: Atlntida Editora, 1977), 292. 3Estado-Maior do Exercito, Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974) [Historical-Military Report of the African Campaigns(1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Ministeno do Exercito, 1989), Vol. I, 426; and Luis Alberto Santiago Inocentes, Colonel, Staff Corps, PortugueseArmy (Retired), interviewed by the author, 18 March 1994, London. "TP" or 7ipo Portugues was the earlier, pre-1953 method modeled largely on the French army, and "TA" or Hpo American reflected the U. S. Army in World developed War II. organisation

130

1974.4 This modernisation included construction of an improved national infrastructure in for NATO Europe the as use part of commitment. new weaponry of and acquisition It also had the effect of developing the proficiency of Portugal's armed forces in the in The modern gains new skills, equipment, and of war. operational processes waging facilities put it on a par in force quality with the other front-line NATO militaries. This focus was European at the expenseof the colonies.

After World War II and prior to the incidents of 1961 the troop disposition in Angola 31 been December had to modest and very numbers, on reduced the other colonies and 1960 there were approximately 6,500 military personnel in the colony, 1,500 European

'General Kalza de Arriaga, PortugueseArmy (Retired), interview by the author, 8 November 1994, Lisbon. The reorganisation and integration of the armies into a single Force in 1960. The Air was created as a separateservice completed structure was only in 1952, and its extension to the ultramar completed in 1957. The Navy by 1958 had itself in bring NATO. General Arriaga to step with as well a restructuring completed had been based had the they on that very good reorganisations principles, while observed been applied sluggishly with a consequentdelayed effectiveness. General Arriaga had been appointed when he was a Lieutenant Colonel to assumethe duties initially as the Sub-Secretaryof Statefor Aeronautics and later as the Secretary of State for Aeronautics in building the PortugueseAir Force. In 1952 the air arms of the Army and Navy were by 1957 Air Force, form Portuguese this the to and new service was organised combined its its in NATO be to to and and sister services step with extend and structured infrastructure and operations to the ultramar. While the number of aircraft of all types had grown from a beginning level of 200 in 1952 to nearly 600 at the beginning of the African Campaigns, the truly important achievement had been the construction of the in in joint both This infrastructure the the metr6pole and particularly ultramar. aerial 65 750 airfields, about of which could accommodate produced civil-military project largest 22, fields, In Angola 27 400 the there ones. about and were of aircraft medium in large In Mozambique handle the and aircraft. medium some cases which could 20 300 It "greatest the time the respectively. at and was considered one of were numbers had been in Portugal. " This that undertaken national ever a scale on projects construction instrumental in development was mobilising Air Force support during the Angola timely in 1961 the and conducting subsequent campaigns. of uprisings 131

' figures for Guine Mozambique date In locally 5,000 troops. this and are recruited and in 4,736 Guine later (3,736 European however, troops there one were year unavailable; in (8,209 11,209 Mozambique European locally troops 1,000 troops) and recruited and " locally 3,000 troops). recruited and In all cases the great majority of these were

local African European in local training the and of and recruiting and security employed the territory throughout They of eachcolony rather scattered consequently were soldiers. than concentratedin any area of potential trouble. Further, the military commandersin forces brought in have these together three theatres the could not quickly of each Angola Mozambique because local the threat of and and the of vastness a countering difficult terrain of Guine. The limited capability of infrastructure to serve military inhibited further in the three colonies any rapid each of mobility requirements disbursed be It that these troops. small numbers so surprising cannot concentration of defend Angola in to theatre or any other territory successfully were unable each widely fact in incident 1961 The Angola March likes telling the the most attacks. the of against days 88 Battalion following these elapsed until under seventy-seven that, assaults, was 31 in May Damba, Colonel Pinheiro Lieutenant the on at arrived a city the command of for 12,000 devastation, the assumed securing and responsibility an area of centre of ' kilometres. square

The Portugueseproceededto reinforce Angola throughout the year as well as Guine

5Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas de Africa (Disposition of Our Forces in Angola), 72.

(1961-1974), Vol. II

6Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 260-261. 'Who A. Esteves Felgas, Guerra em Angola [War in Angola] (Lisbon: Livraria Clssica Editora, 1961), 109. 132

and Mozambique in anticipation of additional trouble. By the end of 1961 there were 49,422 military personnelin the three colonies, as depicted in Table 1, and thejacquerie had been subdued. But Portugal's war machine had not been prepared, and much work lay aheadif it were to defeat the nationalists and regain the confidence and loyalty of its population.

.::: ".:

MiIitartPersonnel in the Three. Theatres of Operation ; :",,.,:::::, ": ":.:.: . : 31 December 1961:. '' '< .. European
African

Total

Mozambique Angola : 28,477 8,209 3.000: ..,..,.. :.: "5.000. `, :. :. . 33,477 11,209.4,736

Guine.

": '3,736: -' 1.000 :,.::....::... :

Total 40,422 9. 000 ..:..:.:;.. 49,422

Based on information in'Resenha Hist6rico-Militar

das Campanhas de f ica (1961-1974), V ol I, ' 259

Table 1

The immediate and obvious lesson that the PortugueseArmy learned in this initial its force that conventional was ill-suited to wage a counterinsurgency. It action was lacked almost every quality that was necessary in this type of conflict. Britain had

entered Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus unprepared, France had done the same in Algeria, 8 found itself in Portugal Portugal set about the task of now similar circumstances. and building an army tailored for combat against an unconventional enemy in a forbidding from far home. environment

Campaign Organisation for Counterinsurgency

'Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer M. Taw, Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s (SantaBarbara: Rand Corporation, 1991), 1 and 20; and Alistair Home, A SavageWar of Peace,Algeria 1954-1962 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 100.

133

The first serious events in Angola prompted a remodelling of the command structure in the territories in which the duties of the Commanderof the Military Region for each theatre, who was part of the territorial organisation, and the Commander-in-Chief of each theatre were separated. The Commander-in-Chief assumedadditional duties as the local Provincial Governor, bringing him closer to the people and their needs. This

development came with a deeper recognition that the conflict was as much a struggle to gain the loyalty of the population through socio-economic activity as it was a military effort. The Commanderof the Military Region was dependentthrough the administrative Staff Chief the of of the Army, the Ministry of the Army, and the on chain of command Chief of the General-Staff of the Armed Forces-for support in effecting the preparation, ' discipline his of elements and under command. Somewhat mobilisation, administration, later this same structure was implemented in Guind (1963) and Mozambique (1964), as the conflict developed.

With the passage of time the Commanders-in-Chief played an increasing role in operational matters, until ultimately toward 1969 the Commanders of the Military Regions were withdrawn from this responsibility and assumeda support role for both military and civil efforts. The Commanders-in-Chief thus became responsible for

intelligence and operations in an operational chain of command to the Chief of the General Staff, while the Commander of the Military Region continued to be responsible for administration, logistics, and instruction and reported to the Chief of Staff of the Army-10 Below these levels were the Territorial Commanders and Intervention Zone

Africa das de 9Resenha Campanhas (1961-1974), Vol. I, 202. Histrico-Militar 10Resenha Histrico-Milizar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 203. 134

Commanders. The Territorial Commanderswere largely administrative, presided over Commander through the low-threat reported of the and consequently environment, a Military Region. Intervention Zone Commanders were largely operational, faced a for Commander Military Region depended the the of administrative on combat situation,

Commander-in-Chief. These but logistical to the adjustments reported support, and by increasing the military and were an the role pacification of an assumption reflect
in they the ultramar. to evolved to attempt respond combat conditions as

The Territorial Commandersand their organisationrepresentedthe original, pre-war its It key for Portugal the and of colonies. was also a part security structure responsible formed Army's the the of organisational structure at part the and organisation military of formation, levels. It the tactical oversaw recruitment, mobilisation, and campaign and logistic and administrative support of military contingents needed for the wars. While the territorial organisation had a long history and tradition, the modem organisationwas in 1895 Campaigns Africa the the of as the well as gained experience of a reflection " in in World War II NATO. and country's more recent participation

In the ultramar at the beginning of the Campaigns, the territorial commandswere headquarters the to of their respective military region and were the general subordinated Region. Each Military Commander these the the of of commands was of purview into further Each Sectors into subdivided zone sectors. was were zones. subdivided de battalion into (zona divided to of operation acco) and assigned a zones again The battalion his directed the activities companies. commander normally and commander

interview, 22 October 1994. 11lnocentes 135

12 de acco. within a zona

This quadrillage concept had been modified from the French Army strategy of introduced into in Angola by General Carlos Miguel Lopes da Algeria and pacification Silva Freire. 13 The system entailed full cooperation between the military, the police, levels. The the all accent was traditionally on' the prominent at administration civil and force in the area. In cities it was the police. In the rural areas it was the army. Each linked helped development the the to and other, entire effort a was civil supposedly " from insurgent intimidation. the the population protection of program and

During the period of transition in the status and duties of the Commander of the Military Region as dictated by the course of the wars, there was a division of In areas of little or no enemy activity,

responsibility according to enemy activity.

battalion operations would be coordinated through the Territorial Commander or at the high level. In be field threat a environment, a special sector command would regimental battalion the the to and senior problem, commander appointed as the address created " de (comando battalion to sector) oversee and coordinate activity. sector commander Often a battalion was the only one in a special sector, and its commander was also the de sector. comando In this case, he would report to the Commander-in-Chief,

12BrigadeiroHe1io A. EstevesFelgas, PortugueseArmy (Retired), interview by the 1994, Lisbon. 22 November author, "Silva Cunha, 297. 14EdgarO'Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection, 1954-1962 (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1967), 64-65. 15Felgas interview, 22 November 1994.

136

16 Commander of the Military Region, or Zone Commander, as assigned.

From time to time, particularly in the early years of the campaigns when insurgent activity was comparatively widespread, several sectors would be combined in a zone of intervention (zona de intervenco). When the conflict began in Mozambique in

1964,it wasnecessary September to establish a zonetherethat extended north from the

Zambezi River to the Tanzanian border on the Rovuma River. " Its commander was

located in Nampula in a forward command post (posto de comando avancado), as the in distant Lourenco Marques. Similarly, headquarters the military region of was general in anticipation of insurgent activity that developedin the east of Angola in 1966 with the Chipenda faction of the MPLA, a comparable zone (Zona de Intervenco Leste) its in 1961 commander strategically relocated to Luso was with previously established by brigadier in from battalion 1966.18 Becauseof to strength command a augmented the nature of the war in Mozambique and its concentration along the Tanzanianborder, the general headquartersof the military region and of "the Commander-in-Chief was in 1969, "intervention November Nampula the term to and zone" was changedto moved "operational zone" (zona operacionan in 1971 as a matter of the Commander-in-Chief's

16Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde fiica (1961-1974), Vol. 1,203-204.

17Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974), Vol. 4,103; and Estado-Maior do Exercito, Subsfdios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974) [Aid for the Study of Doctrine Applicable in the Campaigns of Africa (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1990), 116-117: The Northern Territorial Command (CTN or Comando Territorial do Norte) was changed to the Northern Intervention Zone (ZIN or Zona de Intervencao Norte) in late 1964.

"General Jose Manuel de Bethencourt Rodrigues, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 9 November 1994, Lisbon; and ResenhaHistrico-Militar das Africa (1961-1974), Vol. 2,65. de Campanhas

137

19 style.

Each of the changesdescribedrepresented an effort to protect the population as much as to destroy the enemy using a mutually supporting zone system. The British Army in Malaya (1948-1960)useda similar tactical organisationknown as framework deployment,

divided into districts Malaya Portuguese to the arrangement. was similar which was
infantry battalion. These districts would the of an responsibility which were normally have correspondedto the Portuguesezones of operation (zona de accdo) or later in the war, special sectors. The battalion's companieseach occupied an assignedsector of the district. From time to time it was possible to retain one company as a reserve for

districts but large the that suchreservescould so were normally circumstances, unforseen be maintained only at the higher levels of command. Each company knew its assigned hunt intimately to thus there effectively. and able was sector Maintaining a fixed

important, be for to a company proved very as the troops would become assignment familiar with the terrain and the habits of the local guerrillas (Chineseterrorists or CTs), and this acclimatisation would give them a proficiency that otherwise efficient units introduced to a strangesector could not duplicate. Theseinfantry companiespermanently immediately intelligence devastating to to on able act a sector were with assigned 2 results.

Africa das 19Resenha de Campanhas Histrico-Militar (1961-1974), Vol. 4,167; and Arriaga interview, 8 November 1994. 20Lieutenant Colonel Rowland S. N. Mans, "Winning in the Jungle - Malaya" in The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, ed. T. N. Greene (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), 123.

138

The French in Algeria (1954-1962) addressedthe concentration of guerrilla forces inside the country by covering it with a checkerboard of outposts. This quadrillage dependedon the thorough knowledge of local conditions that the troops in each post included duties The these troops of routine security and police work, possessed. intelligence, limited construction projects, and military operations. various collecting Whenever possible the troops were permanently assignedto these posts to maintain the local knowledge the their with citizens and of area operation relationship of continuity conditions. These local garrisons were reinforced by mobile units that helped to foil Larger by the offensive operations were population. performed contact with an guerrilla intervention force, the ReserveGenerale, composedof elite troops. In the latter stages 300,000 troops were committed to the quadrillage system and an the about war of 21 30,000 Ggngrale. Reserve This system worked well against 10% the to or additional force, by dispersed the Portuguese guerrilla and was adopted and modified a widely Army for certain situations in its Campaign.

The Portuguese had failures as well in limiting accessto its people. The fact that they were not always successful,however, doesnot negatethe effort. One such example infantry 1969, 1968 Portuguese between the stationed and a company of when occurred in theposto of Madina do Boe in the easternexpanseof Guine next to its southernborder isolated, inhabited. Guinea. The Sent Republic the remote of area was and sparsely with there to administer to and defend the civil population and to interdict the PAIGC incursions from Guinea, the troops found the situation impossible. There were very few

"Peter Paret,FrenchRevolutionary Warfare from Indochinato Algeria: TheAnalysis Military Doctrine Press, 1964), 103. (London: Pall Mall Political and of a 139

importance help, to preserve, and dozens of no structures any needed of people who kilometres of permeablefrontier. Other than protecting the odd bridge and the occasional 2 itself. job defending There was a reluctance to withdraw its that tabanca, was of main the company from its untenable and overextendedposition, as the PAIGC would then declare the region "liberated. " A similar situation had developed earlier in the more

PAIGC had declared Portuguese Beli, troop the the withdrawal and of upon zone eastern
area to be a "liberated zone." Eventually the same situation developed with the

in 1969, Madina the and the PAIGC proceeded to entertain company at of withdrawal foreign journalists on Portuguesesoil with the consequentunwanted publicity. The area important the to either sparse population was not strategically value, economic was of no in duties. better hindsight it is In Portuguese troops the other were utilised and side, in joint this the that case were not and military resources part of a civil plan apparent thoroughly coordinated. Then too the jungles and swamp of Guine provided protective bled lacked. Algeria for that the the of guerrillas cover The French more easily

dispersed and destroyed guerrillas in theseareasand were able to protect their outposts do Madina Bod. did Portuguese than the at effectively more

While the Portuguesecommand structure was describedin laws and regulations, their interpretation and the actual solutions differed from one theatre to another. These differences dependedon various factors, such as the expanseof the theatre, the tempo of the conflict, the personalities of the Commanders-in-Chief, and their relations with Lisbon. Becauseof these factors each structure had evolved somewhat differently over

22Felgas interview, 22 November 1994. "A Companhia de Madina estava11para se defender a si propria. "

140

the course of the Campaigns, but nevertheless, representedthe command and control solution to the problems of each theatre and were effective in maintaining pressureon the enemy. Each is the result of a continuing reassessmentin the midst of war and

23 learn to and adapt. representsa willingness

The Portuguese constantlysoughtto rethink and refine their commandand force

structure to address the execution of their counterinsurgency plan, which sought to initiative the through the long-term patrolling of a small areas, operating maintain extensively at night, acting on intelligence about the insurgent's infrastructure, and maintaining contact with the population. While mistakes were made, solutions were sought within their resources, and they never lost sight of the fact that the purpose of their armed forces was to cement this all important relationship with the people24 To this end the gradual and ponderouschangesin the campaigncommand structure supported the implementation of establishedcounterinsurgencyprinciples adapted to the ultramar.

Organisation

for Civil-Military

Coordination

The Portugueseknew that this struggle was a war that the military could not win on its own. The intricate web of civil administration, police, and military had to be woven into a cohesive whole, capable of functioning as a war machine. The Portuguese honoured the concept explained by Sir Gerald Templer soon after being appointed High Commissioner for Malaya in 1951: "I should like it to be clearly understood that in

"Christopher C. Harmon, "Illustrations of 'Learning' in Counterinsurgency," Comparative Strategy (January-March 1992): 29. 24Bethencourt Rodrigues interview, 9 November 1994.

141

Malaya we are conducting the campaign against communism on all fronts. We are fighting not only on the military front, but on the political, social, and economic fronts in intent, less definition Portuguese " The the their of own were no emphatic as well. General Staff Colonel Oliveira Army: "National by Lieutenant the described the of of as forces, but the absolutely on a country's on armed exclusively not rely must mobilisation n26 resource. every

The Portuguesewrestled with the proper method of integrating the military and civil in During the wars they consideredand used three: the way. most efficient structures " Parallel civil and military structures, "A "A single military structure, and mixed structure with a combination of civil and military organisations .1

They saw advantagesand drawbacks to each of these systems. The first was employed in normal circumstanceswhen the colonies were at peace and included the initial period being daily lives The in taken. measures were of the preventive which of subversion it largely Because the two systems were separate, was unaffected. remained population levels, between the two to all structures at and there was always the not easy coordinate

''Mans, 120. 26Hermes de Arajo Oliveira, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff, PortugueseArmy, "Guerra Subversiva: Subsfdiospara uma Estrategia de Reacgdo" [Subversive War: Aid for a Strategy of Response], Revista Militar (November 1964): 672. "A mobilizagdo forcas deve, armadas, mas sim sobre todos os no sobre as recair apenas pois, nacional do " da pals. actividade sectores "Subsfdios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhasde Africa (19611974), 113, and General Manuel Amorim de Sousa Menezes, interview by the author, 17 November 1994, Lisbon. General Menezes is one of the three authors of the document. referenced government 142

possibility of conflicting objectives and a duplication of effort.

The secondwas used when the civil government had lost control of the situation and " function in face insurgent to the activity. Military intervention became of was unable necessaryand a military government was establishedto coordinate the civil and military functions. Military functions were substituted for civil ones, or civil functions were integrated into the military hierarchy. This system ensured a convergenceof civil and military objectives, a unity of enforcement, and a close coordination at every level. The drawback was the suspensionof certain civil liberties and the consequentinconvenience and disruption to the normal routine of the population.

The third was initiated once the situation had stabilised and was envisioned as the 29 for just There debate considerable operations. vehicle pacification was over proper how to establish the mixed structure, having one side dominate or having both the civil 30 dominating together certain sectors of government. In with each and military work Guine, the system was unipolar with a single person responsible for both the civil and military functions. This system adhered to the principle of unity of command and was ideal for counter-subversion. In Angola and Mozambique the bipolar systemwas used. This system diluted the principle of unity of command but was adopted for political or

Africa 28Subsfdios da Estudo Doutrina Campanhas de Aplicada (1961nas para o 1974), 113, and Menezes interview, 17 November 1994. Africa 29Subsfdios Estudo da de Doutrina Campanhas Aplicada (1961Para o nas 1974), 113, and Menezes interview, 17 November 1994. Africa 30Subs(dios da Estudo Doutrina Campanhas de Aplicada (1961para o nas 1974), 114, and Menezes interview, 17 November 1994. 143

depended to the as a concession or civil government, and reasons on a clear psychological " between the two authorities. understanding and perfected coordination This

Councils, Defense Provincial through the achieved which represented was coordination an integration of the duties of the Governors-Generaland Commanders-in-Chief. While in the unipolar systemthesetwo offices were embodied in one person and thus functioned in intensive labour in bipolar the comparison system was organisation, executive as an that it was a committee organisation in which many people neededto coordinate at each level. The decision-making processwas slow and cumbersome becauseof the diverse nature and interests of these participants; nevertheless, all sought to overcome the 32 it bipolar inherent weaknesses to the system and make work. of

Probably the largest impediment to coordination in either system between civil and in The forces the structural rigidity each. armed struggled authorities was military internally in coordinating operationsof the three services under a theatre commander-inin-theatre Often the service chiefs were senior to the theatre commander-in-chief chief. junior. forces If from to the a armed control assigning operational suffered and resented 33 departments then the civil were even more affected. organisational arteriosclerosis, Health, education, public works, veterinary, agronomy, and the other departmentswere inbred structure a strong resistanceto change to cope with the war with part of a rigid in inflexibility itself between This the civil governor and the conflict manifested needs.

Africa 31Substdios da Estudo Campanhas de Doutrina Aplicada (1961para o nas 1974), 114, and Menezesinterview, 17 November 1994. 32Menezes interview, 17 November 1994.

33Inocentes interview, 8 February1995. 144

in bipolar a system, and successonly came when the posts were commander-in-chief de General Ant6nio Spinola Guine In the as system worked relatively well, combined. held both offices. However, it was never easy to make the civilian departments

doctors in hospitals by the could side side civilian civil and military work or understand

34 departments the teach the that sergeants education alongside civilian staff of could
The military tended to encounter civil problems more broadly becauseof its size and departments increased The the population. civilian contact with and consequent mobility tendedto be office-bound, and becauseof their limited budgets, to be reducedin presence and authority. For instance, the Chief of the Health Department in Guine had four

doctors in the field while the Army Medical Corps had forty 35 The Chief of Public Works and Communicationshad two engineersable to repair two miles of road per day, had Corps Engineering Army twenty engineersand a workforce adequateto the while 36 including bridges. day, the twenty repair of miles of road a rebuild

Notwithstanding the problems stemmingfrom the differencesin resources,structurally the military and civil systemswere parallel. In the case of both the single and bipolar in to the the continuing the commands equated political subdivisions military systems,

34Inocentes interview, 8 February 1995. This coordination was so important that facing it in difficulties In Africa to them. was anxious with overcome country every 1966-1967 the Rhodesians invited a large contingent of Portuguese officers to their headquarters for a briefing on civil-military coordination and on their solution to the from Not their transferable the relative solutions applicable or all of were problem. length Angola kilometre Rhodesia the the thousand to or vastness of of compactnessof Mozambique. Nevertheless, the Portuguese were constantly trying to improve this coordination. 35Inocentes interview, 8 February 1995. 36lnocentes interview, 8 February 1995. 145

effort to coordinate activities and obtain a unity of effort, as shown below: " Provfncia (Province) = Military Region or Territorial Command " Distrito (District) = Territorial Command or Military Command " Concelho or Circunscrico = Military Command or battalion-size Unit

(Parish),or Aldeias(Settlement) " Postos,Freguesias = Units or Detachments37

In Mozambique, for example, in 1963 there were three Territorial Commands with
limits coinciding with the boundaries of districts:

Northern Territorial Command (CTN):

All districts north of the Zambeze River: Niassa,CaboDelgado, Mocambique, and Zambezia. All districts between the Zambeze and Save Rivers: Tete and Manica e Sofala. All districts south of the Save River: Inhambane, Gaza, and Lourenco Marques.38

Central Territorial Command (CTC):

Southern Territorial Command (CTS):

At the end of 1964 CTN was redesignatedthe Northern Intervention Zone (ZIN) and districts: into to the three three sectors corresponding subdivided Sector A- District of Niassa Sector B- District of Cabo Delgado Sector C- District of Mocambique.39

Africa 37Subsfdios da Estudo Doutrina Campanhas Aplicada de (1961para o nas 1974), 115.
Africa 38Subsidios da Estudo Doutrina Aplicada Campanhas de (1961o para nas 1974), 116. Africa 39Subs(dios da Estudo Doutrina Aplicada Campanhas de (1961para o nas 1974), 117.

146

As an example of the coordination required, it is helpful to examine the counterlevel for Angola as it existed in 1971. There the provincial at organisation subversion were four levels of organisation: " Provincial Council for Counter-Subversion (province level), which included the Governor-General,who actedas its president, the Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary General, the Provincial Secretaries,and the local commandersof the three military services; Counter-Subversion and Inspection Groups (there were three: 1. Silva Porto, 2. Luanda, and 3. Nova Lisboa); District Councils for Counter-Subversion(district level); and Local Commissionsfor Counter-Subversion(concelho and/or posto level). 40

"

" "

diverse problems Each of thesebodies had both civil and military membersand addressed Catholic Church, levels. Often local the traditional their authorities, chiefs respective at for health heads education or were representedat their meetingsto or agency of militia, develop solutions and to provide insight into problems. In addressing such problems, each council or commission always made a supreme effort to find a solution at the local level rather than seeing the issue elevated to a higher one, where its importance was diluted in a crowded and less personal agenda. Those closest to the problem were invariably best fitted to craft a solution." The work of coordinating these bodies with

the different orientations of their memberswas tedious and time consuming and required in however, It the all participants. was, effort a proven way to addressan a prodigious

Africa da 40Substdios Estudo Doutrina Aplicada Campnhas de (1961nas para o 1974), 129-130; Carlos da Costa GomesBessa, Colonel, Staff Corps, PortugueseArmy (Retired), interview by the author, 18 November 1994, Lisbon; and Gomes Bessa, "Angola -A luta contra a Subversoea colaboraco civil-militar" [Angola - The fight against subversion and civil-military collaboration], Revista Militar (August-September 1972): 421.

4'Gomes 425; and interview, 18 November1994. Bessa, 147

insurgency."'

This Portuguesesystem for civil-military coordination was similar in many ways to the British apparatus established in 1950 by Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, Director of Operations in Malaya. While the Portuguesesystem was a combination of

liaison, British the one was an elaborate committeesystemthat agency and committees
for its The the scheme relocating with population. committees associated closely was federation levels district, liaison the at state, and and provided established with all were
involved in counterinsurgency operations. The District War Executive Committee was

the basic building block of the system. Chaired by the civilian district officer, it included level The civilian authorities. next and was the State War of military representatives Executive Committee, one for each of the nine Malay statesand one for two of the three British colonies. The Federation Executive Council was the ultimate authority and "' Commissioner. This by High the chaired -three-tier system compares closely with the four-tier hierarchy in Angola in 1971, which was indicative of other Portuguesetheatres included Catholic Church local The Portuguese the traditional and authorities as well. The British keep to their tended to counterinsurgency environment. concession a as

Both to officials. and military werereflectiveof the counterinsurgency civil membership structure. environmentand government

The Portugueseapproach representeda blend of the British and French approaches.

42Mans,120. 41Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960 (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), 117-118.

148

As guerre revolutionnaire was almost wholly military in character, its application in Algeria to civil-military integration was met by extending the responsibility of the armed forces. The role of civilians in counterinsurgency remained largely unexplored in

44 The Algeria, and without this dimension a counterinsurgency cannot fully respond. Portugueseauthorities likewise usedtheir military to perform a bulk of civil duties simply

for suchapplications because was readily available. The Portuguese military manpower
were quite aware that an extensionof civil authority was more appropriate than military in the case of counterinsurgencybecausethe social, political, and economic dimensions dominated; however, Portugal was forced to use its available resourcesto respond. Their counterinsurgency organisation sought and integrated civilians into its decision-making indicative this the though and military predominated, solution even was of the process improvisation and compromisethe Portuguesefound necessarythroughout the Campaigns to find the affordable meansto achieve the desired ends.

Shifting to Small Units of Light Infantry The PortugueseArmed Forces was well versed in the principles of counterinsurgency, its fighting troops that were not a classic conventional war, and knew that its aware was

forces neededto be modified and adaptedto the job at hand. There was substantial
forces, in in Army the the throughout armed and particular, undertaking such a concern it change, radical as not only affect all aspects of tactics, and would wholesale

as but it disturb techniques,and psychology, would also professionalcareer paths

44Paret, 125.
Africa 45Subsfdios da Estudo Doutrina Aplicada de Campanhas (1961para o nas 1974), 124-125.

149

Portugal thus compromised between the creation of an entirely new army uniquely "' tailored to counterinsurgencyand adapting its present army to the new type of struggle.

From 1961 onward the namesof PortugueseArmy units did not necessarilyindicate

that the majority their duties. This situationreflectsthe counterinsurgency requirement infantry infantry. light Light be forces trained are the most effective companies as of
force in "seek destroy they the enemy can and a modem army, as out counter-guerrilla initiative, "' his terrain, stealth and surprise. using on Thus, infantry companies,

did lend batteries, themselves and cavalry squadrons, as such, not necessarily artillery to counter-subversivewar. In order to fulfil the counterinsurgencyrequirement, almost designation their and purpose, were effectively subornedas original whatever all units, light infantry companiesand functioned as such. While these units were organisedinto infantry companies(companhiasde cacadores), they often retained their old designations instead infantry fact into "combat The that of groups" platoons. subdivided were and they still retained their artillery or cavalry designations, for instance, meant that unit forsake intimated did traditions, that when the war was their and necessarily not members in field These their the they chosen would resume career path of warfare. concluded,

de important, designations as esprit corpswasvery closelytied to unit particularly were

function influence had large and a consequently on the type of original a unit's

Africa 46Subsfdios da Estudo Campanhas de (1961Doutrina Aplicada para o nas 1974), 126.
47LieutenantColonels James K. Bruton and Wayne D. Zajac, Cultural Interaction: The Forgotten Dimension of Low-Intensity Conflict, Paper presented as a part of the "Introduction for Special Operations" U. S. Air Force The the to seminar at syllabus Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida, March 1990,1. The authors John Wickham's 1984 General from White Paper U. S. the the on of primary role quote Army's light infantry divisions.

150

individuals that it attracted. It should also be noted that cavalry squadronsand artillery batteries in some casesdid not shift to the infantry function. The cavalry exception and its unique role in Portuguese counterinsurgency will be addressed in a forthcoming chapter.

' ....:..::.

Three Infantry, Companies, each with

......

" ..::.:.

.....

--Commander Platoon/Combat Group -Staff/Administrative %: *Tbree Infantry Platoons/CombatGroups ""::: ' ": >: Based on information from Resenha Histdrieo-Milizar das Campanhar de 4fifca (1961-1974), Vor: I; Subsk&osPara O awde "' da Dourrina 4plicada nas Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974) and interviews with General Menezes, Brigadeiro Marques Pinto, and Colonel Inocentes.

Table 2

The reorganisation of a battalion of infantry and its companies of combat groups is depicted in Table 2. Each infantry company of about 120 men was comprised of three four identical infantry support and a platoon, providing of elements or combat platoons in 30 This allowed structure one platoon or combat each. group reserve, men of groups for immediate for two to the company, and support always ready mounting a one 48 high-tempo In the operations, the command and service company event of patrol. for infantry the and combat security reserve platoons or groups other would supply

its flexible This the to of extent resources. organisationrepresented a companies

Africa da 4SSubsfdios Estudo Doutrina de Campanhas (1961Aplicada para o nas 1974), 131.

151

departure begun in 1953 from the former French pattern of three platoons per company (Tipo Portugues or "TP") to that of the U. S. with four to five platoons per company (Tipo Americano or "TA"). This more powerful structure provided the local commander in addressinga guerrilla threat. options with additional

These units would also needaugmentationin both manpower and special skills from time to time. This reinforcement would come from reserve forces comprised of normal forces fuzileiros (comandos, of special especlais, tropas pkra-quedistas, et or units cetera), depending on the skills needed. These reserve forces were called intervention forces (forca de intervencao) and were usedas the Commander-in-Chief saw fit to adjust for deficiencies in a particular sector or zone.

The creation of elite, special purpose forces that operated in small units with the attendant flexibility proved particularly valuable. This augmentationwas embracedby "' formation Army (commandos), Air Force the the of comandos all three services with " (paratroops), and the reestablishment of the Navy fuzileiros tropas pdra-quedistas 5' The began (special Portuguese Army Cacadores Especiais training marines). especiais

Hunters)in 1960at its new CIOE and deployedfour companies (Special to Angolathat
1961 The training to subsequently was modified and extended all after units year. same

49Resenha de Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 329-331, Histrico-Militar das Campanhas 73. II, Vol. and 50Arriagainterview, 8 November 1994. 51ViceAdmiral Nuno Goncalo Vieira Matias, PortugueseNavy, Superintendentof Material Services, Lisbon, interview by the author, 23 November 1994, Lisbon. Admiral Matias is a former detachmentcommander of Fuzileiros Especials (Special Marines) in Guind.

152

with the CacadoresEspeciais name no longer applying. Comandos(commandos) were formed in Angola beginning in 1962 on the recommendationof the Chief of Staff of the Military Region, Colonel BethencourtRodrigues.S2In 1963 the first of these new troops in in September 1964 1. a de Companhia Comandos deployed the small numbers and were (1st Company of Commandos) began operations from Belo Horizonte, Angola.

Subsequentlycomando units and training centres were establishedin Guine and

Mozambique, which produced ComandosAfricans.

The tropas pkra-quedistas were established on 14 August 1955 through the he State for Sub-Secretary General Arriaga Aeronautics. when was of of sponsorship First offered to the Army, which did not appreciate the need for such exotically-trained troops, the pdra-quedistas were then assigned to the new Air Force and trained as a quick-reaction force that could be rapidly applied to a security problem.

The Portuguesefuzileiros have a long history dating from 1618 and are the most in 1890 infantry Disbanded for Portuguese troops. and activated a short period of ancient from 1924 to 1926, thefuzileiros were reactivatedin 1961 for naval contingenciesin the ultramar. Admiral Armando Reboredo, Chief of the General Staff of the Navy at the time, sponsoredthe reactivation, believing that patrol craft and small ships with infantry detachments would be indispensablein counterinsurgency. Initial training was conducted in the United Kingdom through the Royal Marines, while the Escola de Fuzileiros (School for Marines) was establishedat Vale do Zebro. Subsequent experience enabled the Portuguese to modify the training there to fit their specific theatre and way of

9 August 1995. 52Marques Pinto correspondence,

153

fighting. Companhiasde Fuzileiros (Marine Companieswith a complementof about 180 men) were used in defense of Naval installations, in maritime and riverine security in supporting Army operations by water. and patrols, Fuzileiros Especiais (Special

Marines) were formed in detachmentsof 70/80 men and trained in special operations techniques. Each detachmenthad expertisein a particular geographicalareaand operated

there. Detachment were usually insertedinto their operatingareaby rubber personnel

boats for a normal two-day operation, always travelling cross country and avoiding roads becauseof mines.53 The normal range of a patrol was about 30 kilometres becauseof the difficult terrain and tidal actionM They complemented the Army's commandosin the type of operationsundertakenand were similar in capability to Royal Marine Special Boat Units and U. S. Navy SEAL teams.

These troops were all usedin counterinsurgencyoperationsand were widely respected by ally and enemy alike." The paratroops and special marines were employed as

intervention forces in areaswhere air mobility or water assaultwas appropriate and were generally operated with Army forces. Both the air and naval forces normally supported Army operations, as that service had primary responsibility for the war. Air Force support comprised primarily transportation, reconnaissance, and combat air support. Naval support involved protecting the riverine lines of communication, transporting and inserting troops by water, and water-borne fire support.

53Corpo de Fuzileiros, Fuzileiros Especiais (Lisbon: Ministeno da Marinha, in history 1987), 14. written unpublished 14Matias interview, 23 November 1994. 55Brigadier Michael Calvert, "Counterinsurgency in Mozambique, " Royal United Services Institute Journal for Defense Studies (March 1973): 82.

154

Portugal had thus changedits Army to fit the war rather than trying to changethe war to fit its Army. This complete restructuring from top to bottom of a nation's armed

forces to fight a counterinsurgencywas uniquely Portugueseand standsin stark contrast to the U. S. force structure in Vietnam, the British force structure in Malaya, Kenya, and

Greece, and the initial French force structure in Algeria, all of which began as
in S. forces U. The seemed particularly counterinsurgency. conventional untrained insensitive to the requirements of a counterinsurgency force. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, when he learned that the U. S. intended to introduce ground forces into Vietnam, made the observation in a series of cables to Washington on 22 February 1965 that the American soldier, "armed, equipped,and trained as he is, (is) not suitable as (a) guerrilla fighter for Asian forests and jungles. "56 Later on 8 March 1965 witnessing the initial U. S. Marine Battalion Landing Team come ashoreat Da Nang, AmbassadorTaylor was distressed to note the accompanying tanks and self-propelled artillery that would be of " little use in a counterinsurgency.

The British Army entered each of its conflicts, Malaya, Kenya, and Greece, with inexperienced lack The trained troops. of a proper command structure meant and poorly that authority was disbursed, and there was no counterinsurgencydoctrine to guide the soldiers. Eventually the deployed troops were restructured and trained for

56Cables, Maxwell D. Taylor to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 220620Z, 1-5, and 220545Z, 1-3, February 1965, Center for Military History, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 57Krepinevich, 141.

155

counterinsurgency, but much time had been lost and the insurgencies gained 58 momentum. France in approaching the war in Algeria made the same mistakes in 1954 that had cost it Indochina. counterinsurgency force and plan. It required until 1956 to develop a collective Alistair Home has described the initial French

experience:
Deployed in the Aures, "Babar" Cherriere's ponderous, N. A. T. O. -style forces found themselvesat an impossible disadvantage. Beyond clearing the road to, and liberating, Arris and T'kout, tanks and armoured troop-carriers proved useless. As the colonel commandingan armoured regiment remarked despondentlyto Jean Servier, "All that I can do is to hold the road... and as for the rest..., " he in Servier "If 1830 the French his to commented, shrugged shoulders; which Expeditionary Force had had tanks, they would not have gotten beyond the beach at Sidi-Ferruch! " There were no mules or horses available and one solitary helicopter in all Algeria, and neither Cherriere -a fifty-eight-year-old veteran of the First World War and a disciple of Weygand - nor his area commander, General Spillmann, had any experienceof guerrilla warfare. The troops under " their command were equally untrained. The Portuguese had studied these British and French campaigns at the IAEM and had noted the errors of improper troop deployment. Acting to avoid these costly mistakes, the Portuguese Army strove to field a force properly structured, equipped, and trained

its in campaign. early

Education and Training for Counterinsurgency Portugal's preparation of its armed forces for counterinsurgency was constantly from in its but to not only gained adjusted reflect others and experience also rethought conflict. The Army had studied the medium extensively and had organisedits education its in both based the theoretical the training and on approach on practical experience and

58Hoffman andTaw, v. 59Horne, 100. 156

in held 1961 British Malaya lessons Angolan The days the uprising. experience of early that were absorbedby the PortugueseArmy mission to Maresfield Park Camp in 1958-

1959:
Thousands of troops had to be indoctrinated in the art of fighting an elusive in living taught that the jungle was no mystery of time the same enemy and at bamboo but drinking rather the understanding of an out of eating roots and due (S)uccess but to a well-trained of war.... was principle well-tried unofficial Security Force team able to kill and harry their enemy until he was exhausted. They fought their opponent in the jungle and out of it, and beat him 60

The Portuguese approach attempted to emulate this British successand represented instruction, S. U. Army's training to the exercises and service school a stark contrast in forma Even U. S. Army made serious the when nature. generally pro which was form bastardised the to train, often a of conventional operations was more effort attempts " doctrine. This misplaced training emphasisand than a reflection of counterinsurgency doctrinal confusion left the U. S. Army unprepared for its entry into Vietnam in 1965. The French in Indochina (1946-1954) were similarly oriented and seemed to have forgotten their counterinsurgency principles and the teachings of Joseph Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey. They did not implement programs reflecting their heritage until much later in Algeria (1954-1962). As one historian explained: The fall of Dien Bien Phu marked the fall of an empire in South east Asia - and dogma. Here a notably backward Oriental demolition the of much military country triumphed smashinglyover one of the most technically advancedWestern countries, well supplied with airpower, tanks, artillery, and graduatesof the Ecole de Guerre.62

60Mans,127-128.

61Krepinevich, 53.
62Mans,145.

157

Even as the campaign was closing, Colonel Charles Lacheroy, a veteran of Indochina, delay degree "Without the to which the War of Indochina was must we examine asserted,

for us a lessonand how it has turned our doctrine and 'military practises' topsyturvy. 1163

Portugueseeducation and training of troops for counterinsurgency was lifted from British experienceand addressedfour interrelated issues: " The educational function of attuning men's minds to understand subversion and insurgency - the way in which force is employed to achieve political ends, and how political considerationsaffect the use of force. Instruction on the integration of military and civil measuresto achieve a single government aim. Development of leadership skills in the context of counterinsurgencywarfare. Instruction in the tactics used in combat in a counterinsurgencyenvironment.64

"

" "

These four issueswere taught on the three levels of officer, sergeant, and soldier. At duties instruction level to the tailored the and responsibilities of the audience. was each While the initial contingent of forces entering Angola in March 1961 had little such training, they fully briefed their replacementsand the new troops arriving while a more formal program of instruction was being established. This situation was not uncommon in the opening phase of a counterinsurgency and is reflected in a British officer's

'Colonel Charles Lacheroy, Colonial Infantry, French Army, Action Viet-Minh et Communisteen Indochine ou une Lecon de "Guerre Revolutionnaire, " paper given at the "Conference on the War in Indochina," Institut de DefenseNationale, Paris, July 1954, 2: "C'est sansretard qu'il faut examiner dans quelle mesurela guerre d'Indochine a ete lecon bouscule doctrines 'habitudes et comment eile a nos et nos une pour nous militaires'. " 'General. Sir Frank Kitson, Low-Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping(London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1971), 165-167.

158

in in Malaya 1954: "If I was going to have to lead jungle-patrols on arriving comment in what seemeda strangely hypnotising kind of half-war, then it looked as if I would have to start learning all over again, from the beginning. n65 By 1962 troops entering the war zone had the benefit of special coursesin counterinsurgencywarfare.66 By 1965 the course of instruction on all levels was refined and capable of supporting the including in increase deployment, the establishmentof training facilities troop accelerating in the ultramar for local recruiting and, later in 1968, for acclimating new arrivals. 67

Development of Specialised Counterinsurgency Instruction There was a sequence of specialisedinstruction activities establishedearly in the wars to address specific problems and situations in the ultramar, and these programs sought to provide an improved overall understanding of the operational requirements there. Most were administered at the CIOE; however, certain technical training was located 68 Their establishment and demise reflect the specialised centres. at other elsewhere in in both the seasoningof the training regimen and the the and course of wars changes of the armed forces. The establishmentof each was not only a reflection of the changing face of the war but of necessaryadjustmentsto the maturation of the PortugueseArmy in the conflict. Training sites were also progressively shifting from the metrpole to the in increased in both to the there recruiting response and recognition of the need ultramar

65OliverCrawford, The Door Marked Malaya (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1958), 17. 'Estado-Maior do Exercito, 5.1 Repartigdo, Circular NQ1020/IP, 10 March 1961. 67Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 313. 68NationalAssembly (Ministry of War), Portugal, Decree-Law N4 42 928 (16 April 1960).

159

to train in the combat environment. More importantly this entire evolution was indicative for that training the troops engaged, the sufficient counterinsurgency without of principle the conflict will last longer and be more costly to fight. 69 These adjustments acknowledged this premise and the sustainability of the Campaignsthat it implied.

Training in the ultramar sought to accomplish two objectives: (1) training locally from in (2) the the ways of troops, acclimatising new arrivals metrpole and recruited in Africa. counterinsurgency In the first instance, basic instruction in the ultramar

parallelled that in the metrpole with adjustmentsto accommodatethe differences in the local orientation of recruits. Reconciling local culture and language with the military requirements of a soldier presented the greatest challenges, and adjustments were local Local irregular. for both Portuguese the the recruits. and education was necessary As a result the Army adopted a policy of making all recruits complete the four-year 7 Soldiers Regimental School each day after the attended school. primary of equivalent " this training to satisfy requirement. Many of the recruits spoke only rudimentary

Portuguese, and consequently, it was necessaryto include a language course in the first phase of training. After 1954 the introduction of relatively modem armament and

for instruction in local language its capabilities outstripped use. Consequently, equipment the Portuguese language became so important to train in technical matters that the 72 European instructors were no longer allowed to speak the local dialects in classrooms.

