SECTION 12

People v. Tampus FACTS: At around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, went to the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch water. The accused, Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal institution, followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Saminado died upon arrival in the prison hospital. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. They told the guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami." The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his written report submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated that, according to his on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was armed in the comfort room and his back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado. The trial was held at the state penitentiary at the insistence of the Avila. The court found Tampus and Avila guilty for the murder of Saminado. In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio of appellant raises the following issues: ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution (now Sec. 12, Art. IV of the 1987 Const)

2. W/N the trial court should have advised defendant Tampus of his right to remain silent after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus to testify 3. W/N defendant Tampus was denied to his right to public trial because the arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary HELD: 1. No. Even before the investigation for the killing was inititated, Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out of the scene of the crime, they surrendered to the first guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court. Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel de oficio to rely on the rulings in Escobedo vs. Illinois and Miranda vs. Arizona regarding the rights of the accused to be assisted by counsel and to remain silent during custodial interrogation. It should be stressed that, even without taking into account Tampus' admission of guilt, confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution. 2. No, considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial confession. The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right for him. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right

3. No. The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial in the national penitentiary. Besides, there is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304). The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial court may motu propio exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of the defendant, exclude from the trial every person except the officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution and defense. TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: The extra-judicial confession of the accused is manifestly barred from admission under the Bill of Rights. I have grave doubts as to the alleged waiver by the accused of his constitutional right to counsel and to remain silent given in the middle of his "voluntary" extrajudicial confession during his custodial interrogation by the prison investigator, who at such late stage (in propounding question No. 6, not at the beginning of the interrogation) purportedly took time out to admonish and inform the accused of his rights to counsel and to silence. The fundamental rights of such unfortunate disadvantaged persons as the accused should all the more be clearly protected and observed. At the very least, such alleged waiver must be witnessed by a responsible official of the penitentiary, if not by the municipal judge of the locality. Counsel for the accused's second assigned error is also well taken. After the prosecutor had presented the State's evidence at the hearing for the purpose, and when counsel de oficio then called upon the accused to testify, it became winz naive

the trial court's duty (contrary to the majority's ruling) to apprise and admonish him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and against self-incrimination, i.e. the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Under the above-cited section 20 of the Bill of Rights, any confession or incriminatory statement obtained in violation thereof is expressly declared "inadmissible in evidence." Gamboa vs. Cruz162 SCRA 642, June 27, 1988 Facts: On July 19, 1979, at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, petitioner Christopher Gamboa was arrested for vagrancy, without w arrant of arrest, by Patrolman ArturoPalencia. On July 20, 1979, during the line up of five (5) detainees including petitioner Gamboa who was identified by complainant Erlinda B. Bernal as one of the companionsin the commission of the crime of robbery. On July 23, 1979, an information for robberywas filed against him. On August 22, 1979, he was arraigned.On August 13, 1980, petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit predicated on the groundthat the conduct of the line- up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counselviolated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.On October 23, 1980, the lower court denied the Motion to Acquit, hence, theinstant petition for certiorari and prohibition. Issue: Whether or not petitioners constitutional rights to counsel and to due processwere violated during the conduct of police line- up.Held:Police line- up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yetentitled at such stage to counsel. When the process ha d not yet shifted from theinvestigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confessionthe accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer. Since petitioner in the courseof his identification in the police line- up had not yet been held to answer for a criminaloffense, he was, therefore, not

deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because theaccusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have violated petitioners rightto counsel and due process as the confrontation between the State and him had not begun.The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admission s or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way,deprived of the substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by amember of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to presentevidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file aMotion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is theabsolute lack of opportunity to be heard.The petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order issued is lifted Gamboa vs cruz Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition. Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or

confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel. On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard Escobedo v. Illinois Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner Danny Escobedo asked to speak with his lawyer while in police custody but before being formally charged and was denied. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Not allowing someone to speak with an attorney, and not advising them of their right to remain silent after they have been arrested and before they have been interrogated is a denial of assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

