[

1. ADMISSIONS GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE

]
EXCEPTIONS

A. Offer of compromise Rule 130, Sec. 27 Section 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromised by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to lesser offense, is not admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer. An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury. (24a) B. By third party (Res inter alios acta [Part 1]) Rule 130, Sec. 28 Section 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. PEOPLE V. RAQUEL The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar. Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal. The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

Rule 130 Section 26 Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. Rule 130 Section 31 and 32 Section 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. (28) Section 32. Admission by silence. An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him. (23a) PEOPLE v. MENDOZA It is basic precept that relationship per se of a witness with the victim does not necessarily mean he is biased. The Court finds improbable and contrary to human experience accusedappellant's claim that Alipio testified for no other purpose but revenge. It was not shown that Alipio was actuated by improper motive, thus, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. The testimony of Charmaine that she saw accused-appellant, her father, hide a gun under his bed, leads us to believe that accused-appellant killed his own wife. Accused-appellant cannot escape criminal liability on his theory that when Charmaine testified for the prosecution, her testimony did not appear to be a naturally spontaneous narration, but rather evidently a coached one. According to him, this theory was bolstered when she cried and suddenly, embraced accused-appellant in public view. On the contrary, the fact that Charmaine cried during her testimony is mute evidence of her credibility, this, being in accord with human behavior and nature. It must have been a most traumatic and painful experience for her, at a very tender age, to testify in court against her own father whom she loves and respects as shown by the act of embracing him.

Article III, Section 12 (pars. 1, 2 and 3) of the Constitution 1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

2. 3.

C. By Conspirator (Res inter alios acta [Part II])

]
PEOPLE V. AGUSTIN Facts: Accused Wilfredo "Sonny" Quiao, an alleged former military agent or "asset" who had been picked up in La Union by the police authorities, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman in the fatal shooting of Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco. He implicated several others. Appellant Jaime Agustin, narrated therein his knowledge of the shooting of Dr. Bayquen and revealed the identities of his cohorts in the crime. In a confrontation two days later, he identified Quiao as "Sony," the triggerman. After a careful study of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R and a painstaking evaluation of the evidence, we find this appeal to be impressed with merit. Indeed, the extrajudicial admission not extrajudicial confession of the appellant, which is the only evidence of the prosecution linking him to the commission of the crime charged, is wholly inadmissible because it was taken in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. We also see in these cases a blatant disregard of the appellant's right under Section 2 of Article III when he was unlawfully arrested. Before we go any further, it should be pointed out that, contrary to the pronouncement of the trial court and the characterization given by the appellant himself, the assailed extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicialconfession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. We take this opportunity to once more distinguish one from the other. Sections 26 and 33, rule 30 of the Rules of Court 18 clearly show such a distinction. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 19 Wharton 20 defines a confession as follows: A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, and admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. We have examined the assailed extrajudicial statement of the appellant, and we are satisfied that nothing therein indicates that he expressly acknowledged his guilt; he merely admitted some facts or circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to authorize a conviction and which can only tend to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibly in evidence under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph 3 thereof expressly refers to both confession and admission. Thus: (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. PEOPLE V.ARINQUE It is incorrect for appellants to make it appear that they were convicted solely on the basis of their extrajudicial confessions. In truth, the trial court disregarded their confessions after

Section 30. Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. D. By co-partner or agent Section 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party. 2. CONFESSIONS Rule 130, Sec. 33 Section 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. Rule 133, Sec. 3 Section 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. PEOPLE V. VALLA More importantly, the declaration of appellant acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him under Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Note that his extrajudicial confession is corroborated by the corpus delicti as required by Section 3 of Rule 133. The Rules do not require that all the elements of the crime must be clearly established by evidence independent of the confession. Corpus delicti only means that there should be some concrete evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession. In this case, the fact of the crime was sufficiently proven through the testimonies by witnesses such as Myra Pines, who heard the cries of the victim, and the other members of the search party who found the body of the victim, and witnessed the confession of the appellant, as well as documentary evidence presented during trial such as the medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "D") attesting that the victim had been raped and killed. The statement of the accused asking for forgiveness and even offering his own daughter in exchange for his crime[18] may also be regarded as part of the res gestae under Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Res gestae means "things done".[19] There are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence, in this case the discovery of the body of the victim; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood, in this case, appellant had begged for forgiveness immediately after the body was found; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances, in this case, appellant had admitted to raping and killing the victim, and even "offered" his daughter in exchange for the victim.

]
investigated, it is not enough that the subject be informed of that right; he should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of the same and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. If he decides not to retain a counsel of his choice or avail himself of one to be provided him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer. Even assuming that in the instant case the extrajudicial confession made by appellant spoke the truth and was not extracted through violence or intimidation, still the failure of the police investigators to inform appellant of his right to remain silent, coupled with the denial of his right to a competent and independent counsel or the absence of effective legal assistance when he waived his constitutional rights, rendered the confession inadmissible under Sec. 12, par. 3, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution was crafted and ordained at a historic time when our nation was reeling from ghastly memories of atrocities, excesses and outright violations o f our peoples rights to life, liberty and property. Hence, our bill of rights was worded to emphasize the sanctity of human liberty and specifically to protect persons undergoing custodial investigations from ignorant, overzealous and/or incompetent peace officers. The Constitution so dearly values freedom and voluntariness that, inter alia, it unequivocally guarantees a person undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense not only the services of counsel, but a lawyer who is not merely (a) competent but also (b) independent and (c) preferably of his own choice as well. PEOPLE V. LORENZO Lorenzos statement: Im surrendering because I killed my husband Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Note that what must be corroborated is the extrajudicial confession and not the testimony of the person to whom the confession is made, and the corroborative evidence required is not the testimony of another person who heard the confession but the evidence of corpus delicti. Except when expressly required by law, 18 the testimony of a single person, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. 19 In determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. 20

finding that they were extracted without the assistance of a competent and independent counsel.[27] But, even without their confessions, the trial court found enough evidence to convict them. His confession to Montederamos, a private person, is admissible against him, not having been extracted under custodial investigation PEOPLE V. SUAREZ The lower court treated the confessions of the three accused as interlocking confessions sufficient to corroborate and bolster the truth of each accused's own incriminating statements. This doctrine of interlocking confessions has been accepted and recognized in numerous decisions of this Court as an exception to the res inter alios acta rule and the hearsay rule. [26] Reyes' confession is thus admissible against Lara to show the probable involvement of the latter in the perpetration of the crime. Where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by an accused co-conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against him. Once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. [30] The burden is on the accused to destroy this presumption. [31] A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency. Extrajudicial confessions independently made without collusion, almost identical with each other in their essential details which could have been known only to the declarants, and corroborated by other evidence against the person or persons implicated to show the probability of the latter' s actual participation in the commission of the crime, are thus impressed with features of voluntariness in their execution. [34] Also, the failure of an accused to complain to the swearing officer [35] or to file charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests voluntariness in the execution of the confession.

PEOPLE V. SALCEDO A voluntary extrajudicial confession of an accused, even where it reflects the truth, if given without the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver thereof, is inadmissible in evidence against him. Under Sec. 12, par. 1, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The right to be informed carries with it the correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is being conveyed. Since what is sought to be attained is comprehension, the degree of explanation required will vary and depend on education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person being investigated. In further ensuring the right to counsel of the person being

As to the corroborative evidence of corpus delicti, the appellant herself does not question its presence because she knows that it has been overwhelmingly established in this case. Corpus delicti is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was committed. It is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for example a man has died or a building has been burned, and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the act. Section 3, Rule 133 of