"Hoffman and Taw, 35.

70Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 336. 71lnocentes interview, 22 October 1994. nlnocentes interview, 22 October 1994.

160

Portugueselessonsbecamemandatory for everyone not proficient in the language. With these exceptions, training in the ultramar was little different than in the metrpole. In

Angola in the early 1960sa training officer's commenton the aptitudeof local recruits
in have been the metrpole: made could It seemsto me then, that as a general rule, the native of Angola is favourably disposed to military life; he has the aptitude to be instructed and educated intellect, his development organisation of and especially to simultaneously with the degreein which, parallel and progressively, he maturesinto an intellectual and 73 human being. moral This officer further commentedon the reaction of theserecruits to their initial brush with Portuguesemilitary culture and could have been made of any military service: It is understood, nevertheless, that as much as he will be frightened by the mundane things in life to which he will be subjected; as much as he will be disconcerted by the difference in his new surroundings and their effect on him; as much as he will be perturbed with the new practices of hygiene, of diet, of new from other villages; of the chance contact with a with men clothes, of closeness new language with different forms of expression; of the discipline of a schedule and rigid customs and rules; he will in the end overcome these and a number of 74 in his difficulties training. completing other

The training systemwas theoretically well conceived; however, in practise there were

'Captain A. J. Reis Pereira, "Educacoe Instruco do SoldadoIndigena" [Education and Instruction of the Indigenous Soldier], Boletim Militar (Regio Militar de Angola) (15 September 1960): 35. "Afigura-se-me, pois, que de um modo geral, o nativo de Angola apresenta-se pars a vida militar em condices favorveis; poder ser instruido e do intelecto, desenvolvimento do organismo simultneo e num sobretudo na educado medida em que, paralela e progressivamente,adquirir conhecimentose se consciencializar " e moral. mental como ser 'Pereira, 35. "Compreende-se,no entanto, quanto o atemorizar a mudancade vida diferenga de quanto o ambiente em que vai prosseguir embaragard a sujeitar-se; vai a que a sua existencia; quanto o perturbarao as novas prticas de higiene, de alimentacao, o homens de o convivio com outros povos; o contacto, por vezes, com vesturio, novo formas de diferentes de lingua expresso;a obediencia a um hordrio ea regras e nova dificuldades de de tero um enfim: sem nmero que ser vencidas, para rigidas normas " de programa. um cumprimento

161

shortcomings. The Portuguese troops originally assigned to a zona de accao, for instance, while indoctrinated in subversivewar, were not specifically prepared to engage the enemy aggressively. They tendedto confine themselvesto the local encampment and ' initiative. to thereby the attacks, abdicating simply reacted enemy gained from this initial disappointment, -the military With the experience

leaders shifted to a new

in based 1968 on smallunit operations at the company andplatoon concept organisational

76 level. This shift becamemost apparent in Guine following General "combat group" or Antonio de Spinola's arrival in 1968 and his vigourous implementation of the reformed organisation. Not only did General Spinola implement this new concept, but he also in it Guine. These PAIGC units were called bithe that of guerrilla units after modelled Portuguese (bi-groups) to similar a were reinforced sub-companyplatoon or and grupos "combat unit. "

The PAIGC armed forces (FARP) had originally had a basic unit of 21 men divided development into three groups of seveneach. The bi-group or bi-grupo was a subsequent from the February 1964 CassacCongressin which the FARP was reorganised. The bi" formed by into three two these combining of groups a single unit. The size grupo was 20 25 to the of about men optimally aligned as follows: the leader, the consisted unit of

''Silva Cunha, 298. 'Silva Cunha, 299. This changewas endorsedby the Minister of National Defense (General S Viana Rebelo), the Minister of the Army (Brigadier BethencourtRodrigues), the Sub-Secretaryof Statefor the Army (Colonel Joao Pinheiro), the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (General Venancio Deslandes),and the Chief of the General Staff of the Army (General Camara Pina) in March 1968. "Patrick Chabal, Amflcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 99.

162

3 bazooka aimers, 3 bazooka loaders, 3 light machine gun aimers, commissar, political 78 Normal supporting arms were 3 light machine gun loaders, 9 riflemen, and 3 snipers. two mortars and two heavy machineguns. The bi-grupo could, however, be divided, and independently. "This basic structure of the small the operate could grupos each of commando group was maintained within the (PAIGC) army throughout the war.

Flexibility was addedso that bi-grouposcould quickly be brought togetherinto units of

200 to 300 men."' General Spinola's new emphasisin 1968 on small, aggressiveunits

in initiative Guine to the Portuguese. The smaller units were much more the swung battalion than or a and were thus able to concentrate their firepower a company mobile larger, than the the effectiveness more cumbersomeentities, given greater enemy with on the limitations of the combat environment.

In conjunction with this emphasison small unit operations, General Spinola faced best facilities in the metrpole, Despite the training the efforts of another problem. in in decreasing the were quality and enthusiasmfrom 1966 ultramar arriving soldiers 8 in became It to the the ultramar that this commanders obvious consequently onwards. deficiency neededto be corrected in situ. The British were faced with a similar situation in Malaya, where they created an elaborate program to acclimate arriving units to the " operational environment. General Spinola borrowed the concept from the CIOE,

''John Biggs-Davison, Portuguese Guinea (London: Congo Africa Publications, 1970), 21-22. 79Chabal, 99. 8Thomas H. Henriksen, "Portugal in " Orbis (Summer 1977): 404. Counterinsurgency, Africa: Comparative Notes on

81Mans, 128-129. 163

it Guine, Operational Proficiency Instruction to the and syllabus called course adapted (Instruco de Aperfeicoamento Operacional, or IAO). 82 It had been proposed earlier that IAO training be established in the ultramar, however, budget constraints had 83 this move. IAO addressedthe retraining and sensitising of all new troops precluded focused it from the as entirely on counterinsurgency warfare and was metrpole arriving fought in the operational theatre. It also extendedto local recruits and representednew basic instruction for them. The establishmentof IAO was a recognition that soldiers familiar with the people, culture, and geography of their operational theatre are in indispensableto a successfulcounterinsurgencyprogram. Its obvious appropriateness it fixture for duration IAO the the to a permanent made of wars. a problem response it teething the problems and once were resolved, was also effective proved extremely 84 in Angola. adopted For unexplained reasons it was never implemented in

Mozambique.85 In both Guine and Angola the nationalist movementsbecamea standoff 86 factors. 1970 by these the changesamong other effectivenessof and reflected militarily

This type of adaptation was a factor in the military effectivenessof troops in other counterinsurgencies. The British Army found local IAO-type training to be

indispensable,and veterans of the British Emergency in Malaya endorsedits importance

82Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 331-334. "Marques Pinto correspondence,9 August 1995. 84Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 331-334. "Silva Cunha, 299.

"Willem van der Waals, Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974(Rivonia: Ashanti PublishingLtd., 1993), 140. 164

in training new arrivals. personal experience:

Lieutenant Colonel Roland Mans stressed its value from

As a preamble to any discussion of minor tactics against guerrillas, I must emphasize my belief that troops should never be introduced "cold" to such operations. A carefully coordinated training program, preferably carried out in a comparatively safe area within the country in which they are going to fight, enablesthem to learn their trade in the right locale and at the sametime become thoroughly acclimatized. In Malaya, all incoming units were initiated into 87 in Centre Southern Training Far East Johore. tactics the at antiguerrilla First Lieutenant Oliver Crawford, a graduate of Johore, amplified the value of its instruction: "The School drew on the accumulatedexperience of the whole Army. Its

theory of jungle-warfare was quite possibly the most advancedin the world - particularly for Malaya, where every month of the past seven years' fighting had helped to test and refine it. ""

Theatre indoctrination was also deemedimportant by the French, who in Algeria in 1956 establishedand ran an extensiveprogram at the Centre d'Instruction de Pacification 89 Conversely, this in-theatre indoctrination was not Arzew. Contre-Guerrilla at et treated seriously by the U. S. Army in Vietnam with disastrous results: (T)he Army's conduct of the war was a failure, primarily because it never realized that insurgency warfare required basic changesin Army methodsto meet the exigenciesof this "new" conflict environment.... (T)he changesthat did occur impact little to too make a significant on the Army or its approach to the were late in implemented too the war to achieve results, and retained for too brief war, a period in the service to have an impact on preparations for future low-intensity

"Mans, 128. "Crawford, 74. 89A1f Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgencyin Algeria (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 176.

165

wars.

90

The Portuguese implementation of IAO largely parallelled that of the British with commensuratedividends.

Adapting to Counterinsurgency Portugal had faced a wholesale shift in the mission of its armed forces from a force to one of counterinsurgency. conventionally-oriented This conventional

insurgency be dismembered face in Africa, and had to to and reoriented an organisation leap by Portugal's military leadership, but also the huge conceptual a not only required doctrine new with associatedtactics and training. At the of a completely establishment campaign and tactical levels Portugal's uniquenessin organising itself for the African Campaignslay in its learning from the earlier experiencesof others, and as the conflict lessons both its these the and applying adapting practises of own observations progressed, to its conduct of the wars. Following the initial uprising and the use there of largely demonstrated it Portugal to that troops restore order, could learn in the face conventional in initiative doing difficult homework. 1970 By the after so gained some and adversity of the insurgents in Angola had been stalematedmilitarily and "reduced to little more than nuisance value by efficient Portuguese security action, geographical limitations and leadership conflicts. "" In Guine the military reorganisation and the new operating

General led Spinola deteriorating to the methods of stabilising of a and situation concepts

90Krepinevich,259-260. 91van der Waals, 140.

166

and negotiations for talks with the PAIGC in the closing months of 1972.92 Mozambique was quiescentuntil 1970becauseof internecine strugglesand purges within the nationalist movements. Thereafter, the conflict became "slow-moving shadowboxing 93 with hardly any punches landing on the opponents.

hadalwaysbeencloseto the British commerciallyandmilitarily and The Portuguese

believed the British experience with counterinsurgency to be among the richest in the world. If the British forgot about counterinsurgencybetween wars, they always seemed to relearn quickly. Emphasis on tactical flexibility was a centrepiece in their

counterinsurgencies,and one which the Portuguesesought to embrace. The British drew from their experiencethe principle of tactical flexibility. They proved willing and able to set aside their textbooks on conventional war, delve into the thin literature of the pamphlets, or the unconventional, draw extensively on personal experience and, as Clausewitz would have advised, draw on ' from had been there. colleagueswho secondary experience garnered Although the Portuguese struggled in the early years to find the proper combination in Angola and Guine, they followed this British flexibility and with the advent of small unit tactics and General Spfnola's reemphasisof IAO in 1968 drew the earlier efforts together in a cohesive and effective force. Their experiencein learning was not unlike that of the British in Malaya. Our tactics in Malaya were by no meansperfect. The gift of hindsight enables

92AvelinoRodrigues, Cesrio Borga, and Mario Cardoso, 0 Movimento dos Capitdes Movement 25th de [The Captains Moraes April] (Lisbon: 25 Abril the the and of of eo 244; Guilherme Calvdo, de De Conakry 1974), Alpoim Ao M. D. L. P. [From and editores, Conakry to the M. D. L. P.] (Lisbon: Editorial Intervengdo Lda., 1976), 89-90. "Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence1964-1974 (London: Greenwood Press, 1978), 48.

94Harmon, 36. 167

many of us to see where we went wrong and how we can improve in the future. But this was a new sort of war fought over some of the most formidable terrain in the world. In the beginning, we had to improvise and gain experience, and this took time. Nevertheless, in the final event, we were able to devise methods that forces involved the to inflict a decisive defeat on militant enabled all varied Communism."

French learning was promptedby their defeat in Indochina and resulted in the
development of their guerre revolutionnaire concept as a new way of countering " insurrections. anticolonial This thinking became dominant in the strategy to retain It *Waslikewise a powerful influence on

Algeria and shaped overall defense policy.

Portuguese thinking and was rigorously sifted for solutions to the problems in Africa. The Portuguesesearchalso contrastedsharply with the U. S. attitude in Vietnam, where "their first mistake was a product of military arrogance, i. e. their complete rejection of any lessons that may have emerged from the French experience up to 1954."7

So the Portuguese, like the British, went to "small patrols of well-trained men who intelligence, kill disrupt food terrain to gather guerrillas, rugged penetrate gathering could down traffic, call artillery or air strikes where appropriate, and above all, courier and make contacts with the population."98 This patrolling kept the initiative away from the insurgent. When the Portuguesefollowed thesepractises, as in Angola and Guine, they in When deviated, Mozambique they as successful. with Operation "Gordian were

"Mans, 143.
"Paret, 7. 'Michael Elliott-Bateman, Lessons from the Vietnam War, Report of a seminar held Services United Institute in London, 12 February 1966,4. Royal the at

"Harmon, 36. 168

Knot, " they suffered.

The foundation of the military dimension of Portuguesecounterinsurgencywas not the grand operation but the mundaneinfantry patrol, which would be routinely performed by a combat group of thirty men and would last four to five days, although it could

be by duration. The taken to the target troops to twice that generally would area extend
foot, from by During them. there the carrying everything with and would patrol vehicle period they would cover from 50 to 100 kilometres, depending on the nature of the country. For food there would be the normal packed combat ration. Apocryphally their beans, bag of some chick peas and possibly a piece of dried consisted of a rations codfish, all to be soaked in any water that could be found - probably infected with bilharzia - then cooked and eaten in the evening. Contact with the villagers was

important not only to show military strength but also to gain intelligence on the insurgents." On one such patrol in eastern Angola an observer reported shadowing an

insurgent group for three days guided by a local tracker. Surrounding and ambushingthe group at twilight, the Portuguese quickly overcame them with surprise and firepower. Immediately afterwards the Portuguesetroops were offering the enemy water from their 1 interrogating binding their prisoners. wounds, and canteens,

In contrast, Operation "N6 G6rdio" occurred in July 1970 in northern Mozambique, lasted 36 days, and with over 8,000 personnel involved was the largest operation

"Duke of Valderano,interview by the author, 17 March 1995,London. 10Co1in M. Beer, interview by the author, 14 March 1995,London. 169

'0' in during Campaigns African (1961-1974). By the end the the ultramar undertaken in 1969 Mueda the north of the Cabo Delgado district next to the the around area of

border hadbecome Tanzanian alarminglyinfiltrated with insurgents. GeneralArriaga,

as the Commander-in-Chief, had establisheda perimeter around the infected area and attemptedto drive the insurgentsinto the waiting force with air-supportedground assaults

in a modified hammerand anvil tactic.102While manyguerrilla baseswere destroyed

into 20,000 local fleeing the the melted strong population enemy captured, weapons and 103The operation the area to avoid the fight. FRELIMO moved eastwardand escaped. its large scale, and other areas of Mozambique were because be of concealed could not denuded of troops to support it, leaving the population vulnerable elsewhere. It was not it disappointing predictably yielded and operation, results at great a counterinsurgency expense. Further, Sir Robert Thompson, the Secretary of Defense for Malaya, was 104 in large They took counterinsurgency. scale operations about avoiding emphatic launched, to talent, time, and organise, when and manpower were no secret. The much insurgent could avoid contact or choosethe battlefield. The results for the government far disappointing. The constant pressure of small patrols more was were generally in its low key, low cost approach. effective

In addition to learning from others, the Portuguese learned by doing. While the

Africa 10tSubsfdios da Estudo Campanhas de (1961Doutrina Aplicada nas para o 1974), 181-185.
102Arriaga interview, 8 November 1994.

103Carlos ManuelSerpade Matos Gomes,Colonel,Portuguese Army, interview by the author, 21 November1994,Lisbon.

"Harmon, 36.
170

Portuguesehad observedthat the small unit tactics of the British in Malaya had worked well, it was necessaryto adapt them to the African environment. Observing the PAIGC bi-grupo operations provided the Portuguesewith an important demonstration that was to guide their force restructuring for counterinsurgencyoperations in Guine and Angola. As the British in Malaya appreciatedthe value of in-theatre training, so Portugal learned

its importance to appreciate andimplementation aswell. Development of its IAO proved

fighting in irregular Africa. to troop quality and solution apathy a sound

The Portuguese Army had intensely studied the British and French methods for structuring and training a counterinsurgency force and sought to adapt the successful its in Africa. While the Army strove to shorten the these two to situation of practises period of adjustment necessaryto train and deploy effective troops in reaction to the insurgencies,it still required an inordinately long time to field the proper force. Like the British, the French, and the U. S., the Portuguesehad to overcome hidebound views on insurgency at the highest command levels to achieve the proper formula. Portugal

seemedinordinately slow in this processand required about seven years to implement a fully coordinated approach. The French in Indochina and the U. S. in Vietnam never feat. following lessons The French, this the of Indochina, required two accomplished implement in Algeria to the guerre revolutionnaire concept. The British experience years four in in from Malaya Kenya to make the needed two to about years years varied `05 Given that the reorganisation of the Portuguese Armed Forces for adjustments. had from 1937 to 1960, the seven year span for war required conventional modern

15Hoffman and Taw, 28-29.

171

106 brief. delay, by The however, was appears comparison counterinsurgency unnecessarily costly in time, treasure, and manpower, and one of its important

the difficulties of was the 1968 recruiting crisis, which compounded manifestations
managing the war. This problem of implementing the doctrinal principles for

later described by the time the Army's and at acknowledged counterinsurgency was

(1961-1974): for the Studyof the African Campaigns Commission

However, the great problem surfaced much more in the implementation of doctrine rather than in its definition, which was understood. Its fulfilment faced in inertia difficulty rapidly adapting to the actual requirements and natural a demandedin an anti-subversive war, so different in doctrine, organisation, and training, which until then had been solely oriented to conventional warfare. Such demand far to a mental predisposition toward acceptance as as adaptation went 107 is which normally slow.

Nevertheless, the PortugueseArmy solved theseproblems by 1968 and by 1970 had in It it had three theatres. then the that the could all conflict claim of control gained led, it force, trained that and was successfully applying properly correctly structured its in Africa, and that the to adapted situation concepts counterinsurgency proven insurgencies were under relative control. These achievements were no small

low had been The tempo a subdued, of attaining conflict goal realised accomplishment. Forthcoming indefinite sustainability. chapters will examine the alongside an apparent

106Kaulza de Arriaga, "PortugueseNational Defenseduring the Last 40 Years and in the Future, " Lecture delivered on 20 October 1966, Instituto de Altos EstudosMilitares, Lisbon, 12. Africa 107Subsfdios da Campanhas de Escudo (1961Doutrina Aplicada nas para o 1974), 138. "No entanto, o grande problema pareceter residido muito mais na aplicagAo da doutrina do que na sua definico, o que se compreende, face natural indreia e dificuldade na adaptaro rpida as formas de actuagdo que uma luta anti-subversiva da doutrina, diferente to organizagdoe treino ate ento voltados unicamentepars exigia, inclusivamente, Tal adaptaco exigia, uma predisposicomental a guerra convencional. de aceitacoque 6 normalmente lenta."

172

in logistics this accomplishment. and of recruiting, operations, components specific

173

V Portuguese Africanisation of Counterinsurgency

One of the most significant elementsin the Portugueseconduct of the Campaignswas the Africanisation of its armed forces. By shifting the predominant burden of supplying manpower to run the wars from the metrpole to the ultramar, Portugal gained in four it inclusion broadened First, the through source of military manpower an of the ways. it fielding Second, the troops through a reduction reduced cost of population. colonial in transportation and training costs. Third, it gained a large measureof almost indefinite it first Last, kept the conflict subduedand low two the through aspects. sustainability tempo by moving a large portion of the conscription and casualties away from the Portugal's This the origins of review chapter will recruiting problems and its metrpole. in local African troops, and examine the application of local recruiting using experience in the theatres, analysing its implementation and comparing it with contemporary in experiences counterinsurgency.

Origins of the Manpower Shortage After crafting its counterinsurgencydoctrine and redesigning its armed forces for the Campaigns, Portugal faced the severeconstraint of raising an army and maintaining it at the necessarylevels. The metrpole presenteda limited and fragile source of manpower

in the initial years, to conductthe Campaigns.While therewasan element of chauvinism

by 1966 this patriotism had worn thin, and by 1968 Portugal faced a problem of

174

identifying manpowersourcessimply to run the wars.' Portugal proper with a population in just 9 three colonies was conducting a counterinsurgency campaign million of under 12 distribution This about million? would seemto dictate aggregated whose populations that proportionately about 60 percent of the manpower should be supplied by the 3 1966,30 Army's from In the the manpower came percent of ultramar. In colonies.

" Subsequently, 1968it had drifted upwardto 32 percent. this trend continued:
1969 - 31 % 1970 - 32 % 1971 - 40% 1972 - 40 % 1973 - 42V s

The data in Table 1 below supports the premise that European recruiting was displaced by colonial recruiting beginning in 1966 and increasing until 1971. During the 1971-1974 period in Angola local recruitment in the armed forces had stabilised at 42 during it 50 Mozambique In the same period. In Guine, percent exceeded percent. from limited draw, local to there which only a population was recruitment never where be Portuguese 21 It the that should also noted percent. recruited African troops exceeded in in laws the to same effect the metrpole, a code that required all able-bodied according 20 45 between 1968 In (efectivos) to two the the two years serve ages of and years. men

'Estado-Maior do Ex6rcito, 1. a Repartiro, Estudo sobre Problemasde Recrutamento 1968 [Study on the Problems of Recruitment 1968] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1968). 2The official Portuguese government census of 15 December 1960 showed the metrpole with a population of 8,889,392 and Angola, Guine, and Mozambique together of 11,959,373. 3Estado-Maior do Exercito, ResenhaHistrico-Militar das Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974) [Historical-Military Report of the African Campaigns(1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Ministeno do Exercito, 1989), Vol. I (General Summary), 259-260.

4Resenha de Africa (1961-1974), Histrico-Militar das Campanhas Vol. I, 259-260. 5Resenha de Africa (1961-1974), Hist6rico-Militar das Campanhas Vol. I, 259-260.
175

was extended to four, two of which had to be served in Africa.

The law was loosely

enforced in Africa until the manpower requirement became acute in the 1966-1967 " period.
Chat of Troop Sarogt6by Origin in the,ThreeTlwtree '::` .

A neole " .::., ,".: .:: " ;:; :'>>'ToW :" ':"::: 'Year. Med6poe 'ToW :.::;: Local ::. ':. L ocai Murpde T Meudpole'" Total ": '. ' . Local ': Total :::..: eatres . ;. ">; ". . 1961 : 5,000(15%) " 28,477 ': 33,4TJ i :., 3,000 (27%) ';. ,7A9 ' 11,209 ; 1,000 (21 %) 3,736 4,736: :` ;. 49,422 "

.".:. '>'` (31 December)'; ':: ::; `. `: ' :::::::.:::.: >;..:! :...:. '''' `:; ; ', :...::.:.> ....: >'` Moumbiaue:; : ".; CM16 ".,;.::.;...::: ".;::;, !::; ":::;:.;

"** 61.847 4,070 S, 070: 1962 11.165 (25%) 33,760*:.44,925 : 3,000(25%) 8,852, 11,852 '1.000(20%) :'"4,070' . " 1,314(14%): 8,344 9,650- 71,296' 1963 12,870(27%) 34,530 47,400" 5,003(35%) 9,243 14,246:'" ". ": ":: "`.: 52,493:. .7,917(44%): :: 10,132 18,049.; 2,321 15,015 (29%) `37,419 (15%) :. 12,874 "15,195; ":" 85,737 <'1964 ` 9.701(42%) ' : 13,155" 22,856 '"' :: 2,612(15%) :"14,640.:. 17,252;'<' 1965 15,448(27%) 41,625 : 57,073 ' . "` 1966 17297(31%). 38,519 55,916, 11.038(36%) 19,550 30,586 (9%) : 17,760 20,801 107,205. 57,420 . 11,557 (33%) 23,164 34,721 " 3,229 (15%) 1967 14,369 (25%) 43,051 18,421 21,650 113,791.
1968 20,683 (36%) : 37,547 58,230' 13,898 (38%) "22,717 ~ : 36,615 " 3,280 (14%)

3,715 (14%) 22,866 26,581 121,251 16,079 (42%) ' 22,633. ' 38,712 " : 4,268 (16%) ',' 22,507 "'26,775 1970', ; 19,059 (35%)' 36,174 55,233 120,720 1971" 25,933(42%) `36,127 62,060. .22,710(51%) 21,795: >44,505 5,808(20%)? "23,402: -29,210'": 135,775"";: " x;. " . ,
1972 25,461(42%) ' 34,856 1973- 27,819 (42%) "37,773 60,317 -24,066 (52%) " 22,657 46,723 5,921(20%) 24,036 . " 6,425 (20%) 65,592 ' 27,572 (54%) 23,891. 51,463. --25,610 . . 29,957 32,035' 136,997 . 149,090

1969 18,663 (34%) 36,911 55,574

15,810(40%) 23,286. 39,096

19,559 ::'22,939: ' 117,684' . . .

Compiled by the author from official Porhiguese Army documents.

Table 1

These figures are for the Army alone. The Navy and Air Force numbers were if by comparison, and aggregatedwith the Army, would not significantly change modest ' the percentages above. But these numbers do not tell the whole story. The

in form the the of self-defenseunits, police, and other paraof population militarisation military forces which were not integrated into the primary organisation of the armed

6Douglas L. Wheeler, "African Elements in Portugal's Armies in Africa (19611974)," Armed Forces and Society (February 1976): 240. 7Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 251. The Army total of 216,195 at the conclusion of the wars on 25 April 1974 was augmentedby 6,000 2,500 Naval including its Air Force tropas pdraand personnel, approximately quedistas (paratroops). 176

' 50 forces had the effect of increasingthe foregoing percentages to constructively percent. In the case of Mozambique, the percentageof locally recruited troops in all categories

" force? it increased 50 In Angola 70 the total to about percent. reached percentof

The problem beganin 1961, when the Portugueseknew that the war would last longer than simply a few months to stabilise the situation in Angola. Just how much longer was in be however, the would measured years and not months. With this process uncertain; prospect in mind, the government turned to the population of the country to satisfy its military personnel needs. The official censusby the Portuguesegovernment conducted just before beginning following 1960, 15 December the the the showed of campaigns, on broad population distribution: "

Metropole
Angola Guin6 Mozambique

8,889,392
4,830,283 525,437 6,603,653

From these figures and additional census data the numbers of able-bodied males between the ages of 20 and 24 in the four recruiting areas were 816,781, distributed as

BJoaquimMoreira da Silva Cunha, Ultramar, a Napao eo "25 De Abril" [The Overseas Provinces, The Nation and The "25 of April"] (Coimbra: Atlntida Editora, 1977), 297. 'General Kalza de Arriaga, interview by the author, 8 November 1994, Lisbon. 1Luz Cunha, 159. "Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 213-214. The figures cited in the 1960 censuswere to be the most accurate for the foreseeable future in the colonies. The 1970 census numbers for Portuguese Africa were suspect becauseof the war disruption and its attendantrefugee migration, and no censusof either Angola or Mozambique has been taken since. 177

shown below.

Males Aged 20-24 Years in 196012Approximate Annual Addition

Metropole Angola Guine

Mozambique

336,672 208,853 21,256

250.000

67,334 41,771 4,251

50.000

Total

816,781

163,356

From the age profile contained in the census it was determined that approximately 163,356 able-bodied males would reach their twentieth birthday and would thus become available annually to add to the pool of eligible candidates. These numbers were always nominally adequateto support the recruiting required to man the armed forces between 1961 and 1974, as the annual addition to the pool from all sources was never less than the replacement requirement. The difficulty came in adjusting to the increasingly high delinquency rate in the metrpole, which squeezed the seemingly favourable numbersand burden disproportionate to the soldiers currently serving and to recruiting in the a shifted ultramar.

Table 2 above depicts the recruiting picture in the metrpole during the course of the wars. There are several dynamics apparent in the trend of the figures, despite the

for 1969. The data estimated pool of able-bodied males aged 20-24 at the missing

beginningof the warswas336,672. To this numbereachyear was addedabout67,334,

62,175 data, based the the average eleven years of on on were chosen. For military and for the therefore, theoretically the entire period of the pool was adequate purposes,

12Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 214.

178

"":... "..

"",. >`>'>: '::: ';::;: ;::; ".:": .. '

Year :;"'>1961

eMetr ecruitmentInt
Called

ole`.: r`.> :

":. '>'>: ':::: "; "::.,,:::;;;;..::: <:: ".,...::: c:: :; : >:.;:

. Delinquent

1962 ..:...,::..::;:: ";: :1963

:. '1964'
1965 : "":;': ' ::: .': ;

".;

75,366

"; 48,832(64.8%) *

8,122(11.6%Y.
13,328 p5.6 %) . 16,972(18.8%)': "":. :'.

357'::,? 57,073(72 :: 85,410 59,676 (69.8 %).: '';;.:

86977;:.
64805(11796).: ::;

>' : ..::. :.: :..

1966 ... 1967' `. . 1968 1969

1970

90289 " ':...

61249(70.4%).;::'::..: 14,357(165%) .

87.506'. 63,342(72.3%) :"":..; 16.008(18.4%) "' . 86.065'. 62,017(72.64b)";::::::?16,512(19.296) :. :": ': ::::... .. ",:;:.. "; `' r;;. . " ,: ;. :::. ::"::;: . 70.504 (73.7%1 ";:;, 95,634 17,838 (18.6%) ':.;;. ;:;.:
,": .;.

'": ' '.::: s: `: `: ::: .:,::;: EE:: ` ':;:::; <.:

:... ":..:.;. '.

. 63,996 (71.5 99,693".: * .,

(19.6%)
:; 18.534 (20.9%) ":

'1971. _: 91,363" .,. " 92,613 :.:...:....::. 1972

65.746(72.00 15,644(20.3 %) "::::::::: 66,681(72.0%):.:: 18841 ;...:.

de jfiw 129614974), tha Hirrrico Milirar dzs Cmnpanhas Vol. 1,258; and Recur uvctedfrom Rose FstudoSobreProblems de Recrutam mt 1968,17. :' *The minimumdraft agewasloweredis 1971from 20 to 18 yars. "

Table 2 conflict.

There were, however, other elementscompeting for this manpower in the metrpole and disturbing this equation. Portugal's population has always been one of its leading exports, and the census figures do not fully reflect this drain, particularly clandestine emigration. Continental Portugal with a population at the time of nearly 9 million had 13 3 On intense top this expatriate population of million. of estimated problem was an an psychological campaign waged from abroad and aimed at planting doubts about the war in Portugal's recruiting-age youth, raising the spirit of the enemy and supporting deserters,however few. " This campaign was centred in the universities, and while quite disruptive, was containable. Open student demonstrationsbegan on 17 April 1968 with the inauguration ceremony dedicating a new building at Coimbra University, and student

"Americo Simes Gaspar, Captain, Infantry, Portuguese Army, Emigracao em Portugal [Emigration in Portugal] (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1974), 36.

14Simes 38. Gaspar,

179

indiscipline continued at a high level until the force of the law and the academic '5 in later the authorities restored order year. This disorder was attributed to communist incitement against "the colonial war" primarily through the outlawed Portuguese Communist Party, which had clandestine operatives within the country. The entire

episode had a demoralising effect on the recruiting effort generally and on officer

16 forces the the moraleof armed sufferedaccordingly. recruiting specifically,and

The recruiting figures do, however, show an accelerating problem in attracting increased demands from 48,832 in The the manpower wartime on metrpole personnel. 1961 to a height of 70,504 in 1968 and remained just below that number for the remainder of the wars. Draft registrations peaked in 1968 and declined thereafter.

Certainly one cause of this decline was an extension in required service. In 1968 the normal two year conscription period was effectively extended to four through a new 17 in Africa. In order to arrest this decline and that two required years of service charter it level in the theoretical pool, was recommendedthat the draft age a sufficient maintain be lowered from 20 years to 18 years effective in 1971. The Portuguese military but decisions these two agonized could reach no other conclusions over establishment 18 in The have fought largely be the to recruiting metr6pole. wars would with regarding the soldiers that existed in 1968, particularly if the skills acquired on the battlefield were

'5Marcello Caetano,Depoimento [Deposition] (Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record, 1974), 55-56. "Silva Cunha, 290.
17Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 233.

18Ertudo 1968,3-4. Thesetwo optionshadbeen de Recrutamento sobreProblemas 1968 in this study. proposed
180

to be preserved and not lost to wholesale personnel turnover. "

The metrpole was

limited as a manpowerresourceunder the current recruiting parameters,and new recruits in sizable numbers would have to be found in the ultramar.

As depicted in Table 2 above, draft delinquencies or "no shows" were 11.6% in

figure within Portugal'stwentiethcenturyexperience.This number 1961,a manageable

increased on both an absolute and percentagebasis through 1970, levelling thereafter. The delinquent rate of 20.9 percent in 1970 is unremarkable alongside a sampleof other years (1900 - 15.7%; 1912 - 22.7%; 1922 - 36.8%; 1933 - 16.6%; 1940 - 12.7%; and 20 1950 - 9.8%); however, in the context of the wars, the trend is unmistakably negative. Recruiting in the metrpole, while it always satisfied the nominal military requirements for manpower, increasingly reflected a lack of enthusiasm for the war alongside the lure boom The a'European economic of alternatives. north of Portugal as well available increasingly job domestic became market attractive in contrast to the as an expanding in inconvenience danger Africa. Emigration had always serving of and relative personal been largely from the rural areas and over time they becamedepleted, leaving the more

19Estudo sobre Problemas de Recrutamento 1968,3: fazem as guerras... of se existem que

"... e com os soldados que

20Resenha de Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 268; and Histrico-Militar das Campanhas Estudo sobre Problemas de Recrutamento 1968,17. These relatively large delinquency due in also are part to the Portuguese system of conscription, in which percentages individual for induction. If he failed to that sent asking report were an several notices initial he then the notice, was delinquent. Becauseof the largely rural nature on report fact inductee been in factory have Renault that Portugal, the the might a working of impediments, Paris, similar or other of many reported late as a matter of routine. outside The Portugueseauthorities were aware of theseproblems, and disciplinary measures were taken only after reasonableinduction efforts had failed.

181

developed areas as the primary centres supplying recruits.2'

The limitations of the domestic population base threatenedthe war effort. From the beginning of the wars in 1961 until the conclusion in 1974 the number of personnel in the primary Army organisation expanded from 49,422 to 149,090, representing an

' increase annualrateof of aboutelevenpercent. Portugal'sneedto recruit ever average

increasing numbers was driven by two factors: the expansion of guerrilla activity from Angola to Guine and finally to Mozambique, and the increasing use of the military as a ' for expanding psychosocial activity. manpower pool In relation to the expanding

insurgents 22,000 in the activity, numbered about all theatresby 1974, giving guerrilla Portugueseforces at that time a numerical superiority of about 6.8 to one.24 Maintaining this ratio strained Portugal's resources. Compared to other insurgencies, this ratio fell short of the British experiencesin Malaya of 37.5 to one and in Cyprus of 25 to one, u in 16.7 in Algeria French Kenya 4.6 to that the to one, and exceeded of and of one. It was similar to the combined U. S. and Republic of Vietnam experience there, where

2l 1968,18. de Recrutamento EstudosobreProblemas 'ResenhaHistrico-Militar das Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 259.
'Silva Cunha, 295. 24DouglasL. Wheeler, "African Elements in Portugal's Armies in Africa (19611974)," Armed Forces and Society (February 1976): 277. There were 6,425 African troops in Guind, 27,572 in Mozambique, and 27,819 in Angola in 1974 facing 6,000 guerrillas for the PAIGC, 10,000 for FRELIMO, and 4,500 for the MPLA. UNITA and the FNLA combined had fewer than 1,500 full-time guerrillas in Angola. Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer M. Taw, Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1991), 38; and Colonel Virgil Ney, U. S. Army (Retired), "Guerrilla Warfare and Modem Strategy," in Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (Glencoe, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 36. 182

in 1964 the ratio was an estimated4 to one and later in 1968 about 8.75 to one 26

The momentum of the psychosocialprogram would be maintained through a shift of available manpower and its orientation. Through a series of government directives in 1968, a five point plan was implemented to addressthe issue: (1) intensify recruitment

held the potential to sustain a flow of in the ultramar, where the demographics
candidates; (2) expand the numbers of special forces for counterinsurgency; (3) expand the local ultramar paramilitary forces; (4) reduce metrpole forces proportionately to the in in forces the ultramar; and (5) modify the force structure to recruited expansion include additional small units suitably effective in counterinsurgency. ' Thus, faced with this necessary expansion and the recruiting difficulties at home, Portugal in 1968 in its focus local to the colonies. Reinforcing this shift recruiting shifted pragmatically indigenous forces belief the that would strengthen the political legitimacy also was necessaryfor successagainst the insurgents.

Recruiting Leadership In addition to the search for raw manpower, the expansion of the armed forces development leaders in the form of officers the training, recruitment, and of necessitated and sergeants. The Military Academy produced adequatenumbers of permanentofficers for the first four years of the war, but thereafter was never able to recruit properly from the universities and fulfil the requirements. In 1966 Portugal began to draw from the

26FrankN. Trager, "Military Requirements for U. S. Victory in Vietnam, " in Yet Nam: History, Documents, and Opinions on a Major World Crisis, ed. Marvin E. Gettleman (Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1965), 347.

"Silva Cunha,295. 183

Central School for Sergeants to fill this need for permanent officers and did so until 1972. Table 3 below reflects the dynamics of this problem. Contestants for vacancies

at the Military Academy exceededopenings until the 1965-1966 academic year, after
became increasingly deficit the a problem. which Officers from the sergeants ranks did

not wholly satisfy the need, but produced adequatenumbers of leaders in the form of 1972. To supplement the corps of permanent the to officers run war until permanent officers, reserve officers (milicianos, literally "militia") were recruited to flesh out the
junior officer ranks. At the end of their contract these officers had the option of

extending it, or later of applying to continue as permanent officers, or of resigning.

Military Academic Year Vacancies

Academy

Permanent

Officer

Commissioning Commissioned Sergeant% Net Deficit

Unfilled Contestants Admitted Vacancies

1961-1962 1962-1963
1963-1964

265 266
200

559 444
392

257 266
180

8020 -

8 0
20

1964-1965 1965-1966 1966-1967 1967-1968 1968-1969 1969-1970 1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974

262 350 377 410 430 460 400 550 495 243

307 283 199 175 149 112 151 169 154 155

137 129 90 90 58 33 62 103 72 88

125 221 287 320 372 427 338 447 423 155

42 118 236 261 226 287 200 -

125 179 169 84 110 201 51 247 423 155

Compiled from information in Estado-Maior do Excrcito, 6. ' Rcpartic5o, Notice N" 17/IE, 18 March 1982.

Table 3

The recruiting difficulties in the metrpole adversely affected the ability of the armed forces to attract and retain the key leadership skills embodied in the officer and sergeant ranks. The normal miliciano contract was two years in duration, and means were

constantly explored to grant these officers and sergeants special privileges if they would

184

21 idea Also the their obligation military of giving miliciano officers with good extend records the option of accepting a regular commission was regularly studied. This long been had popular with Western military services and provided retention mechanism into for a military career through several avenues outside the entry opportunity an Military Academies. This practise would have been implemented long ago, according

to DouglasPorch:
had its effects on the rather archaic promotion system in the Portuguesearmy ... forces disruptive. Most armed attempt to strike a balance between not proved so in the promotion stakes, giving preference perhaps to top and ability seniority Military Academy graduates. But Portuguese promotion was based almost " exclusively on seniority. It would be fair to say, however, that with the advent of the wars, seniority was less of " in factor determining promotion. a

The spectreof having the milicianos be given credit for all of their former service in in their a systemwhere seniority was everything was too much of seniority establishing interested in fact Caetano became Dr. Despite the that personally changing an obstacle. the systemand all of the Commanders-in-Chiefwho came to Lisbon from the operational theatres supported the plan, the resistanceof the regular officer corps to this move was just too strong.31 The initial solution to the problem was borrowed from one adopted following the Great War in which a special category of officer (quadro especial de

28SilvaCunha, 295. 29DouglasPorch, The Portuguese Armed Forces and Revolution (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 65. 30Lufs Alberto SantiagoInocentes, Colonel, Staff Corps, PortugueseArmy (Retired), interviewed by the author, 5 September 1994, London.

31Caetano, 184-185. 185

oftciais, or QEO) was created.

The QEO provided for the granting of regular

in limited numbersbut confined their to good miliciano officers of standing commissions 32 lieutenant the to colonel. The first small contingent of 90 officers rank of advancement into the regular officer corps through this mechanism in 1970, thus augmented was temporarily solving the problem.

As Table 3 shows, the problem only worsened. By 1973 the QEO allotment had been exhausted,and the retention difficulties had again reached crisis proportions. Thus the situation was reexamined by the new Minister of National Defense, General S Viana Rebelo. This review resulted in the Council of Ministers approving Decree Law N4 353/73 in July 1973, which gave the miliciano officers under certain conditions regular 33 length based their of service as a reserve officer on commissions with seniority Although less than 200 miliciano officers were eligible and would affect the force of over 2,800 regular junior officers, these "Rebelo decrees" becauseof their implications were immediately and strongly unpopular with the officer corps of the armed forces' This

fissure was also heightened and exploited by the communists to undermine service 36 35 in Dr. Caetano's experiencewas Dissention the captain ranks. centred was morale.

Africa de 32Resenha das Campanhas (1961-1974), Vol. I, 236-237. Histrico-Militar Decree Law N4 49 324 of 27 October 1969 created the QEO and limited it to the following officer numbers: lieutenant colonel - 20; major - 40; captain - 120; and 180. subaltern -

33Caetano, 185.
34Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 255-257; 296. Cunha, Silva and

35Inocentes interview, 5 September 1994. 36Silva Cunha,305. 186

indicative of approachingproblems: It was not many days later that my military adjutant... informed me that the decree law did not sit well with much of the Army becauseof the changesin relative seniority caused by the ex-miliciano officers. There are captains, he told me, who have jumped past lieutenant colonels. And he reminded me of the enormous importance that a soldier attachesto his seniority on the ladder: "seniority means a promotion. "37

While the Rebelo decreessolved the retention problem for the miliciano officers, the bitterness causedby the implementation of this long overdue reform sowed the seedsof junior officer revolt that contributed to the revolution on 25 April 19743S It was likewise in this context that Portugal sought to expandits sergeantand officer ranks through local recruiting in the war theatres.

Precedent for Africanisation Portugal increasingly turned to its colonies to fill its wartime manpower need, as it had done in the past, although never on the scale of the Campaigns. African troops represent a tradition of having served or cooperatedwith Portugal in times of need since the earliest days of the colonies. In almost every year between 1575 and 1930 there was in Portuguese Africa, somewhere campaign and the African auxiliary and colonial a irregular forces proved indispensable. Called the guerra preta ("black war") from the 1681 had history loyalty this they until century, a of of and could be raised campaigns

37Caetano,185. "No tardaram muitos dias, o meu adjunto militar... informou-me do Exercito da decreto-lei da cafra mal nos meios causa por modificarao o posico que relativa de antiguidadesque envolvia para os oficiais ex-milicianos. H capites, disselembrou-me importncia E tenentes-coroneis. para pulam a que enorme que para o me, militar assumea sua antiguidade na escala: "a antiguidade 6 um posto."

38Silva 305. Cunha,

187

" short notice. on

This flexibility meant that Portugal did not have to mobilise large

numbers of its continental troops and transport them to Africa in times of colonial crisis. While these earlier campaigns were pacification operations and were not in the same insurgencies as modem with their political theme, they nevertheless, set a genre precedent for Portugal's extensive Africanisation of the late Campaigns.