Facts. After being arrested and taken into police custody as a suspect in the murder of his brother-in-law, the petitioner asked to speak to his attorney. His attorney arrived at police headquarters soon after the petitioner did and was not allowed to speak to his client as the officers said they had not completed questioning. The petitioner also was not warned of his right to remain silent before the interrogation. He was convicted of murder and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. He was then granted certiorari. Issue. If a suspect has been taken into police custody and interrogated by police without their request to see an attorney being honored, nor being advised of their right to

winz naive

remain silent, have they been denied effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment? Held. Yes. Reverse the petitioners conviction and remand the case. The Sixth Amendment protects the right to effective assistance of counsel. Here, because the police investigation focused on the accused as a suspect rather than a less specific investigation, refusing to allow an accused to speak with his attorney is a denial of this Sixth Amendment right. The incriminating statements he made must thus not be admitted into evidence. A law enforcement system that relies too much on the confession is more subject to abuses than one that depends on evidence obtained through skillful investigation. The result here recognizes this idea. Dissent. Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented on grounds that this result will place obstacles in the way of legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement. Also, he thought Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) demanded a different result. Justice Potter Stewart believed that the right to assistance of counsel should not arise until indictment or arraignment, and that this contrary result would cause problems for fair administration of criminal justice. Justice Byron White expressed the opinion that this result would make statements made to police inadmissible without the accused waiving their right to counsel. He believed this would effectively render the voluntariness test of the Fourteenth Amendment useless, and make law enforcement more difficult.

proper investigative efforts are appropriate. It mentions that a subject asserting their rights should not be something the system is afraid of, but that it would render interrogation much less effective. This case is really best understood as the precursor to the warnings that would arise from Escobedo v. Illinois, 1964 Historical Background Between 1961 and 1969, the Supreme Court handed down a series of rulings that extended constitutional standards of due process to all States, and forced the American criminal justice system to apply stricter standards regarding the rights of the accused. Beginning with Mapp, 1961 (search and seizure restrictions), andGideon, 1963 (the right to legal counsel), the Court began to eliminate State court and police practices that it viewed as violations of the due process guarantees in the Constitution. By the end of the 1960s, the Court had established a "minimum standard of fairness" which all courts whether federal or State, would be required to meet. The case of Escobedo v. Illinois provided another landmark in the evolution of the Court's standard. Circumstances of the Case Danny Escobedo was taken into custody by Chicago police at 2:30 A.M. on January 20 in connection with the shooting of one of his relatives the night before. After a one-hour interrogation, and without an attorney to represent him, Escobedo was released, having made no self-incriminating statements. When police later arrested Benedict DiGerlando, a friend of Escobedo, DiGerlando told police that Escobedo had fired the fatal shots, and Escobedo was arrested once again. Police told him that, "although not formally charged, he was in custody and couldn't walk out the door." Escobedo's lawyer arrived shortly after his client had been taken into custody the second time. The attorney was repeatedly denied permission to talk to Escobedo, who was interrogated all night, from nine o'clock at night until

five o'clock in the morning. Escobedo asked to speak with his lawyer "repeatedly," but the police kept telling him that his lawyer did not want to see him. Throughout the interrogation, the suspect was kept standing, hands cuffed behind his back. He was told that DiGerlando had accused him of the murder. Allowed to confront his accuser, Escobedo told DiGerlando, "I didn't kill Manuel, you did it." Becoming more emotional, Escobedo made statements concerning his connection with the crime which were later used to convict him of murder in an Illinois court. Constitutional Issues The case centered on the 5th Amendment protection against self-incrimination and the 6th Amendment right to legal counsel. At what point must an accused person be afforded counsel in a State prosecution? Was a confession gained without the aid of legal counsel admissible in a State court? Should Escobedo be given a second trial? Did the police act properly or were their actions a violation of Escobedo's rights against self-incrimination? Did the State Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment have a bearing on this case? Arguments For Escobedo: Denying Escobedo the right to consult with an attorney was a clear violation of his right to due process. His confession had been coerced and was thus inadmissible. His conviction was faulty, and the resulting verdict should be overturned. Escobedo should have a new trial. For Illinois: The criminal procedures used in the courts of the State of Illinois rest upon the sovereignty of that State, and are part of the powers reserved to Illinois by the 10th Amendment. The authority to specify the criminal procedures to be used in State courts is clearly not vested in the Supreme Court. A decision in favor of Escobedo would therefore violate the basic plan of federalism. Decision and Rationale

