This article was downloaded by: [Hellenic Open University] On: 20 January 2013, At: 04:45 Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

International Journal of Cultural Policy

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gcul20

Exporting national culture: histories of Cultural Institutes abroad

Gregory Paschalidis
a a

Department of Journalism and Mass Communications, University of Thessaloniki, 46 Egnatias STR., 54622, Thessaloniki, Greece Version of record first published: 14 Sep 2009.

To cite this article: Gregory Paschalidis (2009): Exporting national culture: histories of Cultural Institutes abroad, International Journal of Cultural Policy, 15:3, 275-289 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10286630902811148

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-andconditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

International Journal of Cultural Policy Vol. 15, No. 3, August 2009, 275289

Exporting national culture: histories of Cultural Institutes abroad

Gregory Paschalidis*
Department of Journalism and Mass Communications, University of Thessaloniki, 46 Egnatias STR., 54622, Thessaloniki, Greece
International 10.1080/10286630902856713 GCUL_A_381284.sgm 1028-6632 Original Taylor 2009 0 3 15 Dr koradbirkiye@yahoo.com 000002009 Selen & and Article KoradBirkiye Francis (print)/1477-2833 Francis Journal of Cultural (online) Policy

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

Cultural policy research has so far paid little attention to the field of external cultural policy. The multiple interactions between internal and external cultural politics, however, as well as the growing significance of external cultural policy in the contemporary global arena of cultural and linguistic antagonisms, necessitate its inclusion in the cultural policy research agenda. Focusing on the specific instrument of Cultural Institutes abroad, this paper traces their historical development from the time of their original deployment by the European great powers, to their recent adoption by a host of lesser and greater countries. The different phases of this policy instrument development demonstrate its unique versatility and adaptability to a variety of contexts and functions and, more generally, its strategic role in the workings and processes of external cultural policy. The current state of Cultural Institutes challenges the widespread belief in the declining cultural role of the nation state and affirms the persistence of the ideology of cultural nationalism. Keywords: external cultural policy; Cultural Institutes; cultural nationalism; cultural diplomacy

In December 1945, four months after the end of the Second World War, the old Liberty ship Mataroa sailed from Piraeus carrying over 200 young Greeks on the first leg of a journey that ended in Paris where they commenced their university education as recipients of French state bursaries. The extraordinary number of bursaries awarded, as well as the amazing feat of transporting such a large human cargo across a war-ravaged Europe, was both engineered by the director of the French Institute in Athens, Octave Merlier, and its secretary, Roger Milliex. Although it had little in common with Varian Frys rescue of 2000 refugee intellectuals from Nazi persecution through the clandestine shipments he organised in Marseilles (19401941), Octave Merliers exploit is often commemorated as a unique rescue operation thanks to which the flower of Greek radical youth was saved from the ravages of the impending civil war. His political motives, however, were of minor importance. As one of those grant recipients discloses in her recent demythologising account of that dramatic journey, his primary objective was to assimilate in French cultural space and train as future representatives of French culture in Greece as many talented Greeks as possible ensuring, at the same time, the influence of French language against the post-war rise of English (Andricopoulou 2007, p. 29). Accordingly, the selection procedure was at no time compromised by extra-academic criteria, as subsequent events also confirm. Most of the young people aboard the Mataroa went on to have distinguished professional careers, while some became internationally renowned intellectuals, scientists and artists like Castoriadis, Axelos, Svoronos, Xenakis, etc. and emblematic
*Email: paschagr@jour.auth.gr
ISSN 1028-6632 print/ISSN 1477-2833 online 2009 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/10286630902811148 http://www.informaworld.com

276

G. Paschalidis

figures of the French cultural establishment. In vindication of Merliers ambitious design, the massive human shipments organised by the French Institute in Athens in the mid-1940s did indeed ensure the dominance of French culture and language in post-war Greek thought, art and science. What motivated Merlier was not some kind of personal vision but the characteristically French magnificent obsession with rayonnement culturel. As a director of the French Institute in Athens since its foundation in 1925 he had overseen its swift rise to the status of the leading foreign institute in Greece. He must therefore have been particularly troubled by the spectacular popularity of the language courses offered by the British Council as soon as it opened in Athens in 1938. As Frances Donaldson relates in her history of the British Council, when the latter reopened after the war, the crowd of prospective students gathered in the square outside it was so large that the police had to be called out to deal with them (Donaldson 1984, p. 147). More importantly, Merliers worries and designs faithfully adumbrated the French governments feelings about the anglocentric drift of the post-war world, as well as its desire to retain world power status. That explains why his extravagant scheme was approved and financed so generously at a time when France was still struggling to feed its people. It is characteristic that just a few months after that group of dazed Greek students arrived in Paris, the French delegation in the UNESCO Preparatory Commission recommended that each country should adopt one universally used cultural language. In order to neutralise the resurgence of native languages in the newly independent ex-colonies, to stem the renewed popularity of the Esperanto movement, as well as to preserve its prewar international prominence against the rising currency of English, the French delegation at the General Conference of UNESCO (1946) proposed the teaching in every country of one of the great and most commonly spoken cultural languages as a precondition for achieving the interpenetration of cultures (Pendergast 1976, p. 460). The whole range of issues involved in how states organise and design their cultural projection abroad has traditionally been assigned to the discipline of international relations, usually under the label of foreign cultural policy or, more recently, of cultural or public diplomacy. I believe it is time to challenge this conventional wisdom and reclaim this area of institutional activities and policies as an essential item in the cultural policy research agenda. If Andr Malrauxs cultural democratisation is widely regarded as a central chapter in the development of modern cultural policy, why should we ignore his brilliant use of Frances cultural treasures in enhancing the international cultural and political status of France? There are very few people, even inside Greece, who know about the Mataroa shipment masterminded by Octave Merlier. There are millions of people though who can recall the shipment of the Mona Lisa and Venus de Milo to Washington (1963) and Tokyo (1964) respectively, organised by Malraux (Lebovics 1999). Although the two most famous artworks in the Louvres collection hardly qualify as examples of the French genius, their hugely popular public exhibition in the USA and Japan had such an impact that Malrauxs bold initiative can justly be considered as the prototype of all similar acts of cultural diplomacy that have taken place since then. With these highly charged acts of cultural generosity he managed to heal severely tense Franco-American relations, to advance Frances co-operation with the rising economic power of Japan and boost French cultural exports ensuring, at the same time, the lasting appeal of Paris as the capital of international cultural tourism. Cultural policy research has so far focused almost exclusively on internal cultural policy: on the institutions, the principles and strategies that concern the administration and regulation of culture within national boundaries. Among the standard textbooks of the last decade,

