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NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (LAW OF ECONOMICS).....................................................5
BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE..................................................................................................................6
SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVE...........................................................................................................6
SOURCES OF LAW.................................................................................................................... 7
HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES.................................................................. 7
HISTORY...........................................................................................................................................7
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: DIVISION OF POWERS .........................................................................8
OVERVIEW OF REGULATORS AND MARKETS.............................................................. 10
PURPOSES OF SECURITIES REGULATION .....................................................................................10
SECURITIES MARKETS...................................................................................................................10
TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE (TSX) AND TSX VENTURE .............................................................11
ELECTRONIC TRADING SYSTEMS.....................................................................................................11
REGULATORY STRUCTURE............................................................................................................11
GLOBAL SECURITIES REGULATION: IOSCO...................................................................................11
PROVINCIAL/TERRITORIAL REGULATION (PRIMARY REGULATORS)...............................................12
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC).........................................................................................12
Judicial Review of Regulators Decisions ....................................................................................12
CRITICISMS OF PROVINCIAL/TERRITORIAL REGULATION AND RESPONSES....................................13
OTHER SELF REGULATING ORGANIZATIONS ..................................................................................14
DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................................... 14
SECURITY........................................................................................................................................15
LEGISLATIVE DEFINITION................................................................................................................15
OPTIONS/FUTURES/DERIVATIVE SECURITIES..................................................................................16
INVESTMENT CONTRACT ................................................................................................................17
VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS.................................................................................................................18
RE WORLD STOCK EXCHANGE ......................................................................................................20
REPORTING ISSUER........................................................................................................................21
THE PROSPECTUS................................................................................................................... 22
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A PUBLIC OFFERING ...................................................22
ADVANTAGES .................................................................................................................................22
DISADVANTAGES.............................................................................................................................23
OVERVIEW OF PROCESS................................................................................................................23
UNDERWRITING .............................................................................................................................24
DEFINITION AND PURPOSE..............................................................................................................24
Intellectual Perspectives
Neoclassical Economic Analysis (law of economics)
Voluntary exchanges over collective decisions: individuals should be free to make
own choices because they are capable of acting rationally to maximize their own
welfare (i.e. in best place to determine what is in their interest and maximize utility)
Goal: efficiency - exchanges where the result of the exchange is that at least one
person is made better of by the exchange and neither person is made worse off
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Behavioural Finance
Examines decision making and factors that influence it
Empirical findings: people make decisions that are not rational
o Disposition Effect: avoiding regret and seeking pride causes investors to
be pre-disposed to selling winners to early and riding losers for too long
o House-Money Effect: After people experience a gain or profit, they are
willing to take more risk
o Risk-Aversion (snake-bite) Effect: after experiencing financial loss, people
become less willing to take a risk
o Endowment (or status quo bias) Effect: people are more protective of
things they already own rather than things they want to acquire (i.e.
tendency to hold the investments they already have; demand more to sell
an object than they would be willing to pay)
o Cognitive Dissonance and Investing: investors seek to reduce
psychological pain by filtering out negative information and fixating on
positive
o Mental Accounting: decision makers tend to place each investment into a
separate mental account (investors bundle the sale of losers and separate
the sale of winners over several days to prolong favourable feeling)
Socio-Legal Perspective
Examines behaviour of regulatory agencies
What factors influence rule making (i.e. social, economic, political, etc.)? Who
benefits from the rules? How do regulatory authorities use their enforcement power?
ice theory resources are allocated by regulators to those recipients who seek them
most forcefully usually relative small and well organized grounds that have a high per
capita stake in the regulations
Condon focus on the role of interests is problematic
o Interest tends to be treated as easily discoverable
o Confusion between regulatory effects and causation (i.e. if new regulatory
practice benefit some identifiable constituents, it is assumed that the
practice was put into place to benefit them)
Sources of Law
Note: common approach to numbering NI, NP and CSA notices [SEE pg.20]
Analysis:
Quasi-criminal offence is necessary to enforce substantive provisions and bolster
behaviour of issuers
If there is conflict between provincial and federal, provincial enactment is inoperative
Both can operate concurrently because there is no conflict in the sense that
compliance with one law involves a breach of the other
R v. McKenzie Securities [1966/Man.CA] harm to residents is sufficient connection to province
to engage provincial securities regulators
Facts: broker in Ontario sells securities by mail and telephone to investor in Manitoba
Analysis:
Non-resident of Manitoba can become liable under Manitoba statute if activities can
be construed as trading within the province
Brokers were trading in Manitoba (broad approach to what it means to trade in
particular province)
Condon: if residents of the province are harmed by the activities of those registered
elsewhere, it will be an acceptable connection to engage the jurisdiction of the
provincial regulator
Multiple Access v. McCutcheon [1982/SCC] provinces can regulate in area where federal
government has already regulated if no conflict
Quebec v. OSC [1992/Ont.CA] when province enters into the capital markets of another province,
must abide by that provinces securities law
Issue: Can OSC use its regulatory power against Quebec Crown Corporation?
Analysis:
Because Quebec corporation has entered into Ontario securities market by selling to
ON investors it is brought under umbrella of ONT securities legislation
Quebec would have reasonable expectations that any other province, when entering
Quebecs capital markets, would abide by Quebecs regulatory laws
Global Securities Corp. V. BC [2000/SCC] provincial power can extend to assisting foreign
jurisdictions b/c main purpose is to enforce BC law (get reciprocal help)
in pith and substance the provision was the enforcement of BC securities law by
obtaining reciprocal assistance from foreign regulators and by discovering foreign
securities law violations by domestic registrants
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Facts: P in BC and wants to be eligible to sue under the OSA b/c longer limitation period
Analysis:
Illustrates practical problems that arise when a scheme of provincial securities
regulation is not the same as other provincial securities regulation
Not open to the plaintiff to choose which Act applies
If securities are distributed is province under that provinces securities legation, that
provinces legislation governs opportunities to sue
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC)
Facts: review of OSC decision with respect to applying Ontario securities law or not
applying it to transactions entered into in Quebec which adversely affected Ontario
minority SH
Analysis:
Two goals: protection of investors and the efficiency of and public confidence in
capital markets
High degree of defence to OSC decisions given its expertise
Court applies a standard of reasonableness to find that the OSC appropriately
exercised discretion (i.e. found insufficient connection with Ontario to justify
intervening in order to avoid policing out of province transactions)
Re Cartaway Resources Crop. [2004/SCJ] can use sanctions to deter
Can use sanction to deter
Motivation was not punishing but to protect capital markets
can use sanctions to deter future behaviour, it is in their power to do so
Condon: these individuals are getting punished in order to deter
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Passport System: allows jurisdictions to enter into agreements whereby one jurisdiction
would recognize decision made by another on the basis of the rules applicable in that
other jurisdiction
MI11-101
Principle regulator for every issuer of securities (note: principle regulator determined
by location of issuers head office)
o Principle regulator grants approval for distribution of securities qualified
by a prospectus and all other provinces that were signatories to this
instrument will defer to the principles judgment
o Need approval of principle regular + Ontario
o If principle office is in Ontario, there will be another principal regulator
(next biggest province in which you are distributing securities)
New development: other provinces are defaulting to Ontario if Ontario is the province
with the closest connection [i.e. will only need to get approval from Ontario]
Other Self Regulating Organizations
Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS): responsible for market surveillance,
investigation, and enforcemen
o Real-time monitoring: protects investors by monitoring every single
equities trade as it occurs (i.e. computerized system flags deviations from
normal patterns of trading)
o Introduced Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR)
Investment Dealers Association (IDA): regulation of brokers (registration, reporting
and enforcement of professional standards of and business conduc)
o also operates as lobby group for industry (conflict of interest?)
o Note: plan for IDA and RS to merge into one body
Mutual Fund Dealers Association: regulates mutual fund dealers
Canadian Public Accountability Board: oversee the auditors of public companies
TSX and TSX venture listing requirements
Definitions
Tiered analysis:
Is item being bought or sold a security? If no, securities law N/A
Is security being traded? If no, no registration/disclosure requirements
Does trade amount to a distribution of offering of securities? If no, no prospectus
requirements
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Security
Legislative Definition
OSA s.1(1): A security includes,
o Broad - could mean any commodity you buy courts engage in policy
oriented analysis
o Distinction made by courts/regulators: when person bought this did they
think they were buying a commodity or did they think that they were
buying an investment
(c) any document constituting evidence of interest in an association of legatees or heirs,
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o Certificate that investors get from person called promoter (i.e. person
responsible for organizing business.)
o Considered as security b/c investing money is being used to engage in
profit making activity
(k) any oil or natural gas royalties or leases or fractional or other interest therein,
(l) any collateral trust certificate,
(m) any income or annuity contract not issued by an insurance company,
(n) any investment contract,
(o) any document constituting evidence of an interest in a scholarship or educational plan or
trust, and
(p) any commodity futures contract or any commodity futures option that is not traded
on a commodity futures exchange registered with or recognized by the Commission under
the Commodity Futures Act or the form of which is not accepted by the Director under that
Act
Definition of security is broad and regulators narrow down scope using policy-based
interpretation
Options/Futures/Derivative Securities
Option: instrument that gives the holder the right to buy or sell an underlying interest
(shares) in respect of a named issuer at an agreed price, on or before an agreed date
o Two key types issued by corporations
Option issued to existing SH (option to acquire additional SH at a
specified price at future point in time)
Option issued to executives as a form of compensation
o Note: inverse relationship between options trading and market stability
(b/c because you lock in price and reduce effect of volatility)
o Note: persons other than corporations can issue options (call options and
put options)
Call options: option writer (i.e. seller) sells option to purchaser for a price (known as
the option premium) which entitles the purchaser to force the writer to sell an
outstanding share of a 3rd party corporation at a specified price on or before a
specified date
Put options: purchaser of the option acquires the right to require the writer to
purchase a corporate share from him or her at a stated price on or before a certain date
Futures: contracts to sell a specified asset on a stated date in the future at a stated
price (Note: commodity futures contracts that are publicly traded on a commodity
futures exchange are excluded)
Derivative Securities: value of a derivative security derives from the value of
another security, financial asset, or other reference value (underlying interest)
o characterized as option or futures contract or a combination of the two
Buy options on value of stock index and exercise option if price you agreed to is
lower than the value of the instrument at the time you are entitled to exercise it
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Investment Contract
Securities and Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey [1946/US] 4 indicators of IC: (1)
investment of $ (2) common enterprise (3) expectation of profit (4) profits solely from efforts of others
Facts: sold pieces of land and offered service contract to cultivate and sell oranges on
behalf of the people that bought the land and is conveyed by warranty deed
Issue: Is this a real estate transaction or an investment
Analysis:
Definition of Investment 4 part TEST:
o (1) Investment of money
o (2) Common enterprise: investors pooling sources together in a common
enterprise (i.e. not a one-on-one transaction)
o (3) Expectation of profits
o (4) Profits expected come solely from the efforts of others
Form is immaterial transfer of property was incidental
Court focuses on fact that purchasers attracted by expectation of substantial profits
and that those profits accrued solely from the efforts of others
Common enterprise: commonality of interest profit would be derived from purchase
of fractional interest in orange grove
State of Hawaii v. Hawaii Market Centre [1971/Haw.Sup.Ct.]
