Robots, AI, A-life In Chapter 5, Clark analyses Marrs 3-level model of vision: computational or task analysis, of representation and

algorithm, and of implementation in relationship with the development of neuroscience in the last 5 years that indicated that the computational level of cognition has !een seen to !e strict related or interconnected to neuronal level "neuroscience#$ %owever, the relationship !etween all these levels involves the relationship !etween perception, action and the !rain$ In order to understand this relationship, we need to analyses it under the evolutionary framework$ &he development of the last period from cognitive neuroscience shows that perception, action and the !rain are strong interconnected$ More than this, according to Clark, due to the evolution of our species, perception and action are interrelated$ "Clark '(( , p$ ))# %e mentions a new view on descri!ing vision, *interactive vision+ "Churchland, ,amachandran and -e.nowsky //0# against classical approach of simple division of la!or "1 *sense-think-act+#$ Interactive vision has some characteristics: daily agent-environment interactions are independent of full 32 scene3 low-level perception involves motor routines 4 5etter input$ ,eal-world actions are important for computational process3 the internal representations are not passive information !ut a *direct recipe for action+$ "Clark p$ ))# In this conte6t, Clark considers a particular e6ample - ro!ot %er!ert "Connell /)/#$ %er!ert was a!le to collect soft drink cans situated on ta!les from a la!oratory$ Instead of *sense-think-act+ perspective, %er!erts actions involve only collection of sensors and *independent !ehavioural routines+: with ring of ultrasonic sound sensors the ro!ot halts in front of o!.ect$ &he main difference !etween these two approaches is that the random movement of the ro!ot within the la!oratory is interrupted if its visual system detects a *ta!le-like outline+ and a new ro!ots function !egins: the sweeping of the surface of the ta!le$ If a can is detected than *the whole ro!ot rotates until the can is centred in its field of vision+$ &he arms ro!ot with touch sensors skim the ta!le surface until a can is encountered, grasped and collected$ &hen the ro!ot continues its movement$ "Clark, p$ / -'# 7ccording to Clark, perception is not a *passive phenomenon+ !ut perception and action are strong interconnected$ ,odney 5rooks " // # is one of the pioneers of the *new ro!otics+ "his slogan *&he world is its own !est model+#$ 7 5rooks view for constructing ro!ots is

la!elled the *subsumption architecture+$ "5rooks // # 7 ro!ot is constructed as having 3 different layers$ 8ach layer accomplishes a simple function from input to motor action$ It means there is a separate control system "a layer 1 hard-wire finite state machine# for each task performed !y ro!ot$ "5echtel and 7!rahamsen '(( , p$ 3('# &hose 3 layers are for avoiding o!stacles, moving randomly, and moving toward a particular location$ &he coordination !etween layers "depending of e6ternal input received !y ro!ot, one device turns off, another turns on# produces the se9uences of a serial processes$ -u!sumption architecture is a decomposition of activities hori:ontally !y task and not vertically !y function$ "5echtel and 7!rahamsen '(( , p$ 3('# In this way there is not necessary any central processor of planning the !ehaviour of a system$ &he system is without any kind of representation "no semantic interpretation# or ;odorian modules$ ;or supporting the idea of strong relationship !etween perception, action and the !rain, Clark appeals to +mirror neurons+ "2i <ellegrino et al$, //'#: there are some neurons in monkey ventral premotor corte6 that are action oriented, conte6t dependent, and implicated in !oth self-initiated activity and passive perception$+ "<$ /5# &hese neurons are activated when the monkey o!serves and performs an action$ Clarks conclusion is that perception, action and cognition has to !e considered strong related and interconnected$ =n the evolution line, the !rain is an *organ of environmentally situated control+$ "p$ /5# 7gain, we have to understand and e6plain the relationship !etween computation and neuronal level$ Clark notices the 9uestion rises !y Churchland and -e.nowski " //(, p$ '0/: at what level of neural organi:ation > *the !iochemical $ $ $ the mem!rane, the single cell, and the circuit, and perhaps $ $ $ !rain su!systems, !rain systems, !rain maps and the whole central nervous system? - does the implementation take place@ Clarks answer is that the answer depends on the function or task that we want to e6plain$ ,eturning to his approach, Clark considers that we need to e6plain the *fine-grained patterns+ of a level and, in this way, certain elements considered .ust implementation level can !ecome organi:ational components$ "p$ /A# Clark investigates the relationship !etween computation and implementation$ 7t computational paradigm, we saw that the implementation is .ust the *neural implementation+ of conceptual framework "the results !eing a serial conscious states and processes#$ &hrough *neatly decomposa!le+ systems, there is instantiated a map !etween a!stract se9uence of algorithmic ' steps and independent

