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HISTORY OF KARGIL WAR

'Kargil Yudh' was the last armed conflict of the 20th century fought between India and Pakistan from May to July 1999 on the trans Himalayan plateau in Kargil District of J&K. At that time the Atal Bihari Vajpayee was the prime minister of India. Pakistan army under the COAS General Musharraf had gone to another adventure as an attempt to reach Srinagar after declaration of Pakistan nuclear test In May 1998,cross the LOC.

Gen. parveez Musharraf ,

Former chief of the army staff
PAKISTAN

Gen. V.P. Malik, Former Chief of the Army Staff

INDIA

Kargil War Part of the Indo-Pakistani Wars Date Location Result MayJuly 1999 Kargil district, Kashmir, India Pakistani military retreat; India

regains control of occupied territory. Territorial changes Belligerents India Commanders and leaders Ved Malik Strength 30,000 Casualties and losses Indian Figures:

Status quo ante bellum

Pakistan

Prakash

Pervez Musharraf

5,000

Official Pakistan claims

Military

527 killed[ 1,363 wounded

353-453 killed 665 wounded

1 fighter jet Indian shot down claims

Officials

1 fighter jet crashed

700 killed

Pakistan Opposition

helicopter of Kargil War claims 10004000 killed

shot down

LOCATION OF WAR
Before the Partition of India in 1947, Kargil was part of the Baltistan district of Ladakh, a sparsely populated region with diverse linguistic, ethnic and religious groups, living in isolated valleys separated by some of the world's highest mountains. The First Kashmir War (194748) concluded with the LOC bisecting the Baltistan district, with the town and district of Kargil lying on the Indian side in the Ladakh subdivision of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.[22] After Pakistan's defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the two nations signed the Simla Agreement promising not to engage in armed conflict with respect to that boundary.

The town of Kargil is located 205 km (127 mi) from Srinagar facing the Northern Areas across the LOC. An Indian national highway (NH 1D) connecting Srinagar to Leh cuts through Kargil. Kargil is just 173 km (107 mi) from the Pakistani-controlled town of Skardu, which was capable of providing logistical and artillery support to Pakistani combatants.

THE BEGINNING OF KARGIL CONFLICT

After the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, there had been a long period with relatively few direct armed conflicts involving the military forces of the two neighbors notwithstanding the efforts of both nations to control the Siachen Glacier by establishing military outposts on the surrounding mountains ridges and the resulting military skirmishes in the 1980s. Because of the extreme winter weather conditions in Kashmir, it was a common practice of the Indians and Pakistan Army to abandon forward posts and reoccupy them in the spring. In early May 1999 Pakistan Army along with the Mujahideen reoccupied the forward posts in Kargil sector before the Indians. Pakistan Army was able to bring down effective artillery fire on Indian positions through much of the conflict since they commanded all strategic heights, from the observation posts the Pakistan Army had a clear view to target the Indian main supply route National Highway No.1 (NH 1) inflicting heavy casualties.

The crisis in Kargil was a spill over of an unprovoked Indian attack (6 May) on a Paki stans forward post in Shyok Sector in Siachen region, about 20 km from the last delineated point of the LoC. The attack was repulsed by the Pakistani forces. The Pakistani positions on the mountains across Dras river enjoy certain advantage. India captured these positions in 1965, but returned them as per agreement. It managed to recapture them in 1971, and has retained them since.. The main stand point of India has been that so-called intruders from Pakistan have seized several heights in Dras-Kargil-Batalik sectors. But there have been conflicting statements regarding the identity and number of intruders on the one hand .India first referred to them as militants, then infiltrators, then Afghan Taliban and now has stated implicating Pakistan Army regulars. On 19 May Indian Army officers estimated that at least 300 Afghans were holding out in the mountains-approximately at 17,000 feet , Pakistani Lieutenant general Shahid Aziz, and then head of ISI analysis wing, has confirmed there were no mujahideen but only regular Pakistan Army soldiers who took part in the Kargil war. "There were no Mujahideen, only taped wireless messages, which fooled no one. Our soldiers were made to occupy barren ridges, with hand held weapons and ammunition," Lt Gen Aziz wrote in his article in the The Nation daily in January 2013 . Some writers have speculated that the operation's objective may also have been as a retaliation for India's Operation Meghdoot in 1984 that seized much of Siachen Glacier. According to India's then army chief Ved Prakash Malik, and many other scholars, much of the background planning, including construction of logistical supply routes, had been undertaken much earlier. On several occasions during the 1980s and 1990s, the army had given Pakistani leaders (Zia ul Haq and Benazir Bhutto) similar proposals for infiltration into the Kargil region, but the plans had been shelved for fear of drawing the nations into all-out war. Some analysts believe that the blueprint of attack was reactivated soon after Pervez Musharraf was appointed chief of army staff in October 1998.

CONFLICTS EVENTS
DATE HISTORICAL EVENT

May 3, 1999

Pakistani intrusion in Kargil reported by local shepherds

May 5

Indian Army patrol sent up; Five Indian soldiers captured and tortured to death.