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

International Journal of Cultural Policy

277

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

only Toby Miller and George Yudices Cultural Policy (2002) devotes a few pages to USA foreign cultural policy. We need however to overcome this domestic bias. There is no danger here of stepping into foreign territory, the territory of the foreign, but only of side-stepping a crucial domain of contemporary cultural policy a domain that becomes increasingly crucial as the accelerating spiral of Globalisation fosters new contexts, practices and institutions of inter-societal intercourse and interaction. Hence, the fast increasing interest of scholars of international relations and politics in the issues and institutions of external cultural policy. The multidimensionality of this particular policy domain however and, more specifically, the intricate interplay of domestic and international cultural politics, the dense interweaving of cultural politics and cultural economics, as well as the complex dialectic between concepts of culture, definitions of national identity and the regulation of national culture that characterise it, demand the interdisciplinary skills of cultural policy specialists, their close critical engagement and, last but not least, their reconstructive intervention. Historical outline Regardless of our country of origin, we are all familiar with institutions like the British Council, the French Institute/Alliance Franaise, the Italian Institute/Dante Alighieri and the Goethe Institute. They defined our common cultural landscape long before the appearance of Hollywood blockbusters, MTV or McDonalds. It is thanks to them that many have learned an international language, discovered foreign authors, scientists, musicians and film-makers, and perhaps even received a grant to study abroad in places like London, Rome, Berlin or Paris, like the fortunate Greek award recipients aboard the Mataroa. It is upon the Cultural Institute that I focus in the present study, my fundamental premise being that this particular instrument of external cultural policy has a central significance for understanding the workings and dynamics of external cultural policy. This, I hope, will become evident as we proceed to trace its historical development. There are four distinctive phases in its developmental process, each with its own characteristic set of phenomena. Phase 1: Cultural nationalism (1870s1914) It is widely believed that the origins of the globally familiar presence of the British Council, the French, the Italian or the Goethe Institute, lie in the mission civilisatrice of European colonialism. This belief, however, is rather inaccurate. A close study of the beginnings of these institutions reveals a complex picture with diverse patterns. The protagonists in this early phase are Italy, Germany and France. In contrast to this last, Italy and Germany achieved national unification rather late and moreover in such a fashion that left substantial ethnic communities outside their national space. Both countries, in addition, had a significant number of expatriate communities due to emigration. It is these extra-territorial ethnic communities that were targeted by the All-German School Association for the Preservation of Germanhood Abroad (Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein zur Erhaltung des Deutschtums im Auslande, 1881) and by the Societ Dante Alighieri (1889). The former was mainly active among the German-speaking communities in the eastern and south-eastern Europe. The first Dante Alighieri Societies, on the other hand, were created in the major trading ports of the Eastern Mediterranean Salonica (1890), Smyrna (1891), Istanbul (1895), Cairo and Alexandria (1896) reflecting the prominent role Italian traders and the Italian language itself traditionally held in the commercial life of the region. Subsequently, the Societys location pattern follows the spread of Italian immigrant communities in Western

278

G. Paschalidis

Europe, North and South America. Only the Societys branches in Libya (Tripoli, 1898 and Benghazi, 1906) can be directly linked to Italian colonial expansionism. By providing support to schools, libraries and students, the aim of these organisations was to preserve the language and cultural identity of ethnic Germans and Italians who lived outside the borders of their respective nation states. Far from being the cultural tools of European expansionism aiming to solidify colonial empires, these organisations were rather the manifestations and instruments of that expansive imaginary community which Meinecke, in 1907, called the cultural nation (Kulturnation): a collectivity whose outreach extended beyond the borders of the political nation (Staatsnation). Clearly, the insistence on the cultural nation-building process even after national integration had been achieved was symptomatic of the perceived incompleteness of the political nation-building project. The irredentist aspirations of the Dante Alighieri Society, for example, were explicitly stated in its July 1889 founding declaration. Its opening sentence defines the Society s aim to be the completion of the political unification of the nation, since the mother country was not yet wholly within the physical boundaries of the State. In fact, the Societys operations among the Italian-speaking communities in the disputed territories still under Austrian rule were quite negligible. A much clearer case of an organisation characterised by an irredentist activism similar to that of the German Schulverein was the Association for the Propagation of Greek Letters ( ). Established as early as in 1869 and openly endorsed by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Association was particularly active in providing educational resources and services to the Greekspeaking communities in Macedonia and Thrace territories which, still under Ottoman rule, were targeted by rising Slavic nationalism. What characterises, then, this particular pattern is not assimilationist colonial policies but anti-assimilationalist nationalist politics: politics that aim to prevent expatriate or same-language communities from being integrated into foreign states, and to maintain them as potential foreign policy instruments, either in relation to territorial claims or to the procurement of economic and political advantage. A rather different pattern is found in the way France developed its own cultural outreach. Experiencing a protracted decline as a world power since its defeat in 1871, France geared its external cultural policy mainly in the context of its competition with Great Britain for political and economic hegemony in the Middle East over the disintegrating territories of the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain greatly reinforced its presence in the region by taking control first of Cyprus (1878) and then of Egypt which until 1882 was under joint AngloFrench control. The foundation of the secular Alliance Franaise in 1883 and Mission laique franais in 1902, both aiming to propagate French language and culture in the colonies and abroad, in combination with the Oeuvre des Ecoles de lOrient (1855) which supported a wide network of Catholic missions in the Middle East, represented a comprehensive mechanism for the spread of the French language and culture in the region. The rhetoric of the mission civilisatrice was essential for all those organisations, and above all for Pierre Foncin, the first General Secretary (18831897) and sixth President (18991914) of Alliance Franaise. Foncin proposed that the military conquest of the colonies should be followed by their conqute morale, primarily through teaching French to the native populations (see Bruziere 1983, p. 40). Although the idea of colonial expansion was rather controversial at the time, there was a clear political consensus regarding the idea of the expansion of the French language, and the establishment of the Alliance Franaise was the direct consequence of this consensus (Burrows 1986, pp. 125126). During most of this period, state funding of these private organisations was relatively small. Still, their activities greatly augmented Frances political and economic standing in the Middle East. By contrast with the poor impact French education had in colonies like Cambodia, Cochin-China or