A typical example is representedby the 1888 campaign in the Zambezi Valley in which more than 90 percent of the soldiers in the Portuguese pacification force were Africans. 40 During this period Portuguese influence in the Zambezi Valley beyond its coastal regions was on a negotiatedbasis with the leaders of a series of small kingdoms furnished by the coopted leaders of these half these troops were of or prazo states, and fiefs. These leaders kept private armies of warrior slaves or achikunda as a secondary force for protection of their prazo holdings, and thus, the typical Portugueseforce was comprised largely of theseachikunda and a contingent of African militia. Leadershipand direction was provided by Portugueseofficers and the friendly leaders of the secondary of the use of locally recruited states. Allen Isaacmanprovides a valuable assessment troops in this 1870-1902campaign for control of the Zambezi Valley: Lisbon's ability to recruit a large African force provided crucial support for its success. Less than three per cent of the total army of twenty thousandwere of Portuguese descent. Fourteen elite platoons were recruited from such diverse Nguni Inhambane, Chope the the as of groups of Lourenco Marques, the ethnic Macua of northern Mozambique and a mix of Angolan peoples. Many of these soldiers had already been coopted into the colonial system and had aided the

39C.R. Boxer, RaceRelations in the PortugueseColonial Empire 1415-1825(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 32. They were also known as empacasseirosfrom a hunters. "buffalo " meaning word 40Allen F. Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1976), 38.

188

Portuguese in earlier conquests. In turn for their services they enjoyed a relatively privileged economic and political position. Portuguese officials, in large the agricultural companiesand the new prazo owners, also with conjunction mobilized more than 15,000 sepais or reserves from the immediate Zambezi region. Many had previously served as supervisors of gangs of African agricultural workers, as policemen, or as low-level functionaries for the Portuguese government, for which they received salaries several times those of the local African population. Besidesfinancial remuneration, the opportunity to seize the women and children of the vanquishedpeoples provided an additional al incentive for the sepais.

In the twentieth century the guerra preta continued to be used both in pacification in in 1930 Great 1914-1918, War the their and conclusion of and endured until operations 42 for General Norton de had defense Matos force formidable the colonies. of a as indigenous levels be in 1924 that troop maintained in Angola at 15,000 recommended in 45,000 by that time could mobilise an additional system reservists a supported regulars "' of war. The continuing reliance on colonial troops as a source of manpower was

it in 1924 from 460,000 defense that was estimated and policy, all sources established " in be fielded divisions In this calculation Angola and in 28 crisis. a national could men Mozambique were to supply 71 percent or 20 divisions totalling 325,000 men.

Mozambique had also been a fertile recruiting ground for troop requirementsin other

41lsaacman, 65. 42CapitoGasto Sousa Dias, "A Defesa de Angola" [The Defense of Angola], Revistar Militar (July-August 1932): 611-619. 43GeneralJose Mendes Ribeiro Norton de Matos, "0 Exercito em Angola" [The Army in Angola], Revista Militar (March 1924): 85. `Gaspardo Couto Ribeiro Villas, Colonel, Staff Corps, PortugueseArmy, As Tropas Colonials na Vida Insernacional [Colonial Troops in International Affairs] (Lisbon: Sociedadede Geografia, 1924), 72.

189

in beginning the early twentieth century. One to two companies were formed colonies eachyear and deployed for two year tours between 1906 and 1932.45These deployments included virtually every colony: Angola, Guine, Timor, Macau, Sao Tome, and India. Consequently, the reputation of Mozambican troops was well establishedby 1961.

During the GreatWar, Portugalfoughtin France,in the southof Angola, andin the
largest The Mozambique. of campaignconductedwas the defenseof Mozambique north against the German incursion. Portugal sent 32,000 troops from the metrpole and hurriedly recruited another 25,000 locally. 4' The mixture of this force was 44 percent African. Portugal had had an urgent manpower requirement on its border between

Mozambique and German East Africa and had had no choice but to rely on local troops.47 Many companiesof indigenous personnel were formed and trained under the most difficult of conditions, and acquittedthemselvesadmirably in this campaign. At the conclusion of hostilities, a Portuguesemajor who had led troops there acknowledgedtheir vital role in this conflict: During the four years of struggle our native African infantry always fought with courageousdetermination, when well supportedand led, and there was never an incident of disloyalty or betrayal in their ranks.... Many citations acknowledged this dedication which was characterisedby natural bravery and valour. But of this most important contribution to the causefor which we fought, the majority of the

"Colonel E. A. Azambuja Martins, 0 SoldadoAfrican de Mocambique [The African Soldier of Mozambique] (Lisbon: Minist6rio das Col6nias, 1936), 34. 46Luz Cunha, 73; and Carlos Selvagem, Tropa D'frica [African Troops] (Porto: Portuguesa, 1919), 410 and 416. Renascenca

"German East Africa, 1885-1920; TanganyikaTerritory as a British subsequently Tanganyika,1961-1964; Mandate,1920-1961; and Tanzania,1964-present 190

Portuguesepeople remained unaware.48

Before the beginning of the African Campaigns (1961-1974), the history of locally in African their the troops and exploits was not widely appreciated, particularly recruited is despite fact Just the their remained so obscure contribution a mystery, why metrpole.

of any of the African colonial powers. that it was the mostvenerable

Development of Africanisation Africanisation within the primary organisation of the Army went largely according to the plan developed in 1968, which was to level recruiting efforts in the metrpole and increased in levels desired force through the ultramar. the to the recruiting expand Africans serving in first line units of the Army represented30 percent of the force in 1966 and by 1971 had increasedby a third to 40 percent, where it remained throughout increase from in in local This troops theatres an represented all the wars. expansion 25,000 however, There 54,500, troops. 30,000 than to new more were, or nearly about this first tier of troops in the Africanisation process.

Prior to the Campaigns and to this augmentation, local troops were not only raised

by the armed forces but also by the comparablecivil authorities, and employedas
"second line units" with the functions of guides, civil militia, auxiliary forces, self-

48FranciscoArago, Major, Cavalry, Portuguese Army, Tropas Negras [Negro Troops] (Lisbon: SearaNova, 1926), 22 and 23. "Durante quatro anos de luta a nossa infantaria indigena sempre se bateu com valorosa deciso, quando bem enquadradae fileiras de deslealdade de Muitas das traicao... suss no saiu um exemplo e ou comandada, dedicaco bravura essa ea natural e valentia que as caracterizam. premiaram citag6es Mas o concurso mais importante que deram a causa por que nos batiamos permanece " ignorado para a maioria dos portugueses. 191

defense groups for villages and other specialised roles.49 The self-defense units were simply armed civilians who had been organised and trained to act in defense of their

by guerrillas. This organisation to village, if surprised provideda degreeof confidence

local communities through a rudimentary ability to defendits members. Supposedlythese forces coordinated their activities with local Army operations; however, this para-military

50 might to their surprise was not alwayspresent. Army units consequently cooperation
find themselvespatrolling the same area concurrently with another friendly force.

This sanctioned activity continued during the Campaigns and in the three theatres these irregular troops fought well and provided an invaluable services' In Angola the forces and "third line units" of the Organizaco Provincial de Voluntrios various police e Defesa Civil (Provincial Organisation of Volunteers and Civil Defense, or OPVDC) 52 body The OPVDC was composedof contracted individuals as a single were organised whose original duties were to protect the rural areas in the north of Angola. The

for began as a mobilising the white settler population but became vehicle organisation increasingly multi-racial towards 1970.53Later theseduties were expandedto include the in construction of road equipment areas of aggressiveguerrilla activity. guarding

49Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 242. 501nocentes interview, 5 September 1994. 5'Silva Cunha, 297. 52SilvaCunha, 297. "Peter Abbott and Manuel Ribeiro Rodrigues, Modern African Wars (2): Angola and Mocambique 1961-1974 (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1988), 41. 192

This centralised organisation was not always the case. Initially in Angola, for instance, Portuguesemobilisation was fragmented. There were:

"
"

de Regedoria(TraditionalLocal JurisdictionMilitia) Milicias Tradicionais

Forcas de Contra-Guerrilha (Counter-Guerrilla Forces), which were created according to diverse criteria for various duties and with neither a structure nor a

missionthat was well defined'

Originally in this groupingthere were

Tropas Especiais (TB),

Forces Especiais (FE),

Grupo Sonda in the Zona Militar Leste (ZML), Pseudo Terrorists (PT) in Nambuangongo, and Milicias Armadas de Malanje. ss In addition to the regional militias, the OPVDC, also known as the Corpo de Voluntdrios (Volunteer Corps), was created, as described earlier, and only gathered momentum in Angola. 56 From about August 1967 there was a move to consolidate and gain control of these local para-military forces and to direct their efforts more effectively. The Grupos Especiais (GE), TEs, and OPVDC were the primary vehicles for this tighter organisation, during the course of the wars this task was constantly challenged by the although following bodies. The additional of paragraphswill addressthe more unique surfacing aspectsof PortugueseAfricanisation, some of which began outside of the conventional

54Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 243-244, 154. II, Vol. and
55Resenha Histrico-Militar 154. II, Vol. and das Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 243-244,

56Resenha deAfrica (1961-1974), Histrico-Militar das Campanhas Vol. I, 243-244, 154. II, Vol. and 193

force structure, and normal soldiering duties. Ultimately many of thesewere recruiting, officially incorporated into the PortugueseArmed Forces and account for the recorded increasein numbersof locally recruited troops. Others remainedpart of the para-military Africanisation until 1974.

TropasEspeciais(SpecialTroops)
Called Tropas Especiais (TE) becauseof the special nature of their recruitment, this force had its origin in the 1965 defection of Alexandre Taty, the Minister of Armaments of the UPA/FNLA/GRAE and a prominent Cabindan. Taty, who had studied to be a priest and forsaken the cloth for a job in the post office, had a strong affinity for women and drink. He stole from his employer to support theseinterests, and when discovered, fled to the Belgian Congo and ultimately joined Holden Roberto's organisations. He next failed to replace Roberto, and subsequentlythrough Portugueseagentsof and attempted the PIDE negotiated the forgivenessof his postal robbery and his return to Angola. With him he brought about 1,200 loyal troops, half of whom remained in the Congo to gather intelligences' Taty was instrumental in helping the Portuguesecontrol Cabinda and the border of Angola. northern adjacent

Crossborder operations were routine for the TEs, who were composed entirely of black troops and carried no Portugueseidentity cards. Their missions were thoroughly for full by they them and prepared on scale model replicas of the practising planned,

"General Joaquim Miguel Mattos Fernandes Duarte Silva, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 3 April 1995, Lisbon. When he was a Major, General Duarte Silva was the PortugueseArmy liaison officer to the TE operation under the code 28 between 1966 January 14 July 1967. Lourenco and name 194

targets at their camps in northern Angola. They wore insurgent uniforms and carried Soviet block weapons and equipment on their numerous raids.58 The Portuguese if these missions were fully accomplished, and while sure authorities were never 59 sceptical, felt that this activity kept the insurgentsoccupied defensively and off balance. Initially the troops were irregularly trained and were organised in groups of thirty-one

of ten meneach. Later they were expanded of a leaderandthreesections menconsisting from Taty's recruitingeffortsandorganised on thePortuguese patterninto four battalions
of sixteen 31-man combat groups each. This force of 64 groups operated from Cabinda and the districts of Zaire and Ulge in northwest Angola. When the ZML becameactive in 1966, a battalion was sent there. Portugal paid and fed the troops and ran the harbouring low to criticism of a avoid and using former insurgents. with profile operation In 1972 they numbered about 2,000 and were incorporated into the regular forces60

Grupos Especiais (Special Groups) In 1968 a series of similar groups appeared in the east of Angola. These were

formed from captured insurgentsor thosewho presentedthemselves,and were organised designation Grupos (GE). Especiais the with As time went by, they were used

throughout Angola, but particularly in the easternsector (ZML). There were ninety-nine "1 incorporated into likewise forces GEs, in 1972. these the and were regular groups of

"Duarte Silva interview, 3 April 1995. 59DuarteSilva interview, 3 April 1995. 60Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 243-244, 347. II, Vol. and

deAfrica (1961-1974), 61Resenha Vol. I, 243-244, Histrico-Militar das Campanhas 347. II, Vol. and
195

By 1974 these ninety-nine groups with an average compliment of 31 men per group 62 3,069 troops. totalled

In Mozambique GEs were also organised in 1970 and parallelled the structure, training, and duties of those in Angola. The first organisation consisted of six groups 63 in They 550 the mould constituted as small units were originally men. aggregating in 7,700 light and eventually numbered about typical combat group, men or platoon of a " eighty-four such groups. At first they were led by European officers and sergeants;

however, progressively as cadresmatured, Europeanswere replacedby black officers and ' include initiation in GE 1971 Later training to extended an was of parachute sergeants. qualification. Twelve units from this program were established as Grupos Especiais

Para-quedistas (Special Groups Parachutists,or GEP) and attached to the Air Force as 6 an adjunct to the normal tropas pdra-quedistas. Each of the twelve units had a

lieutenant as its commander, a sergeant specialist in psychological operations, four forty-eight total corporals, sixteen and soldiers, a or commanders, sub-group as sergeants

Africa das de Campanhas (1961-1974), Vol. I, 243-244, 62Resenha Histrico-Militar 173. II, Vol. and Africa de das (1961-1974), Vol. I, 243-244, Campanhas 63Resenha Histrico-Militar 156. IV, Vol. and de Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 243-244, "Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas 308. IV, Vol. and 65General Kalza de Arriaga, Guerra e Polftica [War and Policy] (Lisbon: Edices Referendo, Lda., 1987), 313. 66Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 244.

196

67 of seventy men. All totalled the GEPs numbered about 840 troops. Other than the qualification jumps the units were rarely used in this fashion and were deployed by helicopter similarly to the normal paratroop units.68 One might conclude that their General de Kadlza Arriaga's earlier interest and training a manifestation of was special 69 later Much Portuguese there was also a small number the paratroops. sponsorshipof de de Combate (Special Groups Combat Pisteiros Trackers, or Grupos Especiais of of GEPC) who were quite specialisedand simply incidental to "first line units. " In all the GEs, GEPs, and GEPCs in Mozambique totalled about 8,500 troops.70 While originally trained as a counterinsurgencyforce, their chief duties evolved as protective cadres for the population in the aldeamentos(resettlementvillages), which will be addressedin a forthcoming chapter."

Milicias

(Militia)

In Guine units similar to the TEs and GEs were formed in 1964 as paramilitary forces, taking the designation of Milicias (Militia). They came to be called Milicias

Normais (Normal Militia) and Milfcias Especiais (Special Militia), depending on the

67MiguelAnt6nio Gabriel da Silva Machado and Antonio Eleuterio Sucenado Carmo, "Tropas Para-Quedistas Portuguesas" [Portuguese Paratroops] Boina Verde (JulySeptember 1991): 83-84. 68David E. Spencer and Miguel Machado, "The Unknown War: Portuguese Paratroops in Africa, 1961-74 (2)" Military Illustrated (May 1992): 42. 69SilvaMachado, 83. 70TwelveGEP units with 70 men per unit and eighty-four GE units with ninety men 8,500 troops. about yield unit per 71Arriaga, 313.

197

duties of the units.'Z The Normal Militia assumeda defensive role in protecting the in lived from or near their villages, and fell under the operational attack, population control of the local military commander. The Special Militia conducted offensive from local defenses. In 1971 a new Corpo de the away operations counterinsurgency

Line Milfcias wasformedto integrate all of theMilfcias and Tropasde 2. aLinha (Second
Troops) into the regular Army. The Corpo was organised by companies of combat They were

' 40 8,000 than companies more some with men. groups and aggregated

G-3 bazookas. Portuguese There was also a the assault rifle and with primarily armed Comando Geral de Milicias (Militia General Command) which oversaw their

training was conductedat three-centres,and the course administration and training-. --Their Militias in The lasted instruction three were quite effective months. protecting the of freeing for in troops the of regular other operations. Towards consequent and villages the latter stages of the Campaigns the Militias were accounting for 50 percent of insurgent contact.74 By the end of the Campaigns these Militia totalled forty-five 9,000 (about Militia Normal Special twenty-three and men) groups of of companies " 713 (about Militia men).

Katanganese Mis (Faithful) After the granting of independenceto the Congo by Belgium in 1960, there was an

de Africa (1961-1974), 72Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas Vol. I, 244.

73General Carlos Fabio, Portuguese Army (Retired), interview by the author, 31 March 1995, Lisbon. 74Fabio interview, 31 March 1995. 75Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. III, 110.

198

in Force Publfque, the the new nation's army. This centred upheaval political enormous declare disorder Moise Tshombe to the Province of Katanga an prompted spread of independent state, expel the mutinous elementsof the Force Publfque, and raise his own "" Eventually the UN intervened and returned Katanga to the force of gendarmerie. in 1963, January Mr. Tshombe went the at which point government central control of into exile in Spain. During this period Portugal had openly encouraged the Tshombe it from forces. Angola UN In June 1964 the against eastern supported and government the UN withdrew, and Mr. Tshombe was unexpectedly invited to return as Prime Minister in a government of reconciliation. Unfortunately Mr. Tshombe could not bring harmony to the situation, and it degeneratedinto a civil war' Faced with a -weak and

demoralised CongoleseNational Army, he took the controversial step in September1964 in his General Josephtroops to hiring army assist regaining order. mercenary white of Desire Mobutu, the army commander, along with selected army units and mercenaries Portuguese The Mr. Tshombe, ties again the established strong with rebellion. quelled insurgent 1965. dampened In 1965 through the activity this autumn of relationship and General Mobutu overthrew Mr. Tshombe in a coup, and again he left for Spain. With MPLA Angola. 1967 General In then to the Tshombe given access was eastern exit the Mobutu suspendedthe new constitution and the National Assembly and prevented Mr. Tshombe from returning to the Congo. At this point the old gendarmerie, loyal and faithful to Mr. Tshombe, crossed into eastern Angola at Teixeira de Sousa to fight for the Portuguese.

76Mike Hoare, Congo Mercenary (London: Robert Hale, 1967), 291. 77Hoare,14.

199

These "Fieis" or faithful onesnumberedabout 4,600 with women and children.78 The Portuguese screenedand selected some 2,300 men initially, whom they organised into three battalions of 15 companies. Each of these battalions was based at one of three districts between Lunda Moxico, Camissombo border Chimbila the the of and on camps:

in Lunda,and Gafaria(the old leapercolony nearCazombo) (nearVerissimoSarmento)

in Moxico. The "Fieis" retained their command structure with their own officers and

"Brigadier" N'Bumba Nathaniel; the of general command under were and sergeants however, in performing missionsthey were placed under the operational commandof the 79 Their primary duty was to protect the crews building roads local military commander. in easternAngola. Theseblack troops were "fearless soldiers who fought like tigers" and by 1972 had sustained 31 killed in action, 34 killed in accidents and 36 seriously 3,000 80 1974 troops By threat they about and posed numbered a continuing wounded. 8' influence Portuguese The Mobutu. this to their General situation exploited maintain to influenced from he insurgent Congo that the him the activities sanctuary. and over

Commandos Comandos and ComandosAfricans (African Commandos)had their more modem from learned Portuguese lessons their in the that own colonial pacification the origin from in French the this additionally observing century and experience earlier operations

'8Colonel Dionisio de Almeida Santos,PortugueseArmy (Retired), interview by the Santos Colonel Almeida Portuguese liaison 1995, Porto. March 30 to the was author, "Figis. " 79AlmeidaSantosinterview, 30 March 1995.

interview, 30 March 1995. 80Almeida Santos

81AlmeidaSantosinterview, 30 March 1995.

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in Algeria, which was "the paradigm of subversive war and the laboratory for identified having "82 The Portuguese, techniques. the need for a small counterguerrilla in force, 1959 "quick in be to the a series of established reaction units" used specialised internal security, counter-subversion, and counterguerrilla of special operations 83 de Companhias Cacadores Especiais (Companies Special Three these of of activities. Hunters, or CCE) completed training in April 1960 and were sent to Angola in June. Others followed to Mozambique and Guine, as each theatre commander realised that he " to troops conduct counterinsurgency operations. The CCEs neededa cadre of special 1961, Army training their to was extended as all units. The after produced were not in it force 1962 by Lieutenant for and was remained, recommended a specialised need Colonel BethencourtRodrigues, the Chief of Staff of the Military Region of Angola, that 85 Centres were established for their expansion formed. be (commandos) comandos in local training and each of the three theatres, beginning with recruitment through Angola, and later in 1970, Mozambique and Guine.86 In Guine locally recruited

82RibeiroVillas, 84; and Colonel Rio Carvalho, Infantry, Portuguese Army, "As Companhias de CacadoresEspeciais" [The Companies of Special Hunters], Jornal do Exercito (April 1994): 26. "... o paradigma da guerra subversiva eo laboratrio das " de contraguerrilha. tecnicas 83RioCarvalho, 26. "unidades pars intervengdo imediata." 8'Colonel Antonio Dias Machado Correia Dinis, Commando, Portuguese Army, SubsfdiosPara a Histria dos ComandosPortuguese [SupplementaryInformation on the History of the PortugueseCommandos](Lisbon: Associacode Comandos, 1981), Vol. III (Guin6-1963), 14. 85BrigadeiroRenato F. Marques Pinto, PortugueseArmy (Retired), correspondence 1995, 9 Oeiras. August the author, with 86Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 330-331.

201

87 Commandoswere known as African Commandos.

In directing the establishmentof the 1st Company of African Commandos on 11 February 1969, General Antonio de Spinola set the tone for its formation and use in

in Lisbon in 1968: keepingwith the tenetsof Africanisationestablished

The defenseof peace in the sacredlands of Guine together with the building of the future for its people, must be completed progressively for those who were born here and strive here to make a better life. In light of this national imperative, our African Military Force has been establishedat a growing rate and formed 1st Company African Commandos, includes the of elite unit, now Guine.... Your from the of ascensionto the position of sons native exclusively Commando in the PortugueseArmy marks a significant stage in the course of 88 for Guineans. all progress And- later in authorising two more indigenous regular infantry companies, General Spfnola again reflected the new emphasison Africanisation: We do not want war. The new African force, born today, is destined to conclude the war and bring peace. The government does not want to spend more money destroy kill The bullets bombs that everything. government wants to and and on into for hospitals, its Province the the construction of money channel all in in is Guine It the to simpleness of and guarantee peace maternities, schools....

87Joaquim Lopes Cavalhairo, Forcas Especiais na Guine: 0 Batalho de Comandos 1971-1973 [Special Forces in Guind: The Battalion of Commandos 1971-1973] (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1979), 1-2. "General Ant6nio de Spinola, addressgiven on 11 February 1969 establishingthe 1st Company of African Commandos, Bissau, Guin6, as quoted in Forcas Especiais na Guine: 0 Batalho de Comandos1971/1973 [Special Forces in Guin6: The Commando Battalion 1971/1973] by Joaquim Lopes Cavalheiro (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1979), 1. "A defesada paz no sagradocho da Guind, paralelamentecom a devero das futuro do competir, progressivamente,aquelesque suas gentes, construcao imperativo lutar luz deste A aqui anseiam por uma vida melhor. aqui nasceram e Forca Militar African, a crescente, nossa em onde estruturando, ritmo est se nacional, de 1' Companhia de Comandos formada Africanos, destaca escola unidade como se da Guin6.... A do de ascenco vossa a postos comando naturais exclusivamente por Ex6rcito Portugues fica a marcar uma expressiva etapa na rota da promocao do povo Guiniense... "

202

the peaceful spirit of its people, that the new African Army is born. 89

In Angola there were five companies operating by the end of the war 90 Each 91 had 125 for 625 Commandos The total a complement of about men a company of units were mixed rather than largely European or locally recruited. Thus it is difficult to give a close assessment of Africans serving in this capacity. In Guind there were three companies of African Commandosin the Commando Battalion at the conclusion of the 92 in 125 With a company the total of locally recruited Commandoswas about men war. about 375 men. In Mozambique by the end of the war there was a battalion of

Commandos with eight companiesof about 125 men each.93 Half of the companiesor about 500 men were recruited locally.

"General Antonio de Spinola, addressgiven on 16 April 1969 establishing the 11th de Indigenas Cacadores (Indigenous Companies of Hunters), Companhias 12th and Bissau, Guine, as quoted by Lopes Cavalheiro, 2. "No queremos a guerra. A nova forga africana, que hoje nasceu, destina-sea acabar corn a guerra ea conquistar a paz. 0 Governo ndo quer gastar mais dinheiro com bombas e com balas que matam e tudo destroem. 0 Governo quer canalizar todos os dinheiros da Provincia para a construcao E hospitais, de maternidades, escolas.... pars garantir a paz no cho da Guind ea tranquilidade de espirito do seu povo, que nasceuo novo Exercito Africano. " 90Resenha de Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 243-244, Histrico-Militar das Campanhas 170. II, Vl. and "Lieutenant Manuel Ferreira da Silva, interview by Al J. Venter in The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons Ltd., 1969), 134. 92Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 243-244, 167. III, Vol. and
93Resenha Histrico-Militar 184. IV, Vol. and das Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 243-244,

203

Fuzileiros (Marines) The Portuguese Fuzileiros had their origin in the formation of the Royal Naval Regiment of Portugal in 1618. Deactivated in 1890, they remained so until 1961 except for a brief period from 1924 to 1926. Responsiblefor maritime and riverine security,

the Fuzileirosplayedkey and varying roles in all of the theatres. Almost exclusively
de in Companhias Fuzileiros (Companies the trained the metrpole, of and recruited Marines, or CF) were responsible for coastal security and river support. Special

de by Destacamentos Fuzileiros Especiais (Detachments the conducted operations were first forces in DFE), be Marines, Special these the to the or and were naval used of Campaigns with the deployment of DFE 1 to Angola on 10 November 1961.94
Subsequently deployments reached a height in 1971-1972 with eleven DFEs and eight CFs in the three theatres. 95 Locally recruited units were restricted to Guine, where in February 1970 two Destacamentos de Fuzileiros Especiais Africans Special African Africans (Detachments of

Marines) were formed at the Centro de Preparacao de Fuzileiros

(Training Centre for Special African Marines) at Bolama. " These units, DFE

21 and 22, served throughout the Campaigns, and while not a large portion of the Navy's important. very were overall complement, As the normal DFE held a complement of 80

98 level 160.97 This 9% Africanisation. totalled two the only represents about units men,

14Corpo de Fuzileiros, Fuzileiros Especiais (Lisbon: Minist6rio da Marinha, in 1987), Schedule history Deployments (Angola). written of unpublished 95Corpode Fuzileiros, 17. 96ViceAdmiral Nuno Goncalo Vieira Matias, interview by the author, 23 November 1994, 'Lisbon; and Corpo de Fuzileiros, 15.
97Corpo de Fuzileiros, 14.

204

Flechas (Arrows) Lastly, the most controversial African force was the Flechas. The Portuguese

intelligence apparatus required specialised augmentation in Africa, and PIDE was designated to perform these counterinsurgency duties." PIDE and its successor, the

(DGS)normallyperformedthevariouspoliceand security Direccao Geral de Seguranca duties that would typically fall to the British MI-6, Special OperationsExecutive,
Scotland Yard's SpecialBranch Officers, or the U. S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency.1 When the Campaignsbegan, the new requirements in Africa attracted the best talent in PIDE for this purpose. PIDE faced initial problems in intelligence insurgents' to the to the and gathering environment on new adjusting be local in The Angola. to terrorised, the continued population situation movements for long there term solution. a consequent pressing need was a and remained confused, PIDE continued to experiment with this uncertain situation in its searchfor the key. One languages its the to proliferation of efforts was spoken, as there were perhaps obstacle fifteen different dialects. By about 1967 in an attempt to make its reconnaissance

98Corpode Fuzileiros, 17. There were 11 DFEs at 80 men each and 8 CFs at 120 1,840. 160 for Africanisation 9% figure. total this at of a men represented of each men "Marques Pinto correspondence,9 August 1995. The Portuguese Army, although it did not have an intelligence service of professionals, had a system of intelligence with divisions or sectionsat all headquarters commands. These cells were mannedby officers intelligence. in There schooling and was thus a system functioning sub-specialty a' with it by Air Force levels the and command, supported was of with visual and photo all at by The PIDE was responsible radio attachments. and monitoring reconnaissance internally for intelligence for in collecting this case and counterintelligence and externlly In Angola intelligence Mozambique the and entire picture was counter-subversion. de Servigos Centralizafdo Coordenagdo de Informaces the through e coordinated (Service of Centralisationand Coordination of Intelligence, or SCCI), which analysedthe intelligence information reports. and produced raw 10Duke of Valderano, interview by the author, 17 March 1995, London.

205

it missions more effective, had begun to use local auxiliaries with their knowledge of the immediate terrain, familiarity with the population, and unique language skills. This

initiative proved partially successful,and about 600 agentswere eventually employed to address both the vastnessof Angola and the large number of languages. This original '01 1,000 by 1974. to number was expanded about

This use of auxiliaries beganaround the city of Luso in easternAngola, and employed been born into had there to the familiar bush and discover what and raised go who people locals happening. These could travel easily through the country for extended was periods, blending with the population and maintaining a low profile. Initially theseagents information insurgents; however, PIDE to and collect supposed observe on simply were found that they were being captured and tortured, so it began to arm them for their own defense and train them properly. It found that the Bushmen were the best for this

'02 inhabited These the vast remote area of the Cuando Cubango district people purpose. in southeasternAngola, which was also aptly named "Terras do Fim do Mundo" (Lands is here Earth). It End that the Bushmenlived and were largely employed, the the of of began. Flechas is here it that the and

PIDE had to make a number of concessions in employing the Bushmen for in They were small stature and could not carry heavy weapons. work. reconnaissance for And indeed, the PortugueseG-3 9mm assaultrifle was too heavy and unmanageable

1O1Oscar interview by Cardoso, the author, 1 April 1995, Azaruja, Portugal. Sr. " Cardoso is a former Inspector with the PIDE/DGS and was instrumental in founding the Flechas. 126scarCardoso interview, 1 April 1995.

206

them. Thus they continued to carry their bows and arrows armed with poison tips. The insurgents were allegedly terrified of this weapon, and becauseof the awe that it evoked, "I it flechas it for the men who wielded were named or arrows. Before eventually

1974 By Soviet AK-47, they tried the many weapons. standardisationhad settling on

begunon the lightweightU. S. M-16 assault rifle.

PIDE began with the most primitive people in the sense of civilisation and not intelligence. These Bushmenwere initially motivated by their hatred and mistrust of the blacks, as historically the blacks had treated them as chattels and sold them as slaves. PIDE exploited this animosity and compensatedthe Flechas through booty. 104 Later blacks were employed to work primarily in western Angola and adjustmentswere made but had be handled ill feeling. Pay to dampen the changed were methods carefully. to While the value of the compensationwas the same as that of his fellow European, he in be quite the same way. paid not could As many would immediately spend their

little left have drink to their support several wives and numerous and on earnings families disbursements to to accommodate this made were children, multiple '5 propensity.

The Army had great respect for the Flechas and operatedwith them frequently either in small reconnaissance groups or in larger contingents as part of an Army operation. These reconnaissance missionswere wide-ranging, deep-penetrationpatrols in known or

1036scar Cardoso interview, 1 April 1995.

1046scar interview, 1 April 1995. Cardoso

1056scar Cardoso interview, 1 April 1995.

207

suspectedenemy areas and were spartanand low profile. When Flechas operated with the Army, they reported to the local Army commander and were used to guide the normal troops. The Army relied on the Flechas to maintain the continuity of local operating knowledge in an area, as the overall experiencelevel of a typical unit tended 106 its degrade troops. the to constantrotation of with

Flechas were organised into combat groups along the same lines as the Army and from Portuguese Commandos. Often the training was extensively training their received have African Flechas to a seemed unique always way of solving problems. as modified, thirty men, and they invariably operatedin areaswhere they Their groups never exceeded The for language familiar terrain. their operations the primary centres and with were Gago Coutinho Caxito (Luanda), (Moxico), (Uige), Carmona and Serpa Pinto were (Cuando-Cubango). Gago Coutinho was the site of the first turned guerrillas in late 1968, and this recruiting avenueyielded about 200 former insurgents scatteredthroughout 107 In the beginning there were eight Flechas, and by 1974 there were Flecha the ranks. implemented in Mozambique late in The 1,000. the war, and the also concept was about 108 Flechas hundred there. were established several

It is thus apparent that the range and degree of formal militarisation varied greatly. In addition to the specialised units described above, there were thousands of men in forces. both Those locally the and out of armed who were membersof the recruited

1066scar Cardoso interview, 1 April 1995. 1076scar Cardoso interview, 1 April 1995. ' Oscar Cardoso interview, 1 April 1995.

208

armed forces served generally as infantry soldiers or in other non- or low-technical duties. Those in civil support jobs, such as drivers, were again performing a low 109 Soldiers from the metrpole generally performed the more technology service. technical tasks becauseof their higher education level. The count for those formally in 3. is included in data Table Conversely, the civilian employment soldiers as employed "' data is so irregular as to be only gross estimates.

The lack of delinquency figures on African recruiting would indicate either that the be inaccurate data could not calculated, or that there was no real and census was delinquency problem. - The answer is most likely the absence of an accurate count, in by Portuguese if the some capacity, then the not recruited although efectivos were likely alternative was serving one of the nationalist movements. The Portuguesewere insurgents for higher While than the to rate a at a number of recruit reasons. able always life was spartan for the Portuguese soldier, it was even more difficult "1 guerrilla. for the

The best estimatesof nationalist strength show a peak of about 22,000 guerrillas by 1974 against 61,816 locally recruited troops just in the formal Army organisation.'12 If one adds the pars-military forces, the ratio of African against African would easily

109lnocentes interview, 22 October 1994. "'Pedro Cardoso interview, 17 November 1994. "'Edgar O'Balance, "To Turn His Coat - or Not?, " Royal United Services Institute Journal for Defense Studies (March 1973): 85-87. 112Wheeler, 277.

209

exceed 3 to one. This experienceis similar to that of the French in Algeria, where "At did fighting from 1962 Algerians 1954 to the time of numbers with the F. L. N. for no independencematch the number of Algerians fighting on the French side.X113There were about 200,000 Algerians serving France, of whom about 171,000 were auxiliary

troops, againstthe 35,000man FLN army in 1961or abouta6 to one ratio."a

This PortugueseAfricanisation comparesfavourably with the efforts of the French in thejaunissement or yellowing of their Indochina War (1946-1954)and their use of locally far in (1954-1962). It Algeria troops was also more extensive than the U. S. recruited Vietnamisation between 1963 and 1973. At the height of the Indochina War in 1954 the French Expeditionary Corps numbered235,721, to which about 54,000 Vietnamesewere "5 19 In Algeria French for jaunissement troop strength levelled of percent. a added 200,000 in 1961, Algerians for 600,000 about of which were an "Arabisation" at about 116 S. In Vietnam U. Republic Vietnam forces 33 the totalled and of percent. about of "7 in 1968 about 700,000 of which 200,000 or 29 percent were Vietnamese. Thus

forces in indigenous in the counterinsurgency was not a of new concept, use none while locally foregoing the cases were raised troops used to the relative extent that the of

113Horne, 255. 114AlistairHome, A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 255 and 476; and Alf Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 179 and 261. '1"DouglasPorch, The French Foreign Legion: A CompleteHistory of the Legendary Fighting Force (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 531 and 550.

116Home, 235 and 506; and Heggoy, 179.

117Trager, 338: and Krepinevich, 192.

210

Portuguese employed them, and few reachedthe absolute numbers.

Motivations In a war of national liberation in the modem era, the question inevitably arises as to local, Army large Portuguese the and why these locally of was percentage why such a determination. fought There the troops such are several with nationalists recruited factors The for development. two this that prevailed motivational general explanations in all three theatres were: (1) the opportunity of relatively well-paid employment as a benefits, (2) belief the the that care and other of medical security and soldier with Africans would benefit more now undera government by the Portuguesethan potentially "' under a victorious nationalist movement. These two factors were paramount, and

differences, were never as compelling. as ethnic such elements, other

Certainly the local populations were very poor. From 1962 onward the Portuguese in locally which recruited troops would receive the same a policy government established This European troops. overture made voluntary enlistment overwhelming, and pay as 19 fill. As to the other factor, the than to openings there were always more volunteers Africans tended to believe that the Portuguese would win. 120 They were benefitting

18Inocentes interview, 5 September 1994; and Major Lufs Alberto Santiago Inocentes, interview by Al J. Venter in Portugal's Guerrilla War: The Campaignfor Africa (Cape Town: John Malherbe Pty Ltd, 1973), 134. Colonel Inocentes expanded in the more recent interview on the motivational characteristics of the local troops that he had described to Mr. Venter in 1971. 19Brigadeiro Who A. Esteves' Felgas, PortugueseArmy (Retired), interview by the 1994, Lisbon. 22 November author,

120Pedro interview, 17 November1994. Cardoso 211

did and not perceive the nationalists as medical care, and prosperity schools, new with being able to defeat the Portugueseand deliver on their promises."'

Portugueseuseof locally recruited troops reflected a further dimension. Thesetroops in Forces into Armed integrated Portuguese "miscegenation" fully the a complete were in 122 French Algeria, that the This of with where the contrasted practise of units. Algerians serving in a military capacity were not integrated into French units. Algerian discrimination to this sensitive and were never treated particularly career officers were 1 European their peers. as the equals of This inequity was highlighted in their

" "native, "autochthonous, " "Franco-Muslim times-as at of native various classification de i124 There for "Muslim " was many a crise conscience officers. an and statue, Algerian officer and few served in Algeria after 1954.125 In Malaya the British also had separate British and Malayan units in the Commonwealth Forces, keeping a 12" 127 for held Kenya This between The European them. practise as well. segregation Portuguese felt quite comfortable working alongside African Portuguese, and this 128 helped to the a solidarity maintain strong with population. relationship allegedly interview, 22 November 1994. 12'Felgas Luz Cunha, 159. '13Heggoy,262. 124Heggoy, 263. 1 Heggoy, 262-263. 126Henry Miller, Jungle War in Malaya, The Campaign against Communism1948-60 (London: Arthur Barker Limited, 1972), 25.

127Hoffman andTaw, AppendixA. 128Arriaga interview, 8 November1994.

212

Sensitivity to Casualties
Casualtiesin any war representa policy dilemma in that they erode public support at home for continuing to fight. The greater are the casualtiesproportionately, the greater is the potential for waning public support. Portugal in its Africanisation of the wars was

129 its in European die letting Africans The implications the of soldiers. place of accused by that this replacingpotentialmetrpolecasualties are with African ones accusation of
be home The maintained. at could counter to this concept is that the support public Africans were also Portuguesecitizens fighting for their way of life, and they too would felt if dying for fight long they they that were simply a European colonial cause. not Consequently, did the African troops shoulder a disproportionate burden in the fighting in the attempt to retain the colonies and consequentlysuffer unequally? The total number for in from 8,290, deaths theatres the three the all causes entire war was of which of

5,797 were recruited from the metrpole and 2,493 were recruited from the colonies.130 Not only was the gross figure for ultramar-recruited troops lower, but the death rates between 1961 Given 1974 lower. likewise that average on and about 71,067 troops were 36,025 from locally deployed the and metrpole were recruited, death rates were were 0.63 per thousand for European troops and 0.53 per thousand for African troops. This Africans data the that claims nationalist refutes were fighting and dying statistical disproportionately for a European colonial cause and shows that, indeed, the black Portuguese troops fought and died at nearly an equal rate with their white counterparts.

129AmfcarCabral, TextosPolfticos [Political Texts] (Porto: Edig6es Afrontamento, 1974); Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle (London: Stage 1,1969); and Basil Davidson, The Liberation of Guine (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969). de Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 264-266. 130Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas

213

Table 4

When only combat deaths are considered, the figures are even more emphatic.

As

depicted in Table 4 below, combat deaths in the three theatres over the thirteen year Campaign were 4,027, of which 917 or 23 percent were locally recruited and 3,110 or 77 percent were European troops. 13' Clearly the African troops were not

disproportionately

at risk in the thick of combat.

Success and Controversy Portugal in shifting its recruiting efforts to the ultramar to support the war achieved First, important the recruiting pressure on the metrpole was relieved gains. of a number in benefits the public sentiment. consequent with In this shift Portugal was not only

following its tradition of using African troops to fight African wars but was also relieving fighting. impediment domestic to continued a With this change in policy, pressure on

in the metrpole was alleviated, and manpower requirements and casualties mobilisation in local be by There be the increasingly theatres. thus recruits assumed would would fewer emotional reminders returning from Africa, indeed even quiescent. subdued, remain would and domestic public dissatisfaction

'31Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. 1,264-266. 214

Second, PortugueseAfricans who had the greatestinterest in the outcome of the wars and thus the highest motivation for a successful conclusion would now seemingly be doing their portion of the fighting. Engaging the African in his own defense was also forms best the of political mobilisation. as one of seen

Third, this policy introducedefficienciesin the allocation of manpower,as the

European recruits with their higher technical skills and education were directed toward the more complicated tasks, while their African counterparts with their irregular education and general lack of technical skills were employed in the more labour intensive tasks, and wars are labour intensive.

Fourth, employing African troops reduced overall manpower costs in that it was far less expensive to recruit and train a soldier in the local theatre of operations than it was to do so in Portugal with the added cost of transporting him to Africa. While initially

the African soldier was paid less than his European counterpart, this inequity was if in little, differential. The primary savings the any, cost and played part early corrected African in the transportation, as recruit was generally trained and employed near occurred his home.

Portugal had been forced to mobilise about one percent of its population to fight in Africa and simply could not sustain this domestic manpower drain. On a percentage basis it had more men under arms than any other nation outside of Israel.132Portugal's

"'Thomas H. Henriksen, "Portugal in Counterinsurgency," Orbis (Summer 1977): 404.

Africa:

Comparative Notes on

215

mobilisation would have been the equivalent of the U. S. putting 2.5 million men in Vietnam instead of 500,000. The Africanisation of the conflict was thus a pragmatic decision in that Portugal had no other choice but to follow this route if it wished to continue. Portugal was indeed fortunate in that it had a loyal population in Africa willing

in to shoulderthe burdenof fighting the nationalists. Unlike the French experience

Algeria, where there were mass defections of Muslim bands, the Portugueseallegedly "' incident desertion. Africanisation from the or of rebellion of mass experiencednot one Portuguese perspective was thus a sound response to a manpower shortage. It added sustainability to the conflict and helped Portugal counter the long range guerrilla strategy of attrition. And finally, by moving the recruiting away from the metropole to the

its Portugal to goal of maintaining a subdued, low tempo, able realise was ultramar, affordable war.

133Paret, 39.

216

VI Portuguese Intelligence Network in Counterinsurgency

Locating and destroying insurgents after they had infiltrated the three colonies foot-slogging. lot intelligence "' intelligence Gaining "a a of network and good required if the Portuguese were to keep them separatedfrom the the guerrillas was vital, on intelligence food, deny to them and shelter, on military operations, and to population, destroy them. Information was neededon their political leaders, their military command, their forces in the field, their sourcesof support both within the colonies and externally, intentions? information This their and plans was obtained through operational and interrogation infantry of captured or surrendered air reconnaissance, patrols, reports of 3 informers documents, The Portuguese Army and paid and agents. captured guerrillas, intelligence for build to this and effective need proceeded critical a productive realised in its forces This describes helped the that exploit weaknesses enemy. chapter network intelligence Portugal's development of systematic the organisation and effort and shows its effective link in a relentless effort to rob the insurgents of their initiative. It addresses in field in selectedareasand follows the these operations with the problems encountered the solutions adopted, comparing and contrasting them to the experiences of other

'Lieutenant General Janie J. Geldenhuys, Chief of the South African Army, "Rural " in Revolutionary Warfare and Counter-Insurgency, Insurgency and Counter-Measures, University for Pretoria, Institute Strategic (Pretoria: Studies, 1984), 41. Hough M. of ed. 2Edward E. Rice, Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Undeveloped Countries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 103. 3D. S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, Who Will Win?: A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War (London: Crane Russak, 1989), 26.

217

counterinsurgencyoperations. This intelligence effort countries with contemporaneous but in to the to particular adapted counterinsurgency campaign only each theatre. not was These several adaptationswere uniquely Portugueseand in keeping with the subduedand cost-consciousstrategy.