Discussion. This case caused a lot of confusion for scholars, as some believed it had widespread application, and others thought it only applied to the specific facts here. There is a great deal of language within it that is very hostile to confessions, but at other points it says that

winz naive

By a 54 margin, the Court deemed Escobedo's confession inadmissible, overturned his conviction, and ordered that he be given another trial. Speaking for the majority, Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote: "When [Escobedo] requested and was denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, the investigation had ceased to be a general investigation of 'an unsolved crime.'*Escobedo+ had become the accused." As such, he was entitled to counsel. Goldberg also declared that, since Escobedo was "undoubtedly unaware that under Illinois law an admission of 'mere complicity' in the murder plot was legally as damaging as an admission of firing the fatal shots*t+he 'guiding hand of counsel' was essential to advise [him] of his rights in thissituation." Reflecting on past cases, Goldberg wrote: "This Court has also recognized that 'history amply shows that confessions have often been extorted to save law enforcement officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid and independent evidence.'No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights." Goldberg then moved on to write a carefully generalized statement of what would become "the Escobedo Rule" an application of the "exclusionary rule" that bars from court evidence gained from a confession made without an attorney present. The Court's ruling in this case, however, was somewhat limited. It applied only to cases where certain specific conditions were present. First, a police investigation must have proceeded beyond the point of "a general inquiry into an unsolved crime," and must have "begun to focus on a particular suspect." Secondly, the suspect had to have "been taken into police custody" and been subject to "a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements." Third, the suspect must have "requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, " while the police must "not have effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent." Provided that all of the above conditions existed, the Court would

find that "the accused has been denied the 'Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment as 'made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,'and *as such+ no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial." "Escobedo Rule" holds that individuals have the right to an attorney when an investigation goes beyond a general inquiry and focuses on a particular suspect. This principle states that a statement by a targeted suspect who is in police custody is not admissible at trial. However, if the police warns the suspect of the right to remain silent and gives an opportunity for the targeted suspect to consult with retained counsel, the statement is admissible Miranda v. Arizona Brief Fact Summary. The defendants offered incriminating evidence during police interrogations without prior notification of their rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (the Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Government authorities need to inform individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights prior to an interrogation following an arrest.

admission to an assistant district attorney. There was no evidence that he was notified of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights. The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover (Mr. Westover), was arrested for two robberies. Mr. Westover was questioned over fourteen hours by local police, and then was handed to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, who were able to get signed confessions from Mr. Westover. The authorities did not notify Mr. Westover of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights. The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart (Mr. Stewart), was arrested, along with members of his family (although there was no evidence of any wrongdoing by his family) for a series of purse snatches. There was no evidence that Mr. Stewart was notified of his rights. After nine interrogations, Mr. Stewart admitted to the crimes. Issue. Whether the government is required to notify the arrested defendants of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights against self-incrimination before they interrogate the defendants? Held. The government needs to notify arrested individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, specifically: their right to remain silent; an explanation that anything they say could be used against them in court; their right to counsel; and their right to have counsel appointed to represent them if necessary. Without this notification, anything admitted by an arrestee in an interrogation will not be admissible in court. Dissent. Justice Tom Clark (J. Clark) argued that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution would apply to interrogations. There is not enough evidence to demonstrate a need to apply a new rule as the majority finds here. The second dissent written by Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) also argues that the Due Process Clauses should apply. J. Harlan further argues that the Fifth Amendment rule against self-incrimination was never intended to forbid any and all pressures against self-incrimination. winz naive

Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) consolidated four separate cases with issues regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained during police interrogations. The first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda (Mr. Miranda), was arrested for kidnapping and rape. Mr. Miranda was an immigrant, and although the officers did not notify Mr. Miranda of his rights, he signed a confession after two hours of investigation. The signed statement included a statement that Mr. Miranda was aware of his rights. The second Defendant, Michael Vignera (Mr. Vignera), was arrested for robbery. Mr. Vignera orally admitted to the robbery to the first officer after the arrest, and he was held in detention for eight hours before he made an

Justice Byron White (J. White) argued that there is no historical support for broadening the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution to include the rights that the majority extends in their decision. The majority is making new law with their holding.