Facts: retail co. raised capital by recruiting founding members to purchase merchandise
and then could earn money/compensation for referring and establishing new members
Analysis:
Broadens Howey Test (based on too narrow a concept of investor participation
necessary to revise because investors did have some participation here)
4-part Risk capital test: investment contract is created when
o Offeree furnishes initial value to the offeror
o A portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise
o Furnishing of the initial value is induced by offerors promises or
representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a
valuable benefit of some kind will accrue
o Offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual
control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise
o Note: part 2 and 4 are the key changes
All parts of the test are met
o Security is inseparable from risks of the enterprise [ability to earn money
is dependant on success of the enterprise]
Court focused on fact that paid more than asset was worth
overcharges were the investments and subject to the risks
o Irrelevant that inducements leading investor to risk are founded on
promises of fixed returns rather than a share in profits (note: key
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Whether there was a common enterprise and profits were derived solely from
significant efforts of persons other than investors was most contentious issuee
US case which found that sales of viatical was not a sale of a security [Life Partners]
OSC focused on when the promoter was engaging in investment related activities
o LP: investment effort (finding viator, engaging medical experts and
figuring out life expectancy) was done before investors came up
o Universal: activities done once investors had been located - more like a
common enterprise because these investors were heavily dependant on
Universal to make this work and were obtaining fractional interests
Note: buyers and sellers of securities sellers have power because they have the
knowledge BUT in this example have the reverse (the seller is the vulnerable party)
Albino [1991/OSC]
Facts: phantom stock options [incentive plan to senior officials - paid the difference
between the price at which the stock was traded at a certain point of time (award date)
and the price at which they were trading on the exercise date) insider trading
allegations (when Albino exercised his option, knew some material undisclosed info)
Analysis:
Security regulators did not agree 3 conclusions
o Not a security: not commonly known in the business world as securities
form of executive compensation
o Is a security: should be considered the same as any other derivative
securities, which draw their value form the underlying securities
Should be treated as trading securities even though no stock
exchanging hands because the award is substantially the same as
trading stock
o Couldnt decide: OSC should exercise discretionary power to sanction in
the public interest because behaviour was seriously prejudicial to public
confidence in capital markets
Trade
Significance: If there is a trade, the trader had to be registered [s.25]
ENTITY BEING REGULATED IS THE SELLER OF SECURITIES: want to
equalize position of sellers and buyers by making definition of trade broad
OSA s.1(1): A trade or trading includes,
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o Policy concern: control persons using ownership strategic for the purposes
of personal gain to them at the expense of other investors
(e) any act, advertisement, solicitation, conduct or negotiation directly or indirectly in
furtherance of any trade/sale of a security
(a) A trade in securities of an issuer that have not been previously issued,
o Applies to first time issuers and long-lived issuers issuing new securities
(b) A trade by or on behalf of an issuer in previously issued securities of that issuer that have
been redeemed or purchased by or donated to that issue ( moot cant redeem/re-issue)
(c) A trade in previously issued securities of an issuer from the holdings of any control
person,
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(a) Securities Issued under predecessor Act: corporations that issued VOTING securities
prior to the coming into force of the current act and obtained a prospectus receipt for them
(b) Filed Prospectus for which Director issued a receipt for under this Act
(b.1) that has filed a securities exchange take-over bid circular under this Act before
December 14, 1999
o Historical significance: strategy issuers used (take over shell company and
issued securities out of them)
(c) Listing on recognized stock exchange: since the 15th day of September, 1979 listed and
posted for trading on any stock exchange in Ontario recognized by the Commission,
regardless of when such listing and posting for trading commenced
o Historical interest: issuers on exchanges used to transfer to TSX and be able to
sell securities in Ontario w/out prospectus filed in Ontario
(d) to which the Business Corporations Act applies and which, for the purposes of that Act,
is offering its securities to the public,
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(e) that is the company whose existence continues following the exchange of securities of a
company by or for the account of such company with another company or the holders of the
securities of that other company in connection with,
o (i) a statutory amalgamation or arrangement, or
o (ii) a statutory procedure under which one company takes title to the assets of the
other company that in turn loses its existence by operation of law, or under which
the existing companies merge into a new company, where one of the
amalgamating or merged companies or the continuing company has been a
reporting issuer for at least twelve months, or
The Prospectus
Prospectus Required - 53(1): No person or company shall trade in a security on his, her
or its own account or on behalf of any other person or company if the trade would be a
distribution of the security, unless a preliminary prospectus and a prospectus have been
filed and receipts have been issued for them by the Director
Prospectus required for initial public offering (IPO) and a primary offering of
securities
o IPO: first offering of securities by an issuer entering the market
o Primary offering: first offering of a particular set of securities my an issuer
already in the market (reporting issuer)
Prospectus also required in limited instance of secondary offer (i.e. resale of securities
by a control block holder)
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3. Pre-closing:
Receipt for final prospectus obtained, commercial copes of final printed and
distributed, cooling off period beings to run
4. Post-closing
Money and securities change hands, underwriter advices issuer when issuer is out of
distribution and how much sold in various jurisdictions
Underwriting
Definition and Purpose
Three main parties is offering process: issuer, underwriter, investor
Underwriter - s.1(1): person or company who, as principal, agrees to purchase securities
with a view to distribution or who, as agent, offers for sale or sells securities in connection
with a distribution and includes a person or company who has a direct or indirect
participation in any such distribution, but does not include,
o (a) a person or company whose interest in the transaction is limited to receiving
the usual and customary distributors or sellers commission payable by an
underwriter or issuer,
o (b) a mutual fund that, under the laws of the jurisdiction to which it is subject,
accepts its shares or units for surrender and resells them,
o (c) a company that, under the laws of the jurisdiction to which it is subject,
purchases its shares and resells them, or
o (d) a bank listed in Schedule I, II or III to the Bank Act (Canada) with respect to
securities described in paragraph 1 of subsection 35 (2) or to such banking
transactions as are designated by the regulations;
Business Purpose: understand market for securities (often determine terms and price
of offering given market demand), find investors, offers credibility to issuers (i.e. well
known investment banking firms)
Legal Purpose: gatekeeper to the capital markets
o Can be sued by investors for failing to ensure that the prospectus is free of
misrepresentations [130(1)(b)]
o Acts as 3rd party evaluating the issuers securities and evaluating
disclosure provided in prospectus
o Relationship between the underwriter and issuer is somewhat adversarial
Certificate of Underwriter s.59(1): subject to subsection 63(2), where there is an
underwriter, a prospectus shall contain a certificate in the following form, signed by the
underwriter : To the best of our knowledge, information and belief, the foregoing constitutes
full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts relating to the securities offered by this
prospectus as required by Part XV of the Securities Act and the regulations thereunder (note:
proposed amendment note in effect)
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Must play devils advocate, going beyond statements of director and challenge
disclosure issuer proposes to make to the investing public (cant be automatic
reliance)
Must seek out and question all relevant and material facts to reasonably ensure
himself that facts are full and true
Note: argument that this adversarial role is unrealistic in the business climate
(underwriters want to earn money)
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Material Adverse Change - 57(1): where a material adverse change occurs after a receipt is
obtained for a preliminary prospectus and before the receipt for the prospectus is obtained or,
where a material change occurs after the receipt for the prospectus is obtained but prior to the
completion of the distribution, an amendment to such preliminary prospectus or prospectus
shall be filed as soon as practicable and in any event within ten days after the change occurs
Waiting Period - 65(1): interval of at least ten days, between the issuance by the Director of
a receipt for a preliminary prospectus and the issuance by the Director of a receipt for the
prospectus
Proposed Amendment 65(1): period prescribed by regulation or, if no period is
prescribed, the period between the Directors issuance of a receipt for a preliminary
prospectus and the Directors issuance of a receipt for the prospectus.
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Once review process is complete, regulator sends comment letter to issuer advising of
any required revisions or additional information - issuer revises accordingly and
submits final prospectus to the commission
Statistics: 32% of prospectus reviewed were long form; 65% were short form; of long
form, 69% got basic review and only 15% got full review
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KEY: Issuer/underwriter are able to solicit expressions of interest BUT not allowed to
engage in advertising that is not directly connected with the availability of the
prospectus
o Policy: that public might take info in preliminary prospectus as final
representation of the accuracy of information underpinning the offer
o Problem: fine line between testing the market for expressions of interest
and advertising during the waiting period
The prospectus requirement s.6.2(1): Securities legislation generally provides that no one
may trade in a security where that trade would be a distribution unless the prospectus
requirement has been satisfied, or an exemption is available.
6.2(2): The analysis of whether any particular advertising or marketing activities is prohibited
by virtue of the prospectus requirement turns largely on whether the activities constitute a
trade and, if so, whether such a trade would constitute a distribution.
Permissible Advertising/marketing during the waiting period - 6.5(1): it is permissible
during the waiting period between the issuance of the receipt for t he preliminary prospectus
and the receipt for the final prospectus to:
o (a) distribute notices, circulars, advertisements, letters or other communications
that
identify the securities proposed to be issued,
state the price of such securities, if then determined, and
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Two requirements: (1) full, true, plain disclosure of all material facts and (2)
compliance with securities law [key rule is NI 41-101]
Financial Statements
NI 41-101, part 4 [p.86]
An issuer, other than investment fund, that files a long form prospectus must include
in it the financial statements and the managements discussion and analysis [MDNA]
required by this Instrument [s.4.1(1)]
Requirement for audit of financial statements included in prospectus [s.4.2(1)]
Each financial statement and MDNA included in or incorporated by reference into the
long form prospectus must be approval by board of directors before filing [s.4.4(1)]
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prospectus or prospectus shall be filed as soon as practicable and in any event within ten days
after the change occurs
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Test for materiality is objective market impact test investor wants to know facts
that would reasonably be expected to significantly affect the market price or value of
securities
Did not contain full, true, and plain disclosure of all material facts
Unique risks (intermingling of business with business in Eastern Europe that were
known to be money launders) was not disclosed
Did not tell investors precisely what YBM knew about the investigation or the
purpose of the special committee
Note courts concern that lead underwriter sat on special committee if the
independence of ones mandate is threatened then the reasonableness of ones
judgment becomes questionable (Condon: if underwriters suppose to be a neutral
third party, this shouldnt happen)
See Form 41-101FI General Instruction 15: forward looking info included in a
prospectus must comply with ss.4A.2 and 4A.3. FOFI must comply with Part 4B
o Note: NI 51 - 102 only refers to reporting issuers BUT Form 41-101FI
deems these sections to apply as if the issuer were a reporting issuer in at
least one jurisdiction
unless the issuer had a reasonable basis for the forward looking information
Disclosure 4A.3: reporting issuer disclosing material forward looking information must
include disclosure that:
o (a) identifies forward looking information as such
o (b) cautions users that actual results may vary and identifies material risk factors
that could cause actual results to differ materially
o (c) states material factors or assumptions used to develop forward looking
information
o (d) describes reporting issuers policy for updating the information if it includes
procedures in addition to those listed in s.5.8(2)
the FOFI or financial outlook is based on assumptions that are reasonable in the
circumstances.