mechanicalBelectronic mechanisms$ "Clark '(( , p$ /C# De remem!er that -earle critici:es not only the relationship !etween synta6 and semantic "Chinse ,oom# !ut also !etween synta6 "algorithm# and physical level at computer "-earle //'#$ In contrast to computationalism !ut related to ro!otics, Clark emphasi:es the !iological evolution that is not *!ound !y the process of conscious, step-!y-step design+$ "Clark, p$ /C#
5ut there is no need for !iological design to conform to the principle of neat functional decomposition$ Instead, evolutionary search "!y processes such as random variation and differential selection# can uncover pro!lem solutions that depend crucially on comple6 interactions !etween multipurpose circuits$ &his is a corner of design space curiously opa9ue to conscious human reason, which is far and away most comforta!le with simple linear interactions !etween multiple single-purpose components$

"Clark '(( , pp$ /C-)# =n the same line is Michael Dheelers thesis against two Cartesian dogmas: the split !etween mind and world "accepted !y most people from cognitive science# and mind!ody distinction "re.ected !y almost every!ody#$ "Dheeler //A in 5echtel and 7!rahamsen '(( , p$ 3('# Dheeler re.ects the notion of representation and computation from computationalism$ ;or him "and artificial-life#, the primary function of internal processes for sensations and control action and !asic sensoriomotor processes are not isolated !y higher a!stract processes$ &his view is constructed within the %eideggerian paradigm$ "Dheeler 7!rahamsen '(( , p$ 3('# Dheeler is a proponent of anti-representationalism view$ In his paper, "*&wo treats to representation+, '(( # he introduces two *treats+ against the idea that the e6planation of online !ehaviour needs notions of representation: if e6tra-factors are necessary to e6plain the !ehaviour of a system "* non-trivial causal spread+#, then we do not need the notion of representation$ 7ny representations view appeals automatically to homuncularity and Dheeler re.ects this notion !ecause of causal contri!ution of each component of a system is conte6t-sensitivity and varia!le over time "*continuous reciprocal causation+#$ ;or grasping online cognition, Dheeler introduced the already classical e6amples from ro!otics 5rooks " // # and ;ranceschini et al$ " //'# with a ro!ot with elementary motion detectors avoiding o!stacles: //A in 5echtel and

E shape, a!solute position, or orientation of the o!.ects in the environment are neither calculated nor stored$ &he upshot is that although, in a sense, the maps perform the traditional representational role of !eing internal stand-ins for e6ternal states of affairs, they emerge more fundamentally as agent-centred, dynamic control structures that code for conte6t-specific possi!ilities for action$

"Dheeler '(( , p$

' 5# ;or Clark and Dheeler, the causal spread "Dheeler and Clark ///# means that some internal elements depend upon certain causal factors e6ternal to the system$ &he e6ample of supporting this idea are from the computational neuroethology of ro!ots "2ave Cliff // , Cliff, %arvey and %us!ads //C in 5echtel and 7!rahansem '(( , p$ 3((#$ &he main idea of Cliff, %arvey and %us!ads " //C# is that they simulated a ro!ot, a room and the network: the network evolved to control the ro!ot moving a!out in rooms$ &he conclusion is that the distinction !etween online and offline cognitions is !lurred if we re.ect ar!itrariness "different classes for the same function# and homuncularity
it can !e compartmentali:ed into a set of communicating su!systems, each of which performs a welldefined su!task that contri!utes towards the collective achievement of an adaptive solution$ &ypically, such su!systems will !e hierarchically organi:ed$$$ -o certain su!systems are interpreted as producing information that is then consumed downstream !y other su!systems$ =f course, homuncular su!systems do not literally understand the elements with which they deal to !e information-!earersE Dhat this tells us is that the ways in which functionally integrated clusters of homuncular su!systems e6ploit inner elements, so as to collectively generate on-line intelligent !ehaviour, are intelligi!le only if we treat the su!systems involved as !eing responsive to the information that the elements carry$ 7nd once one has an inner economy of information-!earing vehicles, one surely has a system of representations$ "Dheeler,

p$ '' -'#

Dheeler emphasi:es that homuncularity is strong related to modularity$ "<art 0 of his article# Continuous reciprocal causation is used !y heeler *multiple simultaneous
interactions and comple6 dynamic feed!ack loops, such that "i# the causal contri!ution of each component in the system partially determines, and is partially determined !y, the causal contri!utions of large num!ers of other components in the system, and, moreover