]
no probative value[24]. To repeat, the failure of the defense to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay, does not give such evidence any probative value. And herein lies another fatal error committed by the trial court because, without Maribel Diong and Hilda Dolera being called to the witness stand to affirm the contents of their sworn statements, the allegations therein are necessarily hearsay[33] and therefore inadmissible. Article III, Section 12 (pars. 1, 2 and 3) of the Constitution -supra C. PREVIOUS CONDUCT Rule 130, Section 36 Section 34. Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge; identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. Child Witness Rule, Sec. 30 Section 30. Sexual abuse shield rule. (a) Inadmissible evidence. - The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding involving alleged child sexual abuse: (1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and (2) Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged victim. (b) Exception. - Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence shall be admissible. A party intending to offer such evidence must:

the Rules of Court does not mean that every element of the crime charged must be clearly established by independent evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that there should be some evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession. Otherwise, the utility of the confession as a species of proof would vanish if it were necessary, in addition to the confession, to adduce other evidence sufficient to justify conviction independently of such confession. Otherwise stated, the other evidence need not, independently of the confession, establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. Since the corroboration of Isabelo Liban's testimony was unnecessary, we need not discuss its intrinsic merits, more especially on its alleged inconsistencies vis-a-vis the testimony of Eclipse which inconsistencies we, nevertheless, find to be on minor matters. Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses; on the contrary, they even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. We do not, however, agree with the trial court's characterization of the appellant's declaration that she killed her husband as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. In a confession. there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. A confession is defined as an acknowledgment of guilt of the crime charged or of the facts which constitute the crime; but it is an admission and not a confession if the facts acknowledged raise an inference of guilt only when considered with other facts. A confession is an acknowledgment in express words, by the accused in a criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of some essential part of it. Whether it was a confession or an admission, it was admissible against the appellant and, having been duly proved, together with the other facts and circumstances, the burden of the evidence was shifted to the appellant to disprove, by strong evidence, that she made the admission or, admitting it, to prove that she was not guilty of killing her husband.

PEOPLE V. FRANCO With respect to the testimony of Pat. Nestor Napao-it,[21] there is no dispute that his testimony on the conduct of the investigation is admissible in evidence because he has personal knowledge of the same.[22] However, his testimony on appellant's alleged separate confession/admission to Hilda Dolera and Maribel Diong, which the trial court invariably considered in its decision as establishing the truth of the facts asserted therein, is hearsay. In the terse language of Woodroffes, said testimony is "the evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others"[23] And whether objected to or not, as in this case, said testimony has (1) File a written motion at least fifteen (15) days before trial, specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered, unless the court, for good cause, requires a different time for filing or permits filing during trial; and (2) Serve the motion on all parties and the guardian ad litem at least three (3) days before the hearing of the motion.

]
veracity of affiants allegations.[5] An affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented for cross-examination. PEOPLE V. SILVESTRE As regards the affidavit of Bernadette Matias, the same is hearsay as she was not presented as witness. The appellees admission only referred to the fact that the statement was made by Matias. In People vs. Gaddi,[31] it was ruled that when testimony is presented to establish not the truth but the tenor of the statement or the fact that the statement was made, it is not hearsay.[32] The lower court was therefore correct in admitting only the existence and contents and not the truth or veracity of the unsworn statement of Matias as an independently relevant statement[33] This statement cannot be used to es tablish the veracity of it; it would be hearsay as Matias was not presented in Court. PEOPLE V. PANIDA A sworn statement is hearsay only when the affiant is not presented in court. PEOPLE V. SILVANO In the case at bench, there is no dispute that appellant is the father of the victim, a fact which he even admitted during his direct examination[103] and is further corroborated by the victims duly certified Certificate of Live Birth which indicates appellant as her father.[104] Moreover, such admission is sufficient to establish paternity without further proof. This is so because, acts and declarations about pedigree which includes relationship is an admissible hearsay under the rules.[105] Besides, appellant interposed no objection to the victims testimony when she positively identified the former as the one who raped her on January 23, 1996. [106] Such relationship of father-daughter in rape cases is considered an aggravating circumstance under Article 15 of the RPC. The testimony of a person as to her age is admissible although another hearsay, though she can have no personal knowledge of the date of her birth, as all knowledge as to ones age is acquired from whatever is told by the parents or relative[115] and such testimony constitute an assertion of family tradition.

Before admitting such evidence, the court must conduct a hearing in chambers and afford the child, his guardian ad litem, the parties, and their counsel a right to attend and be heard. The motion and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal and protected by a protective order set forth in section 31(b). The child shall not be required to testify at the hearing in chambers except with his consent. ENRIQUEZ V. PEOPLE ENRIQUEZ was Municipal Treasurer, while ESPINOSA was Administrative Officer and acting Municipal Cashier of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig (Pasig Treasury). Enriquezs accounts contained a shortage amounting to P3,178,777.41, which shortage was mainly due to a dishonored China Banking Check The Sandiganbayan clearly erred in inferring from the incident that transpired on September 23, 1987, wherein ESPINOSA deposited checks with the Quezon City Treasury for which she was issued an official receipt in the amount of P3,583,084.18, but which she later corrected to conform to the actual amount of the checks as P583,084.18, as indicative of a modus operandi to cover-up a shortage in the amount of P3 million. ESPINOSA has explained, and her testimony remains unrebutted, that she requested that the correction be made because she discovered 15 minutes after she was issued the official receipt that the checks and the accompanying statements of checks[17] had not been endorsed and signed by ENRIQUEZ. Moreover, the general rule is that the law will not consider evidence that a person has done a certain act at a particular time as probative of a contention that he has done a similar act at another time. This is the rule of res inter alios acta[18] found in Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as amended.[19] Said incident could not even sufficiently establish a plan or scheme between ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA to cover-up a shortage that has never been proven. Oldmiso D. Hearsay and its exceptions, independently relevant statements 1. General Rule Rule 130, Sec. 36 Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. FERIA V. CA Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of Peoples Journal dated January 18, 1985, page 2,[20] issued by the National Library, containing a short news article that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed"[21] and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or not,[22] unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated. VALENZUELA V. BELOSILLO The affidavit of Meriam Colapo cannot be given credence and is inadmissible without the said affiant placed on the witness stand to give the respondent Judge an opportunity to test the

Independently Relevant Statement Independently relevant statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply, hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. When Evangelista said that Rubia told her that it was petitioner who requested that the check be exchanged for cash, Evangelista was only testifying that Rubia told her of such request . It does not establish the truth or veracity of Rubias statement since it is merely hearsay, as Rubia was not presented in court to attest to such utterance. On this score, evidence regarding the making of such independently relevant statement is not secondary but primary, because the

statement itself may (a) constitute a fact in issue or (2) be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact.[20] Indeed, independent of its truth or falsehood, Evangelistas statement is relevant to the issues of petitioners falsehood, his authorship of the check in question and consequently, his culpability of the offense charged. Nevertheless, we hold that Rosa Solartes testimony on what her father told her constitutes independent relevant statements distinct from hearsay, and are thus admissible not as to the veracity thereof, but as proof of the fact that they had been uttered. 2. Exceptions to Hearsay

]
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand. The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief. c. Re-direct/re-cross examination Rule 132, Sec. 7 and 8 Section 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. After the cross-examination of the witness has been concluded, he may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain or supplement his answers given during the cross-examination. On re-direct-examination, questions on matters not dealt with during the cross-examination, may be allowed by the court in its discretion. (12) Section 8. Re-cross-examination. Upon the conclusion of the re-direct examination, the adverse party may re-cross-examine the witness on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and also on such other matters as may be allowed by the court in its discretion. 3. Recall of witnesses Rule 132, Section 9 Section 9. Recalling witness. After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require. (

Cf Rule 30, Sec. 5; Rule 119, Sec. 11 (on rebuttal witnesses) Sec. 5. Order of trial. Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as follows: Rule 132, Section 12, pars. 2 and 3 (a) The plaintiff shall adduce evidence in support of his complaint; Section 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility. (b) The defendant shall then adduce evidence in support of his defense, counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint;

]
crime. It shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-criminal proceedings involving child witnesses.chanrobles virtual law library Sec. 2. Objectives.- The objectives of this Rule are to create and maintain an environment that will allow children to give reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma to children, encourage children to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth.chanrobles virtual law library Sec. 3. Construction of the Rule. This Rule shall be liberally construed to uphold the best interests of the child and to promote maximum accommodation of child witnesses without prejudice to the constitutional rights of the accused.chanrobles virtual law library Sec. 4. Definitions.

