TWO RIVAL CONCEPTIONS OF SPHROSUN Alan Pichanick1

Abstract: Many commentators still take the Delphic speech in the Charmides as Socrates (or Platos) opinion of sphrosun. This is a misreading. The speaker is Critias, a future tyrant, and close analysis reveals his conception of self-knowledge, as a godlike and self-certain wisdom, to be perverted by his tyrannical views. His conception of sphrosun must be distinguished from Socrates (knowledge of ignorance), and while the former conception is refuted in the dialogue, the latter is not.

I The Problem of the Charmides In Platos Charmides 2 Socrates conducts an inquiry with the young Charmides and his guardian and cousin Critias, in order to find the elusive quality, sphrosun. Its elusiveness appears clearly in the manifest failures to define this virtue, a fate shared by other notions in the early Platonic dialogues, such as the Euthyphro (piety), Laches (courage), and the possibly inauthentic Theages (wisdom). But for us, sphrosun seems even more difficult to grasp from the outset. The word has a variety of meanings, referring to wisdom, discretion, self-respect, moderation, chastity, temperance, prudence.3 We appear to be at a disadvantage, for we have no English word that somehow ties all these concepts together.4 To begin with, then, it is not immediately evident how we should even translate sphrosun into English. Most translators render it as moderation or temperance or even self-discipline. A more literal translation of sphrosun would be sound-mindedness. For sphrn is the result of a combination of two other Greek words, ss and phrn.5 Ss denotes safety, soundness, or wholeness. Phrn can refer to ones heart or spirit, but in this context refers to the mind, as the seat of thought. One who possesses
1 University Honors Program and Department of Philosophy, The George Washington University, Rome Hall 453, 801 22nd St. NW, Washington, DC 20052. Email: adpichan@gwu.edu 2 I have used the translation, with my own revisions, of W.R.M. Lamb, Charmides (Harvard, 1986). 3 T.G. Tuckey, Platos Charmides (Amsterdam, 1968), p. 9. 4 See Platos Collected Dialogues, trans. and ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, NJ, 1961), p. 99. 5 See Lidell, Scott, and Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th edition (Oxford, 1940). Also see Protagoras 332b, where Socrates says that the opposite of acting sphrn is acting aphrons. This can be rendered foolishly, but of course its literal meaning is unminded. Not to be sphrn is, in a sense, to be out of ones mind.

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sphrosun would thus be sound-minded.6 Perhaps the best approach, though, is to leave sphrosun untranslated, as I will do in what follows. I will focus on the discussion between Critias and Socrates regarding the message of the oracle at Delphi: Know yourself. This is the only substantive discussion in Plato of the oracle outside the Apology, and it is thus worth paying careful attention to it, if one is at all interested in the philosophy of Socrates and those who in any way follow or depart from him. For though sphrosun may be elusive, the dialogue makes it clear that it is deeply connected, whatever its nature is, to the philosophical outlook of Socrates, tying together his ethical and epistemological stances. The task of understanding sphrosun is thus doubly important: not only will it give us a supremely insightful glimpse into Socrates and his philosophical activity, it will also yield a glimpse into ourselves, if its elusiveness is due, at least partly, to a modern understanding of human nature that is alien to that of Socrates. Yet the dialogue poses a perplexing problem. For though it presents a discussion of self-knowledge, and ties this directly to the notion of knowledge of what one does and does not know, Socrates concludes at the end of the dialogue that this seemingly Socratic description of the telos of his own philosophical enterprise seems to be neither possible nor beneficial. That is, by the end of the dialogue Socrates and Critias appear to be at a loss to explain how one can know what one does and does not know, and whether this will really benefit us. Put simply, the strangeness of this Socratic dialogue resides in its inability to explain Socrates himself. This in itself may be the reason for the undeserved neglect of the dialogue, when compared to other Socratic explorations of the virtues.7 There are basically two responses one can have if one takes this problem of the dialogue seriously: either one accepts Socrates rejection of Socratic knowledge of ignorance as the right understanding of sphrosun and accepts the consequences of such a rejection, or one dismisses this rejection by explaining that the Socratic ideal of knowledge of ignorance is not in fact refuted in the dialogue. Those who follow the former path make a reasonable argument for distinguishing between the views of Socrates and Plato, and assert that Plato is using the dialogue to show the limitations of Socratic method, limitations that must be overcome by Platonic insights.8 Interestingly enough, those who are keen enough to draw this sharp distinction between Socrates and Plato do not draw a sharp enough distinction
6 T.G. West and G.S. West, Platos Charmides (Indianapolis, 1986), render the term as sound-minded in their translation. 7 This neglect has lessened recently, but most commentators still seem to be missing some of the key elements of the dialogue which I will discuss in this article. 8 In addition to Tuckey, this position is found in D. Hyland, The Virtue of Philosophy (Athens, OH, 1981), C. Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue (Cambridge, 1996), R. McKim, Socratic Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Knowledge in Platos Charmides, Transactions of the American Philological Association, 115 (1985), pp.