May 9

Heavy shelling by Pakistan Army damages ammunition dump in Kargil

May 10 Infiltrations first noticed in Dras, Kaksar and Mushkoh sectors

MidMay

Indian Army moves in more troops from Kashmir Valley to Kargil Sector

May 26 IAF launches air strikes against infiltrators

May 27 IAF loses two fighters MiG-21 and MiG-27;. Flt Lt Nachiketa taken POW

May 28 IAF MI-17 shot down by Pakistan; four air crew dead

June 1

Pakistan steps up attacks; bombs NH 1A

June 5

Indian Army releases documents recovered from three Pakistani soldiers indicating Pakistans involvement

June 6

Indian Army launches major offensive in Kargil

June 9

Indian Army re-captures two key positions in the Batalic sector

India releases intercepts of conversation between Pakistani Army Chief Gen Pervez June 11 Musharraf, while on a visit to China and Chief of General Staff Lt Gen Aziz Khan in Rawalpindi, as proof of Pakistani Armys involvement

June 13 Indian Army secures Tololing in Dras

June 15

US President Bill Clinton, in a telephonic conversation, asks Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull out from Kargil

June 29 Indian Army captures two vital posts Point 5060 and Point 5100 near Tiger Hill

July 2

Indian Army launches three-pronged attack in Kargil

July 4

Indian Army recaptures Tiger Hill after an 11-hour battle

July 5

Indian Army takes control of Dras. Sharif announces Pakistani armys withdrawal from Kargil following his meeting with Clinton

July 7

India recaptures Jubar Heights in Batalik

July 11

Pakistan begins pullout; India captures key peaks in Batalik

July 14

Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declares Operation Vijay a success. Government sets condition for talks with Pakistan

July 26

Kargil conflict officially comes to an end. Indian Army announces complete eviction of Pak intruders

Some Indian and American analysts call Kargil the fourth Indo-Pakistani war. Certainly,for the soldiers fighting along the LoC, it was a war. But we prefer to call it a conflict, or anear war. The scale and intensity of the fighting exceeded even the high levels of peacetime violence along the Kashmir LoC. Moreover, because probably about 750 to 950 soldiers died in the heights near Kargil, this conflict did not meet the classical definition of war as an armed conflict with at least 1,000 battlefield deaths

OCCUPATION BY PAKISTAN

During the winter season, due to extreme cold in the snow-capped mountainous areas of Kashmir, it was a common practice for both the Indian and Pakistan Armies to abandon some forward posts on their respective sides of the LOC and to reduce patrolling of areas that may be avenues of infiltration. When weather conditions became less severe, forward posts would be reoccupied and patrolling resumed. During February 1999, the Pakistan Army began to re-occupy the posts it had abandoned on its side of the LOC in the Kargil region, but also sent forces to occupy some posts on the Indian side of the LOC. Troops from the elite Special Services Group as well as four to seven battalions. of the Northern Light Infantry (a paramilitary regiment not part of the regular Pakistani army at that time) covertly and overtly set up bases on the vantage points of the Indian-controlled region. According to some reports, these Pakistani forces were backed by

Kashmiri guerrillas and Afghan mercenaries. Pakistani intrusions took place in the heights of the lower Mushkoh Valley, along the Marpo La ridgeline in Dras, in Kaksar near Kargil, in the Batalik sector east of the Indus River, on the heights above of the Chorbatla sector where the LOC turns North and in the Turtok sector south of the Siachen area.

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PAKISTAN SHOOTS DOWN TWO INDIAN MIGS Pakistan shot down two Indian fighter jet which violated Pakistani airspace. Pakistan had already warned that if India would continue to violate its airspace than its army would target them in retaliation. The Indian jet violated Pakistani airspace and made a hostile attack on a Pakistani post which was shot down. Another Indian Mig also violated after the first one .

Indians made a propaganda that its jets were shot down in Indian territory altough the wreckage of the jets were found 12 km inside Pakistani territory. The pilot of the Mig-27 Flt Lt. K Nachiketa was captured alive by Pakistani soldiers while the pilot of Mig-21 Sqn Ldr. Ajay Ahuja was killed. It was believed that he shot himself. After the downing of the Indian Migs the Indian media made propagandas the Pakistan Army could not shoot any Indian aircrafts and the IAF is continuing their activities. The Pakistani defence spokes man Brig. Rashid Qureshi said that after the Indian planes had been shot down they did not violate the Pak airspace and continued to patrol inside Indian territory at a very high altitude.

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INDIA ATTACKS PAKISTANI POSITIONS

The terrain of Kashmir is mountainous and at high altitudes; even the best roads, such as National Highway 1D from Leh to Srinagar, are only two lanes. The rough terrain and narrow roads slowed traffic, and the high altitude, which affected the ability of aircraft to carry loads, made control of NH 1D (the actual stretch of the highway which was under Pakistani fire) a priority for India. From their observation posts, the Pakistani forces had a clear line-of-sight to lay down indirect artillery fire on NH 1D, inflicting heavy casualties on the Indians. This was a serious problem for the Indian Army as the highway was its main logistical and supply route. The Pakistani shelling of the arterial road posed the threat of Leh being cut off, though an alternative (and longer) road to Leh existed via Himachal Pradesh. The initial Indian attacks were aimed at controlling the hills overlooking NH 1D, with high priority being given to the stretches of the highway near the town of Kargil. The majority of posts along the Line of Control were adjacent to the highway, and therefore the recapture of nearly every infiltrated post increased both the territorial gains and the security of the highway. The protection of this route and the recapture of the forward posts were thus ongoing objectives throughout the war. The Indian Army's first priority was to recapture peaks that were in the immediate vicinity of NH 1D. This resulted in Indian troops first targeting the Tiger Hill and Tololing complex in Dras, which dominated the Srinagar-Leh route.

The battle of BATALIKThis was soon followed by the Batalik-Turtok sub-sector which provided access to Siachen Glacier. Some of the peaks that were of vital strategic importance to the Pakistani defensive troops were Point 4590 and Point 5353. While 4590 was the nearest point that had a view of NH 1D, point 5353 was the highest feature in the Dras sector, allowing the Pakistani troops to observe NH 1D The recapture of Point 4590 by Indian troops on June 14 was significant, notwithstanding the fact that it resulted in the Indian Army suffering the most casualties in a single battle during the conflict. Though most of the posts in the vicinity of the highway were cleared by mid-June, some parts of the highway near Drass witnessed sporadic shelling until the end of the war.