(c) The third-party defendant, if any, shall adduce evidence of his defense, counterclaim, crossclaim and fourth-party complaint; (d) The fourth-party, and so forth, if any, shall adduce evidence of the material facts pleaded by them; (e) The parties against whom any counterclaim or cross-claim has been pleaded, shall adduce evidence in support of their defense, in the order to be prescribed by the court; (f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their original case; and (g) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision, unless the court directs the parties to argue or to submit their respective memoranda or any further pleadings. If several defendants or third-party defendants, and so forth, having separate defenses appear by different counsel, the court shall determine the relative order of presentation of their evidence. Sec. 11. Order of trial. order:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The trial shall proceed in the following

(a) A child witness is any person who at the time of giving testimony is below the age of eighteen (18) years. In child abuse cases, a child includes one over eighteen (18) years but is found by the court as unable to fully take care of himself or protect himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.chanrobles virtual law library (b) Child abuse means physical, psychological or sexual abuse and criminal neglect as defined in Republic Act No. 7610 and other related laws.chanrobles virtual law library (c) Facilitator means a person appointed by the court to pose questions to a child.chanrobles virtual law library (d) Record regarding a child or record means any photograph, videotape, audiotape, film, handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic recording, computer data or printout, or other memorialization, including any court document, pleading, or any copy or reproduction of any of the foregoing, that contains the name, description, address, school or any other personal identifying information about a child or his family and that is produced or maintained by a public agency, private agency or individual. (e) A guardian ad litem is a person appointed by the court where the case is pending for a child who is a victim of, accused of, or a witness to a crime to protect the best interests of the said child. (f) A support person is a person chosen by the child to accompany him to testify at or attend a judicial proceeding or deposition to provide emotional support for him. (g) Best interests of the child means the totality of the circumstances and conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to his physical, psychological, and emotional development. It also means the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the child. (h) Developmental level refers to the specific growth phase in which most individuals are expected to behave and function in relation to the advancement of their physical, socio-emotional, cognitive, and moral abilities.chanrobles virtual law library

(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability. (b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if any, arising, from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case. (c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue. (d) Upon admission of evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda. (e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified. 4. Special Procedure on Presentation of Child Witnesses a. Generally Child Witness Rule, Secs 1-4 Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. Unless otherwise provided, this Rule shall govern the examination of child witnesses who are victims of crime, accused of a crime, and witnesses to

]
(e) The guardian ad litem shall not testify in any proceeding concerning any information, statement, or opinion received from the child in the course of serving as a guardian ad litem, unless the court finds it necessary to promote the best interests of the child. (f) The guardian ad litem shall be presumed to have acted in good faith in compliance with his duties described in Sub-section c. Presumption of competency; Determination of competency; competency examination Child Witness Rule 6, Sec. 6. Competency. Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. However, the court shall conduct a competency examination of a child, motu proprio or on motion of a party, when it finds that substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court. (a) Proof of necessity. A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of necessity of competency examination. The age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency examination. (b) Burden of proof. To rebut the presumption of competence enjoyed by a child, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging his competence. (c) Persons allowed at competency examination. Only the following are allowed to attend a competency examination:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) The judge and necessary court personnel; (2) The counsel for the parties; (3) The guardian ad litem; (4) One or more support persons for the child; and (5) The defendant, unless the court determines that competence can be fully evaluated in his absence. (d) Conduct of examination. Examination of a child as to his competence shall be conducted only by the judge. Counsel for the parties, however, can submit questions to the judge that he may, in his discretion, ask the child. (e) Developmentally appropriate questions. The questions asked at the competency examination shall be appropriate to the age and developmental level of the child; shall not be related to the issues at trial; and shall focus on the ability of the child to remember, communicate, distinguish between truth and falsehood, and appreciate the duty to testify truthfully. (f) Continuing duty to assess competence. The court has the duty of continuously assessing the competence of the child throughout his testimony. d. Manner of Examination Child Witness Rule, Secs. 7-17 Sec. 7. Oath or affirmation. Before testifying, a child shall take an oath or affirmation to tell the truth.

(i) In-depth investigative interview or disclosure interview is an inquiry or proceeding conducted by duly trained members of a multi-disciplinary team or representatives of law enforcement or child protective services for the purpose of determining whether child abuse has been committed. b. Appointment of guardian ad litem Child Witness Rule, Sec. 5 Sec. 5. Guardian ad litem (a) The court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a victim of, accused of, or a witness to a crime to promote the best interests of the child. In making the appointment, the court shall consider the background of the guardian ad litem and his familiarity with the judicial process, social service programs, and child development, giving preference to the parents of the child, if qualified. The guardian ad litem may be a member of the Philippine Bar. A person who is a witness in any proceeding involving the child cannot be appointed as a guardian ad litem. (b) The guardian ad litem: (1) shall attend all interviews, depositions, hearings, and trial proceedings in which a child participates; . (2) shall make recommendations to the court concerning the welfare of the child; (3) shall have access to all reports, evaluations, and records necessary to effectively advocate for the child, except privileged communications; child; (4) shall marshal and coordinate the delivery of resources and special services to the

(5) shall explain, in language understandable to the child, all legal proceedings, including police investigations, in which the child is involved; (6) shall assist the child and his family in coping with the emotional effects of crime and subsequent criminal or non-criminal proceedings in which the child is involved; (7) may remain with the child while the child waits to testify; . (8) may interview witnesses; and (9) may request additional examinations by medical or mental health professionals if there is a compelling need therefor. (c) The guardian ad litem shall be notified of all proceedings but shall not participate in the trial. However, he may file motions pursuant to Sections 9, 10, 25, 26, 27 and 31(c). If the guardian ad litem is a lawyer, he may object during trial that questions asked of the child are not appropriate to his developmental level. (d) The guardian ad litem may communicate concerns regarding the child to the court through an officer of the court designated for that purpose.

]
Sec . 12. Waiting area for child witnesses. The courts are encouraged to provide a waiting area for children that is separate from waiting areas used by other persons. The waiting area for children should be furnished so as to make a child comfortable. Sec. 13. Courtroom environment. To create a more comfortable environment for the child, the court may, in its discretion, direct and supervise the location, movement and deportment of all persons in the courtroom including the parties, their counsel, child, witnesses, support persons, guardian ad litem, facilitator, and court personnel. The child may be allowed to testify from a place other than the witness chair. The witness chair or other place from which the child testifies may be turned to facilitate his testimony but the opposing party and his counsel must have a frontal or profile view of the child during the testimony of the child. The witness chair or other place from which the child testifies may also be rearranged to allow the child to see the opposing party and his counsel, if he chooses to look at them, without turning his body or leaving the witness stand. The judge need not wear his judicial robe. Nothing in this section or any other provision of law, except official in-court identification provisions, shall be construed to require a child to look at the accused. Accommodations for the child under this section need not be supported by a finding of trauma to the child. Sec. 14. Testimony during appropriate hours. The court may order that the testimony of the child should be taken during a time of day when the child is well-rested. Sec. 15. Recess during testimony. The child may be allowed reasonable periods of relief while undergoing direct, cross, re-direct, and re-cross examinations as often as necessary depending on his developmental level. Sec . 16. Testimonial aids. The court shall permit a child to use dolls, anatomicallycorrect dolls, puppets, drawings, mannequins, or any other appropriate demonstrative device to assist him in his testimony. Sec . 17. Emotional security item. While testifying, a child shall be allowed to have an item of his own choosing such as a blanket, toy, or doll. e. Duty and Powers of Judge in relation to testimony of child witnesses Child Witness Rule, Secs. 5,10,12,13,18,23,24 Sec. 5 -13 supra Sec . 18. Approaching the witness. The court may prohibit a counsel from approaching a child if it appears that the child is fearful of or intimidated by the counsel. Sec. 23. Excluding the public. When a child testifies, the court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons, including members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made to protect the right to privacy of the child or if the court determines on the record that requiring the child to testify in open court would cause psychological harm to him, hinder the ascertainment of truth, or result in his inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity. In making its order, the court shall consider the developmental level of the child, the nature of the crime, the nature of his testimony regarding the crime, his relationship to the accused and to persons attending the trial, his desires, and the interests of his parents or legal guardian. The court may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during trial is of such