Intelligence Organisation

In the Portuguese Army there was an intelligence system at the beginning of the Campaigns,which while not being a professional serviceas in the British Army, operated similarly. The officers and men serving in the 2a Repartico or 2a Secco (Second

Division or on a lower echelon, Second Section, which was responsible for the intelligence function) of the General Staff of the Army and its replications down to the battalion level were personnel with diverse warfare specialities (infantry, cavalry, intelligence forth) to assigned an were so who section. The rationale for artillery, and this policy was that officers "self-specialised"themselves,following a natural interest and developing a proclivity for the intelligence craft.' When an intelligence service was

it. As 1958 General Secretary to the these early as gravitated officers of established, National Defense attempted to draw the various services together in an intelligence for began Intelligence Centre of the training this the a cadre purpose at and sharing effort British Army, Maresfield Park Camp, United Kingdom .5

This effort was overcome by the events of 1961. As early as January of that year

4Colonel Luis Alberto Santiago Inocentes, interview by the author, 5 June 1995, London. 5Pedro Alexandre Gomes Cardoso, As Informaces em Portugal [Intelligence in Portugal] (Lisbon: Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 1976), 106.

218

there had been a working group in Lisbon composedof representativesfrom the military commands,PIDE, the General Commandof the PortugueseLegion, the Director General of the Political and Civil Administration, the Customs Police, and other government 6 arms. The working group recommendedthe creation of a local intelligence service that

from intelligence disseminate it in fashion draw timely together sources all and a would to relevant users. This body would be known as the Intelligence Service of the
Government General (Servico de InformafOesdo Governo-Geral or SIGG) and would be in including duties for host this a of vein, psychological operations, responsible intelligence, counterintelligence,electronic surveillance,prisoner interrogation, etcetera.7 This path was followed in both Angola and later Mozambique, where the bodies were known respectively as SIGGA and SIGGM.

Following the March 1961 attacks in the north of Angola and the appointment of General Venancio Deslandesas the Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Angola, he created a true Service of Centralisation and Coordination de Coordenaco de Centralizaco Informafaes (Semco 29 SCCI) Intelligence e or on of June. It included not only local intelligence gathering and disseminationbut was also the

throughthe Ministry of ForeignAffairs, the Ministry beneficiaryof intelligence gathered

These diverse Provinces, Overseas sources! and national the other avenuesprovided of intelligence. both tactical to and strategic access Later a SCCI was created in

6Estado-Maior do Exercito, Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974) [Historical-Military Report of the African Campaigns(1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Ministeno do Exercito, 1989), Vol. I (General Summary), 360-363.

'Pedro Cardoso,107-108.
BPedroCardoso, 109.

219

Mozambique, in Guind, and in the other colonies as and when it was deemedappropriate. Oversight of the SCCI was the responsibility of the Province's Intelligence Commission (Comissode InformacOes), which setpolicy on intelligence operations,military security, like. for It the the creation of the district, also responsible and was counterintelligence, held Commissions local Intelligence which responsibility for the district, regional and 9 SCCI As with most undertakings of this magnitude, local the sectionsof regional and the SCCI required tuning to make it function properly across the various military and civil bodies. importance: Each passing day reinforces the need of moving quickly to coordinate as much intelligence as is reported and obtained through various methods, as well as to in know its to not only what the enemy wants but order procurement organise ' interests us. especially what By February 1963 General Deslandes affirmed the progress and its

It was never an easy task for the SCCI to reconcile the diverse viewpoints of the in interest the the the and police, military commands agencies, civil of an various between intelligence intelligence Professional rivalries picture. agencies overall accurate Portugal tradition everywhere, and was no exception. The most virtually service a are PIDE, difficulty normally considered a superior and effective arose with notable intelligence service, disagreeing with the Army. " PIDE in a number of these instances

9PedroCardoso, 111-114. 10Pedro Cardoso, 118. General Cardoso quotes General Deslandes: "Cada dia que depressa de de caminhar no sentido a necessidade coordenar tanto as se verifica passa informaces que chegame soobtidaspor vrias vias, como de organizar a pesquisapara inimigo aquilo o que quer mas especialmenteaquilo que nos apenas que no saibamos interessa..."

" Africa Report (September"Michael Degnan,"The 'ThreeWars' of Mozambique, October1973):9.

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its it information the through acted offensive and on operations of own Flechas. withheld For the most part, however, PIDE did not feel threatened by the military intelligence its fellow Army. Its the conflict was with usually with well civil and worked sections " intelligence agencies. Notwithstanding these difficulties, cooperation was viewed as

improved by leadership. It the considerably when the essential and was pursued 13 The consequentwisdom of this Governors-Generalwere also Commanders-in-Chief. by Sir Claude Portuguese Fenner, the operated was reinforced which concept under Inspector-General of the Malaysian Police, 1963-1966, who spoke from his experience in this capacity: "Intelligence is one of the most important factors affecting the conduct intelligence hazards both collecting agencies entails of grave the a multiplicity and war of ideal is intelligence The have to alike. a single, unified of to collectors and sources intelligence service... ""' This unified effort by the PortugueseArmed Forces contrasted in by Sir Vietnam, Robert U. S. Thompson, Head the as observed position sharply with between 1961 1965: Mission "Nor Advisory there British and was there any the of in fact intelligence When I the organisation rather opposite. added up of concentration in in Saigon 1966 against the intelligence operating were which organisations the Vietcong there were seventeen,both American and South Vietnamese, and none of them "'s to talking other! each were

12BrigadeiroRenato F. Marques Pinto, interview by the author, 30 March 1995, Oeiras. Brigadeiro Marques Pinto was Chief of Military Intelligence in Angola 19631965, and Director of the SCCIA 1965-1968.

interview, 5 June1995. 13lnocentes

from the Vietnam War, Report of a seminar held at the '4Sir Claude Fenner, Lessons Royal United Services Institute in London, 12 February 1966,6. from the Vietnam War, Report of a seminar held at 15SirRobert Thompson, Lessons in London, 12 Institute February 1966,2. Services United Royal the

221

The Portuguesesought to avoid this pitfall. In each theatre Portugueseintelligence level. it done Militarily theoretically at every was effected from the coordination was intelligence Headquarters Commanderto the the gathering and of using patrols smallest in-Chief. On the civil side it ran from the local posto's contact with the population to the Governor General. At every stageintelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination for joint between The this civil arms. military and mechanism coordination was sought 16 district, local levels. SCCI, the the province, regional, and which existed at process was Contact with the population was consideredparamount. Interpreters and translatorswere infrastructure. infiltrated freely Troops Agents the enemy's moved and usedextensively. interpret trackers the to the the accompanied and population, patrols among regularly jungles locate Special formed forests the enemy. the militias and and were also of signs for the self defenseof the population and hopefully reported on enemy contact. All of these activities formed a network or system of intelligence gathering that was documented, Operations throughout the civil and shared and military arms. coordinated, " information flow basis. This this to exploit on a and executed regular planned were in innovation Malaya, British to the where the government established system was similar district, province, and national intelligence centres run by the police but with representativesof the military and civil authorities and regularly planned and executed 18 intelligence by the this to produced network. operations capitalise on

Africa das de Campanhas (1961-1974), 16Resenha Histrico-Militar Vol. I, 368-370.

"Estado-Maior do Exercito, Substdiospara o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Africa (1961-1974) [Information for the Study of Doctrine Applicable in de Campanhas (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior Africa do Exercito, 1990), 159Campaigns of the 160. 18D.S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, Who Will Win?: A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War (London: Crane Russak, 1989), 26.

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Intelligence Operations The desired responseto an insurgent's ability to move secretly, strike suddenly, and then disappearis "an intelligence apparatusthat will pierce the screenof secrecy."" It is the military's responsibility to build this apparatusto support its operationsagainst the for intelligence While the vary according to the scaleof command, requirements enemy. they always centre on developing a sound understanding of the environment and of the in difficult lack task This that throughout the theatres there a was was a of enemy. guerrilla organisation and communication. Guerrilla thrusts were only generally

it Consequently, difficult to understand operational plan. a vague was organised with doing Effecting they contact until was made. were contact was difficult, what precisely incursions imprecise insurgent intelligence the was countering almost as and as so gaining 20 insurgents intelligence The (SIGINT) was used no radios, so themselves. signals plans denied. This situation was due to three factors: (1) radios were unavailable; (2) the difficult; languages (3) low the communication made and of educationallevel proliferation it difficult higher insurgents to technology very operate and the made maintain of later, began however, did listen! "When in "21 to Thus they use radios we equipment. its counterinsurgency campaign the Portuguese were forced to develop this picture 22 following Each the through sources and methods. of these made an piecemeal important contribution in solving the intelligence puzzle, and becauseof this guerrilla important information it from that was one reinforce that from the vagueness, operational

19Blaufarb and Tanham, 27. 21Marques Pinto interview, 7 November 1994. 21lnocentes interview, 14 April 1994.

de Africa (1961-1974), nResenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas Vol. I, 363. 223

others to produce an accuratepicture.

Ground Reconnaissance Ground reconnaissance was the most basic method of finding and fixing the enemy in the difficult terrain of Guine or the vast expanses of Angola and Mozambique and was field battalion level had job. To difficult this the at each problem a staff that address a included an Operationsand Intelligence Section (2a Secpo). This section was comprised 2 2 2 and enlisted men. Supporting this staff was a reconnaissance sergeants, of officers, by 3 25 29 It an officer sergeants with and enlisted commanded men. men of platoon it jeeps to and radios give added mobility. -equipped with was In some instances,

depending on availability, helicopters might be used; however, this practise was the 35 Thus, 5 there than the and were officers men rule. or about percent rather exception intelligence duties, devoted to battalion a somewhat greater proportion than strength of is normally found in a force structured for conventional warfare. 23

Patrols by both reconnaissance platoons seekinginformation on the enemy and normal intelligence in the course of performing other missions proved obtaining groups combat 24 Both types the and productive sources. of units were constantly valuable most among initiative, the the to enemy and maintain with contact make and thus all attempting degree Experienced troops to or another embodied a reconnaissance role. one operations

interview 17 by 23Duke March 1995, London; and Marques Valderano, the author, of Pinto, correspondencewith the author, 18 July 1995, Oeiras. 24MajorJoseEmfdio Pereira da Costa, "InformaCoe Contra-Informacao Militar em Ambiente de Guerra Subversiva" [Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence in the Environment of SubversiveWar], Revista de Artilharia (September-October1961): 149.

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information knowledgable deduce through the to skills simple of observation, able were for example, the length of time an insurgent encampmenthad been abandonedand the force. in One in the this reasoning process was the the of clues enemy number of men Also latrines the type, condition, and origin of any captured the the campsite. at state of it known insurgents fingerprinted as reliably, was who sponsored which weapons ' indicated It the capability and mission also armament. nationalist movementwith what knowledge logistic this insurgents their needs, and was valuable to a tactical the and of These him in to the manoeuvre against enemy. several examples enabling commander illustrate importance its to the the contribution puzzle of and of ground reconnaissance "foot slogging." Attempts were always made to verify this type of information through contact with the population.

The population represented a key source of information, and indeed it was the insurgency. in "the Clausewitzian battlefield, terms, centre of gravity" an or of primary The Portuguesesoldier was indoctrinated in this principle and instructed by his doctrine he intelligence to the in his always seek population was on the time with that relations 26 forces. he be Not of guerrilla armament, and numbers of only must nature of sighting, its but he from intelligence the also must enemy, protect source to on primary alert it found higher Indeed level the intimidation. that the the was confidence of guerrilla it, information it Portuguese in to the the the ability protect soldier's greater population intimidation build do Guerrilla ("wall could easily a muro of silencio would provide.

2'Pereira da Costa, 149. 26Estado-Maiordo Exercito, 0 Exdreito na Guerra Subversiva [The Army in do Estado-Maior Exercito, 1963), Vol. II, Part 1, Chapter V, (Lisbon: War] Subversive 2. page

225

it between the the soldiers, population and and required enormous patience, silence") time, and good will to penetratethis "wall. "' great. The rewards of doing so, however, were

This well established principle was explained by Second Lieutenant Oliver

Crawford from his experiencesin Malaya in 1955: But we could not bring our military machine to bear without information, and we could not get information without the support of the population, and we would not get the support of the free from they terrorism, and we could not were unless population free them from terrorism until we had sent men to kill the terrorists. So it went round and round -a most complicated combination of vicious circles. The key to breaking thesevicious information. thing: one circles remained And so the breaking of this "wall of silence" paid dividends for the Portuguese,as well.

An illustration of the typical result of this type of work occurred around the village 1970. in It here November Portuguese Guine, began that to Bissssema, was patrols of PAIGC information their the that through the contacts with population were acquire four bi-grupos 150 The Portuguese their with or about to camp men. attack. planning insurgents into in between laid the the trap would attack which crossfire a a consequently in jungle. hidden The bivouacked the only escaperoute was through patrol camp and a force it PAIGC When destroyed the booby-trapped attacked, was minefield. as a result a 28 intelligence. Of this this course source was a two-edged sword. of the use skilful of Portuguesecombat groups generally patrolled by day and establishedambushesat night PAIGC, however, PAIGC. The detect the to on pressure steady were able to maintain a

rSubsfdiospara o Estudoda Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhas de Africa (19611974), 157.

de Africa (1961-1974), Vol. 111,168;and 28Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas Lieutenant Colonel Baptista Lopes, interview by Al J. Venter in Portugal's War in Guine-Bissau (Pasadena:California Institute of Technology, 1973), 90-91.

226

its through contact with the population. Thus in order to remain effective, the ambushes Portuguese were forced to move the ambush sites constantly29

Air Reconnaissance Air reconnaissance was the complementarymethod to ground reconnaissance and was in difficult in locating important the activity and vast expansesof the guerrilla very theatres. It was difficult to do well becauseof the cover provided by the forests and jungles and the deep reservoir of experienceand skill required by an observer to identify the clues to insurgent presencefrom the air. An observer neededto know the area well detect He familiarity by flying over his he this that changes. acquired could easily so in Dornier DO-27 a observation aircraft at the relatively area routinely assigned patrol low altitude of 200 meters for many hours. Consequently he was able to discern the typical clues to insurgent presence:a new footbridge, a new trail, new and heavy use of an old trail, boats concealedalongside a stream, shelters built at the edge of the forest 30 lack domestic in huts. In the than and a of crops or open, animals around rather fly the to the aircraft on a straight continue site, pilot would suspicious a observing hoped It if that this routine would not flush curious was noted. was nothing course as the guerrillas. Altering course and loosing altitude for a closer look could cause them bridge, In the their case quickly. of a a boat, a trail, or another object of camp to move 31 look less however, 50 than a close at no meters was generallywarranted. transit guerrilla use,

interview, 9 April 1994. 29lnocentes 30Captain Pilot Aviator Joaquim Vito Corte-Real Negro, "Subsidios para o ReconhecimentoAereo Visual" [Aid to Visual Air Reconnaissance],Boletim do Estado Major da Forca Aerea (N212 - 1962): 34. 31Negro,42.

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Photographs of these sightings were a useful tool and their analysis was helpful in 32 insurgents. Details not easily visible to the naked the or presence absenceof revealing identified in be more could readily pictures. For instance, the construction of normal eye huts included a door and windows. Insurgent huts had two or three large doors, no 33 larger hut. These subtleties might elude the naked the than normal windows and were discerned from in be flight but could easily post-flight photography analysis. Other eye clues were detectablein the use of burned over areas, fishing structuresalong the rivers, ' float bridges, bridges, dugout forth. Also trails, rafts, canoes, suspension caves,and so a series of photographs taken over a month could show changes in the use of these facilities. Information from air reconnaissance was fed to the Army on a continuous basis, as an enemy beaten in one place today would tomorrow establish new camps at another with extraordinary speed. The enemy's tactics were also in a constant state of flux, and it was vital to detect these changes promptly and to modify operations " accordingly.

The bulk of intelligence came from these Army patrols and air reconnaissance "' be In the north of Angola during their effectiveness cannot understated. and missions, the reaction to the 1961 incursions from the Congo, air reconnaissance was indispensable in locating guerrillas in the tall elephant grass and in directing the ground forces to

32Marques Pinto interview, 30 March 1995. 33Negro,35, and Marques Pinto interview, 30 March 1995. 34Negro,34-40. 35Negro,43. 36Valderano interview, 17 March 1995.

228

engagement. This particular operation by the T-6 Harvard and Auster aircraft from the new military airport of Negage, namedAerdromo-Base N2 3 (AB3), occurred in April 1961. It was centred around the village of Mucaba and its reoccupation by units of the 37 21st Battalion of Paratroops.

The senseof urgency in reacting to the results of air reconnaissancedependedon many factors, the activity of the guerrillas, their proximity to or remotenessfrom the local the troops. Normally guerrillas did not concentrate availability of and population, in large numbers, so locating them required quartering the large expanses of Angola and Mozambique in searchof their telltale signs. Visual reconnaissance was necessarilydone in daylight, and the guerrillas worked at night, so with this limitation deductions had to be made from these signs." Once located, the Portugueseintelligence network began to develop a picture of their intentions. As the guerrillas moved on foot, their progress was Portuguese time to prepare a trap. The guerrillas were easily the and gave slow normally in had be had been They to taken planning any operation. great care and spooked, hunted so relentlessly that at any hint of danger they quickly melted away. The

intelligence picture would then have to be redeveloped. These procedures were in step with maintaining a subdued, cost-conscious war, as the small aircraft were

inexpensive to maintain, and were quiet and unobtrusive and relatively unsophisticated in the vastnessof the colonies. The results of these low-profile flight operations were

37ColonelPilot Aviator Augusto Candido Soaresde Moura, "Testemunho Norte de Angola (1961/1962)" [Witness of the North of Angola (1961/1962)], Mais Alto (19811989 period), 51. 38Negro,43.

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39 in light investment the of satisfactory modest extremely

Captured Guerrillas Captured enemy personnelpotentially representedthe best source of information and thus "a terrorist captured alive is much more valuable for intelligence purposes than a

dead one." Reconnaissance patrols were often assignedthe secondarymission of

capturing a prisoner, and this mission required careful preparation and special training. Upon capture an insurgent was immediately interrogated to obtain current information insurgents, local the their camps and staging points, the other area, presence of about their equipment, their lines of advance and withdrawal, and so forth. "' This highly

for immediately, information tested generally soundness and was verified at perishable least to the extent possible under field conditions.

The Portuguese were always concerned about mines and booby traps, and thus devices for insurgents destruction. Somewere to these also asked unmask were captured less depending fear their so, others on and and the proximity of their cooperative In these cases the prisoner was asked to lead the way to the compatriots. guerrilla devices, for as one Portugueseveteran commented, "After all they laid them and they knew where they were. X42

39Negro,43. 40Pereira da Costa, 150. "... un terrorista capturado vivo 6 muito maior valor para do " informaces terrorists morto. que um as

4tValderano interview, 17 March 1995. 42Inocentes interview, 14 April 1994. 230

A secondinterrogation would occur at battalion or sector headquarters to obtain more detailed information on the insurgent himself, his training, background, companions,and instructors. While most of theseinterrogationswere performed by Portuguesespecialists, there were exceptions. In Zala, for instance, there was an insurgent captured in 1965 for Alfredo the Portuguese. He had developeda and who now worked named who was

talent for interrogation, as he knew the languageof the guerrillas that habitually
infiltrated into the area and had formerly servedan insurgent commanderin interrogating from Captain Ricardo Alcada Portuguese. the garrison post at Nambuangongo, captured Angola, explained that Alfredo "usually spentan hour or two with a man in a room. By the time he came out he knew the man's history, who his grandmother was, whether she in doing the area, what his unit was, what he was the man was was a communist, what know. in fact Portuguese "43 do the to to could everything wish going -

An assessment would then be made as to whether the man was wholeheartedly with the nationalist movementor whether he had been coerced into joining by fear, promises, in demonstrations In both. the troops these training shown cases prisoner was and of or firepower. An attempt was made to convince him that the Portuguesewould prevail in ` the struggle. The prisoner was also exposedto the new villages and the social work for including done being These latter the the population, apresentados. was which individuals were Africans living in the bush due either to fear of the insurgents or of the Portuguese troops and who had presentedthemselvesto the authorities for resettlement

43Captain Ricardo Alcada, interview by Al J. Venter in The Terror Fighters: A Profile in Southern Warfare Africa (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons (S.A. ) (Pty.) Guerrilla of Ltd., 1969), 72.

interview, 17 March 1995. 44Valderano 231

in the new villages. They could also be civilians working for the insurgents as porters, cooks, and the like, and had simply run from the camp. With this exposure to an environment of law and order, organisedadministration, and medical care, the prisoner was supposedto conclude that life under a Portugueseadministration would be infinitely 45 insurgent in dangerous bush hard the to the an existence of and preferable

Treatment of Africans by the insurgents also contrasted sharply with that of the Portuguese. Anything from a minor mistake, such as the loss of a weapon or kit, to a rational questioning of authority could draw a severe penalty from the insurgent "' It was thus very rare in the case of a captured insurgent, apresentado, or leadership. deserter to rejoin the insurgents, although he had the opportunity to do so." The

facilities These isolated, the of war camps. prisoner were and all one of alternative was were similar to Sao Nicolau on the southern coast of Angola, which was bounded by desert With flee the the to side and on other. sea on one opportunity shark-infested foreclosed by natural obstacles the atmosphere was relaxed. Frequently the former insurgents would take a new wife and with Portuguesehelp build a new life. "'

This benign approach was not necessarily the norm, however, and all dependedon If the time the capturing patrol was on an operation and of capture. at circumstances

a5Valderano interview, 17 March 1995. 46Michael Calvert, "Counter-Insurgency in Mozambique," Royal United Services Institute Journal for Defense Studies (March 1973): 83.

interview, 5 June 1995. 47lnocentes "Marques Pinto interview, 30 March 1995. 232

believed that it was in immediate danger, then treatment would acquire a sense of in Guine 1970 during Geba late In the the around confluence of operations and urgency. the Corubal Rivers, a PAIGC infiltration group crossedthe border from Kandiafara with the mission of cutting and mining the Bafata road. The unit had attacked Bambadinca

bi-grupos for further two to with assaults. await rendezvous and withdrawn oneevening The following day a Portuguese a PAIGC patrol from Artillery Battalion2917 captured
in firing intact Included PAIGC the group a shot. was a senior without party scouting by helicopter flown Bambadinca He to and given a choice of revealing all was officer. or dying. hours.49 General Spinola was allegedly privy to the entire battle plan within a few

Lieutenant Colonel Joo Barros e Cunha, garrison commanderat Nambuangongoin 1968 described another aspect of the rehabilitation program: "We offer the hand of friendship to thesepeople - partly becausewe feel we have to, from a Christian point of for know help X50 In because they the their can us win war. exchange we view, and partly lives the terrorists were required to disclose all from beginning to end: "names, places, future documents dates training, and past programs and explain of any and signals, codes, in in found "51 Finally have been their possession. a moment of truth the that may plans former his lead headquarters Portuguese is to the to tour and provide a required prisoner

de f ica (1961-1974), Vol. 111,167;and Histrico-Militar das Campanhas 49Resenha Lieutenant Colonel JoaoMonteiro, interview by Al J. Venter in Portugal's War in GuineBissau (Pasadena:California Institute of Technology, 1973), 151. SOLieutenant Colonel Joao Barros e Cunha, interview by Al J. Venter in The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons (S.A. ) (Pty. ) Ltd., 1969), 55. 51Barrose Cunha interview.

233

of his operational area. It is here where the final showdown comes. The man takes a patrol through the jungle to his various hide-outs. He shows them the places he has usedin his own campaign against the Portuguese. Invariably he is spotted by his former jungle. from They know this man is betraying them and their the colleagues cause to their sworn enemy. The Portuguesein turn know that if the prisoner ever tries to return to his guerrilla colleagues he will be shot for helping the enemy. The defector knows this as well. It's as simple as that. This man becomesour man and we are so confident that he will continue to help us, for he has no alternative really, that we give him a gun to protect himself. 52

Torture was formally prohibited by directives of the Commanders-in-Chief. It was in French Algeria, and was entirely contrary to Portugal's the as sanctioned, with never including the the allegiance of population, of winning captured insurgents. It was policy further seen as alienating both domestic and foreign allies." Both of these reactions

would seriously undermine the overall war effort, and certainly the French experience in Algeria was an object lesson. The French malfeasancein the use of torture in intelligence operations among other factors made ties to France ever less desirable and ' for Algerians. the tenable Even military successfor France could not overcome this

factor. it While be would manifestly untrue to state that torture was political adverse information by Portuguese, its the through received used use was always suspect, never " have limited. been its to practise appears and

52Barros e Cunha interview. 53Valderano interview, 17 March 1995. Christopher C. Harmon, "Illustrations of 'Learning' Comparative Strategy (January-March 1992), 33. in Counterinsurgency,

55Valderano interview, 17 March 1995. 234

Under normal conditions prisoners were seemingly treated well.

Most had been

indoctrinated with the myth that, if captured, they would be subjected to a slow and painful execution.-' When they were actually captured and were treated decently, the intelligence. in factor developing Lieutenant became Colonel sound a major revelation Barros e Cunha describedthe rehabilitation of Alberto Imbu, a former guerrilla who had in had been badly Algeria his Tclemen training and wounded on 18 March at received 1967 on an operation near Nambuangongo. After recovering under Portuguesemedical his in led he had on old camp, where many of his former an ambush a patrol care, " killed. comrades were This behaviour was not uncommon in guerrillas from other

instance, for Vietnam, In the U. S. Marine Corps found that once conflicts and cultures. fear hospital had had Cng been their Viet care, and and pain received replaced wounded " be The British they cooperative. routinely very experiencedthe same would relief, with in in directing the Sultanateof Oman the campaign counterinsurgency prisoner reaction in the early 1970s. ProfessorsBlaufarb and Tanham explain the procedure there: In the early phasesof the program, captured insurgents were interrogated in the normal businesslike fashion. This proved unproductive. It was then decided to try handling them according to the rules pertaining in that desert society for They were greeted politely, offered coffee, and chatted up guests. welcoming before being asked questions of interest. This approach worked well and was followed for the rest of the war.59

56Valderano interview, 17 March 1995. S'Barros e Cunha interview. 58U. S. Marine Corps, Professional Knowledge Gainedfrom Operational Experience in Vietnam, 1967 (Washington: HeadquartersUnited StatesMarine Corps, 1969), 136137.

27. 59Blaufarb Tanham, and

235

When the Portuguese followed these tested principles of treating prisoners, they intelligence. When they did not, the processresulted sound, reliable generally acquired in inaccurate information, it discourageddisaffected enemy from surrendering, and it degradedthe Army's standingin the eyesof the people. Certainly this situation was the

in 1968 FRELIMO district in Mozambique Tete the of when opened an offensive case
there from its new sanctuaryin neighbouring Zambia. In mid-1971 General Kalza de Arriaga, the Commander-in-Chiefof the Armed Forces of Mozambique, installed a brutal Armindo Videira. Once in Colonel Tete, the extent of this officer's governor military in became Wiriyamu the tragedy terror and culminated apparent of on applied systematic ' 16 December 1972, he was dismissed. The damage had been done, however, and

Portugal never fully recovered the confidence of the population there.

Captured Documents and Equipment Captured documentsand equipmentrepresentedan important facet of the intelligence handled Normally documents and preserved. carefully were and were effort collection it language in Portuguese, the often only common as was available to the written insurgents.61 For the most part the local languagesof PortugueseAfrica are spokenonly. When a prisoner of any importance was captured, documentswere usually found on him or with his equipment. These documents were used to verify his story during

interrogation and provided a valuable index to his credibility. 62 In many cases the

611homas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence 1964-1974 (London: Greenwood Press, 1978), 130.

61Marques Pinto interview, 30 March 1995. 62Pereira da Costa, 149.

236

circumstancesof capture proved to be as important as the documentitself. For example, any document listing guerrilla units was particularly important if connected with the precise time and place of capture. Battlefield searchesalso often uncovered official papers. Particularly important was a searchof the dead insurgents, as they often carried

documents that revealedtheir intentionsand were of immediatetactical value. These

were always processedas rapidly as possible through channels, as such information was invariably perishable."

In one instance captured documentsprovided the Portuguesewith confirmation that their operationswere effective in denying the PAIGC permanentcampsin Guine. A field Gadamael in 1971 July on the southern frontier was written in near messagecaptured Portugueseand reiterated a decree to the effect that no PAIGC unit was to remain in a local area for more than two days. It also reminded bi-grupo leaders and commissarsof in disobeying this order both from the PAIGC command and from the the consequences " had been located. They would be punishedby both. Force Air the Portuguese once unit

Captured equipment provided the Portuguese with an indication on the type and degree of support that the guerrillas were receiving from external sources. The taking intelligence by the or complemented strategic confirmed equipment provided such of Lisbon. The Portuguesepublished booklets describing the equipmentand its capabilities, by location the their types armament enemy of used and all of capture. By cataloguing

63Pereira da Costa, 149. 64LieutenantColonel Lemos Pires, interview by Al J. Venter in Portugal's War in Guine-Bissau (Pasadena:California Institute of Technology, 1973), 45. 237

these means the troops knew the enemy's order of battle and what to expect in combat. The information on mines and booby traps was particularly helpful 65

Agents and Informers For the Portuguesethe use of agentsand informers was a normal processin obtaining information. In some caseswithin the theatres such agents worked with the military

directly, and in others they sought the police, dependingon which authority was present in the area. It was for this reason that a close liaison between the two was so vital and in intelligence jealousy gathering were so counterproductive. More often and competition than not the police were in closer contact with the population than the Army and

" for facilities better this centralising activity. possessed

In penetratingthe sanctuarycountrieswhere the nationalist movementsresided, border handled Army through the and agents on missions further afield agents were generally 67 by PIDE handled were Competition between the various factions within the

informers bred fostered fissure Disaffected that and a agents. provided movements fertile the a source of recruits and an opportunity for proved movements all of members PIDE to sow the seeds of dissention. In Guine, the PAIGC "suffered from internal frictions betweenthe mulatto CapeVerdian leadershipand the African Guineans;and this

65Marques Pinto interview, 26 June 1995,Lagos. "Pereira da Costa, 148-149. 67Marques Pinto interview, 26 June 1995.
238

by "" the Portuguese. exploited naturally was

In Mozambique the main nationalist movement, FRELIMO, was in open competition for forces 1972 only not external sponsorship but also for until with rival nationalist nationalist movement dominance. Additionally, within FRELIMO there was a split between those committed to revolutionary socialism and the conservatives. The isolated followed found themselves their leader, Lazaro Kavandame, and conservatives in joining the Portuguese. Shortly thereafter in February 1969, FRELIMO's leader, by a parcel bomb. Earlier he had recognisedthe Eduardo Mondlane, was assassinated factionalism and its opportunities for exploitation, particularly by PIDE: Another difficulty, particularly acute in the early stages of development, when know little is danger the the about one another, members movement's of of many infiltration by Portuguese agents. And this is connected with the problem of splinter groups, since thesemay use a member of the main organisation to try to bring dissent, to over a section of the membership. The complexity so as spread it divisive difficult behind the to guard against: conduct makes more of motives individual neuroses,personal ambitions, real ideological differences are muddled 69 the tactics secret the service. enemy of up with

The Angolan nationalist movements spent most of their time fighting among themselvesand thus had little united war effort. The Portuguese were so successfulin it defections differences Rene Pelissier that to these and causing prompted exploiting informants Portuguese in "the PIDE in 1971 Congo-Kinshasa that networks and comment

"Peter Janke, "Southern Africa: End of Empire," Conflict Studies (December 3. 1974),
69Eduardo Mondlane, TheStrugglefor Mozambique(London: Zed Press, 1969), 132. 239

in "70 division the to of ground. effect a parachutists on are equal

It is likely that the Portuguesein their missions to Algeria learned something from the French experience there. Here the French had proved very adept in their use of

in indicated: 1957 August description Home's Alistair of events agents,as

Meanwhile, the French were resorting to new and subtler techniques of inspiration Captain Leger, Arabic Under the of an expert with the penetration. 11th Shock, selected turncoats clad inconspicuously in workers' dungarees, or bleus de chauffe, were unleashed in the Casbah to mingle with their former terrorist associatesand lead Godard's intelligence operatives to the bosses' lairs. that the expression la bleuite, or "the The technique was to achieve such success blues, " later assumeda particularly sinister connotation in the war as whole." It would also be a gross dereliction for a country fighting an insurgency not to exploit the its leaders and organisational deficiencies, as of a movement's personal weaknesses explained by Mr. Michael Elliott-Bateman: It is a mistake to start off by imagining the enemy are a solid block of fence block the a solid of and we are of anti-communists side on one communists half If that the game, and attitude with one misses the starts off one other. on in incredible fail the to strains and stresses any revolutionary movement. note will For a start, great struggles for leadership and power are going on within the is lesson be If there one exploited. can or one technique which enemy structure that should be developedin counter-insurgency,it is the ability to infiltrate within 72 debase it. to the organisation so as splinter and the structure of enemy's

The Portugueseconsistently sought to undermine the organisational structure of the Campaigns. The during the existenceof many and varied ethnomovements nationalist

70Douglas L. Wheeler and Rene Pelissier, Angola (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), 216. "Alistair Home, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 212. from the Vietnam War, Report of a seminar held 72MichaelElliott-Bateman, Lessons, in Services Institute London, 12 United February 1966,4-5. Royal the at 240

linguistic groups throughout the theatresmade the task of maintaining constituencyorder far more difficult for the insurgents than the Portuguese. Any action, normally brutal, against the population by either side was an unpardonable offense and an unbearable transgressionagainsta group, particularly if it were inflicted by insurgents of a different

of vendettas was a continuingconditionof the Campaigns73 group. An undercurrent

Guides and Translators The Portugueseused guides and translators routinely to identify and track insurgents and to communicate with the population. Normally such guides were simple,

unsophisticated people whose confidence and cooperation were vital to Portuguese " success. In Angola, for instance, the best trackers were Bushmen from the Kalahari

75 The Desert in the southeast, who were also initially employed as PIDE agents Bushmen were intelligent and gifted people who had: lost none of their age-old talent for tracking in the bush. In the sandy wastes ... they are able to pick up trails that are often a week old. They can tell how old it in have is, how and used which direction the original party track many people a humans, the tell they smell of could also presence and you going.. whether was . they were black or white - all at a distance of about a quarter mile, or further, 76 in direction the the right wind with

73Inocentes interview, 5 June 1995. 74Pereira da Costa, 149. Oscar Cardoso, interview by the author, 1 April 1995, Azaruja, Portugal. Sr. Cardoso is a former Inspector with the PIDEJDGS and was instrumental in founding the Flechas. ""Captain Vitor Manuel Rodrigues Alves, interview by Al J. Venter in The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons (S.A. ) (Pty. ) Ltd., 1969), 142. 241

With the plethora of local languagesin each of the theatres,translators were attached to every unit to accommodatethose that might be encounteredin its operating area. In Guine, for example, each company had between20 and 23 translators attached, as there n in languages 20 different the they their that might use course of operations. were some These translators also provided a bridge between the population and the soldiers in the field and took great pride in their responsibilities for the simple reward of appreciation '' in Their their needs. pay, the physical while normally equal value of satisfaction and kind Portuguese of and cash, and often payment was that a mixture to soldier, was of a divided and made not only to the translator but to his wife or wives."'

The importance of being able to communicate with both the population and the in insurgency. be the political atmosphere overemphasised of an cannot captured enemy This requirement was not unique to the theatresin PortugueseAfrica, and the men of the 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, cameto understandthis principle in their 19661967 deployment to Vietnam and to learn what the Portuguesehad found so indispensable in cross-cultural communication. Colonel O'Neill, its commanding officer, explained: I used one of our Vietnamesenative interpreters when talking to the villagers, not but because interpreter formed Vietnamese, did I because the speak not a only I between bridge the with whom myself and person was talking. It seemed social Vietnamese important to relax as much as possible and a good to get each very Vietnamese interpreter was able to do this far better than any European. This interrogation, for important but for not only general contact consideration was interpreter for knew Vietnamese the social a good and civilians, officials with form, he knew the local area, he could effect the right sort of introduction at the

T'Brigadeiro He1io A. EstevesFelgas, interview by the author, 22 November 1994, Lisbon.

78Pereira da Costa, 149. 796scar Cardosointerview, 1 April 1995.

242

humour he knew to use, he could warn a conversation, what of commencement me if I put a foot wrong and he could suggestsomething I might do or say to the person with whom we were speaking which would produce a favourable " reaction.

In contrastthe U. S. Army in Vietnamlackedthe attuned approach of the Portuguese

lack familiarity by hampered language its "intelligence the a of with were operations and by they the absenceof any the working as as were well with whom people and culture of Army procedures for the procurement of such intelligence. "81 The Portuguesesoldiers local have facility for knew in Africa tongues to and or more seemed one a recruited 82 fight if "you After a political them. cannot war you cannot communicate all, acquiring fighting. "" for you are the and with whom whom people with

The Key to Counterinsurgency

The Portugueseclearly understoodthat the centralised flow of intelligence was the key to counterinsurgencyand that this flow would come primarily from the population." They consequentlydesignedtheir intelligence collecting machinery to work in this special from here It that their effort again entire was reoriented conventional was environment. information focus its the the to primary source as on enemy of war with

"Robert J. O'Neill, Vietnam Task(Melbourne: CassellAustralia, Ltd., 1968), 75-76. "Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., TheArnry in Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 230. "Marques Pinto interview, 30 March 1995. 83PhilipGoodhart, Lessonsfrom the Vietnam War, Report of a seminar held at the Royal United Services Institute in London, 12 February 1966,16.

8`Marques Pinto interview, 30 March 1995.

243

in which the operating area and the civil population there were counterinsurgency, by junior The this of was well articulated a Portuguese understanding principle primary.

officer writing in a military journal of the time:

Intelligence is the principal contributing factor in implementing adequate measures is internal The the terrorists to destroy the objective of primary security. of population's confidence in the guaranteesof protection that can be provided by local government. With this objective achieved, the local population is reluctant to provide intelligence to the authorities for fear of reprisals. Only with well it be loss to this reestablish of confidence. will possible operations conducted And these depend upon the timely utilisation of reliable intelligence, developed from this source to satisfy the clear requirement of being advised in advanceas 85 habits the terrorist and methods of operation. much as possible on

No counterinsurgency could be won without intelligence, and indeed nothing happened without information. The Portuguese intelligence apparatus sought it

Crawford Oliver described Lieutenant just First British in the as experience relentlessly, Malaya: The search for information was the key to the war. Information came from it; lives from bought from informers; their terrorists, with spies; who captured from every kind of civilian contact and grapevine; from photographs of the jungle; from single footprints in the jungle; from captured documents, weapons, from jungle-patrols the the of reports supplies; quartering clothes, camps, backwards and forwards over the same huge areas. All this added up into the files which, accumulating, told us more and more about our enemy and massive how to kill him. 86 And killing, or preferably capturing, insurgentswho had infiltrated into the three theatres

85Pereirada Costa, 147. "A informagdo eo factor contribuinte principal para interna. de 0 dos de seguranca adequadas primeiro medidas objectivo aplicagdo descrddito as e entre o a populagdo quanto garantiasde protecgdoque the criar terroristas local. Conseguido dadas locais pelo governo este objectivo, as populag6es ser possam informaces fornecer desta forma, tornando-se, a seguras, a recusar-se evidente passam dos hbitos de, conhecer, o mais possfvel, com antecedencia, se procurar a necessidade dos " de terroristas. actuagdo e mdtodos

"Crawford, 179-180.
244

was Portugal's military aim.

As intelligence networks operatelargely in secret, the details of their organisationand litmus The to test for the effectivenessof an outsiders. not often visible operations are intelligence apparatus is the frequency with which it is taken by surprise. In the Campaignsthe Portuguesewere seldom caught unawares, but when they were the results in in initial 1961 Angola The events representedmore a failure to act on were severe. intelligence than poor intelligence itself. " Thereafter, the system in all three theatres

it to and was more often the insurgents who were taken well, appeared work relatively by surprise in operationsthat were plannedand executedregularly to exploit information. The contribution of a good intelligence network was one of the decisive factors in Portugal's ability to sustain the conflict for thirteen years and to employ its limited resources in effectively controlling the guerrilla threat. It was able to anticipate the him defeat largely over this prolonged period through consistently guerrilla well and thorough intelligence work. The most notable exception lay in the Tete district of

Mozambique, where FRELIMO in 1969 shifted from attacks on the massive Cabora Bassa dam project to politicising the population-88 FRELIMO began systematically Zambesi, deteriorated the the tribal and north of security chiefs situation eliminating largely became Portuguese It the unawares. caught readily apparent that the and rapidly intelligence network in Tete had either failed or been disregarded. The failure in the

"Brigadier Martins Soares, interview by Al J. Venter in The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons Ltd., 1969), 12-13. "Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record: Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: 1964-1981 (London: John Murray Ltd., 1987), 116. 245

north of Angola in 1961 may have been understandable. The failure of the intelligence in apparatus Tete in 1969 representeda serious void in that Portuguese complacency about FRELIMO's capabilities allowed a rapid subversion of the district.

Notwithstanding this setback, information was the cornerstone of Portuguese

intelligence. This and no operation proceeded without substantial counterinsurgency,

fragile military presence stretched across the three an otherwise strength sustained theatres and was indicative of Portugal's use of leverage in pursuing a relatively inexpensive advantageover its opponents.

246

VIII
Portuguese Approach to Mobility in Counterinsurgency

"Foot slogging" by infantrymen was the most important and fundamental way to limitations his insurgency; however, increase To his to there were mobility. an address introduced helicopter Portuguese two the the contrasting means, and the horse. versatility, While there were other, more conventional solutions to the mobility problem, such as trucks, jeeps, and light armoured cars, thesevehicles required at least crude roads, had land limitations, to terrain mines. The helicopter had no such and were vulnerable other limitations, and the horse was ideal transportation in the rugged areas of central and These Mozambique. Angola two methodswere by no meanspanaceas and central eastern for Portugal's ground force mobility requirements; however, they are considered here becausethey bear the distinctive imprint of Portuguesecounterinsurgency. This chapter describes the organisation and development of these two responsesand examines their in insurgents hunting limitations initiative. the and maintaining and strengths compares and contrasts their counterinsurgencies. employment to that in other It also

contemporary

Initial Helicopter Operations The advent of the helicopter and its application in counterinsurgencybegan with the British in Malaya on 1 April 1950 with the formation of the Far East Casualty Air

247

Evacuation Flight at Seletar with a strength of three Westland S-51 Dragonfly helicopters.' During the Malayan Emergency the British used their helicopters primarily for casualty evacuation and later for airlifting troops. Their helicopters suffered from problems, and availability was consequentlylow. Helicopters at that severemaintenance time were relatively new, and there were many teething problems associatedwith their in insidious tropical environment. At the height of helicopter the employment, especially operations in 1956, there were only 17 medium and 14 light helicopters, or a total of 31, 2 inadequate. Operationswere exclusively transport, and and thesenumbers were always insertions beginning in 1952, troop there there was nothing and extractions were while its associatedtactics. a gunship with as as advanced

The French beganthe war in Algeria in October 1954with one Bell helicopter rented from a commercial firm and six months later acquired 8 Sikorsky helicopters from the U. S. Air Force in Germany.' With this modest beginning the French Air Force

helicopter develop, to and expand employment, and experimentedwith refine, proceeded lightly armed helicopters and airborne commandposts. From 1957 onward, about three helicopter beginning had become a mainstay of the the of conflict, operations after years 4 in Algeria. counterinsurgency

'Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth's Wars 1948-1966 (London: Routledge, 1991), 95.

2Jackson, 96-97.
'Alistair Home, A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 113. "Major Hilaire Bethouart, "Combat Helicopters in Algeria, " in The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, ed. T. N. Green (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), 266267. 248

The PortugueseAir Force was heavily influenced by theseFrench developmentsand its but African theatres them to also purchasedFrench equipment in the adapted only not Sud Aviation series of helicopters. The Portuguesewere slower than either the French or the British to embracethe helicopter as a counterinsurgencytool, and it was five years

from the beginningof the wars in 1961until the initial combatoperations occurredin
Angola in 1966.