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The Battle of TOLOLING:

The Pakistani troops at Tololing were aided by Pakistani fighters from Kashmir. Some of the posts put up a stiff resistance, including Tiger Hill (Point 5140) that fell only later in the war. Indian troops found well-entrenched Pakistani soldiers at Tiger Hill, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. After a final assault on the peak in which 10 Pakistani soldiers and 5 Indian soldiers were killed, Tiger Hill finally fell. A few of the assaults occurred atop hitherto unheard of peaks most of them unnamed with only Point numbers to differentiate them which witnessed fierce hand to hand combat. As the operation was fully underway, about 250 artillery guns were brought in to clear the infiltrators in the posts that were in the line-of-sight. The BoforsFH-77B field howitzer played a vital role, with Indian gunners making maximum use of the terrain that assisted such an attack. However, its success was limited elsewhere due to the lack of space and depth to deploy the Bofors gun. However, The IAF lost a MiG-27 strike aircraft which it attributed to anengine failure as well as a MiG-21 fighter which was shot down by Pakistan; initially Pakistan said it shot down both jets after they crossed into its territory. One Mi-8 helicopter was also lost, due to Stinger SAMs.

One Mi-8 helicopter was also lost, due to Stinger SAMs.

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On May 27, 1999, Flt. Lt. Nachiketa developed engine trouble in the Batalik sector and bailed out of his craft. Sqn Ldr Ajay Ahuja went out of his way to locate his comrade but was shot down by a shoulder-fired Stinger missile. According to reports, he had bailed out of his stricken plane safely but was apparently killed by his captors as his body was returned riddled with bullet wounds.[17] In many vital points, neither artillery nor air power could dislodge the outposts manned by the Pakistani soldiers, who were out of visible range. The Indian Army mounted some direct frontal ground assaults which were slow and took a heavy toll given the steep ascent that had to be made on peaks as high as 18,000 feet (5,500 m). Since any daylight attack would be suicidal, all the advances had to be made under the cover of darkness, escalating the risk of freezing. Accounting for the wind chill factor, the temperatures were often as low as 15 C to 11 C (12 F to 5 F) near the mountain tops. Based on military tactics, much of the costly frontal assaults by the Indians could have been avoided if the Indian Military had chosen to blockade the supply route of the opposing force, virtually creating a siege. Such a move would have involved the Indian troops crossing the LoC as well as initiating aerial attacks on Pakistan soil, a manoeuvre India was not willing to exercise fearing an expansion of the theatre of war and reducing international support for its cause. Two months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly retaken most of the ridges that were encroached by the infiltrators; according to official count, an estimated 75%80% of the intruded area and nearly all high ground was back under Indian control. INDIA BANNS PTV BROADCAST The Indian government banned Pakistan Television broadcasts in India and restricted foreign journalists from going to Kargil. Eleven former Indian generals and bureaucrats have demanded suspension of independent analyses of Kargil. They include, the hawk K Subrahmanyam, and two former foreign secretaries. They say Kargil is a test of the national will. Hence any postmortem by analysts should be suspended. India has given us the certificate of truth by banning PTV, Mushahid Hussain Indian Army faced shortage of coffins during the conflict
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INDIA HAS MOVED WITH HEAVY WEAPONS:

SRINAGAR, May 15 (AFP) India has moved heavy weapons to Pakistans borders in Kashmir amid reports that Pakistani troops captured a frontier village in the Himalayan zone, officials said on Saturday. The deployment came amid reports in a local newspaper on Saturday that Pakistani troops Friday captured a village after bombarding the frontier town of Drass, some 160 kilometres (100 miles) southwest of Srinagar. Some 10,000 people fled their homes in Drass after the shelling stopped late Friday evening, the English-language newspaper said.. Drass is located in Kashmirs mountainous border district of Kargil, which is frequently targetted by Pakistani gunners. INDIA LAUNCHES MAJOR OPERATION IN VALLEY: 16 May 1999, SRINAGAR: Thousands of Indian troops on Sunday launched a major offensive against militants in occupied Kashmirs Kargil sector, officials said. Military sources in Srinagar said infantry reinforcements moved into the mountains of Kargil, where 10 soldiers and 15 militants have been killed in skirmishes over the past week. Kargil is 240 kilometres southwest of Srinagar. Dozens of helicopter sorties over Kargil were reported on Sunday. Newspapers in occupied Kashmir reported Indian combat jets over the region. Officials said an unspecified number of guerillas, including fighters from Afghanistans Taliban militia had entered occupied Kashmir under the cover of week-long shelling by Pakistani troops. PAK ARMY CAPTURE SEVEN POSTS & A VILLAGE IN KARGIL SECTOR; 17 May 1999, NEW DELHI: Pakistan has captured seven more Indian posts in the Kargil Sector of Indian-occupied Jammu & Kashmir, with the shelling and firing between Indian and Pakistani troops entering seventh day on Saturday, 17 May 1999. Reports said that Pakistani troops have also captured a village after bombarding the frontier town of Drass, some 160 kilometers southwest of Srinagar. Sources in the Indian Defence Ministry in New Delhi said; at least a dozen unguarded dominating positions described as posts of the Indian Army were taken over by the Pakistani troops backed by heavy artillery fire in the eastern areas of Batalik Range near Drass during the past days.

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Indian Defence authorities here confirmed that intense fighting between the Indian and Pakistani troops has left 23 persons dead including seven Indian army men, one civilian and 15 armed freedom fighters since Sunday morning. Highly placed sources in New Delhi said that Pakistanis have captured one of the village near the Line of Control (LoC) while shells continued to land in the border township of Kargil after intervals, breaking the grim silence of the ghost town. The coldest town of Drass where temperature dips to 40 degrees centigrade below freezing point in winter turned real hot at midnight when troops exchanged shells near the sleepy town. This is the first time since 1947 that Drass has come under artillery fire. PAK FORCES CONTINUE TO ADVANCE IN KARGIL: 18 May 1999, NEW DELHI: Pakistan continued to occupy the 20 strategic posts it wrested from the Indian Army, even as fierce gun fighting was going on in and around Kargil town and Drass region north-east of Kashmir Valley for the ninth consecutive day. Pakistani troops in the meanwhile have repulsed a fresh attack in which India has to suffer a heavy loss as its five army personnel including a Captain were killed during the attack. On the other hand only two Pak army Jawans were reportedly injured. No contact has so far been established between Pakistani and Indian commanders and it is feared that if situation remained the same for a few more days it may turn into an open war between the two arch rivals. India has for the first time pressed satellite into service to get the actual location of mujahideen occupying higher areas. Police in Srinagar confirmed the death toll to 45. The people fleeing from the area have, however, reported more than 100 casualities. According to sources the satellite imges that have reached to Army Commanders in the area have shown pictures of the cordoned area and have confirmed that around 300 mujahideen divided in six groups are hiding in the area.