Sec. 8. Examination of a child witness. The examination of a child witness presented in a hearing or any proceeding shall be done in open court. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child witness may, however, move the court to allow him to testify in the manner provided in this Rule. Sec. 9. Interpreter for child. (a) When a child does not understand the English or Filipino language or is unable to communicate in said languages due to his developmental level, fear, shyness, disability, or other similar reason, an interpreter whom the child can understand and who understands the child may be appointed by the court, motu proprio or upon motion, to interpret for the child. (b) If a witness or member of the family of the child is the only person who can serve as an interpreter for the child, he shall not be disqualified and may serve as the interpreter of the child. The interpreter, however, who is also a witness, shall testify ahead of the child. (c) An interpreter shall take an oath or affirmation to make a true and accurate interpretation. Sec. 10. Facilitator to pose questions to child. (a) The court may, motu proprio or upon motion, appoint a facilitator if it determines that the child is unable to understand or respond to questions asked. The facilitator may be a child psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker, guidance counselor, teacher, religious leader, parent, or relative. (b) If the court appoints a facilitator, the respective counsels for the parties shall pose questions to the child only through the facilitator. The questions shall either be in the words used by counsel or, if the child is not likely to understand the same, in words that are comprehensible to the child and which convey the meaning intended by counsel. (c) The facilitator shall take an oath or affirmation to pose questions to the child according to the meaning intended by counsel. Sec. 11. Support persons. (a) A child testifying at a judicial proceeding or making a deposition shall have the right to be accompanied by one or two persons of his own choosing to provide him emotional support. (1) Both support persons shall remain within the view of the child during his testimony. (2) One of the support persons may accompany the child to the witness stand, provided the support person does not completely obscure the child from the view of the opposing party, judge, or hearing officer. (3) The court may allow the support person to hold the hand of the child or take other appropriate steps to provide emotional support to the child in the course of the proceedings. (4) The court shall instruct the support persons not to prompt, sway, or influence the child during his testimony. (b) If the support person chosen by the child is also a witness, the court may disapprove the choice if it is sufficiently established that the attendance of the support person during the testimony of the child would pose a substantial risk of influencing or affecting the content of the testimony of the child. (c) If the support person who is also a witness is allowed by the court, his testimony shall be presented ahead of the testimony of the child.

]
(e) The court shall issue an order granting or denying the use of live-link television and stating the reasons therefor. It shall consider the following factors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) The age and level of development of the child; (2) His physical and mental health, including any mental or physical disability; (3) Any physical, emotional, or psychological injury experienced by him; (4) The nature of the alleged abuse; (5) Any threats against the child; (6) His relationship with the accused or adverse party; (7) His reaction to any prior encounters with the accused in court or elsewhere; (8) His reaction prior to trial when the topic of testifying was discussed with him by parents or professionals; (9) Specific symptoms of stress exhibited by the child in the days prior to testifying; (10) Testimony of expert or lay witnesses; (11) The custodial situation of the child and the attitude of the members of his family regarding the events about which he will testify; and (12) Other relevant factors, such as court atmosphere and formalities of court procedure. (f) The court may order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link television if there is a substantial likelihood that the child would suffer trauma from testifying in the presence of the accused, his counsel or the prosecutor as the case may be. The trauma must be of a kind which would impair the completeness or truthfulness of the testimony of the child. (g) If the court orders the taking of testimony by live-link television: (1) The child shall testify in a room separate from the courtroom in the presence of the guardian ad litem; one or both of his support persons; the facilitator and interpreter, if any; a court officer appointed by the court; persons necessary to operate the closed-circuit television equipment; and other persons whose presence are determined by the court to be necessary to the welfare and well-being of the child; (2) The judge, prosecutor, accused, and counsel for the parties shall be in the courtroom. The testimony of the child shall be transmitted by live-link television into the courtroom for viewing and hearing by the judge, prosecutor, counsel for the parties, accused, victim, and the public unless excluded. (3) If it is necessary for the child to identify the accused at trial, the court may allow the child to enter the courtroom for the limited purpose of identifying the accused, or the court may allow the child to identify the accused by observing the image of the latter on a television monitor. (4) The court may set other conditions and limitations on the taking of the testimony that it finds just and appropriate, taking into consideration the best interests of the child. (h) The testimony of the child shall be preserved on videotape, digital disc, or other similar devices which shall be made part of the court record and shall be subject to a protective order as provided in Section 31(b). Sec . 26. Screens, one-way mirrors, and other devices to shield child from accused. (a) The prosecutor or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the chair of the child or that a screen or other device be placed in the courtroom in such a manner that the child cannot see the accused while testifying. Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this Section, he shall consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject to the second and third paragraphs of Section 25(a) of this Rule. The court shall issue an order stating the reasons and describing the approved courtroom arrangement.

character as to be offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, on motion of the accused, exclude the public from trial, except court personnel and the counsel of the parties. Sec . 24. Persons prohibited from entering and leaving courtroom. The court may order that persons attending the trial shall not enter or leave the courtroom during the testimony of the child. f. Mode of examination and questioning Child Witness Rule, Secs. 8,18,19,20,21,25,26,27 Secs. 8, 18 supra Sec . 18. Approaching the witness. The court may prohibit a counsel from approaching a child if it appears that the child is fearful of or intimidated by the counsel. Sec. 19. Mode of questioning. The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth; (2) ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child; (3) protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment; and (4) avoid waste of time. The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form. Sec. 20. Leading questions. The court may allow leading questions in all stages of examination of a child if the same will further the interests of justice. Sec . 21. Objections to questions. Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten, or intimidate the child. Sec. 25. Live-link television testimony in criminal cases where the child is a victim or a witness. (a) The prosecutor, counsel or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the testimony of the child be taken in a room outside the courtroom and be televised to the courtroom by live-link television. Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this section, he shall consult the prosecutor or counsel and shall defer to the judgment of the prosecutor or counsel regarding the necessity of applying for an order. In case the guardian ad litem is convinced that the decision of the prosecutor or counsel not to apply will cause the child serious emotional trauma, he himself may apply for the order. The person seeking such an order shall apply at least five (5) days before the trial date, unless the court finds on the record that the need for such an order was not reasonably foreseeable. (b) The court may motu proprio hear and determine, with notice to the parties, the need for taking the testimony of the child through live-link television. (c) The judge may question the child in chambers, or in some comfortable place other than the courtroom, in the presence of the support person, guardian ad litem, prosecutor, and counsel for the parties. The questions of the judge shall not be related to the issues at trial but to the feelings of the child about testifying in the courtroom. (d) The judge may exclude any person, including the accused, whose presence or conduct causes fear to the child.

]
Electronic Evidence Rule, Rule 10, Secs. 1,2,3 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES SECTION 1. Electronic testimony. After summarily hearing the parties pursuant to Rule 9 of these Rules, the court may authorize the presentation of testimonial evidence by electronic means. Before so authorizing, the court shall determine the necessity for such presentation and prescribe terms and conditions as may be necessary under the circumstance, including the protection of the rights of the parties and witnesses concerned. SEC. 2. Transcript of electronic testimony. When examination of a witness is done electronically, the entire proceedings, including the questions and answers, shall be transcribed by a stenographer, stenotypes or other recorder authorized for the purpose, who shall certify as correct the transcript done by him. The transcript should reflect the fact that the proceedings, either in whole or in part, had been electronically recorded. SEC. 3. Storage of electronic evidence. The electronic evidence and recording thereof as well as the stenographic notes shall form part of the record of the case. Such transcript and recording shall be deemed prima facie evidence of such proceedings. 6. Rights and obligations of a witness Rule 132, Secs. 3, 16 Sec. 3 . Rights and obligations of a witness. A witness must answer questions, although his answer may tend to establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness: (1)To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting demeanor; (2)Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require; (3)Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue; (4)Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense unless otherwise provided by law; or (5)Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it to be the very fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer to the fact of his previous final conviction for an offense. (3a, 19a) 7. Remedies durig examination a. Objections Rule 132, Secs 36-38 Sec. 36 . Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the unless a different period is allowed by the court. In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (36a)