4B.2(2): FOFI or Financial Outlook that is based on assumptions that are reasonable in the
circumstances, must, without limitation:
o (a) be limited to a period for which the information in the FOFI or financial
outlook can be reasonably estimated and
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o (b) Use accounting policies that the reporting issuer expects to use to prepare its
historical and financial statements for the period covered by the FOFI or the
financial outlook
Additional Disclosure 4B.3: In addition to disclosure required by s.4A3, if reporting
issuer disclosure FOFI must include disclosure that states:
o (a) the date management approved
o (b) explains the purpose of the FOFI and cautions readers that the information
may not be appropriate for other purposes
Merit jurisdiction regulators can say they dont think that it is a good investment
for anyone to make BUT
Note: language in bold saying no securities commission has passed on merits (i.e.
cant say where regulator has issued a receipt the regulator is saying there is worth the
investment)
(a) the prospectus or any document required filed with it (i) does not comply with in any
substantial respect with any of the requirement of the Act/regulations or (ii) contains a
statement, promise, estimate or forecast that is misleading, false or deceptive, or (iii) contains
a misrepresentation
(b) an unconscionable consideration has been paid or given or is intended to be paid or given
for any services or promotional purposes or for the acquisition of property;
(c) the proceeds from the sale of the securities under the prospectus and other resources of the
issuer are insufficient to accomplish the purpose of the issue stated in the prospectus
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Example 2
Day 1: agree to buy
Day 4: receive final
prospectus
Day 5 prospectus amendment
Example 3
Day 1: receive final prospectus
Day 4: agree to buy
Day 5 prospectus amendment
filed
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filed
Day 6: wants out
Cooling off period starts on
day 1 cant get out of the
agreement b/c amendment was
not filed until after this
purchasers cooling off period
was over
filed
Day 8: amendment delivered
Day 9: want out
Fact that amendment filed
before cooling off period
ended triggers obligation to
receive the amendment
cooling off period re-starts on
date the amendment is
received
SUM:
Not bound by agreement during cooling off period
Cooling off period runs from the date purchaser receives latest prospectus (date of
agreement is irrelevant)
If an amendment is filed during cooling off period, period will re-start on date
amendment is received
If an amendment filed after cooling off period, does not re-start the period
Failure to Deliver Prospectus
Penal Sanction s.122(1)(c): everyone who contravenes Ontario securities law, is guilty of
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o More outcome would relief through the opportunity at common law for
SH to sue for breach of contract where a prospectus should have been
provided and was not
o Jones v. Deacon Hodgson: failure to file prospectus renders contract of
purchase and sale void and there is no limitation period for a remedy to be
available (unlike misrepresentation)
Lapse and Refiling of Prospectus (note: not covered in class)
Lapse Date s.62(1): 12 months after the date of the most recent prospectus relating to the
security
directors and officers must supplying information and certificates that allow the holder to sell
the securities in that if the issuer doesnt co-operate the regulator has authority to order the
issuer to furnish such information OR
Waiver s.64(2): Director can waive statutory requirements if satisfied that all reasonable
efforts have been made to comply with this Part and the regulations and that no person or
company is likely to be prejudicially affected by such failure to comply
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Underlying policy: these issuers are already in the market, listed on exchanges, and
have widely disseminated information about them
OSA s.63(1): permits SF prospectus and deems it to provide sufficient disclosure of all
material facts for purposes of s.56 if it complies with regulations
Trend: move towards SFP rather than LFP [2005 51% were SFP; 2007 65% were
SFP]
Eligibility Requirements
Content/Disclosure
Review of SFP
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Note: enhanced passport system ONT had undertaken to review SFP within two
days of receiving
Shelf-Prospectus
Governing law: 44-102
Eligibility: issuers eligible for SFP [s.2.2]
Self-prospectus can qualify a series of distributions over a 2 year period [i.e. file and
the same document can qualify a number of subsequent distributions as long as they
occur within a two year period of getting the receipt for the shelf prospectus]
44-101CP s.1.6: Issuers qualified under NI 44-101 to file SFP using the self
distribution procedures are governed by requirements and procedures of NI 44-101
[should have regard to NI 44-101 then refer to NI 22-102 and any accompanying
policy for additional requirements]
NI 44-102 s.5.6: Information that may be omitted from shelf-prospectus if not
known by the issuer at the time it is filed
o Terms of the securities that may be distributed
o Dollar amount, size, and other specific terms of each
o Terms of plans of distribution
o Information about underwriter
Post-receipt Pricing Prospectus
Governed law: 44-103
Eligibility: available to ALL ISSUERS
Similar to shelf-prospectus in that you can distribute securities and decide pricing
after you receive receipt for prospectus as long as they are distributed within 90 days
o Often used in situations where need additional financing but are still
deciding on kind of security
o Receipt expires after 90 days [s.3.5]
Can only be used to qualify a specific transaction and a single type of security
o not including a rights offering [s.2.1]
Two-step filing process:
o Based prospectus document filed plus
o Supplement (one page document) dealing with the actual securities [s.4.1]
Does not need further regulatory approval
Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System
Governing law: NI 71-101 (governs application of MJDS rules to US issuers wishing
to issue securities in Canada)
Underlying principle of mutual recognition: allows US issuers to distribute securities
to Canadian investors using US disclosure documents
Eligibility requirements for Canadian issuers wishing to issue securities in US:
o Reporting issuer in Canada for one year
o Public float of US 75 million
41
(d) Every expert in relation to: reports, opinions, statements made by them
(e) Every other signer of prospectus or amendment to the prospectus (i.e. CFO)
Kerr v. Danier [2007/SCC] no liability for non-disclosure of material facts arising after receipt
Facts:
May 6: receipt obtained for final prospectus forecast of Q4 financial results
May 16-19: Q4 results lagging behind due to unseasonably warm weather
May 20: distribution closed
June 4: issues revised forecast and material change report; share price drops
June 27: Q4 ends; original forecast substantially achieved
Analysis:
Inconsistency in wording of s.57 and s.130
o If material change occurs after receipt and prior to end distribution, have
to file an amendment [s.57]
o Right of action for misrep (misrep. defined as a material fact) [s.130]
Cant read s.130 as a self-standing provision only
Only positive obligation to disclosure material changes after receipt no liability
under s.130 for failing to disclosure material facts that dont amount to material
changes after receipt
Material change s.1(1): change in the business, operations or capital of the issuer that
would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of any
of the securities of the issuer
Changes here was a material fact not change because the financial downturn was a
results of a change in weather (external to issuer)
Earnings (results of operations) not read into provision
Condon: doesnt accord w/ what investors want to know earnings affect price a lot
43
Remedies
Rescission [only if defendant is issuer/selling SH (130(1)(a) or underwriter (130(1)
(b)] or damages
Limitation re underwriters s.130(6): not liable for more than they underwrote
Non-liability for damages - s.130(7): not liable for damages that the D proves do not
represent depreciation in value of the security as a result of the misrepresentation
Joint and several liability s.130(8): can choose D - subject to court discretion if
satisfied that to permit recovery of such contribution would not be just and equitable
Limitation re amount recoverable s.130(9): damages limited to price at which the
securities were offered to the public (no opportunity $ - i.e. would have bought
something else)
Kerr v. Danier: Prima facie measure of damages is difference between price paid and
post-misrepresentation price (dont have to crystallize loss can still hold securities)
Limitation Periods s.138
Cant bring action for rescission more than 180 days after the date of the transaction
that gave rise to the cause of action; or
Cant bring any other action more than 180 days after P first had knowledge of the
facts giving rise to cause of action or 3 years after date of transaction (earlier of)
Statutory Defences to s.130(1)
Issuer defences
o Condon: if market wide loss accounted for some of loss, may be off the hook for
that portion BUT there are few opportunities for this
NOTE: ONUS ON DEFENDANT
Additional defences for directors/officers/underwriters
44
statement of the expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from the report, opinion or
statement of the expert
(i) After reasonable investigation, had reasonable grounds to believe that such
part of the prospectus/amendment fairly represented report, opinion or statement
(ii) on becoming aware of misrepresentation advised the Commission and gave
reasonable general notice that such use had been made and that he, she or it
would not be responsible for that part
Key requirements:
Actual belief that there is no misrepresentation
Reasonable investigation to provide reasonable grounds for that belief
*Issuer and Selling SH do NOT have due diligence defence*
Due Diligence Defence OSA- s.130(4)(5): No person or company, other than the issuer or
selling security holder UNLESS:
(a) Filed to conduct reasonable investigation as to provide reasonable grounds for a belief that
there had been no misrepresentation; or
(b) Believed there had been a misrepresentation.