AIR OPERATION BY INDIA

From May 11 to May 25, ground troops supported by the Air Force tried to contain the threat, assessed the enemy dispositions and carried out various preparatory actions. Entry of the Air Force into combat action on May 26 represented a paradigm shift in the nature and prognosis of the conflict. During Trishul, the IAF flew 5,000 sorties with 300 aircraft using 35,000 personnel
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and engaged targets at high elevation in the Himalayas. On the second and third day of the operations, still in the learning curve, the IAF lost one MiG-21 fighter and one Mi-17 helicopter to shoulder-fired missiles by the enemy. In addition, one MiG-27 was lost on the second day due to engine failure just after the pilot had carried out successful attacks on one of the enemy's main supply dumps. The Indian airfields nearest to Kargil were Srinagar and Avantipur. Adampur near Jalandhar was also close enough to support air operations. Therefore, the IAF operated from these three bases. The planes used for ground attack were MiG-2ls, MiG- 23s, MiG-27s, Jaguars and the Mirage- 2000.

WITHDRAWL & FINAL BATTLES: Following the outbreak of armed fighting, Pakistan sought American help in de-escalating the conflict. Bruce Riedel, aide to then President Bill Clinton reported that the US intelligence had imaged Pakistani movements of nuclear weapons to forward deployments for fear of the Kargil hostilities escalating into a wider conflict between the two countries. However, President Clinton refused to intervene until Pakistan had removed all forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control.[65] Following the Washington accord on July 4, where Sharif agreed to withdraw Pakistani troops, most of the fighting came to a gradual halt, but some Pakistani forces remained in positions on the Indian side of the LOC. In addition, the United Jihad Council (an umbrella for extremist groups) rejected Pakistan's plan for a climb-down, instead deciding to fight on.[66] The Indian army launched its final attacks in the last week of July; as soon as the Drass subsector had been cleared of Pakistani forces, the fighting ceased on July 26. The day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Kargil Victory Day) in India. By the end of the war, India had resumed control of all territory south and east of the Line of Control, as was established in July 1972 as per the Simla Agreement.

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HEAVY LOSES TO INDIAN ARMY

21 June 1999 RAWALPINDI: Pakistans artillery units, responding to unprovoked and indiscriminate shelling by Indian troops during, the last 24 hours, successfully targeted the enemys logistic installations and military convoys in the Dras, Kargil and Batlik sectors. A spokesman for the Inter Services Public Relations stated here on Monday evening that, according to credible information, 13 Indian soldiers were killed and many wounded. All types of movements, whether along the Line of Control or the international border, are being closely monitored. NOT A SINGLE ARMY POST LOST ON CONTROL LINE: 23 June 1999 ISLAMABAD: There is not a single Pakistan army position on the LoC that has been lost, Pakistan armed forces spokesman Brigadier Rashid Qureshi told BBC. He said: India has lost its credibility due to issuing ever-changing statements and its frequent claims of achievements in Kargil sector. Rashid said: We have heard so much and so many claims by the Indians over the last month and a half that we have come to a stage where not much of what they
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say is believed here. In response to a question, he said: There was an attack by the Indian army on the LoC on one of the Pakistani positions. That attack was beaten back. Yes, we did suffer some casualties and in the process one of our patrols, which had moved out at night, is missing since. Qureshi said: That is absolutely untrue and we have been saying this for a long time now and, I guess, as time passes, the world will come to know the truth. So, this is absolutely something that the Indians have brewed up and they say that the Pakistan army is responsible. He said: First they termed them as Mujahideen, then Taleban, Islamic militants and finally Pakistan army. So, frankly, I hope they have lost all credibility. ICRC TO WITNESS RETURN OF INDIAN DEAD BODIES: 23 June 1999 ISLAMABAD: Pakistan will invite representatives of the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) in case of return of bodies of Indian soldiers in future, Director-General ISPR Brig Rashid Qureshi said on Wednesday. He told a news briefing in Rawalpindi that the decision had been taken after Indias wild accusations of mutilation of its soldiers bodies returned by Pakistan. We did not expect that Indian leaders will level unfounded and malicious allegations, he said. Pakistani troops, he said, had recovered the bodies of six Indian soldiers,left behind by their colleagues.

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CASUALTIES

Memorial of Operation Vijay. Pakistan army losses have been difficult to determine. Pakistan confirmed that 453 soldiers were killed. The US Department of State had made an early, partial estimate of close to 700 fatalities. According to numbers stated by Nawaz Sharif there were over 4,000 fatalities. His PML (N) party in its "white paper" on the war mentioned that more than 3,000 Mujahideens, officers and soldiers were killed. Indian estimates stand at 1,042 Pakistani soldiers killed. Musharraf, in his Hindi version of his memoirs, titled "Agnipath", differs from all the estimates stating that 357 troops were killed with a further 665 wounded. Apart from General Musharraf's figure on the number of Pakistanis wounded, the number of people injured in the Pakistan camp is not yet fully known although they are at least more than 400 according to Pakistan army's website. One Indian Pilot was officially captured during the fighting, while there were eight Pakistani soldiers who were captured during the fighting, and were repatriated on 13 August 1999; India gave its official casualty figures as 527 dead and 1,363 wounded.