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between Socrates and Critias, the interlocutor in whose mouth Plato first places the words self-knowledge. But it is this distinction that is crucial to a proper response to the problem of the Charmides. In examining Critias speech about the Delphic oracle, we will see that the dialogue brings into focus two distinct images of the nature of sphrosun. There are two views, call them the Critian and the Socratic, which are in tension with, and even diametrically opposed to, one another. At the heart of the conflict between these two views is a battle between the tyrant and the philosopher, and their corresponding tyrannical and philosophical visions of the limits and possibilities of human beings.9 This is further confirmed, I will argue, by the other extant discussion of the Delphic oracle in Platos Apology, where Socrates describes his own response to the words of the oracle. In the Charmides, Plato is presenting to us an engagement between Socrates and a kind of anti-Socrates, and is asking us to choose whose life is best. When one sees the distinction between the Socratic and Critian viewpoints, it becomes evident that the Critian view is incoherent while the Socratic ideal of knowledge of ignorance escapes refutation, even if it remains an ideal to be further explored. Plato, rather than critiquing the limitations of Socrates method, seems to be critiquing the flawed understanding of Socrates companions. In the battle between the philosopher and the tyrant, the philosopher walks away victorious, even if (or perhaps because) it is not victory that is his true concern. II Sphrosun as Critian Self-Knowledge At the middle of the dialogue Critias makes a remarkable claim, that sphrosun is identical to self-knowledge. He has been led to make this claim by Socrates elenchus, which revealed that Critias earlier picture of a
5977, R.F. Stalley, Sphrosun in the Charmides, in Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides, ed. T. Robinson and L. Brisson (Sankt Augustin, 2000), pp. 26577. 9 Critias and Charmides both turned out to be members of the Thirty Tyrants who overthrew the democracy. Critias companionship with Socrates is also one of the factors leading to the claim that Socrates was the teacher of tyrants. The discussion of the Charmides thus takes place with these issues present in the background. As I make clear, I believe the dialogue is a defence, rather than a critique, of Socrates. As should be clear by what follows, I am greatly indebted to the work of David Levine and Tom Schmid for this insight. (See further, D. Levine, Platos Charmides [Ph.D. Dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1976]; and T. Schmid, Platos Charmides and the Socratic Ideal of Rationality [Albany, 1998].) As Notomi points out, both Critias and Charmides were oligarchs, more properly speaking, and there is reason to believe that Xenophons own political agenda caused them to become known as cruel tyrants. See Notomi, Critias and the Origin of Platos Political Philosophy, in Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides, pp. 23750. However, I believe the Charmides reveals what is properly tyrannical about these two individuals, as I will explain.

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sphrn individual as one who does good things10 is in fact a picture of an individual who is self-ignorant: though the person possessing sphrosun does good things, there are times when he is ignorant of the benefit of his actions.11 This is significant, for the consequences are quite dire for Critias, who is older and more experienced than the youthful Charmides. Not only does it now look like he himself may not know what sphrosun is, but Socrates response suggests that Critias may not know what his own good is. Socrates subtly raises the possibility for Charmides and everyone else to hear that Critias himself may not understand what really is his own benefit, and thereby what is truly good. It seems that perhaps even the mature Critias is ignorant of himself, that his self-knowledge is inadequate and superficial, more shadowy than real. The way has thus been paved for Critias longest speech, which stands at the centre of the dialogue and unambiguously asserts the primacy of self-knowledge. He has finally gotten a glimpse, though perhaps only a shadowy one, of what his account needs: he sees that Socrates is pointing to self-knowledge, and thus is prompted to suggest it as a definition.12 Having earlier appealed to Hesiod, he now abandons the poet, and calls up the Oracle at Delphi as his authoritative witness:
For I would almost assert this to be sphrosun: knowing or recognizing oneself (to gignoskein heauton); and I go along with the one who put up a prescription of this sort in Delphi. For it seems to me that this inscription was put up as if it were a greeting (prosrsis) from the god to those coming in instead of hail (chaire), as if hail were not correct, and they must not exhort (parakeleuesthai) one another to say this, but to say be sphrn. Thus the god addresses (prosagoreuei) the ones coming into the temple differently than do human beings. Such was the thinking of the one who put up the inscription, it seems to me, and he asserts that the god always says to those coming in nothing but be sphrn. But he says it in a quite riddling way (ainigmatdesteron), like a prophet (mantis). For know yourself (gnthi sauton) and be sphrn are the same, as the inscription and I assert. But perhaps someone might consider (oithei) them to be different, which happened, it seems to me, to the ones laying down the later prescriptions, Nothing too much (mden agan) and A pledge, and ruin is near (to engu para d at ). For they supposed know yourself to be advice or
10 163e. Critias entered the conversation to defend the notion that sphrosun was doing of ones own things (162c). When Socrates presses him for an explanation of this phrase, Critias claims that he means the doing of good things. 11 164c. Socrates gets Critias to admit that the doctor in treating his patient does not know whether his treatment will be beneficial or not. Socrates point is that the doctor knows how to cure the patients sickness, but he does not know whether it is good for the person to be healed. He thus seems to do good things without knowing they are good, at least according to Critias view. A similar argument can be seen in the Laches, 198d199d. 12 Cf. Tuckey, Platos Charmides, p. 24; Levine, Platos Charmides, pp.1723.