o Similar results for two VPs: court makes mention of fact that they were
relatively uneducated, but there was nothing to show that they made
reasonable investigation to provide reasonable grounds for belief that there
is no misrepresentation (didnt matter that they couldnt read)
Lawyer/outside directors
o Outside director who participated as lawyer in preparation of prospectus
held to higher standard than other outside directors (should have known
obligations under statute)
o Condon: Those who sit on board who have particular set of expertise and
experience will be assessed in connection whether they acted in
accordance with the appropriate standard for that profession or for that
skill set
Outside Directors and underwriters: need to make some effort to verify info given by
officers/inside directors
NOTE: burden of proof falls on defence in US
Facts: investigated for illegal activity (money laundering and organized crime) shortform prospectus offering special committee said no disclosure AIF only said
subject to risks generally associated with companies doing business in Eastern Europe
Analysis:
Issue 1: Definition of materiality
Reinforces statutory standard: whether undisclosed facts would have revealed that
YBM was exposed to risks that would have significant effect on value of shares if
disclosed
Some facts may be material on their own while other facts may be material in
accordance with other facts (must be assed contextually)
Common sense must prevail
Condon: compare to Kerr big difference in SCC approach to material and OSC
(SCC never references broader factual context)
Issue 2: role of OSC re assessing due diligence
Jurisdiction to make sanctions is independent of whether or not they would have met
their due diligence defence under s.130
Even if due diligence defence is made out, can still mark order in public interest
Issue 3: Approach to due diligence
Look at individual directors in terms of skills and experience and whether they
exercised an appropriate level of due diligence
Members of Committee:
o Mitchell: belief not reasonable given that he was an experienced
director/underwriter, had considerable skill, access to most information,
and extensive participation (focused on potential conflict of interest acting
as director and underwriter)
46
o Davies: belief not reasonable given his skill and business experience he
didnt act prudently after personal visit from FBI (didnt ask questions)
o Schmidt: age, inexperience, and lack of information reasonable to rely
on advice from experienced counsel and advisors
Outside Directors:
o Peterson: lawyer - Due diligence available but barely given professional
reputation
o Antes and Greenwald: adverse comments about being more appreciative
of muddy disclosure, but pass (no material role/participation)
o Condon: OSC more generous to outside directors (but more expectations
since Enron scandals)
Underwriter: defence not available as it was a sophisticated and experienced
underwriting firm, had more knowledge than typical underwriter
Continuous Disclosure
ALL REPORTING ISSUERS are subject to periodic and timely disclosure obligations
Policy Rationales
Up to date disclosure assists in valuing securities (EMH efficient market means
information reflect in price in fasted way)
Reduces possibilities for fraud (insiders of issuers cant take advantage of position)
Assists w/ achieving corporate governance goals (i.e. managerial accountability)
Equality of opportunity as between all investors
Increases investor confidence
Facilitates the issuance of new securities b/c can use publicly available info to gain
timely access to financing through SF, shelf, post-receipt pricing, multijurisidctional
disclosure system prospectuses
Arguments against mandatory disclosure regime:
Market is better regulator of info than regulator rules
o Rules fossilized dont meet future needs
o Flexible Market issuers respond to signals from investors re info needed
o Too onerous and costly keeps companies private
Issuers have incentives to voluntary disclose
Role of gatekeepers in disclosure system
Costs of mandatory disclosure lowers value of issuer
47
48
Overall performance
Selected Annual Information
Results of operations
Summary of quarterly results
Liquidity (i.e. how much cash company has to meet its obligations)
Capital Resources
Off-Balance Sheet arrangements (that are reasonably likely to have an effect on
current or future operations of financial condition)
Transactions with related parties
Proposed Transactions
Critical accounting estimates
Changes in accounting policies
Must disclose info number of outstanding shares have in market place [s.5.4]
o Policy: tells how many SH have claim on the assets of the issuers
FOFI NI 51-102 - s.5.8(3):
o If previously FOFI is no longer accurate, but disclose this in MD&A
o
NOTE: doc most like prospectus (description of business, directors, major business
contracts, legal liabilities, etc.)
Filing Requirement s.6.2:
50
Reviewed filings
No misrepresentation (no untrue statement of material fact or omission of
material fact)
Fairly represent financial condition, results of operations, and cash flow
Responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure procedures and control
over internal financial reporting for the issuer and that you have designed such
disclosure procedures to provide that reasonable assurance re reliably of financial
reporting and evaluated effectiveness
Caused issuer to disclose in MD&A any material change in internal control over
financial reporting
51
NOTE: internal control over financial reporting (reporting financial info across all
segments of business and operating divisions) is controversial
Compliance costly in US
Canada: rejected proposal to require internal controls audited (just have to certify that
these are in place and working to the best of their knowledge)
Audit Committees: MI 52-110
Venture issuers are exempt from composition requirements in Part 3 and reporting
obligations in Part 5 [s.6.1]
Characteristics of Non-Venture Issuer Audit Committee- Part 3
Meaning of Independence
Relationship with External Auditors s.2.2: external auditor must report directly to
audit committee
Mandated Audit Committee Responsibilities s.2.3:
o
o
o
o
(1) Must have written charter that sets out mandate and responsibilities.
(2) recommend external auditor and compensation to BOD
(3) Directly responsible for overseeing the work of the external auditor
(4) Pre-approve all non-audit services provided by the issuers external auditor.
52
o
o
o
o
(5) Review financial statements, MD&A and annual and interim earnings press
releases before disclosure
(6) Be satisfied that adequate procedures are in place for review public disclosure
of financial information and assess the adequacy of those procedures.
(7) Establish procedures for receipt, retention and treatment of complaints
received re accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters
(8) Review and approve hiring policies of issue regarding former or present
partners and employees of external auditor of the issuer.
Disclosure MI 52-110FI:
NI 58-101F1- Disclosure:
BOD: identity and whether they are independent, whether the majority of directors are
independent (if not describe what BOD does it facilitate its exercise of independent
judgment), whether chair is independent
BOD mandate
Whether BOD has written position descriptions
Training and continuing education for new directors
Whether BOD has adopted a written code of conduct and any other steps taken to ensure
exercise of independent judgment and encourage ethical business conduct
Process for nomination of directors
Compensation (how it is determined whether there is an independent compensation
committee, etc)
Other Board Committees
Assessments (whether committees and individual directors are regularly assessed)
Composition of BOD
Meetings of Independent Directors
BOD mandate
Position Descriptions
Training and Education
53
Decision to implement a such a change where it is believed that confirmation of the decision
by BOD or any other persons acting in a similar capacity is probable
Pezim v. BC [1994/SCC]
Drilling Results: material change and should be disclosed in a timely way
o Contextual analysis: BC Act referred to as a change in business,
operations, assets or ownership that is reasonably expected to
significantly affect market price of value of securities of issuer in order
to give meanings to expression, necessary to read in value (of assets)
Problematic as per SCC that stock options were awarded to senior mangers a day or
two before disclosure of results
o Senior management/directors have a positive duty to inquire as to all
material changes if issuer wants to engage in securities transactions BUT
if disclosed prior to transaction wont be possibility of insider trading
o Duty to disclose before reporting issuer engages in a securities transaction
Private Placement of Shares: material change if potential to have significant effect on
material ownership of issuer
o Material change - put a significant SH in position to block transactions
Break down in contract for sale of new securities for over 4M: material change
54
YBM Magnex International Inc. [2003/OSCB] material change where implication of even is a
material change - when it is uncertain if change will occur, apply probability/magnitude test
Facts: audit suspension Apr19 due to concerns wrt to validity of transactions, whether
counterparties to YBM were legal entities, organized crime money laundering auditing
deadline mid-may lawyer said didnt need to disclose
Analysis:
Implication of audit suspension: YBM missing filing deadline and having securities
subject to cease trade order
Implications of the audit suspension constituted a material change
Materiality is a question of mixed law and fact
Supercritical interpretations of meaning of material change doesnt support goal of
promoting disclosure or protecting investing public
Material change is not certain to occur
Probability/magnitude test: significance of information as it affects the price of
securities discounted by the changes of it occurring
Affect on price of securities would be significant (cease trade order) and it was
probably to occur given extraordinary nature of concerns and D&Ts request for
forensic investigation, after which it would decide whether to continue audit
Kerr v. Danier [2007/SCC] material change does not include change in results of operations
caused by something external to the issuer
Facts: claim under s.130 for damages arising from alleged misreps contained in
prospectus wrt forecast (FOFI) fourth quarter results were lagging behind its forecast
due to unseasonably warm weather but didnt update info until 2 weeks after IPO
closed
Issue: whether intra-quarterly financial results amounted to a material change
Analysis:
Distinction b/w material fact and material change: material change is limited to
change in business, operations or capital
Literal/narrow reading of change in business, operations, or capital
Change in intra-quarterly financial results is not a change in issuers business,
operations, or capital
Not a change in operations was a change in result of operations caused by
something external to issuer
Poor intra-quarterly results may reflect a material change in business operations if
caused by something internal to the issuer (e.g. restructuring)
Condon: less expansive view than Pezim could be b/c Pezim originated as question
of JR while Kerr originative as action under s.130
NP 51-201 Examples of Material Information NOT MANDATORY - s.4.3:
Changes in corporate structure
o Reorg, amalgamations, mergers
55
56
Condon: once you make confidential disclosure, you acknowledge that a material
change has occurred (cant not disclose later and argue that it isnt material change)
NP 51-201 s.2.3: issuers must monitor trading in securities very closely. If unusual
market activity, may mean that info is leaked and full public disclosure must be made
Timing of Disclsoure
Timing OSA s.75(1): immediately issue press release and file report as soon as
practicable and within 10 days from date of change
Pezim v. BC
Threshold test for timing - probability/magnitude test disclose when significant
impact on price or value of securities and when it is probable to occur
Duty to disclose prior to engaging in self-dealing security transaction (i.e. awarding
stock options to senior management)
AIT Advanced Information Technologies [2007/OSC]
Facts:
Analysis:
Discussion of probability/magnitude test
o Cautions that US doesnt have equivalent concept of material change
o May be useful for issue of materiality, but not useful in determining
whether a change has actually occurred
Meaning of implement
o Act specifies that there is material change when decision to implement
change made by BOD and it is believed that approval is probable
o TEST: in circumstances of merger and acquisition transaction, whether
there is sufficient commitment by both parties (commitment by one party
is insufficient)
o 3M not sufficiently committed to this at end of April
Role of LOI with respect to small public issuer, paras 246ff and para 255, 263
o Signing of LOI will trigger disclosure in some cases depending on content
o Did not trigger disclosure in this case: Non-binding, price not firm, and
most of conditions precedent were beyond ability of AIT to resolve
57
Rumours (that a particular change is about to occur company cant always contain
confidential info)
NP 51-201 - s.2.3: If a confidential material change has had leaked out or appears to
affect share price, company should take immediate steps to ensure full public
announcement and get exchange to halt trading until news release is issued
NP 51-201 s.6.13: adopt a no comment policy and ensure it is applied consistently
(inconsistent response may be interpreted as tipping)
Selective Disclosure
Reporting issuers or executives/officers within reporting issuers may make disclosure
to some subset of market participants but not to the market generally (e.g. info
preferentially distributed to analysts within brokerage firms)
o Condon: can lead to tipping allegations
NP 51-201 (NOT MANDATORY)
Dont privilege particular types of investors or particular types of market
participants
3.3(5): necessary course of business exception for tipping doesnt generally permit
company to make selective disclosure of material information to analyst, institutional
investor, or other market professional
3.3(7): distinction b/w disclosures to credit rating agencies (necessary course of
business) and disclosure to analysts (not necessary course of business)
3.7: mitigating factors considered in selective disclosure enforcement proceedings
o Implemented, maintained and followed policies to prevent tipping?
o Selective disclosure was unintentional?
o Steps taken to disseminate information unintentionally disclosed?