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KARGIL WAR HEROES They'd promised their families they'd come back soon. They more than kept their word. Went as mere men. Came back as heroes. In coffins.
"THEY GAVE THEIR TODAY FOR OUR TOMORROW"

Over a 400 of them at last count. Median age 19 to 35. The grim-faced army officers receiving the coffins, draped in the tricolour, the carriage to the army parade ground, the set-jawed shok shastra farewell salute by steely soldiers.

Lt Saurabh Kalia was the first martyr in Kargil War. On May 15, 1999, after a continuous cross fire with Pakistan armed forces from across the LoC, he and his troops ran out of ammunition. It is also believed that their signal instrument was out of order, or not working in those conditions. Grenadier Yogendra Singh Yadav, an Indian Army soldier instrumental in capturing the strategic Tiger Hill during the Kargil War. He was awarded the Param Vir Chakra the countrys highest gallantry award.

Featured Collections Lt. Colonel Vishwanathan Lt. Colonel Vijayraghavan

"We grieve the loss of our son. But we are also proud he has dedicated his life to the nation," - V Ramakrishnan, 60, the father of Lt. Colonel Vishwanathan.

The brave man of the 15 Kumaon Regiment made the supreme

sacrifice of his life on June 25 while leading counter-insurgency operations near Machchal near the LoC.

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Lt. Kieshing Clifford Nongrum Nation's second highest wartime gallantry award MAHA VIR

Captain Nation's third

Sumeet highest

Roy wartime

gallantry award VIR CHAKRA was awarded to Captain Sumit Roy on 15th August 1999.

CHAKRA was awarded to Lt. Kieshing Clifford Nongrum on 15th August 1999.

Captain Anuj Nayyar Nation's second highest wartime

Deputy Commandant Joy Lall Lall (36), a valiant officer, was among the three ITBP personnel killed at Gund in Jammu and Kashmir in a powerful landmine blast triggered by terrorists.

gallantry award MAHA VIR CHAKRA was awarded to Captain Anuj Nair on 15th August 1999.

Captain Vikram Batra Nation's highest wartime gallantry award PARAM VIR CHAKRA was awarded to Captain VIKRAM BATRA on 15th August 1999.

Naik Digendra Kumar Nation's second highest wartime gallantry award MAHA VIR CHAKRA was

awarded to Naik Digendra Kumar on 15th August 1999. Captain Amol Kalia The recapture of a key position in the Batalik sector by Capt Amol Kalia and 13 of his men, all of whom died.Nation's third highest wartime gallantry award VIR CHAKRA was awarded to Captain Amol Kalia . Lt. Manoj Kumar Pandey Nation's highest wartime gallantry award PARAM VIR CHAKRA was awarded to Lt. Manoj Kumar Pandey on 15th August 1999.

Major Ajay Kumar Major Ajay Kumar

belonged to 13 Mechanised Infantry. He was killed in the Avantipur area when leading a search operation. Lt. Balwan Singh Nation's second highest wartime gallantry award MAHA VIR CHAKRA was awarded to Lt. Balwan Singh on 15th August 1999.

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GALLANTRY AWARDS
A number of Indian soldiers earned awards for gallantry during the campaign.

Grenadier Yogendra Singh Yadav, 18 Grenadiers, Param Vir Chakra

Lieutenant Manoj Kumar Pandey, 1/11 Gorkha Rifles, Param Vir Chakra, Posthumous

Captain Vikram Batra, 13 JAK Rifles, Param Vir Chakra, Posthumous

Captain Anuj Nayyar,17 JAT Regiment, Maha Vir Chakra, Posthumous

Major Saravanan, 1 Bihar, Vir Chakra, Posthumous Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, Indian Air Force, Vir Chakra, Posthumous

Rifleman Sanjay Kumar, 13 JAK Rifles, Param Vir Chakra Major Rajesh Singh Adhikari, 18 Grenadiers, Maha Vir Chakra, Posthumous

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KARGIL VIJAY DIWAS

July 26 is oberved as Kargil Vijay Diwas in memory of the successful Operation Vijay. On this day in 1999, Indian soldiers regained control of outposts that had been intruded into by Pakistan. Tiger Hill, a mountain in the Kargi -Drass area of Jammu & Kashmir, was the most crucial point of the Kargil War. Its recapture played a key role in this war.

July 26, 1999 will go down in the annals of Indian history as a day when the determined Indian forces achieved a glorious victory over the retreating Pakistani army. It was on this day that the Indian victory over Pakistan was complete. True to its character despite having to pay a heavy price for fighting a war within its territory, the Indian forces allowed the Pakistanis to return across the Line of Control (LoC). It was a gesture which depicted the great Indian tradition of forgiving even the enemy, when it pleads for it. For Pakistan, it was another lesson which it would probably not forget for a long time. It would also put Pakistan to shame, for it chose to torture and kill the Indian prisoners of War (PoWs), rather than handing them over safely as was done by India through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

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KARGIL REVIEW COMMITTEE

Soon after the war the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government set up an inquiry into its causes and to analyze perceived Indian intelligence failures. The high-powered committee was chaired by eminent strategic affairs analyst K. Subrahmanyam and given powers to interview anyone with current or past associations with Indian security, including former Prime Ministers. The committee's final report (also referred to as the 'Subrahmanyam Report'led to a large-scale restructuring of Indian Intelligence. It, however, came in for heavy criticism in the Indian media for its perceived avoidance of assigning specific responsibility for failures over detecting the Kargil intrusions. The Committee was also embroiled in controversy for indicting Brigadier Surinder Singh of the Indian Army for his failure to report enemy intrusions in time, and for his subsequent conduct. Many press reports questioned or contradicted this finding and claimed that Singh had in fact issued early warnings that were ignored by senior Indian Army commanders and, ultimately, higher government functionaries. In a departure from the norm the final report was published and made publicly available. Some chapters and all annexures, however, were deemed to contain classified information by the government and not released. K. Subrahmanyam later wrote that the annexures contained information on the development of India's nuclear weapons program and the roles played by Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi, P. V. Narasimha Rao and V P Singh.