Discussion. The majority notes that once an individual chooses to remain silent or asks to first see an attorney, any interrogation should cease. Further, the individual has the right to stop the interrogation at any time, and the government will not be allowed to argue for an exception to the notification rule. Miranda vs Arizona Facts of Miranda v. Arizona: On March 2, 1963, Patricia McGee (not her real name) was kidnapped and raped while walking home after work in Phoenix, Arizona . She accused Ernesto Miranda of the crime after picking him out of a lineup. He was arrested and taken to an interrogation room where after three hours he signed a written confession to the crimes. The paper on which he wrote his confession stated that the information was given voluntarily and that he understood his rights. However, no specific rights were listed on the paper. Miranda was found guilty in an Arizona court based largely on the written confession. He was sentenced to 20 to 30 years for both crimes to be served concurrently. However, his attorney felt that his confession should not be admissible due to the fact that he was not warned of his right to have an attorney represent him or that his statement could be used against him. Therefore, he appealed the case for Miranda. The Arizona State Supreme Court did not agree that the confession had been coerced, and therefore upheld the conviction. From there, his attorneys, with the assistance of the American Civil Liberties Union , appealed to the US Supreme Court. Supreme Court Decision:

The Supreme Court actually decided four different cases that all had similar circumstances when they ruled on Miranda. Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the court ended up siding with Miranda with a 5-4 vote. At first, the attorneys for Miranda attempted to argue that his rights had been violated as he had not been given an attorney during the confession, citing theSixth Amendment. However, the Court focused on the rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment including that of protection against self-incrimination . The Majority Opinion written by Warren stated that "without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so freely." Miranda was not released from prison, however, because he had also been convicted of robbery which was not affected by the decision. He was retried for the crimes of rape and kidnapping without the written evidence and found guilty a second time. Significance of Miranda v. Arizona: The Supreme Court decision in Mapp v. Ohio was quite controversial. Opponents argued that advising criminals of their rights would hamper police investigations and cause more criminals to walk free. In fact, Congress passed a law in 1968 that provided the ability for courts to examine confessions on a case-by-case basis to decide whether they should be allowed. The main result of Miranda v. Arizona was the creation of the "Miranda Rights." These were listed in the Majority Opinion: "[A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." Interesting Facts:

Miranda was convicted a second time based on the testimony of his common law wife to whom he confessed the crimes. He had told her that he would be willing to marry Patricia McGee if she would drop the charges against him. Miranda would later sell autographed cards bearing the "Miranda Rights" for $1.50 each. Miranda was killed of a knife would after a bar fight. The person who was arrested for his murder was read the "Miranda Rights."

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HERSON TAN y VERZO, accused-appellant. FACTS: Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, a to inform her that he will drive Lito Amido and appellant Herson Tan to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time that Freddie was seen alive. His body was later found sprawled on a diversion road with fourteen stab wounds. Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same. Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder

Ernesto Miranda was released from prison after serving only eight years of his sentence.

Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant winz naive

for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to writing. In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant. ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel, is admissible in evidence against him. HELD: No. It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. R.A. No. 7438 reenforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a pertinent provision of which reads: As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law. Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice. Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be "voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel." Any statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. "This Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government." THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. HERSON TAN y VERZO, accused-appellant.