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

International Journal of Cultural Policy

279

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

Algeria, in the Ottoman Empire in 1914 over 40% of those educated in foreign schools attended French ones, while French was the most widely used language in the Middle East (Burrows 1986, p. 134, 110). This early, preparatory phase reaches its conclusion with the first systematic elaboration of the idea of external cultural policy by the cultural historian Karl Lamprecht. A long-time supporter of Pan-German Leagues patriotic activism and of Germanys historical role as an expansive state (Expansionsstaat), Lamprecht subsequently adopted a less aggressive agenda. In his 1909 address to the Association of Germans Abroad (Verein fur das Deutschtum im Ausland, 1908) successor of the Schulverein Lamprecht scandalised his audience by suggesting the replacement of the antiquated, military methods with a new ideal of cultural policy which, although it continued to emphasise the ties with all Germans living abroad, espoused the cosmopolitan visions expressed at the peace congresses of the time (Chickering 1993, p. 408). At the First Congress of the Association for International Conciliation (Verband fr Internationale Verstandigung, 1910), in October 1912, Lamprecht championed a cultural foreign policy (Auswrtige Kulturpolitik) which aimed to advance Germanys international economic and political status through the peaceful means of a spiritual export of knowledge. According to his biographer Roger Chickering, Lamprechts conception of a cultural foreign policy comprehended a vast catalogue of undertakings, such as to:
Coordinate the operations of German business and cultural organisations in foreign lands, to support German schools abroad, to attract foreigners to higher education institutions in Germany, to arrange exchange programmes for scholars and tours for German artists abroad, to oversee the scholarly study of German communities abroad. (Chickering 1993, p. 419)

Lamprechts paradoxical combination of nationalism and internationalism, realism and idealism, ethnocentrism and universalism, was aptly described by George Hallgarten as antinomian universalism (cited in Chickering 1993, p. 412). Although his recommendations were left largely unheeded, the peculiar set of contradictions characterising Lamprechts thinking was destined to seal the progress of external cultural policy for a long time ahead. Despite the fact that the beginnings of Cultural Institutes abroad coincide with the age of neo-imperialism, they seem to be more related to the great European powers nationalist aspirations and geopolitical rivalries. The geographical spread of these institutions is, accordingly, almost exclusively focused either on ethnic diasporas or on the contested spheres of influence opened up by the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East. In most cases, the major ideological force behind them is a pervading cultural nationalism, with its characteristic emphasis on language and education. It was no accident that Italy, Germany, France and even Greece were all hotbeds of triumphalist nationalism. In this early phase of external cultural policy, however, the role of government is seriously limited. The initiative, the financial support and the management of these organisations came from individuals and not the state. In this period of grass roots patriotism (Hobsbawm 1990, pp. 121122), external cultural policy is in the hands of volunteers, societies, churches, clubs and associations. Characteristically, the aforementioned German and Greek Associations were the leading edge of a multitude of similarly minded organisations which, though not always working in unison, were equally based on public subscription, popular activism and patriotic fervour. Phase 2: Cultural propaganda (19141945) In 1927, Julien Benda denounced intellectuals for betraying the values of universalism and rationalism to become Ministers of War (Benda 2006, p. 107). A rather apt description has