Except for the individual Portuguesesoldier, the most useful all-purpose item in the theatres was the helicopter. Becauseof its versatility there were always missions to be flown, and consequentlyits use was continually rationed. The helicopter was the one in difficult illustratively, the the terrain, that mobility proper and could provide vehicle ' in helicopter hour foot flight in jungle. the equalled about a one on a one minute Applying this formula in Guine, for instance, meant that the lack of a helicopter to bring the typical patrol out of the jungle following operations resulted in a return walk of two days and a night for its men." The freakish geographical configuration of Guind made the helicopter the most efficient method of moving forces there, as the British had earlier ' in In February 1952 Flight Lieutenant J. R. Dowling made Malaya. be found to true lift 17 "from in Ulu terrorist to the men and a captured a swamp sorties of number a Bernani area north-west of Selangor (Malaya), when rising water threatenedto cut them

from the Vietnam War, Report of a 'Lieutenant General Sir Walter Walker, Lessons in United Royal Services Institute London, 12 February 1966,21. held the at seminar 6Luis Alberto Santiago Inocentes, Colonel, Staff Corps, PortugueseArmy (Retired), interviewed by the author, 9 April 1994, London. 7Brigadeiro Hdlio A. Esteves Felgas, "Papel do Helicptero na Guerra da Guin6" [Role of the Helicopter in the War in Guin6], Jornal do Exercito (August 1968): 33. 249

off.

The soldiers were all suffering badly from fatigue and sickness after spending

twenty-nine days in swampcountry, and it would have taken a fortnight for help to reach

"' them by surfacetransport.

In counterinsurgency to makecontactwith the challenge warfaretherewasa constant

was often impossible, or the enemy. When contact was made, complete reconnaissance ' be lost. for Consequently, the security forces required engagementwould opportunity flexibility infrequent to these capitalise on and opportunities and to speed, mobility helicopter The tactical was the answer to responding promptly and success. establish 10 The Portuguese became from in helicopter enemy contact. quite proficient profiting in developed Borneo, followed by Lieutenant the methods as explained and operations General Sir Walter Walker: "We usedour helicopters... to achieve a silent approach, and to achieve surprise by setting down troops unseenand unheardneatly in depth to outflank did "" This type the of capability not come easily, and the Portuguese enemy. outwit and force hard train to a composite of aviators and ground troops based mould and worked African helicopter their to the adaptation and capabilities environment. on

Portuguese Adaption The first helicopter operations were begun in 1966 near Madureira and Zala in Angola against UPA attacks on convoys. Initially ten rotorcraft were deployed in the

'Jackson,98-99.
9Duke of Valderano, interview by the author, 17 March 1995, London. 10Walker,21. "Walker, 7. 250

Dembos region and would deposit a picked body of Commandos behind an ambushing insurgent force, thereby blocking its escape and catching it in a crossfire.12 This procedure was the simplest and most obvious use of heliborne troops and had been used by the British and French since the early years of Malaya and Algeria. 13 Thereafter

became quite refined. operations

In Angola the Portugueseformed flights of five helicopters together capableof putting 20 men on the ground quickly and judiciously to take advantage of insurgent contact. The order of battle of the normal flight comprised five helicopters to accommodatethe five sectionsof a combat group of Commandos,although the actual size dependedon the flight If be the transported. to troops was expected to encounter resistance, number of then a heli-canhdo or helicopter gunship with a 20mm cannon covered the insertion and '4 as required. recovery and provided support

The key to its successfuloperation was the lead pilot in the flight. He was invariably fixed in both helicopters and wing aircraft, and would spend the qualified an aviator initial phase of his training flying many hours low over the his assignedoperational area in a small Dornier DO-27 observation aircraft. In addition to familiarising himself with the terrain, he would mark a map with suitable helicopter landing sites that might be used

"CaptainRicardoAlcada,interviewby Al J. Venterin TheTerror Fighters:A Profile Southern (Capetown: in Purnell Africa Warfare Sons 1969), Ltd., 71. Guerrilla and of
13Lieutenant Colonel Roland S. N. Mans, "Victory in Malaya, " in The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, ed. T. N. Green (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), 266126; and Bethouart, 266. interview, 17 March 1995; and Marques Pinto correspondence, 18 July 14Valderano 1995. 251

in future operations. In designating the landing sites, he would also mark approach routes to each. These routes were chosenfor their natural terrain features which would mask a flight's arrival and potentially provide as near total surprise as possible. In for familiarisation the pilots, the Commandosand other troops the area conjunction with 's its team. memberswere proficient as a rehearsedoperations until

Once prepared, the team was kept on alert at a primary base, such as Luanda or Luso, until an operation was imminent. At that point the group would relocate to a be in there the operations, anticipated where area of might a wait of several major airfield days before an opportunity occurred. The entire success or failure of the mission depended on the factor of surprise, and considerable pains were taken to achieve it. Reconnaissanceof the target was kept to an absolute minimum to avoid flushing the forbidden Discussion the of mission was outside the secure prematurely. guerrillas briefing area.", Once called, the team would quickly be given its final brief and

launched, taking the most direct preselectedroute to the target area and its prescribed 17 flying (LZ), the landing zone earth profile enroute. The helicopter gunship a nap of his LZ, fire, the the cannon area with and providing covering suppressing circle would if required, while the other helicopters were most vulnerable in debarking the assault force. The 20mm cannon was much feared by the guerrillas and was an improvement

interview, 17 March 1995. 15Valderano interview, 17 March 1995. 16Valderano "General Tomas George Conceicdo e Silva, interview by the author, 3 April 1995, Lisbon. General Conceico e Silva was the Chief of Staff of the PortugueseAir Force from 1988 to 1991. 252

18 lighter There French less the use of rockets and machineguns. might accurate over 19 9-rocket DO-27 These two be Dornier canisters, one under each wing. with a also 37mm rockets were used for marking with smoke or attacking guerrilla sites. They had been developed by the French and were very reliable. " The force would immediately

" fire the the covering of gunship. move to engagethe enemy under

At the conclusion of the action, the helicopters would land at the nearestsuitable site highly hopefully The load team a valued prisoner. entire action the and assault and would last about ten minutes, and the team would then prepare to assault another in field insurgents the the The team remain pursuing normally and would objective. forces day. At throughout the the conclusion of ground with operations coordinating daylight operations, it would rendezvouswith a preselected, specially equipped ground for As bivouac the to only certain units were equipped with evening. unit with whom in fuel, host field to ammunition, and maintenance capability an air support the necessary During considerable this some planning and coordination. team, choice required assault fuelled be for further helicopters the and rearmed, and the men rested would the evening for four day. This days before following three to process continued the operations ' base. returning to the original

266-267. 18Bethouart, 19Conceico e Silva interview, 3 April 1995, 267. 20Bethouart,

interview, 17 March 1995. 21Valderano interview, 17 March 1995. 22Valderano

253

Upon occasiontwo air assault teamswould be employed together, thereby doubling the force on the ground from 20 to 40 troops. Unless the team was part of a larger in forces hammer formed the closing a one of and anvil tactic or a similar operation and by insurgent be larger force. body Thus care a could overrun a small such manoeuvre, had to be exercisednot to insert a team into an untenable situation?1

In Guine, where there was only one squadron of twelve helicopters, the loss of a ' With limited this a catastrophe. very number a team considered was single machine four helicopters. This three to occasionally and situation was a normal was restricted Spinola just General to that reluctant authorise was an assault on the such a constraint initiation of enemy contact. As the helicopters were relatively slow and there was little far difficult their to achieve than to approach, surprise was terrain more shield natural in Angola. When the PAIGC commanders heard helicopters approaching, they

disengagedand disappearedinto the jungle. Consequently, helicopters would generally intelligence insurgents beginning in the be the an operation when of on was not used not fully defined. General Spfnola's policy was to hold the helicopters in reserve while the intentions, likely determined the strength, and withdrawal routes of ground commanders PAIGC forces.15 It was at this point that the helicopter assault troops would be depositedbehind the enemy as a blocking force in an attempt to foreclose his withdrawal. This tactic was not always successful in terrain where an insurgent could "creep in

interview, 17 March 1995. 23Valderano interview, 9 April 1994. 24Inocentes SergeantAiphonso Mateus, interview by Al J. Venter in Portugal's War in GuineBissau (Pasadena:California Institute of Technology, 1973), 167. 254

between the lianas or a mangrove root and you won't see him even if you pass within touching distanceof him. "" Nevertheless,the surprise attackswhich were conductedby the ground forces in Guine and which were so successfulbetween 1963 and 1966 had become ineffective. By 1968 it was impossible to surprise an enemy camp becauseof the sentries and defensive mining and booby traps surrounding it, oftentimes out to a distanceof severalkilometres. The helicopter had been the only solution to regaining the initiative. '

Helicopter Limitations While the helicopter was seen as a high-technology tool essential to modem in it field, had this a and major advance operations represented also counterinsurgency important disadvantages. Helicopters were relatively expensive and their of number a increased Because costs significantly. to of this constraint the British a campaign addition in Malaya at the height of their campaignin 1956 could only muster 31 helicopters. The Portugueseby 1974 had accumulateda precious inventory of 93 helicopters and always 28 frustrated desires 12 These delivered when were newly machines, a more. wanted IIIs SA-330 Alouette Pumas, Sud Aviation destroyed in and were of a night composite Revoluciondria by Maoist AcCdo Armada the opposition underground raid sabotage

26Mateus interview. 2'Felgas, 33. 28T. N. Dupuy, John A. C. Andrews, and Grace P. Hayes, The Almanac of World Power (Dunn Loring, Virginia: T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1974), 112. The Portuguese helicopter order of battle comprised 2 Sud Aviation Alouette IIs, 80 Alouette HIs, and 11 SA-330 Pumas, a total of 93 machines. 255

(ARA) at the Tancos airbase in early 1971.19

Added to the initial cost of a helicopter were the extraordinarily high maintenance and in a tropical environment. Helicopters require a great particularly operating expenses, fly have to them, their men service and and specialised expense of very would number been a substantial and continuing burden, particularly as helicopter usage rose.30 Portugueseaircraft usagewas always high, as its number of available craft was severely limited. Further, the Portuguesemachineswere old before the strains of combat, for the 31 This situation required a high standard of inventory was largely second-hand. if did fly, it for to availability. planes aircraft not ensure was generally a maintenance lack of cash to buy spare parts.32 BecausePortugal had difficulty affording additional helicopters, preserving its current inventory was the best answer to the shortage. Because into fell Portugal having its in limited the trap troops never these of resources carried of helicopters so frequently that they lost contact with the population and lived in a different helicopters Moreover, from the the use of armed enemy. was carefully controlled, world in indiscriminate damage the through avoided population were casualties any and use so from Helicopter firepower. assault operations were executed away populated areas. of

There was much to be said about the advantages of helicopters; however, their

29Mateus interview. 30FrankKitson, Low Intensity Conflict: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1971), 137.

31Mateus interview. In 1972Portugalwascontinuingto acquireaircraft on a regular basis; however,the last new aircraft was takeninto servicein 1954. interview. 32Mateus
256

intelligent deployment was not always in direct proportion to their numbers. In fact, just the opposite might be said, and this principle worked in Portugal's favour. While this desire for additional helicopters was always present, the very limited number available forced Portugal to use the aircraft as effectively as possible. And indeed, search and destroy operations in the theatres would not have been possible without them. Nevertheless, when there was a vast quantity of helicopters, as with the U. S. in Vietnam, fully Such fostered keep to them there employed. pressure pressures constant was and loss in his Thompson Sir Robert of noted such a purpose criticism of the and a misuse, U. S. use of helicopters in Vietnam: "I have seen hundreds of helicopters and it is a fantastic sight. It is a constantstreamof helicopters and, when you get to that stage,you "" S. Army had The U. the enemy. constantly sought course with are not on a collision helicopters improvement its improve troop saw to mobility and as a quantum methods This by Chief Warrant leg position vehicles. was reinforced ground and power over Officer Robert Mason, a U. S. Army helicopter pilot in Vietnam, who described the in September1965 at laager area Lima, two following conversation with a squadronmate 19: "I Wendall... Route had French. He Khe talked to An the about on pass miles east of Fall. by Bernard Joy, Without Street read His descriptions of how the French were

destroyed around here by the samepeople we were going against got me depressed. The felt hadn't French helicopters. leaders the we could where win was our our major reason We were the official test, he said."' The development of the U. S. Army's airmobile

firepower to the air and mobility exclusion of pacification and on centred concept

from the Vietnam War, Report of a seminar held at 33SirRobert Thompson, Lessons in 12 Services Institute London, February 1966,21. United Royal the 34RobertMason, Chickenhawk(London: Corgi Books Ltd., 1983), 87-88. 257

forces 1964 busied themselves In Vietnam the airmobile after securing a population. searching for main force guerrilla units and allowed the individual guerrilla to work his 5 infiltration the the of villages and subverting rural population. The entire purpose U. S. focus was the operation of the air assault division in mid-intensity conflict.

The Portuguesehad adaptedtheir helicopter assaultoperations to their environment. They outflanked and outmanoeuvredthe enemy when contact was made, just as their in done Borneo: had British, the precursor, It was a combination of the judicious use of helicopters and good intelligence that intentions, him him the to cut enemy's off, seal off and anticipate enabled us destroy him before he could retreat to the safe sanctuary of his side of the frontier. Becausehelicopters were such a battle winner and were our life line, learnt in how best to because the they supply, we short get use out of were and them, and indeed we valued them as highly as we did the lives of our soldiers?, The helicopter and its effective utilisation was without question the biggest difference in ' forces Portuguese between that the and of of enemy. military capability

Horse Cavalry Becausehelicopters were in such short supply and had their operational limitations, found be had to their the to capabilities and augment provide necessary methods other in Helicopters indispensable for battlefields for the theatres. were certain mobility jungle forests Guine Dembos deltas but Angola, in the they tidal the of and of mobility far. less in There difficult but be that were other areas were so still spread could only

35AndrewF. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press) 1986), 125.

"Walker, 7. 37Felgas, 32.

258

their own way presentedseverechallengesin terrain and provided the insurgents with a fertile medium for operations. It was in these areas of large open savannahplains in imaginative highlands Mozambique Angola that the supplementto the of an and central helicopter was required. They were too expansive to patrol on foot, particularly with Portugal's manpower limitations, and unsuitedfor wheeledvehicles with the tall elephant helicopter While frequent the was considered the answer, there were rivers. and grass too few of them, and their unique requirements often were needed more imperatively in its had disadvantage fly helicopter the tendency to The operational also elsewhere. over the populations of these areas where communication with the people and securing their loyalty were vital.

In 1966 the MPLA openedits easternfront, and thereafter insurgent activity became between Serpa had begun in Luso Pinto. UNITA increasing the and also area problem an its military activity nearby in December 1966 with an attack on the Portuguesepost of Cassamba. Consequently, eastern Angola becamea priority, and an effective solution had to be found to addressthis new extensionof the conflict. The first lay in developing force, one which would combine mobility over rough terrain with the proper security links The insurgents the second with population. and maintain strong ability to engage lay in isolating the guerrilla in these vast tracts of wilderness.

Dr. Jonas Savimbi, who headed UNITA and believed that a nationalist movement inside isolated Angola, 1969 less by from bases soon was and counted should operate than 1,500 followers. In order to survive in defeat, he and his force came to an

between 1971 and 1973 UNITA was restricted Portuguese, the and accommodation-with 259

to a zone which it was not supposedto leave.38 In return UNTTA would ceaseactivities 39 40 UNITA Portuguese. This the arms also received and medical support. against development left primarily the MPLA to address.

The partial solution to the shapeof a proper force was found in history. Horse
in 1571 had in been Angola had the early Battles of and participated since used cavalry Cambambe (1583) and of Rio Lucala (1590).4' These and subsequent experiences through the 1850shad taught several lessonson the use of cavalry here: " Mounted troops were historically superior against the much more numerous indigenous forces on foot. " to An armed rider firing from a charging horse presentedan intimidating appearance foot. on man a " African horses were unsuitable for cavalry use becausethey lacked stamina from a disease. historically This had diet local to shortcoming susceptibility and poor from Brazil Argentina, importation the and of animals where they were required bred to climate and with a physique and temperament similar were a accustomed for combat patrols. more suitable

38AdelinoGomes, "Exercito e UNITA Colaboraram antesde 74" [Army and UNITA Collaborate before 741, Publico (19 October 1995): 2-4. Oscar Cardoso, interview by the author, 1 April 1995, Azaruja, Portugal. Sr. Cardoso is a former Inspector with the PIDE/DGS and was instrumental in founding the Flechas. 401nocentes interview, 17 March 1995. 41ColonelAntonio Casimiro Ferrand d'Almeida, "Recordaces de um Drago de Angola" [Recollections of a "Dragoon of Angola"], Revlsta Militar (October-November 1985): 690-692. 260

"

The enemy held no tradition in the use of mounted troops. Thus no opponent was likely to employ an opposing cavalry force. This situation existed becauseof the restriction, which was lifted in 1796, on importing mares to Angola so that horses could not be bred and used by indigenous forces against the Portuguese42

It was thought that horse cavalry might be the solution to the problem of establishing in the ground certain parts of Angola where conditions of the cooler, on a presence tsetse-free climate, varied terrain relief, grassy vegetation, and sparse population lent themselves to a mounted force. That the horse would present a large target and be it in firelight feed that to another and represented yet a mouth and animal to vulnerable train were valid concerns of the sceptics. In experiments and tests it was found that horses were a confusing target and difficult to hit when charging head-on. Experience loss the this thesis to and normal rate of a cavalry squadron of 130 to 150 support was 43 horse troops per month. Theseobservationsconfirmed the consistent was one mounted durability of horses in combat over the years, as earlier explained by Captain L. E. Nolan of the 15th Hussarsin 1864, "Saddleswill be emptied, horseskilled and wounded, but no horse, unlesshe is shot through the brain, or has his legs broken, will fall; though he death, "44 Captain Nolan through the the to struggle charge. will cited the stricken following incident as an example:

42Ferrandd'Almeida, 692-693. 43ColonelCesar Augusto Rodrigues Mano, PortugueseArmy (Retired), interview by the author, 10 November 1994, Oeiras. Colonel Mano commanded the Grupo de Drages de Angola between 1973 and 1974.

44Captain L. E. Nolan, Cavalry;Its History and Tactics(Columbia,SouthCarolina: Evans and Cogswell, 1864), 173.
261

One without his rider, at Strigau, which had one of his hind feet carried away by a cannon-ball, joined the left of the squadron, where he remained with the others during all the battle, although we were several times dispersed; at the sound of the call he always fell into the sameplace, which was, without doubt, the same that he had before belonged to in the squadronas Moreover, the cost of one Berliet truck roughly equalled that of the horses required to

46 mounta platoon.

The required logistic and veterinary support and the necessaryspecialisedtraining also ' less than troublesome anticipated. proved Obtaining water in the central plains of

Angola was normally not a problem on operations; however, it was important to be be dry In during the the sources could as usual surprisingly-empty. season, one careful instance during an operation in the region of Fort Cameia, south of Lumeje, it was days, in for horses during daylight lead two the the to resting shade and necessary 48 River for Luena the the arrived at squadron travelling at night, until watering. Health both horse fairly and and man were vaccinated against the conventional, problems were known diseases. Vitamins and dietary supplementsalso played a key role in maintaining 49 horses they to health that were not susceptible sickness. Through research so the of the formula kilograms 4.5 feeding to a of reduced of ground corn and was and experience five four days, 18 22.5 kilograms feed day. As to to the patrol was normal of oats per

45Nolan, 173. 46Peter Abbott and Manuel Ribeiro Rodrigues, Modern African Wars (2): Angola and Mozambique 1961-1974 (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1988), 24.

47Ferrand d'Almeida, 695. "Ferrand d'Almeida, 704. 49Ferrand d'Almeida, 704-705.

262

by in individual plastic sacks each horse. This ration was also ration were carried packed fodder local they to as and able eat as well. Extra rations noted, were supplemented, 50 infrequent horse became in he that that the a so sick event could not move were packed

it was found that a patrol could go anywherefrom eight to In further experiments

" difficulty. days twenty-seven without The horses had a hard, durable hoof, so shoes

52 had few farrier the terrain not and required, stones. Based on this services were and be into found it that the patrol could normal extended a long-range one experience was 53 by helicopter five days. 25 days A 20 truck to or about every with resupply patrol of 250 kilometres days typically-cover about and would extend further with would of eight increased duration.' The normal speedof advancewas 8 to 13 kilometres per hour or

day kilometres 50 when patrolling, which was many times that of a man on per about foot. Quite often the horseswere transported in trucks or by railcar to their patrol area, infantry troops, to make more efficient use of this in the with practise similar as 55 resource.

50Ferrand d'Almeida, 705. 51Colonel Luiz Barros e. Cunha, "Cavalaria a cavalo no Ultramar? Algumas in Some da Revista Ultramar? Cavalry Cavalaria (1967 [Horse the reactions], reflexes" 277. issue): annual 52Inocentes interview, 14 April 1994.

53Mano interview, 10 November1994.

"J. A. (initials only), "Cavalaria a cavalo em Angola" [Horse cavalry in Angola], Revista da Cavalaria (1969 annual issue): 171. "Lieutenant Colonel Vicente da Silva, "Lances de Cavalono XadrezAngolano" [Moves of the "Horse" on the Angolan "Chessboard"], Jomal do Exercito (June 1972): 28. 263

Both training and organisationfollowed the historically testedand traditional route and was similar to that employed a century earlier by such North American figures as Lieutenant GeneralJamesEwell Brown Stuart, CSA, and Colonel John Singleton Mosby, CSA, in the 1860-1865period, as well as by the Portuguesein the Angolan campaigns 56 for horse Centre Instruction 1850s. A the cavalry was establishedin Angola in of of 1970, and over 300 mounted troops were trained there in the basics of equitation and ' during Campaigns. the tactics cavalry In the initial phase of the program 225 horses

from Republic imported Argentina, the subsequently and of South Africa supplied were the sturdy Boerperde at a rate of about 20 to 30 mounts every three months for squadron " replacement and expansion. --

Also beginning in 1970 local recruitment was sought for the cavalry squadrons. Because there were few horses in Angola, it was very difficult for many of the early had before. that they to to animal never an seen adapt recruits Consequently, the

in Angola, toward the cuanhamas certain peoples southwestern gravitated effort recruiting fierce had history and a the who were very of cattle raising. As these cuamatos, and familiar horse they to the with cattle, adapted quickly and proved to be were people S9 it is difficult While to say precisely what percentage of the recruits riders. excellent for indigenous, local the the troops cavalry squadrons most were part comprised of were

56Colonel for Light Dragoons and J. Lucius Davis, The Trooper's Manual: or, Tactics Mounted Riflemen (Richmond, Virginia: A. Morris, 1862), vii-ix. 689. d'Almeida, -17Ferrand

SBMano interview, 10 November1994.

"Fen-and d'Almeida, 712. 264

except for the officers and sergeants. In one squadron all of the subalterns were cuanhamasand cuamatos with the exception of one white, two mesticos and a negro.60

The basic cavalry organisation was the platoon, which consistedof three sectionsof ten mounted troops each, plus a support section of one machine gun and three rifle " farrier. bugler, Three platoons comprised a squadron, a and grenadiers, an orderly, a and three squadronsequalled a group. The typical cavalry patrol was performed by a inverted formation in double "V" that was between 200 a echelon or advancing platoon 62 "V" be Alternatively, 500 the could wide. changedto a single echelon, or metres and to a line abreastor rank formation, dependingon the terrain and visibility. The mounted troops could see over the vegetation and undergrowth from the height of the horse and identify insurgents readily from this vantage. It was very difficult for the insurgents to foot horsemen to they the and as on unable see were a patrol, well enough for ambush be formation Should then the attempted, an ambush would executea wheeling surprise. insurgents. With the advantageof speed the the toward attack and surround movement "shoot height, the the cavalry prevented normal and scoot" tactics of the guerrilla, and destruction in instances 63 and capture or such encirclement enemy was almost certain. and Consequently ambushesof cavalry became rare, as the insurgents could not counter it successfully.

6Ferrand d'Almeida, 713.

61Abbottand Ribeiro Rodrigues, 24. 62Ferrand d'Almeida, 698. 63Manointerview, 10 November 1994. 265

Dragoon Operations Initial exploratory operationshad begun in 1966 with a reconnaissance platoon based in Silva Porto." In 1968 this unit was expandedto form the three squadron Grupo de Cavalaria N21 and operatedvariously from there and Munhango throughout the war.65

300 mountedtroopsand operatedin Angola between This combinedforce approached

Silva Porto and the eastern border near Cazombo. The southern boundary of the buffer, Savimbi the and the northern one was the River Cassai,which area was operating 66 latitude 111 The concept was extended to the south ran approximately along Mozambique in 1971 and operated from Vila Pery in the highlands west of Beira until 67 the end of the Campaigns.

The Portuguese dragOes or dragoons were indeed trained equally for cavalry or infantry service, just as their predecessorsin history had been. In some instancesthe horses would be used for a patrol to reach its assignedarea quickly over difficult terrain foot for based dismount to an attack or reconnaissance on then continue mission on and intelligence. In thesecasesone rider in every six would be left at the dismounting site infantry horses, for the troopers the and remaining would conduct an patrol. The to care five 30 leave horses and form a patrol of 30 to the guard men would typical platoon of 25 men. Picketing the horses for long periods lightly defended and thus exposing them

6`Abbottand Ribeiro Rodrigues,24. 24. Rodrigues, 65Abbott Ribeiro and Ferrandd'Almeida, 694. 'Abbott and Ribeiro Rodrigues, 24.
266

to enemy attack was not the normal practise.68 Nor were night actions sought, as cavalry operations were predicated on a visual advantage over the insurgents. At night this in horses the dark. as cannot see evaporated, particularly well advantage Cavalry

for depended contact signalling, and this communicationwas visual also upon manoeuvres difficult under low visibility. Darkness thus put cavalry at a severe disadvantage,and

this vulnerability was to be avoided. So cavalry patrols preferred to rest at night and bivouacs where the enemy was unlikely to pinpoint the troopers and secluded sought horses for an attack.69

Cavalry forces tended to operate in vast tracts of wilderness where there were few during Encountering fewer the rainy season. ones mines was passable even roads and thus an infrequent event. When a horse did step on a mine, it was inevitably killed, "' although the rider generally survived. Likewise in firefights horses were rarely

in face to the the normally were not prepared stand guerrillas of a charging as wounded, horse with its firing rider. It was not only psychologically intimidating to the guerrilla, "' for him. In Angola one horse was wounded on the average dangerous it but was also ' four months, and almost all recovered. about every

The cavalry forces from the beginning of their combat operations in 1966 and

68Manointerview, 10 November 1994. 69Ferrandd'Almeida, 707. 7Mano interview, 10 November 1994. "Marro interview, 10 November 1994. 72Manointerview, 10 November 1994.
267

particularly after augmentationin 1968 helped to neutralise MPLA operations in central and eastern Angola and presenteda continuing threat to insurgent activity. Their large in destroyed found Angola him. It was the the of enemy plains and vast sweepingpatrols in it decisive but guaranteeingthe security of the population was not spectacularwork, 73 lives. in Cavalry its lead to the effective normal was particularly people and enabling psychological impact on the enemy. The mobility and quickness of reaction, especially to an ambush, was intimidating. A cavalry formation charging at a gallop and

it decisive force insurgent was and generally successfulin its or pursuing surrounding an helicopter Horses the through to the savannah plains silently relative and moved action. insurgents had in better detecting thus the to and quite well, success surprise able were 74 helicopter-borne They bush in troops. than the were not only capable of guerrillas during 500 kilometres distances a and patrol, vast was not considered moving over inaccessible but the most and remote territory. In moving also of negotiating unusual, flexibility force, they exhibited with the combination of an approach enemy against an 75 foot. by horse and the transition to attack or reconnaissance on

These Portuguesecavalry operations representeda partial solution to the problem of 250,000 kilometres square of miserable terrain, normally approximately covering impassablein the rainy season. With some 300 cavalry troops and a minimum of logistic intelligence, Portuguese to the able gather communicate with the population, were strain between larger, full-scale the conduct operations and offensesagainst provide a presence,

73Ferrandd'Almeida, 714. 'Abbott and Ribeiro Rodrigues, 24. 75Ferrandd'Almeida, 715-717. 268

76 Only in Rhodesia with the establishment of Grey's MPLA infiltration in the east. Scouts in 1976 did a modern counterinsurgencyemploy horse cavalry as a solution to its " in did. Portuguese the that the mobility requirements way

Beginning in 1977, the South African Defense Force (SADF) used cavalry and scrambler motorcycles for hot pursuit of guerrillas in its border war with SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation), which was concludedin 1989. This SADF usewas from long in different Portuguese Angola. All three of the the patrolling of range quite these cavalry employments were successful in their own way; however, there were limitations. Under heavy fire a horse could panic and throw his rider. While there were few equine deserters; nevertheless,this risk was present. The use of horses was also limiting to tsetse-free a significantly areas, condition. Horses, like humans, restricted incapacity less This become was no serious than a mechanical failure on a sick. could feeding the training, care, and of the animals was no more arduous or and vehicle, fact, In the the use of motorcycles by the than same vehicle. maintaining expensive SADF revealed that the horse, while not as fast, was more durable. Motorcycles in the bush tended to have a short life. 78 While such mechanical devices were useful, the farther difficult terrain than most vehicles trooper could range much afield over mounted farther his foot becoming than comrade on without exhausted,even in hot certainly and from him distinct His atop a steed gave perspective a advantage over the weather.

76lnocentes interview, 14 April 1994. "Patrick Ollivier, Commandos de Brousse [Bush Commandos] (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1985). 78Willem Steenkamp, South Af ica's Border War 1966-1989 (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing Limited, 1989), 201. 269

guerrilla. The horse moved silently through the bush and gave mounted security forces the advantage of surprise. Finally, the most compelling argument for resurrecting the archaic horse soldier lay in the unique advantageof combining troop mobility with the maintenanceof contact with the population.

Portugal's resources were stretched thin in fighting the Campaigns. The nineteen Alouette helicopters and the two newly acquired SA-330 Pumas representedin the 1970 400,000 kilometres the to estimated square thin cover of Angola's resources period 79 front. The addition of the dragoonsproduced a winning, cost effective, low-key eastern infantryman in helicopter that the and resulted a neutralisation of the with combination 80 in the east. enemy

79Willem S. van der Waals, Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974 (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing (Pty) Limited, 1993), 196.

SOvan der Waals, 195.

270

VIII Portuguese Social Operations and Aldeamentos

Meeting insurgent force with force in counterinsurgencyis a key elementin protecting the population; however, the initiation of appropriate and efficient action to addressits ' its Since before is the the support. means of gaining most effective considered needs in 1910, had been Republic liberal Portuguese feeling in there the a of establishment Portugal that the indigenous inhabitants of the colonies should be elevated in both their laws had While been living their citizens. status as many and passedto this of standard by backed been had in the necessary resources and thus Lisbon, they never effect 2 in in With 1961 the the outbreak of ultramar. war and the arrival remained unenforced implement Lisbon's in Army, to there adequate the an vehicle existed now policies of Africa. And indeed in 1961 an Army that thought it was going to Africa to fight

insurgents sometimes found in protecting the population that the enemy was the white ' blacks. While the such social progress was admittedly long abusing were colonists who insurgency; hostilities by the of an nevertheless, social problems prompted overdue and insurgency initiated be the their the to and correction of was root with were perceived

'D. S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, Who Will Win?: A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War (London: Crane Russak, 1989), 18. 2Malyn Newitt, Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981), 102. 3Brigadeiro Renato F. Marques Pinto, interview by the author, 10 November 1994, Oeiras, Portugal.
271

vigour and enthusiasm.

Although Portugal's motives for these improvements were

always transparentto the indigenous population, they were no less genuine and beneficial in their effect.'

This chapterdescribesthe development and implementation of Portugal's social

in the through the theatres, the three swaying of population carefully programs (PSYOP) to advance the social effort, and the operations psychological orchestrated its in through the the protected resettlement to population control and protect attempt in It the these social problems address encountered will villages or aldeamentos. operationsand follow the solutions adoptedto achievesuccess,comparing and contrasting them to the experiences of other countries with contemporaneouscounterinsurgency operations.

Basis for Social Operations The basis of the Portugueseeffort in all three areaswas contained in the experiences Portugal's Britain, these to France adapted elements were and anticipated and of it Social however, in the theatres. the centrepiece; advancement was alone requirements was not the complete solution. It was necessary to promote this action through a

facilitate benefits to the acceptance population's of social and appeal and psychological found in first French The the aspect was principally concept of guerre self-defense. from drawn Portugal's longstanding the second not only and was revolutionnaire,

22 May 1995,Oeiras. 4Marques Pinto correspondence,

SPeter Janke, "Southern Africa: End of Empire, " Conflict Studies (N452 - December 1974): 5.
272

experience with protectedvillages and population regroupmentbut also from the modem British and French experiencesin counterinsurgencies.

The Portuguese in their contact with the French and their guerre revolutionnaire theory in Algeria in 1959 realised that the psychological weaponswhich were embodied in this concept were applicable in PortugueseAfrica. An essential ingredient of this

theory was the unprincipled use of psychological warfare." The French theorists divided this offensive into two parts: psychological war and psychological action. The first was directed toward the enemy, and its methodswere designedto undermine his will to resist. The secondwas directed toward the population and the security forces, and its methods sought to strengthenboth the morale and allegiance of the people and the fighting will Portugal the saw this aspect of counterinsurgency as being critical to its soldiers. of its indigenous in African populations, it could to the that approach proper with success hold its colonies with minimal expenseand loss of life. 7 If it were to work, then the have be familiar to action would as of psychological as any other weapon to principles its soldiers, for they would be the prime conduit of any messageto the population. Portugal would also have to use thesemethodsto rally its domesticpopulation and inspire its willing sacrifice.

The final point in implementing any social program was separating the population from the guerrillas so that they were deprived of their logistic and political support. One

6GeorgeA. Kelly, "Revolutionary Warfare and Psychological Action, " in Modern Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka(New York: Free Pressof Glencoe, 1962), 430. 'Kelly, 430-431. 273

of the most prominent solutions to this problem was regrouping the population. This important facet in and considered an a sound concept maintaining internal was move security. Widely dispersed or refugee populations were easy prey to insurgent

intimidation and extortion. Insurgentsrequired manpower, supplies, and intelligence on deny To forces, this the the the source of sustenance. was population and government built by the to the government and theoretical villages population, were access guerrilla the population brought together and resettled in these strategic hamlets. This

bring facilitated to the efforts medical care, education, and government's concentration food to the people as well as to preserve them against insurgent contact. Villagers were forces both into as a counter to guerrilla attacks and as a political self-defense organised mobilisation. This village organisation provided the government with an opportunity to deliver its messageto the population. Lastly, if the population were controlled, then the security forces could conduct unrestricted warfare outside of the villages against the ' guerrillas.

This resettlement concept was sound in theory but so often went wrong in its finance, depended knowledgable Success thorough adequate on planning, and execution. indeed factors ingredients These always present, and not were other provided people. did Nomadic the not welcome restrictions of a permanent populations obstacles. improperly built help the government's and administered one would settlement, nor like in Portuguese, British Consequently their the the predecessors and French, position. had both successand failure in the application of this concept.

'Colonel Carlos da Costa Gomes Bessa, "Angola: A Luta contra a Subversdo ea Colaboragdo Civil-Militar" [Angola: The Fight against Subversion and Civil-Military Collaboration], Revista Militar (August-September1972): 435.
274

Portuguese Social Operations In planning social operationsin the ultramar, the Portuguesesought two goals within the population: " Its overall support for the defense of the colonies and the concept of Portuguese sovereignty; and Its general collaboration not only with the governing authorities but also betweenits ' constituent groups.

"

Achieving these goals was complicated by ethno-linguistic divisions. In Angola, for instance, there were nine Banto and two non-Banto groups. The nine Banto groups 10 into further divided 101 languages This mosaic different were subgroups. speakingnine in Mozambique. both Guind had Each interests and similar group was varied of peoples that frequently were very different, and these differences produced severe antagonisms divergent in Reconciling these viewpoints the numerous languagesto population. within "national harmony unity" was extremely difficult and representeda or achieve overall continuing challenge.

A further impediment was the irregular distribution of the population, particularly in Angola. Here, for instance, according to the census of 1970 more than 80% of the inhabitants kilometre, four less had than per square and more than half of the territory 9% land. The located in the of the on majority concentrated were was population districts of Huambo (25.7%) and Luanda (16.6%). About 20% of the population was

9GomesBessa,410. do Exdreito, ResenhaHistrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa 10Estado-Maior (1961-1974) [Historical Military Report of the African Campaigns(1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1989), Vol. II, 29. 275

located in twenty-five cities with half of this figure in Luanda and its surrounds." Guine and Mozambique were characteristically similar.

The dual nature of the colonial economieswas yet another consideration. In Angola and Mozambique there were areas of stagnant and slow economic activity that lay between islands of modem and vibrant enterprise. The former was characterisedby farming and commercial activity which served an internal market. subsistence small or The latter was marked by large operationsserving not only an internal market but export as well. This disequilibrium produced inconsistencies in prosperity that neededto be

'2 addressed. In Guine, however, the economywas predominately agricultural and rested in the raising of rice the littoral zone and maize, cattle, and peanuts in the interior. " on This situation produced its own set of problems.

The Portuguese in addressing the development of the colonies through social first, by their to achieve goals, an economic expansion that sought operations integrated traditional the them into the overall agricultural pursuits and encompassed economy, and second,through a comprehensiveeducational program for the indigenous Agricultural had the objective of teaching advancedand profitable crop support peoples. farmers, to the techniques rural subsistence raising and providing marketing cattle and

11Gomes Bessa,416. 12Gomes Bessa,417. da Guind, Prospectiva do DesenvolvimentoEconmico e Social da Guing 13Provincia [Prospectus for the Economic and Social Development of Guind] (Lisbon: Junta de Investigag6esdo Ultramar, 1972), 63-72. 276

14 Education had for the objective of teaching Portuguese to their produce. support be there that a common tongue throughout the ultramar, and thus would everyone so easier communication betweenthe various ethnic groups with a view to a more cohesive " population. The universal knowledge of Portuguese within the theatres would also

In less PSYOP addition to education and economic complicated. considerably make infrastructure, improvements local health to communications, and services, expansion, the self-defenseof rural localities and villages were added. An increasingly prosperous it believed, would tend to support the Portuguesegovernment was and content population, insurgency. than an rather

It has been estimatedthat during the Campaignsmilitary operations comprised from 10% to 20% of the war effort, and political and economic programs representedover 80%. 16 The implication of this statementwas that the political and economic aspects large and encompassed many types of activity, all of which were were proportionately And the to the the agency only with resources effect required change yet non-military. forces. This Portugal. In Vietnam for to situation was not unique the armed was instance, Ambassador Robert Komer (Deputy to the Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, 1966-1968)electedin May 1967to place pacification under the aegis "if because, to are going get a program going, you are only going to you the military of be able to do it by stealing from the military. They have all the trucks, they have all the

14Gomes Bessa, 418. 15Gomes Bessa, 418. 16Gomes Bessa,407.

277

have have the they they all people, all the money."17 Consequently, the lion's planes, share of the burden fell by default on the Portuguese military, and it shouldered a in full, if the areas of education, health, construction of responsibility not substantial, local infrastructure, communications improvements, and the training of self-defense localities. for the and rural villages militia

Education and Commercial Development Education in PortugueseAfrica was not always as it seemed. While statistics were kept on the European-style education in European-style schools, this index was not necessarily the true measure of a proper and useful schooling for the indigenous population. Africans had been educating themselves in their own way long before

Europeansarrived, and indeed this type of training had far more relevance for the rural " if individual However, had European the an than process. aspirations of leaving citizen the rural setting and seeking a job in the urban environment or even of participating in he European the then needed elements of a education. With the economic advancement, industrialisation of Angola and Mozambique and the consequent demand for trained increasingly Campaigns, during key this The the education was sought. elements workers language knowledge in Portuguese literacy the and an elementary of mathematicswere of higher living but to to the a standard of also communication throughout means only not Lusophone Africa. Portugal accordingly recognised education as a weapon to be

deployed in the struggle and assumed full responsibility for and control of it, giving

17AndrewF. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army in Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 217. 18Newitt, 141.
278

development the training teachers to the and of primary education in the rural of priority
areas. 19

Primary Education in the Utrramar School Year Angola Students Teachers

Guine

196111962

1969/1970

103,781 2,890 13,534 228 388,328 4,361

420,410 10,177 26,401 563 578,410 8,549

Students Teachers
Mozambique

Students Teachers
Compiled from official Portuguese sources

Table 1 Table 1 shows the dramatic results of this effort claimed by the Portuguese through in in increase teachers primary education between the 1961/1962 and and students the 1969/1970 school years. The most impressive achievement was reflected in the four fold increase in Angola during this eight year period. The approximate doubling of teachers

during Mozambique likewise in Guine the and same period appeared and students dramatic. Progress in secondary and university education was also exceptional.

Secondary school expansion in all areas more than tripled in Angola and Mozambique 2 in fold Guine. The Universities Luanda Lourenco Marques increased ten of and and 21 in 1970 2,000 by While the enrolment each exceeded and students. established were it from began low base. In 1960 it impressive, is a very was estimated that expansion

S. van der Waals, Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974 (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing (Pty) Limited, 1993), 123. "Willem 20Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Portuguese Africa: An Introduction (Lisbon: Ministry 56-57. 1973), Affairs, Foreign of 2'Portuguese Africa: An Introduction, 58. 279

98% in illiterate Portuguese Africa the of population much as and that only 50% as was 22 by Nonetheless, 1970 Portugal believed that it had exceededits Portuguese. spoke African neighbours in offering a substantial part of its population an European-style 23 in its felt field this achievement proud of education and

The Army played an important role in this educational expansion. Illustratively, in Guind for the school year 1970/1971 the Army ran 127 of the 298 primary schools, or 43 %, compared to 91 (31 %) official schoolsand 79 (27 %) missionary schools.24 Each 10,000 approximately students. The reason that the Army had category accommodated so many more schoolsto accommodatethe samenumber of studentsas the government it that the undertook to address the sparser areas of the missionary schools was and in It Portuguese thin. these the that was was population areas soldiers where country built schools, and when there were no civilian teachers available and anti-guerrilla operational activity was not necessary,sent university-trained soldiers to spend part of their time each day teaching-25

Also in Guine the teaching job at the primary level was complicated by the duality African European-style the traditional teaching the the requirements, and education of Portuguese both. The Instruction at to authorities attempted accommodate schooling.

Ivan der Waals, 43; and Colonel Guilherme Pires Monteiro, Populaco de Angola Tendo em Vista a sua Defesa [Population of Angola Relative to its Defense] (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1965), 5. 'Portuguese Africa: An Introduction, 54-57. 24Prospectiva do DesenvolvimentoEconmico e Social da Guine, 188. 25NeilBruce, "Portugal's African Wars, " Conflict Studies (N4 34 March 1973): 15. 280

this level addressedthe traditional rural life and the fundamentals of agriculture, and 26 for in the technical these made necessary support courses. arrangements were Concessions were also made to support the cultural heritage of certain sectors of the in language Portuguese in Guind, In Islamic areas to the addition students population.

in Arabic, Arabic to taught corruption of or more exactly a called and write read were 1 marabout.
theatres.

These sorts of teaching complicationswere prevalent throughoutthe

When General Spinola left Guine in 1973, there were approximately 30% of schoolbecause laid, he had the that that of and ground classes, attending work children age figure allegedly reached 60% two years later.28 This effort was duplicated in the other African colonies as well. For example, in the garrison of Nangade on the Tanzanian border of Mozambique a battalion was using the skills of its soldiers to man the school. Here in November 1972, Army personnel were teaching 312 school children by day and 130 adults in the evening.29 Other government schools worked in three shifts from 7 11 in in 37% the to the o'clock evening until educate morning an estimated of o'clock

26Comando-Chefe dasForcasArmadasda Guind, "Directive N265/69: Manobra SocioEconomica. Esforco no 'Chao' Manjaco" [Directive N2 65/69: Socio-Economic Operations. Work in the Manjaco "Sacred Lands"], 13 August 1969, Headquarters, Bissau, page 3.

do Desenvolvimento 7'Prospectiva Econ6mico e Socialda Guine, 188.

28ColonelLemos Pires, interview by Al J. Venter in Portugal's War in Guine-Bissau (Pasadena:California Institute of Technology, 1973), 53. 29Michael Calvert, "Counter-Insurgency in Mozambique," Royal United Services Institute Journal for Defense Studies (March 1973): 84.
281

the children of Mozambique.3 With this sort of effort a European-style education became increasingly available to virtually the entire population.