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counsel (sumbouln), not a greeting from the god to those coming in. And so, in order that they might put up (anatheien) counsels no less useful (chrsimous), they wrote these and put them up.13

This is a complex and difficult speech the meaning of which is not readily clear. But it will be seen that perhaps the biggest mistake in interpreting this speech has been attributing its content to Plato or Socrates.14 In what follows I hope to make clear that the view Critias is putting forward, consistent with what he has heretofore presented, cannot be Socrates (or Platos) opinion, but is rather a twisted perversion of it. To begin with, we should note the traditional link between gnthi sauton and sphrosun, which serves as the background for this move by Critias. Briefly, the traditional view emphasized the restraining value of sphrosun: living a sphrn life entailed shunning ones hubris, containing ones ambition, and having the self-knowledge to bring this about, i.e., knowing ones own human limitations.15 But Critias own version will twist this conventional view of sphrosun and self-knowledge. Rather than an exhortation to human beings to recognize their human limits and not attempt to transcend them, Critias view carries with it a doctrine of narcissistic self-benefit that will be shown to be more and more radical as the dialogue progresses. What emerges from this first speech are further suggestions that the self-knowledge Critias values is neither compatible with sphrosun, nor is it Socratic. The conception Critias is here putting forward is essentially connected to the definitions and account he has already presented, most notably that the good is defined by what is his own, and he is attempting to defend his own self-interested views in calling upon and departing from the Delphic oracles command to know thyself.16 Critias begins by agreeing with the authoritative Oracle, and begins to describe the intention of the person who put up the inscription. One expects to hear an explanation of the words that are written in Delphi, but this is not forthcoming from Critias. Rather, his first comment about the Delphic inscription is that Be sphrn is a greeting (prosrsis), and a more correct greeting than Hail! or Rejoice! (chaire). The god thus greets humans coming into the temple in a different way than human beings greet each other, and
164d165a. Hyland, The Virtue of Philosophy, pp. 8893, is especially guilty of this, which is surprising since he agrees that it is Critias conception of self-knowledge, and not Socrates, that is refuted in the dialogue. As Schmid points out, Friedlnder, Guthrie, and North also come close to the same error in their readings of the passage (Platos Charmides, p. 179, n. 32). 15 See Tuckey, Platos Charmides, pp. 910, 24; Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, p. 191. 16 Cf. Levine, Platos Charmides, p. 127: This is not then a new opinion. Rather it needs to be seen as a step toward the explication of the presuppositions of his thinking . . . It is that which stands beneath his thought.
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Critias asserts that the god is really exhorting (parakeleuesthai) human beings to greet each other similarly. This is strange. First of all, at a basic level, what does it mean to say that Be sphrn is a kind of greeting? Second, why is Critias talking about this particular greeting from the Delphic oracle? For, even though there is the traditional link, the Delphic oracle does not mention sphrosun, but only self-knowledge. As Critias continues, his speech takes up the latter question first, and later the first question becomes his theme. First, Critias claims that the inscription makes the connection between sphrosun and self-knowledge in a riddling (ainigmatdesteron) manner, because it is done, after all, by a prophet (mantis). This is his answer to the latter question: the inscription does not say Be sphrn, but gnthi sauton, because these are the same and because it is written by a riddler. As Critias continues explaining the riddling manner of the oracle, the traditional link between self-knowledge and sphrosun comes more into focus. For he mentions the two other inscriptions that were put up in Delphi: Nothing too much (mden agan) and A pledge, and ruin is near (to engu para d at).17 The appearance of these inscriptions alongside know yourself emphasizes the traditional meaning that the Oracular inscription had. For the latter two remind human beings to recognize their limits: their inability to understand, predict, or rule all that is around them.18 Both emphasize the importance of knowing ones place, and not transcending it. Know yourself thus carries with it a corresponding meaning. However, Critias now reveals that he is ready and willing to kick away the ground on which the traditional link between sphrosun and self-knowledge appeared to be standing, and assert his own correct understanding of the true Delphic inscription. In this way he begins to answer our first question: what does it mean to say that Be sphrn is a kind of greeting? Critias asserts that the latter dedicators misinterpreted know yourself as advice or counsel (sumbouln), rather than as a greeting. They consequently erroneously decided to put up advice that was no less useful (chrsimous). This is the sum of Critias response to our question, and though it is brief it does provide some illumination, if one considers the contrast between what is advice or counsel and what is a greeting. For instance, Levine claims that, Counsel is above all prescriptive, value laden, advice. As such it proposes, in the case of deficiency, a change in ones own or anothers doing or thinking, in oneself and in ones way of life.19
165a. Nothing too much emphasizes the moderation required in our actions, while A pledge, and ruin is near indicates that promises only bring trouble to human beings, for mere mortals do not really know if they can keep them. 19 Levine, Platos Charmides, p. 175.
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Seen in this light, it is clear that a greeting is unlike counsel in all these ways. It is not value laden, prescriptive, or aiming at change in the other. Advice such as nothing too much holds one to a higher standard, but with regards to a greeting this is just not so. A greeting such as Hail! or Rejoice! (Chaire) seems to be value free, and imposes no view of what is good and bad on the other.20 Thus self-knowledge or sphrosun are now only tenuously connected to, if not wholly separated from, knowledge of the good. In addition to this, the content of a greeting seems to be a matter of pure convention. Whether one says Hail or Cheers or Ciao is a phenomenon that seems to carry no significant content, philosophically speaking, and is dependent on the customs in ones community, customs that are human, all too human. It is here that we further see Critias radical view come to light. For his words ultimately bring the god down to a human level: he is rejecting the notion that the superior god may be giving mere humans advice, and is asserting that the gods are really participating in a value-free practice that humans engage in with one another.21 At the same time, however, Critias is asserting that few human beings have actually understood this correctly, and that he himself is one of those who sees into the mysteries, who is really at the level of the so-called god. True self-knowledge and sphrosun are thus only in the domain of the elite: it seems only the superior can be truly sound in mind.22 So at the same time that Critias has brought the god down from the heavens, he has elevated himself and others like him to the super-human. In sum, Critias description of the greeting know yourself thus seems to be tied up with three other beliefs:
1) Sphrosun is somehow value-free, for the greeting from the gods is not advice.