DECISION ROMERO, J.: May the confession of an accused, given before a police investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel, be admissible in evidence against him? Accused-appellant Herson Tan, along with Lito Amido, were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, of [1] Gumaca, Quezon Province, under an information dated February 8, 1989, which reads as follows: That on or about the 5th day of December 1988, along the Maharlika Highway at Barangay Tinandog, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with bladed and pointed weapons, with intent to gain, by means of force, violence, threats and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from one Freddie Saavedra, a Honda TMX motorcycle with a sidecar bearing Plate No. DW 9961 valued at THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) Philippine currency, belonging to the said Freddie Saavedra, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid amount; and that on the occasion of said robbery and by reason thereof, the said accused, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of their superior strength and in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon said Freddie Saavedra, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which directly caused his death. Contrary to law. On arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.

winz naive

The relevant facts established by the prosecution are as follows: On December 5, 1988, at about 7:00 oclock p.m., tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, at Our Lady of Angels Academy in Atimonan, Quezon, where the latter is a third year high school student, to inform her that he will drive both accused to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time, however, that Freddie was seen alive. When the latter failed to return that evening, Delfa, as early as 4:30 oclock a.m. of December 6, 1988 inquired on his whereabouts from relatives and friends. In the course of such inquiry, a certain Arnel Villarama revealed that the lifeless body of her husband was discovered on the diversion road at Barangay Malinao in Atimonan. Forthwith, they proceeded to the said place and found him sprawled on the ground with fourteen stab wounds in different parts of his body. Meanwhile, relying on the information that an abandoned sidecar of a tricycle was sighted at Barangay Malinao, Lucena Philippine National Police (PNP) led by Lt. Carlos Santos proceeded to the scene of the crime and recovered a blue sidecar which they brought back with them to their headquarters. Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa for a sum of P4,000.00. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same. After admitting that it was purchased from both the accused and upon failure to present any document evidencing the purported sale, Teves voluntarily surrendered it to the police who turned it over, together

with the sidecar, to the Atimonan Police Station for safekeeping. Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the [2] supposed confession to writing. Appellant, on the other hand, alleged that he had no participation in the offense charged and contended that his only involvement in the matter was the referral of accused Amido to Teves. He recounted that sometime in December 1988, Amido sought him at his house and told him that the motorcycle he was riding on was being offered for sale. Upon proof shown that it was indeed registered under Amidos name, he accompanied the latter to Manila on board the said motorcycle and they approached Antonio Carandang. The latter, thereafter, brought them to a certain Perlita Aguilar and Danilo Teves with whom the sale was finally consummated. He allegedly received P150.00 as his commission. Amido presented alibi as his defense. He alleged that although a tricycle driver by occupation, he was at Barangay Malusak, Atimonan on the day in question, some seven kilometers from the town, busy assisting in the renovation of his mothers house. He narrated that the victim was his friend and, therefore, he could not have participated in the gruesome death of the latter. In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premised in the foregoing considerations, this Court finds Herson Tan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery with Murder and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of

RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is further ordered to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). Due to insufficiency of evidence, Lito Amido is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges against him and the Provincial Warden of Quezon, Provincial Jail, Lucena City, is hereby ordered to release from custody the person of said Lito Amido, unless he is being detained thereat for some other lawful cause. SO ORDERED.
[3]

Appellant assails the finding of conviction despite failure of the prosecution to positively identify him as the culprit of the crime and to present clear and convincing circumstantial evidence that would overcome his innocence. In light of the above facts and circumstances, the appealed decision is set aside and appellant acquitted on the ground that his constitutional rights were violated. It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. Article III, Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution provides: x x x xxx xxx

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. xxx xxx xxx

winz naive

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible against him. Republic Act No. 7438 (R.A. No. 7438), approved on May 15, 1992, reenforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial [5] investigation, a pertinent provision of which reads: As used in this Act, custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law. Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating [6] statements that the rule begins to operate. Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the [7] accused would thus not suffice. Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in [8] writing. While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with
[4]

the assistance of counsel. To reiterate, in People v. [10] Javar, it was ruled therein that any statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. The records of this case do not indicate that appellant was assisted by counsel when he made such waiver, a finding evident from the testimony of Lt. Santos on crossexamination, thus: Q Now, when you brought Herson Tan to the Headquarters, did you tell him that he is one of the suspects in the robbery slain (sic) that took place in Atimonan on December 5, 1988? A Yes, sir, and he was also suspect to the robbery case which was investigated at Lucena Police Station. There were two (2) cases which were investigated on Herson Tan. Q Now, so in addition to the Atimonan case, you also took Herson Tan to your custody in connection with another case that happened in Lucena? A Yes, sir.