280

G. Paschalidis

given the phenomenal mobilisation of intellectuals and artists in the service of official propaganda during World War I. The politicisation of culture inaugurated by the nationalist cultural politics of the previous half century now assumed new heights and forms. Internationally oriented propaganda, methodically deployed during the Great War, exploited the political utility of culture for the first time, fostering a new awareness of the potential of external cultural policy and a new commitment to its pursuit. State initiated, administered and financed external cultural policy is, in effect, a post-World War I development, part of the wider post-war surge of diplomatic activity, national projection and international institution-building. France had taken the first steps as early as 1909, by setting up the Bureau des coles et des uvres to coordinate the various cultural agencies operating abroad, and starting an international network of Cultural Institutes, assigned with the task of promoting awareness and appreciation of French art abroad. The first French Institutes were established in Florence and London, in 1910, and by 1936 there were thirty of them, located mainly in the major European cities. In 1923, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the first office for cultural diplomacy in history. On the whole, though, France was too preoccupied with its international cultural influence to effectively integrate cultural action to its foreign policy (Balous 1970, p. 13). A systematic effort in that direction was made with the establishment of the Association franaise daction artistique (AFAA, 1934), in place of the hitherto private Association franaise dexpansion et dchanges artistiques (AFEEA, 1922), which was active in the international promotion and exportation of French art. The decision of Quai dOrsay to assume control over French rayonnement culturel was, in effect, a response to the new political conjuncture prevailing in Europe after March 1933, when Hitler consolidated his rule in Germany. The propaganda pyrotechnics at the 1936 Berlin Olympics, as well as the symbolic confrontation between the Soviet and the German pavilions in the 1937 Paris World Expo are revealing instances of the aggressive turn that European powers external cultural projection was taking in the mid-1930s. AFAAs emphasis consequently moved from creating an export market for French art to winning friends over to the French cause. Just as in World War I, the major objective was to move the American public out of its cautious neutrality. The challenge was taken up by the French Institute of New York (established in 1911) and the 300 strong Federation of Alliances Franaises, assisted by a dense network of Franco-American associations. Despite Lamprechts pioneering proposals in the pre-war years, German interest in cultural diplomacy only took off after the war, largely motivated, as Michels suggests, by a rather exaggerated belief in the role propaganda had allegedly played in the defeat of the Reich in 1918 (Michels 2004, p. 206). In the early 1920s, simultaneously with the even more aggressively nationalist activities of the Verein, we have the establishment of the Department of Germans Abroad and Cultural Affairs (Abteilung fr Deutschtum im Ausland und kulturelle Angelenheiten) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the founding of a range of relevant public and private institutions. The two most important, still in existence today, were the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD, 1925), and the Deutsche Akademie (1923), the precursor of Goethe Institute. None of them, however, targeted foreign audiences, since the Weimar Republic continued the traditional preoccupation with the German-speaking communities abroad (Hiden 1977). By 1929, McMurry notes, the members of the Reichstag had become more aware of the need for Kulturpolitik, and, as a result, the Foreign Office increased funding for external cultural policy, devoting almost 15% of its total budget to it by 1931 (McMurry 1944, p. 57). It was in this climate of increased emphasis on external cultural policy that the Deutsche Akademie won sufficient state support to promote the German language among foreigners. It remained,

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

International Journal of Cultural Policy

281

however, a private association till 1941, when Hitler made it the official institution for helping the German Language to assume its proper place as a world language. Even then, however, its activities were limited to those parts of Europe which, even under Nazi rule, were to enjoy a certain degree of political and cultural self-determination (Michels 2004, p. 224). Addressing Italian writers in 1926, Mussolini called upon them to spearhead a spiritual imperialism, by spreading abroad information about the new Italy, as shaped by war and the fascist revolution (Totaro-Genevois 2005, p. 30). In the same year, the fascist regime assigned this mission to the state-controlled Istituti italiani di cultura, which subsequently took over the functions of the Dante Alighieri Societies, turning them into centres for the spread of fascist propaganda. Just like Nazi Germany, fascist Italy subsumed most of its cultural communication abroad to the interests of political propaganda. Both countries sought support from their emigr communities and mobilised them in order to build friendly political constituencies abroad, particularly among potential enemies like the USA and strategically located neutrals, such as the Latin American states. The intense political antagonisms of the 1930s decisively shaped the field of external cultural policy by fostering a process of strategic syncretism, of the deliberate adoption of the features of ones adversaries. This is how both Great Britain and the USA developed their own instruments of cultural propaganda. It was the opening up of language schools (called Lektorate) by the Deutsche Akademie, as well as the expansion of Dante Alighieri Society in the strategic regions of the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean which prompted the foundation of the British Council in 1934 (Michels 2004, p. 221) and dictated its location strategy during its first decade of operation. The USA, on the other hand, developed its first official programme of external cultural policy in 1936 in response to Nazi Germanys cultural propaganda in Latin America. Perceiving the latter as a threat to its interests and influence in the region, the US developed an extensive educational exchange programme with Latin American countries, cultivating the idea of inter-American unity through a good neighbour policy (Mulcahy 1999, p. 11). Coming exactly one century after the first use of the Monroe Doctrine, which asserted the US security interests in Latin America, and reviving its rhetoric of pan-Americanism, this was the first time that the formal policy of the US government incorporated a cultural dimension (Arndt 2006, p. 57). Similarly focused on Latin America, the Division of Cultural Relations, established in 1938, developed an ambitious programme of scholarships, artistic exchanges and librarybuilding, with most of the funding provided by private sources. During the war, however, the Division assumed a much more aggressively propagandist role. In general, the close bond forged between external cultural policy and propaganda in this period is best illustrated by the hectic expansion that all the relevant cultural agencies had while the war was raging on. During the three decades of this phase, cultural nationalism, with its guiding principle of a national ideal, is gradually replaced by cultural propaganda and its guiding principle of a political ideal. The Cultural Institutes, along with the various related bodies and activities (scholarships, student and academic exchanges, art exhibitions, theatre and concert tours, etc.), become a standard feature of the official external cultural policy of the great powers, typically under the control of Foreign Affairs Ministries. The institutionalisation of external cultural policy in the inter-war period coincides with the heightened involvement of the state in the domain of public culture and the beginnings of a national cultural policy. War and international antagonisms, on the other hand, dictate that the geographical spread of the Institutes in this period largely follows the different states geopolitical priorities and interests.

