Berger, P.L., sociology of knowledge. Luckmann, 1967 T.

The social construction of reality: a treatise in the The Social Construction of Reality is rooted in a sociological interest in the concepts of Reality andKnowledge. Berger and Luckmann argue that from a sociological perspective this interest is justified by the social relativity of these concepts. Berger and Luckman say, What is real to a Tibetan monk may not be real to an American Businessman. The knowledge of the criminal differs from the knowledge of the criminologist. It follows that specific agglomerations of reality and knowledge pertain to specific social contexts, and that these relationships will have to be included in an adequate sociological analysis of these contexts. (p15) Berger and Luckmann believe that the sociology of knowledge should be concerned with a societys criteria of knowledge and how this is developed. Their postpositivist stance is clearly laid out when they write of how members of society arrange their world view around their here and now, both originating and maintaining their ideas of reality and knowledge from their own thoughts and actions (and other significants in their life) rather than anything truly objective. The world of everyday life is not only taken for granted as reality by the ordinary members of society in the subjectively meaningful conduct of their lives. It is a world that originates in their thoughts and actions, and is maintained as real by these. (p 33) Berger and Luckmann believe that semiotics or signification is the primary means by which human beings categorise their subjective view of the world. They define a sign as anything that has an explicit intention to serve as an index of subjective meaning. (p50) These include gestures, body language, material artefacts, and the most important is language, which they say may be defined as a series of vocal signs. Language provides me with a ready-made possibility for the ongoing objectification of my unfolding experience. (p53) Berger and Luckmann believe that society and social order are solely products of human activity, and that social norms and rules are a man-made, rather than natural, process. Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product. (p79) Because of this social construction, members of a society or institution who were involved in the construction of the social norms are much more likely to conform to their constraints. Social disorder generally comes from new members of society that

were not part of the construction. In order to properly socialise new members of the society, sanctions must be put in place to prevent them from breaking the rules. Deviance from the institutionally programmed courses of action becomes likely once the institutions have become realities divorced from their original relevance in the concrete social process from which they arose. To put this more simply, it is more likely that one will deviate from programmes set up for one by others than from programmes that one has helped establish oneself. The new generation posits a problem of compliance, and its socialisation into the institutional order requires the establishment of sanctions. (p80) Institutional segregation causes the formation of socially segregated sub-universes of meaning. These sub-universes can be structured based on criteria such as sex, age, occupation or religion. Each sub-universe has its own structured values, norms, rules and barriers to entry. Berger and Luckmann give the example of the medical profession as a sub-universe and the various mechanics in place to keep nonmedical professions following the instructions of doctors and to keep doctors from resorting to unapproved conduct like religious or homeopathic healing. The increasing number and complexity of sub-universes make them increasingly inaccessible to outsiders. They become esoteric enclaves, hermetically sealed (in the sense classically associated with the Hermetic corpus of secret lore) to all but those who have been properly initiated into their mysteries. [] The outsiders have to be kept out, sometimes even kept ignorant of the existence of the sub-universe. If, however, they are not so ignorant, and if the sub-universe requires various special privileges and recognitions from the larger society, there is the problem of keeping out the outsiders and at the same time having them acknowledge the legitimacy of this procedure. This is done through various techniques of intimidation, rational and irrational propaganda (appealing to the outsiders interests and to their emotions), mystification, and, generally, the manipulation of prestige symbols. The insiders, on the other hand, have to be kept in. This requires the development of practical and theoretical procedures by which the temptation to escape from the sub-universe can be checked. (p104-105) On the topic of revolution and revolutionary leaders Berger and Luckmann say that often a group will take on an ideological doctrine because it has gain for them and people of their status in society. Involvement in such a group provides them with solidarity and legitimation for their cause. The revolutionary leader likewise must have others who agree with him and help to maintain the subjective plausibility of his

ideology in his own mind. Practical success of the ideology fortifies the reality it possesses for the leader and the group as a whole. Frequently an ideology is taken on by a group because of specific theoretical elements that are conducive to its interests. For example, when an impoverished peasant group struggles against an urban merchant group that has financially enslaved it, it may rally around a religious doctrine that upholds the virtues of agrarian life, condemns the money economy and its credit system as immoral, and generally decries the luxuries of modern living. The ideological gain of such a doctrine for the peasants is obvious. [] Every group engaged in social conflict requires solidarity. Ideologies generate solidarity. The choice of a particular ideology is not necessarily based on its intrinsic theoretical elements, but may stem from a chance encounter. (p141-142)

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY

SUMMARY OF THE BERGER-LUCKMANN MODEL

As we live our lives, we tend to develop repetitive patterns of behavior. These habits, as they are called, are useful to us because they allow us to handle recurring situations automatically. Our habits are also useful to other people. In face-to-face communication the participants observe and respond to each other's habits, and in this way all of us come to anticipate and depend upon the habits of others. As time goes by, some habits become shared among all of the members of the society. An institution is a collection of shared expectations about such long term public habits. Institutions encourage the development of roles, or collections of habitual behaviors that are associated with and expected of individuals who are acting in an institutional capacity. When a person assumes a role, he or she adopts these habitual behaviors, and we interact with him or her as part of the institution rather than as a unique individual. As an example of this, consider our society's collection of habits that have to do with right and wrong - that we should not injure other people, that we should not steal, that we should stop at red lights, and so on. This group of publicly shared

habits makes up the institution that we call the Law. As an institution, the Law incorporates many roles including, for example, police officer, judge, lawyer, victim, prisoner, guard, and so on. When we interact with people in any of these institutional roles, we treat them according to our shared expectations of the role. Thus, if a police officer pulls you over on the highway, you behave towards each other as your two roles require. If instead you had met "unofficially" at a party or while shopping at the mall, your relationship would be very different. Because they establish behavioral rules, institutions provide societal control. However, if this control is to persist over time, then each new generation of children must be trained to participate in the institutions of their parents. Thus, institutions are legitimized and maintained by means of tradition and education. Eventually, some institutions become reified - that is, the members of the society forget that the institutions are human constructions, and they begin to relate to them as if they are natural objects. In this way, we create social structures that seem as real to us as the reality the "natural" world.
According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), society is constructed through three stages. 1. Externalization- we create cultural products through social interaction. These cultural products may be material products, social institutions or values or beliefs concerning a particular groups. When these products are created, they become external to those who have produced them, becoming products outside ourselves. 2. Objectivation- is when products created in the first stage appear to take on a reality of their own, becoming independent of those who created them. People lose awareness that they themselves are the authors of their social and cultural environment and of their interpretations of reality. They feel as if the products have an objective existence and they'll become another part of reality to be taken for granted. 3. Internalization- we learn the supposedly "objective facts" about the cultural products that have been created. This occurs primarily through socialization, the process of social interaction in which one learns the ways of society and one's specific roles-- the sets of rules and expectations attached to a social position in that society. In this stage we make these facts part of our consciousness. Because of this process of internalization, members of the same culture share an understanding of reality and rarely question the origins of their beliefs or the process through which these beliefs arose.