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WMDs and the nuclear factor

Since Pakistan and India each had weapons of mass destruction, many in the international community were concerned that if the Kargil conflict intensified, it could lead to nuclear war. Both countries had tested their nuclear capability in 1998 (India conducted its first test in 1974 while it was Pakistan's first-ever nuclear test).. When the Kargil conflict started just a year after the nuclear tests, many nations desired to end it before it intensified. International concerns increased when Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad made a statement on May 31 warning that an escalation of the limited conflict could lead Pakistan to use "any weapon" in its arsenal .The threat of WMD included chemical and even biological weapons. Pakistan accused India of using chemical weapons and incendiary weapons such as napalm against the Kashmiri fighters. India, on the other hand, showcased a cache of gas masks as proof that Pakistan may have been prepared to use non-conventional weapons. US official and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons determined that Pakistani allegations of India using banned chemicals in its bombs were unfounded.

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FACT BEHIND THE CURTAIN

1)

Crossing LOC by PAK forces-

The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the LOC, which serves as the de facto border between the two states. During the initial stages of the war, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces, led by General Ashraf Rashid.

2) Political problem
Kashmir is a political problem and kargill is part of Kashmir.The dispute regarding Kashmir b/w India- Pakistan from the partition of Country l like first Kashmir war in 1947,second kashmir war in 1965,partition of pakistan in 1971,Jihad war in 1979,and then Kargil war in 1999.

3) Cut off the link b/w Kashmir and Ladakh

The Kargil conflict between Pakistan and India took place in Kashmir between May and July 1999, the objective of the whole conflict was to cut off the link between Kashmir and Ladakh by hitting National Highway No.1 (NH 1) and cause Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier forcing India to negotiate and resolve the decade old Kashmir dispute. Pakistan Army was able to bring down effective artillery fire on Indian positions through much of the conflict since they commanded all strategic heights, from the observation posts the Pakistan Army had a clear view to target the Indian main supply route National Highway No.1 (NH 1) inflicting heavy casualties

4) Kargil is nearer to Pakistani-controlled town of Skardu

One of the reasons why Kargil was targeted was that the terrain surrounding it, lent itself to pre-emptive seizure of unoccupied military positions.[27]With tactically vital features and
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well-prepared defensive posts atop the peaks, a defender of the high ground would enjoy advantages akin to a fortress. Any attack to dislodge a defender from high ground in mountain warfare requires a far higher ratio of attackers to defenders,[28] and the difficulties would be exacerbated by the high altitude and freezing temperatures.[29] Kargil is just 173 km (107 mi) from the Pakistani-controlled town of Skardu, which was capable of providing logistical and artillery support to Pakistani combatants.

5) Post-Simla Developments Along the LOC

After the signing of the Simla Agreement, India unilaterally banned the supervision by the UN Observers along the LOC - the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) - while still retaining their presence overall; Pakistan still cooperates with and recognizes the role of these observers. But as a result of the Indian action there has been no international supervision - on the Indian side - of India's subsequent. In fact, India seriously undermined, de facto destroyed - the Simla Agreement almost immediately after it was signed, when, in 1972, the Indian military crossed the LOC in the Chorbat La sector and established 3-4 posts, 2-3 kilometres on the Pakistani side (around 10 sq. kms).

6) Simla Agreement
A further erosion of the Simla Agreement came with the Indian occupation of Siachin in 1984, when Indian forces occupied the passes at Saltoro Range and laid claim to the Siachin Glacier. Then, in 1988, the Indians established three posts in the unoccupied Qamar Sector and, later, they increased these to twelve posts (33 sq kms). They also came across the LOC around the Dras area to set up the Bhimbet and Marpola posts. The Indian military also made additional ingresses, post-Simla, across the LOC

7) Post-1998 Nuclearisation of South Asia

The conducting of nuclear tests by both countries in 1998, led to an increasingly belligerent atmosphere.With India's 1998 nuclear tests, and in the intervening

period before Pakistan tested, Indian belligerency reached new levels. Indian leaders
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like L. K. Advani threatened to occupy Azad Kashmir by force.48 Accompanying the declaratory threats, there was an upping of the military ante by India across the LOC, with massive targeting of villages along the AJK side of the LOC - which had begun just before the nuclear tests.49 For a number of reasons India probably felt that Pakistan was vulnerable at this time, given the limited military deployment along the LOC at the time by Pakistan. Also, the Indian side may have assumed that Pakistan's ability to conduct nuclear tests was not there, because of its massive foreign debt, financial crunches and internal political machinations. This assumption may have led the Indian leadership to run amok with their threatening statements. However, the threatening statements also revealed the ongoing Indian military planning to alter the LOC in such a way that the rest fell into its lap.

After Pakistan's nuclear tests, while India altered its diplomatic tack, it continued to sustain the raised belligerency level against Pakistan. July and August 1998 saw the most violent spell, in terms of military exchanges along the LOC, in a decade.

8) The political dimension

As is the pattern in Pakistan, the political leadership is periodically briefed on operational military matters. It was no different in the case of Kargil. Once the Indian intentions and capability to undertake offensive operation were identified, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was briefed on the impending threat and what could be Pakistan's response. He received a number of briefings relating to developments along the LOC in 1999, beginning with a briefing in Skardu on January 29, and one in Kel on February 5, which specifically related to the interdiction taking place in that sector from the Indian side of the LOC. So, somewhere between these developments, an external factor came into play, which further impacted the Kargil dynamics.