While the economy of Guin6 was difficult to grow, those of Angola and Mozambique

31 % 9% 11 This and respectively. expansion was rates of at average expanding were increasing Africans jobs at rates, and was evidentparticularly employing and creating
foreign investment. Portugal 1965, the to ultramar opened wholesale when after Subsequently such projects as the Cunene River Dam with its irrigation potential in 32 jobs. 500,000 With this prosperity in Angola began Angola to create an estimated new inclined insurgency. The to Mozambique, were pursue an ultimate -fewer-citizens and insurgency lay in fact it the that with this an prosperity preempting was policy of proof of "where the greatest economic and industrial growth took place that the guerrillas were 03 in the end least successful.

The Portuguese attempted to manage their educational effort in the theatres to development the programs, so that there was an avenue of commercial complement frustration dead for This than the the rather a population of end. approach opportunity in Vietnam, Republic the that of where: with contrasted the educational system set up by the French and perpetuated by the Saigon ... higher secondary and reserved education and therefore the regime effectively leadership positions in non-Communist society, for the urban middle and upper

30Calvert, 85. 31Portuguese Africa: An Introduction, 76. 32Portuguese Africa: An Introduction, 70. 33Newitt, 238. 282

classes and for the former landed class of the countryside that had fled to the towns and cities. If a peasant child managed to get through the five years of elementary education, he faced a dead end. The nearest secondaryschoolswere in the district centers. The farm families were usually too poor to send the did initial district beyond four the the them, to schools not go and years children of secondaryeducation in any case. Virtually the sole route to status in life for Cng Viet National Liberation Front, their to the to turn and was a peasantchild ' did. talented the obviously most as

This flaw in the French systemextendedto Algeria as well. Muslims were neglected in favour of Europeans and in 1954 the extent of this neglect meant that illiteracy (in 35 French) among the Muslims was 94 percent in males and 98 percent in females. During the Algerian conflict there were enormous strides in education. At the primary level enrolment increased from 650,000 in 1958 to nearly a million in 1960; however, half of all children did not attend school and technical education was limited becauseof "' jobs 28,000 had been Only lack new created against a target of personnel. of skilled a 400,000.37 Without the proper education there would not be industrialisation. The little learning that was available created an appetite for more in the Muslim community. It because "literate the the economy could to a class of unemployed" threatened create also 38 into job fed frustration This the the these entrants qualified market newly not absorb in Portuguese that the their sought situation case to avoid. a cause, nationalist

34Nei1 Sheehan,A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1988), 522. 35Alistair Home, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 61. 36Horne,421. 37Horne,421. 38Horne,61.
283

Health Throughout the theatresthe problem of health was identical to that in all of tropical Africa: a need for large investmentsin health care, a need for medical and para-medical level low socio-economic within the population, and a general lack of a personnel,

" hygiene and proper nutrition. medicine,

From the beginningof the wars Portugal

in limited budget. improve health The World Health the to ultramar care on a continued
Organisation (WHO) noted this progressin its 1963visit and report that "certain services deserve to be cited as exemplary" throughout the ultramar. 40 But it was clear that more had to be done.

In 1971 the WHO standardsfor proper health care for a country stood at "1 "1 "1 "1 "5 doctor per 10,000 inhabitants, nurse per 5,000 inhabitants, hospital bed per 430 inhabitants, hospital nurse per 15 dozen hospital patients, and 41 hospital nurse. nursing auxiliaries per

The Portugueseauthorities took theseguidelines seriously and soughtto implement them in Africa, and again the armed forces becamethe primary vehicle in achieving the health had by 1971 Army health Guine In the the augmented systemto such a degreethat goal. it met or exceededthe WHO standards. Table 2 below showsjust how vital this military lion's in in In Angola 1970 the there was one share of resources. supplying was support doctor per 10,000 inhabitants, and in Mozambique, one per 15,000. In Angola there was inhabitants, in 3,080 Mozambique, 4,080. In Angola there and one per per nurse one

do DesenvolvimentoEconmico e Social da Guine, 211. 39Prospectiva

40Portuguese Africa: An Introduction,50-51. do Desenvolvimento 41Prospectiva Econmicoe Socialda Guine,211.

284

42 in 600 inhabitants, Mozambique, both bed 400 In hospital one per per and one was
it likewise the military these was cases of resources that made the difference in

in WHO Because this the standards. of support, medical care exceeding approaching or the ultramar trailed only that of the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia during the " Campaigns.

Health Standards for Guin6 against Actual Figures by Source 1971 WHO Standards
for Cruine

Health
Department

Military 49 100
-

Doctors Nurses
Hospital Nurses

48 96
75

5 33
-

Nursing Auxiliaries Hospital Beds Compiled from official Portuguesesources.

375 1.100

89 918

260 -

Table 2

The figures, however, do not tell the whole story.

Portuguese medical care had

increasingly drew for to the reputation which patients clinics widespread a established treatment. In Guine for instance, patients from Senegal without documentation to cross Senegalese maternity patients were even given

the border, came to receive this care. ' follow-up appointments.

This traditional role of the patient coming to the clinic was terrain. It was necessary The goal

long distances difficult because the and of possible not always

in order to reach these remote people for the Army to establish mobile clinics.

have did to that every not regular contact with the more village was a monthly visit

42Portuguese Africa: An Introduction, 52. "Colonel Luis Alberto Santiago Inocentes, interview by the author, 14 April 1994, London. Colonel Inocentes was Chief of Staff, Brigade Headquarters, Guine, 1970-1972. 44Inocentes correspondence, 15 July 1995, London. 285

developed centres. It was hoped that this important facet of social operations and the confidence that it developed would prompt the all important flow of intelligence and in large Angola Mozambique; dividend This true to a extent and was cooperation. however, Guind was so small a theatre that the guerrillas were around every corner, and it was thus very difficult to prevent subversion of the population 45

This Portuguese medical outreach program was similar to those of other Corps S. Marine MEDCAP (Medical Civil U. The Action Program) counterinsurgencies. (CAP) help Combined Action Platoon the the corpsman, with of the of simply consisted for basic "sick local the a call" administering village on a routine members, other platoon basis.46 The Marines would conduct MEDCAP patrols as often as every day but more likely twice a week in the local village or villages for which they were responsible, and tried to give the program a permanencethrough not only treatment of the Vietnamesebut 47 for how It hoped to themselves them that this association care teaching was also between bond Marines Vietnamese The the the and people. positive a would produce French approach in Algeria was similar in that the SAS (SectionAdministrative Speciale) in bled the to the remote villages would establish clinics to be visited by teams assigned basis intents the nurses on a regular with same teams and general of physicians travelling

interview, 14 April 1994. 45lnocentes 46U. S. Marine Corps, Professional Knowledge Gainedfrom Operational Experience in Vietnam, 1967 (Washington: HeadquartersUnited StatesMarine Corps, 1969), 482. 47A1 Hemingway, Our War Was Different (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 112 and 133. 286

48 results. and

Local Infrastructure and Communications The greatest impact of social operationswas achieved in the rural areaswhere local

had had been such modest government and consequently presence weak, administration
had little influence on the population. Military security coupled with social and

infrastructure advancesaimed to restore or strengthen government influence through a The strategic emphasiswas the building of population. and cooperative confident more local aviation runways and heliports and connecting the various centres with passable roads. Local emphasis concentrated on building irrigation dams, boring wells,

49 helping build houses. to and stations, zinc-roofed constructing schools and medical In this process the military again led the way, although its efforts were augmented throughout the theatresby civilian contractors and labourers.

While many other infrastructure projects were impressive in their scope, there was With the throughout the theatres. than the goals construction program road so more none district the supporting military operations, expansion, and connecting economic aiding of job bent Portuguese the to the with a relentless will. capitals, Angola at the beginning

36,211 kilometres in 1974 had figure that of roads and about the wars exceeded of 80,000 with 12% asphalted,38 % tarred with gravel or dirt surfaces,and 50 % rough dirt

48Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfarefrom Indochina to Algeria: An Analysis Military Doctrine (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 46-47. Political and of a 49Ministdrio do Exercito, Os Dez Anos do Batalho de Engenharia da Guine [The Ten Years of the Engineering Battalion of Guind] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1974), 17-32. 287

" in impassable that tracks the were generally roads or rainy season.

This dramatic

increase was made even more so by the difficult terrain with which the Portugueseoften had to contend. Colonel Souza at the Eastern Intervention Zone headquartersin Luso described some of thesedifficulties in a 1968 interview: "Almost the entire region was

5 depth In to a of about metres. someareasthe sandwent down sand up with overlaid

to more than 40 metres. It is impossible to build roads on this kind of foundation. We do, of course, have some good roads, but it's a giant task keeping them serviceable. ""

This construction also entailed a major bridging effort.

The military initially

undertook the upgrading of the road systemhere beginning in June 1960 and completed its work by mid-1964. It took ten battalions of engineers50 months at the rate of 90,000 kilometres build, 52 100 to of road per repair or maintain the system. man-hours Ultimately the job was given to road contractors as a more efficient use of resources,and the military provided security. These contractors with Lisbon managementand local following became the war moved with their skills to continue good, and quite workers in the Middle East.53 Building of new roads continued until 1974 at the rate of about 1,100 kilometres a year.54

"Portuguese Africa: An Introduction, 73. s'Colonel da Souza, interview by Al J. Venter in The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in SouthernAfrica (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons Ltd., 1969), 129. 52Colonel (Engineering) Armando Giro, 10 Batalhes de Engenharia em Angola ... Antes da Subverso [10 Engineering Battalions in Angola... Before the Subversion] (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1965), Annex. 53lnocentes interview, 14 April 1994. Africa: An Introduction, 73. 14Portuguese 288

In Guine during the Campaigns520 kilometres of new tarred road were built, of battalion balance by by 241 the the and engineering resident road were completed which " Department. Works Public hired the through contractors Guind began the war with

3,102 kilometres, of which 55 were paved with asphalt and about 2,000 were open yearbut had been 3,570 they total, In there rebuilt and upgraded the only were end round. despite booby bridges. This the mines and completed work was with new surfacesand traps that the guerrillas laid in advance of the road crews to disrupt their progress56 This modest increase in total roadway relative to the other theatres occurred becausein Guine the rivers were more important than the roads for communication. There were for large 130 kilometres 300 vessels, and approximately such rivers of navigable about 100 local tons of each and moving cargo on a upwards craft were capable of carrying 57 basis. regular

Mozambique began the war with 37,000 kilometres of roads and boasted48,000 in 1974.58 Here the emphasis was placed on building new north-south roads, as the from land the the east-west routes were along rivers and communication pre-war primary interior. the to ports The primary north-south traffic had traditionally moved by sea

little had length kilometre the than tracks 1,000 more colony, while rutted of the along Campaigns links. During Portuguese land the the converted communication served as

da Guing, 33. 550s Dez Anos do Batalhode Engenharia

interview, 14 April 1994. 56lnocentes 57ViceAdmiral Nuno Goncalo Vieira Matias, interview by the author, 23 November 1994, Lisbon. Admiral Matias is a former detachment commander of Fuzileiros Especiais (Special Marines) in Guine. "Portuguese Africa: An Introduction, 73. 289

these tracks to roads with a measure of paving and a major bridging effort.

This

11,000 kilometres however, totalled this of about varying surfaces; expansion " by be the the territories. to tended overshadowed vastnessof achievement Brigadier

Michael Calvert, reporting on a November 1972 trip there, commentedon this immense

in the following observation: taskandput it in perspective with othercounterinsurgencies "The road programmealone which is running at a rate of 1,400 km of tar macadam
highway a year for six years compared with the Americans' total of 1,400 km of high140 km in in 12 in Vietnam Malaya, will cost more in and our years class road six years than the whole Cabora BassaDam complex.n60With something over 45,000 kilometres during Campaigns, like built theatres the the throughout the Romans, the of new roads Portugueseappearedto subscribe to the adage, "The end of subversion dependson the "61 Good the and good roads. roads of course served both a population morale of commercial and military need.

While the road system stands as the most significant infrastructure accomplishment during the Campaigns, there were others that contributed more directly to the improvement of the quality of life among the people. One of the most important in this in Guine. irrigation dam dyke Here be the the or program population can was respect from interior. line higher by Toward the divided tidal the the separating a zone roughly fish follow live on and primarily and the rice animist religions. people ocean The

59PortugueseAfrica: An Introduction, 73.

60Calvert,83. 61Giro, 33. " estradas. "0 termo da subverso depende do moral da populaco e de boas 290

interior people live on maize and meat and are Moslems. The lives of the coastalpeople indeed, by "rains" epocas. by their the they cycle, count and age or rice are governed This sequencebegins with the three-month rainy season in mid-July, and when it is finished in mid-October, there is virtually no rain until the next year. As the rains begin in the north and move south along the African coast in this cycle, so the people begin labour This the requirement also extended to the children, and their work soil. working in the fields during the Campaigns initially disrupted their schooling but was later building dykes in Critical the throughout the river system this was of process resolved. from by fresh the the salt or brackish the and runoff supplied rains to separate water in basins formed by It dykes by the the that the rice the tidal action. was water produced 62 harvested. was planted, grown and

The war disturbed this agricultural cycle considerably. The insurgents usedthe threat dykes While the to the the seeds stealing subvert and population. protection of cutting help to the other means also sought as were people. possible, widely as extended was Special rice seed that could resist salt water was developed from Philippine strains. It but it improved five to this four the rice yield to program, perfect years took 63 damaged in dyke dykes To the system and repair concert with expand significantly. 630 build dykes between 1963 and Army to the over engineersundertook this program, 1974.14

62General Pedro Alexandre GomesCardoso,interview by the author, 29 March 1995, Lisbon.

interview, 29 March 1995. 63pedro Cardoso

640sDez Anos do Batalhdo de Engenharia da Guing, 54. 291

In the Islamic interior drinking water was very important for cattle raising as well as the population overall because of the dry season. Consequently, there was also a for drilling Guine throughout these purposes. and water collection of well program During the period 1969-1973 the number of wells was increased from 26 to 163 along

fountains, 56 drinking fountains' 32 houses, The 34 and public watering wash with
battalion drilled 56 built to the supplement activity wells and employed contractor civilian " 550,000 litres total a capacity of associated water reservoirs with In both of the

foregoing examples the Army engineerswere the prime force behind their execution.

In support of expandededucationand health care in Guin6, Army engineersbuilt 196 five from in 1969-1974.67 health This construction 51 the years stations schools and health in the the three theatres expanded education and care programs with was associated in which the Army played such a key supporting role.

Lastly, from about 1969 onward in Guind a reordenamento rural (rural reordering) in implemented to the regroup population settlementswhere it would have program was 68 facilities, Each to care, schooling, sanitary medical and water. of these access ready its based on a currently existing village and expansion was carefully settlements was designed in its locale Rural to the settlement was accommodate people and to planned.

da Guine,79. 650s Dez Anosdo Batalhode Engenharia da Guine,52. 66Os Dez Anosdo Batalhode Engenharia
670sDez Anos do Batalho de Engenharia da Guing, 77. 61Comando-Chefe das Forras Armadas da Guine, Plano Director pars o Reordenamentos [Plan Directive for Resettlements] (Bissau: Headquarters, ComandoChefe das Forcas Armadas da Guind, 1969), 5. 292

69 in keeping facilities In the setting. proper a pleasant with the people's provide local houses the simple and constructed of were materials. For the most part preferences, they were wood covered with clay, and the only modern concession was that of a tin into harvested long local The tree and split rachas or was strips made with cibe roof. the grain. The future occupantsgenerally furnished the labour of weaving these rachas into sides, covering them with mud, and constructing the houseunder the supervision of the Army engineers. The tin roof was important for permanenceand protection in the leaves heat to the with palm covered reduce noise rain and and was usually season rainy ' Each family took great pride in its handiwork. In the five years in the dry season. from 1969 to 1974 the Army engineers built 8,313 of these huts in support of the " program. Not infrequently a family would also build a traditional hut without a tin

' the to more modem one. roof next

In these years the bulk of the wells, school houses, and medical clinics built were the the program, which entailed construction or reordenamento with associated 73 By establishing these improvement of sixty-one towns, villages, and settlements foster life, for the government could economic expansionand provide community centres for Guine depended The the basic people. rural population of on the land the necessities

da Guine, OrdenamentoRural e Urbano na Guing Portuguesa [Rural and 69Provfncia Urban Resettlementin PortugueseGuine] (Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1973), 7-9. 70Pedro Cardoso interview, 29 March 1995. "Os Dez Anos do Batalho de Engenharia da Guine, 78. Marques Pinto interview, 30 March 1995, Oeiras. 73Ordenamento Rural e Urbann na Guine Portuguesa, Index. 293

for its livelihood, and thus it was important to support them with the farming and animal husbandry techniques, selection of seedsand feed, and pest control. The reordenarnento for help. focal this a administering point program was

While Guine hasbeencited in the forgoing examples,the situationsin Angola and

Mozambique were similar, and the projects there were tailored to their specific problems. In these latter two theatres, the resettled villages in threatened areas were known as benign in the settings as reordenamentos. Similarly, the armed more aldeamentosand forces played a key, if not preponderant, role in all such social operations, and led the way in supporting the war effort with the population. In this respect it most resembled the progress madeby Governor GeneralJacquesSoustelle'sprogram in Algeria, in which the SAS corps (SectionsAdministratives Specialisees,or essentially, the social services in 1955 to extend social operations to the remote bled. Alistair established was support) Home explained the work of these men: Their aim, essentially, was to take into their protective net populations in the become bled that subject to the rebels, or buffeted by the might otherwise remoter detachments S. S. Some 400 A. both. were created, each under an army army - or lieutenant or captain who was an expert in Arabic and Arab affairs and could deal from aspect of administration; conceivable agronomy, teaching and with every health, to building houses and administering justice. The kepis bleus, as they devoted band a selflessly called, and courageous were of men, affectionately were loved by local for the themselves that reasonwere much populace, and made who F. L. N., heaviest targets the the the suffering of principal casualtiesof any often journalists Foreign administrator. who saw them at work in the category of in isolated danger, bled, and constant never ceased to be impressed. remoter Unfortunately, there were always too few kepis bleus with all the numerous 74 job the required. qualifications that

Pacificationwork by the Portuguese was similar to that in other counterinsurgencies 74Horne, 109.
294

but was tailored to their specific problems in each theatre. The U. S. in Vietnam tended to addresspacification the least, as it had no deep responsibility for the population. The French doctrine of guerre revolutionnaire was primarily military, and accordingly in in British Algeria. The back their counterinsurgencies took a seat realised pacification

both in a coordinated that both the military andsocialfrontsexisted andaddressed effort. The Portuguese the British examplegenerallybut differed in mostresembled approach
its specific application becauseof the differing characteristics of the various conflicts. The last of the three aspectsof pacification, population resettlement, was practised by all four major counterinsurgencyparticipants with vastly different results from very different approaches.

Aldeamentos The aldeamentoprogram was one of the most controversial social operations of the Portuguese Armed Forces. Conceived in responseto the insurgencies, it was intended to facilitate three functions in controlling the rural population and in keeping it separated from the guerrillas and their demandsfor intelligence, food, and shelter: " " " Administration of the expandedsocial and economic programs, Protection of the population from insurgent intimidation, and 75 Execution of psychological operations. The primary

Not everyone, even in the military sphere, agreed on this program.

be the to the willingness of population relocated or protected. There was consideration between for the what military compromise needed a security and the people's was always desires. Moving people was invariably an emotional processbecauseof their attachment

75LuizF. Carreiro da Camara, "Aldeamentos," Jornal do Exercito (April 1970): 62.

295

to ancestrallands. Timing was also a large factor, and moving the population after it had been subverted was pointless and generally backfired. 6 Often implemented in a rush, the program experienced unnecessaryteething problems that required a sizable amount of time and money to correct.

Resettlement of a population was not for the Portuguese an outgrowth of modem insurgencies. The word aldeamentowas derived from the mid-sixteenth century practise developed by the Jesuits of gathering the nomadic Brazilian Indians into villages, called facilitate instruction ), Arabic (from their to the aldayl religious and protection aldeias Church, develop local to the the -of, a economy, and to utilise the eye watchful under V Christian Indians as a military force against attacks by the unconverted. As time

from diverged in 1758 as a result Jesuit those the the of aims government, and passed, decreeing free Indians land Pombal's Marquis the to them, the men and of granting of 78 from Jesuit power. the aldeias were wrested

The modem aldeamentoprogram was begun in 1961 in the north of Angola, and by 1964 a total of 150 had been built, each with a capacity to accommodateabout 2,000 initial, 300,000.79 Here between the total the of violent action capacity a or people,

76lnocentes correspondence,15 July 1995, London. "Edward Bradford Burns, A History of Brazil (New York: Colombia University Press, 1970), 29-30. 78GilbertoFreyre, trans. by Samuel Putnam, The Masters and the Slaves (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 165. 79vander Waals, 120. 296

UPA insurgents and the Portuguese had created an estimated 400,000 to 500,000 starvation, 8 faced These people were the victims of attacks by both refugees. homelands to to their return and traditional way of life. For and were unable combatants, them the aldeamentosheld the hope of safety and the potential for employment on the

had developed The so rapidly that Portuguese problem plantations. coffee neighbouring
irregular in helping displaced the population and appeared earnest, action, while protecting their tenuousthread of economic sustenance. After the eastern front opened in Angola, the program was introduced there. By February 1973just short of a million Angolans were living in 1,936 aldeamentosin the Eastern Military Zone, and by 1974 " in 900 further the north. there were a aldeamentos At the end of the war there were

in 3,000 living Angolans almost villages. well over a million

Initially there were chargesthat the villages were prisons and that they resembledthe turn of the century camps in South Africa where the Boer civilians were "concentrated" to prevent contact with Boer forces, or worse, the German camps of World War II. 82 This appearance in the early years stemmed from the urgency of the situation in lack funding, in the the a of of refugees, and plight a shortage planning. As alleviating the program matured in Angola and these flaws were addressed,the situation improved it invariably disruptive however, to the economic wellbeing of those was somewhat;

80GeraldJ. Bender, Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 165.

81van der Waals,200-201.

82Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), 372. 297

83 By 1972 concern ran high, and sufficient resources had been allocated affected. largely to resolve the earlier problems of human discomfort.84 The South African Vice Consul in Luanda also reported from a military perspective that after 1972: The aldeamentopolicy frustrated the enemy's attemptsto set up consolidatedbase areas in the guerrilla-contaminatedzones. By these means, Portugal succeeded in disrupting the prescribed revolutionary pattern of gradual expansion and 1972 initiative. After there were no "liberated" or the strategic regained At Angola. the most there were areas of areas within revolutionary-controlled influence. 85

In Mozambique the first aldeamentoswere built in 1966 and by the end of the war "' in 953 had been 969,396 Mozambicans Here also there regrouped villages. a reported funding in ideal led less that to than and execution, planning, a were significant problems irregular, fronts but intent Certainly the was nevertheless, on all and will progress result. 97 benefits bring to the Portuguese to the population authorities appearedsincere. The of from FRELIMO insulating that the there were mistakes meant population of urgency made. The short notices that were often given for regroupment and the coercive

disruption to the routine of the population sowed the consequent with measuresemployed the seedsof animosity. Colonel Ronald Waring, now the Duke of Valderano, provided a personal observation:

83Bender,164.

84 201. Waals, der van

85vander Waals, 232. "Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1974 (London: Greenwood Press, 1978), 155. "Miguel Artur Murupa, Perspectivas da Africa Ponuguesa [Perspectives of Portuguese Africa] (Beira: Edition of the author, 1973), 35-37. 298

On occasions, the new villages were badly sited in quite unsuitable places, on indigenous from formed for local Militia, the the the population occasions some defense of the villages, joined FRELIMO, taking their weapons with them, but these were very rare occurrences. Sometimes there was a certain degree of bands, between and where protected villages guerrilla and villages cooperation bought off enemy attacks by handing over food and even weapons rather than fight to defend a village perimeter. There is no doubt too that on occasionsthere in hostility the world, the to a relocation of village, as elsewhere enforced was African villagers preferred to stay on their ancestrallands rather than move to the have degree they thereby, a much greater would of new villages, even when, " protection. It required much patient work to rectify this ill will. In Mozambique as elsewhere,

Portugal's limited resourceswere constantly taxed in addressingthe vastnessof the task it from FRELIMO, to the and of providing preserve adequately population of resettling it with the promised benefits.89 It was always a-fine line in-the trade-off between the ill will of disruption and the delivered benefits to the population in executing the aldeamento program.

In Guine, as earlier described, the reordenamentorural program was the basis for improving based than current on villages and rather was expansion social and economic in Militias the population new villages. of were established resettlement any wholesale the population was already relatively concentrated for any threatenedvillages, but because

the in settlements, program as'such was not the answerto separating an aldeamento
in insurgents from theatre. this the population

Accusations that the aldeamento program was not successful overlook its primary inconvenient for in the The the terrorists that population was very of thrust. regrouping

1995, 17 March London. interview 88Duke by Valderano, the author, of

"Henriksen, 158. 299

their accessto it was restricted. Every effort was made to preserve the local pattern of life, and the construction of huts and other habits of the population were disturbed as little as possible. Such issuesas theft, rape, and other abuseswere no greater or lesser 90 in the aldeamentosthan elsewhere.

The aldeamento program in Mozambique was more controversial than in the other theatres, as General Arriaga attempted to do too much to quickly with inadequate resources, and this combination produced significant problems. His urgency was

battleground belief his the by the that population was on which the war would prompted be won or lost. 91 While the numbers of aldeamentos built and people resettled to Angola, he battleground General's that equalled of the never oversaw nearly protect 1,000 such settlementsand had ambitious plans for a total of 4,000 92 Nearly always the aldeamentoswere viewed by the local citizens in a negative light, unless they were threatenedby immediate violence; however, from a military perspectivethere was merit, has Henriksen Professor argued: as Despite all their failings, a measureof aldeamento effectivenesscan be deduced from FRELIMO's reactions to them. Labelling them "concentration camps," the fairly forces the protected villages and rocketed mortared on a routine guerrilla basis. FRELIMO struck most frequently and intensely in Tete, where infiltration. Rapid-fire of slowing siegeswere aimed a chance regroupment stood in local Portuguese lowering prestige eyes and at negating whatever military at But benefits these shellings strengthened the resolve of ' some existed. social Mecanhelas forces, frontier. Malawi So, the the as on such self-defense village all regrouped or self-defended villages were not seedbedsof anti-Portuguese fared for defense, better As the than the comparatively aldeamentos much revolt.

interview, 14 April 1994. 90Inocentes 91Kadizade Arriaga, Coragem, Tenacidade e F9 [Courage, Tenacity and Faith] (Lourenco Marques: EmpresaModerna, 1973), 198 and 200-201. 'General Kalza de Arriaga, interview by the author, 8 November 1994, Lisbon. 300

Diem regime's ill-fated strategichamlets, although the latter faced the much more 93 Viet Cong. the of aggressive assaults

The aldeamentoplan was aimed at denying the insurgentsaccessto the population and its support and in persuading the people that their future lay with Portugal and not a losing cause. According to this definition, the systemwith all of its flaws held a measure ideal, identify is difficult It to similar regroupment project with which to an of success. compare Portugal's effort. The various population relocations and their degreeof success in eachcaseon the character of the enemy and the depended in other counterinsurgencies food available to the population. No group wanted to be "regrouped" in a planned invariably controversial. was action such and village,

In Malaya the communists numbered only

8,000 strong against 300,000

counterinsurgency troops, and thus could never seriously challenge the New Village 423,000 Chinese 94 in 400 New Villages. squatters approximately settled program, which These people representedonly 6% of the population and made no contribution to the 95 Completely life from the them to the country. removing of villages away economic fighting and zone of influence was thus a feasible alternative. Malaya was also a fooddeficit area, so starving the guerrilla was an effective plan. " These conditions were not duplicated in PortugueseAfrica. Its population, while not homogeneous,was not sharply

93Henriksen,162. ''Richard Clutterbuck, The Long Long War: The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960 (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1966), 60-61. "Fall, 372-373. 'Fall, 373.
301

defined in the Chinese-Malay contrast. It was certainly far too large to be relocated on isolated from influence. basis Further, PortugueseAfrica and any zone of a wholesale in farming surplus with a certain areas, depending on the represented subsistence disruption by the fighting and the vagaries of the weather. This situation likewise insurgent insurmountable to an problems operating where the only food almost presented available was that which was cultivated. Water was also scarce in such areas as the remoteness of eastern Angola. The cases are thus quite different in both scope and complexion.

The French in Indochina and the Diem regime in Vietnam each faced a 13 million in food-surplus lived 10 a of which area, so starving the guerrilla into million population, in Malaya was not a viable option. Nor could the population be removed as submission effectively from the fighting area, as the British had done. The French had 380,000 troops facing 500,000 Viet-Minh and could not protect a regroupedpopulation adequately initiative. self-defense a village without While this concept was implemented with

in 1951-1952 in Cambodia through a regrouping of the Khmer peasants,it was success in ' late too the to the tide. came and war stem not universal involvement, a military solution was the preferred option. As in the later U. S.

Following the French exodus, the government of South Vietnam in 1962 attempted 9 to than move more million people or two-thirds of the population into overambitiously

97Captaine Andre Souyris, "Un Proc&de de Contre-Guerilla: L'Auto-Defense des Populations," Revue de Defense Nationale (June 1956): 686-699. 302

98 hamlets. 7,500 The plan ultimately failed through lack of planning and strategic about it but before had achieved some successdespite its flaws. It aimed to not resources, seize the initiative in the contest with the communists at the level of the enemy's attack and to reverse their progress in the countryside. The communists recognised it as a major threat and reacted accordingly, concentrating attacks on hamlets, destroying their defenses, and denouncing the mobilisation of the peasantry. Had problems been addressedand resolved, it could have been devastating to the Viet Cng." As it was,

the plan fell prey to a deficiency in all of the three requirements for a successfulsocial operation: detailed planning, sufficient funding, and an adequatenumber of trained people to administer the operation. With the program in disarray, the U. S. moved to seek a military solution.

The primary touchstone of counterinsurgency practise for the Portuguese was the French experiencein Algeria. Relocation of the Muslim population there, as the military far Challe Plan, the more controversial than the aldeamento program. was element of Two million Muslims were forced to participate in a policy of rehabilitation in which the followed behind the troops and rapidly built roads that connecteda string engineers army of newly constructed military outpostsas a part of the quadricula system. Communities for theseMuslims were establishedwithin this framework with an organised self-defense " detachment. SAS the obligatory militia and These "self-defense" communities or

98Fal1,373. "William Colby, Lost Victory (New York: Contemporary Books, Inc., 1989), 102103. 10Horne, 338. 303

horror become had to the stories and often resembled "the fortified propensity camps villages of the Middle Ages to the concentration camps of a more recent past. In the latter conditions were nothing short of scandalous. Hunger first, and cold secondly, were the enemies.""' The public gaze was directed in July 1959 by an article in Figaro,

102 This improve focused to the prompted pressure a strong effort camps. on which living conditions. While the French appear to have resettled about the same number of have focused isolating from Muslims Portuguese, did to they the the seem on as people the insurgents without the strong emphasison social benefits and the consequentgain in confidence and support of the population.

Alongside this inventory of modernexperience,the Portugueseprogram reflects initial for demands in because the the north of Angola, and sudden of action problems planning lack of resources to execute relocation on the scale envisioned. On the a persistent benefitted from the associatedsocial programs the supposedly population side, positive intimidation. from largely guerrilla protected and was The program consistently

103 While not as airtight as the Malayan disturbed or halted insurgent advances. far in it Vietnam the that effectiveness of exceeded and was relatively experience, humane alongside Algeria. In the long run, however, resettlement only bought time for the Portugueseand could not necessarilydestroy the enemy. This interlude was valuable local build been have for the to necessary used political participation an might and fully have that countered the nationalist arguments. would autonomy

''Horne, 338-339.

338-339. 102Horne,
103van der Waals, 232. 304

Self-Defense It was in the area of village self-defensethat the Portuguesehad one of the greatest frustrate the guerrilla contact with the population. More than anything to opportunities labours in be left their the to the products of and wanted valued peaceto population else defend For the this themselves. to them privilege people would prosper. and enjoy While the Portuguese did much to deliver these circumstances in a physical way, a in in trust the development of came only reluctantly some of cases ringing endorsement the village self-defenseconcept. In virtually every situation except the British in Malaya full large the participation required of populations that were efforts counterinsurgency difficult to move out of reach of the enemy. Arriving at this realisation belatedly, the Portugueseproceeded to develop and implement a village self-defenseprogram in the form of local militia. At first one of the large drawbacks seemed to be an

black African to trust the reluctance population with weapons, when uncharacteristic black troops had historically been armed in relatively large numbers.

Local militia were formed originally to mobilise the white colonists in Angola and later Mozambique under the banner of the OPVDC. 104Only after the struggle matured in body. blacks Its this 1968 primary mission was defenseand widespread toward were in logistic it role aid and social operations. Equally served a secondary security, and also Corpo de less Militar but Segunda the Linha (second important seriously regarded was as line forces), which was organised as a militia largely to support the aldeamento

14Douglas L. Wheeler, "African Elements in Portugal's Armies in Africa (19611974)," Armed Forces and Society (February 1976): 241. 305

105 latter battlefield Members the this themselves, and were organisation of program. if armed and trained properly, offered Portugal an opportunity to defeat the guerrillas by its forces These them the terms. the on own choice of rejecting militia population giving in Angola had reacheda,strength of 30,000 by the end of the war. 116

this point in Vietnam when he said that, In 1967AmbassadorWilliam Colby espoused as the security forces could not be omnipresent to protect the population from insurgent intimidation, village self-defense through a local citizens' militia was the considered but best forms for the also as one security of physical of political only not answer 107 in had Vietnam disarmed Experience that shown a village community mobilisation. five-man by If dominated be they met no opposition, then a squad. and entered could they could harangue the population with their message,collect taxes and supplies, and Even local local defense force block this a modest youths. conscript could or recruit intrusion and allow villagers to resist the subversive intimidation. Automatic weapons found be to to opposition, and vintage effective arms present were a required were not 108 different in This deterrent. the three theatres. situation was no sufficient

Early on it hadbecome clear that the armedforces with its limited manpower could
it from in insurgent to There protect each village possible a presence attack. maintain not

15Douglas L. Wheeler, "The PortugueseArmy in Angola, " Modern African Studies (October 1969): 432. 161. 106Bender,

99. 107Colby,
108Colby, 242. 306

was only one, obvious solution: "suitably instruct and arm the population without regard Thus in the east and north of to the colour of its skin or the level of its education.n109 Angola, in the north of Mozambique, and in all of Guine it became routine to see the its citizens ready to repel any terrorist attack in protecting that which small villages with itinerant forces Like the the theirs. armed medical program, sought through training was its to people a measure of self-sufficiency in protecting give arming villages and 110 The procedures were similar in each theatre and were introduced in themselves. various styles.

In Guine, General Spinola on his arrival in 1968 had directed the implementation of this concept in which each village or tabanca would have a militia for its selfdefense."' This force was trained by the Army, reported to the village headman, and

for help from local to call radios a with camp, if a PAIGC attack equipped was 112 it. Each village was defendedby a series of earthworks and to threatened overwhelm trenches, a barrier of barbed wire, and cleared fields of fire for 200 metres. Beer bottles devices barbed the tinsel on as warning wire. Anti-personnel mines were also served and in used the cleared approach areas to prevent a concentratedcharge at the fortifications that could overwhelm militia firepower at a chosenpoint. The militia was equippedwith

109"Aldeamentos em Autodefesa," Jornal do Ez rcito (April 1971): 62. "... instruir independentemente da cor da pele e grau as populag6es, e armar convenientemente " educacional. "o"Aldeamentos em Autodefesa," 62-63. dasForcas Armadasda Guin6, "Directive N243" [Directive N443], Comando-Chefe 30 September 1968, Headquarters, Bissau. 112Captain Manuel Medina Matos, interviewed by Al J. Venter in Portugal's War in Guine-Bissau (Pasadena:California Institute of Technology, 1973), 144-146. 307

an array of weapons, and training and weapon suites varied from village to village, depending on the availability of arms. Weapons ranged from light machine guns, Kalashnikov AK-47s, bazookas,and the PortugueseG-3 assaultrifle to old Mauser bolt"' action rifles.

Not all programs in the theatresfunctioned on this model. In the north of Angola a in in had developed the the vicinity of Army aldeamentos which were similar pattern camps. During the day the inhabitants would work on their farms or on nearby

dusk return to their settlementswithin the protective shadow of the and at plantations, Army. For resisting the terrorist overtures and refusing to cooperate thesepeople risked their lives and were thus given arms to protect themselves. For each aldeamento the Portuguese had organiseda militia which consistedof a series of platoons under sectionleaders who reported to a PortugueseArmy officer. If the settlement was attacked, the its defense. This direct structure was necessary,as the majority of these officer would in lacked leadership headman. The the traditional often and refugees were people Portuguese went to great lengths to emphasisethe voluntary nature of the program, and Colonel Martins Soaresin a 1968 interview in SantaEulalia, Angola, noted: "We do not for then they only when we are quite certain that are not asked and where arms give v9114 they will be used for protective purposes.

In northern Mozambique the population was relocated in aldeamentos,often forcibly.

113Matos interview. "'Colonel Martins Soares, interview by Al J. Venter in The Terror Fighters: A Profile of Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons (S.A. ) (Pty. ) Ltd., 1969), 16. 308

Becausethis operation imposed hardships on the people and was particularly unsettling to nomads, it created a degree of animosity which sometimes led to a reluctance in "s When armed, the weapons were generally the same population. a resettled arming "6 from have been FRELIMO. General described captured and may easily above as Arriaga indicated that he had issued some 10,000 such arms to aldeamento self-defense "' militias. These weapons went largely to the villages of trusted chiefs, as over 200

had been murdered by FRELIMO and the remaining lived in fear of the same fate."' Ambassador Colby faced a similar situation in Vietnam and from the beginning was less feeling distributing in his arms: on reserved The key point was that giving the villagers arms was a Government show of have favorable impact. in It would be the that them a major would confidence best possible way to enlist the villagers' participation in the struggle against the Communists- essentialto a people's war strategy. Even if some of the weapons in benefit be the the enlisting most net of people would astray, well worth went it. My own estimate was that we would probably lose about 20 percent of the 80 but gain percent of the population - in my view a very good would weapons trade."' About 500,000 vintage weaponswere distributed through Ambassador Colby's program over 1967-1970 Vietnamese the the period with two effects, the loss of very villages to few weaponsand the increasedparticipation of the villages in self-defense. Ambassador Colby explained:

115Henriksen, 160. "'Edgar O'Balance, "To Turn His Coat - or Not?, " Royal United ServicesInstitute Journal for DefenseStudies (March 1973): 87. "'Arriaga interview, 8 November 1994. "'General JoseLuis Almiro Canelhas,interview by the author, 3 April 1995, Lisbon. General Canelhasheadedthe Psychological Operations Directorate in Mozambique from 1969 to 1971. 119Colby, 242. 309

The program was first carefully applied in areas basically safe, both to gain confidence in it and to avoid exposing the self-defendersto more than they could handle. This procedure, and the daily exchangeof the weaponsunder the careful control of the village chief, brought the surprising result that the losseswere no more than 2 or 3 percent of those issued - far below the 20 percent I had firefights Some with the enemy took place, and predictably the selfanticipated. defenders proved not very fearsome warriors, but the primary political purpose be began to the achievedas the number of participants mounted from program of 120 hundreds hundreds thousands. the to the of

A similar oil spot method was used in the sparseareas of northern Mozambique to increase the participation of villages in self-defense. An official communique from the Commander-in-Chief stated that rural population groups organised under a self-defense increased 230,000.121 figure by 1972 in This had the to the of end was centred system 346,100), (pop. Niassa 285,300), Delgado (pop. Cabo Tete (pop. of and mobilisation 488,700), whose populations in 1970 totalled 1,120,100.'22 It thus represents a % 21 in districts the the of people war of about and reflected the fact that participation "there was no shortageof volunteers for the village militia. "' In 1969 the Vietnamese

20% 2 force 400,000 to the million or about of population, of rose which self-defense 124 Vietnamese in The program successful was pacifying the Mekong Delta were armed.

120Colby, 243. 121Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Mozambique, "Portuguese Armed Forces Communique N4 1/73, " 29 January 1973, Headquarters, Nampula, page 5. '22Estado-Maiordo Ex6rcito, ResenhaHist6rico-Militar das Campanhasde frica (1961-1974) [Historical Military Report on the African Campaigns(1961-1974)] (EstadoMaior do Ex6rcito, 1988), Vol. IV, 27. 'O'Balance, 87.

124Colby, 270.
310

'1 far 1971. had four by It Hue the taken of north as spring as years to and reached in The Mozambique, degree Portuguese this success. of self-defense mobilisation reach although quite similar, was slower and more tentative, having taken a longer sevenyears 126 level. to reach a similar

The French in Algeria establishedlocal maghzen units for settlement self-defense. These were detachmentsof from thirty to fifty Algerian volunteers who were armed by the French Army and helped to protect the villages supported by SAS teams. Because had feelings incidents European desertion the community mixed about arming of Algerians. The practise drew a constant barrage of criticism from military quarters that " Algerian. were suspicious of arming any While such a force was necessary to

its from it SAS the the guerrillas, and projects was always controversial and protect in level forces. low Its from the security comfort effectiveness suffered a suffered accordingly.

Portugueseimplementation of village self-defensemost resembled that of the U. S. in Vietnam. The British in Malaya had only to worry about the minority ethnic Chinese for far It job the thus to of support guerrillas. was a source easier a as population limited it in isolate the this than of portion population was any other and resettle insurgency. While Home Guards were an important part of the villages and their

1 Colby, 313. 126Henriksen, 154. '27AIf Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgencyin Algeria (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 196. 311

defense, their organisation and loyalty was far easier to engineer than that in either Algeria, Vietnam, or PortugueseAfrica, where entire populations were vulnerable.128

Assessment of Social Operations When General Spfnola arrived in Guine in 1968, he was disturbed about the overall deteriorating situation and implemented his Psychological Campaign for Recovery, in improved build better Army Guind health, the the a and would with people which "' infrastructure, and commerce. education, This program was known as Um Guine

Melhor or "A Better Guind" and directed substantialresourcestoward social operations fundamental by deeds the that the through the attacking needs of people premise on PAIGC be directly by the the promises of message an oral would supported 130 be PAIGC This to theory the proved valid, and saw the Portuguese challenged. dangerous General Spinola's devastatinglyefficient than more even as potentially program 131Social problems were perceived to be the root of the insurgency helicopter assaults. hope in their to theatres the any and cure critical of victory. of all problem

In Angola the war had been won by 1972, and this victory was perhaps 80 percent

128Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer M. Taw, Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict, The developmentof Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991), 90. 129General Pedro Alexandre Gomes Cardoso, interview by the author, 29 March 1995, Lisbon. '30General Pedro Alexandre GomesCardoso, undatedpersonal notes on psychosocial from 1968-1973, pages 30-31. in Guin6 operations 13'Patrick Chabal, Amfcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 94.
312

132 The to population there was relatively social operations. successful attributable however, been had Mozambique the situation was In made; many mistakes secure. leadership. in 1974 the and patient and skilful addition of resources with retrievable even The blueprint remained valid in that social operations were the key to any government had largely Army Portuguese insurgents. The the entered conflict the successagainst the fight to of shoulder a great part and adjusted to engagement a military prepared its it to burden counterinsurgency and own came understand as as well, civilian Campaigns. This shift in emphasiswas the result of Portugal's searchfor the successful its low long haul in its insurgency cost, strategy with to accordance solution

While many of the aspects of social operations were extremely positive, such as health, education, and infrastructure, the aldeamentosprogram remained controversial. Resettlement led to the social and psychological insecurity of those affected, and an "' influence. to unhappy population was one vulnerable guerrilla While the aldeamento

intimidation it disrupt to the of guerrilla population, successful program was adequately implementation is invariably difficult the that be of such a policy a strongly argued can in balance decision On Portugal's any counterinsurgency strategy. policy and chancy in living indigenous distinct brought the the standards of of a elevation social operations This keeping to theatres. the the throughout contributed aspect effectively populations its loyalty to the the through gain substantive effort of population and subdued conflict insurgents. the neutralise

'32Gomes Bessa,407. 133Bender, 195-196. 313

Ix

SelectedAspects of Logistical Operations

Portugal faced the very formidable logistical challenge of delivering adequategoods distant differing distributing locally to three them the to and war zones and services and identify Campaigns. This the chapter selectedproblems that Portugal faced will sustain in moving and maintaining its forces, and describe the imaginative solutions devised to desired limitations to the the achieve and encountered ends. overcome

Lifeblood of War Military activity is normally describedin terms of strategy and tactics, and thesearts however, important the truly accounts; exciting make activity lies outside of this of war C. Marshall A. P. Wavell Field broader this explained range. perspective: narrow The more I have seen of war the more I realise how it all depends on (what American logistics). transportation It our and allies call administration takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and knowledge hard know it to takes and much work where you can place your when; forces and whether you can maintain them there. A real knowledge of supply and be basis factors the must of every leader's plan; only then can he know movement how and when to take risks with those factors; and battles and wars are won only by taking risks. ' The Portuguese had a long history of military operations in the colonies and had developed an understanding of these principles early in their pacification operations. Their later experience with the Atlantic Alliance had refined and modernised their logistic had developed they support, and as a result of a cadre of logistically concept

'Archibald C. P. Wavell, SpeakingGenerally (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1946), 78-79.
314

indoctrinated and trained personnel. The PortugueseArmed Forces, having shifted to the Tipo Americano or TA methodologyin 1953, proceededto send its officers to the major in States, United the colleges where they studied this logistic and staff command U. S. As the and the similar NATO logistical doctrine and consequence, a phenomenon. in by the concept, adapted principle, and and practise reformulated were practises Portuguese Armed Forces. When the uprisings of 1961 occurred, Portugal was thus theoretically prepared to apply what it had learned in supporting the wars in the 2 ultramar.