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

282

G. Paschalidis

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

Phase 3: Cultural diplomacy (19451989) In 1946, Friedrich Meinecke suggested that the therapy for the spiritual rebirth of Germany should be the creation of a nationwide network of Goethe communities, consisting of like-minded friends of high culture, whose purpose would be to convey into the heart of the listeners the most vital elements of the great German spirit (Lepenies 2006, pp. 132133). His proposal met with public outcry. In a way, though, it seemed to resurface in 1951, when the Goethe Institute was founded in place of the disbanded Deutsche Akademie. The worldwide network of Goethe Institute branches subsequently established, applied Meineckes remedy for the international rebirth of Germany. Its mission was to heal the international image of Germany by conveying into the heart of its world audience the most vital elements of German culture. With the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953, the post-war structure of Cultural Institutes was complete and ready to embark on its global expansion at an unprecedented pace. In retrospect, it seems rather paradoxical that the cultural agencies which were born and bred with ideals of cultural nationalism and elevated to the status of official institutions by the expediencies of inter-war and war-time propaganda, were widely considered as the most prudent option for bringing the war-weary international society back to the conciliatory path of mutual appreciation and understanding. Symptomatic of this renewed trust in the cultural component of international relations was the establishment of UNESCO as the main institution of international cultural cooperation. Its work was however constantly challenged and compromised by the persistence of national agendas for cultural projection, as exemplified by the positions of the French delegation, by the conflicts of interest surrounding development projects in the Third World, as well as by ideological conflict like that which kept the USSR and its satellites out of UNESCO until 1954. The storms that rocked UNESCOs progress, vividly attested by Richard Hoggart (1978) who served as its Assistant Director-General (19701975), faithfully mirror the major issues and contexts that shaped the growth and orientation of the different Cultural Institutes in this period. We can summarise these issues and contexts by reference to the following three axes of geopolitical and geocultural division: (1) West vs. East: The Cold War was in many respects a cultural war. The politicisation of culture that intensified with inter-war propaganda now escalated to turn culture from a vehicle for ideology into a synonym of ideology. As David Caute underlines, the cultural contest between the Western and the Communist camps was a unique historical phenomenon, an unprecedented imperial contest in which both sides felt compelled: to prove their virtue, to demonstrate their spiritual superiority, to claim the high ground of progress, to win public support and admiration by gaining ascendancy in each and every event of what might be styled the Cultural Olympics (Caute 2005, p. 3). The location of the hundreds of US and USSR cultural centres and libraries around the world attests to the fact that the main objective was winning the hearts and minds of people in the contested regions outside the direct control of the two super-powers. Predictably, when the Cold War started to ease, all this feverish activity came to an abrupt end. (2) North vs South: In the era of the disintegration of empires, external cultural policy was extensively deployed for the preservation or promotion of economic and cultural ties between metropolitan and ex-colonial countries, providing an alternative, new structure of integration. The entrenchment of the British Council in the Commonwealth countries, as well as the expansion of US, German and French

International Journal of Cultural Policy

283

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

Cultural Institutes into the Southern hemisphere, exactly follows this pattern. Through programmes of educational aid and student grants, scientific cooperation and technology transfer, their primary aim was to win over the local lites. At the same time, the traditional rhetoric of the mission civilisatrice gave way to that of the development mission. Notwithstanding the rhetorical flourishes, this competition for the acquisition or maintenance of spheres of economic and cultural influence, was an exemplary case of neo-colonialism. The scramble for the Middle East which marked the first phase was in effect replayed, only on a much vaster scale. (3) USA vs. Europe: According to Robert Phillipson (1994, p. 9) never in the history of the world, except during the period 19501970, has so much been spent on the spread of a language, that is on English. The global rise of English in the post-war period, combined with the conquest of both European and world cultural markets by American popular culture made the concept of cultural imperialism, originally applied to the developing world, a rallying cry for Europeans as well. The counteroffensive was led by France, which turned its Cultural Institutes abroad into showrooms for the promotion of French art cinema and literature. Much more effective, however, was its renewed emphasis on the spread of the teaching of the French language, which in 1986 culminated in the establishment of the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF). It is tempting to consider the inter-war and the post-war phases as one extended period of cultural propaganda, dominated by the cultural contest between antagonistic ideological systems. The scale and intensity of the inter-war cultural competition seems, in many ways, to have prefigured and paved the way for the unprecedented diversity and magnitude of cultural resources mobilised during the Cold War years. A crucial demarcation point, however, is the prominence assumed in the post-war period by the issue of modernisation. The competition between the two rival socio-economic systems, as well as the global entrenchment of development discourse, fostered a gradual expansion of the concept of culture. Initially restricted to the humanistic (or litist) idea of high culture, it was gradually revised to include a more inclusive range of cultural expressions, but also science and technology, the social sciences and development projects. UNESCO made a crucial contribution to this revision by promoting a reconceptualisation of culture in relation to society which combined a more comprehensive, non-litist understanding of culture, the celebration of cultural diversity and the integration of cultural and economic development. It was a revision, additionally, that was in tune with the increasingly public address of external cultural policy. With the concept of cultural propaganda stigmatised for its association with the aggressive practices of the 1930s, the emphasis shifted to the more benign concepts of cultural diplomacy and cultural relations.

Phase 4: Cultural capitalism (1989) Until the epoch-making events of 1989, the instruments of external cultural policy were the prerogative of the great powers Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the USA and Soviet Union. Since then, such instruments have been developed by a range of other countries as well, most of which are not members of the big league. The rising tide of this new phenomenon suggests that what was once the distinguishing feature of national might, is fastly becoming a standardised form of national representation and projection, a basic ingredient of the new system of international and intercultural relations. In the multipolar world of the