(b) If the court grants an application to shield the child from the accused while testifying in the courtroom, the courtroom shall be arranged to enable the accused to view the child. Sec . 27. Videotaped deposition. (a) The prosecutor, counsel, or guardian ad litem may apply for an order that a deposition be taken of the testimony of the child and that it be recorded and preserved on videotape. Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this Section, he shall consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject to the second and third paragraphs of Section 25(a). (b) If the court finds that the child will not be able to testify in open court at trial, it shall issue an order that the deposition of the child be taken and preserved by videotape. (c) The judge shall preside at the videotaped deposition of a child. Objections to deposition testimony or evidence, or parts thereof, and the grounds for the objection shall be stated and shall be ruled upon at the time of the taking of the deposition. The other persons who may be permitted to be present at the proceeding are:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) The prosecutor; (2) The defense counsel; (3) The guardian ad litem; (4) The accused, subject to sub-section (e); (5) Other persons whose presence is determined by the court to be necessary to the welfare and well-being of the child; (6) One or both of his support persons, the facilitator and interpreter, if any; (7) The court stenographer; and (8) Persons necessary to operate the videotape equipment. (d) The rights of the accused during trial, especially the right to counsel and to confront and cross-examine the child, shall not be violated during the deposition. (e) If the order of the court is based on evidence that the child is unable to testify in the physical presence of the accused, the court may direct the latter to be excluded from the room in which the deposition is conducted. In case of exclusion of the accused, the court shall order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link television in accordance with Section 25 of this Rule. If the accused is excluded from the deposition, it is not necessary that the child be able to view an image of the accused. (f) The videotaped deposition shall be preserved and stenographically recorded. The videotape and the stenographic notes shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court where the case is pending for safekeeping and shall be made a part of the record. (g) The court may set other conditions on the taking of the deposition that it finds just and appropriate, taking into consideration the best interests of the child, the constitutional rights of the accused, and other relevant factors. (h) The videotaped deposition and stenographic notes shall be subject to a protective order as provided in Section 31(b). (i) If, at the time of trial, the court finds that the child is unable to testify for a reason stated in Section 25(f) of this Rule, or is unavailable for any reason described in Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may admit into evidence the videotaped deposition of the child in lieu of his testimony at the trial. The court shall issue an order stating the reasons therefor. (j) After the original videotaping but before or during trial, any party may file any motion for additional videotaping on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The court may order an additional videotaped deposition to receive the newly discovered evidence. 5. Taking of Electronic Testimony

]
(a)The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; (b)Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and (c)Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to the entered therein. All other writings are private. Rule 132, Secs 23-27 and 30 Sec. 23 . Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. (24a) Sec. 24 . Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a) Sec. 25 . What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a) Sec. 26 . Irremovability of public record. Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a pending case. (27a) Sec. 27 . Public record of a private document. An authorized public record of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody. (28a) Sec. 30 . Proof of notarial documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. AGASEN V. CA And while private respondent denied having signed any document selling the subject parcels of land, the trial court found her signature on the subject documents to be genuine, after a comparison thereof with her own documentary evidence on record (Exh. "B"). Indeed, it has been held that where a comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court, with or without the aid of expert witnesses;[12] and evidence respecting handwriting may be given by a comparison made by the court with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party

Sec. 37 . When repetition of objection unnecessary. When it becomes reasonably apparent in the course of the examination of a witness that the question being propounded are of the same class as those to which objection has been made, whether such objection was sustained or overruled, it shall not be necessary to repeat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse party to record his continuing objection to such class of questions. (37a) Sec. 38 . Ruling. The ruling of the court must be given immediately after the objection is made, unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling. The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated. However, if the objection is based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of Child Witness Rule, Sec. 21 Sec . 21. Objections to questions. Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten, or intimidate the child. PEOPLE V. VERZOSA It bears stressing that appellant Avendao raised the issue of his being charged and convicting allegedly under a wrong name for the first time on appeal. When eyewitness Dojenas identified him in court, no objections were made by the defense as to Avendaos first and middle names and none were registered in the transcript of stenographic notes. Neither do the records bear out any effort on Avendaos part to raise the issue that the person being charged with the crime is named Jerry Avendao y Mendoza and not Cherry Abendao y Pagatpat. Having failed to make an objection as to his exact name in the course of the trial, it was too late for appellant Avendao to raise the matter on appeal. It is axiomatic that an objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds shall become apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. b. Striking off Answer Rule 132, Sec. 39 Sec. 29 . How judicial record impeached. Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings. B. DOCUMENTARY 1. Autthentication and Proof a. Documents a.1. Public Rule 132, Sec. 19, pars. 1 and 2 Sec. 19 . Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation evidence, documents are either public or private. Public documents are:

against whom the evidence is offered.[13] In the case at bar, the lower court compared private respondents signatures on the subject documents with that ap pearing on her own evidence (Exh. "B") and found the same identical. The following circumstances all indicate the genuineness and due execution of the subject documents: (1) The subject documents were duly notarized public documents; (2) The documents enjoy the legal presumption of validity; (3) Their genuineness and due execution were not specifically denied under oath by private respondent; (4) Private respondents signature thereon were found genuine by the lower court upon a comparison of her signature thereon with that in her own documentary evidence; (5) The actual identification and positive testimony of petitioner; and (6) The testimony of the lawyer who had notarized one of the subject documents. Private respondents bare denial of the same cannot, by any measure, overcome the above-mentioned evidence and legal presumptions in petitioners favor. Cf CEQUENA V. BOLANTE The petitioners allegations are untenable. Before a private document offered as authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved first. [8] And before a document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under the Dead Man's Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead, insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the declarant; (c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same was contrary to his interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable the existence of any motive to falsify.[9] In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive and who testified that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is not admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a witness. [10] Such declarant should be confronted with the statement against interest as a prior inconsistent statement. The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either. An ancient document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion.[11] It must on its face appear to be genuine. The petitioners herein failed, however, to explain how the purported signature of Eduarda Apiado could have been affixed to the subject affidavit if, according to the witness, she was an illiterate woman who never had any formal schooling. This circumstance casts suspicion on its authenticity. Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. Furthermore, the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject land was transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership.

]
collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants.[16] In fact, some minor inconsistencies could show that the witness was not previously coached so as to tailor his testimony, and thus they serve as badges of credibility. PEOPLE V. ATIENZA It is well-settled that testimonies of victims who are young and of tender age deserve full credence[24] and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere fabrication.[25] No woman, much less a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in fact, been a victim of rape and impassioned to seek justice for the wrong done to her being.[26] What makes private complainant's testimony doubly credible was the fact that no improper reason or ill motive could be imputed to her as would impel her to falsely charge accused-appellant, her mother's godson and a former neighbor, of such a grave crime as rape. PEOPLE V. SAN JUAN Taking Rowena's version in its totality, we find ourselves unable to concur with the credibility accorded to it by the trial court. For evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.15 The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind.16 Whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance PEOPLE V. DELA CRUZ The circumstance that Romeo was the victim's friend and compadre does not automatically impair his credibility nor render his testimony less worthy of credence since no improper motive has been ascribed to him for testifying against accused-appellant. On the other hand, whether the woman who was shouting was unidentified, as declared by Jerry in court, or the voice of the woman was that of accused-appellant's mother, as stated in Jerrys affidavit, refers to a trivial matter which cannot in any manner serve to discredit him. Besides, whenever there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight because the affidavit is almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate. PEOPLE V. BANELA It is doctrinally settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and to note the demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. A trial courts findings on the credibility of witnesses carry great weight and respect and will be sustained by the appellate courts unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. In the instant case, we see no cogent reason to depart from this established rule as accused-appellant has failed to present any substantial evidence which would merit a reversal of the findings of the court below. We have consistently held that when a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the rape has been committed, and that if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. This is true in

a. Credibility of witnesses; effects of bias or relationship or other circumstances like minority, disability/illness; appreciation by trial court PEOPLE V. VALLA The alleged inconsistency in the testimony of Allarey as to whether appellant immediately reported to him after being summoned, and in the testimony of Merle that appellant was "tulala" at the time he admitted responsibility for the crime, merely refer to minor details which do not in actuality touch upon the "whys" and "wherefores" of the crime committed.[15] Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when referring only to minor details and