Unfortunately, at the onset of the wars Portugal had two reasonsfor concern in this indoctrination in first despite logistics for training The the that elaborate and was area. in Ministry had Europe, Army doctrine the the of war written no or conventional 3 for logistic in the support counterinsurgency ultramar. The second regulations regarding in doctrine first be for that to the a separate needed established each of the parallelled three theatres,as they differed so much in their individual campaignrequirements. These deficiencies were in reality strengths to the extent that while Portugal did not have a logistic systemdesignedto support a war on the scaleof the Campaigns, it began without inadequate doctrine or system. Thus Portugal proceeded to of any the encumbrance design and install the necessary procedures that pragmatically considered the function theatres the that of each of conditions and and would also with characteristics

2Estado-Maior do Exercito, Subsfdios para o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhasde Africa [Aid to the Study of Doctrine] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exdreito, 1990), 193-194.

Af 3Subs(dios da Estudo Doutrina Campanhas de Aplicada ica, 194. para o nas

315

in supporting both military and social operations. flexibility and responsiveness

Organising for War At the beginning of the Campaignsin Angola in 1961 it was relatively easy to move troops to Luanda by air and transport them to the battlefield. There was, however, no logistic structure capableof effectively supporting these initial units and the subsequent increasing frequency by To that ship with and numbers. address this arrived ones forced Angola Region Military to adapt quickly to the new situation -5 the was of problem .

Becausethe fighting in theseearly years was concentratedin the northern most of the four tactical intervention zones, the bulk of the support was required there. As a into logistic divided first Angola two the was areas, covering solely the consequence, Northern Intervention Zone (ZIN) and the secondcovering the rest of the territory in the Central, Southern, and Eastern Intervention Zones (ZIC, ZIS, and ZIL). The area

for its logical developed Luanda the support centre resupply and with was port, around 6 infrastructure. The existence of this natural control point near the road and airport fighting meant that logistic support was defacto considered and administered from here in the context of the entire Military Region of Angola rather than the intervention zones individually.

Africa, da Campanhas Estudo Doutrina de 4Subsfdios Aplicada 198. nas para o 5Estado-Maior do Exercito, Resenha Histdrico-Militar das Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974) [Historical-Military Report of the African Campaigns(1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1989), Vol. I (General Summary), 439. 6Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 439-440. 316

Most of the traditional arms of a logistical service did not exist in Angola in 1961. There was no commissariat, and it took the better part of 1961 to establish a functioning depot in Luanda that was capable of serving all of Angola. Materiel distribution and in be deliver had inadequate initially to to size and scope adjusted and and support were in Health Service The the the centred was move. on units materiel with maintain 1962 in beginning 1961. By the Luanda, Hospital of Military which was embryonic of it began to function with some efficiency. There was no transport service organised in 1961. Unloading ships and aircraft and directing cargo and personnel was inefficient, in Section 4th Division Transport the was established a and progress was not made until in 1962. Angola April Engineering Region Military Headquarters, support was of the of depot functioning in the only establishment of a as and required place and propitiously in 361 did its Communication Battalion for buffer inventory not arrive supplies. an Angola until the spring of 1962, and after its arrival communication support improved ' designed, logistic As the system was established, and refined, this to wartime needs. Mozambique in Guin6 tailored to the and specific and was replicated resource managerial these theatres. of each of requirements

Becausethe armed struggle did not begin in Guine until 1963, it had the opportunity in fundamental Angola. The from the benefit gained adjustments of experience much to in from land-based Angola-developed moving centred primarily system were a to the fluvial large Guin6'ssize, small system, and poor roads to operation a maritime one. distribution dictated the as most practical transportation solution. waterborne with mines Another factor affecting logistics was the oppressiveclimate, which had an adverseeffect

de Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 440-443. 7Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas

317

diseases infections Tropical health, maintenance, operation. and machinery and radio on Service Health The thus and adjustments. problems, required subsistence constant were economy dictated the need to import foodstuffs for the armed forces, rather than buying ' This situation contrasted markedly, for instance, with Angola, where in locally. them

' by tonnage locally. Bissauwas the 1962about62% of logistic requirements met were logistic hub and distributioncentrefor Guine. From therein tonnage84% of all cargo
" 2% for by by Airlift 14% and air. was road, reserved cargo of the water, over moved highest priority, including casualty evacuation and mail service.

The armed struggle did not begin in Mozambique until 1964, and thus there had been time to upgradethe logistic systemby then. It parallelled that of Angola and was adapted to the peculiarities of that country with its great length, lack of north-south located distance from terminals the air and sea primary a great routes, communication fighting, and the civil infrastructure unable to support the war effort. " From the

beginning the logistic base system in Mozambique was considered inadequatewith its 1,000 kilometres from in Marques Lourenco in depot the the north. some war zone single depotswere establishedin Beira, Nacala, and Porto Amelia nearer the As a consequence fighting. This new port network served as the skeletal basis for the logistic structure developed in Angola with identical organisation and functions. It was further modified

BResenha de Africa (1961-1974), Histrico-Militar das Campanhas Vol. I, 444.

'Chief of the 4th Division of the Military Report/Directive 100 of 15 August 1963, Annex G. Region of Angola, Logistic

Africa, Campanhas 10Subsfdios de da Estudo Doutrina 312. Aplicada para o nas

11Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 445. 318

delivery the transport to coast with along road and air maritime coordinate refined and to the interior. "

In Mozambique logistic communications saw cargo and personnel arriving directly from the metrpole by ship at one of the several deep water ports or by air to one of the five primary airfields capable of handling the large air transports of the day and their 13 Nampula. They be Beira, Marques, Lourenco Tete, then Nacala, and would cargo: locally distributed by intratheatre airlift, truck convoy, rail, or a combination thereof.

Portugal executedthe logistical equation well, never allowing the -guerrillas fully to isolate even small posts. This capability required the application of imagination,

flexibility, and hard work. While most aspectsof logistic communicationswere routine, there were three that deserve mention for their innovative thinking: airlift, ground be in These the following paragraphs. care. will explored medical transportation, and

Airlift Prior to 1961 the Portuguesehad had for many years relied almost exclusively on

link and this resource capability as a with the threetheatres, maritime their commercial
bulk Campaigns in to the the the troops the move of of years and opening used was less became less This Africa. the and to attractive as process war progressed, materiel for it was increasingly more expensive to operate a ship compared to an aircraft, 12Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa (1961-1974), Vol. I, 475. "Colonel No Ferreira, Transportes Estrategicos entre as Provfncias de Angola e Mocambique [Strategic Transport between the Provinces of Angola and Mozambique] (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1964), 9. 319

particularly in moving people. It cost about 5,000 per day for a chartered vessel 14 day 2,700 the alongside per pier. The troops were unable to perform underway and their duties while on a voyage, and for a nation pressedfor manpower and cash, it made less and less senseto have an unusablemanpower pool hostageto an expensive transit far An troops transport cargo more efficiently when and priority aircraft could process. all associatedcosts were considered.

For instance, the approximate cost of transporting personnel to the theatres in in 1970 4,534,038 (312,000 The was contos). aircraft and commercial ships chartered in in the same year was transporting commercial materiel ships cost of approximate 653,948 (45,000 contos), or a total of 5,187,986 (357,000 contos). After 1971, with the substitution of PortugueseAir Force Boeing B-707 aircraft for the chartered vessels, the cost of shipping by seawas reducedto 1,634,150 (115,000 contos) per year, or only " While 32% the cost. ocean shipping expenseswere reduced year's preceding of about by shifting to aircraft, the aircraft were also comparably less expensive than vessels.

This shift came relatively late in the Campaigns. The Portuguesebegan the war with in Douglas DC-6A (Cargo) DC-6B intertheatre the centred and airlift capability a modest (Passenger)model aircraft, which were purchased from Pan American World Airways. Ultimately Portugal operateda fleet of 10 DC-6s. Becauseof the mechanical nature of

14Colonel Luis Alberto Santiago Inocentes, interview by the author, 14 April 1994, London.

Africa de (1961-1974), 15Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas Vol. I, 449. In 1970 the averageexchange rate for a conto was 14.53; in 1971, 14.21; in 1972, 15.78; and in 1973,16.58.
320

high their aircraft consequent and maintenancerequirements, availability engine piston 6 time aircraft. never exceeded any one at The DC-6 series could carry only about

50,000 pounds of cargo, and thus this small fleet had a limited impact on the overall logistic picture. The Portuguesewere always short of spareparts to maintain the aircraft,

takento skirt this problem, suchas chromeplating the and while there were measures
improved the to situation significantly. never retard wear, engine cylinders These

in important, that the aircraft were operatedsafely at very nevertheless, measureswere high utilisation rates and never had an accident. Round trips to the theatreswere flown two or three times per week from Lisbon to Mozambique and took 48 tedious hours flying time. These missions always required relief crews stationed enroute to maintain the schedule. Thus with its limited cargo and passengercapacity and its slow speed,it 16 day. by the airlift standardsof was outdated even

In 1971 the PortugueseAir Force purchasedthe last two B-707 models produced by Boeing Aircraft Corporation. These were purpose-built aircraft with a strengthened Flown Pan American to cargo and passenger cabin. and a mixed according undercarriage in Portuguese hands they the highest utilisation ultimately realised standards, operating fact by Boeing. One B-707 a confirmed of the two aircraft was worldwide, of any flexibility dramatic the the and and reliability of a mission, plane made a on always " logistic in difference the picture. In 1973 the two B-707s together flew 299 missions

16General Tomas George Conceicoe Silva, interview by the author, 3 April 1995, Lisbon. General Conceicoe Silva was Chief of Staff of the PortugueseAir Force from 1988 to 1991, and has extensive airlift experiencein Africa. "Conceico e Silva interview, 3 April 1995.
321

'$ for fleet 10 DC-6s. The DC-6s had by then been 209 the of missions entire alongside relegated to the shorter missionsto Guine, the Azores, Madeira, and Europe, and the B707s were serving Luanda and Mozambique. The B-707 typically left Lisbon at 1130 hours, flew to Luanda, was unloaded, serviced, and loaded, and returned to the metrpole by 2230 hours the same day.19 According to Portuguese Air Force records in 1972, instead luggage by by B-707 their transporting ship saved the of and passengers simply armed forces 4,207,469 (266,633 contos). In 1973 comparable savings were

4,437,355 (267,633 contos). These savingsover two years paid for the two B-707s2

Intratheatre airlift was shouldered primarily by the Noratlas aircraft, originally for in in by Aviation 1955 Nord this the French and West German air purpose conceived forces. " The Noratlas fleet performed well and served Portugal's needs. Other

intratheatre support was performed by a variety of aircraft, including the Douglas DC-3 (C-47), DC-4, and DC-6. This assortment was necessaryto accommodatethe various had 403 instance, by 1964 Angola Mozambique had For limitations. airfields and site " following 211, with the capabilities:

"Commander, Ist Air Region, "Resumo Estatistico das Misses Realizadas e PassageirosTransportados (Ida e Volta), 1972 e 1973" [Statistical Resumeof Missions Transported (Round Trip), 1972 and 1973], 30 September1974. Flown and Passengers "General Rui Tavares Monteiro, "Transporte Adreo na FAP, Do zero aos 707" [Air Transport in PoAF, From zero to the 707], Mais Alto (N2 283,1993): 7. "Commander, 1st Air Region, "Resumo Estatistico das Misses Realizadas e PassageirosTransportados (Ida e Volta), 1972 e 1973" [Statistical Resumeof Missions Transported (Round Trip), 1972 and 1973], 30 September1974. Flown and Passengers 21GeneralRui Tavares Monteiro, "Recordando os Noratlas [Remembering the Noratlas], Mais Alto (N4 279,1992): 275-280.

"Ferreira, 9.
322

Field Capability\TO DC-6/Super Constellation/B-707/DC-8 C-54

Angola 12 5

Mozambiaue24 5 10

Guinea 1

Noratlas
DC-3/C-47 Lesser fields (some permit DC-3) Totals

6
11 369

15
30 156 20

403

211

21

The majority of the landing stripswere so primitive that only helicopters or very light be T-6, Harvard DO-27 Dornier the could accommodated. or as such aircraft,
Nevertheless, the airlift capability, as embodied in the numerous fields throughout the link base logistical to every communication virtually of the theatres, extended as a Portuguese Armed Forces.

While the Portuguese began their counterinsurgency operations some twelve years in 1948-September 1949), lessons (June Airlift the Berlin this application of the after logistic power were an integral part of their thinking. The Berlin Airlift had shown that for logistic bases, than transport a more prop short-term air was the and machines given "' developed intensive The techniques there showed the way to operational emergencies. infrastructure the transport, to providing procedures and surface were alternative a sure in place. General Arriaga, the then Subsecretary of State for Aeronautics, had

'Ferreira, 9.
24Ferreira,9. uColonel Antonio Fernandes Morgado, Apoio LogIstico na Guine 1973-1974 [Logistical Support in Guind 1973-1974] (Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militates, 1979), 9-11. "'Kenneth Macksey, For Want of a -Nail: The Impact on War of Logistics and Communications (London: Brassey's Ltd., 1989), 146. 323

establishedthe infrastructure in the 1950s,and Portugal proceededto graft theselessons 27 Except for U. S. operations in Vietnam, other governments into its airlift operations. less attunedto theseairlift calculations. Malaya fighting comparableinsurgenciesseemed its distances here troop the the British made and numbers with and comparable most was British in Singapore There troopships of stream arriving an endless was such effort. no

described this expensive to supportthe war, andonenewly commissioned subaltern and

leisurely process, which was anything but a focused preparation for counterinsurgency into local insertion the environment: a rapid or warfare We spent hours eating huge P. and O. meals, and then more hours after them in recovering deckchairs, watching waves sliding past the ship, endlessly, without pause, without ourselvesrealising that days were sliding past too. Soon they were riot days, but weeks. And soon we were in the Indian Ocean, slowly opening our eyes and much surprised to find the system again appearing among us.... The in decreed had least Singapore every troopship that a should arrive at system $ it be Empire Fowey the this troopship? should our week week, and The Portuguesethus sought the rapid and cost-effective avenue of air transport to move troops and critical supplies, and this choice improved the sustainability of the Campaigns. The shift from high profile troopships arriving and departing with fanfare to the more low-key Campaign. The low the the nature of reinforced aircraft profile of a subtle departing deliveries timely and aircraft providing arriving and a rapid response routinely to needsin the theatres fit the tenor of the Campaigns.

Ground Transportation and Mine Countermeasures Portugal had military posts establishedthroughout all of the theatres which had to be

'General Kalza de Arriaga, interview by the author, 8 November 1994, Lisbon. General Kalza served as the Subsecretaryof State for Aeronautics from 1955 to 1962. 28Oliver Crawford, The Door Marked Malaya (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1958), 13-14.
324

supplied by truck, as there was no other practical means to deliver heavy items. Rail lines were restricted by the route that they took, and airlift by weight limitations. If Portugal was- to win its war, then the trucks with their supplies must reach their destinationsin sufficient numbersto provide for the soldiers. Truck passage not only had to negotiate an enemy but also some of the most primitive and daunting territory in the be by travel truck thus a slow and gruelling process in most areas. could world, and Paved roads were easy routes but tended to connect the principal towns and not the villages and the more remote sites, outpoststhat were important in keeping the insurgent separatedfrom the population. To deliver supplies to the more secludedareas required highways but poor roads, tracks, fleet the not only vehicles negotiating paved supply of a latter degenerate into In these pistes could trails. cases many rutted tracks through and deep sand. Vehicles could and did become stuck in these primitive roads, requiring hours to extricate. During the rainy season unpavedroads becamequagmiresof soft mud impassable. dry In the seasonthey remained a problem, virtually and were and sand hard beds baked dry the and provided a solid roadway. Some of these river although 29 for dry follow 50 llometres course water as much a as trails could

Trucks travelled theseroutes generally by convoy when enemy contact was expected. The convoy might be all military or a combination of commercial hauliers and military. When entering an area of known or probable insurgent presence, the trucks would be for drivers briefed driving, being the on convoy procedure and ambushed,or assembled,

29Colonel(Engineer) Luis Valenta Pinto, interview by the author, 15 November 1994, Tancos. Colonel Valenta Pinto is the Commandant of the Portuguese Army Practical School of Engineering in Tancos and has extensive experience with demining in (1971-1972) Angola and Cabinda (1973-1974). operations 325

hitting a mine. Mines were usedincreasingly in all of the theatresas the war progressed. Initially the guerrillas were inept in using them, but their proficiency improved over time, as they acquired the skill of safely handling and effectively placing the devices. 3 Mining of the road system Eventually their use far exceededthat in other insurgencies. disrupt insurgents Portuguese logistic for the to the ground the system easiestway was 31 for discretion. their truck the a convoy almost at ambushof and create an opportunity in the Widespread mining prompted the Portugueseto adopt a series of countermeasures in demining their and vehicles of procedures. modification and operation

The two vital items for a Portuguese soldier were his supply of water and for insurgent held insurgent The the true these as well. constraints was and ammunition, him from his his bring forced to munitions with sanctuary country, and with generally he limit his limitation there to carry, could so was a consequent offensive on what a 32 increased have had he built He this potential, an arms cache that had might potential. Notwithstanding by Portuguese. the this variation, the average remained undiscovered 5 kilograms, insurgent had the and after weighed mine carried this weight anti-vehicular the considerable distance from his sanctuary at substantial danger, he wanted a for his Consequently, it the mine was risk. planted where return would commensurate be activated within a relatively short wait, giving a nearly immediate effect and instant

30Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1974 (London: Greenwood Press, 1978), 43. 31Valenca Pinto interview, 15 November 1994. 32ValenraPinto interview, 15 November 1994. 326

" gratification.

Becausethe insurgent mine laying capability was constrained by these

logistics, there was no real pattern either as to the minefield or its associatedoperations. The mine may have been laid as a single or as part of a group. It may have been in hit isolated tactic, threat. All a and run or simply as an ambush, an employed with M in Portuguese be had to countermeasures. addressed of these eventualities

First, the trucks were madeas safe as possible in the event that they contacteda mine in the roadway. The Berliet truck was designedand built for resupply. Its wheels were be detonated in front the that the so mines would cab ahead of the driver and of well 35 from blast The bonnet the the protection engine providing with and the passenger, bonnet The had driver's habit the removed. top cab were a of acting as a of metallic in driver force decapitating The the and passenger a mine explosion. and of guillotine the explosion would also throw them both upward againstthe cab roof with severeinjury, if it were not removed. The floor and bed of the truck were also laid with sand bags to from from It important the coming explosion. the shrapnel was also occupants protect for occupants to keep their arms and legs inside the vehicles to achieve maximum 36 bags. from the sand protection

Convoy organisation and truck operating procedures were also adjusted to

33Valenca Pinto interview, 15 November 1994. 34Valenca Pinto interview, 15 November 1994. 35GeneralJose Manuel de Bethencourt Rodrigues, interview by the author, 9 November 1994, Lisbon. mValencaPinto interview, 15 November 1994. 327

lead The danger the vehicle was traditionally a Berliet "mine of mines. accommodate by Unimog followed Mercedes Benz 50 troop the truck a carrier with metres crasher" followed. On The the convoy sandy roads convoy remainder of separation. standard drivers followed immediately in the tracks of the vehicle aheadto be certain of a safeand tested path. Troop carriers were positioned throughout the convoy, and a Berliet

irregular, depending Progress train. the on what obstaclesthe was generally concluded be debris, broken in There found the a suspicion a could of mine, or a road. escort truck. When night came, the vehicles would form a laager, only to be on the road again if "' The travel they met an oncoming convoy light. first at night only would convoys at that had cleared the road ahead. It would then be important to cover the sanitisedroute had insurgents before The the to the opportunity plant new mines. as possible as quickly for difficult insurgent. Planting the much more tarring made mining mines program road digging hard-surfaced carefully removing a section meant of road pavement, a a under hole for the mine, and then replacing the section over the explosive. The pavement its lethal While be to had charge. conceal to no road was thus artfully retarred section 38 insurgents immune, the tracks. the fully sandy preferred

the situation in the Convoys along thesehighways employed a lookout who assessed he felt judgment in his If there that was a risk of mines, then the convoy ahead. road four from from These to halt, team the trucks. eight men would of alight a and would in line begin the the path of search vehicles with pointed probes or abreast a would men

37ManuelRibeiro Rodrigues, interview by the author, 16 November 1994, Lisbon. Sr. Ribeiro Rodrigues is a military historian with the PortugueseCommission of Military History, Lisbon. 38Valenga Pinto interview, 15 November 1994. 328

lances called picas. These were wooden rods of about two metres in length with a derived from lance in 50 the the of which name was used point, centimetre metallic bullfighting. " Thesepicadores or "trail blazers" were rotated every twenty minutes with turn. detailed taking the to a convoy soldiers all The job was tedious as well as

0 dangerous and required uninterrupted concentration. Once a mine was discovered, a from device. If the to the knife clean sand and earth charge used gently was combat in however, it destroyed If be boobytrapped, then to was place. a mine could appeared be recovered intact without exploding it, then it was valuable for study. Most mines 4' in destroyed situ were

Often anti-personnel mines were employed with the anti-vehicular type and placed it. The frustrate in it to this the next purpose of pattern roadside was or either around convoy procedures where personnel would abandon the trucks and seek shelter on the freezing By in the the to their of an ambush. the effects personnel avoid road shoulder of insurgents increase the their threat the mines, would anti-personnel of with vehicles 42 burst known }lagelacao. for of gunfire as a a successfulambush or whipping chances Also anti-personnel mines had the effect of confusing the situation for the picadores and difficult. demining more making Mines were also planted in chains, where raising one

43 Under limited, these to conditions the explode progress was and others would cause

Africa, da Aplicada Campanhas de Doutrina 175. Estudo 39Subsfdios nas para o 40Valenga Pinto interview, 15 November 1994. 4'Valenca Pinto interview, 15 November 1994. 42Henriksen,44.

Africa, da de Estudo Doutrina 43Subsfdios Aplicada Campanhas 176. para o nas

329

18 kilometres a day was not considered inordinately slow.44 During the rainy season from October to April the roads were a quagmire, and it took a convoy about 10 days 41 Rain made the job even more hazardous. For the driver it would 80 kilometres to go become almost impossible to follow the tracks of the vehicle ahead, increasing the

detection job become For the the squad mine would mine. a contacting chancesof insurgents, the One the use of captured methodof accelerating processwas suicidal.
helping, knew devices They they the and after all resisted where rarely available. when ab laid had because them they were planted

Electronic detectorswere tried but never proved as effective aspicas. They were not because the the mine casings and non-metallic presenceof metal of reliable considered debris in the road47 In the instance of the wooden-casedmines, termites would often have eaten the wooden casings and only loose explosives remained in the soil.48 The Portuguese found that the pica in the hands of an experiencedpicador was the most locating It was also the most cost effective. of mines. method effective and reliable Specially trained dogs were valuable aids in detection, but were by no meansas reliable flagellation Many but tested, they mechanical road systems were also the picadores. as

"Lieutenant Enrico Chagas, interview by Al J. Venter in The Zambesi Salient: Conflict in SouthernAfrica (London: Robert Hale & Company, 1974), 24. 45GeneralRafael Guerreiro Ferreira, interview by the author, 29 March 1995, Lisbon. General Guerreiro Ferreira was head of logistics in Mozambique under General Kalza de Arriaga. interview, 14 April 1994. 46Inocentes

'Chagas interview. Africa, da 48Subsfdios Estudo Campanhas de Doutrina Aplicada 176. para o nas
330

four team matched a of experienced none and expensive, were cumbersome and picadores. The task of demining was always in a state of flux, as the insurgents

it human factor Consequently, the that could techniques. was constantly adopted new demining The the these to magnitude of problem was changes. adjust most readily four discovered 52 by held team in of picadores who a an unofficial record reflected 49 day. in mines a single

So mine detecting and destruction was raised to a high art to meet the threat. Like in by in 1969 Vietnam, Corps Marine S. conflict characterised U. mines and a noted the booby traps: "Although a great many detection means, ranging from intricate electronic devices to specially trained dogs, have been developed, experience has shown that an is for detection look look, to the to Marine, and where most effective aware of what alert device."S0 The proceduresthat the Portuguesedeveloped were an important element in in by forces its South African War Border demining the security operations subsequent (1966-1989).s'

Evacuation and Hospitalisation While the advent of modem medical care for the population in the theatres was important, it was relatively mundane. The most dramatic effort occurred in the care of

Africa, da Campanhas de 176. Aplicada Estudo Doutrina 49Subsfdios nas para o

50U. S. Marine Corps, Professional Knowledge Gainedfrom Operational Experience in Vietnam, 1969, Special Issue, Mines and Boobytraps (Washington: HeadquartersU. S. Marine Corps, 1969), 2. s'Willem Steenkamp, South Africa's Border War (1966-1989) (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing Limited, 1989), 235. 331

largely Portuguese Although the soldier was uncomplaining and took war casualties. danger in stride, the presenceof an excellent health service with its hospitalisation and important factor but an morale also served only represented not capabilities evacuation have from hygiene Historically suffered more poor and armies measure. as a practical logistician British Colonel P. D. Foxton, As the from a with than action. enemy sickness Army explained, "Every seven days an armoured division (about 14,000 men) is on infection, 500 have it to to sick as soldiers report a result of up exercise can expect is, An disabilities therefore, vital to any efficient service medical and accidents. routine is best n52 Angola the that starting point, as represents army embarking on operations. began. Campaigns the where

Portugal designed its medical care and evacuation around certain principles for handling casualties. The first was the "Six Hour Rule" in which a casualty has the if he for his the treatment can receive proper medical surviving of greatest chance S3 in lay difficulty hours. The the to removing wounded a primary six within wounds While the the critical period. many of combat casualties treatment site within proper forces in theatres, the the the combat of maintained radio contact remoteness occurred be Initial help treatment than headquarters, summoned. was more often could and with fact highlights importance first that the trained from a personnel, of non-medically not by helicopter Whether handling truck training. or or a combination aid and casualty likely by doctor headquarters, first treatment a was most at company the thereof,

Sep.D. Foxton, Powering War: Modern Land Force Logistics (London: Brassey's Ltd., 1994), 69. 53Foxton,70. 332

irregularly. did In Angola in addition to first go with a patrol although medical personnel aid stations (postos de socorros), it was mandated that an infirmary (enfermarias de estacionamento)of at least 10 bedsbe establishedat company headquartersto make best Depending local the on where the unit action had taken place, personnel. medical use of the casualtiescould receive treatment here or at the sector level infirmary which had at least a 30 bed capacity (enfermarias de sector). These sector infirmaries also served as for level infirmaries but whose condition treated the those at company sites recuperation did not warrant evacuation to a hospital. In both of these instances available civilian hospitals could be used as an alternative. The Military Hospital of Luanda, which had an 800 bed capacity, could treat virtually any case, and served as the ultimate evacuation ' for Angola. site

Once a casualty had had his initial surgery, the "Ten Day Rule" came into effect. This guideline, basedon experiencegained in treating casualtiesgenerally, suggested that increased his surviving surgery markedly if he were given a the chancesof a casualty " before he days to ten rest was moved. period of The number of infirmaries and the

beds in each were based on the number of anticipated casualties, the "Six Hour Rule, " " These for Rule. Day likelihood "Ten the that, once calculations accounted the and infirmary been had an and surgery performed, they could not be received at casualties days. There for ten was consequentlya senseof urgency to evacuatethe sick and moved forward facilities from that the the there would be free to so areas medical wounded

'Headquarters, Military Region of Angola, 4th Division (Logistics), Luanda, "General Plan of the Standard Operating Procedures Issued by the 4th Directorate, " 15 August 1963, Section on "General Rules on Hospitalisation. " 55Foxton,70. 333

accommodatenew casualties. This processcalled for the cooperationof both service and combat personnel in executing a prompt move of patients to the general hospital where the long-term nursing and rehabilitation could begin. schedule for recuperating personnel was set: At the Unit Level Infirmaries At the Sector Infirmaries At the Civilian Hospitals At the Military Hospital of Luanda Accordingly, the movement

10 days, 20 days, 30 days,and

60 days.56

These same guidelines applied throughout the other theatres and were promulgated by their appropriate authorities.

In Guine there was the Military Hospital of Bissau with 320 beds and the capabilities hospital. There was also the network of unit infirmaries and first aid a general of stations, but becauseGuind was such a small theatre, the intermediate facility of the 57 hospital in Bissau infirmary the In this and omitted served was purpose. sector Mozambique there were three hospitals. The primary was the Military Hospital of Lourenco Marques with 340 beds and the capabilities of a general hospital. The

secondary hospitals were the Military Hospital of Beira and the Military Hospital of Nampula with the capabilities of regional hospitals. The Beira facility had 75 beds with

"Headquarters, Military Region of Angola, 4th Division (Logistics), Luanda, "General Plan of the Standing Operating ProceduresIssued by the 4th Directorate, " 15 August 1963, Section on "General Rules on Hospitalisation. " "Colonel Lourenco de Sousa Pereira, "A Integraco da Funco Evacuagdo/ Hospitalizacao nos Tres Ramos das Forcas Armadas" [Integration of the Evacuation/ Hospitalisation Function in the Three Branches of the Armed Forces], lecture given at the Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, Lisbon, 1968-1969 session of the Course for Senior Command, 19.

334

in facility beds. The had 240 beds. 120 Nampula As Angola, a surge capability of " Mozambique had the network of sector and unit infirmaries and first aid stations. Given the casualties of the Campaigns, these beds were adequateto allow every case during the war 51 days of recuperation in Guine, 78 days in Angola, and 61 days in Mozambique without evacuation to the metr6pole.S9 With the exception of the Republic 60 in Africa. better Rhodesia, Africa there was no medical care anywhere and of South

In certain casesof orthopaedic corrective surgery, skin graphs for burn victims, or South African Defense the arrangements were made with specialities, complicated other Force for treatment at the military hospital in Pretoria." There was a small ward of

largely in 1972 Campaigns, late 50 the the these end of until and were patients about blacks. It was also the policy to evacuateall whites to the metrpole, where they could hospitals families. There their were nine military on the mainland with with recuperate 62 2,955 beds. 2,615 beds The exception to this and a surge capability of a total of flown These burn trauma extreme casualties. and other were cases general policy was to the PortugueseAir Force Hospital at Air Base N2 4 on the Island of Terceira in the

58Sousa Pereira, 19-20. 59Joaquim da Luz Cunha, et al, Africa, A Vitoria Trafda [Africa, Betrayed Victory] (Lisbon: Editorial Intervengdo, Lda., 1977), 70-71. Based on figures for sick and in 27,790, 48,465, in in Guin6 Angola from Mozambique of and all causes of wounded in in days Guin6 4,016, Angola 4,746, in 38,950; of of and of combat and of Mozambique of 3,647. 60Inocentes interview, 14 April 1994. Colonel Inocenteswas the PortugueseMilitary Attache to the Republic of South Africa from 1972 to 1975. 61lnocentes interview, 22 October 1994. 'Sousa Pereira, Figure 6.

335

Azores.

This 100 bed facility was separated from the mainland and thus removed the

wounded from any use as pawns in the anti-war movement. 63 Because the casualty level

was relatively light, it was not a large or difficult job.

Medical Services

Deaths to Wounds Casualty Proportions Conflict Vietnam PortugueseAfrican Campaigns Algeria Korea Falkland Islands
World War II

P 1 to Ito 1 to 1 to i to

Rion 5.6 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.8

1to3.1

Malaya : omviied from various quoted official sources.

I to 2.4

Table 1

The effectiveness of Portuguese medical care is compared to that of other conflicts in Table 1, which represents the proportion of those wounded from all causes to those who died. The highest success rate for medical attention lay with the U. S., whose vast resources overcame most complications. Portuguese medical care was the next best with While these figures are a general

one chance of dying in every 5.4 men wounded. indicator,

they are also influenced by such factors as medical advances since the In

beginning of World War II, the intensity of the conflict, and the climatic conditions.

Malaya helicopter evacuation was embryonic, and the jungle conditions posed a problem even for those not wounded. In the Falklands the conditions were filthy and the fighting intense, a difficult environment for wounded. Nevertheless, the Portuguese figure stands as a substantial achievement and carries a message that Portugal was sensitive to the health and morale of its troops, particularly in the context of its manpower shortage.

63Conceico e Silva interview, 3 April 1995.

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Paranurses The Portuguesesoldier knew that, while his diet in the bush might be meagre, the tropical conditions oppressive, and danger lurking in his next step, his Army would go to great lengths to speed him to a hospital should he be wounded. Every available in female important traditional the and an era of roles one of sought, most resource was and unique aspectsof this effort was Portugal's paranurses. In the field of medical care, the Portuguese had observed that the presence of a woman in the early stages of a improve did trauma to the morale of a soldier, particularly one who had much physical been under the stress of combat conditions for an extended period of time. " The

Portuguese lesson came from the limited French use of nurses in combat both in Indochina and Algeria. The French Red Cross had originally sponsoredthe use of three nurses in 1937 to be inserted into areas of public calamity for relief of the injured. Following World War II, the French brought this program under military sponsorship, and in the period from 1949 until the program was closed in 1962, recruited 40 women for the paranurse speciality. There were only about fifteen active at any one time, and of this group only 5 served in Indochina and 7 volunteered for Algeria. While the

deployment of paranurses demonstrated the benefits of such a program, it remained largely a French experiment becauseof its modest size.65

Following World War II and the widespread troop demobilisation, women assumed in forces token armed role generally with the exception of Israel, which was always a

"Colonel Luis A. Martinho Gro, interview by the author, 2 April 1995, Tomar, Portugal. Colonel Martinho Gro, a former parachutist, is presently writing a history of the Portugueseparanurses.

65Martinho Gro interview, 2 April 1995.

337

' short of manpower.

There was a resurgence in the Korean Conflict in which the

various U. S. military nurse corps were increased aggregately to a strength of 5,400 through a recall of reservists, and 500 to 600 of theseservedin the combat zone but were 67 fire. For the remainder of the 1950s and the early 1960sthe to not routinely exposed downplayed S. U. women, calling them "typewriter soldiers" becauseof services various "' their circumscribed roles. The token female recruiting of the U. S. Marine Corps was even basedon beauty as late as 1964, a reflection of the narrow attitude within the U. S. 69 military. The British and French were no more adventurous, although there were small in Malaya, Algeria and Indochina. In the latter theatre there serving of nurses numbers were even some liaison pilots. Consequently, when women were introduced into the PortugueseAir Force in 1961 with the thought of putting them in harm's way, it was in avant garde, particularly a society where a woman's role was so strongly considered defined in the tradition of homemaker.

With the establishment of the Portuguese Air Force, it was easier to introduce innovative warfighting concepts. There was little opposition in this new service, where hidebound tradition had not been establishedand where there was little resistance to

66Binkinand Bach, 134. Women in the predecessorto the Israeli Defense Force in 1936in the guerrilla war betweenthe Arabs and made their first substantialappearance the Jews. By the end of World War II, 1 in 5 frontline troops was female. 67Holm,228. 68Major General Jeanne Holm, USAF (Retired), Women in the Military: Unfinished Revolution (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982), 181. The

69Holm, 181. Each prospective female Marine had to submit 4 photographs (front, back, right and left side views) and the hiring decision was made at the unusually high level of Head of Recruiting.

338

change. The Air Force establishedits own battalion of parachutistsin 1955 and later in 1961 created a cadre of 5 officers and 1 sergeant from female volunteers who were designatedas a part of the Air Force Health Service (Nursing)." These six, whose given nameswere all Maria, were the first graduatesof the program and becameknown as the "six Marias. " Dr. Salazarhad originally had someconcernsabout the nurses serving in isolated environments surrounded by men; however, General Arriaga, then the Subsecretaryof State for Aeronautics, assuredhim that all volunteers would be selected from nursing schoolsrun by the Roman Catholic Church and would thus be imbued with 7' Indeed the sisterswho ran the schools were very supportive influence. a strong moral of the plan and were invited to award the distinctive green beret to their former students 72 fourteen from During training. the their military years that the program graduation on existed there were nine coursesgraduatinga total of 48 paranurses,all of whom operated in a combat environment.73

This number may not seem significant alongside later figures; however, the only country to mobilise women on any scaleprior to the end of the Campaigns in 1974 was the U. S. The British in 1975 accorded women equal pay statuswith men and by 1976 its 4% armed forces were women. Between 1976and 1977 women were placed of about

"Decree Law N4 42 073 of 31 December 1958; and its modifying Decree N2 43 663 1961. 5 May of "Arriaga interview, 8 November 1994; and Martinho Gro interview, 2 April 1995. The schoolswere Escola de EnfennagemFranciscana Missiondrias de Maria and Escola de S. Vincentede Paulo. 7Arriaga interview, 8 November 1994. 'Luis A. Martinho Gro, "Os Filhos de Belerofonte" [The Sons Bellerophon], of Boina Verde (Supplement, April-June 1993): 24.

339

in a combat role with their assignment to the Ulster Defense Regiment in Northern Ireland.74 France severely restricted women until 1971 and in 1973 only 2% of its 513,000 troops were female.75 The U. S. military had remainedclose-mindedin this area it had 1967, a manpower shortage for Vietnam. By June 1970 there were when until 5,000 Army duty by than the end of the U. S. nurses on active and more slightly involvement in Vietnam 5,000 to 6,000 women had been rotated through the combat 76 level 300 from 1967 onward' The theatre about was zone. These women were

frequently assigned duty at remote firebases and conducted MEDCAP with other 78 personnel. So when the PortugueseAir Force began recruiting and in 1961 deploying its nurses in the combat environment, it representedthe forefront in seeking women to easeits manpower shortageand recognising that there are some things a woman can do better than a man, particularly in providing a link for the wounded to normal life outside of combat.

This effective aspectof trauma care in the Campaignsis a clear example not only of the careful thought that extended to the comforting support as well as the medical care but the wounded and also to the overall messageof personal concern that the sick of Portuguesewere attempting to deliver to the people throughout the theatres. While the French had had a heroic but small and virtually experimental program, the Portuguese

'4BinIdn and Bach, 122. 75Binldnand Bach, 117. 'Holm, 203 and 228. "Holm, 227. 78Holm,227.

340

had adopted and expanded on the principles of this small successto meet their own in in lay for field. The this the trauma the care of program uniqueness requirements Portuguesecommitment to an important medical concept and its implementation in the face of traditional social roles for women and interservice resistance to innovation. Conversely, it is interesting to note that the PAIGC subscribedto the samethinking and for identical One in female basis limited such reasons. nurses combat used on a very in Operation de in "Tito. " from Mores Guinea, Base Sofia Biaia the captured was nurse, This PAIGC practise was not thought to be widespread, nor were others encounteredin Angola or Mozambique.79

Comparative Counterinsurgencies Portugal long before the wars saw the growth and development of transportation as in the ultramar. It developed the key campaign to the conducting a counterinsurgency fundamental road, airfield, and port infrastructure well aheadof the trouble in 1961 and became the the shape of this as conflict to work more earlier proceeded expand on logisticians began Campaigns trained It the cadre of a and expanded with apparent. also this group in the years immediately after 1961. It had developedsolutions to the problem it had between distances the theatres, the and successfullyavoided and metrpole of great France's tight situation in Indochina, where the logistic lines of communication from Europe were overstretched. France also had struggled with a local infrastructure too rudimentary to support an extensive counterinsurgencycampaign and with no resources 80 in its it it. had foreseen Portugal improve this strategy. to problem and addressed

'9Martinho Gro interview, 2 April 1995. 80Macksey,158.

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In logistical operationsPortugal was quick to shed the troop transport after the initial surge in favour of aircraft, although it was less quick to upgrade this decision to jet transports. This move contrastedwith the British in Malaya, who clung to the troopship for moving personnel even though the fastest of them had become obsolete. In 1957 it to Singapore. The comparablecontract airfare was cost 120 per person for seapassage 45.81 This reluctance to change was inconsistent for a country that had in 1950 developed the first propellerjet airliner, the Vickers Viscount, and the first turbojet airliner in the DeHavilland Comet two years later. It was even more puzzling in that travel by sea voyage separateda soldier from his proper duties for perhaps three weeks 82 by 48 hours to air. compared

In making the intermodal transition from the primary airheads and ports of the theatres to local distribution, Portugal developed an elaborate ground transportation system based on a wide network of roads, protected convoys, and tested demining defeat designed the guerrilla attemptsat disruption These to measureswere procedures. its troops. Portugal's medical responseranked among the best of postto sustain and World War II conflicts, exceeding all efforts except that of the U. S. involvement in Vietnam. It had applied the proper resourcesimaginatively to produce theseresults and innovations in Sound field, health to this to the provide such care population. collaterally increased helicopters in the evacuation, medical employing and paranurses as effectivenessof this care. In summary the Portuguesewere able to overcome the threat of having the ultramar wilt at the end of slow-moving sealines of communication. They

81Macksey,167. $ZMacksey,167.

342

established a system responsive to the conflict and flexible enough to ensure a high degree of sustainability. The Commission on the Study of the Campaigns (1961-1974) establishedby the General Staff of the Army observed in its report: All who participated in the Campaigns, whatever the Theatre of Operations, agreed that never did they lack a ration, a medication, a piece of uniform, a be but There no great needs and great abundances, would a munition, weapon. the essentials, the fundamentals, would never lack, and it has even been in for that the recovery, evacuation and treatment of example, confirmed, wounded the results were superior when comparedequally to the statisticsof more 83 significant armies. There were shortagesin someremote areasfrom time to time becauseof guerrilla action in however, disruption the this case convoys; no more than an road was against inconvenience. ' Portugueselogistics were timely and tailored in their delivery, and the result of this effectivenesswas a sustainablemilitary capability.

83Estado-Maiordo Ex6rcito, Subsfdiospara o Estudo da Doutrina Aplicada nas Campanhasde, frica [Information for the Study of Doctrine Applicable in the Campaigns of Africa (1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1990), 198. "Todos os que fizeram as Campanhas,qualquer que fosseo Teatro de Operag6es,acordamem dizer que faltou lhes uma raco, um rem6dio, uma peca de fardamento, uma munico, uma nunca arms. Poderia no haver lugar a grandes exigencias ea grandes abundncias, mas o essencial, o fundamental, nunca faltou e ate se pode afirmar, por exemplo, que no levantamento, evacuagdoe tratamento de feridos os resultados foram supreendentes, de " comparados exercitos mais poderosos. quando com estatisticas mesmo 84Inocentes interview, 30 August 1994, London.