284

G. Paschalidis

post-Cold War era, where an odd mixture of old and new nationalisms co-exists uneasily with supranational formations and transnational processes, the century-old instrument of the Cultural Institute abroad seems ready for its most vigorous growth yet. The end of Cold War and the political change in Eastern Europe, had a dramatic impact on the field of cultural relations. With the demise of the Soviet threat the USIA was massively downsized and despite protests (see, e.g. Lacquer 1994), completely phased out in 1999, provoking the outcry of American cultural diplomacy specialists (see, e.g. Schneider 2003, Arendt 2007). At the same time that the US decided there was no longer any need to participate in the cultural relations arena, the ex-socialist countries advertised their national and cultural rebirth, as well as their return to international society by adopting one of its most reputable forms of membership. Within a few years countries like Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic replaced the culture and information centres they maintained in the Eastern Bloc with a network of Cultural Institutes or centres located mainly in the capitals of Western Europe and neighbouring countries. EUs engagement with the cultural dimension of the European integration process, effectively inaugurated by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) has had a mixed impact. On the one hand, it actively encouraged the growth of member states external cultural policy. Currently, almost all of the 27 EU member states maintain networks of Cultural Institutes or centres abroad. In a field that was once dominated by the big four France, Britain, Germany and Italy this represents a dramatic change. The development, on the other hand, of EU instruments of cultural cooperation, significantly reduced the operational scope of the older agencies. The enormous human traffic resulting from the Erasmus/ Socrates educational exchange programme, for example, has effectively made the age-old scholarship and fellowship programmes redundant. The once dominant bilateral model of cultural relations, characterised by asymmetric, uni-directional flows, has consequently given way to a multilateral model, based on mutuality and partnership. It is on the basis of the latter that the older Institutes began to redesign their activities and, above all, to reform their rhetoric. In place of the previous emphasis on service, support or development, we now find all the familiar tropes of the prevailing culturespeak, i.e. multiculturalism, bridge-building, cultural dialogue, etc. Perhaps the most significant change in the modus operandi of the European Cultural Institutes, however, is evidenced by the foundation, in 2006, of EUNIC, a partnership of Cultural Institutes from almost all EU countries which aims at pulling together their resources and expertise in order to design and carry out joint projects in the field of intercultural understanding and cooperation both inside and outside Europe. Fittingly, the idea was first born in Brussels, the de facto capital city of EU. Since 1997, the European Cultural Institutes in Brussels started to cooperate, and in 1999 they created the Consociatio Institutorum Culturalium Europaerum inter Belgas (CICEB) whose founding members were: Alliance Franaise, British Council, Det Dansk Kulturinstitut, Goethe Institute, Instituto Cervantes, Istituto Italiano di Cultura and Suomen Benelux Instituutti. The recent creation of EUNIC represents a path-breaking approach to the age-old problems of inter-European antagonisms, and hopefully, it may prove to be the first step towards the ultimate amalgamation of the various national agencies in a common European Cultural Institute. Still, the emphasis so far has been in setting up partnership clusters in major European cities rather than abroad, where their presence is as yet quite limited. It seems that nationalist stakes in the extra-European territories are still too high to allow a more dramatic change in the immediate future. And the most important of these stakes regards the status of certain international languages.

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

International Journal of Cultural Policy

285

In the past two decades, linguistic antagonism has become more aggressive than ever. Since the early 1990s, the British Council, Goethe Institute and the French Institute have been engaged in a strenuous race for linguistic hegemony in the ex-socialist and ex-Soviet countries. Over the same period, La Francophonie grew into a multi-purpose international organisation, with economic and political functions as well, assuming the status of a veritable French Commonwealth. Significantly, it was in the field of linguistic antagonism as well, that we had new contenders. Spains Instituto Cervantes (1991) and Portugals Instituto Camoes (1992) have expanded swiftly in the past 15 years. The logic of their expansion though reflects quite different linguistic geostrategies. Instituto Cervantes exclusively targets non-Spanish speaking countries, having as its main objective the promotion of Spanish as the second international language after English. Instituto Camoes, on the other hand, is represented almost equally in the Portuguese-speaking and the non-Portuguese speaking world, aiming rather to consolidate the role of Portuguese as a transnational language. The newest contender in the arena of linguistic antagonism is China. Since its foundation in 2004, the Confucius Institute has contributed greatly to the impressive rise of Chinese learning internationally. In the past four years, it has established 210 branches in 64 countries, with many more scheduled to open over the next few years. Next to China, India is the other emergent world power that proceeded to establish Cultural Centres abroad. By placing most of them in Asia, its location strategy has so far been much less ambitious than Chinas. It is quite evident however that both countries feel the same pressing need to assert their recently acquired economic might in cultural terms as well. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the overall picture of Cultural Institutes around the world looks more complex than ever. Different countries develop them for different purposes. France, Britain and Germany strive for linguistic expansion, the exsocialist countries try to remould their international image, old imperial powers like Austria and Portugal renew their ties with their ex-dominions, new world economic powers like Japan, China and India cultivate their soft power image, regional powers like Turkey, Israel and Iran promote their economic and political agendas, and a host of lesser countries cultivate regional interests (Visegrad goup), or retain links with their diaspora (Mexico, Poland). This heterogeneity is quite understandable if we take into account the dramatic upheavals and the radical global reordering that has taken place in the last two decades, on both the political and the economic fronts. In this highly variable and volatile context, the capability of the specific policy instrument to assume a variety of functions and roles demonstrates its unique versatility and adaptability. Next to this heterogeneity, however, the general trend is unmistakable. Starting from the older and more globally established institutes, but also spreading to their numerous smaller scale imitators, there is an accelerating engagement with the export of national culture and nation branding. Starting from the mid-1980s, there is a growing concern about national cultural projection and the world market-shares of the national cultural industries. Picking up noticeably in the 1980s, the growth of cultural trade was staggering during the 1990s. According to UNESCO statistics, world imports of cultural goods rose from $48 billion in 1980 to $214 billon in 1998 (UNESCO 2000, p. 30). At the same time, the marketisation or managerialisation drive that swept the whole field of public cultural policy (McGuigan 2004, pp. 4649) also demanded a refashioning of the norms of external cultural policy. The emphasis on the culture of ideology that marked the height of Cold War rivalries gave way to the ideology of culture. In the era of cultural capitalism, where all kinds of cultural resources, productions and experiences are commercialised (Rifkin 2000), the Cultural Institutes that started their existence as cultural outposts begin to look more and more like cultural trading-posts.