"ii#

those contri!utions may change radically over time$+

vs$ Dimsatts notion of aggregate system$

"a# it is possi!le to identify the e6planatory role played !y any particular part of that system, without taking account of any of the other parts "!# interesting system-level !ehaviour is e6plica!le in terms of the properties of a small num!er of parts$

"p$ ''0##

5ecause of this continuous circular causation, we have to adopt a dynamical holistic perspective "against modularity and representation#$ In this sense, Dheeler offers another e6ample from ro!otics: &hompson " //5# - *artificial evolution is applied to the low-level evolutionary !uilding !locks offered !y reconfigura!le electronic circuits$+ &his e6ample suggests that the nonaggregate !iological systems "no modules or humuncular decomposition# e6ist as the result of evolution and the idea of representation is thus re.ected$ "p$ ''A# In Chapter A, Clark analyses ro!otics "7I#$ &hese products are constructed as complete !ut low-level systems in which strong relation !etween !ody, action and environment produces adaptive !ehaviour$ &hese elements involve emergence and collective effects$ Clark presents other two e6amples from ro!otics, one !eing De!!s cricket phonota6is "the male crickets song has to !e hear, identify, locali:e !y the female that has to locomote toward it#$ Instead of classical model "*hear-locali:e-locomote+ routine 1 task decomposition and identifies a se9uence of su!task#, De!! constructed her ro!ot !eing inspired !y cricket anatomy and neurophysiology "the ears and its inner tracheal tu!e#$ "p$ (0-A# "*E &he vi!ration is greater at the ear nearest to the sound source$ 4 =rientation and locomotion$+# =ne of the fundamental principles of this system is that the cricketFs tracheal tu!e transmits sounds of the desired calling song fre9uency, and the phase shifts in this transmission are suited to that particular wavelength$ "De!!, //A, p$ A0# "Clark, p$ (A# In fact the ro!ot cricket
does not possess any general mechanism for identifying the direction of sounds, nor does it need to actively discriminate the song of its own species from other songs$ ;or other sounds are structurally incapa!le of generating the directional response$ &he ro!ot cricket does not succeed !y tailoring general purpose capacities "such as pattern recognition and sound locali:ation# to the special case of mate detection: instead, it e6ploits highly efficient but (indeed, because) special-purpose strategies. It does not !uild a rich model of its environment and then apply some logico-deductive inference system to generate action plans$ It does not even possess a central sensory information store capa!le of

integrating multimodel inputs$ 7s a result, it is not at all o!vious that the ro!ot cricket uses anything worth calling internal representations$ Garious inner states do correspond to salient outer parameters, and certain inner varia!les to motor outputs$

Heneral ideas: - Artificial life 1 genetic algorithms, cellular automata, network controller for ro!ots$ - &he pair artificial life-biology in parallel with AI-psychology$ "5echtel and 7!rahamsen '(( , p$ ')0# &hey emphasi:e Iangtons vision of synthetic strategy, the responsi!le for the la!el *artificial life+$ &his area has to appeals to a synthetic approach of
understanding the evolution and operation of living systems: researchers !uild simulated systems out of already identified components and see what emerges from their operation$ In contrast, !iologists "and psychologists# primarily take the analytic approach of decomposition and locali:ation in their investigation of naturally occurring systems: starting with a real organism, they figure out what component processes are involved in its functioning and where in the system each process is carried out$

"5echtel and 7!rahamsen '(( , p$ ')5#

&he idea is that from certain primary entities and following some rules and processes, certain a!stract organisms and their !ehaviour has to !e created$ Criticism: " # Jo intentionality in ro!ots "-earles Chinese ,oom# "5echtel and 7!rahansem '(( , p$ 3(3-0#$ -imulated ro!ots "and real ro!ots as well# have representations that are only formal and lack content$ "p$ 3(0# "'# Clark - &he second topic, emergence, in a future lecture$ "3# &he relationship !etween life and mind that reflects the relationship !etween life and artificial systems$ "p$ C# %owever, the definition of life is 9uite o!scure: C-)# properties like autopoesis, autocatalysis elements, self-reproduction, genetics, and meta!olism or a cluster concept >multiple features$ "p$