The former, the external element, has no value for us simply as it stands; we assume something further behind it,

something inward, a significance, by which the external semblance has a soul breathed into it. It is this, its soul, that the external appearance indicates. For an appearance which means something does not present to the minds eye itself and that which it is qua external, but something else; as does the symbol for instance, and still more obviously the fable, whose moral and precept constitutes its meaning. Indeed every word points to a meaning and has no value in itself. Just so the human eye, a mans face, flesh, skin, his whole figure, are a revelation of mind and soul, and in this case the meaning is always something other than what shows itself within the immediate appearance. This is not the way in which a work of art should have its meaning, and not appear as exhausted in these mere particular lines, curves, surfaces, borings, reliefs in the stone, in these colors, tones, sounds, of words, or whatever other medium is employed; but it should reveal life, feeling, soul, import and mind, which is just what we mean by the significance of a work of art. (Aesthetics, 23)

it is a work of art only in so far as, being the offspring of mind, it continues to belong to the realm of mind, has received the baptism of the spiritual, and only represents that which has been molded in harmony with mind. (Aesthetics 33) Upon that which, in works of art, the mind borrows from its own inner life it is able, even on the side of external existence, to confer permanence; whereas the individual living thing of nature is transient, vanishing, and mutable in its aspect, while the work of art persists. Though, indeed, it is not mere permanence, but the accentuation of the character which animation by mind confers, that constitutes its genuine pre-eminence as compared with natural reality. (Aesthetics 34) notes: the place of the artist in the work of art: the passageway, history is the genius and success is determined by the world. The work of art must leave his hands. essential drift, Derrida

A kind of singularity of experience that concerns the spectator of a work of art. It is a singularity of reading, if you will, of a subjective reading, different each and every time. Hegels attribution of the spiritualized element in the work of art: In art, these sensuous shapes and sounds present themselves, not simply for their own sake and for that of their immediate structure, but with the purpose of affording in that shape satisfaction to higher spiritual interests, seeing that they are powerful to call forth a response and echo in the mind from all the depths of consciousness. It is thus that, in art, the sensuous is spiritualized, i.e. the spiritual appears in sensuous shape. (44)

Every genuine work of art may have a good moral drawn from it, but, of course, in doing so much depends on interpretation on him who draws the moral. Thus one may hear the most immoral representations defended by saying that we must know evil, or sin, in order to act morally; and, conversely, it has been said that the portrayal of Mary Magdalene, the beautiful sinner who afterwards repented, has seduced many into sin, because art makes it look so beautiful to repent, and you must sin before you can repent. (57-58) Philosophy of Mind: But as freedom only advances as far as thinking, the activity filled with this indwelling content, the inspiration of the artist, is, as an unfree passion, like an alien power within the artist; the producing has in it the form of natural immediacy, it belongs to the genius as this particular subjectand is at the same time a labor occupied with technical intelligence and mechanical externalities. The work of art therefore is just as much a work of free willfulness, and the artist is the master of the god. (S560, p.260) Phenomenology of Spirit: Speech and work are outer expressions in which the individual no longer keeps and possesses himself within himself, but lets the inner get completely outside of him, leaving it to the mercy of something other than himself.

Here, Hegel identifies speech and work, in other words, acts, as being the expression of interiority made exterior. It seems that it is this translation between interior and exterior states that marks the loss or giving away of authority. In this translation, one must abandon authority, leaving it to the mercy of others. And for Hegel, it is not simply the act that no longer belongs to the individual, he no longer keeps and possesses himself within himself which is to say that he releases part of himself to be interpreted and [mis]understood by others. There is no signification without circulation. It is perhaps what Derrida would call diffrancea space between the self, the difference within the self. For that reason we can say with equal truth that these expressions express the inner too much, as that they do so too little: too much, because the inner itself breaks out in them and there remains no antithesis between them and it; they give not merely an expression of the inner, but directly the inner itself; too little, because in speech and action the inner turns itself into something else, thus putting itself at the mercy of the element of change, which twists the spoken words and the accomplished act into meaning something else than they are in and for themselves, as actions of this particular individual. Hegel indicates the paradoxical nature of expression in that it is at once too much and too little. The one expressing something must invest ones own interiority in something external, which is in turn altered into something else than what was originally intended. Where Derrida will pick up this logic, he takes it further by saying that one may never been completely aware of ones own intentions from the start, even when one believes in them. For Derrida, the intention is never self-present in the utterance.

Not only do the results of the actions, through this externality of the influences of others, lose the character of being something constant in the face of other individualities, but since, in their relationship to the inner which they contain, they behave as a separated, indifferent externality, they can, qua inner, through the individual himself, be something other than they appear to be

either the individual intentionally makes them appear to be other than what they are in truth; or else he is too clumsy to give himself the outer aspect he really wanted, and to establish it so firmly that his work cannot be misconstrued by others. The actions, then, as a completed work, has the double and opposite meaning of being either the inner individuality and not its expression, or qua external, a reality free from the inner, a reality which is something quite different from the inner. (187)