Part V Risks Involved with relations w/ analysts:
o 5.2: Analyst reports (analysts often ask companies to confirm)
o 5.3: Confidentiality Agreements w/ Analysts (no exception to tipping
provisions for this)
Part VI Best Disclosure Practices
o
o
o
o
o
o
58
59
Limits on Liability
Hold more than 10% of the securities that carry a right to vote
(ii) if acting in combination w/ people or companies that hold more than 10% of
the voting rights
(d) a reporting issuer that has purchased, redeemed or otherwise acquired a security of its
own issue, for so long as it continues to hold that security,
(e) person or company designated as an insider in an order made under s.1(11),
o PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD
o
62
(a) a person or company that is an insider, affiliate or associate of (i) the reporting issuer, (ii)
a person or company that is proposing to make a take-over bid, or (iii) a person or
company that is proposing to become a party to a reorganization, amalgamation, merger or
64
Re Donnini [2002/OSCB] event not certain to occur at the time of trading (contingent event) can
still be material fact based on probability that it will occur and the magnitude of the event
Facts: D a trader w/ Yorkton Yorkton assisting KCA wrt second special warrants
financing Paterson made D aware of possibility of KCA financing that day and day
after D traded an unusual high volume of KCA stock (short trading i.e. selling SH dont
own to be bought back later in expectation of a decrease in price)
Issue: whether Donnini engaged in insider trading of shares of KCA in that he had
knowledge of a material fact even though the fact was not certain to occur at the time of
trading
Analysis:
D was in special relationship w/ KCA [s.76(5)(b)]
D purchased and sold securities of KCA
Argument: second financing not material info b/c nothing had crystallized - approval
required by both parties and approval did not occurs until after the change
65
Court applies probability/magnitude test: probability that event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the event (materiality is met where some level of both
probability and magnitude is reached)
o Highly probable that financing would occur: P wanted to do deal and
instructed Y to prepare engagement letter
o Significant effect on value of KCA SH (considers US test whether
reasonable investor considers fact to be important in investment decision)
o Proposed special second warrants financing, negotiations concerning it,
and the proposed price and size of it were all material facts
o Potential magnitude was high, so lower probability of occurrence than
found in this case would still lead to same conclusion
D had knowledge: director and 4th largest SH of Ys parent, colleague of Patterson
(akin to partnership), intimately involved with Ys exposure to KCA, three minute
meeting with P, Ds trading
Condon: case criticized b/c OSC sanctioned Donnini w/ 15 year ban on trading
securities (significantly more serious than sanction in past to send deterrent message)
Policy: is probability/magnitude test fair considering test is applied in hindsight after
contingent event occurs?
R v. Feldlerhof [2007] guilt does not depend on use of material info consider materiality of each
fact sepeartely
Facts:
Feldlerhof: VP of exploration and director of Bre-X
June 20/96-Feb17/97: good stock performance (270/SH) due to 4 press releases
Due diligence by company entering into joint venture w/ Bre-X revealed property had
virtually no gold
May 4/97: Bre-X confirmed results, issued press release, stock dropped to 0.90/SH
Insider trading allegations against F
Analysis:
Requirement #1: D must be in special relationship with the company - YES
Requirement #2: D must have purchased or sold securities
o Not necessary for D to personally give direction to purchase or sell
o What if broker exercises sale/purchase in discretionary client account
w/out receiving instructions? Defence of due diligence available if insider
took care to prevent purchase or sale
o Circumstantial evidence that F directed sale from Nesbitt Burns account
(faxes giving instructions/insider reports filed and signed by F)
Requirement#3: D must have knowledge of material information that is not generally
disclosed
o Whether the alleged information was (at time of trade) (1) a fact, (2)
known by F at the relevant time, (3) material, and (4) not generally
disclosed
o Irrelevant whether D makes use undisclosed material fact
66
o Must show that at least one particular was true, that the defendant had
knowledge of it at the time of the trade, that it was material, and that it was
undisclosed at the time of the trade
o Example:
Count 1: particular 1 and/or particular 2 and/or particular 3
Count 2: particular 1 and/or particular 2 and/or particular 3
Acquitted b/c prosecution failed to examine each fact (particular) individually when
assessing materiality (i.e. said facts as a whole were material)
Tipping
Key elements:
(1) Accused (tipper) in special relationship with reporting issuer
(2) Accused informs another person (tippee) of material information wrt
reporting issuer other than in the necessary course of business
(3) Accused informed of material information before it was generally disclosed
OSA Prohibition on Tipping s.76(2): No reporting issuer and no person or company in a special
relationship with a reporting issuer shall inform, other than in the necessary course of business, another
person or company of a material fact or material change with respect to the reporting issuer before the
material fact or material change has been generally disclosed
67
R appeals conviction and sentence on basis that TJ: (1) placed too much confident in
Ds credibility and (2) paid insufficient attention to whether there was enogh evidence
for each count
No requirement that tipper know, or be reckless to whether, the person receiving the
information would use it (strict liability no mens rea due diligence defence)
TJ made improper inference wrt Rs credibility and flow of information
o Relied on other transaction which had no material relevance to this case
o concluded info wrt to transactions was free-flowing BUT all evidence on
issue was that deal specific information was not free-flowing
o most other reasons for rejecting based on fact that couldnt remember
things (but note that D couldnt either)
TJ made improper inferences wrt flow if information
Problematic nature of Ds motivation not sufficiently addressed by TJ strong
motivations to lie
TJ should have approached each count individually
o R only involved in 3 of the 10 transactions
Court finds problem in fact that rejects Rankins evidence as raising reasonable doubt
b/c he couldnt recall but accepts Duics as proving beyond a reasonable doubt when
he couldnt recall
Other rational conclusions other people who were privy to the info D had access
to Cs computer and admitted to trying to break into computer
New trial ordered
NOTE: early 2007, OSC decides to pursue s.127 hearing (permanently restrict from
being member of securities industry in ONT) in hopes of settlement
Condon: demonstrates difficulties of criminal proceedings higher burden of proof must have sufficient evidence for every count beyond a reasonable doubt
Condon: argument that OSC paid high price to get charges on Rankin
Defences
Statutory Defences
Reasonable Belief that Information Generally Disclosed OSA s.76(4)
s.76(4): No contravention of illegal insider trading OR tipping provisions if the person or
company proves that the person or company reasonably believed that the material fact or
material change had been generally disclosed
BURDEN ON DEFENCE
NOTE: insider trading applies to material changes AND material facts; thus,
continuous disclosure requirements that require only reports of changes dont protect
from insider trading contraventions
Green v. Charterhouse Group Can. Ltd. [1976/Ont.CA] disclosure of material change without
saying what it is not sufficient
68
Facts: Green agreed to offer to sell his shares to D before others D gained knowledge
of possible takeover (offer for shares at higher price) disclosed possibility of
possibility of TB and that there was info but cant disclose info
Conclusion: limited disclosure was not sufficient what letter is really saying is that
confidential info exists which might be of substantial significant to you but which I am
not at liberty to disclose
Re Harold P. Connor [1976/OSCB] insider cant trade immediately after disclosure
Facts: 3rd quarter showed unexpected loss decision made to issue press release on
June 25th usually sent out immediately, but here not until morning of June 26th D
sold SH on June 26th morning defence was that he believed the press release had been
sent and it was public knowledge
Analysis:
Insider is not free to trade immediately after press release is sent out
Appropriate standard is for press release to have been sent, received, and pubic given
time to process the information
Time will depend on specific circumstances, but safe working rule is insider should
wait at least one full trading day after info is released
Necessary Course of Business Defence for Tipping OSA - s.76(2)
NI 52-201 - s.3.3(2):
s.3.3(2): Necessary course of business will generally cover communications with
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Royal Trustco Ltd. v. OSC [1983/Ont. Gen. Div.] disclosing info in some SH and not others in
context of hostile TB is not disclosure in ordinary course of business cant tip a material fact or
change
Facts: hostile TB Directors told some SH of possibility of takeover and that bidder
would not win b/c reason to believe 60% wanted to prevent selling shares
Analysis:
Court recognized difference b/w material facts and material change
69
OSA Regulations
Firewall/Chinese Wall Defence Reg. 175(1) and (3)
NOTE: Corp. has knowledge when one of its officers, directors, employees or agents has
knowledge; thus, if trader for corp. w/out actual knowledge traded shares when an
officer/director/employee had knowledge, the corporation can be guilty of insider trading
70
o Should move from grey list to restricted list when agree to act and the
transaction has generally been disclosed, but may get gain access to inside
information during course of transaction [s.2.6(1)]
Re Donnini
Defence doesnt apply because material information flowed from corporate finance to
trading department
Must have procedures to prevent confidential informationt to flow to those who trade
(Chinese walls, grey lists)
Unsolicited Orders OSA - Reg. 175(2)
Purchase or sale entered into as an agent of another person or company pursuant to a
specific unsolicited order (i.e. if a broker receives an order to execute a trade, can
execute and will not be guilty of insider trading)
Other Party had Knowledge OSA Reg.175(5)
(a) No liability for insider trading, if prove reasonable belief that other party to the
purchase or sale had knowledge of the material fact/change
(b) No liability for tipping, if prove reasonable belief that the person informed of the
material fact or material change already had knowledge of material fact/change
Common Law Defence
Reasonable Mistake of Fact
Not liable if mistaken wrt facts underlying the insider trading transaction (reasonable
belief that the information was not material)
Lewis v. Fingold [1999/Ont. Gen. Div] accused can escape liability if prove had a reasonable
belief that the fact is not material (i.e. would not have a significant effect on the share price)
Facts: director of movie company heard info @ BOD meeting (unexpected bad 4th quarter