20 Interestingly, chaire is connected to charm (battle), which is at the root of Charmides own name (see Liddell, Scott, and Jones, s.v. chaire). Critias is here again trying desperately to save face by defending and praising the youth he is responsible for, not from good intentions, but like a pathologically narcissistic parent, or worse. It may seem that rejoice! is not a value-free imperative, for rejoicing seems to be a good thing. Yet this would still be reading the word as advice, which Critias explicitly denies. 21 This has been hinted at since the beginning of Critias speech, with his emphasis on the dedicator who put up the inscriptions. The human source of the inscription is highlighted, while the intention of the god is only mentioned secondarily. Schmid, The Socratic Ideal, p. 179 n. 35, points out that Critias says the inscription was put up as if it were from the god, and (p.180, n. 36) that he repeatedly calls his account his opinion (dokei moi). This not only emphasizes the human element of the speech, but stresses Critias vision of himself as a knower (cf. 165a, where Critias pairs the dedicator with himself; see Levine, Platos Charmides, p. 312, n. 25). Of course, as Schmid points out, calling it an opinion signals its low epistemic status even if Critias is thereby trying to shield himself from refutation. 22 According to Critias, only one who is able to decode the riddle of the Oracle can be sphrn, otherwise one does not know that self-knowledge and sphrosun are the same.

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Sphrosun belongs only to the superior, godlike human beings who can decipher this riddle of the gods. Finally, these superior, godlike human beings replace the gods themselves, for there is no longer any difference between the practices of human beings and gods.23