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X The PortugueseWay

This thesis has argued that there was a specific Portuguese approach to its drew and which devolvedfrom its successfully on strengths which counterinsurgency
its limited husbanding of strategy resources. Portugal translated this parsimony national into policies and practisesat the campaign and tactical level that permitted it to conduct a sustainedand lengthy war in the ultramar between 1961 and 1974. A review of the fashioned Portugal that a style of counterinsurgency that was distinct from reveals record it its to that overcome and enabled major geographical challengesand countries other limitations and to grind the nationalist movements to a halt. This Portuguese resource way focused on a subdued, low tempo style of fighting that was a function of its constrainedresourcesand low technology. Portugal knew from the beginning that it was fight it long have have fight to thus to to and a war would well and cheaply to going sustain the conflict.

In the implementation of this strategyPortugal's activities fell into two primary

human the management of and material resources and the specific tactical categories, fighting for counterinsurgency. The sum of these two areas reflected the adaptations Portuguese achievement of fighting a subdued war with minimal resources for a

from beginning Portugal had the that there would be period. acknowledged protracted
immediate solutions to its situation in Africa and had proceeded to favour strengths no

it because While lost its it lose did them weaknesses. avoid of military colonies, and not

344

reasons. Central to the Portuguesemilitary achievementwas the recognition that the role in buy to time to match the guerrilla concept of the a counterinsurgency was military of it long haul, low dictated this that goal a cost strategy. This aim and was war, protracted if that the tempo of the conflict could be the accepted principle generally reflected its dimensions in all of contained - geographical extension, populations affected, technology employed, domestic and international public opinion voiced - then the cost of ' be the war could made acceptable.

This Portuguese way of fighting focused on maintaining an overall low intensity its developed its implied low Portugal doctrine to achieve this end cost. conflict with French British having the and experiences and gleaned the studied assiduously after lessons that they held for PortugueseAfrica. It followed this doctrine in educating and training its troops in the methods of conducting such a conflict. It did so through the later it training then to the and counterinsurgency-specific of moving establishment fighting It to the to acclimatization effective environment. a more provide ultramar into infantry its light This force Army type small units. of was the most reorganised in it counterinsurgency campaigning, as proven could maintain the all effective and important contact with the population while fighting small, company-sized bands of infantry is basic force in its Light type the of military also most simplicity guerrillas. inexpensive it has firepower low to equip, capability, remained relatively and as such and train, and deploy. It is also less likely to terrorise the population and alienate this target force firepower. This any massive with use of structure embodied Portugal's audience

'Sir RobertThompson, from the VietnamWar, Reportof a seminarheld at Lessons Institutein London, 12 February 1966,18. the Royal United Services 345

policy of conducting a subdued, low tempo, affordable war.

Portugueseinfantry not only hunted the enemy but befriended the population. It concomitantly participated in social projects to elevatethe people's standardof living and insurgent initiative, This to tangible alternative promises. which included the provide a by supported psychological operationsthat promoted these of grievances, was redressing benefits. These operations ranged from troop instruction in the purpose of the war and the individual soldier's importance in Portugal's African mission to the strong promotion of social benefits targeted to selectedcivilian audiences. These actions too were part of the implementation of Portuguesestrategy for a low intensity war in that undermining the forces the the the will of armed and strengthening and the population enemy of will through communication was less expensive than a military offensive. Social projects were also benign and inexpensive alongside military operations and demonstrated a its by African citizens. Portugal to commitment Promoting these benefits through

broad their through effectiveness operations enhanced a understandingand psychological appeal to the population.

Further, the local people were enlisted to fight in very significant numbers. This Africanisation of counterinsurgency served to remove recruiting pressure from the metr6pole, reduce transportation costs, and engage the local populations in their own defense. Again, Portuguese strategy was supported with this reduction of costs and mobilisation of the African population, which helped to dampendomestic public pressure in Portugal and provide sustainability to the conflict. Finally, the Portuguesethrough the use of turned guerrillas, infiltrators, spies, and refugee troops created adversediplomatic

346

pressure and debilitating internal friction within the nationalist organisations. Initiating these relatively inexpensivedisruptions to the guerrilla capability to organise offensives reduced pressure on the fighting forces. It also reduced guerrilla intimidation of the population by undermining enemy initiative.

Portugal sought to use relatively simple methodsand equipmentthat could be easily understoodand employedby its forces, as they matchedthe guerrilla opponentswith their low technology. High technology was not required to counter the guerrilla and

employing it in counterinsurgencyincreasedthe cost of fighting exponentially with only a small marginal gain in effectiveness. The Portuguesemasteredtheseprinciples, and the depth of this understandingwas reflected in the comparative managementof their resourcesand direction of their military forces alongsidethoseof other powers similarly engaged.

One of the best comparativeindicators in the management of human resourcesis the number of casualtiesabsorbedin relation to troops deployed in this and other conflicts. In terms of deathsin the Campaignsthe overall general level of intensity was low. The intensity for is by deaths taken the entire conflict this comparing normally of measure basedupon an averageper day of war per thousandcombatants. The approximatevalues of selectedconflicts are calculatedbelow using data from various quoted sources. Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam(New York: RandomHouse, Inc., 1988), 172; Alistair Home, A SavageWar of Peace:Algeria 1954-1962 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1987), 538; Alf Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgencyin Algeria (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 175; Joaquim da Luz Cunha, et al, Africa: A Vitoria Tralda [Africa: Betrayed Victory] (Lisbon: Editorial Intervenco, Lda., 1977), 70-71; Harry Miller, Jungle War 1948-60(London: Arthur Barker Limited, in Malaya: The Campaignagainst Communism

347
'-I

Combat Deaths per Day of War per Thousand Combatants Malaya PortugueseAfrican Campaigns Algeria Vietnam 0.0017 0.0075 0.0107 0.0365

Indochina
World War II

0.0691
0.1400

Malaya was by far and away the least intense, followed by the Portuguese Campaigns. The French and U. S. experiences were more costly and intense. The figures follow generally the style of warfare. The French conducted their reoccupation in did its if it U. S. Indochina the conflict, as subsequent a conventional as were of involvement in Vietnam, and both experienced a high rate of combat deaths for troops deployed because of the intensity. The French guerre revolutionnaire as applied in Algeria was military in nature, and this approach, while an improvement over Indochina, intensity Portuguese The World War II experience the the experience. of still exceeded is the classic high intensity conventional conflict and is included as a contrasting reference.

The total number of Portuguesedeaths from all causesin the three theatres for the from 5,797 2,493 8,290, the were recruited of which metr6pole and were entire war was ' forces in The French Algeria (1954-1962) 17,456 from the colonies. counted recruited

1972), 17; and Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington: U. S. Department 362. 1994), Commerce, of 3Estado-Maior do Exercito, Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhas de Africa (1961-1974) [Historical Military Report of the African Campaigns(1961-1974)] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1988), Vol. I, 264-266. 348

dead from all causesin eight years." The United Statesexperienced 58,135 deaths in Vietnam from 1961-1973, a period of twelve years. Between the years of 1964 and 1969, Portugal's heaviest years of fighting, average annual deaths per thousand of deployed troops was 2.23 and was its highest in 1966 at 2.69.' In Vietnam the U. S. 14.7 deaths 1972 1964 between annual of per thousand rate average an and experienced ' fighting. in height 1968 23.5 the the deployed, of at troops with a maximum rate of The French experiencefor Algeria fell between the two. Portugal in the Great War, its fought fronts: deployed troops three and experience, on most recent previous combat France, the south of Angola, and the north of Mozambique. In France there were 57,000 Portuguesecombatants,and in the two African colonies there were 32,000 plus 25,000 local troops, a total of 114,000 men under arms. The war for Portugal lasted two years. The number of deathswas a staggering 7,908 for a death rate per thousandper year of " 34.68. approximately

On balancethen the deathrate during the 1961-1974period was substantiallyless than in insurgencies Vietnam in Algeria two the and contemporary and similar either of Portugal's last conventional war experienceof 1914-1918. The fact that the Portuguese Armed Forces from 1961 had fewer casualtiesin a decadethan the French in Algeria had in a single year reinforces the achievementof Portuguesepolicy.

4Horne, 538.
5Luz Cunha, 74-75.

U. S. Department 'StatisticalAbstractof the U.S. 1975(Washington: of Commerce, 1976). 'Luz Cunha,73.

349

Low casualty rates in conflicts are generally attributed to thorough training, good leadership, and a sound battle plan that is understood by all parties. The Portuguese improve to their counterinsurgencytraining, and moving much of it to sought constantly the theatres from 1968 onward made it very effective in that it thoroughly acclimatised the troops to the African battlefield environment. Spirited military leadershipwas evident in Guin6 from 1968 under General Spinola and in Angola from 1970 under Generals Costa Gomes and Bethencourt Rodrigues. Building on earlier foundations, General Spinola introduced an effective counterinsurgencybattle plan in his "A Better Guin6," both to check the guerrillas and to provide a social action military and which combined introduced Similar PAIGC in Angola by the to promises. plans were alternative viable General Costa Gomes and in Mozambique by General Arriaga. Implicit in these plans firepower to avoid terrorising the population and the mix of the use of restrained was for Except Angola the protection. military with uprisings of 1961 there was action social in Indochina, Algeria, Vietnam, as and army, which massed troops and guerrilla no dealt in Portuguese largely The bands, them conventional ways. with small employed men. bi-grupo 26 insurgent in PAIGC force of as much as 200 An the of as embodied inhabited As the territories sparsely were and had difficult, and also in rare. men was finding Mozambique, Angola terrain, and vast guerrillas was difficult. Where the caseof they were encountered,fights were generally brief affairs with limited casualties. The inherent in the that casualties would not produce volume of simply were war of a style battle firepower. troops of attrition with massed grinding and massive conventional more The intent of the Portuguese to conduct a long haul, low cost conflict was well in figures. born the casualty out appreciated and

350

The financial cost of war is a relative measure, and Portugal's experience must be its is It in that the of other similar conflicts. and alongside economy context of seen 1,461,846,750 Campaigns the that over thirteen years or cost approximately estimated 112.5 million per year.' In Malaya the cost from June 1948 until IndependenceDay ' 77.8 700 The 1957 31 August or million year. million per cost an was estimated on billion 1954 3.6 from 1946 Indochina to French at plus was put the reoccupationof of " 491.8 from U. S., The 335 total. the or about million per year war million another in Algeria for military action alone cost an estimated 4 billion and social operations an " 667.7 25%, total. million per year or about additional By comparison the U. S.

involvement in Vietnam is estimatedto have cost 50,220,000,000 or 5,580 million per is belligerents it low figures from to Again these apparent elected a which use cost, year. long haul counterinsurgencystrategy. Malaya, the least expensive engagement,and the Portuguese Campaigns were both relatively inexpensive and sustainable. The French involvement in U. S. Vietnam Indochina the subsequent and were many of reoccupation 12 largely both basis. they on a conventional conducted were times more expensive, as Algeria, a highly militarised counterinsurgency,cost as much as a conventional conflict. It is readily apparentthat the cost of a counterinsurgencyis directly related to its tempo

$Luz Cunha, 63. Imputed from GeneralLuz Cunha's figures in contos and converted to Sterling. 9Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth's Wars 1948-1966 (London: Routledge, 1991), 115. "Bernard B. Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu (New York: Harper Row Publishers, Inc., 1967), viii. "Horne, 538-539. 12AndrewF. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 258-260.
351

and the type of strategyand tactics that are employed to yield this rhythm. This principle was embodied in the Portugueseapproach, allowing its armed forces to sustain the war effort in step with the guerrilla strategy of protracted conflict.

This burdenalso appeared whenviewed from the overall perspective reasonable of

the Portuguesenational budget; however, there was a cost in increasedpolitical dissent. During the period of the Campaignsthe expendituresfor national defenseas a portion of between high 23 % in 1961 to a low of 17.1 % in 197313 a of ranged state expenditures In absolute terms defense spending increased five fold from 1960 to 1975. These increases,while they remaineda declining percentageof the overall national budget, were financing increasing burden funded through increased taxes which was public part of an factors dissent inflation, that aggravated public as time went on. Comparatively in and France in 1965, a period of peace following Algeria, defenseexpenditures represented 20% of the national budget." Despite the apparent reasonablenessof Portugal's

fabric its This thin. situation was beyond the generals political was wearing expenditure, to repair, and while it was the duty of the politicians, they were failing.

Nevertheless, the human and economic cost of the war was a powerful burden for Portugal. No matter how contained the conflict and how reasonableits cost financially, the burden on the population after thirteen years was telling. In addition to the 8,290 deaths, Portuguese wounded and mutilated were 27,919.15 Social services in the

13Resenha Histrico-Militar das Campanhasde frica (1961-1974), Vol. I, 513.

'4Luz Cunha,62. "Luz Cunha, 70-71. .

352

for the magnitude of this rehabilitation task. The youth of unprepared were metrpole Portugal had been mobilised in one of the largest and most arduous military conscriptions in the world. 16 The troops required for this ambitious venture had stretched Portugal's first later in Only the that the of metrpole population and conscription of capacity.

broad occupationof the colonies to maintain order, the a support ultramar would initiative, flexibility While the this the of mobile reserves. and social momentumof
indigenous largest in in troops the one of uses of any modem strategy resulted in important Portuguese the element an way, the metrpole was still counterinsurgency, in despite low figures burden The that the was extreme casualty affected. adversely its Portugal's force level in the that executing plans as envisioned, was military showing Africa in relation to its population was five times higher than the U. S. commitment in Vietnam. " Deaths from all causeswere on a percentagebasis relative to the population in in Portugal U. S. its Southeast than Asia the times three great as with about involvement. This situation created a problem of diminishing public support that was how deployed. As troops the effectively control no matter were military's a of outside had 170,000 in 1971. Over Campaigns to the the risen emigration period of annual result 1.5 3.5 the to emigrants reduced million workforce million, and the total an estimated 18 by 1974 Inflation 20% 8.6 to was running at million. per year, and the population its feet increasingly to avoid the economic and social penalties with voting population was

16WillemS. van der Waals, Portugal's War in Angola 1961-1974 (Rivonia: Ashanti Publishing (Pty) Limited, 1993), 244. 17van der Waals, 244.

18van der Waals,244.

353

19 the of war.

Another approachto measuringthe Portugueseway is an examinationof the execution important initial Army The Portuguese its doctrine. the made most step in establishing of doctrine before the conflict. It sought to achieve the twin goals of avoiding the cost of fought had lessons that the counterinsurgencies, and of of other militaries relearning in ignorance how be first instance forces In the of victory would attained. committing the Portuguesedelved into the literature on guerrilla wars and the doctrinal manualson the counterinsurgenciesof others. They sent missions to French, British, and U. S. schools and on operations relating to the pertinent aspectsof "small wars, " and sought found in They that little had beenwritten counsel with veterans. the voices of experience instances In the there was no easily majority of counterinsurgency. on modem transmitted doctrine, and security forces in earlier conflicts had been largely left to feel their way along. The literature that was belatedly written for the British action in Malaya, for instance, was only by chance transmitted to Kenya, and neither of the had been 20 known in Cyprus. two these to the troops experiences well volumes on France in Indochina and in the first two years of Algeria was similarly unfocused. The Portugueseassembledcounterinsurgencyinformation painstakingly, reduced it to a plan for the defense of their colonies, and committed it to a written doctrine for the

19Ant6niode Spfnola, Portugal eo Futuro [Portugal and the Future] (Lisbon: Editora Arcadia, 1974), 37-38 and 41.

1919-60(London:TheMacmillan 2 Thomas R. Mockaitis,British Counterinsurgency, PressLtd., 1990), 184.

354

21 This work described for the entire Campaigns, 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva. be defeat him. instruction The the to to the the and methods used enemy of nature army French belatedly in British the the that and only committed their was unusual had been fighting for doctrine they to after writing sometime. counterinsurgency

knowing how from into battle the Portuguese victory was start sent soldierswere
fresh from its doctrine had been be Although the to was writing and achieved. supposed it field, in in its the tested available was and served as a taught guide raw nor neither form. In the modem counterinsurgenciesof Britain, France, and the U. S. initial

hostilities went without the benefit of such guidance. Assembly of the Portuguese doctrine and its transmission had presented a challenge, but the importance of its in be thought to the and methods advance was opposition vital to understanding in teething Adjustments the early years of when needed problems arose were success. the conflict, and Portugal made them in the areas of training and organisation and a doing it by In defined initiative operations. so supported psychological relaunched social in its forces, the their education, Portuguese counterinsurgency shape of of character the deployment. their and

In addition to the timely developmentof Portuguese doctrine, the PortugueseArmy force. basis The itself to a counterinsurgency a magnitude of this wholesale on converted The be from of changing upheaval an understated. army one trained cannot conversion in fight Europe in to to a conventional war one primarily structured small and organised

21Estado-Maiordo Exercito, 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva [The Army in Subversive War] (Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1963). 355

infantry units for counterinsurgency in Africa was cathartic.

This adjustment was

frustrated further by a great influx of conscripts whose ambitions were far different from those of the professional soldiers. Nevertheless, the entire Army did change, and its training was adjusted to addressthe threat. No such wholesale change was either tried While Britain, France U. S. in the and were other counterinsurgency. any or effected indeed had to rely their to counterinsurgencies, and conduct always short of manpower in light do these they the to conflicts so, never regarded same as Portugal on conscription 22 feel did to their task. to the convert compelled entire armies not and consequently Their counterinsurgencies, while important, diverted resources from their primary in Europe Red Army. focus, the a conventional war against was which military Portugal the African Campaignswere its main conflict. For

by the British as well as their PAIGC Emphasisingthe tactical flexibility demonstrated infantry Portuguese the the redefined use of small units and specialisedtroops. opponents, Portugal changedthe training of its infantry forces to emphasisein-theatre indoctrination familiar local instruction them the to more with combat environment and their make and had facile. These it the to changes effect of shaping the conflict to one more adaptation it in French The Indochina keeping Algeria intensity that low way. and and of and of ' in Vietnam S. truly U. subduedengagement never sought a the

drives military operations Intelligencein counterinsurgency and troop employment,

developed Portugal these to actions an efficient political and military support and so

nKrepinevich, 127. "Krepinevich, 192.

356

intelligence apparatus in the use of agents and informers, police, and air and ground patrols. The information from all sourceswas processedthrough a system reconnaissance disseminated intelligence to support operations. centres and coordination of This

in from Malaya and adapted to Portuguese British the system copied organisation was Africa with reliable results. Portugal also struggled to coordinate its military efforts with those of the civil sector in an effort to overawe the enemy through its social programs. It sought to present a very tangible alternative of peaceand social advancementopposite the promises of the insurgents. Every aspectof the Portugueseorganisation for war and deployment of its troops was constructed on the British premise of minimal force, as demonstratedin Malaya, which kept the Campaigns subduedand affordable within the limits of Portugal's resources.

In the final analysis, while Portugal fought an imaginative campaign to retain its in colonies an anti-colonial era, no amount of military verve could overcome the political in legitimacy Africa. Because Portugal lost Portugal's this of circumstance, of problem the war and ultimately its colonies despite its enormous sacrifices. This development largely that the are wars resolvedpolitically. General Spfnola, in writing point reinforced his book Portugal eo Futuro [Portugal and the Future] in 1971, acknowledged this in continuing to expendresourcesat the expenseof the overall no point saw and principle "' in dead-end In the a strategy. pursuing a counterinsurgency military country of good be It to and social only support political measures. cannot replace them. used can action By 1971 in all theatres the military had given Portugal credibility and was prepared to for disengagement. further By 1970 General time Spfnola had a negotiated provide

14Spinola, 42-43.
357
0

leadership PAIGC through the generated a stalemate momentum and spirited and checked his "A Better Guine" social program. This stalematebeganto slip in 1973 as the military in By 1971 Generals Costa Gomes the was not sight. political solution needed realised in had intact Angola Rodrigues Bethencourt that a produced military victory remained and

the nationalistmovements throughthe end of the war. In Mozambique were contained After 1970 having been 1970, then. the the relatively quiescent until conflict until
from deteriorate border began Tanzania to the northern gradually with situation have been fraying This corrected with an application of additional could southward. troops and materiel again under spirited leadership. Military force could not, however, end the war. No amount of imaginative campaigning could have done so. General

Spinola and all of the PortugueseArmed Forces were aware of this fact.25 Portugal's 26 from however, leadership, The shortsighted remained and removed reality. political true hope for the regeneration of Portugal lay in releasing its colonies to resolve both domestic and international dissent and to embrace the European prosperity then 27 in had been from Africa Portugal's the start, and the untenable position underway. 28 fact. Portuguese leadership had farsighted had this military recognised proved military in both its planning and its conduct of the war. It had conducted a sophisticated

from home. had long It its in theatres three a successfully way addressed campaign its fashioned limited the and context of resources a style of warfare that problems within

25Spfnola, 42-43. 26MarcelloCaetano,Depoimento [Deposition] (Rio de Janeiro: Distribuidora Record, 1974), 191.

27Spinola, 37-45. 28Spinola, 235.

358

ground the enemy to a halt. It had skilfully managedthe use of Portuguese lives and treasure. When the politicians failed to provide the necessarycomplementary support, it was the military that intervened on 25 April 1974 and provided the political solution that not only freed the colonies but ultimately liberated Portugal and made possible a

transitionto democracy.

359

Bibliography
The references in this bibliography are divided into subject categories by source, as appropriate, in an effort to make their pertinence to the thesis topic apparent.

PRIMARY SOURCES
Portuguese Government Official and Semi-Official Publications and Documents

"

Ministries of the Colonies,of the Ultramar, and of Foreign Affairs:

Leandro, Jaime de Oliveira, Hermes de Arajo Oliveira, and Joaquim Franco Pinheiro. Estudos de Ciencias Politicas e Sociais, No. 62, Subverso e Contra-Subverso. [Studiesof Political and Social Science,No. 62, Subversionand Counter-Subversion]. Lisbon: Junta de Invesdgacesdo Ultramar, Centro de Estudos Politicas e Socias, 1963. 0 Soldado African de Martins, E. A. Azambuja, Colonel, Portuguese Army. Mocambique. [The African Soldier of Mozambique]. Lisbon: Agencia Geral do Colnias, Ministeno das Colnias, 1936. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. PortugueseAfrica: An Introduction. Lisbon: Ministeiro dos Negcios Estrangeiros, 1973. Moreira, Adriano, Professor. Estudos de Ciencias Polfticas e Socials, No. 1, Polftica [Studies in Political and Social Science, No. 1, Ultramar Policy]. Ultramarin. Lisbon: Junta de Investigag6esdo Ultramar, Centro de Estudos Politicos e Socials, 1961. Teixeira da Mota, A. Monografias dos Territrios do Ultramar." Guing Portuguesa. [Monographs of the OverseasTerritories: PortugueseGuine]. Lisbon: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, Ministeno do Ultramar, 1954. Provincia da Guine. OrdenamentoRural e Urbann na Guine Portuguesa. [Rural and Urban Plan for PortugueseGuine]. Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1973. Prospectiva do DesenvolvimentoEconmico e Social da Guing. [Prospectusfor . the Economic and Social Development of Guine]. Lisbon: Junta de Investigacesdo Ultramar, 1972.

0 Portuguese Army: Chefe do Estado Maior, Regiao Militar de Angola (RMA). Plano Geral das Normas de Execuco Permanente, 4a Repartip2o. [General Plan of Standard Operating Procedures, 4th Division (Logistics)]. Luanda: Headquarters, RMA, 1963.

360

Comando-Chefe das Forcas Armadas da Guind, Quartel-General. Conduta da Acgao N212172. Operations Directive [Conduct de For Agosto/Setembro: Perfodo of o para the Period of August/September:Directive N2 12/72]. Bissau: Comando-Chefedas Forcas Armadas da Guine, Quartel-General, 1972. Epoca das Chuvas de 1972: Directive N2 11/72. da Manobra Conduta na [Conduct of Manoeuvresin the Rainy Seasonof 1972: Directive N2 11/72]. Bissau: Comando-Chefedas Forras Armadas da Guine, Quartel-General, 1972. Manobra Scio-Econ6mica:Esforco no "Chao" Manjaco: Directiva N4 65/69. . [Socio-Economic Operations: Effort in the Manjaco "Sacred Lands": Directive N2 65/69]. Bissau: Comando-Chefedas Forcas Armadas da Guin6, Quartel-General, 1969. Plano Director para Reordenamentos.[Guiding Plan for Restructuring]. Bissau: . Comando-Chefedas Forcas Armadas da Guin6, Quartel-General, 1969. Histria Cronolgica da Cultura do Arroz. [Choronological History of the . Culture of Rice]. Bissau: Comando-Chefedas Forcas Armadas da Guin6, QuartelGeneral, 1968. Direcgdo da Arma de Engenharia. Minas e Armadilhas. [Mines and Booby Traps]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1967. Estado-Maior do Exercito, 2. a Repartigdo. Acco Psicolgia. Operations]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1969. [Psychological

Instrucao de Accao Psicolgica 1.0 Ciclo. [Instruction in Psychological Operations 1st Cycle]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1970. Instruco de Acco Psicolgica na Escola da Recrutas. [Instruction in Psychological Operations in the School for Recruits]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1968. Estudo sobre Problemas de Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1.a Repartirao. Recrutamento 1968. [Study of Recruiting Problems 1968]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exrcito, 1968. Africa, das Histrico-Militar de Resenha Campanhas do Exercito. Estado-Maior Volume I, Enquadramento Geral. [Historical Military Report of the African Campaigns, Volume I, General Framework]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1988. ResenhaHistrico-Militar das Campanhasde Africa, Volume 11, Dispositivo . das NossasForcas Angola. [Historical Military Report of the African Campaigns, Volume II, Disposition of Our Forces in Angola]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1988.
361

Africa, de das Campanhas Volume III, Dispositivo ResenhaHistrico-Militar . das Nossas Forcas Guine. [Historical Military Report of the African Campaigns, Volume III, Disposition of Our Forces in Guine]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1988. Africa, de das Campanhas Volume IV, Dispositivo Histrico-Militar Resenha _. das Nossas Forcas Mocambique. [Historical Military Report of the African Campaigns,Volume IV, Disposition of Our Forces in Mozambique]. Lisbon: EstadoMaior do Exdreito, 1989. frica de (1961Campanhas da Doutrina Aplicada Estudo Subsfdios nas o para . 1974). [Aid to the Study of the Doctrine Applied in the Campaignsof Africa (19611974)]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1990. "Aspectos Recentes da Evolugdo Africana 1960-1969 (Anlise de Alguns _ Indicadores)." [Recent Aspects of the African Evolution 1960-1969 (Analysis of Some Indicators)]. Boletim de Informacao N2 93 (1972-1973): separata,54-116. Guerra Psicolgica contra Portugal. [Psychological War against Portugal]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, Colecgdo CadernosMilitares, 1970. Tecnicasde Propaganda e Contrapropaganda. [Techniquesof Propagandaand . Counterpropaganda]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, Colecgdo Cademos Militares, 1970. Exercito Portugues. Tctica de Guerra Subversiva. [SubversiveWar Tactics]. Lisbon: Militar, SeccoT6cnica, 1966. Escola Prtica de Administracco .0 1969. .0 1969. Caso de Angola. [The Caseof Angola]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, Caso de Guine. [The Case of Guine]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito,

Caso de Mocambique. [The Case of Mocambique]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior .0 do Exercito, 1969. Campanhas Ultramarins do Passado. [Past Overseas Campaigns]. Lisbon: . Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1970. Ministeno do Exercito. 0 Exercito na Guerra Subversiva. [The Army in Subversive War]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1963. Guia para Emprego Tdctico das Pequenas Unidades na Contra Guerrilha. [Guide to the Tactical Employment of Small Units in Counter-Guerrilla Operations]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1963.

362

Os Dez Anos do Batalho de Engenharia da Guind. [The Ten Years of the _. Engineering Batallion of Guine]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Exercito, 1974. Regido Militar de Mocambique. Populaces de Mocambique. [Populations of Mozambique]. Circular N4 31/B, Regio Militar de Mocambique, Nampula, 10 January 1967. Engineering Batallion of Mozambique. Armadilhas. [Booby Traps]. Nampula: Regio Militar de Mocambique, undated.

"

Portuguese Navy:

Corpo de Fuzileiros. Fuzileiros Especiais. Lisbon: Ministeno da Marinha, 1987.

"

Portuguese Air Force:

Estado-Maior da Forca Aerea de Portugal. ResumoEstatfstico das MissOesRealizadas e Passageiros Transportados (Ida e Volta, 1961-1974. [Statistical Summary of Transported (Round Trip), 1961-1974]. Alfragide: Missions Flown and Passengers Estado Maior da Forca Aerea de Portugal, 1961-1974. Forca Adrea de Portugal. Manual do Apoio Aereo na Contra-Guerrilha. [Air Suport Manual for Counter-Guerrilla Warfare]. Lisbon: Forca Aerea, Direcco do Servico de Instrugdo, 1972.

"

Private Authors:

Arriaga, Kalza de. 0 Problema Estrategico Portugues. [The Portuguese Strategic Problem]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1966. Baptista, Manuel Francisco Stadlin, Colonel, Infantry, and Colonel of the Staff Corps Antonio Eduardo Castro de Ascengdo. Anteplano do Aproveitamento das Diferentes Ernas das Populacoes de Angola na Luta Contra a Subverso. [Proposal of Exploitation of the Ethnic Differences in the Populations of Angola in the Fight Against Subversion]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1969. Bruno, Jodo de Almeida, Colonel, Cavalry. Forcas Especiais na Guind: 0 Batalho de Comandos1971-1973. [SpecialForces in Guind: The Batallion of Commandos19711973]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1979. Cardoso, Pedro Alexandre Gomes, General, PortugueseArmy, and General Secretaryof Guine (1968-1972). A Manobra Psicolgica no Teatro de Operacbesda Guing de 1968-1973. [PsychologicalOperationsin the Guin6 Theatre of Operationsfrom 19681973]. Lisbon: Personalpapers, undated.
363

As Informaces em Portugal. [Intelligence in Portugal]. Lisbon: Instituto da . Defesa Nacional, 1980. Carvalhais, Tristo, Colonel. Populaco da Guind, Tendoem Vista a Sua Defesa. [The Population of Guine Relative to its Defense]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1970. Carvalho, Joaquim Rodrigues de, Colonel, Military Administration. Logfstica de Alto [Logistics at the Higher Level, Financial Nfvel, Mobilizaco Financeira. Mobilisation]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1970. Correia, Jose Alberty, Colonel, Staff Corps. Anlise Crftica da Estrutura de Comando Command Mocambique. [Critical Analyses Contra-Subverso the em of para Structure for Counter-Subversion in Mozambique]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1969. Duarte Silva, Joaquim Miguel de Mattos Fernandes. Lourenco. [Lawrence]. Lisbon: Edition of the author, 1974. Africa: A Evoluco Polftica de 1956 a 1970. [Africa: The Political Felgas, Helio. Evolution from 1956 to 1970]. Lisbon: Estado-Maior do Ex6rcito, Colecco CadernosMilitares, 1970. Ferreira, Ivo, Colonel, Pilot Aviator, PortugueseAir Firce. Transportes Estrategicos Entre as Provincias de Angola e Mocambique. [Strategic transport Between the Provinces of Angola and Mozambique]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1964. Gaspar, Americo Simes, Captain, Infantry, PortugueseArmy. Emigracao em Portugal. [Emigration in Portugal]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1974. Giro, Armando, Colonel, Engineering. 10 Batalhes de Engenharia emAngola.. Antes . da Subverso. [10 Engineering Batallions in Angola... Before the Subversion]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1965. Martins, Ral Francois Ribeiro Carneiro. Histria dos Pdra-Quedistas Porrugueses. [History of the PortugueseParatroops]. Lisbon: Corpo de Tropas Para-Quedistas, 1986. Moniz, Julio Botelho, Lieutenant Colonel, Staff Corps, PortugueseArmy. Conduta das OperacesColoniais. [Conduct of Colonial Operations]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1944. Morgado, Antonio Fernandes,Colonel, Infantry. Apolo Logfstico na Guing 1973-1974. [Logistical Support in Guine 1973-1974]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1979.

364

Nunes da Silva, Artur Henrique, Colonel, General Staff. Andlise Critica da Estrutura de Comando para a Contra-Subverso em Angola. [Critical Analyses of the Command Structure for Counter-Subversionin Angola]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1969. Pinheiro, J. A. Franco, Brigadier. Estrategia da Guerra Subversiva. [Strategy of Subversive War]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1968. Pires Monteiro, Guilherme, Colonel, PortugueseArmy. Populag4o de Angola Tendo em Vista a Sua Defesa. [The Population of Angola Has a View of Its Defense]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1965. Estudo sobre Populaces de Remfgio, Augusto de Jesus, Colonel, Artillery. Mocambique na Subverso e na Contra-Subverso. [Study of the Population of Mozambique in Subversion and Counter-Subversion]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1966. Ribeiro Villas, Gaspar do Couto, Colonel, Staff Corps, PortugueseArmy. As Tropas Colonlais na Vida Internacional. [Colonial Troops in International Affairs]. Lisbon: Sociedadede Geografia, 1924. Simes, Fausto da Silva, Colonel, Military Administration. A Unicaco da Funcao Abastecimento nos Tres Ramos das Forcas Armadas. [The Unification and Integration of the Supply Function in the Three Branches of the Armed Forces]. Lisbon: Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1969. SousaPereira, FernandoLourenco de, Colonel Medical Doctor. A Integraco da Fungdo Evacuagdo/Hospitalizag4onos Tres Ramos das Forcas Armadas. [The Integration in Evacuation/Hospitalisation the Three Branchesof the Armed Forces]. Lisbon: of Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, 1969.

Interviews and Correspondence Abrantes dos Santos,Antonio, Colonel, PortugueseArmy, DefenseAttache, Embassyof Portugal, London. Interview by the author, 19 January 1994, London. Afonso, Aniceto, Lieutenant Colonel, PortugueseArmy, Director of Arquivo Histrico Militar, Lisbon. Interview by the author, 21 February 1994, Lisbon. Almiro Canelhas,Jos6Luis, General, PortugueseArmy (retired). Chief of Psychological Operations (5th Division) in Mozambique (1969-1971). Interview by the author, 3 April 1995, Lisbon. Almeida Santos, Dionisio de, Colonel, Portuguese Army (Retired). Former liaison (Tschambe) Katanganese to the pro-Tshombe gendarmeswho fled to eastern officer Angola in 1967. Interview by the author, 31 March 1995, Porto.

365

Arriaga, Kalza de, General, PortugueseArmy (Retired). Commander Ground Forces Mozambique (1969-1970) and Commander-in-Chief Armed Forces Mozambique (1970-1973). Interview by the author, 8 November 1994, Lisbon. Correspondence with the author, 1 May 1995, Lisbon. Beer, Colin M. Former colonial police officer with H. M. Government during colonial by 14 1995, London. March Interview the author, withdrawal. BethencourtRodrigues, JoseManuel de, General, PortugueseArmy (Retired). Chief of Staff Angola (1961-1964), Military Attache, London (1964-1967), Commander Eastern Military Zone Angola (1971-1973), and Commander-in-Chief Armed Forces 9 1994, by November Interview Guine (1973-1974). the Governor author, of and Lisbon. Brochado de Miranda, Jorge, General, PortugueseAir Force (Retired). Former Chief by 21 (1984-1988). Force Interview Air Portuguese the Staff the author, of of November 1994 and 3 April 1995, Lisbon. Cardoso, Pedro Alexandre Gomes, General, Portuguese Army (Retired). General Secretary of Guine (1968-1972). Interview by the author, 17 November 1994 and 29 March 1995, Lisbon. Oscar, Inspector, Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) and its Cardoso, from 1965 de Seguranca (DGS) 1974. Geral Interview by the Direcgdo to successor, author, 1 April 1995, Azaruja, Portugal. Correspondencewith the author, 22 April 1995, Azaruja. Carvalho, A. Marques de, Colonel, Paratroops, Portuguese Air Force (Retired). Interview by the author, 24 February 1994, Lisbon. Chito Rodrigues, Joaquim, General, Portuguese Army. Director, Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, Lisbon. Interview by the author, 23 November 1994. Collins, John M., Senior Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs and National ResearchService, Library of Congress,Washington. DefenseDivision, Congressional Interview by the author, 9 September1990, Washington. Conceicdo e Silva, Tomas George, General, Portuguese Air Force (Retired). Cargo airlift pilot 1966-1969 and Chief of Staff, Portuguese Air Force (1988-1991). Interview by the author, 3 April 1995, Lisbon. Copson, Raymond W., Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington. Interview by the author, 30 September 1992, Washington. Crocker, Dr. Chester A., Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, U. S. Department of State, Washington. Interview by the author, 21 October 1992, Georgetown University, Washington.

366

Duarte Silva, JoaquimMiguel de Mattos Fernandes,General, PortugueseArmy (Retired). Former liaison officer for the UPA defector, Alexandre Taty, and his Tropas Especiais (1966-1967). Interview by the author, 3 April 1995, Lisbon. Fabio, Carlos, General, PortugueseArmy (Retired). Army liaison for militia troops in Guine in 1971. Interview by the author, 31 March 1995, Lisbon. Felgas, He1io, Brigadier, PortugueseArmy (Retired). Battalion commander in Guine (1963-1965), and staff of General Spinola (1968-1969). Interview by the author, 22 November 1994, Lisbon. Ferreira-Pinto, Jose Agostinho Melo, Brigadier, Paratroops, Portuguese Air Force, CommanderParatroopCorps, Monsanto. Interview by the author, 28 February 1994, Monsanto. Gabriel Teixeira, Jorge, Brigadier, Portuguese Army, Sub-Director of the Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, Lisbon. Interview by the author, 28 October 1994, Lisbon. Gomes Bessa, Carlos da Costa, Colonel, Staff Corps, Portuguese Army (Retired). Executive Director, RevistaMilitar, and former staff expert responsiblefor the liaison between the military and civil government. Interview by the author, 18 November 1994, Lisbon. Guerreiro Ferreira, Rafael, General, PortugueseArmy (Retired). Served a tour as Chief of Logistics (4th Divison) in Mozambique. Interview by the author, 29 March 1995, Lisbon. Henriques, Americo Fernandes, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, Portuguese Army, Assistant Military Attache, Embassy of Portugal, Washington. Interview by the 30 September 1993, 1992 Washington. 30 September and author, Inocentes, Luis Alberto Santiago, Colonel, Cavalry, Portuguese Army (Retired). Operationsofficer, HeadquartersMilitary Region Mozambique (1962-1966), Military Attache, Rhodesia (1966-1969), Chief of Staff, Brigade Headquaters, Guind (19701972), and Military Attache, Republic of South Africa (1972-1975). Interviews by the author, 18 March, 9 April, 14 April, 30 August, 2 September,5 Septemberand 22 October 1994, and 17 March 1995, London. Correspondence with the author, 10 August 1994, London, 7 October 1994, Lisbon, 18 November 1994,10 December 1994,1 February' 1995,7 February 1995,15 February 1995,4 March 1995,18 April 1995,5 June 1995,14 July 1995, and 15 July 1995, London. Lopes Alves, Jose, General, PortugueseArmy (Retired). President, Revista Militar. Interview by the author, 18 November 1994, Lisbon.

367

Mano, Cesar Augusto Rodrigues, Colonel, Cavalry, Portuguese Army (Retired). Commander of an Armoured ReconnaisanceCompany (1963-1965), Operations Officer of a Cavalry Battalion (infantry role) (1967-1969), Commanderof a Cavalry Battalion (infantry role) (1972-1973), and Commander of the Grupo de Drages de Angola (1973-1974). Interview by the author, 10 November 1994, Oeiras. Marques Pinto, Renato Fernando, Brigadier, Portuguese Army (Retired). Chief of Military Intelligence Angola (1963-1965), Director of Servigo de Centralizaco e Coordenaco das Informares (Angola) (1965-1968), Chief of Intelligence, Army (1968-1970), Military Attache, London (1970-1974), Chief of Staff, Army, Mozambique (1974-1975), and Chief of Intelligence, Armed Forces (1975-1977). Interview by the author, 7 November 1994, Cascais,30 March 1995, Oeiras, and 3 April 1995, Lisbon. Correspondencewith the author, 23 February 1995, Oeiras, 22 May 1995, Oeiras, 26 June 1995, Lagos, and 8 July 1995, Oeiras. Martinho Gro, Luis Antonio, Colonel, Paratroops, Portuguese Air Force (Retired). Historian for the Portuguese Paratroops. Interview by the author, 2 April 1995, Tomar. Correspondencewith the author, 15 April 1995, Tomar. Mattas, Nuno Goncalo Vieira, Vice Admiral, Portuguese Navy, Superintendent of Material Services, Lisbon. Former commander of a detachment of fuzileiros especiais in Guine under General Spinola. Interview by the author, 23 November 1994, Lisbon. Matos Gomes, Carlos Manuel Serpa de, Colonel, Cavalry. Served in various infantry in (1969), Mozambique (1967 and 1969-1971), and Guind (1972Angola commands 1974). Interview by the author, 21 November 1994, Lisbon. Menezes, Manuel Amorim de Sousa, General, Portuguese Army (Retired). Chief of Staff, Armed Forces, Mozambique (1970-1975). Interview by the author, 17 November 1994 and 29 March 1995, Lisbon. Correspondencewith the author, 17 July 1995, Caxias, Portugal Norval, Morgan, journalist, former officer in the U. S. Marine Corps, and a former counterinsurgency warfare advisor to various governments in Southern Africa. Interview by the author, 11 November 1992, Washington. Pinheiro, Joao Antonio, General, Portuguese Army (Retired). Undersecretary of the Army (1962-1970) and Governor and Military Commanderof Cabinda (1972-1973). Interview by the author, 30 March 1995, Oeiras. Rodrigues, Manuel Alfredo Ribeiro, Colonel, Paratroops, Portuguese Air Force (Retired). Interview by the author, 28 February 1994, Lisbon. Rosas Leito, Antdnio, Colonel, Engineers, Instructor at the Academia Militar, Lisbon. Interview by the author, 16 November 1994, Lisbon.

368

Sheehy, Thomas P., Policy Analyst in African & Third World Affairs, Heritage Foundation, Washington. Interview by the author, 30 September1992, Washington. Themudo Barata, Manuel Freire, General, PortugueseArmy (Retired). President of the Commission for the Study of the African Campaigns (1961-1974). Interview by the author, 16 November 1994, Lisbon. Tucker, Dr. David C., Assistant for Strategic Assessment, Office of the Assistant Secretaryof Defensefor Special Operationsand Low-Intensity Conflict, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington. Interview by the author, 6 November 1992, Washington. Turner, Dr. John W., Historian, Department of the Army, History of Third World Conflict Project, Washington. Interview by the author, 23 September 1992, Washington. Valderano, Duke of, formerly Colonel Ronald Waring, British Army. Professor of English Language from 1956 to 1974 at the Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, Lisbon. Served before and during World War II with the King's Royal Rifle Corps and the Royal Hampshire Regiment. Interview by the author, 17 March 1995, London. Correspondencewith the author, 21 April 1995, London.
Valenta Pinto, Lufs, Colonel, Engineers, Portuguese Army, Commandant of the Practical School of Engineering, Tancos. Interview by the author, 15 November 1994, Tancos.

Vasconcelos, Alvaro de, Director of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Lisbon. Interview by the author, 23 February 1994, Lisbon. Wisner, Frank W., Under Secretaryof Defense for Policy, U. S. Department of Defense, Washington. Interview by the author, 23 September 1993, Washington. SECONDARY SOURCES Background Abshire, David M., and Michael A. Samuels. Portuguese Africa, A Handbook. London: Pall Mall Press, 1969. Anderson, Perry. "Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism. " New Left Review, no. 15 (May June 1962): 83-102. "Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism-2. " New LeftReview, no. 16 (July . August 1962): 88-123. "Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism-3. " (Winter 1962): 85-114. New Left Review, no. 17

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