results) and sold shares before disclosure of the info to the public Fingold argued that
he had a genuine reasonable belief that results were not a material fact
Analysis:
No liability if defendant can prove on balance of probabilities that he reasonably
believed in a mistaken set of facts which, if true, would render the act or omission
innocent
Note: prosecution must prove that the fact is reasonably expected to have an effect on
market security (thus success of defence is remote)
Fingold reasonably believed that the disappointing fourth quarter results would not
have a significant effect on the market price of the shares
Belief in the viability of ongoing projects was reasonable given his long involvement
with the company and confidence in it
R v. Harper [2000/Ont. CJ]
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Facts: Sold 227,600 SH w/ knowledge of undisclosed material fact (soil sample results)
Analysis:
H argued that he reasonably believed test results were not material
Court did not accept because H disclosed positive results in same period
Reliance on expert finding that results not significant wasnt reasonable given his
experience
Argued that results were not reliable - again, he still reported the good results
Sanctions for Insider Trading/Tipping
Criminal - OSA
s.122(1): fine (5M max), imprisonment fine (5 years less a day max), or both
Enhanced financial penalty for violation of s.76- s.122(4): Minimum fine equal to
the profit made or the loss avoided and maximum is the greater of 5 M or triple profit
made or loss avoided
Civil OSA
s.134(1): Inside Trader liable to compensate anyone that sold or purchased securities
for damages that resulted from the trade UNLESS
o Inside trader proves that they reasonably believed that material
information was generally disclosed
o Material information was known or ought reasonably to have been known
by the seller or purchaser
o NOTE: difficult to find out who person on the other side of the transaction
is in the electronic era (no paper trail)
o Also applicable to tipping [see s.134(2)]
134(4): allows reporting issuer to sue insider trader/tipper for any advantage or
benefit received or receivable from purchase or sale UNLESS
o Proves that the person or company reasonably believed that the material
fact or material change had been generally disclosed
135: allows OSC to take civil action on behalf of the issuer if the issuer fails to
Administrative OSA
s.127: Orders in the public interest
s.128(1): OSC can apply to Superior Court for declaration that person or company is
not or has not complied w/ securities law
o if court makes declaration, court can may any order it considers
appropriate despite the imposition of any penalty under s.122 or order
given under s.127 [s.128(3)]
Rankin settlement: not guilty at criminal level, but OSC entered into settlement
agreement under power under s.127 to make orders in the public interest
Donnini: used s.127 power to ban trading for 15 years
72
Prospectus Exemptions
Policy Justifications
Easing the burden on small and medium sized business enterprises by allowing more
flexibility to generate initial working capital
Wealthy and/or sophisticated investors are capable of making investment decisions
without the information that a prospectus provides
Issuers are issuing securities to those with whom they have a pre-existing relationship
(assumption that investor has or has access to information about the issuer and its
financial prospects)
Some securities are considered extremely safe investment (i.e. government bonds)
73
Sources of Law
NI 45-106 (not all sections applicable in Ontario/proposed amendments published for
comment/replaces MI 45-103)
OSC Rule 45-501
OSA Part XVII (some parts not current law and inconsistent with NI 45-106)
o NOTE: OSC Rule 45-501 s.3.1: exemptions in OSA 72(1)(a)(c)(d)(l)(p)
and 73(1)(a) are not available
NI 45-102 (Re-sales)
Companion Policies helpful to provide guidance on way rules work
o 45-106 CP [see p.1399]
o 45-102 [see p.1318]
Exemptions for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises or Start-up Issuers
Private Issuer Exemption [NI 45-106, s.2.4]
Founder Control Person and Family Exemption [NI 45-106, s.2.7]
Government Incentive Securities [OSC Rule 45-501, s.2.1]
Note: Ontario closely held issuer exemption REPEALED by 45-106
Private Issuer Exemption: NI 45-106
Prospectus requirement does not apply wrt trade in a security in circumstances
outlined in s.2.4(2) [s.2.4(3)]
Definition of Private Issuer s.2.4(1)
(a) Issuer that is NOT a reporting issuer or an investment fund
o Condon: accords with the goal to provide funds for start-up companies
(b)(i) Restrictions on transfer of securities contained in issuers constraining
documents (i.e. articles of incorporation) or SH agreements
(b)(ii) Cap on the number of security holders
o Securities not beneficially owned by more than 50 persons [NOT
including employees and former employees of the issuer or its affiliates]
o Each person is counted as one beneficial owner BUT
o Anti-avoidance provision: each person counted as one beneficial owner
UNLESS person is created or used solely to purchase/hold securities of in
each beneficiary must be counted as separate beneficial owner
Prevents issuers from setting up trusts/companies (where could be
many SH) to hold securities of the private issuer
74
Policy Question: is the list of people really targeted to types of people that should be
eligible to get this exemption?
Prohibition on commissions/finders fees paid to director/officer/founder/control person in
connection with a trade, except for trade to an accredited investor [NI 45-106, s.2.4(4)]
o
Note: this does not prohibit use of registrants, finders or advertising in any form
to solicit purchasers under exemptions BUT use of these means may give rise to
the presumption that relationship required for use of these exemptions is not
present (i.e. if paying someone to find investors, precondition of close
relationship is likely not present) [NI 45-106 CP, s.3.1]
75
Didnt expand on reasoning for the test likely justification is that one is not likely
to take advantage of friends/associates w/ common bonds of interest and persons
having common bonds may have access to type of info that would appear in
prospectus
the second person carrying votes which, if exercised, would entitle the
first person to elect a majority of the directors of the second person,
unless that first person holds the voting securities only to secure an
obligation
(b) second person is a partnership, other than a limited partnership, and
the first person holds more than 50% of the interests of the partnership
(c) Second person is a limited partnership and the general partner of the
limited partnership is the first person.
76
Control Person: A person who (a) holds a sufficient number of any of the securities of an
issuer so as to affect materially the control of the issuer, or (b) more than 20% of the
outstanding voting securities of an issuer except where there is evidence showing that the
holding of those securities does not affect materially the control of the issuer
77
Individuals
(1) Financial Asset Test Branch (j): Individual (alone or with spouse) beneficially
owns financially assets net valued at 1M [before taxes but net of related liabilities to
ensure you are targeting high net worth individuals]
78
Financial assets s.1.1: cash, securities, or any contract of insurance or deposit that
is not a security for the purpose of this act
Related Liabilities s.1.1: (a) liabilities incurred or assumed for the purpose of
financing acquisition/ownership of financial assets or (b) liabilities that are secured
by financial assets
Factors indicative of beneficial ownership Rule 45-106CP s.3.5(3):
o Physical or constructive possession of evidence of ownership of financial
assets
o Entitlement to receipt of any income generated from asset
o Risk of loss of value of the asset
o Ability to dispose of financial asset or otherwise deal with it as the
individual sees fit
(2) Income Test Branch (k): net income before taxes exceeds 200,000 in two most
recent calendar years OR combined income with spouse exceeds 300,000 in each of those
years AND reasonably expects to exceed that net income in the current calendar year
Condon: reasonably expect to exceed BUT only seems necessary to show
maintaining current income levels
Condon: Is 200,000 is the right threshold to put in category of sophisticated investors
(3) Net Asset Test Branch (l): Individual who, alone or w/ spouse, has net assets of at
least 5M
Substantive Requirements:
REQUIREMENT: PURCHASER MUST BE ACCREDITED INVESTOR
Anti-avoidance Rule s.2.3(6): exemption doesnt apply to trade in security to
person if person is created or used solely to purchase or hold securities as an
accredited investor
Focus on purchaser NOT issuer!
Seller to accredited investor does NOT have to be issuer provides flexibility in
allowing accredited investors to sell to each other
Reporting Requirements:
Report of Exempt distribution s.6.1: If ISSUER distributes security of its own issuer
under accredited investor exemption, must file report no later than 10 days after the
distribution BUT
No report required s.6.2(1): if making trade of debt security of its own issue OR
concurrently with distribution of debt security, an equity security of its own issue to
Canadian financial institution or bank
NOTE: If dont qualify as an accredited investor, could make large investment and
qualify for minimum investment exemption
79
Contents
OSC Rule 45-501 s.2.1(1):
o
o
82
o
o
o
OSC Rule 45-501 Part 6 6.3: must inform prospective purchaser of rights under
s.130.1 of the OSA [civil liability provision which gives purchaser ability to sue for
misrepresentation]
o See OSC Rule 45-501CP Part 5
Condon: Not reviewed by regulator in the same way prospectus is and very little
prescribed content, but can sue if there is a misrep.
Remedies:
o Damages
o Recession
Filing requirements
Delivery s.6.4: Copies of OM to be filed with OSC within 10 days of the date of
distribution
NOTE: No review of OMs and OMs not made public (SEDAR)
Discretionary Exemptions
If dont qualify for specified exemption, can apply for discretionary exemption
83
84
Substantive Rules
Restricted Period Resale Rule: NI 45-102 s.2.5(2)
NOTE: More stringent [conditions on issuer and re-seller] because the exemptions are
more likely to cause regulatory concern of lack of disclosure and back-door underwriting
Condition #1 Seasoning Requirement: issuer is or has been a reporting issuer for the
4 months immediately preceding the trade (resale)
Rationale: Have to provide docs to become a reporting issuer and within 4 months
will be at least one set of interim financial statements
Exception - NI 45-102 s.2.7: seasoning period doesnt apply if became a reporting
issuer after the distribution date by filing a prospectus
Distribution date = date securities originally issued in reliance on exemption
85
Example: if accredited investor held a convertible security for 6 months and upon
conversion wants to re-sell, there is no further restricted period as it expired
while the accredited investor held it as a convertible security
86
87
EXAMPLE
Issuer XYZ qualifies to be a private issuer; Directors of XYZ are A, B, and C; XYZ has 20
security holders, including D and E; D is a close personal friend of A; E is a close personal
friend of B
Can XYZ issues securities to F who is a close personal friend of C?
o YES - F is eligible under private issuer exemption (close personal friend of
directors) and sale does not put private issuer over 50 person limit
Can D sell securities in XYZ to E?