The picture yielded by these beliefs puts on display Critias doctrine of narcissistic self-benefit. As Schmid sums it up, Critias views are the amoral human praise of self-certainty, not the divine moral counsel of self-restraint. Levine suggests that Know Thyself becomes be thyself, do your own affairs without restriction. It is the lions way: do what you want . . . without regard to bad or good other than ones own advantage . . . 24 It is thus surprising that this passage has not aroused more suspicion. As I mentioned above, commentators have identified, or come close to identifying, the speech Critias makes here with Platos own opinion.25 In fact, Critias presentation, at the very least, forces the reader instead to ask the question: Is Critias view of the Delphic oracle, and thereby of self-knowledge, really identical to Socrates own view? And my argument implies that the answer to this question must be a resounding no. Critias defines the good by what he is and what he does. When Critias first defended the notion of sphrosun as doing ones own things, he made clear that all harmful things are the affairs of others (ta blabera panta allotria),26 while only the beneficial things are ones own. It might be tempting to hear Critias as saying that the good is his guiding principle, and that what is ones own is defined in reference to this ideal. But precisely the reverse is true: throughout the dialogue Critias confirms that it is ones own benefit, even though this is not clearly defined, that is the standard for good and bad. Hyland compares Critias position to that of Thrasymachus: One is sphrn who does only that which is useful to oneself; anything that is harmful is someone elses business, and so sphrosun as doing ones own business is to be understood as doing only what is useful to oneself.27 But Socrates showed that this definition, the doing of good things, failed as well insofar as it seemed that the sphrn individual could
See Schmid, The Socratic Ideal, pp. 379; Levine, Platos Charmides, pp. 1757. Schmid, The Socratic Ideal, p. 38; Levine, Platos Charmides, p. 176. 25 The cause for this seems to be a projection of a Socratic interpretation of know thyself into the anti-Socratic speech. For instance, Hyland makes the striking claim that Critias characterization of know yourself as a greeting is a well-chosen image for the kind of responsive openness to things which . . . [is] the interrogative stance of philosophy (The Virtue of Philosophy, p. 90). Levine, in his review of Hylands book, responds rightly: Critias is anything but open . . . [T]he conclusion of this part of the discussion is Critias exposure of his own deep-seated incapacity for such openness at 169cd. See Levine, The Tyranny of Scholarship, Ancient Philosophy, 4 (1984), p. 69. 26 163c. 27 Hyland, The Virtue of Philosophy, p. 83. Cf. Schmid, The Socratic Ideal, p. 34: Critias underlying thought is clear: the true meaning of sphrosun does not consist in
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do good things without self-knowledge, i.e., without knowing his own things. Socrates thus implied that Critias himself may not in fact know what is really good for him. Perhaps Kant would describe the impasse this way: doing ones own things without knowing the good is empty, while doing the good without knowing ones own things is blind.28 The suggestion Socrates seems to be making throughout is that knowledge of the self, qua human being, is somehow inseparable from knowledge of the good. But how is self-knowledge related to knowledge of the good? This is the question raised for those listening in on this conversation, while Critias either misses or refuses to see it. Socrates will thus attempt to get clearer on the matter and in doing so he will show that Critias views of self-knowledge and the good continue to be problematic, and it is these views that turn out to be incoherent by the end of the dialogue. This should not be surprising, for we have already been led to believe that Critias supposes that self-knowledge is value-free. Critias may believe that the essence of sphrosun is self-knowledge, but his understanding of self-knowledge is so perverted, that ultimately it will be impossible for him to relate self-knowledge to the good at all, which is exactly what happens in the final interchange with Socrates. III Socrates Response in the Charmides Socrates makes no comment about Critias description of the Delphic Oracle. Instead, he begins his response to Critias with a remarkably brief question. He says, If knowing or recognizing (gignskein) is what sphrosun is, then clearly it is some science (epistm), and an epistm of something (tinos). Or not?29 Critias agrees immediately. But what does Critias believe he is affirming when he affirmatively answers Socrates question? Given what I have already argued, we should suspect that Critias agreement stems from his underlying beliefs about sphrosun and the good, beliefs that are tied up to his narcissistic views. But to see this more clearly, consider why Socrates is so insistent on getting at the of what? (tinos) regarding this epistm. Critias, in removing the phrase know yourself or Be sphrn from the realm of advice or counsel, has narrowed the notion of self-knowledge considerably. The action of knowing oneself, according to him, does not aim to bring about change at all as
making or even doing what is beautiful; it rather focuses on the idea of procuring benefit for oneself and avoiding all harm as alien . . . Critias identifies the good with what benefits himself, in the sense of a calculating, narrow egoism. 28 Cf. Kants comment about intuitions and concepts: Critique of Pure Reason, B 76. 29 165c. This is the first mention of epistm in the argument. This move from gnsis to epistm has been one of the largest centres of controversy among readers of the dialogue. In my view, this controversy is misguided, but for brevitys sake and since it is not crucial for my current argument, I will not discuss it here.