]
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself- such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance. PEOPLE V. ALQUIZALAS In his bid to obtain reversal of his conviction, appellant casts doubt on the testimony of private complainant. He claims that the fact that private complainant rode again with him in the motorcycle after the alleged bestial act is an unlikely attitude of a rape victim. He insists that his carnal knowledge of private complainant was with the latters consent. We find appellants attempt to impugn the credibility of the prosecution evidence not convincing at all. Private complainants attitude after the sexual assault is understandable. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident especially if the assailant is physically near. Some may shout, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may even welcome intrusion.[11] On her part, private complainant was only waiting for the proper time to reveal her harrowing ordeal as soon as possible and that is the reason why she just took the same ride with the appellant to Barili, Cebu. In fact upon her arrival home, she immediately reported the incident to her grandmother in the presence of the wife of appellant. Moreover, there is no reason to doubt private complainants story. The records reveal that private complainant could not help but cry during her direct examination.[12] The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience.[13] Besides, evidence to be believed must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself as when it conforms to common experience and observation mankind can prove as probable under the circumstances.[14] PEOPLE V. BEA In the instant case, the trial court found Jocelyns testimony to be clear, convincing and straightforward. It must be noted that in several stages[11] of the trial where Jocelyn took the witness stand, the trial court observed that she became hysterical, causing the court, upon agreement of both counsel, to defer the proceedings to a later date. Thus, in People v. Gecomo,[12] it was correctly observed that the crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature. PEOPLE V. GONZALES The fact that prosecution witness Mary Iris Hortezano was merely seven (7) years old at the time of the incident and eight (8) years old at the time she testified does not disqualify her from being a witness nor does this circumstance render her testimony incredible. It is well-settled that any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined. The requirements of a childs competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication.[33] Even a mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness.[34] And, there is no minimum age for witnesses, even a child can be a witness so long as he can perceive and relate his perceptions. Besides, the testimony of children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons.[35]

the instant case where the trial court found that there is clear, convincing, and competent physical and testimonial evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against accused-appellant. PEOPLE V. CALAYCA We have ruled in numerous cases that an errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness especially when she is recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape.[18] Minor errors in the testimony of a rape victim tend to buttress, rather than weaken, her credibility since that would indicate that her testimony was not contrived The victims brief but candid and straightforward narration of how she was raped by appellant bears the earmarks of a credible witness PEOPLE V. PADILLA First. The basic test of a witness qualification is of course whether he can perceive and, perceiving, can make known his perception to others. [4] Negatively put, Rule 130, 21 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: The following persons cannot be witnesses: Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others; Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully. Hence, a mental retardate is not, by reason of such handicap alone, disqualified from testifying in court. He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If the testimony of a mental retardate is coherent, the same is admissible in court.[5] Thus, we have in several cases[6] upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on statements given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate. Trial courts, which have the opportunity to observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony will be given credence.[7] In the instant case, the trial court accorded weight to the testimony of Maria Aurora. Indeed, the complainants truthfulne ss is evident in her testimony: PEOPLE V. ANTONIO Nor did the trial court err in giving credence to the testimonies of Rosalinda Reyes and Feliciana Napao. That the victim was a boarder of Napaos son, Rodrigo Reyes, and the owner of the land being tilled by the latter are not sufficient reasons not to believe this witness. Time and again we have said that mere relationship of a witness to a party, without more, cannot impair the witness credibility. Long settled in criminal jurisprudence is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court. This rule is justified by the fact that the trial court is in a better position to decide the question. Having the advantage of directly observing witnesses, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. PEOPLE V. MAHINAY There is no showing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (sic) fabricated or there was any reason for them to testify falsely against the accused. The absence of any evidence as to the existence of improper motive sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that the testimonies of the witnesses, therefore, should be given full faith and credit.

]
Verily, inconsistencies in minor details do not impair the credibility of witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants Further, accused-appellants contend that Crispin Encontad falsely testified against them because they are members of Iglesia Ni Kristo while Crispin is a Roman Catholic. The testimony of Crispin cannot be discredited on this basis alone, as indeed, accused-appellants failed to prove that their religious differences have reached such an intensity as to cause Crispin to falsely attribute a crime to them. PEOPLE V. MANGAHAS Another doubt on the testimonies of the accused and his witness Nestor dela Rosa lies on their claims that the accused fired his gun only once. The victim sustained 3 gunshot wounds of separate and different entries and exits on his body. For a single shot to produce those wounds is highly irreconcilable. inconsistent defenses put up by the accused: As noted by the prosecution, the accused, during the preliminary investigation of the case, executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay[48] dated October 18, 1990 wherein he alleged that at the time of the incident, he was with three other persons in Caloocan City and not at the scene of the shooting incident. At the trial of the case however, accused makes a complete turn-around and claims that he was at the scene of the crime but that he shot the victim only in self-defense. Verily, these two defenses are incompatible with each other. As such, they do not at all provide shield to the accused to ward off the crime imputed against him. When a witness makes two statements, both being sworn to as a witness in one case, and these statements incur in the gravest contradiction, then the court cannot accept either the first or the second statements as proof. He himself by his own act of giving false testimony impeaches his own testimony and the court is compelled to exclude it from all consideration c. Positive versus negative testimony PEOPLE V. UY As against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that they caught RAMON in a buy-bust operation, supported by other evidence such as the packets of shabu sold by and seized from him, RAMONs negative testimony must necessarily fail. An affi rmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially when it comes from the mouth of credible witness.[31] PEOPLE V. CALAYCA This supposed ill-motive of private complainant was not duly established by the defense. Hence, there was nothing for the prosecution to rebut. The elementary principle in the rules of evidence is that an affirmative allegation made by a party must be duly proved to merit acceptance by the court. PEOPLE V. TOLENTINO Besides, against RACHELLE's positive testimony, TOLENTINO had nothing to offer but denial and alibi. Settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony.[17] Equally settled is that alibi is a weak defense, for it is easy to concoct and fabricate. It cannot prevail over, and is worthless in the face of, the positive identification by a credible witness that the accused committed the crime.[18] RACHELLE positively identified TOLENTINO as her rapist.

PEOPLE V. ALBA At any rate, proof of the exact date the rape was committed is not required so much so that the offended partys failure to recall the exact date is fatal. As this Court has held in several cases,[3] the exact date of commission of rape is not an element of the crime. As for the date the victim was entrusted to the custody of the DSWD, it has not been shown in what way the victims failure to recall it can affect her credibility. The fact is that for lack of anyone to take custody of her, considering her tender age, she was entrusted to the care of the DSWD. Accused-appellant contends that the victims competence as a witness should have been first established considering that she was a minor at the time she testified. There is, however, no law requiring that a witness competence be first established before he can testify. The burden of showing that a witness is incompetent to testify is on accused-appellant.[9] The fact that the offended party is a minor does not mean that she is incapable of perceiving and of making her perception known. In the case at bar, the offended party was questioned by accused-appellants counsel concerning her competence, and her answers show that she was competent to testify Indeed, as this Court observed in one case,[11] children of sound minds are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of older persons. Other than the allegation of minority, the defense failed to adduce other grounds for the disqualification of the victim as a witness. b. Conflicting testimonies as badge of truth and/or falsehood PEOPLE V. OBELLO Between a positive and categorical testimony on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails. Indeed, the testimony of a single witness, when positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even of murder. Testimonies are to be weighed, not numbered; hence,afinding of guilt may be based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness when the trial court finds such testimony positive and credible. Likewise, the alleged inconsistencies regarding the identity of the person or persons who brought the deceased to the hospital do not discredit the account of the prosecution. Lourdes Faiganes[19] testimony that the victim was brought to the hospital by his brother is not necessarily inconsistent with Ricardos testimony that he and the brother did so. In any event, the alleged inconsistencies refer to minor details and not to the basic elements of the crime. They do not cast doubt on the identification of appellant as the assailant. Hence, they cannot impair the credibility of Witness dela Cruz. Such minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor,[20] for they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[21] PEOPLE V. BADON Accused-appellants endeavor to discredit the testimony of Demetrio and Crispin based on the lack of absolute harmony in their testimony. However, this Court cannot and does not expect absolute uniformity in every detail, because witnesses react differently to what they see and hear depending upon their situation and state of mind. It is of common experience that the perception of individuals may vary depending on their location and the extent of their peripheral vision. To expect identical features in the testimony of witnesses cannot but generate the suspicion that the material circumstances testified to by them were integral parts of a well thought out and prefabricated story.