o YES E is eligible under private issuer exemption (existing SH)
XYZ does an IPO on March 2006 and on April 1, 2006 E wants to sell his securities
o RR s.2.6 RR
o OK seasoning period met b/c issuer became reporting issuer after distribution
date
NOT 4 months for the date the security is converted into underlying
security [s.2.9(3)]
Condition #3: No unusual effort is made to prepare the market or to create
demand for the security that is subject of the trade
Condition #4: No extraordinary commission or consideration is paid to a person
or company in respect of the trade
Condition #5: Selling security holder has no reasonable grounds to believe that
issuer is in default of securities legislation
Takeover Bids
10% Threshold s.102.1(1): Every acquiror who acquires beneficial ownership of, or
power to exercise control or direction over, 10% or more of outstanding voting or
equity securities of any class of securities (or securities convertible into voting or
equity securities) must disclose in two ways issue and file news release and file
report w/OSC containing info required in the news release
o NOTE: In determining whether 10% threshold is met, count acquirors
securities (definition s.102: securities of that class owned on the date of
an offer to acquire either by the acquiror or any person or company acting
jointly or in concert with the acquiror)
o News release must be issued promptly and report must be filed within 2
business days from the day of the acquisition [OSC Rule 62-504 s.7.1]
Content of news releases/reports NI 62-103, Part 3, s.3.1(1): info in Appendix E
Appendix E [see p.2327]:
o
90
o
o
o
o
5% Rule - s.102.2(1): Must issue and file news release if acquire beneficial ownership
of 5% or more of outstanding voting/equity securities of class subject TB
o Further news release/report for additional acquisitions of 2% [s.102.2(2)]
OSC Rule 62-504 s.7.2: must, before the opening of trading on the next business
day, issue and file a news release containing the following information:
o
o
o
o
o
o
Name of acquirer
Number of securities acquired in transaction that gave rise to the requirement to
issue news release
Beneficial ownership by acquiror and all persons and companies acting jointly or
in concert with the acquiror immediately after the acquisition
Number of securities beneficially acquired by acquiror and all persons/companies
acting jointly and in concert w/ acquiror since commencement of the bid
Name of market transaction took place in
Purpose of the acquirer and anyone acting jointly w/ them for acquiring the
securities
91
93
contains no untrue statement of a material fact and does not omit to state a material fact required to be stated or
that is necessary to make a statement not misleading in the light of the circumstances in which it was made
Signed by: CEO or whoever performs functions of CEO, CFO or whoever performs
functions of CEO, 2 other directors OR offeror if offeror is an individual
Analysis:
Test of materiality OSC Rule 62-504 FI - Item 23: whether information would be
reasonably expected to affect decision of security holders in deciding whether to
accept or reject bid
Inadequately disclosure wrt: out clause, fact that method wasnt tested, complexity
and difficulty of approval process
Public interest power s.127 cease trade order (prevent TB from proceeding)
Directors Circular
Must send to all persons/companies the bid was required to be sent within 15 days
after date of bid [s.95(1)]
Policy: directs advise whether to accept or reject b/c in the best position to value
shares of the target and its going concern aspects AND gives directors opportunity to
shape response of SH and engage in defensive tactics
Duty to evaluate and advise s.95(2):
o (a) whether accept or reject bid and reasons for recommendation
o (b) state that it is unable or is not making a recommendation and reasons
o (c) state BOD is deciding and advise not to deposit securities until they
receive recommendation
o Also see OSC Rule 65-504F3, Item 15
OSC Rule 62-504F3:
o Item 7: Material relationship material w/ offeror or offerors officers or
directors
o Item 8: Arrangements between offeree issuer and officers and directors
o Item 9: Arrangements between the offeror and security holders of offeree
issuer
o Item 10: Interests of directors and officers of the offeree issuer in material
transactions with offeror
o Policy: concern that directors of target may want to act in their own
interest wrt bid rather than in interest in SH
Time Periods & Take-up Issues
Bid Period s.98(1): Bid must be open for 35 days
95
o May not extent formal bid period unless offeror first takes up securities
deposited under bid that have not been withdrawn [s.98.3(4)]
Prohibition on Take-up s.98(2): No securities to be taken up (accept for purchase)
until 35 day period expires
Take-up s.98.3(1): Offeror has to take up securities not later than 10 days after
expiry of bid
Payment s.98.3(2): Securities must be paid for not more than 3 days after take up
NOTE: Issues of take up/payment in Canfor - when are the Slocan securities taken up?
OSC held that take-up occurred when first stage of transaction was complete (deposit
receipts given to shareholders who tendered)
Taking up means communication by the offeror of its irrevocable decision to
complete the purchase of shares tendered under its offer
Withdrawal
Withdrawal s.98.1(1): can withdraw securities deposited under a formal bid:
o (a) any time before the securities have been taken up by the offeror (i.e.
any time before the end of the 35 day period);
o (b) at any time before end of 10 days after notice of change
o (c) if the securities are not paid for within 3 days of take-up
o Policy: want to allow SH opportunity to get out if discover unfavourable
info or a more favourable bid comes along
RE Canfor Corp. [1995/OSCB]
Facts: Canfor had at least 100 days before its shares would be exchanged for deposit
receipts, but Slocan shares irrevocably deposited Slocan argues that offended
withdrawal rights b/c bid could not be completed for an indeterminate period of time
Analysis:
Would have been fairer to Slocan SH to extend withdraw rights until deposit receipts
exchanged for Canfor shares or if Canfor provided a withdraw rate that would operate
if there was another bid made after 45 days of Canfor bid
Infringement wasnt serious enough to sue public interest power to cease trade
extended time period during which Slocan shares could be tendered
Bid Conditions
Bidders can have conditions on their takeover offer (fewer conditions make it easier
to persuade target shareholders to tender)
97.3(1): if consideration is to be paid in cash, offeror must make adequate financing
arrangements before bid to ensure that funds are available to make payment
97.3(1): financing arrangements may be subject to conditions if the offeror reasonably
believes that it is remote that offeror will be unable to pay if financing condition is
not satisfied
Note: in US cant be conditions re financing
96
Equal Treatment
Identical consideration OSA s.97(1): to all holders of the same class of securities
o Does not prohibit offering an identical choice of consideration (i.e. all
cash or part cash/securities) [97(2)]
o Policy: SH tendered initially will not deprived of change in offer price
Increase in Consideration - s.97(3): offeror must pay increase to each person or
company to whose securities were taken up
Prohibition on Collateral Agreements - s.97.1(1): If a person or company makes or
intends to make a formal bid, agreement has the effect of providing a security holder
of the offeree issuer with consideration of greater value than other security holders of
that class (i.e. cant offer inducements to large security holders)
o Exceptions - OSC Rule 62-504 s.4.1 - Employment compensation
arrangements
Pre-bid Integration Issues - s.93.2(1): If within 90 days preceding formal TB the
offeror acquired beneficial ownership of securities of class subject to bid in a
transaction not generally available to holders of that class of securities, the amount
offered in TB must be the same or higher
o Policy: prevent approaching SH prior to bid and giving more money
Lock up agreements - s.93.1(1): prohibited during the period of the bid
o lock-up agreement is permitted before (where whereby a security holder
and an offeror will contract to the effect that the security holder will tender
his shares to a formal TB) BUT cant give more consideration
Partial Bids Proportionate Take UP OSA s.97.2(1): where greater number of
securities is deposited under bid than offeror is bound or willing to acquire, must
take-up and pay for securities proportionately according to the number of securities
deposited by each security holder
Exemptions from TB Rules
Normal Course Purchases Exemption s.100
Bid is for not more than 5% of outstanding securities of a class
Not more than 5% are purchased in reliance exemption within a one year
o Anti-avoidance rule: cant use exemption to do creeping TB by
completing sequential 4.5% purchases in a closely related period of time
o Includes offeror or anyone acting jointly or in concert with offeror
There is a published market for the class of securities subject to the bid
o Make sure sellers of securities can find out if they are getting fair price
Purchase price does not exceed market price at the date of acquisition
Policy: Available to significant security holders to by small numbers of additional
securities as long as the above conditions are satisfied
Private Agreement Exemption s.100.1(1)
Purchases are made from 5 or less persons or companies (including persons or
companies outside of Ontario)
97
If there are more than 5 security holders of the class subject to the bid, it is not made
generally to all security holders
Cap on consideration:
o Published market: consideration <= 115% of market price @ date of bid
o No published market: reasonable basis for determining that consideration
is <= 115% of the value
o NOTE: Calculation of market price re 15% premium average of
closing price in the previous 20 business days [OSC Rule 62-504, s.1.3]
Policy: prevent strategic behaviour to increase market price
98
BOD and white knight typically negotiate agreement that could contain other
defensive tactics (such as break free)
Policy: regulatory concern that value offered by white knight will be too low
Agreement establishing rights for SH to acquire additional securities of the same class
Price at very uneconomical level (above market price) in normal course BUT drops to
very low price when triggering event occurs (TB or acquisition of 15% of shares)
Permitted bids: will not trigger SRA
Can be put in place when a hostile TB is made or well in advance of the possibility of
TB (i.e. agreement that is in effect for 5 years and comes up for renewal)
Purpose: dilute bidders holdings and puts target directors back in control
Policy concern: bidder is treated differently than other SH (divergence from
corporate law principle that you must treat all SH the same)
Danger signal if it is a tactical pill put in place with out SH approval (note: regulators
can use cease trade power under s.127)
Upheld if elements of the plan are appropriate and there is shareholder approval
Target enters into agreement w/ 3rd party to sell a significant asset (crown jewel) if
TB is successful
Purpose: to discourage initial bidder
Policy concern: whether the target board is appropriate value for asset (i.e. is this
something working to the benefit of the company as a whole)
Litigation
Applications to OSC on basis that bidder not acting in conformity with securities law
and applications to competition tribunal
Purpose: delay TB more time for SH to decide BOD to seek out alternative offers
Beware: can also work to prevent target BOD from using defensive tactics
Example stakeholders of target can use litigation to intervene: BCE decision
o Major group of bond holders sought corporate law remedies and argued
terms of merger were oppressive to them
Break Fee
Fee payable in the event that the 3rd party doesnt succeed (3-5% of value T)
99
Facts: CanWest made bid to acquire all o/s Class A and B shares of WIC BOD
thought inadequate initiated SRA break fee to Shaw and radio asset option which is
exercisable whether bid is successful or not application by CanWest to cease trade
Analysis:
In context of hostile TB where the corporation is in play, duty is of target board to
act in best interest of the shareholders as a whole and to take active and reasonable
steps to maximize shareholder value by conducting auction
o Auction: doing best to find alternative bidders who will maximize value
being offered for shares
o where corporation is in play: where it is apparent that there will be a sale
of equity (where there is at least one bid on the table)
Mapeleaf: uphold TJ statement that corporation not truly in play
because controlled by family who could decide whether or not to
sell shares (no public expectation of auction)
Not always apparent when put in play: BCE put into play when
teachers changed its investment intent from passive to active?