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Levine says, it is paradoxically a counsel-free exhortation30 and so the question emerges: is such knowledge really possible? If so, what is it for?31 By first asking him of what this knowledge is, Socrates is attempting to show Critias that his answer to these questions will amount to an incoherent mess. One possible answer to the question, What is the object of this epistm? would be the self or the soul. In fact, this seems to be what Critias is suggesting when he first mentions oneself at 165c.32 This is a pivotal moment in the dialogue from which the conversation could take a quite different turn from the one it actually does. For Socrates and Critias could at this point begin discussing more explicitly the nature of the self, and we would wind up with a conversation similar to the one that occurs in Alcibiades I.33 But Critias chooses to respond to Socrates request for a beautiful work by claiming that sphrosun is not like the other epistmai: while all other epistmai are of something else, but not of themselves, this one alone is an epistm of all the others and of itself.34 If we consider carefully what is implied in this definition, then we will see that it rests on Critias narcissistic doctrine. To possess an epistm which has all others and itself as its object, is to have a knowledge that is both all-inclusive and reflexive. It has generality and self-reference. If possible, the person who actually possessed this would seem to know all there is to know. Sphrosun, as defined by Critias, seems to be a divine wisdom. By now, it should not be surprising that Critias promotes such a conception, for this is explicitly the message of his speech about the Oracle.35 And the final culmination of this divine wisdom is manifested
Levine, Platos Charmides, p. 181. These are precisely the extended challenges Socrates puts to Critias in the concluding arguments of the dialogue. 32 See Levine, Platos Charmides, p. 181: . . . then the further questioning would center upon this oneself, what it is, or the question of the whole man (p. 181). Cf. Schmid, The Socratic Ideal, p. 44. 33 Annas claims that this does not happen in the Charmides because there is a confusion between self-knowledge and knowledge of knowledge. See her Self-Knowledge in Early Plato, in Platonic Investigations, ed. Dominic OMeara (Washington, D. C., 1985), pp. 1356. I do not think this is the whole story, and I argue that it is a mistake to suppose that the confusion here is Socrates (or Platos) as opposed to Critias. The conversation about self-knowledge in the Charmides looks the way it does because it emerges in the context of discussing sphrosun, and because of Critias attempt to link self-knowledge with sphrosun, while having a flawed understanding of both. It may be Socrates who takes the conversation in a certain direction, but Critias goes along with him and produces the conceptions that Annas calls confused. 34 166c. We should be wondering by now whether this doctrine too has its source in Socrates, and whether Critias understanding of it twists the original. Cf. Levine, Platos Charmides, p. 194 and Schmid, The Socratic Ideal, p. 50. 35 In his Delphic speech Critias showed himself willing to bring the god down and elevate himself. The one with sphrosun would not be a lowly prostitute or fish-salt
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when Socrates and Critias construct a city in which the ruler possessing sphrosun has knowledge of all things past, present, and future.36 In sum, this super-human capacity is the main element of Critias vision of human excellence: Critias views of self-knowledge and the good are tied to his desire to break his human bonds and be a god. It is clear by now that this view is diametrically opposed to a traditional understanding of Critias authoritative witness, the Delphic Oracle. I shall now argue that it is also incompatible with the alternative Socrates endorses. In response to Critias reflexive view, Socrates asks a small question of no small import: Therefore . . . [is] sphrosun also a knowledge (epistm) of ignorance (anepistmosuns), if indeed it is of knowledge (epistms)?37 Socrates question here strongly echoes his description of his own famous claim of knowledge of ignorance in the Apology.38 He thus finally prepares us for a discussion of the two conceptions of sphrosun: the Critian and the Socratic. And though Critias understanding of sphrosun will be shown to be untenable, perhaps the Socratic view will escape refutation.39
seller, occupations earlier degraded by Critias, but the one with the knowledge that somehow stands above all these others, and because of its reflexivity, needs nothing beyond itself. It is the ruling science that coordinates all others to serve its proper ends. This view combines the doctrine of self-interest with an all powerful knowledge. Far from coming out of nowhere, this is the logical outcome the ultimate culmination of the views that Critias has expressed so far (Cf. Schmid, The Socratic Ideal, p. 48.). Accordingly, the interpretations of both Stalley and Tuozzo may need to be tweaked. Stalley claims an epistm of knowledge in general is needed because it just is general (Cf. Ion 531a533c) and because of the phenomenon of examining others. See R. Stalley, Sphrosun in the Charmides, in Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides, p. 271. Tuozzos explanation for why sphrosun knows itself and the other knowledge is that if we want to know if the other knowledges are beneficial, we need the one that is the standard for benefit. See T. Tuozzo, Greetings from Apollo: Charmides 164c165b, Epistle III, and the Structure of the Charmides, in Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides, p. 305. Both these claims may be right, but neither explains why it is the Critian conception of a ruling science and not the Socratic conception of knowledge of ignorance which addresses these problems. That is, sphrosun will turn out to be vitally connected with the knowledge of limits in a way that Critias definition, but not Socrates, fails to be. It is this vital Socratic connection that is the answer that Tuozzo and Stalley call for, or so I hope to argue. 36 See 173b174a. 37 166e. 38 21d. This by itself suggests that knowledge of ignorance cannot be an impossible paradox. Consistent with Socrates other uses in the Charmides, the passage in the Apology does not mention epistm but eidenai. Accordingly, at 167a Socrates replaces anepistmosun with ha m oiden. 39 In addition, notice the way Socrates induces Critias to bring self-knowledge into the discussion. Socrates had asked about the ignorance, rather than knowledge, of the individual who does good things (164a). Critias leaves ignorance far behind in his definition, which culminates in the all-encompassing knowledge of all things past, present, and

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A. PICHANICK IV Sphrosun as Socratic Self-Knowledge