]
PEOPLE V. SARABIA Generally, a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof except (1) when it is made through palpable mistake and (2) when it is shown that no admission was in fact made. In spite of the presence of judicial admission in a partys pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented ( Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 596). Undaunted, the appellant inflicted eight (8) wounds on the victims body. Six (6) of them were hack wounds, one (1) stab wound and one (1) contusion in the right forearm. The nature, location and number of wounds inflicted on the victim thus belie and negate the claim of self-defense f. Unbelievable testimony PEOPLE V. ANDALES We are not convinced that Sonia Malobago merely implicated David and Jellie Andales as part of a scheme to displace David and Jellie from their possession of the farm at Sitio Bangon.[16] It is inconceivable that Sonia would risk the life of her husband for the sole purpose of laying claim over a piece of farm, least of all, if they are indeed its actual owners. We find these reasons lame considering that Rodolfo is much bigger in height and built than Jellie. That he got hold of Rodolfo and moved him from side to side in an effort to dodge the bullets fired at him is likewise preposterous and not worthy of belief. His narration could have only been lifted from pocketbooks and quite akin to what could only be seen in movies. As aptly noted by the Court of Appeals, they were quite theatrical in execution. For evidence to be believed it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself, i.e., it must conform to ordinary human experience and the normal course of human conduct. Jellie's version does not meet this test. PEOPLE V. PERUCHO We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.[21] After careful examination of the records, we find that the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses do not pass this test. First, it is unlikely that the leader of a gang included in the PNP Order of Battle would be supervising a construction work at night, unescorted, with a gun tucked in his waist in plain view. More disturbing, however, is the manner in which the policemen effected the arrest. SPO3 Armando Ballon admitted that the object of the surveillance was the Perucho Gang[25] and the kidnap victims.[26] Considering that appellant allegedly led the gang that was believed responsible for the kidnapping, his presence would have alerted an average policeman to the following possibilities: (1) the kidnap victims were being kept there; (2) the victims were being guarded by the Perucho Gang, not by Perucho alone; and (3) even if the kidnap victims were not there, the leader was with the other members of the gang. But the five policemen made no effort to ascertain the presence of the kidnap victims or the other gang members. Moreover, there was no showing that they stayed in the vicinity long enough to find out. Instead, SPO4 Nemeno declared that he and the four other policemen approached appellant immediately when they saw him carrying a pistol. In immediately confronting appellant, the five policemen did not take the time to determine whether the victims or the other gang members were in the vicinity. Instead, they rushed from their observation post to arrest him, heedless of the possibility that the other Perucho gangsters might shoot them and the kidnap victims. In fact, during the time that they were in the place, the police never took measures commensurate to the danger posed by their mission.

NAVAL V. PANDAY ... [t]he testimonies of Wilfredo Bolalin, Domingo Pasibe and Delia Cea to the effect that they did not see judge Panday at the Tigaon pension house on 24 July 1994 constitute negative testimonies which can not prevail over Cecile's positive testimony that she was there with him on said date. Testimony is negative when the witness states that he did not see or know the occurrence of a fact and positive when the witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur. [11] A positive testimony, such as Cecile's is stronger than a negative one. The former has more value than the latter for the reason that he who denies a certain fact may both remember exactly the circumstances on which he bases his denial. Testimony is affirmative or positive if it consists of statements as to what the witness heard or seen. It is negative if the witness states that he did not hear or did not see the phenomenon in question.[15] The Court has held in at least two (2) cases that the testimony of a credible witness that he saw or heard a particular thing at a particular time and place is more reliable than that of a witness who with the same opportunities, testified that he did not hear or see the same thing at the same time and place.[16] Moreover, the positive testimony of a single witness is entitled to more weight and credence than the testimony of several witnesses who testified in the negative or to collateral matters. Thus, in People v. Tibayan,[17] the sister of the victim testified that she and her father saw the accused shoot her brother to death while a farmer and his mother testified for the defense that they were near the scene of the crime; that they did not see the sister of the victim and her father; and that they neither saw the accused and his companions. In affirming the judgment of conviction, the Court held that the negative testimony of the farmer and his mother is not conclusive proof that the accused did not shoot the victim nor does it completely belie the sister's testimony that she and her father witnessed the shooting. In this case, no weight and credit can be given to the testimonies of Bolalin and Pasibe for while they claim that they were in the immediate vicinity of the compound of the Bodega Tigaon on the day, time and place of the incident while there was an ongoing boxing practice, their failure to see and observe the alleged incident can be attributed to want of particular attention considering their preoccupation with the boxing practice. Moreover, the testimony of a witness that he does not remember or has no knowledge of a particular matter has little or no weight as against the direct testimony of a witness who does remember the matter or against the positive evidence that an event occurred which is not contradicted by a witness' testimony that he does not remember whether it occurred or not.[18] d. Eyewitness testimony PEOPLE V. ANTONIO In a number of cases, this Court generally accords the highest respect to the evaluation of the testimonies of eyewitnesses by the trial court. PEOPLE V. BIHISON Eyewitnesses to a horrifying event cannot be expected, nor be faulted if they are unable, to be completely accurate in picturing to the court all that has transpired and every detail of what they have seen or heard. Various reasons, mostly explainable, can account for this reality; the Court has long acknowledged the verity that different human minds react distinctly and diversely when confronted with a sudden and shocking event, and that a witness may sometimes ignore certain details which at the time might have appeared to him to be insignificant but which to another person, under the same circumstances, would seem noteworthy. e. Judicial Admissions

]
the contrary, the evidence shows that the parties did not know each other before the alleged tryst on January 16, 1994. If accused-appellants claim were to be believed, within minutes of their meeting, he and complainant simply engaged in a sexual intercourse with not even nary a word said between them. We find this claim to be highly incredible and contrary to ordinary human behavior. No woman, much less a married one with three children, would just lie with a complete stranger. Indeed, complainants conduct immediately after accused-appellant had left belie the latters claim that they had enged in voluntary sexual intercourse. She ran outside the stall, still fastening her pants, to ask help from the people gathering on the street. She immediately reported the matter to the Langihan police and afterwards submitted to a physical examination at the Butuan City General Hospital at 9:00 that morning. The examining physician found not only spermatozoa in complainants vaginal canal but also a cut in the small finger of her left hand and hematoma on the right side of her neck, confirming complainants allegation that accused-appellant had forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. These circumstances are consistent with the conduct of one who has just undergone a harrowing experience. As this Court has pointed out, the conduct of a woman immediately following the alleged assault is of utmost importance as it tends to establish the truth or falsity of her claim.[13] If complainant had not been forced and intimidated into submitting to the lustful designs of accused-appellant, her natural reaction, as a married woman, would have been to conceal her illicit activity instead of denouncing it immedaitely as rape, for otherwise, her conduct would constitute adultery. Indeed, that complainant could not have gone to the city jail to ask for support from accusedappellant because her husband had allegedly left her, is confirmed by the presence of complainants husband during the trial[16] to give moral support to her. g. Failure to object; effect on probative value RESTAURANTE LAS CONCHAS V. LLEGO Well-settled is the rule that while lack of objection to a hearsay testimony or evidence results in the admittance thereof as evidence, said evidence cannot be given any credence and probative values unless it is shown that it falls within the exceptions to the hearsay rule.[11] In the present case, petitioners failed miserably to show that the financial statements and income tax returns are exceptions to the hearsay rule, thus, their contents have no probative value whatsoever. GONZALES V. NLRC Moreover, the failure of ATENEO to refute the contention of petitioner that the joint affidavits executed by the students and parents were "pre-prepared" raises serious doubts as to the probative value of this evidence. As correctly pointed out by the Executive Labor Arbiter, there is more reason to disregard it especially where the same was challenged and has remained unexplained. Hearsay evidence, in the strict sense, has no probative value whether objected to or not. 2. Documentary a. Probative value of documents otherwise inadmissible but admitted for lack of objection SECURITY BANK & TRUST CORPORATION V. TRIUMPH LUMBER AND CONSTRUCTION CORP It is true that the photocopies of the questioned checks were all identified by private respondents witness Yu Chun Kit during his direct testimony[15] without objection on the part