9)

Pakistan also attempted to internationalize the Kashmir issue, by linking the

crisis in Kargil to the larger Kashmir conflict

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RECENT NEWS

Before Kargil War, Pervez Musharraf crossed LoC: Aide

KARGIL, PERVEZ Musharraf wrote on his official website two years ago, "proved a lesson to the Indians and a rude awakening to the world of the reality of Kashmir." Weeks before hostilities erupted between Indian and Pakistani troops in the Kargil sector in 1999, Gen Pervez Musharraf crossed the Line of Control in a helicopter and spent a night at a location 11 km inside Indian territory, a former aide to the military ruler has said. Col (retired) Ashfaq Hussain, who was a senior officer in the Pakistan Army's media arm, said Musharraf flew across the LoC on March 28, 1999, and travelled 11 km into the Indian side. Musharraf, who was accompanied by Brig Masood Aslam, then commander of 80 Brigade, spent the night at a spot called Zikria Mustaqar, where Pakistani troops commanded by Col Amjad Shabbir were present. Musharraf, who was then army chief, returned the next day. Hussain first made the revelation in his book 'Witness to Blunder: Kargil Story Unfolds', which was published in late 2008.

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KARGIL WAS A BIG SUCCESS FOR PAK: Musharraf

Islamabad: Claiming that his 1999 Kargil operation was a "big success militarily", former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf has said that if the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif had not visited the US, the Pakistani Army would have "conquered" 300 square miles of India. . Though Pakistan had initially claimed mujahideen were responsible for occupying strategic heights along the Line of Control in early 1999, Musharraf later revealed in his autobiography 'In The Line Of Fire' that regular Army troops had participated in the operation.

Aziz, who headed the analysis wing of the ISI during the Kargil conflict, recently revealed that the operation was masterminded by a group of four generals led by Musharraf.

But Musharraf claimed the action in Kargil was a "localised" operation and not a major operation.

"Kargil was just one of many sectors under a Major General stationed in Gilgit, (who was) in charge of the area. Exchange of fire was routine there," he claimed. Musharraf said he would not go so far as to accuse former premier Nawaz Sharif of betrayal but his decision to withdraw from Kargil was a mistake.

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THA KARGIL CONFLICTS IMPACT ON PAKISTANI POLITICS & SOCIETY

General Pervez Musharraf claimed that the prime minister Nawaz Sharif was fully informed about the operation, that Kargil was a successful operation, and that the prime minister showed a lack of statesmanship by running to Washington and quickly yielding to US pressure to withdraw troops from Kargil. Kargil revealed two facets of the Pakistani print media. On the one hand, investigative reporting is still weak. The journalism community had neither the resources nor the will to report on the actual conduct of the war. This chapter analyzes the tensions and contradictions that emerged in Pakistani politics and society in the wake of the Kargil conflict. The first section analyzes the literature and print media narratives of Pakistani commentators. The second section explains Kargils impact on Pakistani domestic politics. The third section explains how and why national and religious political parties, jehadi groups, and the military perceived and responded to the conflict and its aftermath. The fourth and fifth sections analyze how the mismanagement of the crisis resulted in the military coup and created further civilmilitary tensions after the coup.

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KARGIL-LESSONS LEARNED BY BOTH SIDES

Our analysis elicited very different lessons learned for India and Pakistan. In the case of Pakistan, most of the lessons learned are strategic rather than operational or tactical in the military sense.
For Pakistan, the apparent lessons learned from Kargil are principally as follows:

Pakistan now views Kargil-like operations as an ineffective means of dispute resolutionmainly because Kargil appears to have been such a failure in the eyes of the world. The significance of this conclusion, however, is limited by the fact that many stakeholders in Pakistan simultaneously believe that Kargil can be seen as a victory of sorts. This continuing ambiguity about the effect of Kargil, when coupled with the strong Pakistani belief in the utility of other kinds of coercive operations against India, has unsettling consequences for the prospect of lasting

stability. To preclude strategic failure of the kind represented by Kargil in the future, Pakistan must effectively appraise the international response and the operational implications of that response. In particular, Pakistan must better assess the reactions of its adversaries in furtherance of a more effective grand strategy.

Pakistan needs a broad body of experts, perhaps like the National Security Council (NSC), to adequately assess its planned operations of this sort. This sentiment is aroused by the governments sweeping failure to anticipate the squealed of the Kargil crisis and the secrecy in which the operation was shrouded.

Pakistan must develop specific media strategies to shape international opinion and to mitigate Indias advantages on the information battleground. However, even the best media strategy cannot provide insulation against duplicity in the long term.

Recognizing this problem, some interlocutors suggested that Pakistan made a grave miscalculation by hiding behind the transparent mujahideen cover story. Because the use of Pakistani regulars in Kargil proved to be counterproductive and because Pakistan believes that it has fewer no diplomatic options, Pakistan sees only one

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successful strategy for bringing India to the negotiating table: the continued prosecution of sub conventional conflict in Kashmir and perhaps elsewhere in India. Pakistans nuclear capabilities have become the key to successful execution of its political strategies at multiple levels. Nuclear weapons not only enable Islamabad to pursue strategic diversion and immunize the country from a violent Indian counter response,they also serve to catalyze the attention and, Pakistan hopes, the interest of the international community. Consequently, the y have acquired centrality in Pakistans national strategy.
2 The principal lessons that India learned from Kargil are as follows:

India must be prepared for Pakistani recklessness, which could occur in different areas and take different forms: terrorism throughout India, conventional operations and incursions, increased LIC in Kashmir, and a variety of nontraditional threats.

India must more aggressively counter Pakistani threats along the LOC by investing in more technologically advanced military and intelligence equipment. The Kashmir issue cannot be neglected in hopes of gradual atrophy. Rather, its resolution requires high-level attention and commitment as well as creative responses on the part of the government.

India understands that international support cannot be taken for granted. To ensure this support, India must both maintain a posture of responsibility and be seen as seeking peace. These requirements act as an important brake on Indias propensity to respond aggressively to future Pakistani provocations.