Socrates addition of knowledge of ignorance leads to a completely different account of sphrosun. In his view, the sphrn individual is open to what is beyond his limits, in that there is some kind of recognition of what is beyond his knowledge. This calls for a very different orientation to the good, for the knowledge of limits removes the individual from the centre of his world. Rather than being elevated to the godlike, as Critias suggests, human beings now properly stand in that in-between realm, the realm between beast and god. Consequently, the good is not gobbled up by ones own things, as Critias would have it. For it is the neglect of the knowledge of ignorance, the elevation of ourselves to the gods, that seems to carry with it a confusion between ones own and the good.40 In this connection, it is crucial to consider Socrates description of the Delphic Oracle in the Apology, which will further reveal how different the Socratic understanding is from that of Critias. In the Apology, Socrates begins his speech about the Delphic Oracle by suggesting that someone in the audience might rightly ask, But Socrates, what is your occupation or task (pragma)? 41 Socrates raises this question after he has begun to debunk the slanders against him that ultimately have brought him to trial. It is against this background that he calls upon the Oracle at Delphi as his authoritative witness. For he uses the words of the oracle to explain the cause of his slandered reputation:
What has caused my reputation (onoma) is nothing other than a certain kind of wisdom (sophian). What kind of wisdom is this? Perhaps it is human wisdom (anthropin sophia). For perhaps I may be wise in this wisdom, while those whom I mentioned just now are wise in something greater than human wisdom, or I do not know what to say, for I do not understand it (epistamai).42

From the outset Socrates emphasizes that the difference between his own wisdom and that claimed by those he examines is the difference between the human and what is beyond the human. While his wisdom is confined to the limits of human beings, theirs, if it is true wisdom, somehow transcends these limits, a state of affairs that seems unintelligible. For as Socrates
future. For Critias it seems there are no limits to this wisdom he calls sphrosun, a fact he does not realize will cause him trouble when he agrees to Socrates reintroduction of ignorance here, which already seems to be incompatible with Critias own image of sphrosun. 40 Cf. Levine, Platos Charmides, pp. 2101, 2156, 2201, 224; Schmid, The Socratic Ideal, pp. 567. 41 Apology, 20c. 42 20d20e.

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interprets the Delphic oracle, the highest wisdom human beings are capable of achieving is defined by these limits and does not reach beyond them. Socrates explains that Chaerephon, the manic but well-liked companion of Socrates who also happens to be present for the discussion in the Charmides, was the individual who found out from the Delphic Oracle that no one is wiser than Socrates.43 Socrates response is one of utter incredulity. Echoing the passages in the Charmides, he says that the god is riddling (ainittetai), for he knows (xunoida) that he is wise with respect to nothing either great or small.44 Socrates assumes the god told a riddle, for the only alternative is that he is lying. This he says is impossible for him: whereas Critias seemed to suggest that the god bestowed upon humans a value free exhortation, Socrates here makes us wonder if this too might be absurd behaviour for the god. Socrates was perplexed, in aporia, for a long time and then began an investigation that became his way of life, his well-known pragma. Going to people who had a reputation for wisdom, he attempted to show that there must be some human beings wiser than Socrates. But each time he did so he discovered that what the god said was true. For though each person appeared wise to many people and especially himself, he was not.45 Socrates describes the difference between himself and his interlocutors again in terms of his recognition of limits:
So I withdrew and thought to myself, I am wiser than this man, for it is likely that neither of us knows anything beautiful and good (kalon kagathon), but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, but I, when I do not know, do not think I do either. I seem then to be wiser than this man in just this little thing: that what I do not know (oida) I do not think I know either.46

This image is in stark contrast to Critias picture of the Delphic oracle. Critias concluded that the ideal human life was that of a self-certain knowledge of all things past, present, and future, in the service of ones own narrow desires and interests. But this is precisely the knowledge a god would have, and it is beyond the ken of human wisdom. Socrates confirms this in saying that the result, probably, of his investigation is that the god is wise and that his oracular response meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing . . . and that This man among you, human beings, is wisest who, like Socrates, understands (egnken) that in truth he is worth nothing in respect to wisdom.47
43 21a. Not only is Chaerephon present in both the Charmides and the Apology, but Socrates description of him as manikos (crazy) is interesting. Manikos seems to be the very opposite of sphrn. 44 21b. Critias also said the Oracle was a riddle, clearly invoking Socrates description here. But the meanings of the two riddles are not identical. 45 21c. 46 21de. 47 23b.