The same carelessness was shown when they subdued appellant. When he allegedly resisted arrest and punched Nemeno, the four other policemen helped each other pin the former to the ground. Significantly, none of them positioned himself to guard against any other threat and to provide cover for the rest Even after they had arrested appellant, the police displayed the same unbelievable nonchalance. Based on the PNP Order of Battle, it is clear that the alleged Perucho Gang was no pushover, for it was composed of former military men, including a sergeant and several corporals, equipped with assorted high-powered firearms. It must be stressed that the alleged objective of the policemen was to conduct a surveillance of the gang and the kidnap victims. Yet, they did not try to find out if any of these persons were in the vicinity. They did not even attempt to check whether the three construction workers were similarly armed or were also members of the gang. In failing to do so, they were imprudently exposing themselves and the kidnap victims to danger. True, such recklessness on the part of the policemen may signify mere incompetence. But it is unbelievable that they, or any other law enforcers for that matter, are capable of such gross ineptitude. Their wanton disregard of their own safety and that of the victims is incompatible with common experience. Otherwise stated, their story is too improbable to be accorded credence. That a person who was arrested and about to be detained would worry about his personal belongings, such as stereo and television, is hardly believable. But to maintain that he, a supposedly notorious gangster, would voluntarily retrieve from his hut a second gun and surrender it meekly and perfunctorily to the police, after he had already been apprehended, is ridiculous. The police did not say that the second firearm was a product of a lawful search incidental to a valid arrest; they said that appellant just voluntarily surrendered it. Why he did so the prosecution did not and could not explain.[32] In fact, common sense completely rejects this account. PEOPLE V. VIDAL While courts generally brush aside inconsequential contradictions between declarations of the affiant in his sworn statements and those in court, the rule is otherwise where the discrepancies touch on substantial and irreconcilable facts such those omissions in the affidavit concerning important details which the affiant would not have failed to mention and which omission could well affect the credibility of that affiant. We cannot understand why the trial court failed to entertain serious misgivings about the patently inconsistent and contradictory testimony of the complainant. True, Geraldine appeared clear and straightforward on direct examination, where questions and answers could be prepared and rehearsed beforehand. But she was a different witness when the court and the defense counsels took over the questioning. Her testimony was obviously not as clear and straightforward, as the trial court would want us to believe. Geraldines overall demeanor, the serious gaps in her testimony, the uncertainties in identifying the accused during the testimony, her fickleness in answering the questions hardly give the kind of credence to her supposed positive-testimony which would warrant a conviction based on the quantum of evidence required by our penal laws. PEOPLE V. BAYRON It is true the Court has sustained the defense of consensual sex in a number of rape cases. But, in those cases, evidence was presented, consisting of letters and the testimonies of witnesses, to corroborate the claim of the accused that the alleged rape was actually a sexual intercourse between consenting adults. Here, not only is there no evidence of this nature presented but, on

]
neck, and anterior portion of the body,[35] as in this case. These physical pieces of evidence, though mute, constitute an eloquent manifestation of truth and rates high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.[36] What is more, the other surrounding circumstances and physical evidence extant in the records of this case as gleaned from the testimonies of other witnesses for the prosecution, convincingly indicate the perpetration of rape and the commission of homicide. c. Death Certificates PEOPLE V. ABDUL Finally, we reject accused-appellants claim that the prosecution failed to prove the fact of death of the victims for the reason that no death certificate or testimony of an imam or Muslim priest was presented in court to prove the fact of death of Annih and Abraham. The absence of a death or burial certificate does not negate the fact of the killing [22] since corpus delicti can be proved by testimonial evidence[23] Corpus Delicti is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains of a house burned down.[24] In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime has been committed and is made up of two elements: a.) that a certain result has been proved; and b.) that some person is criminally responsible for the act.[25] In the present case, the eyewitnesses established the fact of death of the victims at the hands of the three brothers Isa Abdul, Minya Abdul and Maldis Abdul: d. Police Blotters PEOPLE V. MANEGDENG Moreover, this Court has consistently held that entries in a police blotter are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries and should not be given undue significance or probative value for they are usually incomplete and inaccurate. PEOPLE V SILVA This Court has ruled that official records, as a police blotter, should not be given undue significance or probative value for they are usually incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries. Entries in a police blotter are merely prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein but they are not conclusive e. Affidavits/Writings PEOPLE V. SANCHEZ We advert to that all-too familiar rule that discrepancies between sworn statements and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witnesses. [18] Sworn statements/affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations because the former are often executed when an affiants mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired.[19] Testimonies given during trials are mush more exact and elaborate.[20] Thus, testimonial evidence carries more weight than sworn statements/affidavits. GREPALIFE UNION V GREPALIFE But while it is true that affidavits may be regarded as infirm evidence [16] before the regular courts unless the affiants are presented on the stand, such affidavits by themselves are acceptable in proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. PEOPLE V. MERCADO

of petitioners counsel. The latter even cross-examined Yu Chun Kit,[16] and, at the formal offer of said exhibits, he objected to their admission solely on the grounds that they were irrelevant, immaterial and self-serving.[17] The photocopies of the checks may therefore be admitted for failure of petitioner to tender an appropriate objection[18] to their admission. Nevertheless, their probative value is nil. HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ V CA It is therefore evident that defendants-appellees never put in issue the inadmissible nature of Exh. A as a mere secondary evidence and that the trial judge did not exclude the same when it was formally offered, only to ultimately exclude it in its decision. It is true that the originals of Exh. A were never produced or accounted for by plaintiffs. Yet, notwithstanding this omission, the defense did not object to its not being the best evidence when it was formally offered. Had the defendants interposed an objection to Exh. A on the ground of its incompetency for not complying with the best evidence rule, it would have been properly excluded by the trial court. Defendants omission to object on the proper ground operated as a waiver, as this was a matter resting on their discretion. Unfortunately, petitioners victory was shortlived. For the Court of Appeals, while ruling that Exhibit A was admissible, concluded that the same had no probative value to support the allegation of the petitioners that the disputed land was sold to them in 1959, viz.: The lone fact that Atty. Tabangay asserted that he recognized his signature on the copy shown by Teodoro when the loss of the originals was just made known to him, does not render Exh. A trustworthy as to the actual execution of the alleged deed of sale. Exh. A does not even contain a reproduction of the alleged signatures of the Madrid brothers for comparison purposes. The surviving witness to the alleged execution, Constantino Balmoja was not presented to corroborate Atty. Tabangays testimony, hinged as the latter was on secondary evidence. b. Medico-Legal Reports PEOPLE V. LASOLA Neither is there need to delve at length into the issue that the medico-legal report is inconclusive proof of the commission of the offense, much less the guilt of the accused.[24] A medico-legal report is not indispensable when evidence other than the same point to the inescapable guilt of the accused. It is merely corroborative evidence, the absence of which would not prevent the prosecution from establishing the fact of rape, which in this case, was proved not just by the lone testimony of the victim but also by another witness in the person of her mother. PEOPLE V. QUISAY However, the results of these two medical examinations hardly suggest any conflict or inconsistency that would constrain us not to give probative weight to the second post-mortem examination. While it may be true that the medical certificate or testimonies of the physicians who have examined the victim may not alone suffice to prove that the victim was raped,[30] such evidence may be offered to corroborate the testimony of other prosecution witnesses to prove the fact of rape. The sexual assault in this case was proven not merely by the medical testimony of the prosecutions expert witnesses but on other convincing pieces of evidence. Considering the relative physical position of an accused in inflicting injuries upon a victim of rape and the victim, the usual location of the external bodily injuries of the victim is on the face,

The defense argues that the affidavits of Antonio Peralta and Nelson Tamares show that accused-appellant had no part in the illegal recruitment of workers. This is not true. They are merely incomplete, due no doubt to the fact that they were given ex parte. Moreover, as can be seen from the testimonies of these complainants quoted earlier, accused-appellant was clearly one of those who recruited them without license. Between an affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. [33]