Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), Chapters 4, 5, 6.

Overview This is Waltz's classic statement of minimalist or defensive neorealism. The distrubution of power among states constitutes the structure of the international system, and is characterized by anarchic. States are the primary actors, and act on a principal of selfhelp. States seek to maximize relative power and engage in balancing behavior to ensure their survival. Anarchy limits cooperation among states, but a global goverment is not desirable in any case. States that do not engage in realpolitik will be left behind. Chapter 4: Reductionist and Systemic Theories. Theories of international politics deal with events at both the sub- and supranational levels. Theories are reductionist or systemic according to how they arrange their materials. (p. 60) A reductionist theory explains the behavior of parts. Waltz argues, It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states. Every time we think that we see something different or new, we will have to designate another unit-level variable for its cause leading to the infinite proliferation of variables. (p. 65) Waltz points out that although actors change, similarities in outcomes recur. If the same effects follow from different causes, then constraints must be operating on the independent variables in ways that affect outcomes. (p. 68) For Waltz, these constraints are at a systemic level. A systemic theory focuses on the structure of the international system, where the structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. (p. 80) Structure affects behavior within the system, but does so indirectly through socialization and competition. (p. 74) Just as [s]ocialization encourages similarities of attributes and of behavior[, s]o does competition. (p. 76) Waltz implicitly argues that states emulate other states both to fit into an international society of states,

and to maintain their place in the international system. (pp. 76-77, and more directly on p. 92) Chapter 5: Political Structures For Waltz, a structure possesses an ordering principle, specifies the functions of formally differentiated units, and distributes capabilities across those units. (p. 82) In the international system, Waltz identifies anarchy, defined as the absence of a central authority, as the ordering principle. (p. 89) He assume[s] that state seek to ensure their survival. (p. 91) As long as states exist in an anarchic system, they are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform which justifies treating them as like units (alike in that irrespective of size, they are autonomous political units which face similar tasks). (p. 93, 95-96) Waltz recognizes that international organizations and transnational corporations exist, but dismisses them because structures are defined not by all of the actors that flourish within them but by the major ones. (p. 93) Thus, a theory that denies the central role of states will be needed only if nonstate actors develop to the point of rivaling or suprassing the great powers, not just a few of the minor ones. (p. 95) The structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the systems units. (p. 97) Although this statement seems to violate his assertion that structure must be independent of units, Waltz defends this claim by arguing, Although capabilities are attributes of units, the distribution of capabilities across units is not. (p. 98) Although he does not specify clearly here, it seems that Waltz is arguing that a bipolar world (between Germany and England) is analytically similar to a bipolar world (between the United States and the USSR), and that a systemic change would be a shift along the continuum from anarchy to hierarchy, such as a shift from bipolarity to multipolarity. Chapter 6: Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power

Waltz distinguishes between violence and anarchy. Drawing heavily on Hobbes, Waltz points out, Among states, the state of nature is a state of war. This is meant not in the sense that war constantly occurs but in the sense that, with each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may at any time break out. (p. 102) The threat of violence is characteristic of anarchy, not violence itself. Waltzs distinction between violence in the international and domestic realms relies on the right of a government to reserve the right to use force. In the case of the private use of force, citizens can appeal to the government, but in the international system, there is no authority to which states may appeal. Furthermore, anarchy limits the cooperation between states in two ways: 1) States are uncertain about the distribution of gains from cooperation. Uncertainty about another states future intentions works against cooperation. (Waltz implies the notion of relative gains here.) (p. 105-106) 2) Dependency on other states (whether through trade or through cooperative endeavors) reduces a states ability to ensure its survival in an autarkic, self-help system. Like organizations, states seek to control what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency. (p. 106) Waltz identifies this inability to cooperate as a prisoners dilemma because each state, acting for its own interest, produces a result which is undesirable at the systemic level. (p. 107-109) Furthermore, Waltz argues that an anarchic realm is better than an ordered international system. Moving to a more hierarchical arrangement in the international system would lessen the risks of war between states, but would entail the creation of agencies with effective authority and extending a system of rules. Waltz points out

that these administrative bodies, like other institutions, would be managed by individuals for whom the first and most important concern is to secure the continuity and health of the organization. Furthermore, with centralized institutions, the means of control become the object of struggle. Substantive issues become entwined with efforts to influence or control the controllers. (p. 111) Waltz points out that if an armed struggle breaks out to control the central agencies, it would be a world civil war. He favors an anarchical system, because [i]n the absence of organization, people or states are free to leave one another alone. Even when they do not do so, they are better able, in the absence of the politics of the organization, to concentrate on the politics of the problem and to aim for a minimum agreement that will permit their separate existence rather than a maximum agreement for the sake of maintaining unity. (p. 112) Balance of Power (pp. 116-128) Waltz argues that given states as unitary actors (with either minimalist or imperialist motives), and given more than two states in the system, states engage in balancing behavior. He contrasts balancing with bandwagoning behavior. Because power is a means and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions. They cannot let power, a possibly useful means, become the end they pursue. If states wish to maximize power, they would join the stronger side, and we would see not balances forming but a world hegemony forged. (p. 126) Waltz recognizes that balance-of-power theory is limited. The predictions are indeterminate and do not specify what or how quickly balancing behavior will occur. He argues, however, that even with a time lag in behavior, that the balancing behavior does occur.