India recognizes the utility of the media in contemporary conflicts and will continue its offensive in the information war. India believes that it won Kargil politically in part because of its dexterous capability of shaping international perception. India also values the role of perception management in affecting public

opinion domestically as well as influencing the morale of the Indian and Pakistani militaries. India must treat nuclear issues more carefully because Pakistan is a risk-acceptant state capable of irrational strategic surprises. India thus must be prepared for nuclear operations that may be forced upon it by Pakistani actions.
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WORLD OPINION
Pakistan was criticised by other countries for instigating the war, as its paramilitary forces and insurgents crossed the Line of Control. Pakistan's primary diplomatic response, one of plausible deniability linking the incursion to what it officially termed as "Kashmiri freedom fighters", was in the end not successful. Concurrently, Pakistan made several contradicting statements, confirming its role in Kargil, when it defended the incursions saying that the LOC itself was disputed. Pakistan also attempted to internationalize the Kashmir issue, by linking the crisis in Kargil to the larger Kashmir conflict but, such a diplomatic stance found few backers on the world stage As the Indian counter-attacks picked up momentum, Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif flew to meet U.S. President Bill Clinton on July 4 to obtain support from the United States. Clinton rebuked Sharif, however, and asked him to use his contacts to rein in the militants and withdraw Pakistani soldiers from Indian territory. Clinton would later reveal in his autobiography that "Sharif's moves were perplexing" since the Indian Prime Minister had travelled to Lahore to promote bilateral talks aimed at resolving the Kashmir problem and "by crossing the Line of Control, Pakistan had wrecked the [bilateral] talks." On the other hand, he applauded Indian restraint for not crossing the LoC and escalating the conflict into an all-out war. G8 nations supported India and condemned the Pakistani violation of the LOC at the Cologne summit. The European Union also opposed Pakistan's violation of the LOC. China, a long-time ally of Pakistan, insisted on a pullout of forces to the pre-conflict positions along the LoC and settling border issues peacefully. Other organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum too supported India's stand on the inviolability of the LOC. The joint statement issued by Clinton and Sharif conveyed the need to respect the Line of Control and resume bilateral talks as the best forum to resolve all disputes.

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SUGGESTIONS
The Kashmir Issue Requires High-Level Attention High-level Indian stakeholders indicated that the Kashmir issue requires high-level attention and commitment in addition to creative responses on the part of the Indian state for resolving the ongoing insurgency. India understands clearly that the Kashmir issue will not diminish or atrophy if left unattended.

India Must Cultivate International Support That Will Circumscribe Pakistani Adventurism India understands well that the extent of international support it received during the crisis was contingent upon circumstances and will be so in the future.

India Must Sustain the Information Offensive The media were continually cited as a relevant factor in influencing public opinion domestically and internationally. The Kargil Review Committee Report urges the Indian military to take a stronger role in educating and assisting the media in areas where military operations are unfolding. India has a good understanding of the multiple uses of a well-planned media management strategy.

Must Increase Its Efforts to Contain Intrusions Across the LOC The Kargil Review Committee Report highlights the doubts many military planners had regarding Indias ability to respond effectively against a large Pakistani intrusion.

India Must Prepare for Future Pakistani Recklessness Across-the-Board A wide array of Indian policymakers, analysts, and opinion maker expressed the need to be ready for Pakistani adventurism that could successively manifest itself in several issue areas.

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CONCLUSIONS
At end I concluded that Kargil was an inconvenient time for the West. Kargil-like operations have high political costs for both countries. The base of this conflict which is Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan remains unresolved still, and various pathologies of decision-making continue to manifest themselves within the region. Finally, India must recognize the necessity of taking nuclear issues more seriously. India must give high attention to Kashmir issue & must sustain the informative offence. India Must Increase Its Efforts to Contain Intrusions Across the LOC. Both the country must see each other with friendly eyes to build good relations. India must use sophisticated technology to get information across border activities so the conflict like Kargil can be solved before they convert in serious problem. Good political strategies must be used by our country.

At end I salute to all those brave soldiers who fight for our nation, doesnt bother about their life. I salute to all those all those great soldiers WHO GAVE THEIR TODAY FOR OUR
TOMORROW. Those all remains alive in our great memories ever & ever &

forever..

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REFERENCES
http://www.google.co.in/ http://www.defence.pk/forums/military-history-strategy/81462-pakistan-lists-kargil-wardead.htm/ http://www.mid-day.com/news/2012/jul/260712-Facts-related-to-the-Kargil-war.htm http://hindi.oneindia.in/topic/kargil-war http://hindi.oneindia.in/news/2013/02/01/kargil-war-conflict-musharraf-crossed-loc-in1999-226301.html http://hindi.oneindia.in/news/2013/02/01/kargil-war-conflict-musharraf-crossed-loc-in1999-226301.html http://india.targetgenx.com/2008/07/25/vijay-divas-tribute-to-kargil-war-heroes/ http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/kargil-war http://blogs.mybandra.com/2009/07/26/list-of-kargil-war-heroes-take-a-moment-toremember-kargil-heroes/ http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Blurring-Lines/entry/13-years-after-kargil-war http://assets.cambridge.org/97805217/67217/excerpt/9780521767217_excerpt.pdf http://www.mid-day.com/news/2012/jul/260712-Facts-related-to-the-Kargil-war.htm http://www.pakistanarmy.biz.tc/kargilwar.html http://www.ndtv.com/news/india/not-convinced-if-we-won-kargil-lt-gen-kishan-pal28718.php?cp Gill, John H. Military operations in the Kargil Conflict. In Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia, edited by Peter R. Lavoy, 92-129. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Hoyt, Timothy D. Kargil: the Nuclear Dimension. In Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia, edited by Peter R. Lavoy, 171-204. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Raghavan, V.R. Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia. The Nonproliferation Review 8, no. 3(2001): 82-98.

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