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

286

G. Paschalidis

Conclusions It is evident that the four phases we have delineated do not represent a sequence of totally asymmetrical and unrelated historical periods. They should rather be seen as steps in an ongoing, dynamic process, across which we have both continuities and discontinuities, permanence and innovation and, above all an increasingly reflexive adaptation to changing circumstances and stakes. The crucial dates by which this process is punctuated are more of a political rather than of a purely cultural provenance. This underlines the formative role of broad socio-historical factors, and demonstrates the close interconnections between culture, ideology and power that mark the development of the policy instrument in question. These interconnections are left largely unexplored in the series of histories of the major Cultural Institutes that came out in the mid-1980s to mark their centenary, as in the case of Alliance Franaise (Bruziere 1983) and Dante Alighieri (Caparelli 1987) or half century, as in the case of The British Council (Donaldson 1984). Written mostly by devoted insiders, these studies are highly informative but their scope is that of an institutional history approached, moreover, from an advocates point of view. In the past few years, there has been a notable effort to examine the development of these agencies from a more critical perspective (e.g. Arndt 2006, Michels 2005, Totaro-Genevois 2005). The critical investigation of the history and the operation of the various Cultural Institutes is, however, still in its infancy. The comparative perspective recommended by Leersen for the study of all the various manifestations of cultural nationalism (Leersen 2006, p. 566) is of vital relevance here as well. The locations, strategies and practices of the Cultural Institutes are in many ways so tightly interwoven as to present an exemplary case of what Said has pointedly described as the overlapping territories, intertwined histories of the contemporary global setting (Said 1994, p. 56). The pioneering insights of John Mitchell (1986) in this respect have not as yet been followed up. As the Mataroa incident suggests however we need, in addition, to adopt a more contextsensitive approach, to investigate both the intended and the unintended consequences of the operation of these agencies in a wide variety of specific locations. Burrows suggests that the French mission civilisatrice in the Middle East is one of the best candidates for a total history approach (Burrows 1983, p. 135). It is indeed only through an integrative approach that aims to represent both the different dimensions cultural, political, economic and the multiple practices, meanings and narratives associated with the presence of a Cultural Institute in a specific locale, that we can hope to achieve an effective understanding of their role and impact in their host environments. Instead of constructing totalising histories that reduce the function of these Institutes to a series of policy documents and generalisations it is only through such total/local histories that we realise how policy was more often than not shaped by accident and accommodation, organisational culture and personalities, local cultural politics and social circumstances. Julie Reeves questions the desirability of a cultural studies style of critique which picks at the trees and misses the humanist wood of cultural interchange (Reeves 2004, p. 57). How can we ignore the fact, however, that for most of the time, this cultural interchange involved a markedly uni-directional flow between a handful of global power-brokers and a multitude of colonies, ex-colonies, client-states and dependencies? Even after the recent pluralisation of the field of cultural relations, the global scene continues to be heavily dominated by the institutional networks maintained by ex-imperial states. France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain together account for more than three quarters of the total number of Cultural Institutes around the world. If we add the Russian and Chinese agencies, the number comes close to 90% of the total! Moreover, the geographical spread of most of these

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

International Journal of Cultural Policy

287

networks roughly coincides with the spatial boundaries of their former dominions or spheres of influence. From this viewpoint, the recent change does not seem all that dramatic. The world map of Cultural Institutes at the beginning of the twenty-first century continues to bear a disturbing resemblance to the imperial system of the early twentieth century. Changes have occurred, and they are certainly not negligible. But they lag far behind the demands and visions of cultural internationalism stated so passionately, for example, by Akira Iriye (1997). The field of cultural relations does not reflect the cultural diversity of the world. In fact, it does not even reflect the culture of the nations which have an institutionalised presence in this field. Despite some notable recent exceptions, national cultural projection abroad has always involved products and personalities of the world of high culture. On the part of the older Cultural Institutes this emphasis was dictated by the then dominant humanistic concept of culture, as well as by their perceived mandate to act as beacons of national cultural excellence. This emphasis was subsequently adopted by all newcomers who felt the need to comply to the European standards of high culture in order to project the image of a culturally advanced country. This is another instance of the process by which the European repertory of national symbols and forms of art was adopted by all countries which wished to appear as a match for any other country competing in the international arena (Alasuutari 2001, p. 163). At the same time, the culture projected abroad has always been a sanitised culture, that excludes all embarrassing or controversial elements. Which country would dare today to show-case artworks which may invite criticism for sexism, racial prejudice or cultural stereotypes? The culture projected abroad is above all an uncritical culture, that excludes artworks or artists that question the dominant national self-image. Our habitual focus on the space-bound imagined community of the nation, however, leaves out the nation states international projection: how it claims for itself a cultural space beyond its spatial borders. The projection is of a cohesive community, united by an uncontroversial, shared reality, a distinctive culture and heritage. By claiming to communicate the nation, to turn it into a communication, external cultural policy is primarily a special kind of cultural display. Most of the cultural agencies we have examined are named after illustrious cultural national figures. At the beginning it was Dante Alighieri, then Goethe, and more recently Cervantes, Camoes and Confucius. Their qualification as Institutes, Centres or Councils, on the other hand, serves to underline their strictly cultural-artistic function. The moment of a nations cultural projection is that of its most polished, sublimated, and hence, artificial representation. Projecting national culture abroad is essentially about performing the nation, converting the nation into a performance, and thus, ironically, disclosing its fundamental truth as a cultural construct, as an elaborate artwork. Back in 1939, when the global war of cultural propaganda was at its height, T.S. Eliot noted: At a period in which each nation has less and less culture for its own consumption, all are making furious efforts to export this culture, to impress upon each other their achievements in arts which they are ceasing to cultivate or understand (Eliot 1975, p. 289). Eliots scathing remark was aimed at the philistinism of those governments which, though taken to cultural display and projection abroad, were totally oblivious to the need to develop internal cultural policies. Admittedly, the Arts Council of Great Britain was established a decade later than the British Council, and the French Ministry of Culture was only established in 1959, long after the development of the sophisticated global network of French cultural agencies. What makes Eliots remark particularly resonant today, however, is his reference to the furious effort to export ones national culture. Bringing also in mind Lamprechts emphasis on spiritual exports, the era of cultural capitalism seems indeed to