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Socrates proclamations of ignorance thus, even if they are ironic, contain what he thinks to be a significant insight into the human soul. The proper understanding of human wisdom and its difference from the wisdom of the gods leads one to the highest wisdom that mere human beings can reach. This is the recognition of limits which seems to come out of Socrates small addition in the Charmides, knowledge of ignorance. Critias seeks however to make sphrosun and human wisdom something greater than it is.48 He desires to replace the human wisdom that recognizes its very human limits with the wisdom of the gods. In doing so, not only has he misunderstood the nature and benefit of sphrosun, he has shown that his own self-knowledge is an illusion, a fantasy. As Socrates implies, humans have Critian self-knowledge only in their dreams.49 The waking reality of the tyrants view of self-knowledge and the good is incoherent: the most divine wisdom is beyond human reach. Critias doctrine is not only impious and hubristic, but must ultimately be false, in its failure to recognize the essentially limited nature of human beings. But while Critias vision dwindles into absurd fantasy, the Socratic conception of sphrosun may be able to wake us from this tyrannical nightmare. Socrates is showing us that it is in following his path, not Critias, that we will achieve authentic self-knowledge and true knowledge of the good. V Conclusion The two ideals on display thus seem to present opposed visions not only of the nature of sphrosun, but of human nature and, ultimately, the best human life. While the Critian standpoint transcends our human limits and in so doing leads to an incoherent mess, the Socratic view starts from a proper understanding of human beings and thus escapes the refutation launched against the Critian view. In this paper I have not shown the details of Socrates refutation, but I have spelled out the discrete elements in each view, and how they are diametrically opposed to one another. When one sees this one is left with questions the dialogue raises (but does not answer) about the nature of the Socratic conception of self-knowledge. For though the speech in the Apology supplies helpful details to understand the exchange in the Charmides, it remains somewhat unclear how to spell out the nature of knowledge of ignorance: to begin with, ignorance is only a lack, and so we are trying to define something negative.50 How is this to be accomplished? And if we can spell out the nature of Socrates conception of knowledge of ignorance, how do we relate it to Critias conception? As has
48 49 50

Charmides, 172c. 173a ff. Cf. Levine, Platos Charmides, p. 209, p. 318, n. 60.

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become clear, the two images are incompatible with one another. Yet Critias hinted that he has generated his view from what he takes to be Socrates own teaching. If the Critian conception is a twisted perversion of the Socratic one, how do we properly understand their deep connection? This question is in the background as Socrates now issues challenges to Critias. To be brief: Socrates argument in the remainder of the dialogue has three parts. First, he reveals that Critias cannot demonstrate the possibility, or the likelihood, of a knowledge of itself and all other knowledges.51 Second, even if such a knowledge does exist, Socrates shows Critias that it cannot give us knowledge of what we do and do not know, but only knowledge that we do and do not know.52 Finally, Socrates gets Critias to admit that even if this knowledge could get beyond knowledge-that to knowledge-what, it would not thereby be knowledge of the good.53 In sum, Critias view of sphrosun leads to the troubling conclusion that it would be of no benefit to us. But I believe Socrates own view (unlike that of Critias) survives these challenges, for they are directed at Critias notion of the ruling science, not at the Socratic notion of knowledge of ignorance. It is Critias peculiar mix of universality and self-reference and his omission of the awareness of limits that leads to such absurd results. If this is so, then the Socratic alternative will tie together self-knowledge and knowledge of the good in a way that makes clear its possibility and benefit to human beings. This is the task that remains to be done for the careful observers, and it is not an easy one. For the enigmatic nature of Socrates alternative clearly lends itself to misunderstanding and misuse, as Critias himself has shown. But in presenting this drama Plato has made those with a philosophical nature more aware of the illusions and self-ignorance of the tyrant, lest we ever lose our way. The stakes here are high, for by the end of the dialogue it becomes clear that the conflict between the philosopher and the tyrant is tied to a broader tension the tension between the practices of philosophy and politics, and whether it is possible for the city to be guided by the wisdom of the philosopher.54 Thus it is crucial to continue with the task or pragma of understanding
167b170c. 170d. The problem Critias confronts is this: Someone with a knowledge of itself and all other knowledges, if he examines another person, will only be able to tell this: that this person knows something. But he will not ever be able to say what it is that the person knows! This, of course, is patently absurd, and Critias conception of knowledge is therefore deeply flawed. 53 173e174c. This argument brings the dialogue full circle, for Socrates had earlier showed Critias that his notion, the doing of good things did not include self-knowledge. Now, Critias is forced to see that his notion of self-knowledge does not include the good. 54 The dialogue ends ominously, with Critias and Charmides threatening Socrates with force. It seems the two tyrants have not learned much, after all. This image should be juxtaposed with the ending of Socrates life, and the tension remains a central issue for
52 51

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the philosophers authentic self-knowledge. I believe this remains a question for Plato in the Charmides and the later Platonic dialogues, and may even require venturing into philosophical, political, and psychological territory unexplored by Socrates himself, even if it must at the same time incorporate Socrates insights into the limits and possibilities of human beings.55 Alan Pichanick THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Plato in his later dialogues, most notably in the Republic and the Laws. Cf. Notomi, Critias and the Origin of Platos Political Philosophy, pp. 2489. 55 For comments on this draft, I am grateful to Jonathan Lear, Rachel Barney, Richard Kraut, Martha Nussbaum, Stewart Umphrey, and Justin Tiwald. Any lacunae that remain are purely my own.