[9]

Q And it just happened that without applying third degree to him he gave you that information? A Yes, sir.

Q Did you notify him of his constitutional right to counsel before you propounded questions to him? A No, sir, because we are asking question only to him.

Q Before propounding question or information you sought to elicit from him, did you inform him of his constitutional right not to testify against himself because he is a suspect in these two (2) cases? A No, sir, because we [11] conversing. (Underscoring supplied) were just

The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. This Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative [12] and prosecutory powers of government. What remains of the evidence for the prosecution is inadequate to warrant a conviction. Considering the circumstances attendant in the conduct of appellants investigation which fell short of compliance with constitutional safeguards, we are constrained to acquit the appellant. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon (Branch 62) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HERSON TAN y VERZO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and his immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered, winz naive

Q And you happened to have Herson Tan in your list as suspect in both cases because Herson was previously incarcerated at Lucena City Jail in connection with a certain case, is it not? A Yes, sir.

Q Just for curiosity sake, you invited him in your headquarters, is that what happened in this case? A Yes, sir.

unless there is any other lawful cause for continued detention. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. People vs. Labtan [GR 127493, 8 December 1999] First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur Facts: On 28 March 1993, at more or less 10:30 p.m. while inside a motor vehicle in the national highway at Barangay Agusan up to the road at Camaman-an, all of Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Henry Feliciano y Lagura and Orlando Labtan y Daquihon took away, through intimdation or violence, cash amounting to P720.00, pioneer stereo, booster and twitters owned by and belonging to Roman S. Mercado, and a Seiko Diver wristwatch owned by Ismael P. Ebon, all in all amounting to P10,800.00. Later on, on or about 16 April 1993, at about 2:30 p.m., more or less, at Buntong, Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan robbed Florentino Bolasito of P30 in cash money. In the course thereof, Orlando and Jonelto Labtan stabbed Bolasito to death. On 23 April 1993, an information was filed against Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan charging them with robbery with homicide (as per 16 April 1993 incident). Subsequently, another information dated 20 May 1993 was filed against Feliciano and Orlando Labtan charging them with highway robbery (as per 28 March 1993 incident). Only Feliciano pleaded not guilty to the two charges. Orlando Labtan had escaped the Maharlika Rehabilitation and

Detention Center in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City where he was detained while Jonelto Labtan has eluded arrest. The two cases were tried together. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 found Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation in the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the offended party (the heirs of Florentino Bolasito) the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the offended party the sum of P35,000.00 representing funeral expenses and to pay the cost. The trial court also found Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of highway robbery, and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor as the minimum term to 14 years, 8 months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as the maximum term and to indemnify Roman S. Mercado the sum of P8,000.00, representing the value of the P700.00 cash, stereo, booster, and twitter and to indemnify Ismael Ebon the sum of P2,500.00, the value of the Seiko Wrist watch divested from him and to pay the cost. The trial court convicted Feliciano on the basis of his sworn statement which he repudiated during the trial. Feliciano appealed. Issue: Whether the counselling of Atty. Pepito Chavez to Feliciano cured the initial lack of counsel. Held: Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a competent and independent counsel when he was questioned in the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez testified that he started

questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of 22 April 1993 regarding his involvement in the killing of jeepney driver Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding the fact that he had not been apprised of his right to counsel. Feliciano had been subjected to custodial investigation without a counsel; inasmuch as when SPO1 Cuarez investigated Feliciano, the latter was already a suspect in the killing of jeepney driver Bolasito. Further, Atty. Chavez did not provide the kind of counselling required by the Constitution. He did not explain to Feliciano the consequences of his action that the sworn statement can be used against him and that it is possible that he could be found guilty and sent to jail. Furthermore, Atty. Chavezs independence as counsel is suspect he is regularly engaged by the Cagayan de Oro City Police as counsel de officio for suspects who cannot avail the services of counsel. He even received money from the police as payment for his services.

winz naive