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

288

G. Paschalidis

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

be a new age of cultural propaganda. The stakes are, of course, quite different. These are not some abstract political principles, but market shares in the international tourism and heritage industry, the promotion of the national media and cultural industries, the recruitment of international students for the home universities. If the dense web of Cultural Institutes and Centres which currently spans the globe owes its birth to cultural nationalism, it is from a market-driven cultural nationalism that it derives its life energy today. The birthmark is indelible. As illustrated by Lamprechts antinomial universalism, the element of cultural nationalism is so intrinsic in the concept of external cultural projection as to survive and constantly reassert its priority over every other non-exclusionary or pragmatically oriented discourse. In the era of cultural globalisation the nation state is generally considered to be becoming ever more marginal and powerless. The agencies and policies described, however, point to the fact that it continues to be a major global player. Next to the deterritorialisation of culture brought about by unregulated communication and migration flows, the state sets up its own media of cultural deterritorialisation, organising its own alternative forms of human and cultural flows. At a time when national identities become increasingly hard to sustain as unified, homogeneous entities, the way they are represented and projected in the field of external cultural policy, makes it one of the last privileged instances where these identities retain their unity and solidity. It seems as if the idea of the imagined community of the nation survives best when twice removed from its everyday reality, as an image constructed for the sake of others.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank those in attendance at the 5th International Conference on Cultural Policy Research (Istanbul 2008) for their positive feedback on an earlier version of this article that I delivered there. Also, my sincerest appreciation to Christopher Gordon for his support, thoughtful suggestions and meticulous editing.

References
Alasuutari, P., 2001. Art, entertainment, culture, and nation. Cultural studies/critical methodologies, 1 (2), 157184. Andricopoulou, N., 2007. To taxidi tou Mataroa [Mataroas journey]. Athens: Estia. Arndt, R., 2006. The First Resort of Kings. American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. Washington, DC: Potomac Books. Balous, S., 1970. L action culturelle de la France dans le monde [Frances cultural action in the world]. Paris: P.U.F. Benda, J., 2006. The treason of intellectuals. Richard Aldington, trans. New Brunswick, NJ/London: Transaction Publishers. Bruziere, M., 1983. LAlliance francaise 18831983: histoire dune institution [Alliance Francaise 18831983: history of an institution]. Paris: Hachette. Burrows, M., 1986. Mission civilisatrice: French cultural policy in the Middle East, 18601914. The historical journal, 29 (1), 109135. Caparelli, F., 1987. La Dante Alighieri. Roma: Bonacci. Caute, D., 2005. The dancer defects: the struggle for cultural supremacy during the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press. Chickering, R., 1993. Karl Lamprecht: a German academic life (18561915). Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press. Donaldson, F., 1984. The British Council: the first fifty years. London: Jonathan Cape. Eliot, T.S., 1975. The idea of a Christian society. In: F. Kermode, ed. Selected prose of T.S. Eliot. London: Harvest Books, 285291. Hiden, J., 1977. The Weimar Republic and the problem of the Auslandsdeutsche. Journal of contemporary history, 12 (2), 273289.

International Journal of Cultural Policy

289

Downloaded by [Hellenic Open University] at 04:45 20 January 2013

Hobsbawm, E., 1990. Nations and nationalism since 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hoggart, R., 1978. An idea and its servants: UNESCO from within. New York: Oxford University Press. Iriye, A., 1997. Cultural internationalism and world order. Baltimore, MD/London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lacquer, W., 1994. Save public diplomacy: broadcasting Americas message matters. Foreign affairs, 73 (5), 1924. Lebovics, H., 1999. Mona Lisas escort: Andr Malraux and the reinvention of French culture. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. Leersen, J., 2006. Nationalism and the cultivation of culture. Nations and nationalism, 12 (4), 559578. Lepenies, W., 2006. The seduction of culture in German history. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. McGuigan, J., 2004. Rethinking cultural policy. Berkshire: Open University Press. McMurry, R.E., 1944. Foreign government programs of cultural relations. Annals of the American academy of political and social sciences, 235, 5461. Michels, E., 2004. Deutsch als Weltsprache? Franz Thierfelder, the Deutsche Akademie in Munich and the promotion of the German language abroad, 19231945. German history, 22 (2), 206227. Michels, E., 2005. Von der Deutschen Akademie zum Goethe-Institut: Sprach- und auswartige Kulturpolitik 19231960 [From the German Academy to the Goethe Institute: linguistic and external cultural policy 19231960]. Munich: Oldenbug Wissenschaftsverlag. Miller, T. and Yudice, G., 2002. Cultural policy. London: Sage. Mitchell, J.M., 1986. International cultural relations. London: Allen & Unwin. Mulcahy, K., 1999. Cultural diplomacy and the exchange programs: 19381978. Journal of arts management, law, and society, 29 (1), 728. Pendergast, W., 1976. UNESCO and French cultural relations 19451970. International organization, 30 (3), 453483. Phillipson, R., 1994. English language spread policy. International journal of the sociology of language, 107, 724. Reeves, J., 2004. Culture and international relations. London: Routledge. Rifkin, J., 2000. The age of access: how the shift from ownership to access is transforming capitalism. London: Penguin. Said, E., 1994. Culture and imperialism. London: Vintage. Schneider, C., 2003. Diplomacy that works: best practices in cultural diplomacy [online]. Washington, DC: Center for Arts and Culture. Available from: www.culturalpolicy.org [Accessed 20 June 2009]. Totaro-Genevois, M., 2005. Cultural and linguistic policy abroad: the Italian experience. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. UNESCO, 2000. Facts and figures 2000. Paris: UNESCO Institute for Statistics.