Directors obliged to carry out these duties in manner that minimizes, to the fullest
extent reasonably possible, their conflict of interest position
Producers Pipelines [Sask.CA]: onus on directors to show that their acts were
reasonable in relation to the threat posed and were directed to the benefit of the
corporation and its shareholders as a whole and not for an improper purpose (such as
the entrenchment of directors)
Blair: onus is too high should be more deference to decision of target BOD should
Business judgment rule: where business decisions are made honestly, prudently, in
good faith, and on reasonable and rational grounds, court will not interfere
100
Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corporation [1998/Ont.CA] auction not always required
market canvass is acceptable where single offer and no means to assess adequacy
Facts: BOD rejected ML in favour of bid from another bidder preferred by targets
controlling SH (even though value of ML was higher) argument that unfairly
disregarded minority interest (non-family)
Analysis:
BOD to act in best interests of the corporation
Decision does not need to be perfect, just in range of reasonableness
Special Committees: If BOD has acted on advice of committee composed of persons
having no conflict of interest and the committee has acted independently, in good
faith, and made an informed recommendation, business judgment rule applies
o Application: composed of members of BOD at arms length from
controlling SH and did a reasonable job of canvassing alternatives
Condon: If controlling SH wont tender, little chance of succeeding
Distinction between duty to auction and duty to canvass the market
Auction not required in every change of control required where several bidders time
achieve the best value
Market canvass fine where single offer and BOD has no means to assess adequacy
Duty to set up committee who use reasonable efforts to canvass whether other bidders
are on horizon
Holds Farleys decision correction: corporation never truly in play because it was
known
BCE [Quebec Superior.Ct]
Facts: cash offer for shares of BCE by Ontario Teachers Pension Plan and US equity
firms financing for purchase from increasing debt load for which Bell (subsidiary of
BCE) is forced to guarantee argument that this unfairly disregarded interest of Bell and
BCE debenture holders and breached their reasonable expectations
Analysis:
Fiduciary duty to act in corporations best interest and maximize value of corporation
BUT when corporation is put in play there is an added burden of having to
maximize value of the corporations shares for the benefit of its shareholders
o Two objective are not necessarily incompatible or mutually exclusive
Revlon Duty: hold auction to maximize shareholder value and obtain highest value for
shares (US decision)
o In Revlon, no duty to debt holders because rights were already fixed by
contract that they dont need further protection
Revlon duty may have an appropriate place in Canadian corporate law exercise of
Revlon duty by BCE is not incompatible with fiduciary duties required by Peoples
(act in corporations best interest consider other stakeholders)
Sole fact that SH stand to benefit while debt holders are prejudiced does not give rise
to conclusion that directors have not performed their fiduciary duties
Appeal to CA
101
Defensive Tactics
Poison Pills/SRA most
within securities mandate
(involve trading of
securities and bidder will
want cease trade re issuance
of new shares)
Poison pills, break fee, sale
of crown jewel
Poison Pills
TEST: whether directors, in adopting the defensive tactic, met the onus on them to
show that they acted in the best interest as a whole and whether their actions were
reasonable in relation to the threat posed (proportionality test)
Defensive action was neither reasonable in proportion to threat posed nor taken in
best interests of the company (i.e. improper purpose to entrench directors)
o BOD made no effort to show that TB by Saskoil would be harmful
o No effort to negotiate with Saskoil to increase bid amount
o Did not seek out competing bids
o No effort to establish that tender of shares to issuer bid would ultimately
result in better value to SH
o Would not permit bid under SRA unless 25% over appraised value
o Did not seek shareholder approval
102
Condon: Regulators tend to make SRA time limited rather than completely eliminating
Sale of Crown Jewel
Break fees have a role to play in inducing auctions inducing competing bids to
come forward (regulators and courts)
Break fees are appropriate in circumstances where: (1) they are necessary to induce a
competing bid to come forward (2) the bid represents a better value for the
shareholders, and (3) the break fee represents a reasonable commercial balance b/w
negative effect as an auction inhibitor and its potential positive effect as an auction
stimulator
Note: Regulators decide was not the proper forum sent to court
affiliated entities if one is the subsidiary entity of the other or if both are subsidiary
entities of the same person
Related party transactions - MI 61 101- s.1.1: transaction between the issuer and related
party of the issuer at time the transaction is agreed to
Includes any ASSET transactions [see MI 61-101 for full list]
Related Parties:
o Control person of the issuer
o A person of which the issuer is a control person
o Person who has beneficial ownership or control and direction of securities
of issuer carrying more than 10% of voting rights
104
Substantive Requirements
Requirements: (1) Disclosure (2) Independent Valuation (3) Minority Approval
Insider Bids
Regulatory Concern: management in good position to know fair value of shares and
conflict of interest of (act in interest for SH but also want lowest price as bidder)
Disclosure MI 61-101
Disclosure of Offeror - s.2.2(1):
o
o
o
o
Valuation MI 61-101:
Formal valuation required [s.2.3(1)] of securities to be acquired and any non-cash
consideration [s.6.3(1)]
Valuator determined by independent committee [s.2.3(2)]
Valuator must be INDEPENDENT of any interested parties [s.6.1(1)]
Independence is a question of fact [s.6.1(2)] BUT express exclusions [s.6.1(3)]
o
o
o
o
105
(e) external auditor of the issuer or of an interested party, unless the valuator will
not upon completion of the transaction and that fact is publicly disclosed
(f) material financial interest in the completion of the transaction
Valuation contain opinion re value or range of values rep. fair market value [s.6.4(1)]
Valuator must be given access to relevant material information
Exemptions from formal valuation requirements Lack of Knowledge and
representation s.2.4: offeror (or joint actor w/ offeror) doesnt have board or
management representation of offeree within last 12 months and doesnt have any
knowledge of material info concerning issuer or its securities that has not been
generally disclosed
Issuer Bids
Disclosure MI 61-101 s.3.2:
Background
Prior valuation of securities that has been done in the last 24 months
Any other offers for the securities in the last 24 months
Discussion of review and approval process adopted by board and any special committee,
including any material disagreement between the board and the special committee
Statement of intention of every interested party to accept or not accept bid (if known after
reasonable inquiry)
Description of effect of bid on voting interest in the issuer of every interested party
Disclosure of reliance on any evaluation exemption
Interested Party: issuer and any control person of issuer or person reasonably expected to
be control person on successful completion of issuer bid
Valuation Requirement MI 61-101 s.3.3(2)
BOD or independent committee of the board shall determine valuator [s.3.3(2)]
Same requirements as insider bids [s.6.1]
Exemptions for valuation s.3.4:
o Bid for securities that arent equity securities and arent readily
convertible into equity securities
o Liquid market and reasonable to conclude that will be market for holders
who did not tender following bid that is not materially less liquid
Related Party Transactions
NOTE: Controversial - transactions dont relate to trading of securities
Disclosure MI 61-101
Material Change Report s.5.2:
o
o
o
106
o
o
o
o
Interested party: party to the transaction (unless only party in capacity as security holder affected
security holders and is treated identical to other SH) OR someone entitled to receive a collateral benefit or
payment or distribution as a consequence of the transaction
Description of background
Prior valuations within last 24 months
Other offers received within previous 24 months (whatever is the subject matter
of the transaction)
Discussion of review and approval process by BOD or any special committee and
any material disagreement between BOD and SC
Reliance on formal valuation exemption
Number of votes excluded for minority approval (b/c related parties) and
disclosure of those security holders and their holdings
Form 62-504F2 of OSC Rule 62-504 Issuer Bid Circular
108
Deloitte & Touche LLP v. OSC [2003/SCC] can disclose documents collected by 3rd parties to
respondents in action if relevant to their defence
Issue: whether the OSC acted unlawfully in finding that it was in the public interest to
disclosure documents collected from Deloitte to respondent Philip
Deloitte argument: OSC should carefully examine docs and only give docs that were
necessary for the OSC to make its case instead of disclosing everything
o OSC rejects not reasonable to examine each of the documents dont
know which things respondent will consider useful in its defence
Documents might have considerable relevance to the defence of Philip
Power to Compel Testimony
Search Power s.13(1): power to compel testimony or the production of documents
o Search power doesnt extend to search of private residences [s.13(9)]
Disclosure to Police s.17(7): Cant disclose testimony compelled under s.13(1) to
police of person responsible for enforcement of criminal law in Canada or another
country
Testimony, documents, or reports produced under investigation or examination order
are for exclusive use of OSC and should not be disclosed in any other proceeding
[s.16(2)] EXCEPT where OSC concludes that disclosure is in the public interest
[s.17(1)]
R v. Jarvis [2002/SCC] where predominant purpose of investigation shifts into criminal realm,
compelled testimony predominate can no longer be used and no more investigation activities
380(1): indictable offence to defraud public or any person of property, money, or valuable
security, or any service 5,000
380(2): offence of affecting public market price of stocks/shares with an intent to defraud
382: offence to fraudulently manipulate stock exchange transactions by engaging in various
strategies to create a false or misleading appearance of active public trading
400: indictable offence to make, circulate, or publish a prospectusthat knows is false in a
material particular with intent to induce someone to become a shareholder or partner or to
deceive or defraud members, shareholders or creditors
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Specific sanctions for breach of s.76 s.122(4): minimum fine equal to the profit made or
the loss avoided and a maximum of 5M or amount equal to triple profit made or loss
avoided
R. v. Harper [2003/Ont.CA]
TJ: in demonstrating sanction that should be imposed, prosecutors need to show how
failure to disclose and trading on this information had an effect on stock price
CA: Just need to show that profit was made/loss avoided because of insider trading
dont need to who how price itself was affect by failure to disclose of material
information
New OSA s.126.1
o Creates offence of engaging in fraud or market manipulation (this is in
addition to fraud in CC) so now lower burden but there is requirement
that person or company cant engage directly or indirectly . That
person or company knows or reasonably ought to know..
NOTE: Criminal burden of proof on OSC BUT strict liability (NO Mens Rea)
Rankin: courts are prepared to overturn convictions based on undue inferences being
made on evidence
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Facts: TB Class A non-voting shares had attribute that where bid made for majority of
voting shares, entire class of non-voting shares would convert to voting (coat-tail
provision) structured bid to avoid triggering it - transaction b/w dealers and family for
49% of voting shares w/ consideration constitution a 400% premium over market price
Analysis:
Abusive transaction: within law but had effect of freezing class A SH out while they
provided most of the money
Transaction did not confirm to spirit of TB rules contrary to public interest
TEST for regulator interference in absence of breach:
o Clear abuse of the markets, not just unfairness & must raise public interest
issue
o Must raise public interest issue
Controversial uncertainty for market participants in how to conduct themselves
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MUST BE BREACH for certain orders if person or company has not complied
with Ontario securities law:
Administrative penalty of not more than $1 million for each failure to comply
Disgorge to the Commission any amounts obtained as a result of the non-compliance
Enforcement Action against Lawyers
Wilder v. OSC [2000/Div.Ct]
Facts: OSC sought to reprimand lawyer for making misleading statements to regulators
that YBM had obtained a series of favourable due diligence results
Analysis:
Some orders specific market participant while others specify person or company
Order that person or company can be reprimanded applies to lawyers acting in
professional capacity
Court rejects argument that s.127(1) should be interpreted not to apply to lawyers
acting in their professional capacity
Does not usurp jurisdiction of law society public interest being protected by
regulators is different from law society (maintain integrity of law profession v.
maintaining integrity of OSC procedures)
NOTE: CSA disclosure of enforcement activity majority of matters end in settlement
Philosophies of Sanctioning
Abestos [2001/SCC] error to focus only on fair treatment of investors (also mandate to promote
efficiency) sanctioning should be protective and preventative not punitive
Facts: TB structured so didnt have to make follow up offer to other shareholder (rule that
if paid more than 15% premium had to make follow up offer) minority sought cease
trade on basis that it was spirit of TB regime that they share in premium
Analysis:
OSC: not within purview of public interest they protect (public interest in integrity of
ON capital markets and protection of ON investors) insufficient connection to ON
SCC: error to focus only on fair treatment of investors - regulatory statutory mandate
is also promoting efficiency of capital markets
Implication: OSC intervenes not achieve efficiency (not efficient to intervene in
transaction largely taking place outside of Ontario)
Protective and preventive in making their decisions rather than being punitive OSC
decision was reasonable: took a range of factors in to account, gave weight to factors
appropriately, and reached correct conclusion
Re Cartaway Resources Corp. [2004/SCC] general deterrence is basis for making order
General deterrence is a basis for making an order
Bentham: achieve deterrence by being more punitive than you otherwise would be to
change cost-benefit calculation (assumption that market players are rational)
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